Education for Responsibility

To all beings,
for a harmonious life
 Education Set
coordinated by
Angela Barthes and Gérard Boudesseul

Volume 4

Education for Responsibility

Hélène Hagège
First published 2019 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

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The rights of Hélène Hagège to be identified as the author of this work have been asserted by her in
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ISBN 978-1-78630-366-0
 Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

Chapter 1. The World as a Reflection of the Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.1. Definitions of the terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1. Notions of world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.2. Notions of mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.3. Gnoseological hypothesis, notions of consciousness
and the model of the mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2. The objective world as an epistemological and
societal reflection of the collective mind: an example of science . . . . . . . 17
1.2.1. Paradigms and projections in science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2.2. Examples of projection by a collective
mind onto the objective world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.2.3. Overview: the scientific world,
a reflection of scientists’ minds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.3. The subjective world as a psychological
and phenomenological reflection of the individual mind . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.3.1. The basic mechanisms of the world-mind relationship . . . . . . . . 25
1.3.2. The four horsemen of the individual relative mind . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.4. Integrating the model of the relationship between
the relative world and the mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
1.4.1. Metaphysics of the strawberry tartlet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
1.4.2. The ego, mediator of the reflection
of the subjective world through the individual relative mind . . . . . . . . 89
1.4.3. An example: stereotypes, prejudices and violent radicalizations . . 94
vi Education for Responsibility

Chapter 2. Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind . . . . . . . . . 103

2.1. Introduction: an overview of the tone
of current research on responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.2. Responsibility as a dialogical relationship
between the outer and inner worlds: ethical perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.2.1. Problem of responsibility in the field of ethics. . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.2.2. Responsibility approaches in the field of ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
2.3. Responsibility as a consciousness connected
to oneself, others and the non-human environment (NHE):
psychological and phenomenological points of view . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2.3.1. Cognition and responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2.3.2. Orientation and responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
2.3.3. Emotions, relationships and responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
2.4. Assessment: criteria for guiding towards responsibility . . . . . . . . . . 127
2.4.1. Coherence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
2.4.2. The motivation for innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
2.4.3. Harmony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
2.4.4. Horizon of an education for responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Chapter 3. Education for Responsibility Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 161

3.1. Reflexivities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
3.1.1. Cognitive reflexivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
3.1.2. Dialogical reflexivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
3.1.3. Phenomenological reflexivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
3.1.4. Objectives and material for the implementation
of these reflexivities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
3.2. Meditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
3.2.1. Meditation and its phenomenological effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
3.2.2. Clinical protocols and practices including meditation . . . . . . . . 180
3.2.3. Techniques related to meditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
3.2.4. Psychobiological effects of meditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
3.2.5. Effects of meditation in school and university contexts . . . . . . . 191
3.3. General principle: reflexivities, meditation and responsibility . . . . . . 193
3.3.1. Meditation and dialogical reflexivity
would synergistically promote phenomenological reflexivity . . . . . . . 193
3.3.2. Phenomenological reflexivity promotes
empathy and relatedness by instantiating harmony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
3.4. Summary of the competences targeted in responsibility education . . . 203
3.4.1. Notion of competence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
3.4.2. Emotional competences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
3.4.3. Epistemic competences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
3.4.4. Attentional competences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
 Contents vii

3.4.5. Relational competences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

3.4.6. Axiological competences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
3.4.7. Summary of the progress within the five types of competences . . 219
3.5. Integrating model of psychospiritual
competences targeted in education for responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

Chapter 4. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

4.1. Education for responsibility, ethics and spirituality . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
4.2. Limitations of this approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
4.2.1. Obstacles in the French context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
4.2.2. Some limitations of the proposed model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
4.3. Education for responsibility and happiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
4.3.1. Stopping the illusion of ego and lasting happiness . . . . . . . . . . 238
4.3.2. Connections between education for
responsibility and positive psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
4.4. Building knowledge and practical implementation
in education for responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
4.4.1. Summary of the present argumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
4.4.2. Epistemological, pedagogical and research perspectives . . . . . . . 248
4.4.3. Afterword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254

Postface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
 Foreword

Why is there such an urgent need for education for responsibility?

‘Because the world is mad,’ answers Hélène Hagège, hence this ambitious as
well as modest proposal: we must change the world and, to do so, change
our minds. The book takes an old philosophical problem and presents it in a
new way, by bringing together cognitive sciences, psychosociology,
phenomenology and ethics in order to develop a new modeling approach, a
tool that allows us both to organize the field of research and to act in the
world. For someone like me, unfamiliar with the advances of the cognitive
sciences, the theory is not self-evident. So I have had to rebuild it step by
step to understand its coherence.

You said “responsibility”?

As Hans Jonas and others have clearly shown, modern humanity holds
the future of the planet in its hands. For the first time in history, the threat of
degradation of life on Earth comes not only from natural disasters, but from
human action and the reactions it causes in turn to natural processes. The
coupling of humanity and its environment has never been stronger, to the
point that the dualism of nature and culture seems to be fading in favor of
hybrid objects: is the hole in the ozone layer natural or “cultural”? The
survival of humanity implies a change in the functional norms of Western
societies. In other words, we must transform the way we live, produce,
consume, circulate, etc. And we must probably also redirect our values more
towards being rather than towards having and still much more than that. We
must somehow re-educate ourselves and our children accordingly. The
School is a stakeholder in this case, as evidenced in recent years by the
x Education for Responsibility

proliferation of “education for” (the environment, health, etc.) that challenge

the traditional dualisms of education and training, knowledge and values,
science and ethics or politics. Education for responsibility comes into play
here, not as a new “education for”, but rather as a transversal dimension.

This education has two dimensions: first of all, the internal congruence in
the subject, or rather the “coherence” to use the author’s lexicon: it refers to
a subject who is lucid about themselves, their desires and thoughts, and who
acts in accordance with the values faithfully chosen. Second, responsibility
implies the choice of certain moral objectives: caring about others, taking
care of them and the environment, although there is no consensus in moral
psychology research on the spectrum of values implied by this second
element (Hagège 2014). In reality, one may wonder whether the idea of
coherence is not, in itself, a carrier of these positive values, as some
pragmatists, such as John Dewey, believe, or close to this current, such as
Jean-Marie Guyau. For this philosophical optimism, evil is first and
foremost a disease of the self or the ego.

Metaphysics and the strawberry tartlet

Such ethics requires an epistemological and even metaphysical detour.

Hélène Hagège is not afraid of this term that professional philosophers
nowadays use with caution, even if she mitigates the intimidating potential
of this term by pleasantly proposing this expression of “metaphysics of the
strawberry tartlet” (section 1.4.1).

We must change the world or change our world, we said. But what does
the world mean? The history of philosophy here offers a whole range of
theories of knowledge.

For Kant, who accepts the realistic hypothesis, there is a world

independent of the subject, which is the same for all, supports phenomena,
but is unknowable. We do not have access to this world in itself (to the
noumena), but only to an interpretation of it, to what appears to us:
phenomena. Our intellectual equipment structures our experience: we
perceive things in time and space and according to the categories of our
understanding. Hegel challenges this distinction of phenomena and
noumenon by assimilating reality to the collective experience of humanity
(the Mind) and the ultimate reality to absolute knowledge, which today tends
 Foreword xi

to be interpreted as the horizon of experience. It is in this perspective that the

phenomenological (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre) or pragmatist (Peirce,
Dewey, James) currents are situated. In relation to all these currents, Hélène
Hagège claims to have a “gnoseological” hypothesis, which attempts to
reconcile the ontological hypothesis (the belief in a more or less knowable
outer world) with the phenomenological hypothesis (the world is our
representation or experience, whether individual or collective).

However, the author offers a warning. Individual or collective subjects

are often tempted to believe that their worldview reaches the ultimate reality
while even scientific research is always carried out within a given economic
and social cultural context and therefore presents, in this sense, a certain
relativity; hence the phenomenological theory that the world is a reflection
of the mind. This logically implies that it would be “futile to change the
world without seeking to change the mind” and therefore without changing
oneself (section 1.2.3). Thus, to say that ecological threats force us to live
differently is to say that we must change our relationship with the world, our
vision of the world and select new values-in-action. The necessary political,
economic and ecological changes will only be made if we are aware of the
relativity of our vision of the world and the possible alternatives to this
vision.

Illusions of the ego

If the world is mad, it is because we are mad, or almost all of us are. But
where does our madness come from? From the ego, this illusion takes itself
for reality, this tendency of the self that forces us to seek our own interests
before anything else, to the point of confusing its relative reality with the
ultimate reality. Let us successfully distinguish the individual, the subject
and the ego. The individual is our biological entity, which both links us to a
species and makes us unique. The subject is not a fixed entity; it is,
according to Gilbert Simondon, a psychobiological and sociocultural process
of individuation (Hagège 2014). In short, it is society that provides this
primitive “soup” of sensations, emotions and volitions, the unity of a
permanent self in time and the ability to say “I”. As for ego, it is a way of
being for the subject, an attitude which is lived as separate and absolute:
both as a social atom and as the center of the world. By separating from the
world, projecting preferences and closing off from others, the ego takes its
perspective on the world as the ultimate reality.
xii Education for Responsibility

But how can we evaluate the gap between the perception of the ego and
the ultimate reality? Let us say that the ego is an illusion machine. This
produces a number of discrepancies between saying and doing, such as when
a smoker or heavy drinker makes moral speeches about the importance of
health. Being convinced that it is right, the ego can freeze in its prejudices,
even in dogmatism. Escaping the madness means above all becoming aware
of the relativity of one’s point of view, striving to be coherent in regards to
oneself, engaging in dialogue with others and learning from experience.
Education for responsibility is only possible if the ego accepts a dialectic of
emancipation and limitation by which self-realization renounces the desire of
all power, which implies recognition of the point of view of others and social
norms. But Hélène Hagège goes further: some subjects would be able to
approach the ultimate reality which, on the one hand, would allow us to
measure the gap produced by the crazy perspectives and, on the other hand,
recall the Bergsonian or Nietzschean notions of intuition or the
Schopenhauerian will, capable of tearing the veil of Maya, of representation,
in order to achieve something of becoming or being.

Our hypothesis is confirmed. What Hélène Hagège is looking for are the
psychological, or rather ethical, conditions of an education for responsibility.
Furthermore, we are of course reminded of Spinoza’s or Dewey’s ethics
(Fabre 2015): to eliminate sad passions, those that diminish the power to act,
to be in harmony with oneself, to harmonize one’s self, to open oneself to
others and to connect with the universe. There is no radical evil, or rather,
evil is a disease of the self that must be healed rather than punished. In short,
education for responsibility would involve bringing about “awareness that
relative reality is not the ultimate reality, to train the mind to perceive this, to
function in an increasingly coherent way, to promote empathy and
affiliation” (Box 2.2). All this supports the critical and especially self-critical
mind.

Changing: yes, but how?

“Change yourself and the world changes with you” (section 1.5). The
maxim is Stoic in appearance and seems to refer to voluntarism. Certainly, a
researcher who comes from a molecular biology background probably
knows how to appreciate what depends on us and what does not (heredity,
social determinisms). But as the neurosciences show, this dualist division
does not resist analysis for long if we consider the subject as a process of
 Foreword xiii

psychobiological individuation. This is in other ways in line with the

Sartrean intuition that a human is how they react to situations that condition
them without determining them. Humanity is therefore responsible for itself
and others as well (especially as educators). The maxim is not Stoic, for
another reason that is due to the impotence of the will in the change of self.
The classic representation of the voluntary act, as the result of a rational
deliberation, has already been challenged by Bergson and pragmatism: free
will is probably only an illusion, even if, paradoxically, it is better to believe
in free will, because this belief has performative values. In reality,
everything seems more or less decided in advance, before consciousness, in
an unconscious state, which, in order not to be representative of Freud’s, is
no less effective. If this is the case, there is no point in fighting head-on
against the trends from which we would like to free ourselves, which would
only reinforce them. Rather, we are invited to participate in self-knowledge,
to have a non-judgmental awareness of our entire subjective life: “being
present to what is, without seeking to fight against” (Hagège 2014, author's
translation). Hence the call to meditation in a secular spirituality associated
with reflexivity.

“Education for”, between emancipation and indoctrination

The education for responsibility defended here therefore relies on “the

values of harmonious coherence”. On several occasions, Hélène Hagège
insists on the ethical imperative of giving subjects the freedom to choose
their own values. In addition, she mentions the performative effect of
explaining to subjects the possibility of choosing the values they can have
(otherwise they risk acting unconsciously according to the values of their
environment without ever questioning them). Admittedly, she emphasizes
the educator’s “committed impartiality”, and the educator must not repress
their own values (which would amount to letting them influence it
unconsciously), but must endeavor to present them as choices, among others.
We understand the educator’s concern – a concern I fully share – not to
embrace it. One of the dangers of “educating for” would be to update the
ideal of the education plans belonging to Robespierre’s friends: to regenerate
a population through education; this is what frightened Condorcet. Hannah
Arendt and John Dewey, each in their own way, also denounced the danger
of making youth education the lever of a revolution whose goals would have
been thought of in advance by the adult generation. On the contrary, the
authentic meaning of education is undoubtedly to equip young people
xiv Education for Responsibility

intellectually, emotionally and morally so that they are able to change the
world according to their own objectives.

However, it must be recognized that “education for” puts the educator,

and especially the teacher, in an uncomfortable position and makes them
subject to all kinds of excess. Indeed, teachers must encourage their students
to become more reflective and critical of the madness existing in our world
(in terms of development, health, etc.). They must be encouraged to change
their outlook, but to change it in a certain direction, one that democratically
decided public policies indicate: sustainable development rather than
productivism, for example. We are probably over analyzing when we
consider that taking responsibility is more in line with Nicolas Hulot’s
proposals than with Donald Trump’s denial of reality. Plato called education
as such, a “conversion” to designate turning away from the shadows of the
cave towards the true reality. In addition, Durkheim, analyzing the
beginnings of the modern school of thought, used the term to designate the
educational goals of Carolingian Christianity, goals which, once secularized,
he believed should support school education to this day (Durkheim 1990).
The question posed to an ethics of responsibility that emphasizes the
coherence of the subject is how to solve tensions between metamorphosis
(change that allows the subject to determine his or her own values) and
conversion (pre-directed change in a given direction) (Moreau 2014). It is
not easy, indeed, to reconcile the vital need to change the world in a given
sense if we want to survive, with the educational imperative to equip the
freedom of young people who will have to invent their own world. Perhaps
the articulation is to be sought in an ethics of prudence, as I propose (Fabre
2014). Certainly “education for” is driven by predetermined goals. But it is
in the case studies (should we or should we not have an airport or a dam here
or there? Should we or should we not ban a particular drug, such as
weedkiller?) that we exercise caution. To problematize these cases is to
carefully go around the problem, to elucidate the multiple stakes, to analyze
the unavoidable opposition of values and interests that inevitably
overdetermine it and finally to prioritize the decision-making criteria for a
solution. In the absence of such an education for responsibility, practised
concretely in the analysis of cases, as the author suggests, “educating for”
risks either being brought back into the fold of academic disciplines, at the
risk of being reduced to their scientific aspect, which is considered in a
positivist way, or of giving rise, with the best intentions of the world, to a
pedagogy of inculcation, by indoctrination or conditioning.
 Foreword xv

To guide learners and education professionals in an ethical direction,

Hélène Hagège uses five psychospiritual competencies (emotional,
epistemic, relational, attentional and axiological), which could serve as a
curriculum reference for education for responsibility. Thus, these
professionals would be equipped to support learners in moving between two
forms of ethos (“dialogism between ηθοξ and εθοξ ” in the book), that is, to
invite them to emancipate themselves in a certain direction, without
indoctrinating them, strictly speaking.

“Happy is he who resembles Ulysses...”

We must not be discouraged by the scientific erudition of this work. The

gathered literature, with the rigor required in the exercise of the right to
supervise research, is always at the service of meaning. Regardless of their
original discipline or scientific, ethical or political interests, the reader will
find his or her way around, as he or she will easily recognize many of the
contemporary concerns of any citizen with any degree of insight.

Personally, by reading this text, dense through erudition, but with a fluid
and humorous writing style, I experienced “intellectual hygiene”, something
that Bachelard recommended when he advised their reader to know how to
leave their world to expose themself to other scientific or cultural worlds.
However, by taking me on a trip to unknown countries, Hélène Hagège
allowed me to approach islands of knowledge, familiar lands that I was able
to revisit with a different perspective, to finally return to Ithaca, to my own
questions, especially on “education for”, which have thus been enriched by
this reading journey.

I wish the same experience unto the readers of this book.

Michel FABRE
Professor emeritus, University of Nantes
Centre de recherche de l’université de Nantes (CREN)
President of the Société francophone de philosophie de l’éducation (Sofphied)
 Introduction

I.1. Education for responsibility in today’s context

“The world is mad!” This is the overused phrase that came to my mind
when I tried to describe the context in which we live. How can we present
the supporters of this madness in a few words at most? Let’s see... Let’s take
a few examples on the go.

I will start with the last one I learned about, not bad in its kind and quite
characteristic. It has been known for 40 years – as published in the most
prestigious scientific journal Science – that flame retardants pass from
clothing or fabrics into the blood and then urine (Blum et al. 1978) and that
they are mutagenic (Gold et al. 1978), and therefore potentially carcinogenic
(Blum and Ames 1977). Moreover, it seems clear that these compounds are
neurotoxic (Hendriks and Westerink 2015) and cause developmental
problems – in particular intellectual disabilities (Roze et al. 2009). These
volatile products added to certain fabrics, foams or other materials to prevent
the spread of a possible fire (particularly domestic) are therefore absorbed
into the body by simple contact or physical proximity (a vector would be
dust) and are dangerous for children’s development and health. The worst
part is that they do not even seem to be effective in reducing flames (Lyon
et al. 2007), so even firefighters are fighting against their use (Cordner et al.
2015). Despite all this, one must be careful, as they are still widely available
today in a variety of products, including baby supplies (Stapleton et al.
2011), for example, nursing clothes or pillows). In other words, our society
tolerates that we harm babies without our knowledge, so that chemical
industries can become richer – whereas a decrease of one point of IQ per
xviii Education for Responsibility

individual would cost the society a decline in productivity of around 1

million euros. In other words, even according to the financial logic of
economic growth, this choice is probably absurd. Anyway, this is only the
beginning.

Primary forests are destroyed by napalm in Tasmania and the paper trade
is then enriched by the planting of eucalyptus trees, or for example, in
Brazil, bulldozers extract aluminum from the soil to make individual coffee
capsules. It is estimated that every hour in Borneo, the equivalent of 200
soccer fields of primary forests are sold or burned. Thus, more than 80% of
the island’s primary forest has disappeared, mainly for the production of
palm oil (Bryan et al. 2013). A continent of waste floats in the ocean. The
water is contaminated by radioactivity, heavy metals, pesticides and so on.
Animals are poisoned by waste produced several thousand kilometers away.
The seed trade, based on the patenting of genes, leads to the servitude of
farmers, their poisoning and the reduction of biodiversity. Let’s not even talk
about the hole in the ozone layer; it is so much a part of the landscape now
that we almost forget about it. There have never been so many rich people,
and never before have there been so many inequalities on Earth in the
material possessions of human beings. That is to say, 1% of individuals hold
half of the material wealth. Louis 14th, beside this, had an extremely
ridiculous fortune compared to the poorest French people at the time. Our
garbage cans are full of waste that we have a hard time handling. I remember
that during my studies I attended a conference given by an engineer who was
proud to show the latest system for burying the most permanent radioactive
waste: it was predicted to last about 10,000 years... while the half-life of this
waste exceeded a hundred million years! Thus, he predicted that this storage
would only be effective for a second compared to the life of this waste – and
he seemed proud of it. I was shocked.

In short, consumption and waste seem to be the law. Our “economy of

hyperextraction” leads to an irreversible depletion of the planet’s natural
resources1. Many thinkers have already made observations and short-term
forecasts that should logically prompt us to change our lifestyles and

1 Available at: http://www.enviscope.com/environnement/thematiques/ioan-negrutiu-biologist-in-

the-lens-of-lyon-humanity-should-ask-the-resource-question/9952.
 Introduction xix

economic systems immediately2. On a global scale, we have the material

means to feed and care for all of humanity, yet the logic of being an
individual and looking out for ourselves and the now globalized market
economy seems to take precedence over everything else, which leaves
behind millions of human beings3. A symptom of this logic has just been
elected President of the United States. Why is the world mad? The answer
seems simple: because we are mad. Yes, including you and me, dear reader.
The purpose of this book is to analyze the supporters of this madness, and to
suggest ways to become more sane. Or even, for the bravest, more saintly.
We could go so far as to talk about “wisdom”.

Certainly, critics who experienced post-war misery could contradict this

notion of a mad world: “Yes, but today, on the whole, there is still a sense of
comfort, there is health, to which the middle class did not have access to
before: there is still progress! Drat, we’re not going back to the Stone Age
anyway! And then Man has always known how to find solutions to
problems... we are so scientifically and technically developed that we will
find a way out”. And they could even go so far as to say: “At worse, we’ll
ruin another planet”. I would reply: “Indeed, as Morin explains, destruction
goes hand in hand with construction; opposites are inseparable.
Technosciences create at least as many problems as they solve. But
scientism4 is philosophically and historically untenable. Of course, the world
is not black or white, it is gray. Nevertheless, its color is becoming
increasingly black, since it is nevertheless increasingly deteriorated and
polluted, by processes that are largely irreversible and probably much faster
than our scientific-technical progress! There is every reason to believe that
drastic changes are hanging over our heads and that, without preparing our
minds for them, we risk undergoing them with great violence”. So why do
we persevere in our madness, even those of us who feel alert to these
questions? And why do the majority of us seem to be burying our heads in
the sand?

2 See for example the resources made available on the website of the Institut Michel Serre de
l’ENS Lyon (http://institutmichelserres.ens-lyon.fr/).
3 According to the World Bank, it is estimated that 10% of the planet lives below the poverty line,
i.e. on less than $2 a day, but this figure is controversial. Available at: https://lexpansion.lexpress.fr/
actualite-economique/ce-que-cache-le-recul-historique-de-la-pauvrete-dans-le-monde_17224
37.html.
4 Scientism is a belief (or an obsolete philosophical position) that science is inherently good and
capable of solving all of society’s problems.
xx Education for Responsibility

I.2. Relationship with money

Touiavii5, a Polynesian tribal leader who had visited Europe at the

beginning of the 20th Century, that is, before the globalization of
information and the economy, had, in his probably very wise ways, provided
to my opinion a relevant answer to these questions, raising points that I
consider essential. I share with you here his ethnological and very poetic
views. In addressing his peers, he wrote:

“Sensible brothers, heed my words and be happy that you don’t

know the misery and terror of the white man. […]

Because the round metal and the heavy paper, which they call
‘money’, that is the true god of the white man.

Talk to a European of the God of love: he will think and then a

smile comes over his face – he is smiling about the simplicity
of your thought. But hand him a blank round piece of metal or a
large heavy paper and immediately his eyes will light up and his
lips will moisten. […]

There are many who have sacrificed their friends for money,
their laughter, their honor, their conscience, their happiness,
their woman and their children.

Almost everyone loses their health to it, to the round metal and
the heavy paper. […]

However, it is not possible in these countries of the white man

to be without money only once, from sunrise to sunset. Without
any money you could not satisfy your hunger or still your thirst,
nor could you find a sleeping mat at night. […]

When you have money, you can get tobacco, rings or beautiful
cloth for it. You can have as much tobacco, as many rings or as
many cloths as you can pay for. […]

5 It should be noted that the following text quoted from Erich Scheurmann’s 1920 book The
Papalagi, which purports to be a genuine transcription of the speeches of a native Samoan
chief, has, since its publication, come under some scrutiny from anthropologists who have
queried its authenticity. See Senft (1999).
 Introduction xxi

Where does the money come from? How do you get much money?
Oh, in many ways, some easy and some difficult. [...] You need to
do a thing which the Europeans call ‘work’. ‘Work and you have
money,’ is a rule of behaviour in Europe. Yet there is a great
injustice with all this, about which the Papalagi [the European]
doesn’t think and doesn’t want to think, because then he would
have to admit this injustice. Not everyone who has a lot of money
also works a lot. Actually everyone wants to have a lot of money
without working much.

This is how this comes about: when a white man earns so much
money that he has food, a hut and a sleeping mat and beyond
that a bit more, he immediately uses the money he has to spare
to make his brother work. For himself! He gives him the work
which before made his own hands dirty and hard. He lets him
carry away the dirt, which he made. […]

Then the people say: ‘He is rich’. They envy him, flatter him and
say beautiful words to him. For the worth of a man in the white
world lies not in his honor or in his courage or in the splendour of
this reasoning, but in the amount of his money, how much money
he can make each day and how much he keeps in his thick iron
trunk, which not even an earthquake can destroy.

There are many whites who save up money made for them by
others, then bring it to a place which is well guarded. They keep
bringing it more until one day they will no longer need workers
for themselves, because now the money works for them all by
itself. How this is possible without magic I have never learned:
but it is the truth that money constantly grows, like leaves on a
tree and that the man who has it gets richer, even as he sleeps.

Now, if a person has a lot of money, much more than other

people, so much that a hundred, even a thousand others could
make their work lighter for themselves – he still gives them
nothing. He lays his hands on the round metal and sits on top of
his heavy paper with greed and self-satisfaction gleaming in his
eyes. And if you ask him: ‘What do you want to do with your
money? What more can you do on earth than to clothe yourself,
eat and still your thirst?’ he knows not what to say or he replies:
xxii Education for Responsibility

‘I want to make even more money. Always more. And more

again’. And you soon realize that the money made him so sick,
that all his senses are possessed by money. He cannot reason
like this: ‘I want to leave this world without complaint or
injustice, just as I came here, because the Great Spirit sent me
to earth without the round metal and the heavy paper’. Only
very few consider this. Most stay with their sickness, and never
regain the health of their heart. They rejoice in the power which
gives them all their money.

They swell in their conceit like rotten fruits in the rain. They feel
gratified to leave their brothers to their raw, hard work, so that they
can grow far in their body and prosper. They don’t think of giving
others a part of their money or to make their work easier for them.

From this teaching he takes the right to be cruel, for the sake of
money. His heart is bitter and his blood is cold; he is insincere, he
lies and he is always dishonest and dangerous when his hand
grasps for money. How often a Papalagi slays another for the sake
of money. Or he murders him with the venom of his words; he
uses his words to intoxicate him, in order to rob him. That is why
no one trusts the next person, because all know of each others’
weakness. That is why you can never tell whether or not a man
who has a lot of money is good in his heart; what is certain is that
he can be very evil. You never know how and from where he has
taken his treasures.

But then, the rich man never knows whether the honors, which
are offered to him, are because of him or his money. Mostly,
they are because of his money. […]

My enlightened brothers, we are all poor. [...] We don’t have

enough round metal and heavy paper to fill but one trunk. We
are impoverished beggars in the thoughts of the Papalagi. And
yet! When I look at your eyes and compare them with those of
the alii, I find theirs pale, wilted and tired, but yours are alive
like the great light, gleaming with joy, strength, life and health!
Only with the children of the Papalagi did I see eyes like yours,
before they could speak, when they still knew nothing of money
[…] Let us praise our custom which does not tolerate that one
 Introduction xxiii

man has a lot more than the other, or that one man has a lot and
another nothing. This way our hearts will not become like that
of the Papalagi, who can be happy and cheerful, even when his
brother next to him is saddened and despondent” (Scheurmann,
1997, pp. 70–83, emphasis added).

In his great wisdom, Chief Touiavii clearly perceived that the problem
lay in our minds. We will come back to this later in the book. We can
already note in brackets that there is a problem of blindness to our madness,
which will be thematized in terms of the unconscious. That is to say, we, the
Papalagi, do not always realize that we are “sick of thinking”, even if we are
alerted to the contemporary problems inherent in the globalization of the
market economy.

Now, let us try to model rationally, and simplify, the role of money in our
world. Let us first consider the three sectors of the economy and what we
call “material reality6” which refers to the raw materials (organic, mineral,
etc. used in trade), and the terrain where they are found (Figure I.1). The
primary sector of the economy is therefore concerned by the exploitation of
this material reality (e.g. agriculture, material extraction, etc.). However, this
reality also has an energy dimension. For example, food corresponds to
kilojoules, and this is rather the affairs of the economy’s secondary sector,
which developed with industrialization: it consists of the transformation of
matter into energy (transport, production, etc., for example the use of coal or
uranium to produce heat or electricity) and the transformation of energy into
matter (e.g. electricity consumption by production machines). Here, we
include in this energy dimension any human labor that causes economic gain
(whatever the sector). The tertiary sector corresponds to services and the
management of intangible assets, which we refer to here as “informational”:
their value is more in the information they mean than in their
correspondence with a defined matter. It should be noted that there is always
a material support for the information (examples include paper, computers,
computer servers, etc.). Money has an informational dimension. Previously,
it was directly coupled with material reality, via a gold equivalent stored in
banks: the banknotes were the avatars of portions of gold (or goods). So
there was a link with the primary sector of the economy (gold mining in
particular). However, since this coupling has been broken, that is, since the

6 Dear philosophers, please do not be offended yet by the blatant use of the term “reality”
here! We will justify this later in the introduction.
xxiv Education for Responsibility

autonomy of the banknote printing plate, the quantitative value of money has
become virtually disconnected from the raw material. That is to say, today’s
banknote production essentially depends on the willingness of governments
to use inflation to buy back their public debt: the physical anchoring of
money corresponds only to banknotes and information stored in servers
(those of financial transactions). The economy is thus moving away from
interaction, i.e. dialogism between money and raw material (Figure I.1A). It
is as if the energy of human thought was somehow delocalized in money
(and therefore in information), instead of being oriented towards and
connected to matter. Thus, money in financial terms evolves according to its
own logic, almost disconnected from material reality. The 2007–2008
American subprime mortgage crisis is a good example: on the basis of no
change in the matter, financiers made wagers, speculated, etc., which led to
people losing their homes and ending up on the street.

Figure I.1. An attempt to explain the “magic” that is the disconnection of money
from material and energetic realities . For a color version of this figure, see
www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

COMMENT ON FIGURE I.1.- A) Progressive distance from the economy in

regards to the material reality (rising arrow), from the first to the third
sector of the economy. B) Environmental consequences of the delocalization
of human thought energy at the financial level (arrows 1 to 6): what is
economically valued (downward curved arrows) is exploited, which leads to
collateral ecological deterioration and a decrease in the initial intrinsic
value of the raw material or its depletion (downward straight arrows). C)
 Introduction xxv

Financial information (economic value of money) is no longer regulated in a

reciprocal way with material information. D) The intrinsic value only
provides a little information about economic value, which follows its own
logic, depending in particular on inflation and speculation.

This is a fundamental problem of our society, not just a one-off problem.

Economic crises are only the tip of the iceberg... the underwater part is much
more worrying and consequential. So let’s talk about it: icebergs, yes, they
melt and here we are, in their immerged part!

I will indeed specify here some elements concerning the environmental

consequences of this financialization of the economy. According to some
psycho-sociological theories, we could consider that nature, of which raw
materials are a part, has an intrinsic value, independent of the human being. It
would then be a so-called ecocentric vision (versus anthropocentric or
utilitarian7 ; see references in Hagège, Bogner and Caussidier 2009). For
example, 1 kg of gold, 1 kg of salt or 1 kg of tomatoes would have an
intrinsic value for what they are (value independent of their economic value,
linked in part to inflation for example). This value would therefore be
independent of the socio-historical context. However, there are two
important points that gives nuance to this assertion.

Firstly, the collateral effects of firms of the first sector of economy imply
a scarcity or even a disappearance of certain nutritious raw materials (certain
varieties of cultivated plants for example). Also, probably because of the
abundant use of insecticides and herbicides in intensive agriculture (and
particularly GMOs), the total biomass of flying insects has fallen by nearly
80% in Germany over the past 27 years (Hallmann et al. 2017). Beekeepers
have been sounding the alarm for a number of years now. However, about
half of all edible plant species apparently reproduce only through bees. This
suggests that the intrinsic value of some commodities may be destroyed as a
result of their human-induced disappearance.

Secondly, by dint of exploiting raw materials through energy (and also by

producing this energy or providing transport), and speculating on these

7 An anthropocentric vision of nature considers that human beings have a superior value and a
utilitarian vision that nature only has value to the extent that it can be used by humans for
their own purposes.
xxvi Education for Responsibility

commodities, the search at all costs for productivity and yields has led, for
example via the use of chemicals, to soil depletion and pollution
(Bourguignon and Bourguignon 2015)8, for vegetables to grow faster and out
of season. Today, 1 kg of standard vegetables therefore has a lower
nutritional value and complexity on average than 1 kg of vegetables grown
in the last century (Halweil 2007). Because of the same type of process, 1 kg
of sea salt no longer has the same nutritional quality as before, because it is
contaminated by pollutants, particularly heavy metals (Figure I.1B). Of
course, the secondary sector of the economy, particularly the chemical
industry, benefits from this. And we know that these industries, which are
also sometimes seed producers (such as the Monsanto Company, a spin-off
of the chemical industry, which now produces GMOs), are lobbying
governments to influence economic policies in their favor. Their profits
seem to be their only motivation9. Thus, what might be called “the intrinsic
value of raw materials” varies due to human activity.

In addition, because of speculative bubbles (see numbers 3 to 6 at the

money level in Figure I.1B), the monetary value of a financial entity may
change without this change being in direct reference to material or energy
(see the subprime crisis). As a result, by ricochet effect, even for 1 kg of
tomatoes of a given nutritional value, the price can vary, without any
variation in intrinsic nutritional value. It is the feedback effect of evaluation
by money, which generates a vicious circle of hyperextraction: that which is
valued by money (see the utilitarian economic value in Figure I.1D) is more
exploited, and therefore linked to more deterioration. Money is a bit like the
wind (autonomous information) compared to food (material that has an
equivalent in material information). In other words, it is like injecting air
into liquid cream to make whipped cream: at the end, there is more volume,
and you may be under the impression that there is more material. But no,
there is just more air, and the initial material no longer has the same texture
or the same properties. If humanity evaluates a production energy or raw
material positively with money, especially if there are financial and
shareholder stakes involved, if people who do not leave an office earn
money from there, then ecological deterioration is almost assured. This is an
almost mechanical feedback effect, due to the relocation of human energy to
the financial level.

8 See also: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mPi3wKOyvHI.

9 See Pierre-Henri Gouyon’s comments on GMOs in the series “éthique et biotechnologies”.
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9XsMgOOLmz0.
 Introduction xxvii

“When the last tree is cut down, the last river poisoned, the last
fish caught, so only then will you realize that money cannot be
eaten.” (Quote attributed to Alanis Obomsawin 1972)

In my opinion, this happens in a way that is quite similar to the

tumorization of tissue, that is, the formation of cancer. Initially, before
forming a tumor, the cells contribute to the proper functioning of the tissue,
adhere to their environment and the environment regulates their growth. The
latter also feeds them and the information contained in the cell is thus
consistent with the information present in the tissue. Problems occur when
the cell's information becomes autonomous from that of its environment: it
acquires the ability to move and reproduce independently of the
environment’s needs. In other words, it only serves its own logic of growth,
to the detriment of the entire organization. This leads to the
counterproductive effect of exhausting, sometimes to the point of killing, the
environment that allows life (in this case the human body in which it
evolves)... as we are doing with our habitat, the Earth. Initially, money was
at the service of humanity; it was a very practical communication and
transaction tool. However, monetary information has become largely
disconnected from the physical environment from which it originated, and
from the corresponding physical information (crossed out arrow in Figure
I.1C). Thus, it functions as information in a group of cancer cells that lose
informational contact with its tissue environment. With the financialization
of the economy, we are collectively becoming like a group of cells that
become gangrenous, that metastasizes and will kill our environment and thus
our own possibilities for life.

Thus, economic value is no longer linked to intrinsic values, for example

ecological values (crossed out arrow in Figure I.1D); it leads to their
deterioration (Figure I.1B). Even human values have little influence on
global economic functioning10.

I find in this pathological economic logic many parallels with the

functioning of totalitarianism according to Arendt (1951): an autonomous
logic where the human being has no place, a process fed by the desolation of

10 Indeed, authentic alternative solidarity economies remain in the ultra-minority.

xxviii Education for Responsibility

a mass society, like a “mad” machine that leads to the destruction of politics,
Man, and the world with... the same causes that produce the same effects!

“Time for outrage”, Stéphane Hessel said... “Time to wake ourselves up”,
I want to write!

At this point, we have identified the center of the problem. But that’s not
all. Our societies have undergone significant changes since the beginning of
the last century. Some people refer to a problematic world marked by the
decline of absolutes (Fabre 2016). Legitimate authorities have been partially
replaced by abstract and impersonal dominations (Éraly 2015). These
dominances are exercised, moreover, through the instruments and
institutions of a globalized liberal economy – here it is again! They are
exercised to the detriment of the authority of traditional institutions, such as
the nation, the family or the school, and even to the detriment of the
structure or sustainability of these institutions. This results in a dissolution of
cultural specificities in global values. Thus, for example, our dependence on
the central European power leads to the standardization of cultural or
traditional practices (cheese making, university curricula, etc.).

I.3. Media relations

Above all, the omnipresence of mass media and screens contributes to

general “sleepiness”, by diverting subjects from spiritual and relational
values, and maintaining them in the illusion that happiness is synonymous
with consumption and immediate satisfaction of pleasure (Favre 2007).
Indeed, the psychosociology of happiness and materialism has shown that
beyond the satisfaction of vital or elementary needs, material possessions do
not bring happiness (Myers 2009). Their search, like that for other extrinsic
goals (popularity, beauty, etc.), can generate more stress and other negative
conditions than the search for intrinsic goals (contributing to the community,
personal development, etc.; ibid.). While materialism does not increase a
person’s quality of life, these numerous studies show that, on the contrary,
close and caring relationships, community ties and positive thinking habits
contribute to it (ibid.). In other words, “the best things in life are not things”
(ibid. p. 603). Decades of scientific research have therefore been necessary
to formulate an idea that has been formulated over thousands of years by
most spiritual traditions: happiness does not come from the outside or from
possessions; it comes from the inside or from relationships! Yet values seem
 Introduction xxix

to have reversed in the population in recent decades, newly favoring

extrinsic goals.

With regard to the problem of the mass media, I will focus here mainly
on the example of television. I will not go into detail on the impact of social
networks, Internet sales platforms and other virtual systems, which are
economically dependent on market hegemony, advertising sales or consumer
databases, and which are nevertheless becoming more and more important in
our society.

The French watch television on average 3 hours and 40 minutes a day,

almost two months a year on a full-time basis (Desmurget 2013). And this is
only on average! Programs are made to prepare brains to be conditioned by
advertising, as a famous French television boss once said. Indeed, our Cro-
Magnon human cognitive system is pre-wired to detect movement in an
immobile group, movement that could indicate, initially, predator or prey.
This attentional orientation is therefore linked to a primitive survival system.
Compare the television shots of the 1960s to those of today: from American
shots stable for several minutes, we are faced today with shots lasting only a
few seconds at most. In addition, the effect of television on the brain is also
specific, in that the light comes from the device, which increases the sense of
reality (this is not the case with reflected light from the cinema for example).
Thus, this screen that emits light and movement – in our living room, or now
anywhere, thanks to our “smart” phone – maintains our attention, captivates
it and puts our consciousness to sleep, diverting it from immediate reality11.
When we are connected to the television, we are less present to what is
around us (ourselves or others for example). So advertisements, which play
on symbolic systems, insidiously condition us with often misleading ideas,
and thus guide our consumer behavior in a way that is not necessarily
compatible with our own good, that of others or the planet. Whether on the
Internet, on the streets, in magazines, on television... advertising is
omnipresent. It is a vehicle for the venal use of our cognitive functions,
without our knowledge, hence the importance for us to understand this
functioning, as this book intends to contribute to it. Let us get back to the
power of television. The film Le Jeu de la mort (2009) presents the

11 Citton (2014) has analyzed different types of attention that coincide with this attentional
capitalism. In particular, he evokes that meta-attention can make it possible not to let oneself
be totally taken in by the object being viewed. We will examine this under more general
circumstances, not only in relation to television (chapters 2 and 3).
xxx Education for Responsibility

hypothesis and results of an extraordinary experiment carried out by a team

of researchers led by Professor Beauvois. They wanted to replicate
Milgram’s experiences in relation to the television system.

EXPERIENCE.– In an attempt to understand the submission of the German

people to Nazi authority, Milgram studied how subjects submit to an
authority that was supposed to be legitimate but gave unjust orders. In his
experiment, this authority was the scientific authority, embodied by a man in
a lab coat. Under the watchful eye and non-violent incitement of the latter,
the studied subject had to torture a student, by administering increasing
electric shocks, so that the scientist could supposedly study the student’s
learning. The final shocks could be potentially lethal. This torture was not
real (the student was an actor who was complicit with the scientists), but the
subject believed it was. It was not the learning that was studied, but the
submission of the subject to authority. The scientist’s only instrument to
force the subject to obey and administer electric shocks was the order (“do
it”, “we’ll take responsibility”, etc.). The subject was considered disobedient
when he persisted in refusing after five injunctions to continue. About 37%
of the subjects disobeyed: all the others went so far as to (virtually)
administer lethal shocks to the student. This allowed Milgram and his
collaborators to understand how an entire population could obey unjust
orders while being psychologically healthy. It was easier for the subjects to
take responsibility for themselves and place themselves in a psychological
state of servership, than to face their inner conflicts and the authority
embodied by the scientist.

In the experiment led by Professor Beauvois, the authority was embodied

by a publicly known TV presenter and the context of the science lab was
replaced by a TV board game. The principle of electric shock was similar.
Their results showed only an 18% disobedience level. In other words, this
experience tends to prove that 4 out of 5 people are able to kill another
person in public who has done nothing to them, just because a host –
legitimized by the media system they are a part of – asks them to do so. This
led Beauvois to assimilate the mass media to a totalitarian system, having the
same attributes of formatting minds and behaviors, and submission to an
authority. It has also been analyzed how mass media annihilate democracy
(Stiegler 2008), fabricate opinion (Chomsky et al. 2008), and entertain us in
order to enslave us more successfully (Offensive 2010). We find here
exactly the same parallels with the functioning of totalitarianism according
to Arendt (1951), as those mentioned earlier about money.
 Introduction xxxi

We could also mention here reality TV, series, blogs or Internet channels,
some of which play on a human being’s most vile aspects (lies, judgment,
betrayal, vulgarity, the reduction of a human being to appear as plastic or as
a figure, competition, comparison, slander, etc.) and insidiously feed these
tendencies into the minds of the people who watch them. Whether we like it
or not, we are in fact in tune with what we let our attention be drawn to.
These mass media are, of course, also a great source of information – for a
reflective subject. However, studies on the new generations of students
(“generation Y”) show the birth and dissemination of a new relationship with
information: what is the point of memorizing, since I can find all the
information I need on the Internet? What is the point of thinking or
criticizing, since if I do not have an opinion, and I will find several ready-
made ones on the Internet?

Finally, to conclude on television, studies have shown the disastrous

effects of television and tablets on children’s psycho-affective and cognitive
development and health (Desmurget 2013; Lurçat 2004). This loss of vitality
seems to me to be perceptible in their eyes, all the more dull as these
children are stupefied in front of screens. There are now even TV shows
made for (lobotomizing) babies! Unfortunately, I have a feeling that Chief
Touiavii would not see as much vitality today in the eyes of our children as
he did at the beginning of the last century.

In line with the illusions created by this attentional capitalism12, the

number of single people in France seems to be constantly increasing in
recent years (INSEE 2016), and yet, they have never had so many means of
communication to meet a partner (for example, dating sites). The consumer
society feeds the illusion that happiness is synonymous with the immediate
satisfaction of pleasure, which has the effect of reducing tolerance to frustration:
more than ever before, a partner is thrown away as a single-use product,
families are reconstituted according to the wishes of parents and some of our
elders die isolated from their families, as objects deemed useless in regards
to pleasure or to the consumer society. Society tends to make people less
responsible for the acceleration of ecological deterioration, a “collateral”
damage of the liberal economy (Figure I.1b). It is in fact in society’s interest
to keep the subjects in a psychological state similar to that of a child or
adolescent.

12 This notion refers to the idea that an entire part of the market economy is focused on how
to capture the attention of consumers (Citton 2014).
xxxii Education for Responsibility

I.4. The center of the problem

French schools, which are supposed to transmit the values of the

Republic (freedom, equality, fraternity, solidarity and secularism), are a
champion of discrimination and social inequality among all the countries of
the OECD! (Ministère de l’Education nationale 2013; Hagège 2017d).
Without its knowledge, it reproduces the norms and values of the market
economy: individualism, competition, exclusion of the weakest, etc. (Favre
2007). It thus contributes to the ambient incoherence of “do as I say, and not
as I do” (Hagège 2017c). And we will keep silent here about politicians’
contributions to such inconsistencies, as the press is so full of examples.

In this plural, multicultural, multireligious society, where values and

families tend to be fragmented, where values are vague, contradictory and
disseminated, where the collective is no longer a community (Éraly 2015),
some young people seek their bearings in dematerialized communities, those
of virtual social networks or in groups offering clear and solid roots. When
the community (“us” or “ingroup”) contradicts the rest of the collective
(“them” or “outgroup”), this can lead to radicalization, which can become
violent under certain conditions, as we have seen with the recruitment of
young French people into jihadist groups, a theme we will return to in this
book (section 1.4.3).

If we look again here at the results of the Beauvois experiment and recall
the good words of Chief Touiavii, we can understand that stigmatizing
“money” or “the system” misses the origin of all the centers of the problem:
the functioning of our minds. The agentic state that the subjects who reach
the end of torture in Milgram’s or Beauvois’ experiments find themselves in
is similar to that of a machine that automatically and unconsciously obeys,
like a sleepwalker to whom orders are given. This functioning is one of the
manifestations of what we call “madness” in this book. It is important to
note that the subjects of this experiment are not special: they are no less
intelligent or compassionate than the average member of the public. They
are simply normal humans. Indeed, our normal functioning often consists in
behaving like unconscious automatons, even if we are also alerted to social
problems. Our normal behavior therefore has characteristics of madness.
Thus, to let ourselves be “normal”, we let such devitalizing logics persist
around us, and even actively contribute to it, more or less without our own
knowledge. There is no need to feel guilty about that. But it is useful to be
aware of this, with patience and a desire for change. This is what we are
 Introduction xxxiii

trying to understand in this book. We are trying to analyze the mechanisms

of this “madness”, which has its origin in what we will call here the “illusion
of the ego”13, and we aim to propose educational solutions. This normal state
which is notably characterized by a kind of transient sleepiness, we invite to
awaken.

PROBLEMATIC OF THE BOOK.– In summary, we would like to propose some

answers to the following questions. In this context, how can schools, and
more generally education, promote values compatible with responsibility and
a sustainable future? What are these values? In other words, how can
education for responsibility contribute to a healthier (i.e. less mad) world?
Note: what we are dealing with here concerns both education (of young people)
and training (of adults), that is, teachers and their trainers. To simplify the book,
we will mainly use the terms “education” and “teachers”.

As a starting point, it will be a question of understanding the driving

forces and the manifestation of our own madness, and then grasping the
means to transcend it. In this respect, the scope of this book could go beyond
educational issues; it could also constitute a more general contribution to
ethical and even spiritual approaches.

I.5. The “education for” research field

Fortunately for us, a mostly committed French-speaking field of

research14, “education for”, has been working on these questions for some
20 years. Faced with the environmental, health, social and financial crises
mentioned, many authors claim the urgency of changing our world, and,
within it, more particularly the functioning of our societies (e.g. Capron
2003; Morin 2014a; Viveret 2005). Undoubtedly motivated by these
observations, the injunction to all elementary and secondary school teachers to
contribute to education for sustainable development (ESD), health, safety,
etc. was first mentioned in the official texts of the French Ministry of

13 In this book, “ego” is not synonymous with its common sense, which almost means “pride”.
This first term covers much more complex dynamics, which include pride and also its opposite
(self-deprecation), as well as other subjective tendencies (desire, competition, etc.). We are not
developing all these tendencies here; this will be the object of a future book.
14 There is of course a lot of English-language research on these questions of “education for”
(health, citizenship, etc.), but it does not seem to be structured in a common field of research that
regularly exchanges its knowledge and methods.
xxxiv Education for Responsibility

Education several decades ago. These educational programs, called

“education for” (health, safety, media, citizenship, etc.), contrast with the
“teaching of” (biology, mathematics, French, etc. i.e. school content) and
require different teaching methods (Lebeaume 2012). Indeed, research on
“education for” has shown that, for example, health education cannot be
limited to teaching informative content on the biological hazards of certain
practices, which would probably be ineffective in encouraging subjects to
take active and committed responsibility (called “empowerment” in the
literature of this domain; Arboix Calas 2013). Indeed, we know that it is not
enough to recognize the potential dangers of tobacco to stop smoking... Still,
it is necessary to be motivated to do so, and sometimes this motivation is not
yet sufficient. Thus, one aspect that will distinguish “education for” from the
teaching of school matter is that they require the implementation of
processes that engage subjects, including teachers, in particular by inviting
them to question their values, beliefs and relationships with the world
(Berger et al. 2009). So this partly affects what some people consider to be
the private sphere and we will see that we cannot have it both ways. We
cannot change the world and mentalities by remaining “politically correct”,
by confining ourselves to transmitting knowledge, by not being “invasive in
private”. What I am going to show here is that if we want to change the
world, then we have to change the mind! Thus, we will dare to go beyond
the sphere of private life: we will go to the sphere of the spiritual (which
etymologically in French means “of the mind”). Because we want to call a
spade a spade. But we will define what a spade is later. A spade is very
down to earth. The conception of spirituality that is advanced here, too; so
this conception is also very secular.

Some authors propose that “education for” should be autonomous with

regard to school matters (or, in other words, “non-disciplinary” ones; ibid.),
be oriented towards participatory and deliberative democracy, favor action
over knowledge (Lange and Martinand 2010), and explicitly address values,
interdependence, interdisciplinarity and the complexity of the world (Fabre
2014; Pellaud et al. 2007). Consequently, the relationship of this education
with traditional school norms and contents is problematic (Berger et al.
2009; Hagège 2013; Lange and Victor 2006). These studies have indeed
unraveled many obstacles to the implementation or effectiveness of
“education for” (Hagège 2015b, 2017d). Teachers are generally not at all or
poorly trained to do this. The criteria for their recruitment do not include the
necessary skills for “education for” (or for teaching in general). To my
knowledge, France is the only European country where there is no
 Introduction xxxv

compulsory training in psychology, as if teaching were a matter of knowing

before a matter of human relationships! Anyway, we were talking about the
obstacles. Teachers often feel uncomfortable and illegitimate in addressing
the socially challenging issues that these themes raise (Berger
et al. 2009). “Education for” is mentioned in official texts (e.g. Ministère de
l’Éducation nationale 2007), apart from disciplinary programs. However,
pedagogical inspectors essentially verify the application of these programs,
and rarely (or not at all), to my knowledge, the implementation of “education
for”. A recent exception to the latter point is the “moral and civic ‘teaching’”
which officially appears in the elementary and secondary school curricula as
a new teaching content – even if teachers are not trained to teach it, and it
remains to be seen whether (and how) inspectors will monitor its
implementation. Obviously, this research has also identified effective
pedagogical and didactic mechanisms – locally and with motivated actors –
to serve “education for”, which in general contrast with the masterful
schooling form (for example, debates, Panissal et al. 2010).

These studies envisage that changes in the world and society, useful to
solving the multiple crises that take place in it, require a transformation of
subjects and their relationship with the world (see Pellaud et al. 2007; Berger
et al. 2009). This perspective may lead educators and trainers to want
students or professionals to change. However, for these first (educators and
trainers), the latter are part of the world: it would therefore amount to the
fact that they first wish to change the world, by changing the others. Indeed,
our context does not seem to favor the idea that it is important for the former
to change themselves first, especially before having the ambition to change
others or the world (Hagège 2015b). Another way of expressing this is that
change (like happiness, see above) comes first from within, then from the
outside: “Change yourself, and the world changes with you”. And we are
sure of this, since you are part of the world...

To scientifically argue this proposal, however, it is useful to have a model

of “what is inside” the mind, how it works, its relationship with the world,
and, knowing this, how its function could change. This is the first ambition
of this book. Thus, we will detail the psychological and phenomenological
mechanisms responsible for attentional spells, indoctrination and other
functioning that can explain, at the individual level, the social phenomena
mentioned at the beginning of this introduction. This book also aims to show
the relevance of educational approaches, including meditation in particular,
to promote the responsibility of the subjects. Thus, this reflection falls within
xxxvi Education for Responsibility

the scope of “education for”, by founding a new discipline: that of education

for responsibility.

I.6. A constructivist epistemology to think about education for

responsibility

“The human being is nothing more than what they do. It is

therefore appropriate to make them bear full responsibility for
their existence. And when we say that the human being is
responsible for themselves, we do not mean [that everyone] is
responsible for their strict individuality, but that they are
responsible for all human beings. [...] There is not one of our
acts which, by creating the human being we want to be, does
not at the same time create an image of the human being... To
choose to be this or that is to affirm at the same time the value
of what we choose. Thus, I am responsible for myself and for
everyone, and I create a certain image of the human being that I
choose; by choosing me, I choose the human being” (Sartre
1970, pp. 22–27; author’s translation. We have replaced “man”
with “human being” to reduce the androcentric nature of the
text).

Although we are not specifically situated in any existentialism, this

quotation from Sartre eloquently expresses the notion that each of our
gestures, internal or external (i.e. a movement of the mind or body),
conscious or unconscious, contributes to making us what we are, and
therefore humanity and the world what they are. Our approach is part of a
complex vision, and therefore part of a constructivist epistemology (Le
Moigne 1995), according to which interdependence prevails over any form
of dualism. “Epistemology” means etymologically “knowledge discourse”.
Interdependence corresponds to the idea that at a metaphysical level, every
“element” in the universe is fundamentally connected, directly or indirectly,
to any other, and is therefore dependent on it15. Chaos theory is a

15 Morin (1986) expresses this in his hologrammatic principle: the part contains information about
the whole, as well as the whole information about the part. For example, a French subject contains
information – even if it is partial – on the whole of French culture (language, music, etc.), because
they are a vector of this culture, and they are also a constituent part of French society. Morin
completes this idea with the dialogical principle. We will not mention here its third principle of
recursivity, to which we nevertheless adhere.
 Introduction xxxvii

rationalized expression of this idea, with particular reference to sensitivity to

initial conditions (“it has been said that something as small as the flutter of a
butterfly’s wing can ultimately cause a typhoon halfway around the world”).
“Constructivist epistemology” therefore means that our way of thinking
about concepts and our relationship with them always takes into account, at
least implicitly, the role of the human condition in this knowledge, and more
specifically our own context, the one from which we speak. On the contrary,
a dualistic posture would involve claiming, for the sake of simplicity, that
opposites are disjointed (subject/object, interior/exterior, black/white, etc.)
and that the elements of the universe are fundamentally separable from each
other. However, according to the dialogical (constructivist) principle
proposed by Morin, opposites are not disjointed: it is light that gives
meaning to darkness, and Yin to Yang. In other words, the thesis-antithesis
conflict is not resolved in a synthesis, but the tension between two notions
that must exclude each other, inseparable from the same reality, is assumed
(Le Moigne 1995). Here, the adjective “dialogical” is used in a dual sense,
referring to this constructivist principle on the one hand, and etymologically
designating that which consists of a “dual discourse” on the other hand. The
notion of interdependence coincides with the notion of impermanence: an
“element” only exists because it is in a state of permanent change (because
of its relationship16 with what surrounds it; Hagège 2014). It is closely linked
to the notion of responsibility17: the latter contains at its heart that of the
solidarity of a subject with regard to actions and their consequences. It is
therefore necessary to make everyone responsible for what they are, not out
of principle, nor to burden them, but out of pragmatic efficiency: it is
performative to think that I am responsible for my actions and their
consequences, that is to say, by thinking so, I am actually assuming this

16 Reliance refers to the act of linking what is otherwise disjointed (e.g. knowledge from different
scientific disciplines). For Morin (2014b), ethics implies the subject’s relationship with themself,
others, the environment and the human species. And religion, which shares the same etymology as
“reliance”, implies in particular a connection with cosmic dimensions that go beyond or transcend
human nature.
17 Thus, inevitably, constructivist theories end up with ethical consideration, like the last volume of
Morin’s method (2014b). This is where Western societies have a modern tendency to think the
separability of the scientific subject with the described object – which would absolve the author of
the theory of nuclear fission from any responsibility for the manufacturing of the atomic bomb –
the constructivist vision forces us to consider the non-neutrality of the knowledge produced and the
solidarity of the acts and knowledge produced along with their authors (see also Fourez 2002;
Hagège 2013). This vision is in step with current research in the epistemology of sciences, which
emphasizes the “fundamental human nature” of science that is “involved” and “impartial”, hence
non-neutral. This thus creates “epistemic responsibility” (Coutellec 2015).
xxxviii Education for Responsibility

responsibility. That being said, be careful not to confuse responsibility with

culpability! Just because I take on this responsibility does not mean that I
have to psychologically self-flagellate every time I make a mistake... It only
means that my intentions are guided by including attention to myself,
certainly, and also to others and the non-human environment, because I am
aware that each of my actions impacts the world (see chapters 1 and 2). Even
if many factors we are not directly responsible for contribute to making us
what we are, it will be argued here that it is by fully accepting responsibility
for our functioning and by becoming aware of it that we can change it... and
thus contribute to changing the world. Each of our actions, internal or
external, conscious or unconscious, has an impact on the world, and on
others, because it creates or reinforces tendencies in us, and because humans
are social beings and function physiologically by imitation. Thus, we are
each a living model for others; we influence or affect them in one way or
another. It therefore seems useful for each subject to strive to become a
consciously chosen living model. To do so, everyone could become aware of
the values served by their actions, words and thoughts, and their
consequences, and could strive to act, speak and think in coherence with
consciously chosen values (Sauvé 2000). In any case, we will argue that any
education for responsibility should create conditions that favor such
processes.

Before arguing our point further, it seems important to specify the

position of this book, which could be called “engaged impartiality” (Kelly
1986): “impartiality” insofar as we consider all points of view contradictory
to ours as deserving of being heard and debated – which is not the case with
“exclusive partiality” – and “engaged” insofar as values, particularly in
relation to responsibility, are explicitly defended, and this is assumed –
unlike a “neutral impartiality” according to what the author claims,
fallaciously, to present a descriptive discourse of reality that has no
axiological connotation18. Approaching educational purposes involves
defending or proposing an ideal oriented towards the development of a
human world (Legault et al. 2002). This orientation and these choices are
underpinned – explicitly or not – by values. It is likely that these values and
choices are not suitable for everyone from the outset.

18 “Axiological” means “relative to the values”, relating to the axis according to which we
orient our actions.
 Introduction xxxix

Moreover, promoting their universality, the idea that they would be good
for all, wanting to impose them, would pose two types of problems: on the
one hand, this would amount to an attempt at a forced, and therefore violent,
“evangelization”, colored by a scientism19, unfortunately the founder of our
Cartesian-institutional positivist epistemology (Hagège 2013). Moreover, in our
pluralist context, where several conceptions of the good coexist, the public
space, including schools, should refer to an ethics of fairness (and not of the
good; according in particular to Rawls’ analysis, cited by Prairat 2016). Thus, a
republican posture would imply the choice of values that preserve the
coexistence of freedoms without imposing other normative values (Prairat
2016).

On the other hand, this would be contradictory to the very purpose that is
defended here: as we will see, responsibility coincides on the contrary with
an openness to otherness. Thus, like the complex vision of this book, the
knowledge produced in it is considered as useful tools for achieving certain
goals (Fourez 2002), in this case: educating for responsibility, and producing
and communicating scientific knowledge on this education. Therefore, we do
not advocate a kind of absolute or transcultural superiority of the values put
forward here, but we affirm, on the basis of scientific argumentation, that
they are more effective than others in achieving these goals20.

This analysis is based on a consistent literature review. Associated with a

personal experience of meditation, shared notably via a module called
“Introduction to meditation in an ethical approach” opened at the Faculty of
Sciences of the University of Montpellier in 2012, it highlights the validity and
effectiveness of what is presented here. It is therefore not a question of
preaching these ideas as a new catechism, of giving them a priori a normative
value, but of putting them forward so that they can be considered by the
community as a relevant possibility, undoubtedly complementary to other
approaches, and so that they can undergo criticism and be open to debate. We
are currently working to assess them in light of experiments, in order to
provide additional empirical evidence to that which is presented here.

To rephrase, the fundamental issues of this book can therefore be

expressed as follows: how can we change the world? What changes should

19 See footnote 4 of this Introduction.

20 Value conflicts are often due to divergent goals. If we agree on the goal, then we would be
able to adopt the same values quicker.
xl Education for Responsibility

be made to promote responsibility? How can responsibility education

contribute to this efficiently? 

To begin, we will try to propose some answers to the question: what is the
relationship between the world and the mind? Thus, in Chapter 1, we will
propose an explanatory model defending the idea that the world
is the reflection of the mind. The reasoning is based on science studies.
We will deduce from this the proposal that changing the world means
changing the mind. Then we will develop an explanatory model of the mind
and its functioning. In this way, to “dissect” this interiority, we will use
disciplines that study it, including cognitive sciences and psychosociology,
then phenomenology. Then, we will have a model that highlights the illusory
basis of most of our actions, synthetically called “ego” and relying on a
duality (existing from a relative point of view, but not absolute). In Chapter 2,
we will first present different complementary meanings of responsibility
(drawing on ethics, phenomenology, education and psychology), which will
make it possible to identify different indicators. It will appear that the ego
tends to oppose responsibility, which implies, in particular, a reliance, a
feeling of unity, with oneself, others and the non-human environment. We
can then consider which modalities of the functioning of the mind would, on
the contrary, be compatible with responsibility: essentially a mind freed from
ego, in other words a phenomenological instantiation of interdependence and
impermanence. We will consider the links between responsibility and
harmony, arguing via a mathematical analogy, the possibilities of
transforming the mind. In Chapter 3, we will draw educational conclusions
from this. First, we will highlight the importance of reflexivity – while
distinguishing between different types of reflexivity. We will argue about the
relevance of learning to meditate in order to become more reflexive. We will
present different types of meditation practices and their effects, and argue
how they can lead to the liberation of the ego and thus constitute relevant
practices for education for responsibility. Then, the changes in mind required
for responsibility will be formulated in terms of emotional, epistemic,
attentional, relational and axiological competences. Finally, in Chapter 4, we
will justify why we call these competences psychospiritual. After discussing
the scope and limits of this approach, we will propose to identify the specific
features of education for responsibility among all research in the social
sciences and humanities and the similarities with positive psychology,
particularly through the proximity between the notions of responsibility and
happiness. Finally, we will conclude by discussing the pedagogical
applications of what we are proposing.
 1

The World as a Reflection of the Mind

1.1. Definitions of the terms

1.1.1. Notions of world

A clarification of these topics, at first, requires us to consider what we

can mean by the term “world”.

The word “world” has 28 different definitions in the Littré dictionary (for
the word “monde” in French; Littré 2015a). Of these, those that most closely
resemble its use in this book to date are as follows:

“1. All that we see of space, bodies and beings, so called

because of the arrangement and regularity that prevails there.” 

“3. The physical world, the world considered in its sensitivity. The
moral or intellectual world, or the intelligent world, the world
considered in relation to moral or intellectual things.”

“7. The world, this low world, the earth that men inhabit, as
opposed to heaven, the heavenly kingdom.”

The term “monde” (world) is also used to designate the vastness, specificity
and multitude of a space (meaning 9 from Littré 2015a) or a domain, as in the
expression “it is a world apart”, and also synonymous with “universe” in the
figurative sense. Moreover, the French term “monde” derives from the Latin
mundus, which strictly means “what is methodical, well-placed” and mundus
was translated from the ancient Greek κόσμος, cosmos (ibid.). Like its Greek
equivalent, it has two meanings: that of “good layout”, “decoration” on the one

Education for Responsibility, First Edition. Hélène Hagège.

© ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
2 Education for Responsibility

hand, and that of “world” on the other hand (ibid.). In line with this first
meaning, cosmos has given us the word “cosmetic” for example. This refers to
external qualities, perceptible on the surface of things.

As can be seen in definitions 1 and 3 from Littré, the notion of “world” is

related to what is perceived by the senses, and this in a given context. This
specification is found in von Uexküll’s Umwelt concept, which literally means
“surrounding world” in German and would be more advantageously translated
into French as “own world” (Kull 2010). This concept reflects the idea that
animals living in the same environment, for example a snail and a spider,
perceive it in a specific way because of the specific features of their sensory
organs and modes of locomotion. So they each have their own Umwelt; one
could say that they do not live in the same world. Their world corresponds to a
separate universe of meaning (Salvador 2009), and these worlds are
immeasurable (T.S. Kuhn 2008). In a similar vein, a person with attitudes
considered crazy or inappropriate can be asked the question “What world do you
come from?”: the meaning of their attitudes is foreign or unsuitable for the
interrogator’s universe. Also, it can be said that people living in different social
classes or contexts (e.g. rural versus urban) do not live in the same world:
environmental objects do not have the same meaning for them (e.g. a 20 euro
note, an industrial strawberry tartlet, a fallow field, a social housing project, a
luxury car, etc.).

Dedicated to the human world(s) this time, the Kantian term

Weltanschauung, (literally “look on the world”) refers to the notion of a general
view of life and the world, and has been translated into English by “worldview”
(Wolters 1983). The term worldview has been defined as “a way of describing
the universe and life within it, both in terms of what is and what ought to be”
(Koltko-Rivera 2004, p. 4). This includes descriptive, normative and evaluative
aspects, that is beliefs and values “regarding what exists and what does not
(either in actuality, or in principle), what objects or experiences are good or bad,
and what objectives, behaviors, and relationships are desirable or undesirable”
(ibid.).

This detour through the concepts of Umwelt and worldview only serves
me here to highlight that an individual1 perceives the world in a particular

1 For a distinction between “individual” and “subject”, see Hagège (2014). Briefly, “individual”
refers to a biological being who is a constituent element of the group (or society) and who is
etymologically indivisible, while “subject” refers to a psychological and phenomenological
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 3

way, depending on their biological condition, culture and personal history,

and therefore that they live, in a way, in a world of their own that is in their
world. “Why, then, was there a need to invent these concepts of Umwelt and
worldview? Why not just name these phenomena “perceptions of the world?” I
attribute this reason to the polysemy of the term “world”. In my previous
sentence, “an individual perceives the world” implicitly implies the idea of
an “objective” world shared by all: this corresponds to meanings 6 and 7
from Littré (2015a), which refer to the planet Earth or to the idea of a
common physical reality in which individuals evolve. This is the
ambivalence of the term “world”. In the penultimate sentence, the term
“objective” has been taken for its common meaning and refers to what is
specific to worldly objects, regardless of the human spirit (Petit Robert
1996). This definition contains an oxymoron characteristic of our culture:
how can we talk about something objective, regardless of the human mind? To
say that “something” is objective means situating this “something” in a
common universe of perception and communication, in a conventional
universe, instituted by a culture (Fourez 2002), therefore dependent on a
human spirit. Objectivity can thus be considered as conformity to a socially
accepted rule and as the result of intersubjective construction, negotiation or
standardization (ibid.). In this more elaborate sense, it appears as a medium
term between the world, ideally objective in the common sense, and one’s
own worlds, purely subjective. This analysis therefore makes it possible to
identify three meanings for the term “world”, relevant to our object of
interest:
– an objective world in the ordinary sense, which would refer to a realistic
metaphysical position and the ontological hypothesis that corresponds to it
(Hagège et al. 2010). This hypothesis postulates the existence of a reality
independent of the one who describes it, even if their descriptions are not
independent of them. The fact that this reality is considered to be eternally
veiled and therefore unknowable in its ultimate perfection, does not affect
the hypothesis that ‘assumes’ “the existence of [the essence of reality]”,
independent of the observer’s existence and observer-modeler’s experience”
(Le Moigne 1995, p. 22, author’s translation). It should be noted that any
subject is nevertheless a constituent part of this objective world (see the
gnoseological hypothesis on page 6). This conception of the world is unive-
rsalist: the world being unique is considered to be the same for all;

individuation process, which emerges from the interaction between the individual and the
environment (see also Table 1.2).
4 Education for Responsibility

– an objective world in an elaborate sense, which seems to me to refer to

the commonly accepted position in the human sciences today and to the
notion of the social construction of reality. According to this idea, what is
accessible to our mind is always filtered by the cultural prism through which
we perceive it (Fourez 2002), if only through the language with which we
think it (and by our biological condition). This world would therefore be a
cultural one, such as when we speak of the “Western world” for example
(meaning 10 from Littré 2015a). This meaning thus suffers from the same
limitations and difficulties as the term “culture” and should therefore rather
be considered in a plural form. There are several cultures in humanity, and
the definition of their boundaries overlaps and possible interlocking can be
arbitrary and raise ethical issues (Hagège 2013). In other words, this notion
of the world necessarily refers to a context, and rigour would require that it
be clarified; 
– a subjective world, which corresponds to the individual perception of
reality. Can a subject perceive anything other than such a subjective world? We
answer temporarily by “no”, which we will qualify later. The consideration
of this world inevitably refers to the phenomenological dimension of human
experience, on which we will discuss later.

Thus, the objective world in the common sense corresponds to an absolute

pole, the subjective world to a relative pole, and the objective world in the
elaborate sense, to a medium term between these two poles.

Here the objective world in the ordinary sense is called “ultimate reality”, or
sometimes “the real”. Then, simply, “objective world” and “subjective world”
will designate respectively the two other meanings. It is important to note here a
semantic break between ultimate reality and the world – whether objective or
subjective. The ultimate reality, possibly inaccessible, is as it appears, and if we
were to talk about it, we would then be talking about a world. An objective or
subjective world refers to a universe of meanings, respectively cultural or
personal. So instead of an “objective world” or “subjective world”, the term
“relative reality”, or that of “world” itself, will sometimes simply be used. We
will show in this book that the discrimination between ultimate reality, on the
one hand, and relative reality, on the other, constitutes the founding
epistemological breakthrough (“rupture épistémologique” in French) of an
education for responsibility. As Fourez (2002) explains, at the basis of any
scientific discipline, there is a disconnection, a human action that separates and
prohibits confusion, always according to a project. And the project here is to
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 5

create and validate knowledge (1) heuristics for research in education for
responsibility, and (2) promoters of effective pedagogical approaches in this
field. This knowledge also offers innovative ways of experiencing ethics or
spirituality in a non-dualistic way.

1.1.2. Notions of mind

In this book, we will argue that to change the world, we must change the
mind. That is why we must also lay down in this introduction some basic
principles of what we mean by this.

In French, there is only one term for both spirit and mind: “esprit”. From the
Latin spiritus, which literally means “breath”, from spirare (“breathe, inhale”),
the term “esprit” has 29 meanings in Littré (Littré 2015b). It includes Cartesian
dualism according to which the mind is exclusive to the body and refers to what
is immaterial (meaning 3: “an intangible and intellectual substance”, meaning 5:
“spirits, intangible substances, such as angels and demons”, where it appears,
such as in meanings 7, 9 and 16, as an equivalent to the notion of the soul; ibid.),
as a theological principle corresponding to a god (meanings 1 and 4) or
metaphysical principle synonymous with life (meanings 3, 6 and 7). This
theological principle could be seen as the immaterial counterpart of ultimate
reality: like intelligence or information corresponding to this reality. It will be
called here “principled mind”. This ultimate, absolute mind corresponds to
information that is not distorted by a personal or cultural view, and therefore to a
type of direct knowledge, beyond language. It is always phenomenologically
experienced, so it slightly differs from what have been called, in famous thought
experiments, “omniscient mind” by de Laplace or “demon” by Maxwell. The
transition from an ordinary state of consciousness to this one is called
“awakening”.

Some definitions can be seen as an immaterial counterpart of the objective

world: in the sense 14, “the human spirit, the spirit of man in general”, and the
meaning 21, “opinions, feelings common to a number of people and to
institutions; the family spirit; the republican spirit”.

And finally, we also find the counterpart of the subjective world: in

meanings 13, 23, 24 and 25, where it corresponds to intellectual faculties,
tendencies, aptitudes or individual dispositions.
6 Education for Responsibility

In the latter two cases, we will refer to the “relative mind” (collective or
individual), since this immaterial principle is linked to the perception of a
relative world.

In addition, the word “mind” is frequently interchanged with “thinking” or

“thoughts” (for example, in Daniel 2016), and sometimes with “consciousness” or
“knowledge/knowing” (e.g. being aware of something, having it in mind or
knowing it are almost synonymous). However, it is essential in the reflection
presented here to clearly distinguish these four notions. Below, we focus on
defining more specifically what we mean by “consciousness” and “mind”
(“thought” and “knowledge” being defined in particular in section 1.3.1.1.2).

1.1.3. Gnoseological hypothesis, notions of consciousness and

the model of the mind

“The truth is that there is no truth, including this one” (author’s

translation; Shadoks’ motto).

Consciousness is studied in particular in phenomenology, of which it is the

main object. Phenomenology is the “science of the conscious experience”
(Greisch 2015b). Its criterion is intuitive, rather than exegetical. That is, the
meaning identified in the experience is identified as internal evidence to the
subject, more so than as an objectification inferred on the basis of external
coherence (Depraz 2012). Thus, this discipline aims in particular to report on the
experience of knowing and perceiving the subject.

“Consciousness” comes from Latin conscius, cum (“with”) and scire

(“to know”) and “suggests not only the subject’s knowledge of the object,
but that this object always refers to the subject itself ” (Ey 2015; author’s
translation). The etymology of this term therefore seems to include the idea
of the phenomenological hypothesis of constructivist epistemologies, which
postulates “the inseparability between the act of knowing an ‘object’ and the
act of ‘knowing oneself’ that the knowing subject exercises” (Piaget quoted
by Le Moigne 1995, p. 75; author’s translation). According to this
hypothesis, the “subject does not know ‘things in itself’ (ontological
hypothesis), but knows the act by which they perceive the interaction
between the things” (Le Moigne 1995, p. 76; author’s translation). Thus,
speaking of consciousness as an object of the world, which could be studied
from the outside, or even by trying to define it, are all acts of consciousness...
thus self-contradictory (Bitbol 2014). And coincidentally, as explained by the
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 7

phenomenological hypothesis, the same applies to the existence of an ultimate

reality external to the subject (ontological hypothesis).

Here, we propose a hypothesis that we call “gnoseological hypothesis”

(from the Greek gnôsis, meaning knowledge). It is within this gnoseological
hypothesis that this book is located.

DEFINITION.– The gnoseological hypothesis reconciles the pragmatic aspect

– particularly in order to be able to communicate and exist together – of the
ontological hypothesis (realistic position to consider the existence of an
ultimate reality), with the phenomenological hypothesis, which seems more
relevant to us. First, the ultimate reality, whose character is unutterable, is
considered inseparable from a relative reality and vice versa. This point
therefore distinguishes our hypothesis from the ontological hypothesis. In
other words, these two realities are two inseparable parts of reality, like the
two sides of a coin, mutually constituent of a unit (from an ultimate point of
view) and mutually exclusive (from a relative point of view). Indeed, on the
one hand, the different relative realities and the corresponding different
relative minds are part of what the ontological hypothesis calls “the real”. On
the other hand, these different relative realities exist through the real, which
constitutes their basic reference, so to speak, their foundation2. Thus, one is
in the other as well as the opposite. Secondly, both these two areas are
potentially recognizable, but not in the same phenomenological modalities –
approaching the knowledge of the ultimate reality requires an optimally
conscious mind.

The idea of this gnoseological hypothesis is therefore to keep in mind the

intertwined between these two coincident parts, which are in a dialogical
relationship, while we will speak without complex about ultimate reality and
relative reality. Thus, for example, here, it is a question of creating a world –
the world of education for responsibility – with its universe of meanings, in
particular for the purpose of communicating about it. We will argue in
section 2.4 on relevance, for the intelligibility of this world, of this
gnoseological hypothesis on the one hand, and of this distinction between
ultimate and relative realities on the other.

2 Thus, a mind is usually described as crazy if it is too out of step with the way most other
minds perceive this reality. Here, we have extended the use of this term, qualifying all our
ordinary minds as “insane”, insofar as they are all out of step with reality. This is what we
will discuss in section 1.3.
8 Education for Responsibility

When we talk about “consciousness” in this book, we are talking about a

phenomenological point of view, which is essentially subjective. Thus, if this book
defended a philosophical position, it would undoubtedly be that of phenomenology.
Indeed, everyone can only know about their own experience. If they know one of the
others, it is only through their experience of it... This notion corresponds to a
phenomenological hypothesis.

However, our point is not of a philosophical nature: it claims to be part of the

educational sciences, in which we are required not only to discuss a supposed
reality that exists outside our own individual consciousness, but also to propose
effective ways to change it. We must therefore act as if there is a real recognizable
outside to our personal consciousness. This is where the ontological hypothesis
comes in, which postulates the existence of such a reality. The common person
probably communicates and perceives things on the implicit basis of such a
hypothesis, often set up as postulate. In other words, most people seem to act as if
there is an existing, shared and recognizable reality outside of us.

Here, we bring together these two hypotheses, which are a priori mutually
exclusive within the gnoseological hypothesis, by assuming their tensions in the
form of a dialogism borrowed from Morin (1986).

When an “objective point of view” is mentioned in the book, it suggests that

we are then placed under the ontological hypothesis. All “subjective points of
view” refer to the phenomenological hypothesis. When we refer to an “ultimate
point of view”, it is inevitably an abuse of language (assumed and done
consciously). Indeed, by putting in words and inscribing our object in a universe
of meaning, the point of view could only be objective at best. However, we need
to express the notion of a state of mind that transcends the relative limits of the
personal or the cultural. So we use it. And in this respect our proposals might
seem similar to those of Bergson or Schopenhaueur... whereas we only wish to
communicate in the most effective way to serve our educational and research
purpose (would we not also be a little pragmatic in this sense?).

Box 1.1. Gnoseological hypothesis and philosophical perspectives

“If the known disappeared, knowledge would appear” (quote

attributed to Ibn Arabi).

Despite the previous reservations expressed following the etymological

apprehension of the term “consciousness”, the literature on consciousness is
abundant in philosophical and cognitive sciences, and the authors generally
refer to consciousness as if it were an object of knowledge that is part
of their external world, and more particularly from the objective world.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 9

They rarely take into account the impact of their subjective world on their
choice of words and description of the objective world. And perhaps even
more rarely, the time to observe their own consciousness in order to draw
direct knowledge from it (a method used in phenomenology).

Thus, faced with the proliferation of theories and corresponding

underlying metaphysics and variations in the use of words relating to
consciousness, Block (1995) proposed a distinction that now seems
to constitute a major reference in philosophical or scientific approaches to
consciousness. He distinguished four types of consciousness, according
to usage. We will discuss them after having explained them below3:
– phenomenal consciousness is more precisely the one mentioned above,
and cannot be defined in a non-circular way. It refers to the subject’s
experience of their perceptions, sensations, emotions, inner states, etc., their
immediate and direct knowledge of these phenomena. It could only be
approached scientifically by collecting data in the first person, where the
subject is invited to share this experience (Depraz 2012). It implies quality,
intensity, color, etc. with which a phenomenon is perceived. Some authors
call “qualia” the assumed atoms of unique subjective knowing experience
(Ramachandran and Hirstein 1997)4. This consciousness thus refers to the
irreducibility of subjective experience, to how it is to feel, to see, to
breathe... to live. For example, if I eat a strawberry tartlet, my phenomenal
consciousness refers to how it is for me to eat it, how I experience with my
senses and eventually how it feels to think about what I think when I eat that
tartlet (if I think about something at that time);  
– self-consciousness refers to having a concept of the self and being able
to use it about oneself in a situation. For example, if a mark is placed on the
foreheads of some mammals (including humans over two years of age),
while they are under anesthesia, and then they are positioned in front of a
mirror, these mammals try to remove it – so they pass what is called the
mirror test. This implies that they are aware that the image they see is the
image of themselves. Self-consciousness makes it possible to know (we
would rather say here “to have an implicit idea”) in an action that “I” am

3 This description is based on Block’s article (1995), unless otherwise indicated.

4 They are often part of a biological theory of consciousness (Block 2009), which is not our case,
because this type of theory seems too reductionist to us.
10 Education for Responsibility

completing the action5. This consciousness seems to be essentially

constructed through interactions with others (Clément 2007; Marraffa
2014); 
– access-consciousness refers to the representation of the informative
content of the phenomenon, or its form. And this representation emerges
from contact with the persistence of the phenomenon, as a deduction that is
made by promiscuity with this phenomenon. Such a representation would
typically be the premise of reasoning, control of action or discourse. An
access-consciousness without phenomenal consciousness would be a bit like
a zombie or a computer that could recognize the informative content of a
perception without experiencing the perception itself, in its quality (i.e.
without the knowledge of the quale6 itself). A phenomenal consciousness
without access-consciousness would be like when a subject is sitting on a
terrace with friends and there is a noise below: they experience this noise
without realizing it. If suddenly, at midnight, they realize that there is this
noise (and that they can even identify it from then on), that it was there
before, and that at this moment as in the previous moments, they are hearing
this noise7, then access-consciousness is added to the phenomenal
consciousness at this moment in time. Access-consciousness is the most
empirically studied, thanks to the reportability criterion: the subject is
considered to have been aware of a phenomenon if they are able to say
a posteriori that they have perceived it. This is not the case for subliminal
stimuli, for example, where it is therefore considered that the subject does
not have and will never have access-consciousness (Dehaene and Changeux
2011). Global workspace theories consider that phenomenal consciousness
corresponds to information that is globally processed by the brain, especially
by distant areas (Block 2009), yet experimental arguments seem hardly
available except for access-consciousness (reviewed by Dehaene and
Changeux 2011); 
– monitoring-consciousness can take several forms: internal perception,
review of internal states or higher order thinking. These would be

5 Given the cultural (and probably also interpersonal) variation in the concept of self (Kitayama
and Park 2010), this definition seems somewhat problematic: it suffers from confusion between the
relative world and ultimate reality. In our view, Block’s definition does not correspond to a
consciousness, but rather to what we would call a representation of the basic level of cognition (see
section 1.3.2.3.1).
6 “Quale” is the singular of “qualia”, these supposed atoms of phenomenal experience.
7 This latter knowledge would be a higher order thought.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 11

introspective thoughts. The mental operations targeted here are rather slow
and require a high level of self-reflexivity (Clément 2007). Other authors
have called this consciousness “metaconsciousness” (Winkielman and
Schooler 2011).

However, despite these distinctions, consciousness can only be

phenomenal: these last two types of consciousness refer much more or less
explicitly to the subject’s experience of (1) their perceptions or the
recollection of them, that is, mental phenomena that concern a previous
experience (access-consciousness; since we are talking about human beings
and not computers or zombies), (2) thoughts about themselves (reflexive
consciousness).

As for the definition of self-consciousness proposed by Block (1995), it

implies a conceptual level, concerning the self, which is in our opinion often
unconscious. In this respect, the term “consciousness” seems inappropriate here.
Other authors have proposed two components of private self-consciousness: (1)
internal state awareness, i.e. of emotions, feelings and thoughts, what we
would call here “phenomenal consciousness of the inner world”8 and 2) self-
reflectiveness, which corresponds to thoughts about oneself (Wheeler et al.
2008). This second meaning thus refers to an explicit and conceptual
consciousness whose purpose is to focus attention on the contents of lower
order consciousness9 and therefore also corresponds to a reflective
consciousness according to Block’s (1995) categorization. In our
vocabulary, we will say that these are mental phenomena (see section
1.3.1.1.2) concerning memorized phenomena or events concerning the self.
In other words, we will say that these are verbal thoughts (not necessarily
conscious), which take as their objects previous thoughts or the memory of
past perceptions or sensations about the self. At least a third notion of self-
consciousness has been identified in the literature: pre-reflective self-
consciousness, in connection with “for-me-ness”. For-me-ness refers to the
notion that by acting or perceiving, the subject “knows” that it is they who
are acting or perceiving (Legrand 200710). In other words, it refers to an

8 The terminology of “inner world” and “outer world” was borrowed from Jung (1933/1986).
9 For some supporters of “higher order theories”, these higher order mental states are the only ones
which are phenomenally conscious (Block 2009).
10 In this regard, Ey (2015) distinguishes two structures of the conscious being: the synchronic
structure that corresponds to the phenomenological field of consciousness (the presence of the here
12 Education for Responsibility

implicit sense of self that leads to experiences at the phenomenal level

(phenomelogical self-consciousness; Gallagher and Zahavi 2005).

It therefore appears that Block’s categories (1995) partially overlap. In

addition, it is problematic to reduce consciousness to a representation or
thought11, as Block does in several definitions, because (1) a thought or
representation can be and often is unconscious, (2) consciousness can exist
without thought (Lutz et al. 2007; see also; sections 3.2 and 3.4.7) and (3) a
subject absorbed in their own thoughts is all the less conscious (see example
of daydreaming below). Regarding Block’s example of access-consciousness
(the subject who heard a noise below and did not realize it), we would rather
say that the subject is little or not conscious of this noise and that they
become so. And we propose that, on the other hand, before midnight, while
their consciousness was absorbed in the conversation, their mind perceived
and knew the noise below. In other words, in our opinion, it seems more
accurate to postulate (1) that it is the quantity of consciousness that changes
in this case, and not its “access” quality that appears12 and (2) that the
subject had access to initially unconscious content (or slightly conscious; the
noise below the terrace).

EXAMPLE.– We explain here with another example, why it is problematic not to

distinguish different “quantities of consciousness”13. When a subject dreams

and now) and the diachronic structure that is supported by the “for-me-ness” (the notion of a self
that lasts in time and that is the author of thoughts and actions).
11 This erroneous conception, which reduces consciousness to thoughts, seems quite typical of the
Western world, commonly assimilating intelligence and intellect, thoughts and mind,
consciousness and the brain. Consciousness is often mistakenly considered as a simple
epiphenomenon of brain activity (Bitbol 2014). In most Eastern traditions, the place of the mind is
the heart (Kabat-Zinn 2003), not the brain, and thoughts are considered an epiphenomenon of
consciousness (and not consciousness, identified with thoughts, as an epiphenomenon of the brain).
In fact, the electromagnetic field of the heart is about 100 times stronger than that of the brain. In
the West, theories broadening intelligence (Gardner 2011; Masciotra et al. 2008), consciousness
and the mind (Bishop et al. 2004) consider them as incorporated and therefore as having to do with
both emotions and the body as well as thoughts and the brain. These theories have only been
popularized relatively recently.
12 In section 1.3.2.1.1, we will clarify this, in particular by linking the notion of variation in the
quantity of consciousness with that of the field of consciousness and attention. Indeed, in the
example of the noise heard from the terrace, at midnight attention is now focused on this noise and
the field of consciousness coincidentally directed towards it (whereas this was not the case before).
13 This concept will be further developed in relation to the notions of attention and field of
consciousness, defined in section 1.3.2.1.1.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 13

while sleeping, it is customary to consider them as unconscious, because they

are not aware that they are dreaming (except in the case of a lucid dream; Voss
et al. 2012) and that their five senses and interoception are largely unconscious
to them. However, if they remember their dream when they wake up, it is
because they were able to recognize it and memorize it... To take up distinctions
made by Block, we can imagine that the dreaming subject is phenomenally
conscious of the dream, but not conscious of themselves, and that they then have
no conscious access to the dream (in case they cannot remember their dream
when they wake up). That said, to a lesser degree, when a waking subject is
absorbed in their thoughts, they can somehow dream without sleeping
(“daydreaming”), without realizing at that time that these are only mental
thoughts or images in which their consciousness is absorbed – whether these
thoughts are “of a higher order” and in connection with a reflective self-
awareness, or whether they concern the material planning of the next making of
strawberry tartlets. However, the more the subject is absorbed in their
daydreaming, the less they will be aware that they are daydreaming when they
do so... Is it then better to say that they are conscious, or that they are
unconscious, as if they were sleeping, at the moment when their consciousness
is absorbed in their thoughts? In any case, they are not self-conscious or aware
of the other phenomena at the moment in time, as if these phenomena were in
the background (or even absent) of their phenomenological reality (like the
subject mentioned earlier, who does not hear the noise below the terrace, while
they are absorbed in conversation). Thus, as consciousness decreases
correlatively with its “absorption”14 into a phenomenon (be it mental
or something else), such as a thought of first- or higher order, it seems
semantically problematic to assimilate these two terms: consciousness and
thoughts.

To sum up, the assimilation between consciousness and mind15 (or thought)
is problematic – so not all of the categories proposed by Block seem accurate –
and the boundary between conscious and unconscious is sometimes blurred. In
this book, we propose solutions to each of these problems16.

14 We call this absorption “phenomenological grasping” later in the text.

15 “Mental activity” includes all mental thoughts and phenomena.
16 We will detail the proposed solutions to the first problem (section 1.3.1.1 for the
distinction between mental phenomena, thoughts, consciousness, knowledge and mind) and to
the second (section 1.3.2.1.1), and here we discuss only part of the solution to the second
problem.
14 Edu
ucation for Resp
ponsibility

Thuss, we proposse an operatiional definitio on of conscioousness as a dynamic

of the mind,
m as thee latter grouups the dynaamics of connsciousness and the
unconsccious (Figuree 1.1). To thee left of the figure,
f the suubject is aliennated by
the factt they do nott have conscciousness; th hey are the object
o of pheenomena
that apppear in theirr inner or outer
o world, that capturee their attenttion and
conditioon their life in relation to the past, to
t the expecttations of the future,
and theerefore to thhe fears annd hopes geenerated by the situatioons they
encountter (as in a dream or in i an agentiic state17). It is a persoonal (i.e.
egocenttric) mind thaat is largely unconscious
u . On the righht, instead off reacting
to the past,
p the subbject respondds in the preesent in a way
w that is frree from
conditiooning, and thherefore free of fears and d hopes: theree is a creativve aspect
and an impersonal consciousness, which taakes into acccount both “tthe self”
and otheers (see section 2.4), andd information n from their inner world and that
of their outer world.. These two types
t of info
ormation are no longer seeparated:
there is a unity betwween their mind and realiity, which is no longer pperceived
in a disttorted way. There
T is no more
m madnesss, no more discrepancy
d between
their miind and the real; their prinncipled mindd perceives the
t ultimate rreality in
perfect coherence annd unity. Thhe ultimate and a subjectivve points of vview are
the samme. The subjject, transpaarent to itsellf, is fully responsible
r (literally
response-able). Thee subject ansswers insteaad of reactinng. They aree awake.
Thus, most
m subjectss oscillate duuring their liv ves between these two poles, but
closer too the left polle on average. We will elaborate
e on these
t aspectss later in
the bookk.

Figure 1.1. Gradient

G of spiiritual qualitiess

17 State in which the obedient subjeects in Milgram

m’s experiment can be foundd (see the
eponymouus box in sectioon I.3).
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 15

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.1.– The mind is defined here as the union of the
unconscious and consciousness, which are in a dialogical relationship
(relationship symbolized by double arrows). The boundary between these
two compartments is sometimes thin (which is symbolized by dotted lines).
The unconscious is considered as a set of psychological dynamics, both as
described in psychoanalysis (Jung 1933/1986), and also in its more modern
sense, as it is studied in cognitive sciences (Bargh and Morsella 2008 ; for
more details, see Hagège 2014, 2015b, in connection with system 1; Evans
2008). These dynamics mobilize emotional engrams, attitudinal tendencies,
thought-action repertoires... From left to right, the field of consciousness
widens, and in the process, the latter changes in quality, as we will see later
(sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3). Consciousness includes system 2 (Evans 2008)
and is broader than this latter; it exists without thoughts and corresponds to
phenomenal consciousness (Ey 2015). The more the field is reduced, the
more attention is focused. So from left to right, it is more and more diffuse
(and shared); vigilant attention is being developed (see section 2.3.2).

This modeling of a mind composed of consciousness and the unconscious

echoes the theories widely used in cognitive science, called “dual systems or
process theories”. These studies have highlighted functions of the mind
based on at least two biological information processing systems18: a
primitive, unconscious, implicit, fast, automatic system 1, and a more
evolved, conscious, explicit, slow, controlled19 system 2 (reviewed by Evans
2008; Gawronski and Creighton 2013). We provide here only a quick
example, because we have addressed this issue elsewhere (Hagège 2014,
2017d).

EXAMPLE.– Although most subjects nowadays declare themselves egalitarian

(not racist), strong discrimination still persists in the United States (e.g.
against Afro-Americans; Pearson et al. 2009). In an attempt to explain this
paradox, researchers have uncovered implicit attitudes that correspond to

18 Some authors point out that systems 1 and 2 function as two minds in a single brain (Evans
2003). We prefer to evoke these two systems as two interdependent and dialogical parts of the same
mind, therefore of a subject (i.e. not only in relation to the brain, but to the individual’s entire
body).
19 We will not detail this here because we have already done so previously (Hagège 2014),
why the distinction between the conscious and unconscious appears to be more operational
than than of automatism and control.
16 Education for Responsibility

unconscious preferences20 and are believed to be due to the unconscious

endorsement of cultural stereotypes (reviewed by Pearson et al. 2009). Some
implicit attitude assessment tests are available online21. This research on
racial attitudes and prejudices has shown that although most subjects declare
themselves – and probably believe they are – not racist (explicit attitude),
most of them nevertheless behave in a way that is biased in the racist sense
(reviewed by Pearson et al. 2009). In other words, most subjects who have
egalitarian declarative values would in fact discriminate without even being
aware of it. In this sense, preliminary work carried out in the laboratory has
shown that even activists in anti-racism associations have a majority of
implicit racist attitudes, preferring subjects from the cultural group they
come from. This implicit preference for an in-group has also been widely
studied (see the references in Hagège 2017d).

Dual attitudes obviously pose problems in terms of responsibility

(Faucher 2012): how can we be responsible for behaviors and attitudes of
which we are not aware? Indeed, the consideration of implicit attitudes has
recently given rise to reflections in moral philosophy, inviting us to
reconsider the notion of responsibility (Faucher 2012; Levy 2014). It seems
to me that our responsibility would involve becoming aware of our implicit
attitudes in order to be able to free ourselves from them (Hagège 2014) –
otherwise we are only the object of these social stereotypes endorsed without
our knowledge, and no longer a subject. We will come back to the role of
education at this level later.

To conclude, we retain here a model of the mind as it has a conscious

component (understood as phenomenal) and an unconscious component. We
therefore propose the following operational definition of the mind: the
informational dimension of the conscious and unconscious dynamics of a
subject 22. The mind can perceive seven kinds of phenomena, including
thoughts (section 1.3.1.1). The latter may or may not be conscious, and are

20 The unconscious state of implicit attitudes has been discussed in literature (Gawronski et al.
2006; Hahn et al. 2014). We have argued on the relevance of considering, as most researchers in
the field of dual systems seem to do, an equivalence between the unconscious and the implicit
(Hagège 2014).
21 See for example: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/takeatest.html.
22 For more details on the term “subject”, see Hagège (2014), and on the term “information”, see
also section 1.4.1.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 17

therefore not similar to the mind, much less to consciousness: they are to the
mind what waves are to the ocean... they do not exist without it, but it can
exist without them (Chapters 2 and 3).

1.2. The objective world as an epistemological23 and societal

reflection of the collective mind: an example of science

“The miracle is that the universe created a part of itself to study

the rest of it, and that this part, in studying itself, finds the rest
of the universe in its own inner realities” (citation attributed to
John Lilly 1972).

“Knowledge is a representation of the world that exists only in

and for a human mind” (Perrenoud 1998, p. 493, author’s
translation, emphasis original).

Science studies (Harding 1991; Pestre 2006) have provided ample

evidence that science co-evolves with society and produces knowledge about
an objective world, depending on the subjects and their context of activity.
This objective world is thus seen here as a reflection of their collective mind.
It will also be argued in the following chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) that one of
the major obstacles to responsibility is the following: subjects have the implicit
impression of perceiving the ultimate reality, when in fact they perceive a
relative reality. Here, the proposed analysis leads us to consider that this gap
is omnipresent in science, including within the so-called “hard” sciences. In
the latter, concepts seem to be disconnected from human concerns and
values (Fourez 2002). In this way, these disciplines can commonly give the
illusion of access to knowledge that would relate to the ultimate reality of
phenomena (ibid.).

A central objective of an education for responsibility, ethics or spirituality

will therefore appear, in the context of our reflection, as being the reduction
of the gap between the ultimate reality and what the subject perceives of it, a
reduction that can be achieved by a change in the functioning of the mind
(Chapters 2 and 3).

23 “Epistemology” means etymologically “knowledge discourse”. It is a discipline that studies

knowledge, its status, origin and scope.
18 Education for Responsibility

1.2.1. Paradigms and projections in science

The notion of paradigm makes it possible to understand this notion of

discrepancy: T.S. Kuhn (2008/1962) compares a paradigm to a pair of
glasses that a scientist would wear, without being aware that he is wearing
them (Box 1.2).

Thomas S. Kuhn (1922–1994) is an essential figure in the epistemology of

sciences: some epistemologists consider that there is a pre-Kuhnian and a post-
Kuhnian era in this field.

Based on a socio-historical analysis of the physical sciences, he proposed the

notion of normal science: under such a regime, researchers adhere to norms and
rules of scientific practice, and it is in this way that this practice differs from
pseudoscience. Indeed, their research is framed by a paradigm, which provides a
mold for interpreting reality and the legitimate methods and questions that guide
the research. The paradigm is also based on metaphysical imperatives; it is not
based solely on refutable proposals. Scientists have the illusion of knowing how
the world is made up. The paradigm is a disciplinary matrix comprising
knowledge, values, implicit features, norms, a common language... in short, it
has the attributes of a culture. Thus, the expected results generally belong to a
limited range of possibilities (predictable given the paradigm’s constraints) and
the work of the researcher – rather an engineer than an inventor – consists
mainly in knowing how to achieve them. If a result does not belong to the range
of what is expected, it is often ignored because it is not comprehended. In normal
science, publications are short, comprehensive and addressed to specialists. They
start where the textbooks stop. Before the first period of normal science, the
prescientific period is characterized by the absence of common achievements.
This is the case of physics before Newton, chemistry before Lavoisier or biology
before cell theory. Theories are then drawn from metaphysics and publications
are general books addressed to all. During a period of normal science, the
paradigm grows, gradually accumulating knowledge, but also anomalies. These
anomalies are facts that either contradict the paradigm or whose explanation
resists the paradigmatic methodology. They are put aside, but at some point,
when they become too significant, a crisis period (which is opposed to normal
science) can arise. Here, the foundations of the paradigm are challenged. The
crisis can be resolved with the adherence to a new paradigm, which is a sign of a
scientific revolution. This is what would have happened when the Newtonian
paradigm changed to the Einsteinian paradigm.

This vision contrasts with the conception of linear scientific progress: the
greatest advances would be made by breaking with previous ways of seeing
reality, not by adding new knowledge to the knowledge already acquired. Also,
the other novelty of Kuhn’s theory was the emphasis on the fact that the reasons
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 19

for changing paradigms (and therefore cultures) cannot be entirely rational.

Indeed, on the one hand, at a time when the first adherents to this new culture
were emerging, the new paradigm had not yet provided solid evidence of its
effectiveness. On the other hand, since any instrument of proof or measurement
necessarily refers to a frame and is therefore part of a paradigm, there is no
extraparadigmatic measuring instrument (i.e. outside any paradigm).
Consequently, the choice of one paradigm over another cannot be rationally
assessed, nor can the two paradigms measured in relation to another; in other
words, the latter two are immeasurable.

Box 1.2. Paradigms, normality, revolutions and incommensurability in science

Normal science therefore leads to projections within a paradigm,

projections as unconscious as the paradigm. These projections are language-
mediated. Thus, when new concepts emerge, they are often named by
borrowing terminology from everyday life notions. For example, the concept
of work in physics (W, for work) was derived from the analogy between
(human) work and the changes made by a machine. What initially consists of
explicit and conscious metaphors is then erased and hardened; this gives the
illusion of apparent autonomy (Fourez 2002). Here, as if in nature there were
a W force, instead of considering that humans have constructed an
interpretation of reality according to which a magnitude, which they called
W, makes it possible to understand certain phenomena. Another example, in
biology this time24, concerns genetics. The term “gene” comes from the
ancient Greek γένος, genos, which means “generation, birth, origin”. The
same root can be found in the terms “generate”, “genius”, “genesis” or even
“Genesis”, which refers to the first book of the Bible, in which it is reported
that God created the world. Thus, one of the semantic connotations attributed
to hereditary particles is that of intelligent entities that create (we could
almost add ex nihilo) an entire organism. This connotation, which does not
correspond to biologists’ conscious thinking, has nevertheless implicitly
impacted biology for a long time (Hagège 2004) and probably still does
today.

Indeed, although dualism and genetic determinism are now being

challenged by scientists, it seems that we cannot detach a term from its
cultural semantic connotations, because language is our primary tool to think

24 We will detail the epistemology of biology, particularly molecular biology, in a forthcoming

book.
20 Education for Responsibility

(Vygotsky 1962/2003). Thus, although there has been a hardening (Fourez

2002) of the gene concept, this connotation probably still resonates today in
the unconscious25. We have also analyzed that it even gives rise to logical
contradictions and the recommendation of empirical means that are
sometimes inappropriate to the research questions (Hagège 2004).

We can see in this term “genes” a projection.

DEFINITION.– “Projection” means the “action of throwing forward,

launching” and in psychology, it means the “outside location of felt
impressions that then acquire an appearance of independent reality” (Kipman
2005; author’s translation). Projection is an automatic mechanism that is
mainly unconscious and causes us to project (in the geometric sense) a
vision of ourselves or a feeling we have on an external object (or others).
This results in seeing the object or person as we see ourselves unconsciously
or attributing an emotion to it that we have unconsciously, so that we have
the impression that the vision or feeling is part of the object or person and is
independent from ourselves.

EXAMPLE.– Finalism, that is attributing intentions to objects, for example by

saying “bacteria wants to enter the cell”, is a typical projection mechanism.
It is frequently observed among biology students. Jacob (1920–2013),
winner of the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1965, spoke of finalism as a
mistress whom we cannot do without, but whose existence we cannot admit
in public either. The same could almost be said of projections.

1.2.2. Examples of projection by a collective mind onto the

objective world

This reasoning could probably be generalized to all worlds. We will

consider here some other examples, still taken from our field, that of science,
to further illustrate this point. The field of science has the advantage of
serving as a basis for a perhaps more eloquent demonstration. Indeed, in our
Western societies, it seems more renowned than other fields of human
knowledge, to produce knowledge supposed to relate to the ultimate reality
of phenomena.

25 Because the etymological origin of the term inevitably contributes to its meaning.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 21

1.2.2.1. In physical sciences

A frequent anthropomorphic projection involves projecting permanent
entities separated from their environment, as human subjects tend to consider
themselves at least implicitly (we will detail this in Chapter 2). This is the case
with the notion of genes mentioned above. By following in particular the
momentum of the analytical method formalized by Descartes, particle physics
has sought to isolate what could be the ultimate atom of matter – in the sense of
the individual, that is indivisible. Atoms, electrons, quarks, bosons, etc. the
material still seems to be able to be cut into smaller units. This attempt to catch
what would reassure us in our individuality has so far failed – and perhaps
contributes to slowing down our individuation. Today, all these hopes are falling
back on hypothetical unbreakable energy entities (string theory)... scientists
seem to have lost hope in the existence of such material entities.

1.2.2.2. In biology
Another example is Darwin (1809–1882), who constructed his theory of
natural selection by borrowing from the economist Malthus (1766–1834) a
vision of the world according to which resources being limited, it was
normal that only the best endowed individuals survive. This economic theory
aimed to justify the social inequalities of the time, particularly famines.
According to this theory, it would be quite normal for the poor to die since
they are the worst off and, in any case, there is not enough for everyone to
eat. Thus, despite his humanist values, and probably because of an implicit
belief in an illusory neutrality of scientific theories – as if science faithfully
described the ultimate reality – Darwin gave us a vision of the living, which
has become paradigmatic, according to which living beings undergo
competition and struggle for their survival, in such a way that a merciless
selection takes place on them. Being blind to his own projections, he seemed
to believe that these processes, far from being a cultural interpretation, were
intrinsic to nature. However, there are cultures, for example among the
Touiavii of Samoa Island (or the Bochimans of the Kalahari Desert), where
these notions, imbued with values typical of 19th Century liberal England,
have no equivalent. These human beings think and live without any notion
similar to competition or property... Their world is very different from ours –
and probably warmer too. Since language is always culturally situated, and
axiologically tinged, these objective worlds are never neutral in value26.

26 This idea resonates with W.V. Quine’s ontological relativity theory.

22 Education for Responsibility

Thus, it is not surprising to see that, on the basis of Darwin’s theory,

Social Darwinism developed, which legitimized the establishment of
eugenics (science) and eugenism (its social application) in the United States
and Northern Europe at the beginning of the 20th Century. This science
advocated the good intention of helping nature select the best individuals,
leading to the forced sterilization of tens of thousands of people deemed
unfit for reproduction, usually the poor (first sterilization law in 1907 in
Indiana). It was this momentum that Hitler (1889–1945) drew inspiration
from, with Social Darwinist theories developing his promulgation of the
Aryan race. In our opinion, these abuses were potentially contained in
Darwinian theory: it is not neutral to say that living is competition and
selection. Undoubtedly aware that the objective world depends on the
collective mind that builds it, today some scientists are developing models of
biological evolution based on notions such as cooperation (Nowak and
Sigmund 1998), and these models seem to be effective. The notion of
cooperation is no more neutral than that of competition, but the values it
underlies, and their potential drifts, are more peaceful and more humanistic.

1.2.2.3. In social psychology

Finally, we will briefly present a final field, which concerns closely the
scientific study of responsibility, and whose evolution seems quite eloquent:
that of moral psychosociology. One of the pioneering researchers in this
field was Kohlberg (1927–1987), who put forward a developmental-
cognitive approach forged between the 1950s to 1980s (reviewed by
Kohlberg and Hersh 1977)27. He proposed moral dilemmas to subjects of
different ages and focused on the types of justification for their judgments.
Thus he highlighted six developmental stages, each corresponding to a type
of justification and a level of responsibility (or morality): (1) obedience and
punishment orientation, (2) self-interest orientation, (3) interpersonal accord
and conformity (the “good boy/good girl” attitude), (4) authority and social-
order maintaining orientation, (5) social contract orientation, and (6) the use of
universal ethical principles (including justice), like Kant. Kohlberg advocated
the universality of his model (ibid.). But he was himself inspired by Kant...
the snake bites its own tail. Subsequent studies revealed that the sixth stage
was so rare that it was eventually removed, that its model was not universal,
and that stages 4 and 5 seemed essentially limited to the middle and upper
classes of Western or Westernized urban adolescents and adults in the

27 Situations with two morally problematic outcomes.

 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 23

United States (Jensen 2008). It happened to be with such an audience that

Kolhberg had conducted his studies and that the samples were mainly
composed of male subjects (in short, subjects that resembled him).

Considering this androcentrism, Gilligan (1936–) turned to a female

audience. Through her interviews, she concluded that care was a female
orientation (and not amoral!) while justice was a more typically male
orientation. Her model, like that of Kohlberg, suffers from cultural
limitations.

Thus, researchers who turned to African-American subjects, or Eastern

cultures, revealed dimensions that were almost absent from the first studies
(e.g. spiritual justifications, ibid.). In the social sciences and humanities, the
researcher or experimenter has come to project their own culture on the
object under study, hence the need to contextualize the research (Haste and
Abrahams 2008; reviewed by Sachdeva et al. 2011). Obviously, this book is
also concerned with this assertion, although we try to be vigilant about this
kind of bias by contextualizing our proposals culturally and to minimize
them by referring to an epistemology of complexity.

1.2.2.4. Influences of androcentrism in science

In the history and epistemology of science, it was highlighted that science
and its dominant historical reading had been shaped by a Eurocentric male
perspective. Thus, in biology, we can find mechanistic models and concepts
colored by the male gender (example: the notion of master gene28), under the
influence of an institutionalized and standardized, andro- and Eurocentric
policy (Harding 1995). In addition, male historical reading has tended to
minimize or obscure female contribution to the history of science (see, for
example, the late recognition of Rosalind Franklin’s work 1920–1958, to the
DNA double helix model proposed by Watson 1928–, and Crick 1916–
2004). The feminist argument is one of many: every minority is affected.
Since human thought is necessarily biased, and colored by the socio-
historical contingency of the subject who produces it, standpoint theorists
propose, in order to open up thought and maximize objectivity, to start by
considering minorities and marginal lives.

28 Nota bene: this notion of master gene, which appeared at the end of the 20th Century and
which today tends to be abandoned, echoes the Cartesian idea of “making masters and owners
of nature” (Descartes 1637, p. 78, author’s translation).
24 Education for Responsibility

In short, the problem does not lie in the biases inherent in scientific
activity, but in the absence of their recognition and consideration when the
image of neutral knowledge is promulgated (Coutellec 2015).

1.2.3. Overview: the scientific world, a reflection of scientists’

minds

Thus, we can propose some initial answers to the question about the
relationship between the world and the mind. Subjects (in this case the
researchers who contributed to the construction of this field) who are
considered as being the emergence of the interaction between the individual
and the environment, that as an individuation (Hagège 2014) have had
innovative ideas and actions. Some of these ideas can be interpreted as
psychological projection mechanisms that give the outside world meanings
similar to those concerning the individual’s function in their environment.
We can therefore consider that the origin of these evolutions is in the
creativity of the subjects’ minds. And, in molecular biology, projection
involves seeing in the living a creative mind (see the “gene”).

In summary, the proposed answer to the initial question is that the world is a
reflection of the mind. We do not stipulate here that this world would be a pure
invention, disconnected from the real; as Fourez (2002) expresses it, this world
is the result of a negotiation between researchers and the real, and we cannot say
which part of it comes from the one or the other. If we are talking, it is about a
world, because the real is inexpressible... The meanings that make the world
what it is cannot, in our opinion, be changed if those that make the mind what it
is are not. Consequently, one may wonder whether it would not be futile to hope
to change the world without seeking to change the mind.

In summary, in a so-called “hard” science, objects are studied within a

shared paradigm, which collectively constrains norms, experimental
procedures considered as valid, language, etc. In contrast, in a human
science, each researcher must clarify their theoretical framework, by
borrowing it from another or creating it, defining the terms they use, etc.,
even if certain procedures can also be standardized. It is, in particular, in this
explanation of the theory, in its internal coherence, and possibly in its
empirical operational character that the scientificity of the approach lies.
Thus, in the “hard” sciences, we will speak more of the projection of a
collective mind on an objective world, while in the human sciences, we will
be able to see individual projections more frequently.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 25

In any case, researchers project meanings, which can be problematic when

authors assert the universal significance of the knowledge they produce (Hagège
2013; Jensen 2008). Also, brought back to the question of how to educate for
responsibility, this reasoning invites us to formulate the following question:
what meanings and functions of the mind favor responsibility? We will propose
answers as to the meanings and functioning of the mind, respectively in the
second and third chapters. Beforehand, it is necessary to propose a model of the
functioning of the individual mind and its relationship with the subjective world.
This is what we will do in the next section.

1.3. The subjective world as a psychological and phenomenological

reflection of the individual mind

“Usually, we are trying to take advantage of our world – to milk

our world or to slaughter it. We have precisely the same attitude
toward our world that we have toward cows. […] And if they don’t
produce anything, or even if it only looks like they won’t produce
anything, we slaughter them and eat them up. This is an expression
of aggression […] if your mind is preoccupied with aggression,
you cannot function properly.” (Trungpa 1996, p. 15)

In section 1.2, we illustrated that the objective world is constituted by

reflecting the relative mind on a collective scale. At the individual level, how
is the subjective world shaped? On what basis is it oriented? To answer these
questions, we will first consider the subjectivity of perception. Being the
spiritual or mental counterpart of the notion of subjective world, the notion
of individual relative mind (or more briefly of “mind” in this section) refers
to a subjective perception of the world. So what are the reasons for the
subjectivity of the individual perception of the world?

1.3.1. The basic mechanisms of the world-mind relationship

1.3.1.1. Modalities of perception

1.3.1.1.1. Sensory perception of physical phenomena
A first reason for this subjectivity is that the five senses (which allow us
to perceive visual, olfactory, tactile, auditory and gustatory objects
respectively) are specific. As mentioned above with the notion of Umwelt,
the organs of the human senses are different from those of a bumblebee, an
26 Education for Responsibility

oyster or a crocodile, and allow us to perceive only a part of the real. For
example, unlike bees, our visual photoreceptors do not detect ultraviolet
rays. Beyond these interspecific differences, there are interindividual
differences. For example, a color blind individual does not see colors in the
same way as a person with normal vision. A 5'1'' tall individual does not see
the same things as a 6 ft tall individual.

The five senses allow us to perceive phenomena external to the organism

and we speak of exteroception here (Beaumont et al. 2004). From the
subjective point of view, we will thus evoke the first five types of perception
objects (corresponding to the phenomena detected by these five senses).
Each one depends on a type of particular receptor (respectively photo-,
chemo-, mechano-, and chemoreceptors) concentrated in a sensory organ
(respectively eyes, nose, skin, ears and tongue) and detecting a particular form of
energy: respectively electromagnetic (photons of light), chemical (volatile
molecules), mechanical (pressure on the skin), mechanical (sound vibration)
and chemical (soluble molecules), called “stimuli”29. At the basis of
perception, there is therefore a contact between a form of energy external to
the individual and a sensory receptor, which generates information at the
nerve level. This is called the “sensation”. This nerve impulse is transformed
into perception at the level of the brain. Perception depends on the area of
the cerebral cortex involved (and not on the nature of the stimulus; Campbell
1995). Thus, by pressing on closed eyes a light is perceived at this level; the
mechanical pressure causes a nervous impulse “interpreted” like light
through the areas of the visual cortex.

Biologically, other phenomena can be perceived, although different types

of neural receptors are mobilized, and these are not concentrated in an organ.
They concern the sensations within the organism, generating processes
called “proprioception” or “interoception” (Beaumont et al. 200430): for
example, the perception of back pain, inner pulse, muscle contraction,

29 This schema is a bit simplistic: the skin also contains thermoreceptors and nociceptors in
particular (detecting heat and pain respectively).
30 Some biologists distinguish between “proprioception” and “interoception”, the first referring to
everything that makes it possible to recognize the body's position in space (vestibular perception,
muscle contraction, etc.) and the second to other sensations internal to the body (pain or visceral
sensations for example). In this book, we group these two terms together under the term
“interoception”, which has the advantage of etymologically completing the “exteroception” (see
perception of the inside of the body versus the outside of the body).
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 27

gastric reflux, balance, etc. These sensations may involve nociceptors31 or

mechanoreceptors, in particular. We will talk here about a sixth type of
perception object, the corresponding phenomena being internal to the
organism (i.e. to the individual).

These first six types of perception objects therefore involve a physical

object or phenomenon, present in the subject’s immediate reality, in the
individual’s external or internal environment. They refer to a biological
conception of perception and sensory functions (ibid.), and to what we call
here “the first perceptual modality”.

1.3.1.1.2. Perception of mental phenomena

A second important reason for the subjectivity of individual perceptions
is the fact that reality is interpreted or imagined through mental phenomena.
We also detail this in the next section. The point we are concerned about
here is that we can perceive them. What are these phenomena? Internally, a
subject can experience and perceive the first six objects of perception, in a
way that is disconnected from the real. That is, in the absence of the
corresponding physical stimulus. Try, if you will, to do the following
internally, without it being visible to others from the outside (you can choose
the easiest option for you, out of the two done for each case, and take your
time): visualize your room or the face of a loved one, imagine the smell of
garbage cans or hot chocolate, getting a back massage or a pinch in your
right ear, hear the beloved ballad ‘If You Go Away’ or your own voice that
says “I love you”, eat a strawberry tartlet or a quarter lemon, perceive the
feeling of lumbago or gastric acidity due to hunger. There, we tried to
provoke them. However, this kind of phenomena can occur spontaneously in
the mind. In both cases, visual, olfactory, tactile, auditory, gustatory and
interoceptive objects can be mentally perceived (from the Latin mens,
“mind”), without this involving sensory receptors, or objects actually present
in your immediate environment. We propose to call all these six types of
mental objects “mental phenomena”, and to group them together to constitute
the seventh type of perception object, perceived according to a second
perceptive modality. Here the perception is therefore extrasensory.

As you can see, some mental phenomena correspond to words you hear
“in your head” (we would rather say “in your mind”), with a voice similar to

31 See note 29 in this chapter.

28 Education for Responsibility

yours, as you hear it when you speak aloud (since others hear your voice in a
different way than you). This may be the case right now, as you read these
words... Do you hear them internally with your own voice? Sometimes
another person’s voice can also be recreated internally. This is the case, for
example, if you imagine or remember a discussion between this person and
yourself. It is then an inner dialogue, imagined or recalled. This is what we
call here the “mental verbal”. The mental verbal is a type of thought which
consists of (purely) mental verbal sound phenomena.

With this verbal mind, there is another type of mental phenomena that are
probably predominant in the ordinary mind, which we will call here “mental
images”. They appear as inner visions, which can be associated with physical
sensations, possibly tastes, smells, etc. For example, I can ask you to
imagine yourself lying on a deckchair by the beach in an idyllic setting...
You hear the sound of waves... the ebb and flow from the sea... The sun at its
zenith heats your skin and dazzles you... You smell the sea spray... You let
yourself be rocked by this frame and by the blue sky... The mental
phenomena can be caused as here by reading. It is the virtue of a good novel
to make us experience inner scenes disconnected from our actual perception
of the first six objects of the senses. For example provoking in us a dream in
the waking state in short, which is often accompanied by mental images.
However, most of the time, mental phenomena are born spontaneously
without being directly “controlled” by the environment – as I have just done
and above – even if they are often born in reaction to it. Mental images thus
correspond to what we perceive when we dream during sleep, or in the
waking state, for example, when we recall a past situation or when we
imagine a future situation: scenes or situations are seen internally in the form
of images, sometimes felt through other non-verbal mental sensations. These
mental images are another form of thoughts.

In summary, mental phenomena can involve the purely mental experience

of six types of objects, including verbal mental phenomena (verbal sound
mental objects) and mental images (visual mental objects). They have a
meaning for the subject, a meaning derived from a symbolic language,
respectively verbal or pictorial, in both cases highlighted. This meaning has
cultural and personal dimensions; thus these phenomena are linked to the
collective and individual worlds. Indeed, perceptions are different and do not
function in the brain in the same way in different cultures (Kitayama et al.
2003).
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 29

Mental phenomena are most of the time out of step with the present
moment. We propose here three levels of mismatch with the real, in
descending order:
– mental phenomena are completely disconnected from the present
moment. Interestingly, authors here distinguish between “thoughts oriented
towards objectives” (e.g. task planning), “spontaneous thoughts” (e.g.
dreams or thoughts considered “drifting”, that is without a tail or head;
Christoff et al. 2016, p. 71932). Rather, we will distinguish between reactive
and creative thoughts, the latter being in one way or another in connection
with the real (see section 1.3.2.4.3);
– mental phenomena are linked to the present moment. These are usually
verbal phenomena, for example when a thought comments or describes a
present situation. In this case, on the one hand, there is a time lag, because
what has been named has already changed, at least at the subatomic level
between the time when it is perceived by one of the first five senses and the
time when it is named internally.
On the other hand, the words “lock up” suggest reality in a universe of
cultural significance. The use of the verb therefore fundamentally implies a
cultural cognitive distortion;
– mental phenomena correspond to mental and unconscious infraverbal
processes, intimately related to perception (see sections 1.3.1.2 and
1.3.2.1.1). Here we speak of unconscious thoughts.

These thoughts contain an interpretation of what is experienced, which is

culturally and personally biased, and thus they color and distort perceptions.
In social psychology, it has indeed been shown, particularly with priming
techniques, that by modifying the subject’s preconceptions, they perceive
and interpret information in a biased, priming-oriented manner (Myers 2009).
These mental phenomena therefore contribute to the subjectivity of individual
perceptions.

1.3.1.1.3. The extrasensory perception of physical phenomena

Finally, it is important to note that there is likely to be another type of
extrasensory perception, distinct from the first and second perceptual

32 We also include (unlike these authors) compulsive thoughts such as mental ruminations. We
also do not agree with all the criteria of their classification or terminology. For example, from the
ultimate point of view, all mental phenomena are spontaneous.
30 Education for Responsibility

modalities. We will call it “direct knowledge”. This perception concerns

a priori (but not exclusively) phenomena rather external to the organism, and
its modality differs from the second perceptual modality in that it does not
seem to be mediated by representations, nor a language (verbal or pictorial)
that is consciously accessible33. These seem to be directly perceived
meanings. Thus, it is a third type of perceptual modality. This seems to be the
case, for example:
– with blindsight, where individuals unconsciously detect and identify
visual stimuli in the total absence of perceptual awareness, following lesions
in the V1 area of the visual cortex (Overgaard 2011). For example, they may
discriminate between shapes (by “guessing”) or grasp objects appropriately,
which they do not see (Block 1995). In our opinion, this is unconscious
knowledge34;
– in “excorporations” (out of body experiences), frequent in near-death
experiences. The latter are increasingly being studied scientifically (Sleutjes
et al. 2014). Unconscious and sometimes blindfolded subjects describe
elements of their then objective environment a posteriori, as if they had seen
them with their own eyes (which is certainly not the case; Blackmore 2012) ;
– in intuitive experiences, where subjects may become aware of
phenomena or situations that are beyond the reach of their five senses
(Petitmengin 2003). In this case of intuition, this is what is commonly called
the “sixth sense”. These experiences seem to have a generic structure, made
up of inner microgestures (ibid.), partly characterized by a transmodality
where the “for-me-ness35” disappears. That is to say, what is perceived does
not correspond to a given meaning, but to “movements, intensities, rhythms,

33 Classical phenomenology, with its solipsistic tendency, seems to ignore these knowing
possibilities of consciousness (which have only recently) been mediated and scientifically studied:
in Husserl’s work, the subject can only know through their flesh, through representation and
perception, while in Heidegger’s work, the ultimate reality its subject, the Dasein, in his singular
link with death, is fundamentally isolated from any external reality in regards to the subject
(Courtine-Denamy 2015).
34 Block (1995) discusses the case of blindsight, which is phenomenologically problematic: it is
clear that subjects have no access-consciousness to what they have seen (because they cannot say
anything about it), but have they had a phenomenal, ephemeral and not memorized consciousness,
or in any case not accessible a posteriori (a bit like in the case of dreams during sleep)? Rather, we
propose that the mind recognizes characteristics of this environment and that this knowledge is
unconscious.
35 Term defined in section 1.3.3.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 31

i.e. transmodal qualities, transposable from one modality to the other”

(Petitmengin 2006, p. 89 author’s translation).

These cases, and in particular the latter, seem to indicate the existence of
infraverbal thoughts, such that a meaning appears in the mind, without it being,
at the moment it appears, in the form of words, images or any other precise
form. Sometimes, the formalization of this thought in language can take a long
time. When Poincaré (1854–1912), an illustrious mathematician, had an
intuition for the problem of the three bodies, as he described in Science et
méthode (1908), he explained that this idea suddenly appeared to him while he
was putting his foot on the step of a bus on holiday. This is not the mathematical
sequence of reasoning that he saw, but rather a kind of undifferentiated
summary of the result of this demonstration, which he later wrote.

ANECDOTE.– In a similar way, one day, I was in front of a Buddhist temple

in Auvergne (France). I contemplated the beauty of the extensive landscape
of this quiet countryside. From memory, I was in conversation with
someone. Suddenly the meaning of the world appeared in my mind as a
reflection of the mind, as a concentrated understanding: all of a sudden, I
saw, I understood, I knew, and this, without verbal thought. Like a flash, fast
and illuminating. In a way, as I see it today, this book is a formalization, an
explanation and a justification of this intuition. Even if other insights
appeared to me during the writing of this book, about some aspects of the
reasoning, the formatting of this book will have taken much longer than the
immediate and condensed flash where this meaning appeared to me.

To conclude, there may be direct knowledge, little or no conscious (in the

case of blindsight) or conscious (as in intuition), and seemingly without
thought either. To further detail what was mentioned in the introduction, it
should also be pointed out that in the theoretical framework proposed here,
mental phenomena are considered to be of the same nature as the mind, that
is of an informational nature36. This refers to their representational and
semantic dimension. The mind can perceive or recognize mental phenomena
(like other objects of knowledge), consciously or unconsciously (Figure 1.1).

36 This remains valid even if neural correlates have been involved: some areas of the brain
seem to be activated synchronously with the emergence of mental phenomena (Christoff et al.
2016). Rather subject-specific than individual-specific (Hagège 2014), it is not surprising that
these phenomena have a physical medium, but it is only one of their dimensions (see section
1.4.1).
32 Education for Responsibility

Verbal thoughts are considered here as one of the possible objects of

knowledge (taste, etc). We postulate that they are dependent on the mind, but
when the reciprocal is wrong (e.g. in meditative absorption) there is a
knowing mind in the absence of verbal thought. This is what is called
“mental calm” in some traditions (Lutz et al. 2007). Thus, it is necessary to
distinguish between consciousness, mind, thoughts and knowledge – and this is
even imperative for us here.
1.3.1.2. Projection, phenomenological grasp and identification
(distortion of perceptions)
“There are only two places in the world where we can live
happy: in our home and in Paris.” (citation attributed to Ernest
Hemingway)

Let us return to our question about the processes that generate

subjectivity. When I work on the notion of observation in science with my
students, many of them think automatically that observation and
interpretation are clearly dissociable by most subjects: thus biologists would
make neutral observations, independent of any cultural significance. We
have argued in section 1.2 against this idea. And cognitively, it also seems
clear that such dissociation is not carried out by the majority of subjects (see
below).

At this explanatory level, we find a concept mentioned in section 1.2: that

of projection. The subject projects interpretations and meanings that they
“take for truth”. To what extent are these projections “taken as truth”? To the
extent that there is what we call a “phenomenological grasp”, sometimes
simply called “grasp” in this text.

DEFINITION.– Phenomenological grasping – which might have been also

called phenomenological intake or seizure (as a translation from the French
word “saisie”) – is a dynamic of the mind that causes subjective
consciousness to be absorbed in a perceived phenomenon37 (physical like a

37 “Phenomenon” and “object” both refer to everything that the mind can perceive (see the seven
types of perceptible objects): a tangible or intangible object, a person, a situation, etc., but they do
not refer to the same reference frame. “Phenomenon” reflects the impermanent and interdependent
nature of what is perceived and expresses the phenomenological dimension of perception. It refers
to the ultimate dimension of the object. “Object” is related to something (object of identification,
object of perception, etc.) and expresses a psychological dimension, in connection with the relative
reality.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 33

strawberry tartlet, or immaterial like a thought; see below for more details).
Thus, in the moment, consciousness is reduced to this phenomenon, while
the other phenomena simultaneously present in the mind are obliterated,
displaced from the field of consciousness or put at its background. In the
moment, the subject unconsciously self-identifies with the phenomenon in
which their consciousness is absorbed. That is, the phenomenon is
unconsciously and subtly considered as “me” or “mine”. If the phenomenon
is appraised as undesirable, then the identification automatically changes to
its opposite-alter-ego, rejection. This means that the phenomenon is then
considered as “other”. In both cases, it is a grasp. Note: for simplicity, we
refer below mainly to identification, as rejection emerges from more
complex dynamics (see below).

This notion of grasp is therefore linked to that of identification. The latter

is considered here as an unconscious dynamic, which makes the subject feel
alive through phenomena, which then become objects of identification.
Paradoxically, it is because the subject feels separated from a phenomenon
that they identify with it. In this respect, identification, like rejection,
objectively corresponds to a dual functioning (even if only rejection is
subjectively experienced as a duality). Duality is based on three terms:
subject, object and the relative38 separation between the two. Two types of
identification can be distinguished:
– on the phenomenological level (see the definition of phenomenal
consciousness, section 1.1.3), in connection with phenomenological
grasping, when consciousness is absorbed in a perceived phenomenon, the
subject unconsciously takes themselves for the phenomenon at the time; they
feel themselves unconsciously exist through this phenomenon. If the
phenomenon is rejected, it is the way of experiencing one’s own existence
through the phenomenon that changes, but the process is similar. This
identification may be fleeting. Thus, there can be identification with a
thought, an emotion, a person, a strawberry tartlet, etc.;

EXAMPLES.– As I stand in the line at the bakery, I look at the last strawberry
tartlet that remains in the window. I do “one” with this phenomenon. My
consciousness is absorbed by this vision and I am already salivating from it.
Unconsciously, “me = strawberry tartlet”: at this moment, nothing else is

38 This separation, and therefore duality itself, does not ultimately exist, because of the principles
of interdependence and impermanence which characterize vacuity (see end of 1.4.3).
34 Education for Responsibility

part of my subjective reality. This is an identification. Also, it’s as if I was

sure I was going to eat this tartlet, since I can already see myself eating it
(projection). Identification is therefore linked to desire. Now, damn it, the
person in front of me is buying it. The perception of this situation is instantly
rejected or denied in a way: “a situation where there is no longer in the
window the strawberry tartlet I wanted to eat = other.” In other words, “me =
not this situation”. This rejection therefore consists of the counter-
impression of an identification: instead of embracing the reality that presents
itself to my consciousness, I do “two” with it. It is a duality, manifesting
from a subjective point of view. Note: the rejection of an unwanted situation
can lead to complete amnesia of the situation if it is too painful for the
subject’s consciousness (purely psychological coma or traumatic amnesia).
– on the psychosociological level, the subject has the impression of
living, of existing through phenomena. This identification is more diffuse
and persistent. Thus, the subject frequently self-identifies with their name,
body, social role, etc. It is because of identification that some subjects
experience the end of a social role very badly, which can even lead some
people to commit suicide. For example: “If I no longer have my role as a
mother (because I lost my child), my job (because I was fired) or such a
belief, I no longer feel I exist, so I would prefer to die.” Moreover,
experiments have shown that when circumstances show a subject that their
beliefs about the world are wrong, this creates dissonance (a state of
uncomfortable tension), which will often lead the subject to reinterpret their
own actions in light of new beliefs, with the feeling that they were already
there before (cognitive dissonance theory from Festinger; Myers 2009). It is
therefore as if the subject needs to believe that they have not changed their
own beliefs and that these beliefs are, and have always been, congruent with
the world (or, as the subject believes, with the ultimate reality): as, through
phenomenological grasp, they feel they exist through these beliefs, explicitly
challenging them would be tantamount to questioning their own existence.
Obviously, identifying with persons, situations, endogroups, etc. implicitly
means identifying oneself as not being (or rejecting) other persons,
situations, exogroups, etc. “Me” is defined in relation to the other, in a
duality of identity/otherness. Doing “one” with something implies doing
“two” with others39.

39 And even, as explained above, this is underpinned by a duality with the desired object.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 35

On the phenomenological level, when a subject’s mind is “absorbed” in

their thoughts, the physical phenomena simultaneously present with these
thoughts, and which could be perceived (e.g. auditory phenomena) are in the
background of consciousness. They will then react less to these stimuli; for
example they will not hear when called (“You-hoo! Can you hear me? I’m
talking to you.” “Excuse me, I was absorbed in my thoughts.”) or in a movie,
conversation, etc. This grasp thus makes the perception of the phenomena
incomplete and partial, and it is unconscious at the moment. At the moment
when there is grasping, the subject is not conscious of the reduction of their
consciousness. An analogy can be made here with the method of capturing
monkeys in Indonesia: a bottle is attached to a solid holder and in the bottle a
peanut is placed. The monkey grabs the peanut and can no longer remove its
hand from the bottom; it is thus captured. The relative mind works in a
similar way with perception objects: the monkey allows itself to be captured
(or captivated) by them, without realizing that it would be free “by simply
dropping the peanut”. It is a bit like a dream, where we take our way of
living things as true, whereas this way is a “fantasy” created by our mind
(Box 1.3):

“As soon as we identify with a role or an image, it becomes a

limitation. It’s like placing yourself in a mold and then
wondering why you feel cramped.” (Goldstein 2017, p. 186,
author’s translation)

It should be noted that projection, phenomenological grasp and duality

(identification – rejection) are like the three heads of a Cerberus called
“ego”: the three inseparable facets of the same process. If you hold three
matches vertically by pressing them together, and remove one, the other two
collapse (this is the principle of a beam). Well, it is the same here. Cutting a
single head is enough here to kill this three-headed dog.

When the term “mind” is mentioned, we place ourselves from an objective point
of view, since our definition of the mind not only includes consciousness, but also the
unconscious.

We hypothesize that the dream is a conscious subjective experience and that

it is only a matter of degree as compared to ordinary life (the content of its
experience is only more disconnected from the real than usual). To understand
this, we need to distinguish between subjective and objective points of view:
from the subjective point of view, the dream (dreamed at night or dreamed
during the day) is the phenomenological experience of the subject, and from the
36 Education for Responsibility

objective point of view, this experience corresponds to a reduction of the

subject’s field of consciousness compared to what their mind embraces (and, for
example, everything they perceive unconsciously). So in the dream, it would be
the consciousness that would be absorbed, but the subject is not aware of this: it
is the paradox of the phenomenological grasp. That is, the subject would be
aware of their dream, but not that they are dreaming (if they are not a lucid
dreamer). As we will see, it is when there is, at the subjective level, a transition
from the subjective point of view to the objective point of view, or the
integration into the field of consciousness of something that was not (which was
only in the objective point of view – e.g. becoming aware of an implicit attitude)
that there is a gain in responsibility.

Box 1.3. The mind, dream and phenomenological grasp

In cognitive psychology, the cognitive dimension of the first steps of

phenomenological grasping is called “information processing”. This last
notion makes it possible to link the first and second perceptual modalities
(thus the senses and mental phenomena – in this case the mental phenomena
that are less out of step with the real). It is described as a multi-step process
that includes, according to Launay (2004):
– sensory coding, which encodes the formal properties of sensory signals
(at the level of the five senses and interoception);
– the synthesis of sensory characteristics into a perceptual representation,
which is without semantic value for the subject. This representation is part of
peripheral, modular and automatic processing, and is not controlled by
attentional  processes;
– the semantic processing of perception.

“The effectiveness of sensory detection depends not only on the

ratio of signal strength to ambient background noise, but also on
a subject-specific decision criterion that reflects the subject’s
motivation to identify or neglect relevant signals. Attention acts
as an active filter that only lets through information that is
important […] as far as the subject’s attitudes and motivations
are concerned. […] One of the most essential aspects of the
perceptual stage itself [is] the recognition and identification of
objects. Perception [...] corresponds to the first level of
semantic processing. Still largely automatic, these processes
rely on several mechanisms such as feature extraction and
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 37

stimulus-signal detection, shape recognition, object

identification and categorization.” (ibid., p. 109–110, emphasis
orginial author’s translation).

“Perceptual identification allows [...] the recognition of objects

from the concepts to which they refer: if, in a first step, the
recognition of a shape results from a comparison between what
is perceived and a prototype stored in memory [...], the
recognition of the object is carried out in a second step on the
basis of the characteristics of the class to which the object
belongs.” (ibid., p. 111, author’s translation)

This explanation indicates that phenomenological grasp and coincidental

deformation are carried out in a way that is intertwined with perception: a
mental activity – conscious or not – of labelling perceived phenomena brings
this interdependent and impermanent reality into molds preconstructed by
culture (by gluing concepts on them). This is what we have called above
“infraverbal mental and unconscious processes” (section 1.3.1.1.2). Thus,
psychological experiments have shown that a subject has difficulty seeing
what they are not culturally prepared to see (Kuhn 1962/2008). In other
words, the process of transforming a sensory reception of ultimate reality
into the perception of a relative world is explained and integrated into the
process of information processing: ultimate reality has no meaning for the
subject, but semantic processing that mobilizes memory, connects, compares
perceptions to the known, to the signifier, favors perception according to
personal experience and cultural meaning (Brouillet 2008). This
categorization consists of the implicit affixing of a name to an object. Like
dreams, these subconscious phenomena seem more analogous to the image
than to the verb, although the possibility of naming them could be a
condition of their relative existence40. It seems that a human being learns to
perceive things at the same time as they learn to name them (ibid.).

In his explanation, Launay does not consider the case of the seventh
object of perception, when the mind is absorbed by a mental phenomenon
that is not directly related to simultaneous sensory perceptions, which is
often the case. See, dear reader, how your own mind can easily be caught up

40 Thus, for example, the Lapons distinguish and are able to recognize and name five kinds of
white and some Amazonian Indians, several hundred shades of green, where a European would not
see any difference between these shades of color.
38 Education for Responsibility

in verbal thoughts that repeat the past, imagine or plan the future for
example (section 1.3.1.1.2). Thus, the phenomenon of phenomenological
grasp applies here again to the second perceptual modality, because the mind
can be absorbed into the perception of a physical phenomenon, as well as a
mental one. This extension is an originality of the present theory.

What determines which phenomena are grasped or not grasped? What

processes can lead, for example, to emotional fusion with a strawberry
tartlet? Individuals perceive the environment and interact with it according
to preferences that are culturally and personally conditioned. About the
grasping process, Launey (2004) attributed subjective preferences (processed
information) to the subject’s attention, attitudes and motivations. These
preferences and dislikes have been theorized and explained in psychology or
psychosociology through various concepts, which are the (not exhaustive)
object of section 1.3.2.

1.3.2. The four horsemen of the individual relative mind

I use this nomenclature of the four horsemen mainly as a tribute to Bargh,

one of the leading researchers working on the cognitive unconscious, in
reference to one of his famous articles on automaticity (Bargh 1994).
Moreover, it so happens that the use we make of it here is partially consistent
with the biblical source: in the New Testament, the Four Horsemen
(conquest, war, famine and death) sow the Apocalypse. We will see in this
book that our riders can generate disharmony or harmony (section 2.4.3),
depending on their operation and orientation. In this section, we focus
mainly on their ego functions, which rather sow disharmony.

1.3.2.1. Process of orientation (and deformation) of perception

1.3.2.1.1. Attention, a modulator of the mind
The word “attention” has only two meanings in the Littré and we are
interested in its first meaning here: “action to fix the mind on, to beware of.”
In cognitive sciences, the concept refers to a group of processes called
“attentional processes”41. They occupy a central position in the processes of

41 Indeed, here, attention is considered in its cognitive sense. It is located at the bottom of
Citton’s attentional “milles feuilles” analogy (2014), with the dispositional factors (which we
mention only briefly in this book). In the upper layers of his “milles feuilles”, above what he
calls “individual attention”, he distinguishes other types of attention. Instead, we would rather
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 39

“control”, because they ensure “both the selection of relevant information,

the orientation of processing operations and the management of the
resources necessary for this processing” (Launay 2004, p. 180; author’s
translation). “Attention ‘supervises’ all cognitive activities from the
processing of sensory information to the decision-making processes that
trigger behaviors. It[...] mainly concerns the control of the flow of
representations” (ibid.). It can be assimilated to a more or less selective
filter42 that selects the relevant assessed environmental stimuli. As
information processing capacities are limited, the main role of attention is to
selectively allocate resources and control access to the central system of
processed information. It therefore conditions the perception process
mentioned in section 1.3.1.2.

Semantic characteristics of information would be more important in this

role than perceptual characteristics (Launay 2004). Thus, the subject’s
cultural and personal background would be more important in directing
attention than the components of the environment. In other words, attention
depends more on the relative world than on the ultimate reality. And at the same
time, it contributes to the relativity of this world. “The selectivity of attentional
filtering processes is based on a number of mechanisms that translate into
phenomena of orientation of the attention” (ibid., p. 185, author’s
translation).

Attention can be exogenous when attracted by an unexpected stimulus,

and endogenous when it results from an intention (ibid.). For the latter, there
are two modes: shared attention, when stimuli perceived by different sensory
channels are simultaneous, and focused attention, when only one channel is
used, in which case the processing of information is much better (ibid.) – and
this corresponds to different experimental paradigms (not really
physiological as far as shared attention is concerned). Diffuse attention is also
distinguished when it covers a relatively large part of the perceptual field
and concentrated attention when it is focused at a particular point (Launay
2004). This attentional orientation brings “about an internal representation of
the perceptual field, not on the visual scene itself” (ibid., p. 187):

talk about “situational factors”, and “socio-cultural conditioning” (and their impact on the
subject’s attention).
42 This notion of filter, which refers to Broadbent’s theory, is commonly accepted, although
slightly debated (Maquestiaux 2013).
40 Education for Responsibility

“Particular cognitive processes are then responsible for the

analysis of relevant stimuli. The main function of magnification
(amplification) processes is to increase the salience of the
information sought or expected.” (ibid., author’s translation)

They correspond to signal amplification and more intense nerve activity

when the information being processed is of interest to the subject. An
opposite process is that of inhibition, which leads to attenuation or even
suppression of the signal, also of central origin (Launay 2004). Thus the
perception of the real is distorted.

Also, attention conditions consciousness43. Indeed, any phenomenon that is

not the object of attention cannot be in the foreground of consciousness – it
is therefore subconscious or unconscious. For example, if I drive while my
mind is absorbed in thoughts – objects of my attention – the road is
perceived visually in a subconscious way. Have you ever been surprised by
“suddenly coming back to the objective reality” while your mind wandered
elsewhere, in a very subjective reality disconnected from the real? The
exogenous attention, grasped by a phenomenon that appears, leads to
“absorption” of the consciousness in this phenomenon (thus to a
phenomenological grasp). For example, I am reading (endogenous attention
with grasping) and suddenly the phone rings or a verbal thought is born; this
verbal thought could comment internally on the passage by just reading or
linking it to another event. These two phenomena (telephone or verbal
thinking) can capture my attention and instantly divert it from reading;
consciousness is then no longer present to reading, but only to the
captivating phenomenon (exogenous attention). In both cases, the field of
consciousness is limited to the perceived phenomenon. In the example of the
person on the terrace who hears a noise at midnight (see section 1.1.3), there
may be two scenarios. Either their attention is grasped at midnight by the
noise, in a way similar to the previous example of the phone ringing during
reading. Or, their attention and field of consciousness is amplified at
midnight, so that they become simultaneously aware of the conversation at
the table and the noise below (less likely if the subject has not trained their
attention to be diffused).

43 This consideration of the concepts of attention and field of consciousness in the modeling
of consciousness is a solution to the second problem of Block’s theory (1995) discussed in
section 1.1.3.
 Th
he World as a Reflection of the Mind 41

Thesse consideraations enjoinn us to purrsue the moodeling of thhe mind

outlinedd in the introductionn by categ gorizing connsciousness (always
phenommenal) accordding to the attentional
a modality
m invoolved and thee type of
object to
t which it iss present, that is, which it knows (Figure 1.2). A Attention
can be considered as a a modulaator of conscciousness (D Depraz 2014), which
modifiees or directs the
t quality, nature
n and quuantity of peerceived infoormation.
By “quuantity” of consciousneess, we im mply the nootion of a field of
consciouusness.

DEFINITTION.– The field

f of conssciousness iss the space (physical or mental)
occupieed by consciiousness. “T The subject conscious
c off something fills the
present moment of their
t time wiith this thingg (ideas, repreesentations, feelings,
memoriies, images, perceptions,
p etc.). […] What
W is experienced theree is only
experiennced in its pllace, […] thaat is, in the category
c of reeality assigneed to it.”
(Ey 20115, author’s translation)). Thus, the more attenntion is focuused, the
narroweer the field of conscioousness is and a the smaaller the am mount of
informaation involveed.

Figure 1.2. Quality of co

onsciousness gradients
g as a function of
the attentionaal modality and
d type of objecct

COMME ENT ON FIGU URE 1.2.– In the

t middle, atttention is diffffuse and shaared (it is
attentionn-vigilance; see section 2.3.2), and d there is a phenomennological
dialogissm between the inner world
w (sixth and
a seventh types of peerception
objects) and the outeter world (firrst five types of perceptionn objects), w
which are
perceiveed on an equaal footing annd simultaneo ously (dialogiism symbolizeed by the
42 Education for Responsibility

double arrows). This refers to the concept of equanimity (Desbordes et al.

2015), which will be developed later in the text. The other positions along the
horizontal axis correspond to a more concentrated attention, which coincides
with a narrower field of consciousness (and often a stronger phenomenological
grasp): consciousness is then essentially restricted to a phenomenon. Attention
can be focused either on an inner world phenomenon (e.g. a thought, as in A),
or on an outer world phenomenon (e.g. a phenomenon perceived audibly, or a
seen strawberry tartlet, as in B). Positions A and B are probably the most
frequent in the waking state of ordinary subjects. Attention grasping studies
have shown that salient events that suddenly occur in the environment
immediately grasp attention (Maquestiaux 2013). Studies on thoughts have also
shown that they are automatic and uncontrollable (Wenzlaff and Wegner 2000).
Thus, thoughts arise in the mind automatically. They can therefore be
considered as an event occurring in the subject’s world. The attention “jumps”
therefore in general from one perception object (a thought, noise, visual object
considered positive or negative, bodily sensation considered unpleasant, etc.) to
another, being automatically grasped, and therefore exogenous. It is sometimes
endogenous (for example, when the subject knowingly pursues a reflection on a
point they are trying to elucidate, as long as this research does not resemble
mental rumination, an unproductive process that “goes around on a loop”).

Here, we will essentially consider two attentional modalities:

concentrated attention and diffuse attention. In concentrated attention,
consciousness is absorbed into a phenomenon (a thought, an object of
perception, an emotion, etc.) and, at the given moment, is therefore absent
from all other phenomena, which can however be perceived subconsciously
(Braboszcz et al. 2010; Figure 1.2). In diffuse attention, several phenomena
can be perceived simultaneously, that is the subject can be aware, for
example, simultaneously of their breathing, of a bird and a thought that rises
in their mind. In this last example, as different sensory channels are
mobilized, attention is also called “shared”.

Having retained as a definition of the mind that it is the union of

consciousness and the unconscious, can attention also modulate the
unconscious processes? A great deal of research in the cognitive sciences
seems to attest to this. Indeed, for example, implicit learning, evaluative
conditioning or unconscious thoughts are goal dependent and require
attention (Dijksterhuis and Aarts 2010). Thus, it seems relevant to consider
attention as a modulator of conscious and unconscious processes, and
therefore of the mind as a whole.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 43

What determines a subject’s interest in a signal and therefore the

magnification or attentional inhibition processes? An answer to this question
can be found in appraisal theories.

1.3.2.1.2. Appraisal
“For me, heroin, well, I turn my nose up at it. Kids who inject
themselves all become accustomed to happiness and happiness is
not forgiving, since happiness is known for its cravings. To jab
yourself with a needle, you really have to try to be looking for
happiness and only the kings of idiots have such ideas. But I
don’t really want to be happy, I still prefer life” (Gary 1975,
author’s translation).

“The desire to take is related to the memory of ‘pleasure’.

Refusal is linked to the fear of suffering” (Patanjali 1991, p. 74,
author’s translation).

The appraisal process (Scherer 1999) consists of subjective evaluation

(often automatic and unconscious, but sometimes deliberate) of a situation,
therefore of a conjunction of phenomena from the outer world (perceived
according to the first perceptive modality), as desirable, undesirable or
neutral. Here we have a broader understanding of it, because we also include
the phenomena of the inner world, in particular thoughts (see the second
perceptual modality) and emotions, but also the sixth type of objects (see
interoception, including physical pain). In other words, the latter phenomena
are appraised, as well as external situations. Indeed, as we will detail below,
they can be the object of a phenomenological grasp. Then the mind is
absorbed in it, and perception distorted.

Appraisal determines the nature and intensity of the emotional response

to the situation or phenomenon – although some authors suggest that, on the
contrary, it is emotion that determines appraisal (discussed in Brouillet
2008). Linked to attention, appraisal is therefore a key process in the
perception-action articulation (with an important place for emotions and
mental phenomena in the hyphen between perception and action). Lazarus
et al. initially distinguished three types of appraisal: primary (in terms
of well-being for the individual), secondary (which follow them up and
appraise the resources available to deal with the situation) and reappraisal
(of primary assessments in the light of secondary ones). With regard to
primary appraisals:
44 Education for Responsibility

“three fundamental appraisals are possible: (a) the situation is

irrelevant because it has no personal meaning, it can then be
ignored [(‘I don’t care’)], (b) the situation is considered positive,
the event can be considered beneficial or desirable [ (‘I want’)],
and (c) the situation is considered negative44: the event can be
considered stressful, painful, threatening, [or unpleasant (‘I do not
want’)]” (Brouillet 2008, p. 31, author’s translation).

Thus the appraisal of the situation (or phenomenon) depends on the

appraisal of the emotion that this situation arouses: the “I want” corresponds
to sensations considered desirable, because they are assimilated to pleasure,
unlike the “I do not want” (see a nuance of this assertion in Box 1.4). For
example, if a greedy, or even gluttonous, subject finds themselves in front of
a buffet dinner, they will immediately identify the dishes they prefer (“I want”)
– randomly, strawberry tartlets – those they hate (“I do not want”), and this
corresponds to attention magnification (accompanied by a grasp). Some of
the dishes to which they are indifferent (“I do not care”) will go unnoticed by
them, and this corresponds to an attentional inhibition (which therefore
unconsciously amounts to an “I do not see”). In the same way, in general, a
subject arriving in a room filled with strangers will immediately identify
people who are attractive to them (whom they find well dressed or who seem
nice and approachable, for example, according to the criteria to which they
are sensitive; “I want”), others whom they would a priori tend to avoid (“I
do not want”), while they will not pay attention to all the others (“I do not
care” therefore “I do not see”). You can try to see for yourself how your
mind reacts in such cases.

These two examples illustrate that this focus of attention is based on

personal, culturally colored tastes, criteria, dispositions or judgments. This
operation is typical of what is called here the “ego” (see definition in section
1.4.2). The ego leads the subject to interact with their world essentially
according to the “I want”, “I do not want”, and “I do not care” (Figure 1.3).

44 For Lazarus, in case of stress, the appraisal can interpret the situation either as a threat
(loss of love or self-esteem for example), or as a challenge (gain of autonomy or possibility of
renewal by example; Mikolajczak and Bausseron 2013). The first modality would generate
negative stress, inhibiting action, unlike the second.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 45

Figure 1.3. Steps in structuring subjective ego trends. For a color

version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.3.– This theoretical case considers different visual

(v1 to vn), auditory (a1 to n), olfactory (o1 to n), etc. stimuli of equal importance in
the individual’s environment (in terms of amount of information). For
example, the different visual stimuli would correspond to the same number of
pixels on a photo taken in the individual’s visual field. The contact between
these perceptual objects and sensory receptors (or the mind if these objects
are mental phenomena) triggers step 1. In an ordinary subject, the attentional
magnification process increases the importance of a significant stimulus for
the individual (here v1 and v2) in their subjective reality, while attentional
inhibition decreases the perception of all the other stimuli simultaneously
present (step 2). The latter are therefore hardly part of its relative reality. This
distortion is unconscious. Perception confers a first-rate meaning by
answering “what is it?” (step 3). Note 1: for Koreans, silkworms are a festive
dish, so why not a silkworm pie? Note 2: instead of such an exotic tart, we
could have written “disappearance of the last strawberry tartlet in front of us
in the boulangerie”. The appraisal produces a second-order meaning that
responds to “do I want this?” (step 4). The reification of the ego that follows
(step 5) generally leads to the emergence of mental phenomena and emotions
(step 7) which are in turn phenomenologically grasped, because they are, at
the moment they emerge, in place of blue dots at the top. Approach or
avoidance behaviors may also emerge in this process. They also correspond to
objects of perception. Trends are thus amplified. In this way, step 6 engrams
46 Education for Responsibility

trends (mental, emotional, behavioral) by generating or reinforcing neural

circuits and perception-action schemes (step 7 returns to level 0, adding
another “layer” of phenomenological grasping). Such a reinforcement is
based on what is called “long-term potentiation” in neuroscience.

DEFINITION.– The term “engram” is a common term of German origin,

invented in neurology at the beginning of the 20th Century to designate the
memory trace left in the brain as a result of experience. It gave rise to the verb
“to engram”, which refers to the process by which this memory is inscribed in
neural circuits. Here, the word “engram”, sometimes referred to as emotional,
is used in a similar but broader sense. On the one hand, we consider that it is
potentially the whole body, and not just the brain, that constitutes the place of
engramming. On the other hand, the information corresponding to this
memorized experience is stored in the form of energy and contains data
concerning emotion, the attitudinal tendency and the corresponding thought-
action repertoire (see examples 1 and 2, section 1.3.2.4.2).

In the example in Figure 1.3, a pleasant object for the subject (a strawberry
tartlet), is associated with pleasure and thus appraised as “I want” and an
unpleasant object for them (a silkworm pie) as “I do not want”. However, it is not
always that simple. Sometimes, a subject may have approaching behavior, and
automatically appraise as desirable a situation or object that appears objectively
unpleasant or uncomfortable. This typically corresponds to a resonance with old
wounds (see section 1.3.2.4.2), that is, to known and addictive phenomena (see
section 2.4.2).

Thus, for example, depression or a toxic relationship of submission (example: a

woman who is a victim of domestic abuse) can be considered as an addiction to
certain behaviors and thoughts. The latter, which generally involves identification
as a victim, may correspond for the subject a “comfort zone”... even if this area has
sides that may otherwise seem uncomfortable. That is to say, unconsciously, the
subject’s psyche finds something reassuring, a feeling of existence, and would thus
be afraid of losing something if they dropped this known situation for an unknown
situation of which they eventually ignores the ins and outs. Mental phenomena
generally find coherent justifications in the eyes of the subject to remain in this
dynamic, which aim to maintain the status quo (and are effective in this regard).
So, like when you try to stop taking a drug, the “I want” and “I do not want” get
tangled up. So it may be that “I will stay” or “I smoke”, if “I am too scared” to be
confronted with emotions and a state of lacking.

The case of masochism, which we believe is part of the previous description,

does, however, present some particularities that deserve clarification. Indeed, it has
been proven that an important psychological component modulates the intensity of
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 47

pain. However, there are objectively painful stimuli, because they are perceived via
specific neural receptors (called “nociceptors”) present in the skin, bones, muscles,
joints, etc. These receptors have structural features that distinguish them from
receptors of general sensitivity. In particular, their terminations are free (not
encapsulated in connective tissue). They have a vital biological function, that of
preventing human beings from harming their physical integrity (even if, in the case
of chronic pain, the related signal may be unnecessarily amplified). Thus, the few
subjects (with congenital analgesia) who are insensitive to physical pain have a
shorter life expectancy because it is very difficult for them to learn which morbid
behaviors to avoid. The subjects known as “masochists” find some pleasure in
physical pain (which is only caused under certain conditions, usually those of a
sexual game of humiliation or infantilization).

Finally, we will end here with another special case, that of sugar consumption.
Refined sugar and its substitute saccharin are highly addictive, much more so than
a hard drug such as cocaine (Ahmed et al. 2013). There are also specialized
receptors of “sugar”, in the mouth and intestinal tract, that trigger neural signals
and hormonal reactions (Lee and Owyang 2017). We are biologically wired to seek
out and love sugar, because it is calorific, and these systems have been selected in
a nutrient-poor environment. Our current environment in Western societies is far
from that – France wastes 10 million tons of food per year45. Food industries
frequently take advantage of this biological condition by sweetening their products,
which increases their palatability. However, excess sugar appears to be variously
pathogenic (Khan and Sievenpiper 2016), in particular by being converted into fat
in the body (Sadler et al. 2015). Thus, unlike the case of physical pain, where it is
often beneficial to the physical integrity to rely on this biological signal and avoid
it, in the case of sugar, it is on average more beneficial to health not to consume it
every time our bodies are close to it. Never following such signals can also be, at
the other extreme, very pathological, even morbid; this is what happens with
anorexia for example.

In conclusion, biological bases, linked to our ancestral condition as Cro-

Magnon men (Raymond 2008), guide us, with some genetic (e.g. analgesia) or
psychopathological (e.g. anorexia) exceptions, towards “objectively” unpleasant or
pleasant stimuli in a similar way on average. However, on this common basis,
psychological and cultural constructions and phenomena of addiction condition our
individual tendencies in terms of preference and aversion, making appraisal a
largely subjective process, and the categories of pleasure and pain not always
mutually exclusive.

Box 1.4. About the complexity of the “ I want”

and the “I do not want” (Hagège 2017a)

45 Assessment available at: https://www.planetoscope.com/fruits-legumes/1257-le-gaspillage-

alimentaire-en-france.html.
48 Education for Responsibility

In conclusion, the appraisal processes mean that we do not attribute the

same value to different objects, people, situations, thoughts and emotions,
depending on the conscious or unconscious meaning they have for us. This
notion of appraisal, especially developed in cognitive psychology46,
therefore theoretically refers to a concept worked on in psychosociology:
that of value47.

1.3.2.1.3. From values to behaviors, and the status of the error

“You who invented sin, forgot to invent forgiveness” (Chico
Buarque; personal translation of a verse from his song Apesar de
Você).

The notion of value has been defined as a belief that synthesizes the
emotional and cognitive elements48 that guide subjects in their world (Hitlin
and Piliavin 2004). It corresponds to a criterion or standard of preference,
and is supposed to be strongly linked to decision-making processes
(influencing actions; ibid.). The notion of value was defined in educational
sciences as a “representation or [a] statement that is highly emotionally
invested and, as such, can play a psychological supporting role by
designating what is good, good, beautiful or true more or less explicitly”
(Reynaud 2008, p. 94, authors’ translation). In these two definitions appears
the cognitive and affective entanglement of values. The concept of value is
also linked to the notion of conation, distinguished from cognition and
emotions in social psychology. Thus, in a subject’s relationship with an
object (or a situation, a person, etc.), the affective corresponds to the energy
of the relationship (“I feel”), the cognitive to the mental representation of the
object (“I think”), and the conative to the orientation towards the object (“I
tend to act”). A basic premise of this approach is that if the emotion (energy)

46 The field of emotions (i.e. affects) had initially been distinguished from that of cognition
(i.e. thought, representation, reflection, etc.). However, cognitive psychology studies these
two domains equally well, and they are now considered to be intertwined, including
neurologically. Affectivity corresponds to the bivalent domain of emotions: schematically,
pleasure and pain. The term “affectivity” is more commonly used in psychoanalysis and
social psychology, while the term “emotion” seems to be predominant in cognitive
psychology.
47 We have seen the link between attention and appraisal (Figure 1.3). Citton refers to an
“incestuous  circle between valorization and attention”, explaining “I give my attention to
what I value and I value what I pay attention to” (Citton 2014, p. 202, authors’ translation).
48 See note 46 in this chapter.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 49

is negative, the tendency (conative) will be to avoid the object, while if it is

positive, it will lead to approaching it. However, the meaning of the causal
link between emotion and action is discussed. It would be the value, in
association with the underlying emotion, that would guide the behavior
(approach if emotion and value are positive, avoidance if they are negative).
However, as suggested earlier about appraisal, this simplistic schema needs
to be made more complex.

First, one reason is that emotions and values do not always head in the
same direction. This is the case when the pleasures provided by certain
behaviors run counter to consciously endorsed values. For example: I smoke
or drink with my friends, even though I value health and freedom; I am
fickle, even if my ideal is stability and sustainability; my passion is go-
karting, even if I vote for the green party; I eat a strawberry tartlet every day,
even if I want a colon free from gluten; I frequently buy leather clothes and I
eat industrial-sized steaks, even if I feel concerned about animal welfare, etc.
These examples suggest that the problem of incoherence (i.e. internal
contradictions) of a subject is more complex than this (see in particular the
example of implicit attitudes in section 1.1.3).

Such a finding was made in the laboratory about an epistemic object49. We used
questionnaires in which subjects were asked to qualify objects (science, teaching,
learning, error, proof, etc.) by choosing a position in a continuum between two pairs
of antagonistic adjectives, from different semantic registers: affective (e.g. “enjoyable/
painful”), axiological (e.g. “good/bad”) and cognitive (e.g. “relative/absolute”) (Dang
2013). In the population study (French science students, from the first year of
bachelor’s to doctoral studies), for all objects (science, teaching, learning, etc.),
values were positive and positively correlated with affects, except for the object
“error”. For the majority of these subjects, error was positively valued (as useful,
interesting, positive, etc.), while it caused negative affects. This highlights an
obstacle to learning: it is necessary to make mistakes to learn, however subjects were
afraid of them because they are painful. Why on earth be afraid of mistakes and hurt,
if they can be useful and interesting? And again, here the public concerned is
probably rather close to the learning process. What about such barriers among
struggling students? Where does this obstacle come from?

49 The Greek word “épistémè” has been translated as “knowledge” in English. The term
“epistemic” seems more appropriate here than the term “epistemological”, because the latter is
more restricted: the epistemological corresponds to a meta-type knowledge: on academic
knowledge or on personal knowledge, whereas the epistemic refers to knowledge (whether
first or meta) and therefore includes the epistemological (Kitchener 2002).
50 Education for Responsibility

It could be due to the implicit contamination of the error through fault, in other
words, of the epistemic domain by the moral domain (Favre 2007). Indeed, the error
evaluates a difference between the result of an action and an instituted (or personal)
standard; I made an error in my calculation (or in relation to the drawing I wanted to
make). Let us consider the academic case of the established norm: this norm defines
the true, the correct. There are socially instituted norms about mathematical
calculation. Thus, the error is supposed to have a logical, or more generally
representational, dimension related to form. This deviation from the norm should
have nothing to do with the field of morality. However, the opposite of “true” is
“false”, it is not “erroneous”. In French schools, the term “fault” (“faute” in French)
is much more common than “error” (“erreur” in French, while there is no equivalent
of “mistake”). We are talking about spelling “faults”, calculation “faults”, etc. In one
assignment, the “faults” are counted and a score is assigned, which is qualified as
“good” or “bad” (instead of “low” or “high” for example). A student who
accumulates “bad” scores is often referred to in terms of being a “bad” student
(“mauvais” in French). What are the semantic connotations of these terms? “False”
come from the Latin falsus, from fallere (to deceive, to fail). Fault is defined as a
more or less serious breach of a duty, a law, a custom, a rule, decency. “Bad” in
French etymologically refers precisely to sin, to the Devil. Semantically, a “bad”
student is therefore a student who has sinned, while one bad score, a bad action,
might send them to hell! It is the entire Jewish-Christian universe sin found in this
semantic field. However, this universe can cause guilt or shame. You can have fun
counting how many times a day you think “I must do that” (the verb is “falloir” in
French, with the same etymological root as “fault”). Then try to perceive the
emotional coloration of this thought. It is likely that the individual will be tinged with
guilt or shame. This is unnecessary, because in addition to evoking a sensation that is
considered unpleasant, these emotions often inhibit action50. On the contrary,
thinking for example “I will do that” or “I want to do this to achieve this goal, or
because it corresponds to this value” puts the subject in a more positive energy,
considered more pleasant and which encourages action51. Obviously, the use of the
terms “bad score”, “bad student” and the corresponding implicit attitudes of teachers
are probably not foreign to the exclusive logic of French schools (Hagège 2017d),
which leads more than 100,000 pupils to leave the school system each year without
any qualifications (Favre 2007). In addition, studies have shown that fear of error is
related to learning difficulties, dogmatic thinking and violent behavior (ibid.). We
will detail this later, especially when we discuss the problem of violent religious
radicalization (section 1.4.3).

Box 1.5. Error status, values and emotions

50 See Favre (2007) for more empirical data.

51 If you think “I must stop thinking ‘I must do that’”, it means that something has escaped
you.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 51

Secondly, another reason for the necessary complexification of the initial

schema is that there are explicit and implicit values, often contradictory to
each other (Hagège 2017d). Also implicit values are present in the semantic
connotation of words, in resonance with their emotional effect.

ANECDOTE.– To illustrate this point, here is an anecdote that was told to us by a

secondary mathematics teacher in a priority education area. The teacher had
found a way to motivate her students: in each class, she gave them a very easy
little exercise, which she noted. Put together, all these scores gave a score –
generally quite high – that counted as an average. The students collected their
precious notes with motivation. However, each year, the course that went the
worst was the one on fractions. She could not understand why, until one day
when a student who was very reluctant to attend the class also had an arm in a
plaster cast. She then suspected that there might be an emotional language
barrier. As a result, she asked them what the term “fraction” meant to them – she
brainstormed. The words that emerged were: “fracture”, “to shatter”, “divorce”,
“break”, etc. The students were right in a way, since the word “fraction” comes
from the Latin fracio, which means “breaking action”. Thus, the students
unconsciously put these painful notions behind the term “fraction”, because they
were the only ones their cognitive system had at their disposal to interpret the
sentence52. Since then, the teacher has been doing this brainstorming each time
before the lesson about fractions, then clarifying that they are right to think that
and that what she was going to talk about does not hurt. Since then, her course
on fractions has gone as well as the others! We could have thought that since the
students were in a mathematics class, they would know that what is taught there
is mathematics, and that mathematics is emotionally neutral, it does not hurt. But
such a belief neglects that science is a human construct (section 1.2.1), and that
unconscious processes drive our behavior and emotions (section 1.3.2.4.2).

In summary, values are not only representations, they also consist of

implicit semantic connotations contained in words (see other examples in
section 1.2.1 and point 2 of section 2.3.1). The notion of value refers to the
idea that there are preferences, implicit or explicit (Reynaud 2008), based on
judgments (“good-looking true, good, etc.”) in the subjects’ inner world and
that these preferences, in connection with congruent emotional reactions,
guide the subjects’ actions. In the example of error, it is obvious that it is the

52 Research in science didactics has indeed clearly shown that we always learn with an
already conceptual approach (a preconception) that can act as an obstacle to learning. This
example illustrates that the emotional dimension of such an initial conception can be massive.
52 Education for Responsibility

implicit negative value that is related to the emotional reaction, and not the
explicit positive value.

It should also be noted that different values can guide actions in a similar
way. Thus, it has been theorized in environmental psychosociology that
individuals can be motivated to behave respectfully towards the environment,
because they value either the biosphere or others or themselves, which refers
respectively to biospheric, altruistic or egoistic values (Stern & Dietz 1994).

Values can therefore be considered as the psychosocial expression of

subjective preferences, which are related to the subject’s emotions and
beliefs. The notion of values is also related to that of attitude, which was
mentioned by Launay (2004) as a decisive factor of attention.

1.3.2.2. Modalities of relationship with the world (psycho-affective

attitudes)
Like the concept of value, the concept of attitude is one of the central
concepts of psychosociology. It was initially defined as referring to “a
mental or neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a
directive or dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all objects
and situations with which it is related” (Allport 1935, cited by Dang 2013,
p. 69). According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), an attitude is “a learned
predisposition to respond in a consistently favorable or unfavorable manner
with respect to a given object”53 (quoted by Dang 2013, p. 70). “Current
researchers agree that appraisal is the critical feature of attitudes in that they
express good-bad, like-dislike, and pleasant-unpleasant associations with the
object, on the base of the tracks of past experiences that are stocked in
memory” (Dang 2013, p. 70). The link between this concept and those of
appraisal, values and the notion of “I want” and “I do not want”, and
therefore of attentional magnification, are evident here.

Attitudes are traditionally considered to have three components:

cognitive, affective and conative (see previous section on values, 1.3.2.1.3).
Thus, a subject is supposed to have a positive or negative attitude towards an
object, a phenomenon (a situation, a person, etc.). Other authors consider
attitudes to have only two components, emotional and cognitive (reviewed

53 The link between attitudes and behavior, as well as its experimental appraisal, has been problematic
in recent decades (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977).
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 53

by Dang 2013). This is our case. Thus, we consider attitudes as a model of

the relationship between a subject and an object.

In our work, we have justified the conceptual division of an individual’s

outer world into a human and a non-human environment (NHE): (1)
psychology tends to overvalue the influence of human relationality in
psychological development compared to that of interaction with the non-
human, which is nevertheless just as structuring on this level (Searles 1986),
(2) we also integrate into the NHE its non-natural elements (which is rarely
the case in environmental psychosociology), (3) it would seem that there is a
complementarity and antagonism between the two types of relationship
(Hagège et al. 2009). That is, our model integrates the different ways in
which a subject may be related to others or to the NHE, depending on
whether this relationship is more or less dominated by cognition or affects
(Figure 1.4).

Figure 1.4. Composition, characteristics of attitudes towards others

and the non-human environment (NHE), and the relationships between these
different attitudes. For a color version of this figure, see
www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.4.– The model is based on the assumption of a

limited amount of affects. The latter are more or less destined for an “object”:
54 Education for Responsibility

others (top) or the non-human environment (NHE, bottom). The more affects
there are, the less the distance with the object (low importance of cognition;
lower left and upper right). Affects and cognition are in a dialogical
relationship (double vertical arrows). The subject’s attitude can vary along a
horizontal continuum, described below from left to right for the three
remarkable attitudes: (1) their relationship with others is more dominated by
cognition (they are splitting with emotions towards others, above), while their
relationship with the non-human is mostly emotional in nature at this moment
in time (fusion with the NHE, below)  (2) when their relationship with the
environment (human and non-human) is balanced in terms of being emotional
and cognitive, the subject is conscious, in empathy with others (top) and feels
related to the NHE (bottom) ; (3) if they are in emotional contagion with
others (top), at this moment they are emotionally disconnected from the NHE
(bottom). The two extreme attitudes (splitting and fusion, green stripes) are
those where the subject is least conscious (of themselves and the “object”).

DEFINITIONS.– On the basis of work carried out by our previous research

team (Favre et al. 2005), we distinguish three characteristic attitudes towards
humans:
– splitting with emotions involves being cut off from one’s own emotions
and those of others. Thus, the relationship with others and with oneself is
only cognitive in appearance. That is, the projection ignores the emotional
components of the situation. This attitude can generate violent behavior and
corresponds to psychological protection from what is perceived as a threat. It
is difficult to imagine a torturer who is not cut off from the emotions of their
victim and their own... The splitting corresponds to a subjective “I do not
care”: an attentional inhibition of the perception of their emotions and those
of others. Emotional inhibition coincides with strong identification with
thoughts (see section 1.3.2.3). Indeed, empirical evidence shows that
splitting with emotions and dogmatism go hand in hand (Favre 2007;
unpublished personal work). We emotionally cut off when we see someone
expressing suffering, anger, joy, etc., and we do not feel affected by their
emotion. This is called “remaining unmoved”. We can have internal
comments like “poor them, so unlucky”, have the impression of being
compassionate, but on a phenomenological level, this compassion is purely
intellectual. The disconnect can be useful in some cases, to “keep cool”,
when there is a panic in a crowd for example;
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 55

– emotional contagion (or fusion) is on the contrary the impression of

feeling exactly the same emotions as others. This is what happens when we
identify with a character in a film or novel, or when we are sad seeing a
close one who is sad. At that moment, it is as if there were no distance
between oneself and the other: the subject identifies with the emotion of the
other, which takes, in that moment, all the space of their subjective reality.
This generally corresponds to an “I want” if the emotion is positive and a “I
do not want” if it is negative: there is an attentional magnification of the
emotion and the projection hypertrophies the emotional component of the
situation. In fact, it is our own emotions that are projected onto the other.
Here the cognitive component of the relationship is weak or non-existent.
These first two attitudes are those in which the projection, and therefore the
deformation and phenomenological grasp are the most intense (and the field
of consciousness the most biased and partial);  
– the third attitude is that of empathy: the subject is affected by the other’s
emotion and at the same time they are aware that it is the other’s emotions
and not their own. They feel connected to the other, while having a sufficient
cognitive distance to be able to act in the right way, by being welcoming and
caring. This attitude corresponds to a neutral term between “I want”/”I do
not want” and “I do not care”, and yet is qualitatively different. Thus, we are
empathetic with someone who is sad when we feel their sadness as their
own, when we can simultaneously mentally represent what they are going
through, and when all this does not alter in any way the emotions that are
specific to us (for example joy). Empathy is therefore accompanied, on a
phenomenological level, by diffuse and shared attention, such that
consciousness simultaneously perceives what is happening within ourselves
and in the other.

Our work led us to distinguish three mirror attitudes towards the non-
human environment (NHE). These mirror attitudes (Figure 1.4) are:
– splitting, when the subject feels indifferent to what is affecting the
NHE. This is the case, for example, when a subject experiences environmental
destruction or animal cruelty without consciously experiencing any emotion.
Like the splitting with emotions towards humans, it is a form of psychological
protection;
– fusion, when the subject self-projects what happens in the NHE. By a
mirror effect, they anthropomorphize the NHE. This seems to be the case for
some environmental activists who are willing to sacrifice their lives for a
56 Education for Responsibility

forest. There is an identification with NHE’s object. For example, we might

feel cut up inside to see a century-old tree being cut down. Some people –
such as a famous 1960s French star whose name we will not mention – take
refuge with animals and consider that they are “more human than humans
themselves”. So this attitude is accompanied often simultaneously with a
splitting with emotions towards humans. If we are witnessing the implosion
of the housing project in which we have lived for 30 years, we could
momentarily have the impression that our lives are being destroyed. We
would then be in fusion with this element of the NHE at that moment. If we
were emotionally affected (for example, sad), while being aware that our life
is independent of the tower’s destiny, then we would rather have an attitude
of relatedness;  
– relatedness with the NHE, when the subject is aware of their material
contiguity with the NHE: all their molecular components come from it (the
atoms of the human body are renewed regularly), at the atomic level, they
are identical with the composition of the stars, and, phylogenetically,
humans are derived from animals. In this attitude, the subject feels part of
the NHE structurally and functionally and, at the same time, feels different
as a human being. They are also aware of their individual singularity. Thus,
they feel emotionally affected by what is happening to the NHE while
maintaining a cognitive distance. This allows them to have a representation
of what happens to this environment, without assimilating it to their own
destiny.

The model proposed here is based on the hypothesis of the existence of a

given quantity of affects per individual and per moment: the affects placed in
the NHE are not placed in the human and vice versa, hence the idea of an
antagonism between the affects placed in the human and those placed in the
NHE. In other words, fusion with objects from one type of environment
(human or not) goes hand in hand with splitting from the other environment
(Figure 1.4). We have taken some extreme examples (particularly
concerning fusion with the NHE): this illustrates that relational tendencies
can be found in some subjects, with a pair of attitudes more frequent than the
other two. However, each subject is expected to adopt at each moment an
attitude along the way between the two pairs of extreme attitudes, such that
this attitude may vary from one moment to another.

As we have seen, the concepts of value and attitude are both intimately
linked to the concept of beliefs. Obviously, beliefs, which are related to
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 57

mental activity, significantly affect the relationship between the mind and
the world. It is also a central concept in psychosociology.

1.3.2.3. Modalities of cognition: epistemic dimension of the world-

mind relationship
“We must always reserve the right to laugh the day after about
our ideas of the day before” (quotation attributed to Napoleon
Bonaparte, authors’ translation).

“It is harder to crack prejudice than an atom” (quote attributed

to Albert Einstein).

“We get angry because we identify with the fear we feel when
others do not agree with our point of view” (Finley 2003,
p. 169, authors’ translation).

Beliefs concern the epistemic dimension of the world-mind relationship.

In general, this dimension is related to formal knowledge, or form
(cognition). We distinguish three aspects: two levels and a relational
modality.

1.3.2.3.1. Three aspects of cognition

1) The first level of cognition is a basic level, and concerns the form
itself. It is any content of a representational nature, and mediated by a
language, even if it is imagery and symbolism (as in dreams): verbal or
imagery mental phenomena (1.3.1.1), beliefs, ideas... Beliefs were initially
defined as statements about reality that the individual accepts as true or
factual (Bruvold 1973). Today, this concept seems very similar in semantics
to that of “conception” in science didactics, although they each refer to
different research methodologies. Thus, like values and attitudes (see above),
beliefs can be implicit or explicit, context-dependent and influenced by the
human environment or not, as evidenced by priming experiments (Myers
2009). We have defined thoughts above as a category of mental phenomena,
corresponding to the emergence of verbal language forms in the mind
(1.3.1). Through phenomenological grasping, beliefs and thoughts constitute
an interpretative filter of reality, which makes up our world. Indeed,
thoughts and beliefs, directed towards oneself or towards the outer world,
seem intended to analyze, interpret, imagine (projection towards the future),
judge, dwell (when it comes to the past), etc. All these cases are projections
58 Education for Responsibility

(of a given vision on the real). This language-mediated filter necessarily

contains cultural and personal biases, but the grasping prevents the subject
from being aware of these biases at the time. This is one of the central
processes in the genesis of subjective confusion between relative reality
(world) and ultimate reality (the real). We will come back to this later (see
also the following example with dogmatism).

In fact, the different thought contents are not equivalent in terms of

impact on the world. For example, critical thinking includes the testing of
information. It can proceed according to the rules of formal logic, justifying,
arguing, conceptualizing (Daniel 2016). It is called “constructive” when it is
open to a perspective of change, innovation and is part of a dynamic that
takes into account oneself, others and the environment (ibid.). On the
contrary, negative critical thinking manifests itself with a reluctance to
change, a withdrawal into oneself and an instinctive rejection of others
(ibid.). It tends to focus on the other’s flaws without examining its own
flaws. On the contrary, constructive critical thinking is reflective: taking
itself as its object, it aims at self-correction. In this, it also includes forms of
the second epistemic level (see subpart 2 below; Forges et al. 2011 ; Slade
2002).

Also, thoughts can have a performative character, that is, they can
function as self-fulfilling prophecies.

EXAMPLE: THE PYGMALION EFFECT.– When these thoughts concern others,

this is called the interpersonal expectancy effect in English and more particularly
the “Pygmalion effect54” in educational sciences (reviewed by Trouilloud and
Sarrazin 2003). Thus, when teachers wrongly believe, following experimental
manipulation, that some of their students are gifted and unaware of it, then their
results increase (ibid.). A teacher’s attitude towards a student is in fact
conditioned by their beliefs about them (Hagège 2017d).

So, for example, if a teacher thinks, even secretly, that a student is bad,
they will probably behave in a way that will not help the student to progress
– despite any goodwill expressed to help them. The student in question,
unconsciously feeling the energies of this thought (see section 2.4.3.2.3),
may inadvertently internalize it. This “I am rubbish” may discourage them

54 In Greek mythology, Aphrodite gave life to the statue sculpted by Pygmalion, thus
allowing him to concretize his love with this form issued from his own mind.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 59

from making efforts, which will contribute to maintaining their poor

performance in school.

All situations potentially congruent with this thought (e.g. they fall off
their bike, they are scolded) can thus be attentionally magnified, reactivating
this thought, which will give the individual the illusion that they were right
to think that, since they have just received new proof. Attention is
automatically focused on any phenomenon that reinforces a pre-existing
belief, which then generates a thought in relation to that belief.

Because of the grasping and identification, subjects tend to confuse their

belief with reality, as if, in this case, the character of “foolishness” was
inherent in their person. They do not always realize that it is somehow their
belief that affects their performance, and that by changing this former, they
would probably improve this latter.

On the other hand, a subject who believes in themselves and does not let
themselves become contaminated by the judgments of others may remain
“watertight” to them. They will also probably dare to try more new things
than a subject who thinks they are a failure. Beliefs therefore shape the
subject’s thought-action repertoires.

Thus, thoughts guide the shaping of the world (oneself and the environment),
even when their verbalization does not leave the psychic intimacy of the thinker.
A fortiori, in the case where thoughts are communicated aloud, exchanged or
even argued, their impact on the world would be all the greater.

We will also note the generalizing, and therefore highly distorting, nature
of a thought such as “I am rubbish”. Indeed, we can also consider the
modality of information formulation (idea, thought, belief, speech, etc.),
more or less dogmatic (Favre and Joly 2001). The most dogmatic is to state
general and universal truths, instead of nuancing and contextualizing the
assertion (Favre 1998; see more details in the third part of the present
section).

EXAMPLES.– The same idea expressed:

– in a dogmatic way: “Dolilo is rubbish”;
– in a less dogmatic way, which explains the awareness of one’s own
subjectivity, therefore the relative nature of the idea: “I think that Dolilo is
rubbish”;
60 Education for Responsibility

– in a more objective way, because it is less projective, less generalizing:

“Dolilo did not pass last Tuesday’s test as well as I would have expected
from a 4th grade student.”

2) The second level is included in the previous one, and at the same time
it is above it: it concerns the thought on form, in other words the meta-
representational. This concerns, for instance, personal epistemology (beliefs
about knowledge) and metacognition (understanding one’s own cognitive
functioning). Personal epistemology has been defined as “a field of research
that focuses on beliefs and theories that individuals develop about
knowledge and their acquisition” (Crahay and Fagnant 2007, p. 80, author’s
translation). In the laboratory, we have particularly studied epistemic beliefs,
that is, beliefs (of science students) about science, teaching and learning. We
have been able to demonstrate that students move on average from a naïve,
dualist conception where knowledge is either true or false, and held by
authoritative figures, to a more sophisticated conception where the validity
of knowledge is contextual and where learners can themselves, accompanied
by experts, construct their knowledge (Dang 2013). For such a sophisticated
epistemology, we will speak here of a contextualist epistemology55, which is
opposed to a dualist vision of knowledge56. A constructivist epistemology,
based on a theory of complexity (see introduction), is an elaborate form of
contextualist epistemology. According to researchers in this field,
proponents of development theories, before moving from a dualistic
(absolutist) vision to a contextualist epistemology, subjects would go
through a multiplicist position, according to which, since there is no
absolute, all representations would be equal. After such relativism, they
would be more inclined to adopt a contextualist epistemology, that is, to
consider that knowledge is constructed, validated and used in a certain
context, where it is then more operational than competing knowledge
(reviewed in Crahay and Fagnant 2007).

Metacognition also refers to an active understanding and regulation of

one’s own cognitive processes (Fagnant and Crahay 2010). Like constructive

55 Also called contextual relativism (reviewed in Swaner 2005).

56 The binary conception of a continuum along which a personal epistemology can evolve
(e.g. from a naϊve to a sophisticated epistemology) is no longer fashionable in this discipline,
but we adopt it here to simplify the topic. Today, the personal epistemology of a subject is
rather considered complex, made up of potentially contradictory systems, which emerge
according to the context.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 61

critical thinking, it involves an awareness of the thought and processes used

to reason (ibid.; Daniel 2016), as well as a sophistication of personal
epistemology (Slade 2002).

3) Finally, let us consider the type of relationship the subject has with
these forms (1) or (2): by being more or less attached to or identifying with
them. Here, we will distinguish two orthogonal axes: that of dogmatism to
cognitive flexibility on the one hand and that of a strong phenomenological
grasping to the absence of grasping on the other hand (Figure 1.5).

Figure 1.5. Modalities of relationships with thoughts and beliefs

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.5.– On the abscissa, is the axis of the

phenomenological grasping of thoughts and beliefs, and on the ordinate, the
tendency more (dogmatism) or less (cognitive flexibility) of the subject to
strongly adhere to an idea, a representation and to identify with it. A, B, C and
D refer to four remarkable attitudes. An ordinary subject alternates between A
and B (depending on the situations, the fields of knowledge, etc.), while being
more or less close to the vertical axis (therefore less or more in grasping) and
may have a greater tendency to function in A or B depending on their
temperament or the period of their life.

Dogmatism and cognitive flexibility refer to two opposing ways in which

a subject may relate to their own beliefs, ideas or opinions. Dogmatism was
initially defined as a closed cognitive style, associated with the tendency to
62 Education for Responsibility

seek robust, true knowledge and to rely on authority (Rokeach 1960). This
understanding of dogmatism is close to the notion of the need for closure,
which refers to an intolerance to ambiguity or uncertainty (see a desire for
predictability), associated with the compulsion to seek and adopt an idea –
any idea rather than leaving a question unanswered – and the preference for
organization (order, structure; Webster and Kruglanski 1994). This variable
is empirically correlated with dogmatism (Brandt and Reyna 2010). On the
contrary, cognitive flexibility has been defined as the awareness that in each
situation, there are options and alternatives, and the tendency and
effectiveness to be flexible and adapt to the situation (Martin et al. 2011). It
therefore refers to the ability to easily change one’s mind or representation.
It corresponds to a more open cognitive style (or “open thinking” ; Favre
2007, p. 167). Constructive critical thinking requires a certain cognitive
flexibility and thus seems antagonistic to dogmatism: inherently dynamic, it
easily alternates between closing on one form and opening to another.
Moreover, in line with this, we have shown that a naϊve personal
epistemology was positively and significantly correlated with dogmatism,
while sophisticated vision was, to a lesser extent, correlated with cognitive
flexibility (Dang 2013).

Thus, if we consider the case of a subject in B (Figure 1.5), they can

quickly change their thoughts or beliefs, but each time believe them quite
strongly at the moment, because they have a strong grasp of them. It is
possible that each time the thought or idea is formulated in a dogmatic or
generalizing way. Thoughts and words often take such a form because it is
faster to express oneself in a dogmatic way than to contextualize and
relativize one’s speech. At the scale of a short period of time, this can be
observed within a single train of thought, where contradictory thoughts can
follow one another, being formulated as general truths and grasped each time
in the moment. For example: “Dolilo is a traitor for not helping me. Oh no,
that’s right, I forgot, he had lower back pain. Oh, yes. No, basically, Dolilo
is really a nice person...” Thus, it is possible that a subject with high
cognitive flexibility may produce dogmatic turns of phrases, while being
ready to change the sentence or idea (i.e. without taking the idea for an
unchanging truth). This could be the case, for example, for a subject who
doubts themselves, their ability to understand and reason, with regard to the
ideas they adopt about a given field (but probably not with regard to their
ideas about their own disability). In such a case, it is likely that an
interlocutor will feel a difference in the energy, in the non-verbal
characteristics of expression, between this assertion and the assertion of a
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 63

subject who is more attached to what they say. Thus, whether thoughts and
beliefs are long (case A) or short (case B) in terms of time, it would seem
that the phenomenological grasp57 of thoughts and beliefs would favor a
dogmatic way of thinking or expression.

So, dogmatism and the phenomenological grasping of thoughts and

conceptions go hand in hand with an identification with mental phenomena,
and particularly with verbal thoughts. This is the case where the grasp
operates on thoughts, knowing that it can also, on the other hand, concern
emotions or perceptions. This attitude functions as the implicit and erroneous
belief that the subject’s world is the ultimate reality. A subject may be more or
less dogmatic depending on the moment, the situation, their cultural
dispositions and conditioning. A coarser dogmatism leads the subject to feel
that they exist through their system of thoughts, such that anything that
challenges this system can be implicitly perceived and appraised as a
personal threat. This corresponds to a generalized feature of a subject in A in
Figure 1.5: the subject strongly adheres to an idea, assimilates it to reality
and is not ready to change it or relativize it. This is sometimes accompanied
by a paranoid tendency. In this case, if such a questioning were to become
acute, it would, in principle, generate anger within the subject. Depending on
the subject’s temperament, a dogmatic attitude can therefore easily lead to
misunderstanding, intolerance or even violence against individuals who do
not share the same system of thoughts or beliefs: as the news reported in
2015 and 2016, with the attacks claimed by jihadists, subjects who are
probably dogmatic, who murdered individuals in the name of their beliefs.
On the contrary, cognitive flexibility indicates a lower potential grasp, or, at
a minimum, an increased ability to remove thoughts or beliefs (“to let go of
the peanut”, to use the monkey metaphor mentioned in section 1.3.1.2): the
potentially lower identification with the mind and beliefs would make the
subject more willing to evolve, welcome and tolerate the difference around
them.

SUMMARY.– Two types of cognitive content are distinguished here: first

beliefs, ideas or thoughts that concern the outer or inner world, and reflections,
ideas or thoughts aimed at knowledge, learning or beliefs (see metacognition

57 Earlier we mentioned phenomenological grasping in general (i.e. with regard to the seven
types of perceptual objects). Here, we therefore focus on the particular case of the grasping of
the seven types of perceptual objects, mental phenomena – and, from a psychosociological
point of view, on the case of beliefs and ideas.
64 Education for Responsibility

and personal epistemology). Secondly, two antagonistic modalities of

cognition, dogmatism and cognitive flexibility, are considered. They are
generally accompanied by a certain amount of phenomenological grasp, and
can sometimes translate into a form of content, respectively corresponding to
a more closed and abusively generalizing expression for dogmatism or more
open and possibly constructively critical for cognitive flexibility.

1.3.2.3.2. Thought grasping, time inconsistencies and performativity

Most of the time, the term “dogmatism” is used when the thoughts and
beliefs in question concern the outer world. When thoughts are frequently
and strongly grasped by the subject, and when they concern them, two types
of cases can be distinguished:
– if these thoughts are pejorative, it usually coincides with a
psychopathological state. It has been shown that depressed subjects, or those
with obsessive-compulsive disorder, have an increased grasp of such
thoughts (reviewed by Wenzlaff and Wegner 2000). In addition, they try to
remove them, which is counterproductive (ibid.). It is “the ironic effect” of
thought suppression, which could be observed in most subjects, including
healthy subjects (ibid.);
– if the thoughts are laudatory, it may correspond to a euphoric, even
maniacal state.

This phenomenon is exacerbated in bipolar disorder where subjects

present depressive and manic episodes, often alternating: they may
sometimes really believe that they and their lives are rubbish, and that they
should commit suicide, and sometimes overestimate themselves, believing
they have superpowers, or even take themselves, as some do, for Jesus
Christ. Far from being anecdotal, this psychiatric disorder of bipolarity is,
according to one estimate, the most frequent psychiatric disorder, and thus
represents the sixth most frequent cause of disability worldwide, affecting
1.2% of the general population (Mirabel-Sarron et al. 2006). These examples
show the pathological and deleterious aspect of the phenomenological
grasping of thoughts and beliefs, as well as their prevalence. It is remarkable
to note that a subject can believe very strongly in contradictory beliefs
alternatively, and take them for true each time. This is made possible by the
division of consciousness into stages that are impervious to each other
(Figure 1.6).
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 65

Figure 1.6. Discontinuity of subjective consciousness. For a color

version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.6.– The time scale can be seen fractally: a buffer zone
can represent night and the adjacent zone day, or the schema as a whole can be
at the scale of a life, a year, a day, a microsecond. A buffer zone is a shadow
zone that is completely opaque to consciousness. The principle of this
phenomenological model is that the level of consciousness varies. The higher it
is, the higher the quantity and quality of perceived information (i.e. the wider the
field of consciousness and the lower deformation due to phenomenological
grasp), in other words, the more simultaneously the subject is conscious of their
inner and outer worlds. This pattern provides an explanation for the subjective
impression that “time goes quickly” under certain circumstances (see right-
hand side of the diagram): the more consciousness is absorbed in a task or
distraction (e.g. watching a movie), the lower the level of consciousness
(because the field is reduced), therefore, correlatively, the more unconscious
there is (b). The archetype is sleep: when you sleep, the night goes by very
quickly! On the contrary, when the subject is more conscious (wider and less
absorbed consciousness), time seems to pass more slowly (a). This diagram also
provides an explanation for the adoption of contradictory behaviors or ideas by
a subject in good faith. Because of the illusion of continuity, the subject has the
impression of a certain coherence. It is proposed here that periods of
consciousness are partitioned in a relatively tight way: being in a period, the
subject is no longer aware of the previous ones.

Falling short of pathological cases, each subject may encounter this,

especially with regard to judgments about oneself, others or life.
66 Education for Responsibility

Contradictory thoughts that one believes – that is, those that are grasped – in
the moment, can even occur in a single train of thought, a few seconds apart,
as mentioned above. The same applies to dogmatism and paranoid
tendencies. The extreme cases of psychopathological cases, mentioned here,
therefore present in our opinion markedly features that exist to varying
degrees in healthy subjects.

It seems important to specify that, on the one hand, it is not the fact of having
beliefs that is problematic, but it is the importance that is given to them, through
phenomenological grasping, identification and their status (possibly of absolute
truth). We have all had the idea of hurting someone who hurt us, or killing them
(well, haven’t you?). The difference with a murderer is that most subjects do not
identify sufficiently with these kinds of thoughts to act. So the problem is the
phenomenological grasping. And the stronger it is about laudative thoughts, the
stronger it will also be on pejorative thoughts (see bipolarity): it is a matter of
functional habit of the mind. On the other hand, for an equal phenomenological
grasp, not all beliefs (or thoughts) have the same consequences on the world, as
mentioned above. Thus, for example, the belief “I suck and no one else loves
me” is probably effective in being depressed and “I am better than everyone
else” in being arrogant or condescending.

We have just given a partial overview of concepts used to describe the

relationship of the relative mind with the world (outer or inner), concepts
that characterize what is called here “its inner world”, and that explain
subjective preferences and biased perceptions. Now, we need to focus on a
notion that has already appeared several times, and which seems central to
understanding these processes: the notion of emotions.

1.3.2.4. And the emotions in all this: a driving force of the subjective
shaping of the world by the individual mind
1.3.2.4.1. Emotions, body and energy
What are emotions? Although everyone may feel they know what they
are, there does not seem to be an agreed definition (Brouillet 2008). They
have been defined, for example, as “biologically-based processes that
facilitate rapid decision-making and adaptive behavior by influencing
(among other things) cognitive processes, and at times even by-passing
them” (Chambers et al. 2009, p. 565) or as “a set of interrelated changes in
the body in response to a real or imagined situation or stimulus” (Braboszcz
et al. 2010, p. 1917). They “are experienced as feelings and may interrupt
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 67

ongoing behavior or mental processes in the form of an urge to engage in

action (e.g. flight for fear, outburst for anger, depending on the emotion felt”
(ibid.). They mobilize subcortical brain areas, especially when information
processing is automatic, and also sometimes cortical (Vermeulen 2013).
They clearly have a somatic component, partly unconscious (visceral,
muscular and hormonal)58 and their neuro-vegetative manifestations are very
varied (Fraisse 2015). They correspond to particular facial expressions,
stereotyped according to cultures (ibid.). For example, contempt is
associated with literate cultures (Cottraux 2007a). However, there would be
an innate neurological wiring for the “basic emotions” (joy, fear, sadness,
anger and disgust), or “primary emotions”, which seem transcultural (ibid.,
p. 10). Many agree that they have adaptive and communicative functions
(Brouillet 2008), although others define them as a behavioral adaptation
disorder (Fraisse 2015). Some authors suggest that they have a role in
motivation, in coordinating response systems, in reasoning and decision-
making (Bechara et al. 1997; Brouillet 2008; Chambers et al. 2009).

It is important to note that emotions correspond to bodily sensations

(sixth type of perception objects, see interoception, section 1.3.1.1.1). As far
as the process is concerned, there appear to be bi-directional links between
perceptual and motor systems, where emotional appraisal would be an
automatic and unconscious intermediary (Brouillet 2008). Body reactions
and appraisals can trigger emotional processes (ibid.). “Emotion appears
when the demands of the situation are disproportionate to the subject’s
possibilities, i.e. when there is a gap between their perceptual and cognitive
expectations and their repertoire of available responses. Everything then
happens as if unused energy was diffused throughout the body, disturbing
both organic regulations and the ideation as well as the life of relation”
(Fraisse 2015, author’s translation). Thus emotion can be considered as an
energy that “needs” to unfold through the body. For example, anger is often
accompanied by the need to move one’s limbs abruptly (by hitting
something, for example), fear by tightness in the limbs, and sadness the
release of tears and facial movements. To paraphrase the beginning of
Fraisse’s last quotation, we would say in our vocabulary that emotion appears
when there is a significant gap for the subject between the immediate real and
their projections (or expectations). In general, emotion is assessed positively

58 It is interesting to note that in Chinese psychoenergetics and Tibetan medicine, each basic
emotion is linked to an endocrine gland (whose physiological function is to secrete hormones)
and an organ.
68 Education for Responsibility

if this lag is appraised as beneficial by the subject and negative in the

opposite case. Also, most of the time, the subject does not perceive this
discrepancy, because it is not significant for them, but at certain moments it
does become so. We will link this later to the feeling of separation.

1.3.2.4.2. Emotions, mind and action

“People will say they ‘devour’ newspapers and stick their ears
to the radio [...] in order to keep up with what is happening in
the world, but that is pure illusion. The truth is that as soon as
these poor people are not active, busy, they become aware of
[what] is inside them. No matter, to tell the truth, from which
breast they are suckling, the most important thing for them is to
avoid coming face to face with themselves” (Miller 2006, p. 11,
author’s translation).

Are emotions related to our behaviors? If so, how? It seems that very often,
attention is exogenous (attracted by an unexpected stimulus; see the caption of
Figure 1.2) and instantiates itself in “attentional gestures”59 often driven by a
search for distraction, occupation of the mind (Depraz 2014): fleeing boredom,
we would constantly be busy. Once the attention is focused on a phenomenon,
the lived experience is compared to the expected or desired experience (the
purpose, well-being, comfort, pleasure, etc.), the gap between these two
experiences is appraised, which makes it possible to classify the phenomenon
as “I want” or “I do not want” (appraisal process) and co-generates more or
less conscious thoughts and emotions, which leads to action. In case of “I do
not want”, this action aims to reduce the gap (close the window if there is a
noise outside assessed as annoying or eat a cookie in case of a craving
sensation; see below for coping strategies). In the case of “I want”, the aim of
the action is to try to preserve the status quo (for example, to continue to
watch a phenomenon considered pleasant, or to eat more than necessary if you
are greedy, sitting at a table convivially before good food, and if there are
strawberry tartlets for dessert).

This action is underpinned by an intention and is therefore based on

endogenous attention. After that (and often during60), attention automatically

59 This terminology refers to a concept of attention such as “the tangible and relational body
lived” (Depraz 2014, p. 78, author’s translation).
60 Even when attention is initially endogenous, it is often grasped in some other object along
the way (usually a train of thought, called a “mind wandering episode”; Braboszcz et al.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 69

turns to another phenomenon. This mode of functioning is called here

“unconcious mental”, because it involves mental phenomena (comparison
with the past, with an imagined or implicitly expected situation, etc.), usually
unconsciously. This is probably the most common mode of operation in the
West (Hagège 2013). The subject’s attention is often tossed around by
circumstances and most subjects are not aware of these fluctuations in
attention at the time (Braboszcz et al. 2010).

What determines the intensity and nature of the emotion? “The memory of
emotional experiences is at stake in the specification of emotions felt, but
also the cognitive appraisal of the possible consequences of the present
situation” (Brouillet 2008, p. 29, author’s translation). Thus, in ordinary
functioning (i.e. the individual relative mind), there is a loop between
thoughts and emotions in the face of an emotion-generating situation, and a
coloration of the present experience according to past experiences. Yet, in
general, the subject attributes an external cause to the emotion, a cause that
would be part of their outer world. This outsourcing allocation is the very
principle of projection.

EXAMPLE.– If anger rises following a punctured tire, the subject, in the

moment, absorbed by anger (see the phenomenological grasp and
magnification of attention; “I do not want”) attributes their anger to the
puncture of the tire, a situation they appraise as negative for them. However,
another subject, sat in the very same place, would perhaps laugh at the
situation, or be saddened by it.

Thus, unlike ordinary subjective perception, emotion, in its nature and

intensity, is not inherent in the situation. The situation is only a trigger, an
elicitor of an already present trend (dispositional factor). When a situation is
perceived as aversive, the subject uses a coping strategy (Mikolajczak and
Bausseron 2013), consciously or not. There are many types of them, and a
synthesis of the work of the last two decades in this field has made it
possible to establish a typology (ibid.). These different strategies are not all
exclusive. Emotions appraised as negative often evoke strategies of
avoidance or unproductive reaction (reviewed by Chambers et al. 2009). The

2010). That’s how you get up to get something and when you get there you forget what you
came for, or eat a cookie without realizing and then you can't remember if you ate it or not.
The awareness of this attention grabbing only comes after the fact; it is what is called “meta-
consciousness” (ibid.).
70 Education for Responsibility

latter are forms of escape or struggle with emotion (Box 1.6; Table 1.1). In
the event of an escape (i.e. avoidance) of the emotion, attention is
automatically focused on something other than the emotion itself. This has
the paradoxical effect of reinforcing the emotion (ibid.), which will then
reappear later, being strongly grasped.

Let us compare emotion to a wild animal in a cage, that is, to an energy that
needs to be released. Most subjects let their attention be grasped, especially by
their reactive thoughts. This prevents the emotions from being felt (Figure 1.7).
Thus, most distractions or escapes, among others social networks, reality TV,
tobacco, outings, etc., particularly pervasive in our society overwhelmed by new
communication technologies (Citton 2014)61, can be considered as emotion
avoidance strategies (Table 1.1). It is as if, when in front of a wild animal in a
cage asking to leave (similar to the emotion considered negative), a common
reaction was to move away from the cage to do something else and distract
oneself (escape) from that emotion unconsciously labelled as unpleasant – just
pretend it was not there. Note that another common reaction is to hit the animal
on the head to knock it out (struggle). The animal stays there and may become
more aggressive; it will roar again as soon as it has the opportunity.

Box 1.6. Metaphor illustrating the common attitude of fight or flight

with regard to emotions that are assessed as negative

Attitude towards the situation

Attitude towards

Type of coping
emotion

strategy

Type of
Description of the strategy
strategy

Consideration and appraisal of possible

reception, regulation*
+/- Consideration,

Mental alternatives to deal with the situation, setting

confrontation

planning intermediate goals, setting priorities, planning

Cognitive

actions to be taken.

Detailed anticipation of the course of the event

Mental
(e.g. imagining what I would say to my boss to
rehearsal
explain my mistake).

61 Moreover, in my opinion, subjects’ knowledge of their own functioning also requires media
education, which raises awareness of the way in which most mass media (particularly through
advertising) condition certain behaviors, manipulate and create dependencies.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 71

Seeking information by recalling similar events

Search for
and how you/others have dealt with them in the
information
past, to choose the best strategy.

Attempt to reduce negative effects through (1)

Cognitive focusing on the positive aspects and/or potential
reinterpretation gains inherent in the situation, (2) reassessing
(reappraisal) one’s ability to cope with them, and/or (3)
relativizing the importance of the problem.

Accommodation of cognitive structures to the

Acceptance
reality of the situation.

Attempt to act on the NHE (to neutralize the

Actions in
stressor if they are non-human) or the HE
regards to the
confrontation

(negotiation to resolve a conflict) to modify the

Behavioral

environment
situation.

Search for material help (jack to change a wheel),

Search for
informational help (on the procedure to change
help
the wheel) or emotional help (comfort).

Mental Grasping of attention in mental phenomena

avoidance
Cognitive

distraction unrelated to the stressful situation.

(escape)

Attempts to ignore the existence of the stressor, its

Denial
severity and/or potential consequences.
and “ I do not see”)

Avoid or delay physical confrontation with the

(“I do not care”  

Avoidance
stressor (not going to an exam or postponing it).
Ignorance

Behavioral avoidance

Engagement in an alternative hedonistic activity

Physical that distracts from the stressor (watching
(flight)

distraction television, going out, sleeping, eating, smoking,

etc.)

Behaviors
Consumption or even abuse of substances that
aimed at
alter consciousness (psychotropic drugs, alcohol,
emotional
cannabis, cocaine, etc.).
avoidance
Unproductive

Rumination
(“I do not
Rejection

cognitive

Letting one’s own attention be grasped by

reaction
want”)

(fight)

(example 1:
obsessive negative thoughts that focus on the
“It’s always
negative aspects of the situation or emotions.
me”)
72 Education for Responsibility

Catastrophizing
(example 2: Attention captured by thoughts that envisage the
“I’ll never worst possible outcome to the situation.
make it”)

Guilt-tripping
Capturing attention with thoughts that blame the
(example 3:
subject for the occurrence of the problem or for
“I am
their inability to cope with it.
rubbish...”)

Persistence in trying to implement a solution

Unproductive behavioral

Rigidity
despite its chronic ineffectiveness in the situation.
reaction (fight)

Assignment of
Thoughts or behaviors that blame others for the
responsibility
problem and/or their inability to solve it.
to others

Physical Actions aimed at solving a problem through

aggression violence and/or self-harm.

*Strategies for confronting the situation can go hand in hand with conscious reception and
regulation of emotions, but also with their avoidance... this depends in particular on the
subject’s functional habits and their knowledge of these processes.

Table 1.1. Typology of coping strategies with stressful situations

COMMENT ON TABLE 1.1.– This table is reproduced from Table 5.3 by

Mikolajczak and Bausseron (2013, pp. 159–160, author’s translation), with
slight adaptations and the addition of the first column (attitude towards
emotions). The acceptance strategy (cognitive confrontation) is particularly
well adapted to situations where stressors are not controllable by the subject
(ibid.). Confrontational strategies mobilize energy at the time, but often prove
to be functional in the short, medium and long term (ibid.). Most of them are
probably conscious. Avoidance strategies may appear effective in the short
term because they relay emotion to the unconscious level, but they can be very
harmful in the medium and long term (ibid.; see text). Unproductive reaction
strategies are dysfunctional in the short and long term (ibid.). With regard to
the two latter types of strategy, and despite the usual term “strategy”, the
subject is not necessarily aware that (1) they feel an emotion considered
negative, (2) they are implementing this “strategy” and (3) they are doing so
in response to the emotion evaluated as negative. Note: unproductive cognitive
reactions are characterized by high cognitive distortion (examples 1, 2, 3).
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 73

Figure 1.7. Negative effect of the chain reaction involving appraisal,

thoughts and emotions in response to a situation

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.7.– A) Depending on whether the object of attention

corresponds to physical phenomena present in the individual’s external
environment, to interoceptive sensations or to mental phenomena, the
subject’s field of consciousness is occupied by a reality that is increasingly
distant from reality “exterior” to the individual, but also from the objective
outer world (rising arrow). In a way, they are therefore increasingly cut off
from “shared” reality (and therefore from others in particular). B) When the
subject encounters a significant situation for them (according to their past,
their personality, their culture, etc.), reactive thoughts and emotions arise, and
this all the more intensely if the situation is significant. This generates a loop
(1-2-3) that amplifies this cognitive-emotional reaction. C) When emotion is
assessed as positive, the reaction generally tends to want to maintain the
status quo (e.g. stay as long as possible in a place or with the person we like).
There is a form of attachment to the situation, mentally and implicitly labelled
as positive. Thoughts generally revolve around strategies to prolong the
situation or the apprehension of its future end, which can generate emotions
felt as negative. The short-term harmful effect corresponds to the tensions
generated in the body and mind by these closures (see testimony in section
1.4.1). The long-term effect consists of reinforcing the habit, the tendency of
the mind towards grasping phenomena. D) When emotions considered
unpleasant elicit negative reactive thoughts (rising arrow) and attention is
focused more on the latter than on the emotional experience, an attempt to
avoid thoughts and emotions can have perverse effects. There may be mental
rumination, such that the mind strongly grasps thoughts, while the
74 Education for Responsibility

consciousness is not present at the bodily feelings of emotions. We can

therefore explain what we have mentioned above about the grasping of
thoughts (and dogmatism): it seems mainly due to the unconscious refusal to
live an underlying emotional experience (examples below). If the subject
avoids negative emotion (by engaging in hedonistic activity, for example), then
this type of system will only be postponed (Figure 1.8).
“YOGURT” EXAMPLE.– Let’s consider a fictional situation: a child, while
eating a yogurt, sees a dispute break out between his parents. He tries to
communicate with his parents about one of his needs, but they send him to his
room so he doesn’t have to watch the argument. He experiences this
internally as rejection. But he unconsciously appraises this emotion as too
painful for him, so instead of bursting into tears, for example, he plays a
video game, which distracts him from his emotion. It is an automatic
“protection” mechanism that buries the energy associated with emotion in the
subject’s body. It thus constituted an emotional engram. At the
phenomenological level, what happens at that moment is a reduction in the
field of consciousness: attention is automatically focused on some form of
distraction object (in this case, the video game). So, as soon as he was born,
the wild animal was imprisoned within the child, and the child does not know
about it: for “protection”, here is a new chain at his feet. He grows up with
that caged animal inside him. As an adult, he happens not to like yogurts and
is addicted to video games. Subtle phenomena can occur in the mind such as:
the subject in question walks down the street, sees a billboard with a photo of
yogurt on it, then he subconsciously feels a little sad without knowing why
and will think reactively “Oh no, I don’t want to go out, I would prefer to go
home and finish my video game”, which he will do that night instead of
meeting friends. The emotional engram was reactivated by the billboard. The
subject will have the impression of acting on the basis of free will, whereas
his choice is only the automatic consequence of the unconscious repression of
his emotion. This example highlights how our “I want” and “I do not want”
have been structured to avoid experiencing emotions and continue to do so.
“SWIMMING POOL” EXAMPLE.– This second example is the testimony of a
student following the MBER module62, following a session aimed at

62 MBER stands for Meditation-Based Ego Reduction. I created this module based on the
MBSR program (see section 3.2.2). It was first taught as an option in general culture at the
University of Montpellier (from 2012 to 2018). It consists of an application of the principles
of education for responsibility presented here. More than 300 students have been trained
there. Its content will be presented in my next book, to be published by ISTE.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 75

integrating the emotion of a lived situation (of his choice, but “slightly
unpleasant”): “For my part, I chose my feeling of laziness when it comes to
going to the swimming pool [...]. From there, I explored this feeling by
focusing on the sensations of water on my skin, the freshness of the water,
the bubbles tickling my skin, but the more I concentrated, the more I saw
memories related to swimming reappearing from my past, from the simple
inconvenience of cold water, to the fact that in my childhood I could not
have had friends in swimming because I was outclassed among the older
ones, and, while those of my age were playing, I had to train very hard. Then
came the even stronger memory of my near drowning five years ago when,
because of an asthma attack, I found myself unable to breathe and to get out
of the water, gently flowing into the cold of this icy water. Then, after that
experience, I saw something much longer ago, when I was three or four
years old, when I was first swimming, when I was thrown into the water, and
the times that followed, when I was afraid of that big blue pool that looked
so cold. So, after this meditation, I understood that this laziness came rather
from a childhood trauma, but that, to protect myself, I had buried all this,
whereas swimming is something that, despite everything, I like. As a result,
after this experience, I felt lighter, as if a chain had been removed from me
that passed through my insides. It was a hard and intense experience, but it
was extremely beneficial for me, and to understand things about me that I
didn’t suspect.” Thus, giving credit – magnified attention – to the thought “I
feel too lazy to go to the pool” led this subject to remain unconscious of the
underlying emotional engrams and not to confront himself with the emotion
in trying to avoid the pool, although this activity corresponds to his values.
His testimony also shows the often “multi-layered” character of emotional
engrams: their vibrations attract us in similar situations which, lived
unconsciously, add layers to the pre-existing engram.
The grasping of emotion results in a narrowing of the field of
consciousness, and of the “thought-action repertoire”: the tendencies to act
in a certain way are created or reinforced (Chambers et al. 2009; Figure 1.3).
Influenced by a limited attentional focus, and altered cognitive performance,
the subject identifies with the disruptive emotion and then reinforces it
(ibid.). Indeed, pushing back or fighting an emotion is similar to pushing a
balloon underwater: the harder you push it away, the more vigorously it will
reappear out of the water (Box 1.6). The same is true for a repressed
thought (Wenzlaff and Wegner 2000). Avoiding emotion through thoughts
is therefore a vicious circle (Figure 1.7). This inhibition of emotional
expression (escape or struggle), which is generally automatic and
76 Education for Responsibility

unconscious, therefore has many negative effects: attention focused on

thoughts, to the detriment of the conscious experience of emotion, is
characteristic of pathologies such as depression (ibid.). Some authors even
believe that these processes are the primary cause of psychopathology
(ibid.).

On the other hand, the more courageous confrontation strategies (Table

1.1) allow a distance to be taken from the situation and therefore potentially
a lesser grasp of the emotion. They thus decrease the intensity of the
emotional experience, while giving meaning to the present experience,
according to values and goals, and are therefore generally beneficial (except
when they generate inflexible or unrealistic reassessments; Chambers et al.
2009). Such a decrease is called “regulation” of emotion for the purposes of
this book (Figure 1.8, see testimonies below).

TESTIMONIALS.– Two students from the MBER module testify to their use of
an emotion regulation technique (called “three breaths”): “Sometimes I felt
anxious or stressed and practiced all three breaths, I immediately felt a
soothing, relieving and even energizing effect. It is as if all negative thoughts
have been transformed into energy.” “When I was stressed, I decided to
apply the ‘three breaths’ method and focus on the unpleasant sensation
caused by stress [(confrontation); author’s italicization]. I felt my heartbeat
slowing down, that I was calming down.”

*When emotion is integrated, attention is more diffuse, so there is no distance from the real (the
third perceptual modality is at stake here).

Figure 1.8. Attitudes towards the emotions assessed as negative and their effects.
For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 77

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.8.– The same diagrams can be made for emotions
that are usually appraised positively (except that in B it would not be a
question of struggle, but of identification). A) The trigger of emotion (below)
can be among the seven types of objects: for example, a significant situation
for the subject, physical pain or the recollection of an event, perceived
respectively by the five senses, the interoception or mental phenomena. The
birth of emotion will manifest itself through bodily sensations (6th type of
perceptual object) then give birth to reactive thoughts in cases B and C, and to
direct knowledge in D. Notes for B, C and D: (1) the t0, t1, etc. only indicate a
chronology, not a relative duration (i.e. all the phenomena in B is not
necessarily longer than the sequence of D) and the numbers refer to those
present on the arrows; (2) the size of the red ball represents the quantity of
energy related to the emotion, and when it is “grayed out”, at the bottom, this
shows its unconscious, metastable (dormant) character. B) In the case of
combatting a negative emotion, grasping contributes to engraming (step 6 in
Figure 1.3), which reinforces the size of the emotional memory trace (at t6).
Emotional avoidance almost has the same effect (direct change from t0 to t6).
Also, a completely unconscious emotion similarly generates reactive thoughts,
except that the latter do not explicitly take into account the underlying
emotion. C) Emotional regulation consists of defusing the cognitive-emotional
loops that amplify emotion (example of a method: welcoming emotion,
focusing on one’s bodyily sensations, on one’s breathing, etc.). It does not act
at the source of the emotion, so an engram of reactive emotion remains in the
body. However, repeated regulation of a given type of emotional engram can
reduce its volume. D) The integration of emotion implies letting the energy of
emotion flow through your body without intervention (without evaluating,
grasping, fighting...) and being in a conscious sensory mode (see section 2.3.2
and the “swimming pool” example). Then its energy is transformed, without
leaving any residual trace as a reactive emotion.

If we take the typology of the different offset levels of mental phenomena

with the real (section 1.3.1.1.2), we can compare the phenomenon illustrated
in Figure 1.7 with that of inflammation. During an infection, the body
normally reacts with a chain reaction that quickly activates the immune
system locally – this is inflammation. On the basis of perceived phenomena
and the corresponding infraverbal mental phenomena, thoughts are generated
to supposedly cope with the situation. It is a kind of inflammation that has a
protective purpose. However, if it generates significant stress or ruminations,
then it becomes like an autoimmune reaction: fierce thoughts that reinforce
78 Education for Responsibility

emotions that are unpleasant. These thoughts, disconnected from the real,
constitute a kind of speculative bubble that takes up all the space in the
mind. If this phenomenon is very strong in intensity or very long in duration,
it can cause an acute delirium or depression respectively. It is like a
gangrene of the mind; it has a morbid character, which depends on the
grasping of thoughts. This tendency of thoughts to form gangrene can be
explained: among all phenomena, attention generally tends to focus on those
who confirm thoughts or beliefs. Now, since thoughts are often performative
(see section 1.3.2.3.1), this further reinforces the snowball effect. The
psychopathological model on which acceptance and engagement therapies
are based postulates that most of our difficulties come from our grasp of
thoughts and the resulting avoidance of emotion and situation strategy,
sometimes moving us away from goals that correspond to our conscious
values (Blackledge and Hayes 2001; “swimming pool” example). On the
contrary, living the emotion without identifying with it, without grasping it
(Figure 1.8C), or even evaluating it (Figure 1.8D) respectively blurs or stops
the vicious circles linked to this emotion. This decrease in the grasping of
emotion may require a change in its appraisal: following appropriate
learning, it will be considered tolerable instead of negative (or unbearable)
so it will still be appraised, but less negatively. Here are the testimonies of
two students following the MBER module who illustrate this.

TESTIMONY 1.– “I would say that I feel good, I recognize my suffering, I

don’t try to make it disappear”. “I realized that some events are neither
happy nor sad, they are just there, you have to accept them. I find that no
longer judging life events has also helped me to stop judging others. My
relationship with humans has evolved and I find it better to listen to a person
without judging or cutting them off”.

More generally, learning cognitive defusion, that is, stopping the grasp of
thoughts, is one of the foundations of acceptance and engagement therapies
(Blackledge and Hayes 2001). This method is used in various potentially
psychopathological disorders (such as phobias or addictions) precisely to
regulate emotions (ibid.). This notion of cognitive defusion is included in the
notion of decentering, which concerns not only thoughts, but also emotions.
Decentering consists of looking at these phenomena (thoughts and emotions)
as transitional and objective events, accepting them as they are, without
judging them (Fresco et al. 2007), grasping them, rejecting them, or being
unconscious of them – that is, without being in the “I want”, “I do not want”
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 79

or “I do not see” in regards to them. It is a question of not identifying with

them and not taking them for reality in some way: of living them without
“for-me-ness”, that is, without the implicit notion of “It is me who thinks
that, who feels that”, without innuendo of the type “I am this thought, this
emotion”. Training to function in conscious sensory mode allows us to learn
to cultivate cognitive defusion and decentering (Shapiro et al. 2006) and,
ultimately, to reduce the amount of reactive thinking (through the integration
of emotions; Figure 1.8D; Box 1.7). Below, two MBER students testify to
such training, involving performing a daily activity in a conscious sensory
mode.

TESTIMONIES 2.– “At first [...] I couldn’t sustain my action (brushing my

teeth, walking the dog, [...]) [in conscious sensory mode]. Indeed, my
thoughts were constantly putting me back on autopilot and at the end of the
exercise I didn’t remember how exactly I had completed the action. Then, as
the practices progressed, I first identified the thoughts that made me go on
autopilot, but also those that came back most often. Currently, I manage to
remain conscious of my actions during the exercises and experience new
aspects (tastes, sensations, textures, smells, etc.)”.

“My exercise [in conscious sensory mode] was to walk in the street: each
time I moved, I tried to focus on myself, how I walked, how fast I moved,
but also the smells, sounds, and finally even the other people I met on the
street. I very quickly noticed that the people I met were, like me before,
‘absent’, [...] and in the end, during this exercise, I understood the
importance of being present during our activities, I understood the strength
of the autopilot that makes us walk [...] without seeing anyone while every
day I meet hundreds of people”.

At first, there was a visceral fear of being eaten alive by emotion… as if it were
“her or me”. As if I would disappear, be swallowed up by the twists and turns of
suffering from beyond the grave. As if she were morbidity incarnate. And then,
with the welcoming, with the abandonment of the ego to life, the consciousness
can embrace the being in its every nook and cranny. She can let herself be
penetrated by everything that emanates from the being, without labelling the
experience as happiness or suffering. And then emotion is transformed into
orgasm. A kind of cosmic climax where the mind vibrates in unison with what
there is. And there, in the here and now, the individual’s atoms find themselves
connected, tuned to the cosmos, while the “I” opens up to the entire universe.

Box 1.7. Integration of emotions

80 Education for Responsibility

In conclusion, the role of thoughts in avoidance or unproductive reaction

strategies is to prevent the mind from being consciously present to emotions (its
own and others), especially since most of the time, due to phenomenological
grasping, emotions, thoughts and the implementation of coping strategies are
not fully conscious. This is therefore part of splitting with emotions (section
1.3.2.2). Where do these emotions come from, all these caged animals?
From emotional wounds from the past63 that were not consciously
experienced or integrated: they were each like a wild animal encapsulated by
our unconscious immediately after birth to “protect” our consciousness.
Such a reflex presents the biological relevance of an evolutionary advantage:
it favored the psychological survival of our Cro-magnon ancestors, allowing
them to better devote themselves to their physical survival in a hostile
environment. Nevertheless, this mechanism is counterproductive in terms of
ethics and happiness (see section 4.3).

Indeed, at the time the cage was formed, it was necessary for the subject
insofar as they had not learned to experience their emotions consciously and
without a grasp: the consciousness was thus protected from emotions that would
then have been too disturbing for them. However, then the child has grown up,
and once they are an adult, they may have acquired the psychological means to
cope with these emotions: they then carry cages inside them that will limit their
scope of possible actions and are no longer necessary. Instead of protecting
them, they hinder them. It’s time for the individual to free these animals that
only ask for that! (see examples “yogurt” and “swimming pool”, above).
Because each event that unconsciously revives a feeling of past separation
automatically triggers the implementation of a thought-action repertoire that
distracts the subject from their inner world and focuses their attention on the
outer world, through the mobilization of their reactive thoughts. Thus,
ordinary subjects carry within them multitudes of caged animals and act in
their world to avoid being confronted with these emotions. They thus
reproduce inappropriate patterns and reinforce egotistical engrams without
their knowledge (Figures 1.3 and 1.8B; examples “yogurt” and “swimming
pool”).

63 According to Bourbeau (2013), the childhood wounds that structure us are of five types:
betrayal, abandonment, injustice, humiliation and rejection. They all correspond to a specific
way of experiencing a separation (from a person, a situation, an idea, etc.).
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 81

Let us consider the very frequent case of an ordinary subject perceiving an

emotion that they label as unpleasant. As long as there is this labelling and the
corresponding sensations are therefore assimilated to suffering, the subject is
generally reluctant to experience these emotions consciously. The subject would
have the impression that they were delivering their own conscience with food for
emotions, as if these latter would be devouring, making the subject disappear. A
great fear is there: it is easier to run away, to bury your head in the sand. Let us
compare this emotion, these feelings, to a child in distress knocking on the door.
Our ordinary attitude is to look through the peephole and not open the door. If
you have not been vigilant (if you are tired, for example), then you open the door
without looking first (you start to feel sad, for example, without knowing why).
Our reflex is usually to slam the door in the child’s face... “I’m not having that in
my house!... I’m going to watch TV [or smoke a cigarette or something]
instead”. Imagine how the poor child feels after the door is slammed door in their
face. Their condition will get worse and they will come knocking on the door
again as soon as they have the opportunity, because they are only waiting for one
thing. Releasing the animal in a cage (the emotional engram) consists of letting
the child go home, spending time with them, the necessary time and taking them
in your arms. By practicing this, we will realize that the initial labelling of
emotion as negative and undesirable is purely subjective and optional
(testimonies above). And we will thus be more and more capable of welcoming
the child in an adequate way, that is without identifying with them (the “none of
that in my house” being in fact “I do not want to be like that”), without appraisal
(i.e. without saying “it is negative”, “I do not want that”): in a purely sensory
conscious mode. Therefore, if we manage to take the child in our arms in an
adequate way (with equanimity, without a phenomenological grasp – therefore
with decentration64), then they are instantly transformed into a free child and will
never come knocking on the door again: their energy will have been transformed
into joy and wisdom. It would therefore be useful to understand that it is in fact
the emotion that is delivered as food to the consciousness, and not the other way
around: the suffering aspect of the emotion (linked to the ego) is instantly
dissolved in the consciousness of the present moment (Figure 1.8D). The art of
this integration of emotions is within everyone’s reach, and methods of learning
it are a topic of my next book65.

Box 1.8. Delivering emotions to feed your consciousness

64 The ego would like to grasp only what it appraises positively and not what it appraises
negatively... However, such a thing is not possible (and it is even by making us believe that it
is possible that it is holding us by the nose). Grasping is a functional habit of the mind: if it
occurs with what is positively assessed, it will automatically occur with what is negatively
assessed. That’s why the required training involves not grasping anything.
65 See note 62 in this chapter.
82 Education for Responsibility

1.3.2.4.3. Distinction between emotion or reactive thoughts on the

one hand and harmonious emotions or creative thoughts on the other
This idea of the “imprisoned” emotions in the body, and which limit us in
this way, is the foundation of different types of therapies, which have given
rise to different bodily techniques. To release old emotions, these techniques
generally involve movement: (1) uncontrolled, like in the regenerative
movement (Katsugen Undo), (2) caused by a third party, like in therapeutic
massages, or (3) autonomous, like in the cuirasses/breastplates release
method© (Côté 2005).

This consideration leads us to make a qualitative distinction between two

types of emotions and thoughts. Indeed, the purpose of these therapies is not
to become apathetic, insensitive like a robot, to free oneself from all forms of
emotion, but only from the old repressed emotions of the past: those that
hinder us and generate thought-action repertoires that are often ill-adapted to
present situations. It is these emotions that we have mainly discussed so far.
They also include what is commonly referred to as “neuroses”, concerned
with the discrepancies between appraisal and behavior (see steps 5 to 7 in
Figure 1.3). All these imprints, these engrams, linked to thought-action
repertoires, are part of the unconscious next to system 1 (Figure 1.1). The
associated thoughts (verbal or pictorial undertones) have the function of
escaping these emotions. As argued above, they correspond to the
reminiscence of old patterns in reaction to a present that resonates in a more
or less distant way with this undigested past. We will therefore call these
emotions and thoughts “reactive”. These thoughts, often verbal, are like a
horde of capricious children (“I’m hungry”; “I want that”), rebels (“what an
idiot, I want to hit them”), the police (“my work must be impeccable” ; “you
must succeed”), judges (“it’s wrong to do that”; “Hmm! You should be
ashamed of doing that”), etc. who sometimes converse together. Theoretical
practitioners have translated them into different psychoanalytical categories,
for example into different types of parents, adults and children in the theory
of transactional analysis (De Lassus 2013). These voices want to command
and dictate the conduct of the body, control the mind, frighten, help, etc.
when they are like wind whose only function is to prevent the subject from
hearing the emotion of their inner child knocking at the door at that moment.
In other words, we find here Orthos, Cerberus’ brother: he is a two-headed
dog, one is the reactive mind and the other the reactive emotions... this dog
always walks around with his two heads! On the other hand, if you let one
wither, then the other will follow.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 83

On the contrary, some emotions have nothing to do with the past, nor
with the ego, and everything to do with the present, whether it is inside or
outside: when, for example, we are touched by the beauty of a landscape. A
subject may be moved towards others or the environment in what we would
call a harmonious way, or they may be moved by it in a reactive way. In the
latter case, the present emotion actually resonates with a past emotion, and is
marked by identification with the phenomenon. This corresponds to the
distinction made above (section 1.3.2.2) between empathy or relatedness
(mobilizing harmonious emotion) and fusion or splitting with emotions
(involving reactive emotion felt or repressed respectively). If the emotion is
harmonious, then it leaves no memory trace, because there is no grasping or
engramming (Figure 1.3). It is somehow directly integrated (rather than
being pushed back, grasped or regulated; Figure 1.8).

In addition, thoughts (verbal or not) that are not related to the subject’s
past or neuroses are referred to here as “creative”. More clearly, we will say
that these thoughts are not related to the subject’s ego. They do not
necessarily accompany a harmonious emotion. When they emerge in the
mind, they do not necessarily concern either a physical data of reality
perceptible by the subject’s five senses. They may be verbal or non-verbal:
they use the second or third perceptual modality (section 1.3.1.1). They too
have the property of being harmonious (section 2.4.3). If they contain a great
idea, this idea will be beneficial to people. On the other hand, if an idea
seems brilliant and “creative” and it turns out to have harmful applications
(such as the idea of nuclear fission for example), this disharmonious aspect
indicates in this model that it was tainted by engramings of the subject’s ego
who had it. Probably because the subject’s intentions to undertake their
activity were themselves marked by egotistical motivations.

In short, freeing oneself from reactive emotions and thoughts, the pillars
of the illusion of the ego, does not imply becoming insensitive. On the
contrary, without these distorting filters, phenomena are perceived with
greater intensity – harmonious emotions too – and are further shared.

1.4. Integrating the model of the relationship between the relative

world and the mind

In the previous section, after having laid down the basic mechanisms
(perception, projection, phenomenological grasping and identification;
84 Education for Responsibility

section 1.3.1), we presented the four horsemen with which the mind shapes
the world (section 1.3.2): orientation (attention, appraisal, values),
relationship, cognition and emotions.

Before integrating all these elements into a global model, we would like
to set some metaphysical milestones.

1.4.1. Metaphysics of the strawberry tartlet

“Metaphysical” etymologically means “what is above matter”. You may

have already heard about metaphysical systems in other cultures. For
example, according to Aristotle or Tibetan Buddhism, the world is composed
of five elements (earth, water, fire, air and ether or space, respectively). It is
the same according to Taoist thought too, but the elements are earth, water,
fire, wood and metal. These elements have a symbolic dimension, such that
combined in certain proportions in each phenomenon, they determine their
physical (and even emotional) properties with regard to the human being in
Tibetan Buddhism and Taoism. Thus, in a ceramic pot, the earth element
dominates, even if the other four are present: water gives form, fire gives
cooking and therefore the change of the state of the earth, air provides the
movement that has changed the shape and space the tangibility. Similarly, in
what we call water, the water element dominates, even if the other four are
present. So, what are our own Western metaphysics? Has science lifted our
heads out of this dimension? This is what many scientists seem to think,
advocating a materialism that is in fact... metaphysics! To say that
everything is in fine reducible to matter (a posture called “reductionist
physicalism”) is indeed a metaphysical posture. It is to affirm that the
metaphysical nature of reality is matter. To deduce that metaphysics has no
right of citizenship would therefore be blindness (or worse, bad faith). As
Miquel (2011) expresses it, postulating the causal closure of the physical
world requires positioning oneself outside the physical system... in other
words, in a metaphysical dimension. Any symbolic or knowledge-based
system is necessarily based on metaphysics, implicit or explicit.

What I argue elsewhere (in a forthcoming book) is that the metaphysics

of biology is based on the notions of matter, energy and information. In other
words, these three categories play the same role in our countries as the five
elements in Chinese, Aristotelian or Tibetan thought, even if the term
“element” is less appropriate for the former. It means that our Western
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 85

contemporary metaphysics would incline us to explain that in a ceramic pot,

there is matter (clay, made of atoms), energy (that which is present in the
bonds between the clay atoms and which partly comes from the heat of the
oven used to cook the pot) and information (macroscopically the specific
nature of the clay and the general shape of the pot and microscopically the
nature of the atoms and their relative spatial positions). And I also postulate
that this metaphysics is widely shared in our society, mostly unconsciously.
In other words, there is a confusion between the objective world and the
ultimate reality, an illusion that the relative view is absolute: most biologists
probably have the impression that “in life, there is matter, energy and
information”. Instead of perceiving this way of thinking as a partially
culturally-biased metaphysics, there is a real lack of awareness that these
categories do not constitute the real. Such a process of blindness towards the
hardening of notions has been described in the epistemological literature. In
this regard, T.-S. Kuhn (1962/2008) referred to the formatting of a paradigm
to express this adherence to a worldview in scientific studies, while Fourez
(2002) shows the similarities of this process with that of brainwashing. That
is, in particular, that it would be part of the scientific training to adhere to the
vision provided by the paradigm by taking it for absolute truth and not
distorting... as if the world seen through this scientific look was the ultimate
reality66.

In this section, we therefore strive to make explicit what seems to us to be

the metaphysical characteristic of our culture. And we will see, in the next
two sections, that the aim of responsibility implies making the implicit
explicit.

According to my epistemological positioning, I consider scientific

concepts and models as tools for acting in the world and communicating
about it (Hagège et al. 2010; Hagège 2013). Thus, the modelling proposed
below (Table 1.2) does not claim to correspond to the ultimate reality, but to
the biological world, in which the understanding of emotions and other
phenomena studied by the cognitive sciences is rooted. The objective is
therefore to better anchor the theory proposed here in a universe of meanings

66 We are talking here about the conceptual and metaphysical foundations mentioned, and not
about new or marginal knowledge, which scientific formations generally explicitly present as
unstable (and therefore not to be considered as permanent truths). Indeed, it should be recalled that
according to T.-S. Kuhn (1962/2008), a general questioning of these foundations constitutes a
crisis, and changing them would require a scientific revolution (see Box 1.2).
86 Education for Responsibility

that is familiar to us – without any claim to its universality or supremacy

over other cultures or other metaphysical systems. It seems to me that it has
the quality, quite infrequent in the West, of explaining the metaphysical
system on which it is based. I consider the status of the statements contained
in this book to be that of effective knowledge in promoting education for
responsibility67, in structuring research in this field, and in communicating
these themes. As explained in the caption of Table 1.2, it is not at all a
question of highlighting a separation between body and mind, but only of
showing how these three meanings of the subject’s world (body, emotions,
mind) resonate with the significant metaphysical categories in biology,
which I believe also shape our Western objective world.

Dimension
Metaphysical Part of the
Phenomena of the Level
category tartlet
subject
Mental and
phenomenological
direct mind information strawberries
/ spiritual
knowledge
Emotional emotions psychological energy cream
Extero- and shortcrust
body biological matter
interoceptive pastry

Table 1.2. Typology of the phenomena considered in correspondence

with the underlying metaphysical category

COMMENT ON TABLE 1.2.– As I have argued elsewhere, the underlying

metaphysical categories are in a dialogical relationship (Figure 3 of Hagège
2014). Thus, it is clear that the three types of phenomena (first column of the
table) can be perceived by consciousness, therefore by the mind, just as matter
and energy correspond to information. Here, information is defined in a way
similar to that in biology (see genetic information): an immaterial dimension
that requires a material support and can be transmitted from one support to
another (Hagège 2004). Thus, we consider that a real individual looks like a
strawberry tartlet passed through a blender: a homogeneous pinkish flowing
paste68. That is, body, emotion and mind are in reality neither the same nor
different. On the other hand, here, for the purposes of discourse and modeling,

67 As well as ethics and spirituality.

68 At least I guess it looks like this, because I would never have made such a mess!
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 87

we distinguish strawberries, cream and pastry (mind, emotions and body). We

could speak of an isomorphism, at least partial, between the three levels.

This typology highlights the pivotal place of emotions between the body
and the sensations that pass through it, on the one hand, and between the
mind and perception of phenomena that do not directly involve the first six
modes of perception (seventh type of perceptual object), on the other hand.
Indeed, emotions are rooted in interoception (bodily sensations linked to
hormonal variations, microbiota, muscle contractions, etc.) and generally
generate an inflammation of the mental phenomena, a kind of speculative
bubble that is increasingly disconnected from reality (Figure 1.7). Moreover,
it is interesting to note that the Tibetan word nyeunmong, often translated as
“disturbing emotions” in English, literally means “madness and blindness”:
the distorting madness of attentional magnification (“I want” and “I do not
want”) and the blindness of attentional inhibition (“I do not see”; Figure
1.3)69. Thus, we can say in a way that emotions catalyze the passage from
body to mind, from matter to information, in order to generate a subjective
world. Obviously, the subject’s tendency to identify with their thoughts
reinforces the subjective character of their perception and, coincidentally,
their discrepancy with the ultimate reality.

We find in the incriminated process a blatant analogy with the discon-

nection of money from material and energetic realities (Figure I.1, to be
compared with Figure 1.7). This is simply because it seems to us that money
corresponds to incarnation in the outer world (i.e. the result of the
projection) of individual minds (Table 1.3) and their functioning in the
majority of subjects. This is why the relationship between matter and energy,
with reactive thoughts on the one hand and money on the other, seems to us
to be quite similar, even homologous: they seem to be part of the same
process of emotional avoidance. Indeed, being focused on saving money
prevents us from landing on “what is not going well”, from letting old
wounds rise and integrating them. It is the ego, influenced by society, that
pushes us to amass in this way to the detriment of others. In the same way
that the financialization of the economy deteriorates the planet, in a very
concrete sense, and through more or less direct consequences (see
introduction), the reactive mind generates tensions and deteriorates the body,

69 This Tibetan term seems to me to refer as much to the three modalities of the ego (Figure
1.3) as to the emotional engrams and their particular way of remaining in reactive emotion.
88 Education for Responsibility

through more or less direct consequences (example: muscle tensions linked

to stress or thoughts that lead to suicide). Here is a testimony to this effect.

TESTIMONY.– “My meditation experience allowed me to understand the

influence of my thoughts on myself, focusing on my breathing showed me
that there were many ‘secondary’ thoughts I had never really paid attention
to [...]. The observation of these threads of thoughts showed me how much
all these thoughts were much more than a kind of secondary disturbance, but
that they really prevented me from being present and that they had a very
negative influence on my behavior and moods. [Sleep] yoga also showed me
that there was much more than these thoughts in my reactive mind, but also a
lot of wounds [emotional engrams] that have an important influence on my
moods and thoughts (and my life in general) that I am not yet truly aware of.
I realized that I had to value all these thoughts and observe them rather than
try to silence them in order to be aware of them and to better understand the
dynamics of my motivations, thoughts, actions in order to live a healthier
life” (MBER student).

Metaphysical
Individual relative mind Objective world
category
Information thoughts (reactive mind) money
transformative forces
Energy emotions
of raw materials
perceived body and context raw materials and their environment
Matter
(situation) (planet Earth)

Table 1.3. Isomorphism between the objective world and individual relative minds

COMMENT ON TABLE 1.3.– Compare Figures I.1 and 1.7 for more details.
The relative mind directly impacts the objective world; an analogy between
the two right-hand columns shows money as an avatar of the mind, the drying
up of energy sources as the resonance of our difficulties in regulating
(“ managing”) our emotions and earthly deterioration as the image of the
abuse of our body by the reactive mind.

These harmful effects are mediated by an abnormal, disharmonious

mobilization of energy: on the one hand, emotional energy is often either
repressed or grasped and delocalized in terms of mental phenomena (instead
of being experienced, consciously welcomed without grasping, and thus
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 89

evacuated), and on the other hand, energy is abnormally70 located in the

financial sphere instead of being in its right place. Finance is a system
created from scratch by the human mind. This economic system consists of a
reflection of human ego, and more specifically of its reactive mind. This is
what Pierre Weil calls “the route of destruction”, which originates in the
“fantasy of separativity”: human beings do not realize the causal link
between their “inner disorder” and external disharmony (Pasquier 2018).

1.4.2. The ego, mediator of the reflection of the subjective world

through the individual relative mind

We will now clarify this notion of ego, which has been mentioned several
times.

Here, the inner world refers to the sixth and seventh types of perceptual
objects, and to emotions, while the outer world refers to the perception of
phenomena external to the individual (see the five usual senses and the third
modality of perception; section 1.3.1.1), that is that of the human (HE) and
non-human (NHE) environment.

1.4.2.1. The illusion of the ego

As we have seen, the subject usually operates on the basis of preferences
(attentional orientation, appraisal, values, attitudes and beliefs), which help
them to situate themselves in relation to, or rather in, their outer world. They
are identified with certain external (situations, social role, etc.) or internal
(mental, emotional, etc.) phenomena, through which they feel they exist.
These are essentially phenomena perceived with magnified attention,
therefore of positive or negative valence for them. Phenomena that are the
object of an inhibited attention are not significantly included in their world.
The more attention71 is focused, the narrower the field of consciousness is
and the smaller the amount of corresponding information. By “quality” of
consciousness, we refer to the more or less great deformation operated by the
phenomenological grasp. The more there is grasping, projection and
perception through the filter of the ego, the more there is a gap between the
ultimate reality and the relative reality, and therefore the more subjectively
biased the information is. However, emotion appears when there is a

70 Not in the statistical sense, but in the Canguilhemian sense of “pathologically”.

71 As a reminder, this attention is mostly exogenous (section 1.3.2.1.1).
90 Education for Responsibility

significant gap for the subject between the immediate real and their
projections. In other words, most of the time, the subject does not perceive
this discrepancy, because it is not significant for them, but at certain
moments it becomes so. This is a comical observation to say the least when
you think about it: when a subject feels an emotion, fundamentally, it is
because reality is not shaped according to their subjective world. They find
that they are in duality with the real, and the vicious circle of the ego leads
the subject to take refuge in their subjective world (often their reactive
thoughts), to which they implicitly give more credit to than the real.
Therefore, they are more like two with what is present.

Thus, subjective functioning distorts reality through selfish prejudices

(Trautwein et al. 2014). These mechanisms are linked to a feeling of
separation: erroneously identified with an individual (Hagège 2014), the
subject feels separated from their environment. According to Damasio’s
(2002) model, the fundamental self, which precedes and serves as a basis for
the conceptual self, involves four aspects: a specific spatial point of view
anchored to the body, a sense of internal unity and duality with regard to others
and the environment, a sense of possession, and primordial physical
sensations (Trautwein et al. 2014). There is therefore a feeling of separation,
a duality between what they identify with and what they do not identify with.
They basically self-identify with their body and then the duality corresponds
to that between the inside (individual) and the outside (environment). But as
we have mentioned, they can identify with an external object (e.g. a
strawberry tartlet, the character of a film, etc.) and in doing so they lose
themselves. They do not identify with what is not part of their subjective
reality (“I do no see”) and what they reject (“I do not want”). This too has a
changing character (they can repel a thought, sensation, etc.). Duality can
therefore also be experienced within a world. For example, in a dream,
which is a strongly grasped manifestation of the inner world, the subject
identifies only with a part of the dream (the self in the dream) and not with
what is around them (for example, a strawberry tartlet that they cannot reach
in the dream). However, it is the whole dream that unfolds in their mind, and
not only the form they are identified with in the dream. Thus, the subject
feels separated from the shape of the strawberry tartlet, while it is co-
emerging with the shape of the self in the individuation of the dream: it is
also part of their mind. In the same way, in the event of physical pain, the
subject will be able to identify with all their proprioceptive sensations, with
the exception of the painful sensation implicitly considered as foreign, as not
being part of their body (which is obviously a misinterpretation). These
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 91

different examples illustrate that the feeling of separation supporting the

tangibility of the ego on the one hand depends on the circumstances and on
the other hand is spatially changing. This tangibility of the ego – that is, the
feeling of a permanent self separated from the rest – is therefore illusory and
only based on the ignorance of the subject of their own functioning (see
blindness; Figure 1.3).

Indeed, from an objective point of view (which would approach that of

ultimate reality), the subject can rather be considered as a phenomenon
emerging from the interactions between the individual and their
environment, these two parts themselves emerging from a process of
individuation (Hagège 2014). This vision implies that the ego (or self) is an
illusion, which has been argued elsewhere (ibid.), on neuroscientific,
sociological, psychological or philosophical grounds (Hood 2011).
Neuroscientifical studies on the self have shown that the self is a socio-
cultural construct whose brain bases vary from one culture to another
(Kitayama and Park 2010). Hood (2011) shows, for example, how the
illusion of self emerges from a combination of external influences. Based on
experimental results, he argues that education is not only about learning
from others, but also about becoming like others and becoming a self – a
narrative that memory constructs to weave different experiences together
into a coherent story. As adults, the history of the self is constantly updated
by changing circumstances (ibid.). Thus, the self would be a story – a kind of
matrix in the mind that produces the illusion of a coherent individual – in the
same way that a trompe-l’œil can give the illusion of a real-life scene.

In a dynamic opposite to that of perceiving this illusory character, the

functioning of the ego consists of generating a relative world to feel
existance through it – and, in a way, confusing this world with the real
(hence our madness, which is also blindness). This relative outer world is
essentially based on past assumptions or conditioning (Figure 1.9). Here, we
propose to define the ego as the illusory source of ordinary functioning,
which makes the subject implicitly as permanent, separated from the rest,
identify sees themself with their body (and with other objects of
identification) and implicitly confusing their subjective reality with the
ultimate reality. Conditionings (social, cultural, due to personal history, etc.)
make us perceive reality through a filter that categorizes, judges and names
the perceived phenomena and give them meaning according to these
conditionings. Thus, our consciousness, in addition to being incomplete, is
92 Education for Responsibility

partial (Hagège 2017d): our attention selects information according to

egotistical biases (cultural and personal).

Figure 1.9. Outcome diagram of the functioning of the individual relative mind.
For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.9.– Among the fields of possibilities, the projector of

the subject-who-takes-themselves-for-an-individual, guided by their “I want”
/“I do not want”, and ignoring the objects of “I do not care”, makes them
perceive a subjective world: a world restricted and distorted as compared to
the ultimate reality. This projector carries in the present meanings and
reactions that come from the subject’s past, and thus prevents them from
having a new, unprejudiced look. This impasto over time includes the belief in
a self that is constant through change and separated from the environment and
from what the ego does not identify with. This belief is fueled by the “for-me-
ness”.

This functioning leads some traditions to consider ordinary life as a

dream (Ruiz 2016), qualitatively little different from nightime dreams72.

72 With the idea that the qualitative difference between these two states is much smaller than
between what we call “the waking state” of a relative mind and functioning of a principled
mind.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 93

1.4.2.2. The outer world as a reflection of the inner world

This bias in phenomenology implies that the world in which the subject
lives is only a reflection of the preferences of their inner world. Here, the
notion of the inner world refers to that of the relative mind, and that of the
outer world to that of the relative world. Indeed, the four horsemen of the
mind (orientation, relationship, cognition and emotions) determine the
substrates of basic mechanisms (perception, identification, projection): given
what the mind turns towards and given how it interacts with these
phenomena, what is perceived, grasped, projected and how it is perceived,
grasped and projected is determined. As already argued above, the outer
world can therefore be considered as a reflection of the inner world (Figure
1.10).

Figure 1.10. The outer world as a reflection of the inner world, therefore of the mind.
For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

COMMENT ON FIGURE 1.10.– The labeling of forms, which is part of the

semantic processing of perceptions, makes the phenomena (or objects) of the
environment appear to be separate from their environment. In this perception,
the phenomenological grasp and the subtle coinciding identification implicitly
induce the subject to perceive themselves as they perceive an object: as an
individual separated from their environment. This mirror effect thus reinforces
94 Education for Responsibility

the illusion of the ego. This dual basis of ego functioning seems all the more
accentuated in Western societies, referred to as “individualist”. Since the
mental division of the world (labeling of forms, beliefs, etc.) is intimately linked
to the language and phenomenological grasping of thoughts by the subject, this
division, culturally (ibid.) and personally significant, provides a kind of
fascination for the subject to recognize themselves in the world they perceive;
they unconsciously and illusively seek a feeling of existence there. The ego feels
it exists through identification objects (thoughts, emotions, etc.) and external
phenomena (the gaze of others, situations considered favorable or unfavorable,
etc.).

Note again that this distinction between the inner and outer world seems
useful for communication in our opinion. However, it is not intended to refer
to a dualist conception. Moreover, the model of the world-mind relationship
that we propose, including phenomenological considerations consistent with
an epistemology of complexity, leads to the overcoming of this dichotomy
between the inner and outer. The meaning of “outer world” and “inner
world” is intertwined with that of feelings of separation; it is all three terms
that must be considered, which makes it possible to highlight the artificial
nature of duality.

1.4.3. An example: stereotypes, prejudices and violent

radicalizations

The ego is what makes us pull the covers overs ourselves: it is the source
of our relative world(s) and of all the evils caused by human beings.
Moreover, we will mention it later on, it is what generates our own suffering
– by making us think exactly the opposite...73 what betrayal! In short, we
could consider any conflict or societal problem, and show how the processes
underlying the functioning of the ego have an explanatory role in it. We will
do so with a topical example, that of violent radicalization.

To do this, let us consider one of the basic mechanisms of the ego:

appraisal and its link with attention. We have seen that it depends on
situational factors (the situation) and dispositional factors (the individual’s

73 In other words, it makes us believe that if we follow it, if for example we seek pleasures
and try to avoid displeasure, then we will be happier. However, as detailed in this book, this is
precisely the source of our dissatisfaction and suffering. Moreover, as we will see in
Chapter 2, this causes ethical problems.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 95

tendencies, in relation to their reactive, especially emotional, automatisms).

It also depends on social conditions, such as implicitly or explicitly endorsed
stereotypes. Stereotypes have been defined as beliefs about the criteria that
characterize a group (Myers 2009). With regard to explicit relationships with
outgroups (groups considered as foreign to our own), studies have shown,
for example, that on average a football supporter has a stronger empathy for
a distressed supporter of their own team than when they see a distressed
supporter of the opposing team, a situation where on average they may even
experience pleasure. With regard to implicit stereotypes, social identity
theory incorporates the social dimension of appraisal. According to this
theory (reviewed by Myers 2009):
– we categorize: labeling someone as a Muslim, a Jew, a Mexican, a
politician or a bad student, is a way to implicitly appeal to prejudiced things
about them;
– we identify ourselves: we associate ourselves with membership groups
and gain self-esteem by doing so;
– we compare: we appraise by contrast our membership group (ingroup)
against other groups (outgroups), with a favorable bias for our own.

Many experiments support the underlying cognitive mechanisms.

EXAMPLE.– A test instructs subjects to press a button as quickly as possible:

“shoot at the target”, when in the picture shown, the person is carrying a gun,
and a button “do not shoot” when carrying a lure (e.g. a drink can). These
authors have highlighted a bias among Australians to shoot more and faster
at characters wearing a turban on their heads, whatever they hold in their
hands, and whatever their gender or skin color – what has been dubbed the
“turban effect” (Unkelbach et al. 2008).

Other tests consist of measuring empathic reactions (physiological for

example) to photos of ingroup or outgroup citizens. Thus, it has been shown
that empathy towards citizens in the ingroup is greater than that towards
those of an outgroup when the subjects in the photos are deemed to be in a
negative situation, whereas there is no effect when they are in a positive
situation (Neumann et al. 2013). In one study, with films depicting citizens
from different groups, emotional reactivity shows a bias in favor of the
ingroup (for some ethnic groups; Roberts and Levenson, 2006). Also, it has
been shown that implicit racist attitudes are positively correlated with the
96 Education for Responsibility

speed of detection, and therefore attentional orientation and magnification,

of African American faces (Hugenberg et al. 2003).

In short, it is clear from these few examples that appraisal and attention
orientation are cognitive bases for discrimination (Hagège 2017d).
Discrimination is the foundation of violent radicalization. It can be defined
as negative behavior towards an outgroup or its members, implicitly or
explicitly justified by stereotypes.

Violent radicalization74, on the other hand, has been defined as a process

of engaging in activities that an outgroup considers a violation of important
social norms (for example, the murder of civilians). It covers multifactorial
and complex processes (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010), some of whose common
features include identification with an ingroup and rejection of outgroups
(Borum 2011), or, more concisely, an “identity withdrawal”. It is a kind of
increased tension of the ego, which reinforces the intensity of identification
with a social group and a grasp of the supposed division with the outgroups,
particularly on the basis of a divergence of beliefs. Violence has been
defined as the acquired need to harm others in order to feel alive, strong or
secure (Favre 2007). In this brief explanation, it appears that relationships
with otherness are structuring: relationships with epistemic otherness (with
one’s own beliefs versus those of the Other) and relationships with social
otherness (with one’s social identity versus that of the Other)75.

We therefore conclude that two variables potentially characterize violent

radicalization: dogmatism and discrimination.

We have already mentioned dogmatism (section 1.3.2.3.1). It should be

noted that its emotional component encourages the subject to remain in the
known and pertains to an addiction to certainty (Favre 2016). Fabre (2016)
refers in this regard to fundamentalism, which he defines as the “solidification
of the questioning by inflation of the off question” (p. 20, author’s translation).
That is, what is not addressed in the problem becomes frozen, and then
reifies the problem and the solution considered with it. The latter is then set
up as absolute truth. Dogmatism has been empirically correlated with violent
behavior (Favre 2007).

74 It should be noted that radicalism – any movement that claims to promote the “root”, the
essence of an ideology or practice – is not necessarily violent.
75 These two other factors may be linked with what has respectively been called “epistemological
 otherness” and “external otherness” (Briançon 2019).
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 97

Also, violent radicalization has been explained in particular by a “need

for closure”, a notion related to dogmatism. Its correlation or link with
religious fundamentalism (Saroglou 2002), racism (Van Hiel et al. 2004),
rejection of outgroups and prejudice (Brandt and Reyna 2010) has been
empirically supported.

In addition, numerous studies have highlighted prejudice as a source of

discrimination (ibid., Pearson et al. 2009). Prejudice is thus considered as the
attitude that underpins discriminatory behavior (ibid.). On the one hand, the
separation and distinction between “us” (ingroup) and “them” (outgroup) by
a radicalized subject is at the heart of the process justifying violence in
radical ideology. On the other hand, radical actions generate a vicious circle,
as if discrimination and radicalization were self-sustaining. For example,
with regard to violent Islamic radicalization76: (1) it has been shown that
after September 11, 2001 prejudices against Muslims (more stereotyped as
violent) have increased, as have stereotypes against Westerners (more seen
as “sinners” and “immorals” by some citizens of Middle Eastern countries); 
(2) discrimination against Muslims seems to reinforce the phenomenon of
radicalization, giving rise to indoctrinating speeches by jihadists (Myers
2009). French sociological studies aimed at explaining violent Islamic
radicalization place particular emphasis on the subject’s search for identity
in a world perceived as hostile and confusing (reviewed by Dalgaard-Nielsen
2010). We find here the role of projections and the subjective perception of
reality (involving in particular the performativity of thoughts) as a causal
factor. In our context, where a relativism of values is palpable (Prairat 2016)
and where individualism seems to be authentic and lawful, some subjects
experience a loss of meaning and reference points. In other words, the
appraisal of their environment may become mostly negative. If they suffer
from discrimination, this can lead to an increased sense of exclusion. Some
Muslims descended from immigrants do not find themselves as part of the

76 Here, we use the term “Islamic” only because jihadists from the “Islamic State” claim to be
Muslims. In the Koran, the major jihâd (jihâd al-nafs, meaning “combat against oneself”)
refers to the effort that the practitioner must make to overcome their ego and thus, embody
religious precepts, including respect for others (Larcher 2012). Thus, in violent jihadist
radicalization, the spiritual dimension of the Koranic notion of jihad has been diverted to an
identity dimension, giving the radicalized sense of belonging (rather than a spiritual
aspiration). We consider this usurpation as a return to the archaic human sacrifice (according
to the Girardian theory: social jugulation of violence through the sacrifice of an innocent
alter-ego), whereas a spiritual approach invites us to sacrifice the source of violence within us,
namely the ego.
98 Education for Responsibility

“us” among French society, nor part of that of their ancestors, but rather in
an in-between without a clearly identified ingroup. At the level of the ego,
the subject does not feel they sufficiently exist thanks to the phenomena they
perceive, which generate a form of uneasiness (a lack of pleasure in
appraising a situation as positive).

However, this “identification deficit” could also be an opportunity to free

oneself from existing conditioning. Such a change in dynamics would require a
shift from a predominantly projective to a predominantly reflective attitude,
which could perhaps take place if it were accompanied (Favre 2016), preferably
by a caring and warm environment. Indeed, this destabilization implies having
to face our dark sides, our reactive emotions which are deemed as negative, our
old wounds (looking inside rather than outside, see chapters 2 and 3). And our
attention, if placed in a context that allows it77, will automatically turn to an
external phenomenon with which we will identify (rather than to our
unintegrated emotions). This allows us to escape our negatively appraised
emotional states, which are deemed as negative (Figure 1.7). Among these
objects of identification are for some subjects dogmatic discourses, which give
them a sense of belonging. Now, jihadists argue by demonizing the West
(“corrupt” and “decadent”) and by offering a solid value system. They invoke
the ummah, a virtual global community of all Muslims. Thus, the feeling of
exclusion among these subjects in need of reference points would no longer be
perceived as being due to personal failure, but due to a hostile environment
where there is no place for Muslims. From then on, the subject will be able to
start the radicalization process, finding meaning in their life, a community of
belonging, an “us”. Finding these kinds of reference points seems to correspond
to a basic psychological need in any subject who has not learned to function
otherwise (other than by projection, identification, etc.) and who is unaware of
their own functioning – which is probably the case for many of us.

77 In this case, there seems to be an important role of emotional ties and pressures in small
social groups: today, the underground recruitment of jihadists seems more horizontal (by
“activists” who are already part of the subject’s social environment) than vertical (by imams)
(according to the filtering of social movement theories; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). And this
proximal recruitment seems to be a decisive factor (contrary to the myth of the major role of
virtual social networks and the Internet ; ibid.). It should also be noted that in detail, the
psychological mechanisms involved vary according to the subject’s temperament. Thus,
different psychological profiles of radicalized subjects have been updated (leader, protégé,
misfit or drifter), and in these cases, the objects of identification are different (rather, the
political aim for the first two, the new chance of meaning for the two latter; ibid.).
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 99

In support of this understanding, it has been shown that the evocation of

religious values (Kaplan et al. 2016a) or political opinions (Kaplan et al.
2016b), on the one hand, mobilizes areas of the brain involved in identity,
appraisal, mental phenomena and self-centered cognition (we would
summarize as “the ego”), called the “default mode network”. On the other
hand, these opinions, relating to identity, seem much less subject to change
than opinions that are less structuring for identity. In addition, the areas of
the brain involved in responding to threats also seem to be involved in
resisting a change of opinion. It can therefore be assumed that a subject in
need of identity will first seek to find one, in this case through adherence to
religious values or political opinions, and will therefore be potentially
vulnerable to such an ideology that arises in their close circle78.

It should be noted that the idea of a vicious circle between

fundamentalism (dogmatism) and social isolation has been put forward by
the social movement theory or network theory (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010).
Indeed, during radicalization, the subject would avoid contact and
confrontations of opinions with subjects who explicitly disagree with them79:
in particular members of their family or houses of worship, from whom/
which they are often excluded. The subject who becomes radicalized in this
way will thus find reference points that further dissociate them from the
different forms of otherness (see also the vicious circle of discrimination-
radicalization mentioned above). This illustrates the link between violence
and projection, namely how the world in which they live reflects their own
mind. Indeed, the subject projects the vision of a hostile world. When they
express this vision, they feel rejected by the majority of those around them
who do not share it. This reinforces their vision of a hostile world. In fact,
violence and projection include attributing to the outer world, here to the
outgroup (the West, i.e. “the Great Satan”), the origin of their problems
(instead of seeing it in their own mind). This distortion makes it logical that
jihadists take responsibility for changing this exterior, for solving the
problem at what they believe to be the source (ibid.).

In short, the violent radicalization of the subject seems to arise from a

subject’s closure: of their thoughts (dogmatism), emotions (ignored or
rejected) and towards others (discrimination, prejudices, avoidance of

78 See note 77 in this chapter.

79 This explains why sometimes a terrorist’s close family circle is surprised at the way their
life has turned out.
100 Education for Responsibility

otherness), such as attentional orientation, appraisal... the different

mechanisms of the ego explain the cognitive and emotional bases80 of this
process. This example is an additional illustration that the world (where
terrorism, discrimination, etc.) is a reflection of the mind (borrowing
dogmatism, stereotypes, etc.). As long as the illusion of the ego persists in
some way there are different stereotypes and forms of dogmatism (section
1.3.2.3), to varying degrees and towards different groups, subjects or objects.

We invite the reader here not to highlight their own differences in

functioning with that of a person in the process of radicalization (do not “feel
different from” or “make two” with). That would be counterproductive. It
has indeed been described in the literature that our identification with an
ingroup is accompanied by a sense of superior morality, which thus
contributes to reinforcing stereotypes and discrimination against outgroups
(Brambilla et al. 2013) and thus the vicious circles mentioned above. On the
contrary, the purpose is to be able to identify common functions (which,
placed in one context or another, will mature in a specific way). As
Hofstadter (2008) expresses it, the uniqueness of the mechanisms related to
self-perception in human beings results in “the rich diversity of our methods
of internalizing facts [... and constitutes] finally one of the main forces of
differentiation between individuals” (p. 784, author’s translation). As we
will see, responsibility implies looking at what is inside, that which is in
one’s own mind, and if it is likely to generate this type of effect, instead of
focusing on incriminating or denouncing these causes (stereotypes,
discrimination, dogmatism, phenomenological grasping, identification, etc.)
in others. Let us first look, if you agree, at how our own beliefs mislead us
and cut us off from parts of the real... What germs in our own minds, if they
developed further and in an appropriate context, could lead to behaviors
similar to those of jihadists81?

Here, the examples taken relate more particularly to violent religious

radicalization (in this case jihadism), but such radicalization can also be
political, and we have recently observed that despite the tragedies and

80 We have focused here only on these two concepts of attention and appraisal, however they
are intertwined with the other horsemen and the basic mechanisms of the world-mind
relationship. As for dogmatism, we have already mentioned its cognitive foundations.
81 This would be a very concrete way of applying Morin’s (1986) hologrammic principle and
taking it into account in our own lives.
 The World as a Reflection of the Mind 101

genocides of the last century, violent political radicalization seems to be on

the rise in Europe in recent decades. In any case, this example leads us to
raise an interesting point for responsibility issues, which is part of what we
will call the “taxonomic domain” – that is, the way in which we constitute
groups and territories of belonging (and outgroups). Indeed, for example, we
mentioned empathy as a relational attitude without raising the question of
who it was addressed to: preferably those in one’s own ingroup? Or of a
potentially equal intensity towards all human beings? As for relatedness, can
it also be felt beyond what is identified as the subject’s own territory, or
beyond the ego’s “I want” and “I do no want”? The implicit values are not
the same in each case, nor are the consequences the same with regard to
responsibility. We will discuss this point in more detail in the following
chapters.

In short, whether this results in violent radicalization or in strawberry

tartlet addiction, the basic psycho-phenomenological mechanisms involved
are similar. They are the ones which explain our madness, mentioned in the
introduction. Why is the world mad? Because we are mad. Where does our
madness come from? The mismatch between our vision and the ultimate
reality and the coincident lack of awareness of this mismatch. Of course,
being drugged with strawberry tartlets and being jihadist is not the same
thing: the consequences are not of the same kind. In fact, these behaviors do
not have the same ethical consequences. It is the purpose of our next chapter
to consider benchmarks to guide our madness towards more responsibility,
and even to transform it into wisdom.

Thus, to conclude this first chapter, let us remember that we express

ourselves under the gnoseological hypothesis. We first argued that, from an
ultimate point of view, the world is the reflection of the mind, co-constructed
with reality. In this respect, from an objective point of view, dialogism is
intrinsic to the relationship between the inner and outer worlds. However,
the subjective point of view, that of the ego, is that of a relative reality,
precisely nourishing the (objectively illusory) separation between these
worlds: it favors a dualist relationship to the detriment of a dialogism. As
mentioned with the example of violent radicalization, such a gap can
generate, justify violence and a set of other problems that we will describe
later on as “disharmonious”. Thus, as we argue in Chapter 2, responsibility
will, in our view, consist of a process of aligning relative reality with the
real, that is, from the relative point of view with the ultimate point of view.
In other words, it will be a question of realizing the illusory character of the
102 Education for Responsibility

ego, that is, of being aware at every moment of the dialogism inherent in the
relationship between the outer and inner worlds, and beyond, of the
emptiness of these worlds and their separation.

DEFINITION.– “Vacuity” or emptiness is not synonymous with “non-

existence” and does not imply a nihilistic position. From a relative point of
view, the ordinary subject tends to understand the self and phenomena as
sustainable and separate from the rest, that is, to understand them in a dual
way, based on an interior, an exterior and a separation between the two.
However, from an objective point of view, the characteristics of a self or a
phenomenon are only relative grasps, inherent in the egotistical processing
of information. The notion of emptiness therefore refers to the ultimate,
asemantic point of view that phenomena and the self are constantly changing
and are interdependent on everything else.
 2

Responsibility and
Functioning of the Mind

We have considered the notion of relative mind, proposed a model of its

function and considered its relationship with the world as a reflection of the
latter. The idea is that subjects perceive the world and act within it through
biases, of cultural1 and personal origins, which can be understood using
various concepts of psychosociology and cognitive science. Do these biases
pose responsibility issues, and how? Before answering this question, we must
first try to define what this notion of responsibility means, or at least give an
operational definition.

2.1. Introduction: an overview of the tone of current research on

responsibility

In contemporary research, and according to my probably partial review of

the literature, the notion of responsibility is specifically theorized mainly in
the following French- or English-speaking fields: moral philosophy, business
ethics (corporate social responsability, consumer responsibility, etc.) and, to
a lesser extent, therapeutic education (patient responsibility), criminal law,
environmental psychosociology (environmental responsibility), moral
responsibility or psychology (responsibility attitude in certain psychological
disorders, or attribution of responsibility). The other disciplines that mobilize
the notion of responsibility, such as professional ethics, moral education or

1 Each culture, immeasurable to any other, generates its own biases. See Hagège (2013) for a
discussion of the notion of culture.

Education for Responsibility, First Edition. Hélène Hagège.

© ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
104 Education for Responsibility

“educating for…”, draw on these first fields, but especially on traditional

philosophy, ethics or phenomenology to explain it.

Basically, responsibility is the subject’s ability to “respond (so that they

are response-able) by themselves, of their own accord and instead of
reacting” (Hagège 2017b, p. 186, author’s translation). The concept refers to
the conditions of imputability for an individual’s acts and omissions. It
involves considering the subject’s action in relation to time (they will be able
to answer for their act after having committed it) and to others (they answer
to others; Henriot 2015). It is therefore at a transition of scale, between the
individual and the social. The relationship between the subject’s intention to
act and the action itself is crucial in assigning responsibility: a subject is all
the more responsible when their action is premeditated2 (King and
Carruthers 2012). In other words, the question of the causal link between
mental phenomena and action is central. Beforehand, it is therefore
important to decide on the freedom to think, to act, and therefore on the
existence or not of free will (Knobe and Doris 2010). However, this question
and these statuses are increasingly being researched in cognitive sciences
(Baumeister 2008) and social psychology (Myers 2009). To cite just one
example, neural signals predict an action “freely chosen” several seconds
before the subject is aware of making the decision (reviewed by Bode et al.
2014). These results are disturbing, because they call into question the
foundations commonly assumed for the experience of being a subject
(Hagège 2014): on the one hand, the existence of free will – questioning
which is nevertheless debated (Sie and Wouters 2010) – and, on the other
hand, the correlative notion of responsibility (ibid.). Indeed, if free will is,
like ego, objectively an illusion, can I be held responsible for my actions?
Thus, today, philosophers tend to integrate these results, particularly those of
the cognitive (neuro)sciences, into their arguments (Brownstein 2016),
without which the latter could, as before, sometimes be whimsical or far
removed from the biopsychophysical reality of individuals.

In short, this research is more oriented either towards a normative and

therefore pragmatic aim (education, professional ethics, etc.) or towards a

2 In the case of the conduct of an engagement, the subject may even claim responsibility for a
situation they inherit, which they did not cause (Ladrière, Lecarme and Moatti 2015). That
said, what we call “control” results from largely unconscious processes; the situation inherited
by the subject is never entirely the result of their own conscious will (Figure 4 from Hagège
2014).
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 105

descriptive and therefore theoretical aim (cognitive sciences,

psychosociology, etc.). In the first case, it seems essential to safeguard the
notion of responsibility, as do compatibilist moral philosophers, who decree
compatible moral responsibility and determinism (reviewed in Knobe and
Doris 2010), even if some argue that this assertion is only conventional and
simply allows society and the judicial system to function (Kozakai 2008). In
the second case, many say that free will is an illusion (Wegner 2003), but
without going into the underlying metaphysical considerations that could
relativize these statements (Árnason 2011; Hagège 2014).

Thus, research on responsibility finds itself in tension between these two

objectives: changing the world and trying to describe the subject’s ultimate
reality.

One of the ambitions of this book is to propose a selection of relevant

references and an operational notion of responsibility for the field of
“educating for...”, and more generally for the educational sciences, in the
new discipline of education for responsibility, drawing inspiration from the
cognitive sciences, psychosociology, phenomenology, philosophy and
epistemology. We assume that these reflections could also be of interest in
the fields of ethics and spirituality.

Before that, we will briefly review conceptions of responsibility and

disciplinary anchors, with regard to which we consider it important to situate
the approach of the object that concerns us. We will begin by noting that the
notion of responsibility is at the heart of the intelligibility of education and
ethics. Indeed, on the one hand, educating a child consists of raising them to
have a sense of responsibility, so that they can become responsible for
themselves – where previously guardians assumed the function. On the other
hand, the ethical approach aims at responsibility in the choice of actions and
values.

2.2. Responsibility as a dialogical relationship between the outer

and inner worlds: ethical perspectives

2.2.1. Problem of responsibility in the field of ethics

With regard to ethics, two opposing meanings of responsibility can be

classically distinguished (Hagège 2017c). According to a Platonist conception
of ethics, responsibility corresponds to choices and actions that engage the
106 Education for Responsibility

subject’s specific character, calling for the surpassing of oneself and the norm.
This is an ηθοξ (ethos with an “η”, Paturet 2003). This meaning differs
fundamentally from a responsibility that is obedience to the rules, in
congruence with the εθοξ (ethos with an “ε”; ibid.). Thus, where ηθοξ
loosens, unravels habits, breaks moulds and models, the εθοξ links, channels
and structures. This second meaning, which refers to morals, conformity with
social practices, codifications and habitus, broadly corresponds to the
common, that is, socially widespread, notion of responsibility (Such and
Walker 2004). In a more contemporary sense, the attitude of responsibility
implies on the one hand the presence of a subject who responds and on the
other hand the presence and recognition as legitimate by the subject of other’s
to whom respond; “in the syntax of ethics, responsibility and exercise of the
subject function only as one” (Henriot 2015, editor’s translation). The idea of
responsibility therefore implies holding together the two ends of ethics
constituted by ηθοξ and εθοξ:

“on the one hand, the establishment of a purely objective

pseudo-responsibility, applying from the outside, alienates the
individual-object, rendering it unfit to exercise an authentic
right of reply. On the other hand, the exaltation of a pseudo-
responsibility that is entirely subjective, manifesting the
freedom of a will that unfolds in a vacuum, proclaims both the
omnipotence and solitude of the Unique. [...] Weighing on a
being who is reduced to nothing, the group becomes everything;
the wild impulse of a will for whom everything seems
permissible: these are the two extreme theoretical figures of
irresponsibility, below and beyond. Of the two antithetical
poles, but complementary to the field, neither can be privileged,
nor sacrificed. The destruction of the subjective pole degrades
the situation into a form of unilateral coercion. In the absence of
the objective pole, we are only witnessing the take-off of a will
denying any jurisdiction and whose subject takes itself as a
measure of all things. The field of ethics coincides with that of
responsibility” (ibid.).

In terms of ethics, responsibility therefore implies a dialogical relationship

between the subject’s inner and outer worlds. Thus, an education for
responsibility should be led to make the two ethos coexist within the
educational process, in a “dialectic of emancipation and limitation” (Fabre
2016, p. 20): self-realization through taking into account societal norms and
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 107

the differences of others. This theoretical meaning poses a practical problem:

how can we know, individually, what is the right direction to take? Let us
consider the historical example of the Shoah. Those who, following one
εθοξ, submitted to the authority of Vichy, contributed to the Shoah, mostly
indirectly and without their knowledge. Sociological studies such as
Milgram’s have shown how most subjects can indeed easily submit to an
authority, even if the latter is clearly unjust (reviewed by Myers 2009; see
also Experience in section I.3). The resistance fighters, following one ηθοξ,
rebelled and history considered a posteriori that it was their way that was
right. However, do jihadists not occupy an analogous position to the
resistance fighters, following an ηθοξ brandishing values that go against the
established order, and being ready to use violence to see them generalized?
This provocative comparison is of course limited, as the societal contexts
and the relationship of the subjects concerned with these contexts are not
equivalent. In particular, it seems to us that the resistance fighters wanted to
restore values prior to the German occupation, in a context where implicit
and explicit values, rather intrinsic, were relatively shared. Jihadists would
probably prefer to impose values in a context where they are not
characteristic. Indeed, even if the values of our society are plural
(“reasonable pluralism” according to Rawls, quoted by Prairat 2016), it
seems to me that the majority of its implicit values are rather extrinsic
(consumerist), and its explicit values are rather humanist. The strangeness of
jihadist values in relation to our context makes the cultural violence of the
process all the greater. There is therefore a lack of εθοξ, (while Pétain’s
fighters neglected the ηθοξ). Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume
that the resistance fighters and jihadists shared a form of conviction to act for
the good. Indeed, as mentioned above, belonging to an ingroup is generally
accompanied by a higher sense of morality (Brambilla et al. 2013).

These examples make it possible to raise the question that concerns us

here: when we are there, immersed in a History that is still only the present,
before posterity has made its judgment, what can we do? How can we know
what to do, whether what we think is good is really good beyond our own
judgement? How can we identify a direction that is compatible with an ethical
aim? It is the question of the criteria for guiding action that is at stake here:
what benchmarks should we rely on to guide and orient our actions? For
example, today, how can we know what to do in a neoliberal world where
natural resources are wasted, inequalities are reinforced, and
overconsumption and “possession of mind” by the media are favored?
108 Education for Responsibility

Two Jewish philosophers, marked by the Shoah, and disciples of the

pioneering phenomenologists Husserl and Heidegger, were therefore
precisely interested in the question of responsibility from two
complementary angles according to our approach: responsibility towards the
NHE and towards the HE. We will see that their proposals are not always
congruent with the approach proposed here. Nevertheless, it seems inevitable
to us to address them here.

2.2.2. Responsibility approaches in the field of ethics

First, Jonas (1903–1993), through his famous book The Imperative of

Responsibility, popularized the question of responsibility towards the
environment (understood as non-human). More than ethics, which
corresponds to a project, an intention, a dynamic (Ricœur 2015), Jonas aims
to rebuild morals (Trémolières 2015), which refer rather to imperatives to be
followed in the order of the good, which is however “situated on the path to
carrying out the ethical intention” (Ricœur 2015). Faced with the potential
danger to the nature of scientific and technical progress, and the fact that it
will constitute a legacy left to future generations, Jonas proposes to
recognize nature as vulnerable and to defend a heuristic of fear, not a fear for
oneself, but for the future thus becoming fragile for future generations
(Trémolières 2015). It thus gives an important part to the question of
forecasting, of anticipating harmful consequences.

Although this approach could perhaps usefully motivate political

decisions, it seems to us that it could raise some obstacles in education. Its
purely normative aspect – it is based on an imperative – makes it contradict
the notion of dialogism mentioned above3. As we will see, it is a completely
different approach that is advocated here, based more on creativity and a
certain quality of being, than on the rationalization of a possible future and
fear. For the moment, let us just note that the approach is part of an
anthropocentric and utilitarian vision of nature, which is not considered to be
the most relevant from a psychosociological point of view (Hagège et al.
2009). In other words, nature is considered in terms of its usefulness for

3 For Ricœur, the imperative (criterion of unquestioned judgment) is one of the moments of
this dialogical relationship, completed by ethics: in particular deliberation (practical wisdom
that questions these criteria; Fabre 2016).
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 109

humanity, whose well-being is the purpose of the approach, instead of being

considered as having an intrinsic value (ecocentric vision).

Secondly, Levinas (1905–1995) founded an ethics of responsibility

“centrered on the epiphany of the face of others [coming] in alliance with the
metaphysical desire of the whole other” (Greisch 2015a, author’s
translation). For him, philosophy must be “widsom of love for love” (ibid.).
Thus, the infinite responsibility towards others involves letting oneself be
taken hostage by them, as they are also a subject, but above all they are
other, different, irreducible in their singularity; it is “the Other-in-the-Same”
(Simon 1993, p. 131). According to the ordinary meaning, responsibility
derives from the subject’s freedom, whereas for Levinas, responsibility
comes from the face of others, and it is coincidental with their condition as a
subject: it tears them away from themselves “in the relationship of One for
the Other” (ibid.):

“Levinas suggests the presence of otherness within the very heart

of ipseity4. In this way, he gives a new meaning to Rimbaud’s
formula: ‘I is another’, which would no longer mean so much
alienation, self-betrayal as the experience of humility that the
person who puts themselves in the other’s shoes, blaming
themselves for the evil or suffering they experience, each person
being able to become a ‘Messiah’” (Courtine-Denamy 2015,
author’s translation).

It seems important here to mention Ricœur’s approach, which was partly

developed in criticism of Levinas’s. Ricœur proposes a real “dialectic of the self
and other”: “the enjoined-being as a structure of ipseity, such that [otherness]
can be reconciled with self-esteem and testified to in a reciprocity that would no
longer have anything to do with asymmetry” (whereas it was asymmetrical in
Levinas’s approach; ibid. italics added by the author). Thus, for him, as
expressed in the title of his famous book Oneself as Another, otherness is
constitutive of ipseity itself (ibid.), which expresses the dialogical principle
mentioned above5. The evolution between these two thoughts seems analogous

4 The notion of ipseity corresponds to the identity itself, to what makes a person unique, but
not in the sense of “idem” of a core personality or “self” that would remain constant through
change; rather in that of a singular presence (Depraz 2014).
5 See also the notion of inner otherness developed alongside those of epistemological and
outer otherness (Briançon 2019).
110 Education for Responsibility

to what is put forward in Gilligan’s approach to care6 ethics (discussed in

section 1.2.2.3). According to her female developmental model, the first stage is
oriented towards individual survival, the second towards self-sacrifice
(considered as good), and the third towards non-violence. Thus, in the second
stage, the acceptance of others and the connection with them would be a primary
goal, even to the detriment of the needs of the self (Swaner 2005; as in the
Levinasian vision). In the third and final level, dualism between oneself and
others disappears (ibid.). Thus, we can see in the latter and Ricœur’s thought the
proposal of an ethics of responsibility towards others as a dialogism between the
phenomena of the inner world with which the subject identifies more or less (the
“self”) and the human beings of the outer world (others).

As will be developed further below, one of the objectives of an education

for responsibility would therefore be to bring the subject’s mind to be
present in their inner world, as well as in their outer world, on an equal
footing.

Therefore, what more precisely can the dialogical relationship between

the inner and outer worlds correspond to on the phenomenological and
psychological level?

2.3. Responsibility as a consciousness connected to oneself,

others and the non-human environment (NHE): psychological
and phenomenological points of view

We will hereafter specify how to translate the dialogism characteristic of

responsibility into the functioning of the four horsemen of the mind.

2.3.1. Cognition and responsibility

We repeat here the three modes of cognition that were considered in

section 1.3.2.3.1.

6 Moreover, care is sometimes seen as “solicitude”, and Ricœur “baptizes solicitude the impulse
from self towards the other which constitutes the answer to this interpellation and which does not
consist exclusively in obeying a duty” (Courtine-Denamy 2015).
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 111

2.3.1.1. Basic level of cognition and responsibility

At the level of the basic modality, that which concerns form, the
dialogical relationship between exterior and interior is difficult to instantiate,
because thinking, dualistic in essence, tends to take up a lot of attention: this
is what we have called “phenomenological grasp”. Despite this grasp,
different thoughts or beliefs are not equivalent in terms of responsibility.

Thus, for example, the thought “I am responsible for my thoughts, actions

and emotions” is much more effective (i.e. performative) in terms of
responsibility than a victim’s thought such as “I undergo my emotions and
what happens to me; and I have nothing to do with the future of the world or
my own, I have no control over it”. Thus, all thoughts that reinforce the
projective character of the ego, by assigning responsibilities to the
environment, contribute to the disempowerment of the subject (another
example: “it is because of this person or this situation that I am down”). And
it seems that spontaneously, that is without targeted learning, thoughts tend
to be more projective in this way. As we have explained, taking full
responsibility for your emotions is an opening to yourself and promotes
openness to others. So, “thinking about what we feel”7, for example naming
our emotions, promotes their regulation (Mikolajczak and Bausseron 2013).
Also, “feeling what we think”8 allows us to contact the emotion underlying
the reactive thoughts, thus promoting the fact of being aware of our emotions
(legend of Figure 1.8B). Focusing attention on emotion bursts the
speculative mental bubble (section 1.3.2.4) and thus thwarts projective
automatism.

Also, all the thoughts by which the subject consciously endorses goals or
values that are consistent with responsibility, can contribute to this. For
example: “I wish to develop a dialogical relationship between my inner
world and my outer world; and to become more open to myself and others,
less dogmatic and more tolerant.” Indeed, these wishes constitute a kind of
self-programming, or, to use a term from the cognitive sciences, a conscious
self-priming: when the opportunity arises, such seeding will spontaneously
encourage actions and orientations of attention towards phenomena that go
in this direction (Custers and Aarts 2010), and will thus feed a virtuous

7 According to Favre’s formula (2007).

8 See footnote 7 above.
112 Education for Responsibility

circle. This aspect is related to what we have called the “orientation” (first
horseman of the mind, section 1.3.2.1).

In addition, it should be noted that thoughts about the self and its
extension (probably most of the thoughts of an ordinary subject in fact;
e.g. “I must do that”, “where is my car”, “I am hungry”, “I do not like it
when he talks to me like that”, etc.) reinforce the “for-me-ness” and
therefore the ego. And this is all the more so since they are grasped. Thus, on
the contrary, training one’s mind to be filled with altruistic thoughts instead
generates an opposite attitude of openness and dialogism. For example, if the
thought “I do not like it when he talks to me like that” is born in the mind,
then we can voluntarily generate an open thought such as “I want us to have
a fluid and benevolent communication together”. Such an automatism of
“replacement of thought” would be facilitated if I am aware that if he speaks
to me in an inappropriate way, it may be that he has problems, and that if I
take it wrong, it is that it has triggered a reactive emotion in me (see section
1.3.2.4).

Finally, constructive critical thinking, which aims to question, with kind

curiosity, one’s own representations and those of others (Daniel 2016), will
foster detachment from thoughts and representations, and thus a dialogical
relationship between the inner and outer worlds.

EXAMPLES.– The following thought emerges in the mind: “Dolilo is obtuse”

or “that is what you need to do”. Constructive critical thinking could follow:
“and if I was wrong about Dolilo? What is my share of responsibility in the
conflict I had with him, instead of judging?” or “and if that was not the right
thing to do... maybe it is good for me and the situation I expect, and I will
feel, later, the time to act in the right way”. In the case of negative critical
thinking, after the first thought has arisen, a speculative bubble will rather
reinforce it. For example: “yes, it’s true, Dolilo is really stupid; besides, he
did this to me the other day, it proves it well. If I could, I’d break his neck,
etc.” (thoughts underpinned by anger) or “Gosh ! I didn’t do it, I have to do
it! What will others think of me if I don’t?” (thoughts underpinned by guilt,
and possibly shame, etc.; see the comments on Figure 1.8B).

On the contrary, a negative critical thought, closed on itself, formulated

in a dogmatic way, will maintain the illusion of separation between these
two worlds. It widens the gap between oneself and the other, or between
oneself and the situation: the subject feels implicitly alone, deprived, and
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 113

their relationship with the world at this moment is dominated by a feeling of

isolation, a fear of aggression, the need to defend, to feel existance through
external phenomena such as the gaze of others... there is the illusion that
they are separated from the world and that they must protect their territory
(see the ego). So much tension in such a mind...

In addition, as mentioned above (section 1.3.2.3.1), when a thought is

explicitly shared with others, its impact is enhanced. Thus, activities that
may seem trivial at first glance, such as exchanging gossip or mud-slinging,
have a negative impact from an ethical point of view and therefore engage
the responsibility of the subject who utters them.

2.3.1.2. Meta level of cognition and responsibility

In the same vein, dualism is an obstacle to responsibility.

It tends to be preponderant in our culture, and is accompanied by

individualism. However, according to the social theories of learning
(Vygotsky 1962/2003), Morin’s hologrammatic principle (1986) and the
previous argument on the intertwining of the inner and outer worlds, such an
institutional epistemology is linked to personal epistemologies. The first two
stages of Perry’s (1999) intellectual and ethical development describe this
psychosociological dualism (reviewed by Swaner 2005). It corresponds to
the notion that knowledge is either true or false, and therefore somehow
independent of human activity. It is thus linked to the implicit belief that
knowledge is autonomous from action (Hagège 2013, 2015b; Perrenoud
1998). However, we have mentioned that responsibility implies feeling
connected to own’s actions:

“Being responsible for a situation or action is to be held

accountable, that is, to appear as the cause and even to claim this
quality. The person who is responsible for an initiative thereby
declares that they are ready to present themselves as the principle,
as the origin, to explain about it, to give their reasons, and to suffer
all the consequences that will result from it” (Ladrière et al. 2015).

However, Rousseau (1712–1778), one of the greatest French thinkers on

education, did not educate his own children; they were educated through
public assistance. American research has also shown that ethicists do not
behave more ethically than other professors and that they sometimes even
114 Education for Responsibility

behave worse (Schwitzgebel 2009). Thus, a personal epistemology implicitly

or explicitly marked by dualism can lead to the development of thoughts at
the expense of actions, and implicitly rehabiliate a subject if they do not act
in coherence with its values, “as long as they display beautiful ideas”.

The increased attention given to thoughts relative to emotions and the

body, which we have explained above, reinforces this phenomenon. This is
especially since we think with words (Vygotsky 1962/2003) and since the
more intense the phenomenological grasp of mental phenomena is, the more
likely it is that dualism will be reinforced. Indeed, dualism and individualism
are both intertwined in our Western languages, in which a sentence without a
subject is rare, and the distinction between subject and object is
grammatically marked. This is not the case in Chinese, where sentences,
expressing processes more than (separate) entities, do not have such a
structure, and where sentences can be made without subjects, like in Korean
or Japanese. Thus, while we say “I think” in English, we can say “think” in
Korean, such that the interlocutor understands that the subject who states the
sentence refers to the activity of their own mind. In addition, the values are
built into the language.

EXAMPLE.– In Korea, a collectivist culture, the equivalent of “our” is used to

refer to institutions valued by Confucian culture: family, companies,
homeland or school. From then on, a child, even an only child, will say “our
mother”. On the contrary, in our Western languages, marked by
individualism and dualism, even a child from a big family will mention “his
mother”. Thus, while a Western subject may have the impression of
describing a fact in a neutral way by talking about his mother or his country,
he expresses there without his knowledge the individualistic values
embedded in the language.

The thoughts we grasp, because of the very structure of our language,

naturally reinforce dualism. As a result, the importance of the latter is equal
to the intensity with which thoughts are grasped.

On the other hand, a contextualist epistemology has the potential to

promote responsibility. Thus, most constructivist theories (example: Morin
2014) logically include ethical considerations, because these ways of
thinking logically link worldview and knowledge to the human actions and
values that contribute to their production (Hagège et al. 2010; Fourez 2002;
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 115

Le Moigne 1995). As we find in Sartre’s work (1970; see quotation in

section I.6), it highlights the inseparability of all human action and
responsibility, in other words the relationship between the inner and outer
worlds. Translated into psychosocial and sociological terms, they correspond
to a contextualist personal epistemology, where knowledge is considered
neither as an absolute and universal truth, nor as relative or even subjective,
but as having validity and utility in a given context. Perry’s (1999) work
proposes that the ultimate stage of intellectual and ethical development
corresponds to such a personal epistemology, coinciding in this stage with
commitment: the subject being aware of the intertwined nature of their
visions, their actions and the world, consciously choosing to engage in
certain actions and defend certain visions of the world, in accordance with
their values (reviewed by Swaner 2005). Responsibility is indeed a
component of the conduct of commitment:

“That which is remarkable in the conduct of commitment is that it

concerns a state of affairs largely beyond the control of the actor,
both in terms of the past and the future. The actor only inherits the
situation they assume, which has in fact been generated by other
wills, by other actions. It is therefore involvement that makes
responsibility possible: it is because an existence can assume
others that it can be responsible for what, in the strictest terms,
does not depend on it” (Ladrière et al. 2015).

Obviously, as we have discussed with Schwitzgebel’s work, a person

with a personal contextualist epistemology is not necessarily committed;
they could think dogmatically about such a vision, without seeking to apply
it to themselves or to draw ethical conclusions for themselves. They would
not be attentive to act in a manner consistent with their beliefs, particularly
because of the phenomenological grasp of thoughts and the tendency of the
mind to project, thus to be more attentive to the outer world than to the inner
world. However, such epistemology potentially favors responsibility, unlike
a dualistic epistemology more likely to counter it, as we have mentioned.

To summarize sections 2.3.1.1 and 2.3.1.2, thoughts and beliefs that

foster a dialogue between the inner and outer worlds, and are conducive to
the conscious perception of their dialogical relationship, are likely to favor
responsibility to the detriment of the ego’s separation characteristic.
116 Education for Responsibility

2.3.1.3. Modality of cognition and responsibility

Finally, with regard to the third aspect of cognition, cognitive flexibility
favors distancing from one’s thoughts and representations, and therefore
responsibility, while dogmatism and the grasping of thoughts are opposed.

Indeed, when the phenomenological grasp of beliefs about the outer

world is high9, the awareness of subjective functioning (especially of
phenomenological grasping itself) tends to be correlatively low or
non-existent. We have detailed enough above how such an attitude tends to
cut off from others, to make the subject less tolerant, even violent. On the
ethical level, it is clear that responsibility nevertheless implies establishing a
dialogical and open relationship with the other, which allows the ethical
process to have a transcultural focus (Haste and Abrahams 2008).

On the contrary, the awareness of the cultural and personal biases

inherent in the language that mediates the representations consists of a
reflexivity, which is essentially antagonistic to the projective aspect of the
ego (Favre 2007). Such awareness requires cognitive flexibility, a quality
that could logically be coincidental with a personal contextualist
epistemology. Indeed, as mentioned above, cognitive flexibility tends to
foster a weaker grasp of thoughts and beliefs – a grasp that psychically treats
this knowledge implicitly as absolute and universal. It is therefore more
consistent with the belief in the contextual nature of knowledge.
Neurological studies have shown that cognitive flexibility involves higher
brain areas required for conscious processes (Kim et al. 2011). Other studies
with subjects performing tasks have shown that cognitive flexibility is lower
in subjects with behavioral addictions (Tchanturia et al. 2011), which are
symptomatic of greater confinement in inappropriate and persistent past
functioning (i.e. confined in thought-action repertoires that restrict the ego).
Cognitive flexibility coincides with greater creativity – because it makes the
subject more open to the new things which manifest through themselves –
and requires attention (Ashby et al. 1999). These studies are therefore
consistent with the idea that psycho-affective maturity and cognitive
flexibility go hand in hand and that the latter makes it more suitable for

9 I would like to point out here that the problem seems to me to be much less the ideas we
have, than the force of truth we give them (which sometimes leads to wanting to impose them
on others), the intensity with which we identify with them: if identification with intolerant
thoughts is weak, then the subject will be less willing to act accordingly.
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 117

accepting novelty and diversity in oneself. It therefore potentially promotes

responsibility.

2.3.2. Orientation and responsibility

2.3.2.1. Attention, relatedness and responsibility

“Each instant is new, and what is new is always immediate. The
immediate is constantly stripping itself of the old. The new one
dies at what is even more new [...]” (Finley 2003, p. 161,
author’s translation).

“If we think of a lemon, we know that the idea of the lemon is

not the lemon itself. However, if we think clearly enough about
this lemon, we salivate.[...] That doesn’t mean that the idea of a
lemon is a lemon. Simply, the idea of the lemon has awakened
unconscious memories, and [...] imagining it gives rise to very
clear sensations associated with something yellow and acidic.
[...] It is therefore a question here of what it means to identify
yourself. It’s easy to understand when what we’re talking about
doesn’t really concern us. But when it comes to ‘I’ or ‘me’, our
brains get confused. When you think of yourself, when you say
‘I’, the same inner phenomena surround and support this ‘I’ as
was the case earlier with the word ‘lemon’. But when you think
of this ‘I’, this ‘me’, the accumulated experiences and memories
are even more numerous to come to the surface, they form a
wall of thoughts and almost palpable emotions. When you think
of your ‘self’, you have a sense of reality, because as these
waves of accumulated past pass through you, they give you the
impression of being you. But this is only a temporary state. No
matter how often or how strong it is, that ‘I’ feeling is not you.
You’re not your past. You simply unconsciously identified with
it at that moment. Identifying with these impressions is what
gives you a convincing, but fleeting feeling of existence” (ibid.,
pp. 164–166, author’s translation, italics added).

We explained that the functioning of the ego causes a biased interaction

with the environment. It is based on identifications that generate duality: a
distinction between “me” and that which is not. The “for-me-ness”
mentioned above is partly due to the grasping of mental phenomena whose
118 Education for Responsibility

content can be, for example, past situations which are “performed” (such as
a film that goes through the head10), where attention is focused on what was
perceived in the scene, what nourished the subject’s psyche (for example, the
way others looked at yourself, their approval, which is appraised as a “I want”)
or, on the contrary, what caused a conscious or unconscious emotional injury
(for example, the disapproval of others, which falls into the “I do not want”
category). The grasp of this type of thought implicitly supports the “for-me-
ness”: “It was me who did this, it was me who experienced it, I was perceived
as such, I felt it, etc.” So, when attention is grasped by this type of thought – as
by all other thoughts moreover – it maintains duality and ego (Lutz et al.
2007). This carries the past into the present and makes the subject get stuck in
the quicksand of time: it gives the subject the wrong impression of a continuity
of what they take for their very essence (the ego), whereas it is simply a
narrative agent that changes with the cognitive context (ibid.; Hood 2011).
This is the subject’s diachronic structure (Ey 2015).

The functioning of the relative mind, including unconscious dynamics

such as implicit attitudes, is problematic in terms of responsibility (see
details in Hagège 2014): some of them generate discrimination, because the
subject has unwittingly endorsed such cultural stereotypes (based on a
distinction between the characteristics of the self and the characteristics of
others; section 1.4.3; Hagège 2015d). All this can be related to the problem
of concentrated and exogenous attention, tossed from perception to action,
without the subject being aware of it. Indeed, the frequent, almost
omnipresent grasping of attention on phenomena that arise in their mind or
outside, prevents the subject from being present in their inner world, and
thus from perceiving their implicit attitudes.

Thus, too, we may not really be “present”, moment after moment, in a

large part of our lives: we can sometimes be “a hundred leagues” from the
present moment, without being aware of it. At that moment, the immediate
physical reality is in the background of our consciousness...

EXAMPLE.– Sometimes we can drive for miles on “autopilot”, that is,

without really being aware of what we are doing. In general, it is because we
get lost in thought (related to our ego), rumination or inner images for

10 This type of phenomenological grasp refers to the autonotic consciousness, defined as “the
‘phenomenological’ characteristic of episodic memory: it is this consciousness that allows me
to relive recalled experiences and to travel mentally through time” (Eustache 2013, p. 54,
author’s translation).
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 119

example. Have you ever come to a place wondering where you’ve been? We
can indeed be that much absent... It may otherwise be that on the way an
event suddenly brings us back to the present moment and to ourselves (e.g. a
motorist breaking ahead). At that moment, we realize that we were absent.

In “autopilot”, the events around us, as well as our thoughts, emotions

and sensations (of which we are more or less aware) can trigger old habits of
thought – which are often useless, create minor or major suffering, prevent
us from being perfectly open to what exists and therefore pose ethical
problems. The functioning based on this essentially exogenous attention
which is mainly focused on the reactive mind is called here the unconscious
mental mode (Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Principle of unconscious mental and conscious sensory modes.

For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip

COMMENT ON FIGURE 2.1.– The direction of the red and green arrows shows
the objects on which attention is focused: unconsciously on the reactive mind
(red arrow; exogenous and concentrated attention) or consciously on the
sensations (green arrow; endogenous attention; Shapiro et al. 2006). The
unconscious and conscious sensory mental modes are also illustrated in
Figures 1.7 and 1.8B on the one hand and 1.8C and 1.8D on the other hand,
respectively (and also in testimonies 2 of section 1.3.2.4.2, which clearly
express the antagonism between these two modes). In the open conscious
sensory mode, diffuse and shared attention can also be implemented (e.g. the
mind simultaneously perceives all perceptible physical stimuli, that is, objects
from the exteroception and interoception). If attention is rather focused on one
point, it can also be focalized (see testimony below).
120 Education for Responsibility

TESTIMONY.– “I chose to wash my hands in [conscious sensory mode with

shared attention...]. There is the sight of water running on my hands, the
smell when I used soap, the sound when the water comes out of the tap and
the feel of the water and soap running on my hands. It was a difficult
exercise because I had to pay attention to all these senses at the same time,
and this on both hands. After a few days, I decided to focus on touching only
one specific place on my hand [conscious sensory mode with concentrated
and focused attention]”(MBER student).

In unconscious mental mode, far from our inner reality, we are not in a
position to recognize our implicit attitudes. It has thus been argued
elsewhere how responsibility therefore requires an extension of the field of
consciousness to the inner world, particularly to the unconscious dynamics
of the mind (Hagège 2014). Phenomenologically, another way of evoking
this ethical solution is to switch from exogenous concentrated attention to
vigilant attention. Depraz (2014) highlights her approach in relation to
phenomenologists (notably Husserl, Levinas and Ricœur). She therefore
conceptualizes it only in terms of relationships with others (and not with the
NHE):

“(1) Vigilance rhymes with presence (versus the closed

individual); (2) in vigilance, there is the time for waiting open
to the unknown (versus the memory of the past closed on the
subject); (3) vigilance is like hope, this emotional experience of
the future (versus the control of the known); (4) in vigilance,
there is a precarious relationship with others where risk is a
guarantee of authenticity (versus security of possession). [...] It
is no longer just a question of enhancing my subjective
individual quality of consciousness through the parameters of
observing the duration or awakening the senses, but of opening
it to the demands of others” (Depraz 2014, pp. 456–457,
author’s translation).

Vigilant attention is therefore more intense, sustained, diffuse and shared.

It corresponds to an increase in the quality and quantity of information
perceived in an instant. The last three points of Depraz’s (2014) definition of
vigilant attention are illustrated in Figure 1.2: they correspond to the
right-hand side of the figure, where the field of consciousness is enlarged
and the perception less distorted by the projections and attentional
orientations of the ego. Indeed, as illustrated by Finley’s quotations at the
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 121

beginning of this section, it is mainly the unconscious mental mode that

maintains the notion of a self (diachronic structure), the “for-me-ness” of the
ego. So, being out of this mode relaxes these functional habits related to
assessments and beliefs. In other words, instead of the unconscious mental
mode, the open conscious sensory mode is mobilized (Figure 2.1).

DEFINITION.– In our model, the open conscious sensory mode involves

being present both in the inner world and in the outer world (human and
non-human), in a dialogical relationship. In other words, this mode is such
that the subject’s attention embraces the first six types of perception objects
to the detriment of the seventh (mental phenomena). However, it is not a
matter of being unconscious to your thoughts; this mode is therefore only
fully operational in the spontaneous absence of a reactive mind (called
“mental calm”; Lutz et al. 2007).

We will detail this further below (see the notion of equanimity in

section 2.3.3 and testimony 1 in section 1.3.2.4.2): this conscious sensory
mode correlatively allows us to develop a way of being free of appraisals (by
definition, ego-centered).

2.3.2.2. Values and responsibility

According to the first chapter of this book, the other factor that is
considered typical of orientation – alongside the attention and appraisal just
mentioned – is values (section 1.3.2.1.3).

On the one hand, we could try to promote universal presupposed values.

With this in mind, Anselme (1989) proposed an “anthropological  morality
capable of accommodating the diversity of opinions and the whole of
evolutive humanity” (p. 15, author’s translation). According to him, respect
for the five “essential values” (freedom, equity, truth, biological solidarity
and socio-cultural solidarity) “only allows the survival of humanity and the
preservation of the characteristics that constitute Humanity”. However, it
seems obvious to us that his conception of Humanity is culturally
conditioned; his proposal is not free of cultural bias. It seems to us that this
universalist posture is ethically untenable for two reasons. First, if we
consider a culture as a paradigm (Kuhn 1962/2008), that is a matrix through
which we perceive and understand the world (see the individual role of the
ego), then logic tends to postulate the incommensurability of cultures (Box
1.2): since any value is necessarily expressed in a language, and therefore
dependent on a culture, there is no extracultural value, which could
122 Education for Responsibility

legitimately impose itself on all cultures. Second, when values are

established as universal principles, they can sooner or later be
instrumentalized to oppress cultural minorities who do not share them. Such
a form of extremism has indeed led to deadly violence on several occasions
in the past (e.g. the inquisition; see Hagège 2013). Thus, according to
Ricœur, only a dialogue of cultures could potentially identify universalizable
values (Fabre 2016). However, this assertion raises practical questions that I
believe are unsolvable: how can we ensure that all human cultures are
equitably represented in such dialogue? And how can we designate and
delimit these different cultures? Indeed, the very designation of a culture
raises ethical problems, in particular by masking inequalities and world
views of “intracultural” minorities (which has led some anthropologists to
refuse to use the term “culture”; Hagège 2013).

At the other extreme, we could argue that all values are equal: those of
jihadism as well as french republican values, for example. However, on the
one hand, from a logical point of view, such an assertion is based on the
implicit claim to speak from a place outside of any value system, in other
words extracultural. Indeed, it presupposes being able to observe all these
values in an overshadowing way and to gauge, to evaluate from the outside
that they have the same value. We therefore find the same flaw as mentioned
above: any assertion is always formulated from a context, a culture. On the
other hand, it is clear that different values do not have the same
consequences if they are applied: in terms of life, suffering, etc. (and of
course the application context is also to be taken into account here).

Thus, the middle way proposed here consists of a reflexive proposal,

which includes explicit references to the context from which we are speaking
and the limit of our words (in this case our present context). Using
homology, with the three personal epistemological positions previously
mentioned (dualist-universalist, multiplicist, and contextualist;
see section 1.3.2.3.1), the positioning we will adopt here is therefore
contextualism: which values seem most appropriate in our context? And
“adapted”, for whom and for what? Given the “reasonable pluralism”
(Rawls, cited by Prairat 2016), which means that our societies, without
common absolutes, admit several conceptions of good life, a republican
position is supposed to promote values corresponding to a morality of the
just (and not the good), values that allow the different freedoms to coexist in
the public space (ibid.). Then we would be tempted to simply brandish
French republican values, since they are, a priori, adapted for everyone, and
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 123

for everything, in France. However, it does not seem that simple to me, for
two reasons. On the one hand, the conception of responsibility that we are
talking about always implies a dialogical relationship between the inner and
outer worlds. In this respect, we consider that each individual has a
responsibility to question their own values and those of their environment,
and to problematize with caution (Fabre 2016) their own path. On the other
hand, as mentioned in the introduction, the explicit values of the French
Republic (freedom, equality, fraternity, solidarity and secularism) often seem
antagonistic to its implicit values, which are those of the market economy.
And, in the same way as for dual attitudes, effective actions are often more
consistent with implicit values.

Thus, we will later propose axiological principles referring to values

(section 2.4). They will make it possible to overcome these two difficulties,
and could serve as a reference in the context considered. In short, we will
retain values that favor a mind based on an open functioning (Dambrun and
Ricard 2011), not involving the ego (therefore a principled mind, not a dual
one). The corresponding values (e.g. respect, solidarity, love, etc.) must
therefore be compatible with relatedness and empathy.

For the sake of coherence, here we specify this context: that of research
on “education for” in the academic world, its application in educational and
training environments and perhaps also in other intellectual or spiritual
fields. All this certainly in France, and potentially in other Western countries
or more culturally distant countries. We therefore postulate that this context
could include that of the implementation of an education for responsibility at
the French Public School, which could thus concern different actors such as
training subjects, teachers or students. Obviously, the broader the context,
the more likely the proposals will not be adapted to the “local variations” of
the context. We will therefore try to generalize with caution.

2.3.3. Emotions, relationships and responsibility

Before presenting these principles, we still have to briefly mention the

application of the last two horsemen of the mind in terms of responsibility.
We have detailed the strong propensity of minds to grasp thoughts and the
obstacle this presents to their own emotions (Figures 1.7 and 1.8). However,
the presence to one’s own or others’ emotions is important for the
instantiation of the dialogical character of responsibility. It is made possible
by the implementation of an open conscious sensory mode, instead of the
124 Education for Responsibility

unconscious mental mode that mobilizes the personal and cultural filter of
projections. As a reminder (see the comment on Figure 2.1), it consists of
consciously focusing on all present sensory perceptions (i.e. the first six
types of perception objects), and accepting them without judgment. If this
mode also includes the seventh type of perception objects (i.e. a conscious
mind; see section 3.2.1.2), then attention is relatively disengaged from
reactive thoughts insofar as they are present on an equal footing with the
other simultaneous phenomena: in this case, there is in principle no
phenomenological grasp11. In other words, attention is focused on the objects
that usually screen the dialogical relationship between the inner and outer
worlds (thoughts and emotions), and in doing so, this illusory barrier
dissolves: the subject can better feel themselves and their environment. In
this way, they experience an equanimous consciousness. Here is for example
the experience reported by a subject in the process of learning about
equanimity, where objective dialogism becomes conscious:

TESTIMONY (1/2).– “Observing [my] thoughts also made me realize that my

interactions with others are really important. That my words, my actions and
my way of communicating with others are not insignificant, that they have an
influence on my surroundings in a much more profound way than I thought. I
realized this by trying to be more present to others and more attentive to the
exchange with the other, to things that seemed very harmless to me before
such as body language, chosen words, voice intonation, eyes, etc. That a
single word could cause discomfort in the other, that an anecdote could make
the other sad or nervous and that, on the contrary, some words, some actions
as simple as a pat on the shoulder or a smile to a stranger can have very
positive responses. I have observed all these influences in myself as well. I
was able to see how others influence my approach to events for the rest of the
day, my moods and my energy in general” (MBER student, author’s italics).

DEFINITION.– Equanimity is a state of calm and stable consciousness where

the mind perceives all phenomena and experiences, whatever their emotional
valence (“I want”, “I do not want”, “I do not care”) or their source
(Desbordes et al. 2015). It includes impartiality in dealing with phenomena,
including (1) mental phenomena or emotions that are usually considered
unpleasant because they are not repressed, denied or appraised, and

11 This case typically corresponds to vipasyana training (Lutz et al. 2007), in a subject where
mental calm has not yet been achieved: this subject is still the object of their reactive mind
(unconscious mental mode) when they are not in sensory or conscious perceptual mode.
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 125

(2) experiences that are usually considered pleasant because they do not
create over-excitement, a desire to prolong them, or the temptation to
become attached to or dependent on them (ibid.)12.

Applied to the attitudes developed above, this state corresponds to the

quintessence of relatedness and empathy: the subject is present to their own
emotions and perceives those of others, with an equanimous presence, such
that fusion and disconnection are impossible. Thus, the subject has an
identical attitude towards their own emotions and those of others: not being
in phenomenological grasp or in identification, their consciousness perceives
their emotions “as if they were those of another”, being touched, but not
identified... they are thus in empathy with themselves. Therefore, the subject
literally perceives “themselves as another” (according to Ricœur’s formula,
1990). On the other hand, splitting with emotions and emotional contagion
attitudes (with others or with NHE) restrict the field of consciousness,
because they coincide with concentrated attention (on cognitive and
emotional aspects respectively, such that these aspects exclusively concern
the self or the environment). Thus, the establishment of a dialogical
relationship between oneself and one’s environment corresponds, from a
psychosociological point of view, to an affective (synonymous here with
“emotional”) link with this environment, coupled with an epistemic distance
that makes it possible not to feel confounded with this environment: it is
empathy and relatedness (Hagège et al. 2009).

As we will develop below, the most advanced equanimity is a state of

consciousness where perceived information is not biased by the past, or by
personal or cultural preferences: this state of consciousness is therefore close

12 It seems to me that we can actually distinguish two levels of equanimity. The first corresponds
to the inhibition of the passage from step 4 to 5 in Figure 1.3: there is appraisal without further
grasping (i.e. without identification or rejection): the subject makes neither one nor two with the
appraisal of perceived phenomena. Training in this corresponds to the regulation of emotions
(Figure 1.8C; Desbordes et al. 2015). This makes it possible to gradually achieve the vacuity of the
ego: engrammation (step 6 of Figure 1.3) does not take place, which consequently reduces
behavioral trends (via a weakening of the neural network mobilized by the implementation of this
perception-reaction scheme). The second, more advanced level of equanimity refers to a
functioning in which perception, undistorted, is operated without conceptual or phenomenological
grasp (the perceived reality is similar to the blue line, step 0, at the top of Figure 1.3); there is
neither attentional inhibition, nor magnification, nor ignorance. If a subject perceives this
environment in a neutral, undistorted way, then their principled mind embraces the ultimate reality
(this corresponds to the realization of the vacuity of phenomena).
126 Education for Responsibility

to a perception of ultimate reality by the principled mind. It is a peaceful

attitude towards what is perceived, such that there is no appraisal and
therefore no desire to avoid or prolong sensations (not as in Figure 1.7).
Perceptions are not ignored either.

When I talk about equanimity in class, a common reaction from students is:
“Ah, but then it means that you don’t feel anything anymore, that you don’t have
any emotion? It’s not something you want...” This reaction is normal. A fear of
the ego manifests itself. However, an equanimous consciousness has nothing to
do with a robot or a zombie; it is exactly the opposite. Everything is perceived
much more intensely, with greater acuity and vivacity. Since the subject is not in
the fog perpetuated by the filters of an ego – whose illusory character has been
revealed – then the colors are more vivid, their own emotions (harmonious) and
those of others felt more intensely. This is because there is no longer a feeling of
separation. There is no longer any labeling, appraisal, attempt to escape or avoid
the present experience. There is experience and sensations in the raw state and
the subject’s cognition still works. They have a memory. Their body knows what
has been learned. However, they no longer act in the present according to their
past or their personal projects. They act according to the cosmos. That is the
difference.

Moreover, some subjects experience this kind of experience brutally and

spontaneously13, sometimes transiently. They then recognize its extraordinary
knowledgeable character. This sudden awakening is then often interpreted by the
subject according to their beliefs (Vivekananda 2007).

Box 2.1. Notable differences between an equanimous

conscient subject and a robot or zombie

Thus, as the student in the previous testimony expresses it:

TESTIMONY (2/2).– “In general, I feel like I wake up a little more every day
and I’m just more alive since I started practicing [meditation]. I have the
impression that I have spent a large part of my life asleep and I think that
meditation is now necessary to my life insofar as it is a practice that makes
me feel truly alive because I truly experience every sensation, every thought;

13 It seems interesting to me to note that several subjects describe having had this kind of
experience of awakening, of liberation from ego conditioning, just or shortly after emotional
episodes resembling depression, in which they have abandoned any personal desire or personal
needs (e.g. Quirion 2013; Tolle 2000). I interpret this common point as the fact that they let their
emotions pass through them without grasping or identifying them: the latter would then have been
integrated, which would have allowed their minds to definitively let go of the illusion of the ego.
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 127

meditation allows me to observe, it makes me focus on ‘what is happening’

now rather than on ancillary thoughts from the past or worries which I
simply have no way to control”.

The development of this vigilant attention, being phenomenologically

present with regards to the self, to others and to the NHE, corresponds to the
development of the synchronic structure of conscious being, to the detriment
of its diachronic structure (Ey 2015). This requires a decrease in
phenomenological grasp, especially of reactive thoughts and emotions, and
an increase in consciousness – which allows the mind not to be driven by (or
“glued” in) unconscious processes such as “for-me-ness” and implicit
attitudes. When attention covers the entire perceptual field, without
preferential orientation (i.e. without attentional magnification or inhibition),
the subject is fully aware of themselves and their environment (Desbordes
et al. 2015). On the contrary, when exogenous attention leads to reducing
consciousness to a phenomenon, the subject neglects at that moment a part
of themselves and their environment in their subjective reality (everything
that is not consciously perceived as cognitively processed by system 1).
They are no longer, at that time, in a dialogical relationship with their
environment.

2.4. Assessment: criteria for guiding towards responsibility

In summary, we have just seen that an ideal of responsibility, as far as the

four horsemen of the mind are concerned, presupposes basic mechanisms
such as an undistorted perception, an absence of identification, of
phenomenological grasp, of appraisal and therefore of ego... We will specify
this model later on, through the notion of harmony (section 2.4.3). The
reader could conceive this ideal as a pure theoretical invention, unattainable
in practice. That is why we would like to point out that this does not seem to
be the case. Although these are a limited number of subjects a priori, some
have reported a phenomenological experience that could be formulated with
our words as a liberation from the ego (or rather an exit from the illusion of
the ego). Thus, authors have described, in their own words, that they began
their lives with an ego, that their minds once saw the illusion of it, and that
they now live without the distorting prism of the ego, the mind perfectly
aware of the present moment. This transformation has been exclusive of any
religious affiliation. They explain in their own way the proponents of this
transformation of the mind (e.g. Finley 2003; Quirion 2013; Tolle 2000).
128 Education for Responsibility

However, “spiritual” in French, for example, literally means “relative to the

mind”. So, such a transformation can be described as “spiritual” and it is
probably not utopian. Moreover, it has been described in some traditions,
particularly in the East (Gampopa 1999; Patanjali 1991; Vivekananda 2007),
and we assume that it has occurred in most people described as holy, just or
prophetic, depending on the monotheistic religion concerned.

2.4.1. Coherence

We have asked above the question of how to proceed, when immersed in

a situation, to know the ethical choice, in other words, on the basis of which
criteria can action be directed responsibly? Criteria such as the
correspondence between action and values compatible with relatedness and
empathy (e.g. tolerance, respect, solidarity, love, etc.) could be used. This
correspondence is called coherence (or integrity; Sauvé 2000; Hagège
2015b). However, it is not easy to establish, because as we have largely
detailed, the subject is confused by their projections: they act in an ego-
centered way because of the phenomenological grasp and identification with
a self and phenomena (see “I want”, “I do not want”, “I do not care”;
reviewed by Chambers et al. 2009), and they are not aware of all its
functioning (Hagège 2014). Thus, for example, the subject may believe that
they are tolerant, but may not be aware of unconscious functioning such as
intolerant judgments (mental phenomena) or discrimination (actions). In
other words, from their relative point of view, they believe they are doing
one thing, but in fact, from the ultimate point of view, they are doing
something else. Such inconsistency implies implicit attitudes and seems to
be widespread among ordinary people (Hagège 2014, 2015b). This example
illustrates the gap between the subjective world and the ultimate reality14,
that is, between the subject’s mind and the principled mind: this non-
correspondence is due to the subject’s unconscious. It is problematic in

14 Here, it would also be correct to write: “between the subjective world and the objective world”,
because, for example, actions can be appraised objectively by scientists or by a court. However, I
prefer the term “ultimate reality” here for two reasons. First, one of the aspirations of objective
descriptions is to tend towards those of ultimate reality. Second, my phenomenological modeling
does not include a spiritual counterpart to the objective world. Indeed, I do not see to which
phenomenological experience a collective relative mind could correspond. That is why, in my
opinion, the relevant line of a semantic breakthrough for these arguments is between the relative
and the absolute (i.e. the ultimate).
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 129

terms of responsibility and it explains the illusory nature of the ego. This
leads us to formulate two consequences.

First, coherence is based on the clarity of the mind which first allows the
subject to realize their own inconsistencies. Then, it requires an expansion of
consciousness (Figures 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4). Thus, the educational solution
proposed here would be that the subject clarifies their mind, that they free
space to perceive directly, that is, to feel, the most harmonious solution (see
section 2.4.3 for an explanation of the link between harmony and mind), in
a way that is not dictated by the ego and therefore not based on a dual
functioning. This criterion seems to us to be fundamental. For this reason, we
postulate that the subject should be in an equanimous consciousness. A
broader formulation of this educational goal would be, for example:
“develop vigilant attention, cognitive flexibility, empathy and relatedness,
freeing oneself from the functioning of the ego, and thus learning to perceive
the ultimate reality, developing one’s consciousness towards a principled
functioning of one’s mind”. We will see that the means proposed here to
clarify the mind is the association of reflexivities with meditation.

Second, coherence can also be defined as a perfect correspondence

between relative reality and ultimate reality (Hagège 2014). Consequently,
the gnoseological hypothesis (see section 2.3.1), which pragmatically
postulates the existence of ultimate reality and relative reality, seems
necessary to think about the notion of coherence, and therefore that of
responsibility (Hagège 2014). This distinction between, on the one hand,
relative reality and (relative) mind, and, on the other hand, ultimate reality
and principled mind, allows us to think heuristically about education for
responsibility: this is what we propose here as the epistemological
breakthrough that supports this field of research (Box 2.2). Once again, our
argument supports that a major obstacle to thinking about responsibility, on
the one hand, and embodying it, on the other, is the confusion, respectively
at the theoretical (scientific) and phenomenological levels, between relative
reality and ultimate reality (as reflected in the polysemies of the terms
“world” and “mind”).

The purpose of education for responsibility could therefore also be

summarized as follows: “Awareness that relative reality is not the ultimate
reality, to train the mind to perceive this, to function in an increasingly coherent
way, to promote empathy and affiliation”.

Box 2.2. Formulation of the purpose of an education for responsibility

130 Education for Responsibility

In this sense, it has already been pointed out that responsibility implies the
awareness of the self that acts, of the other (the HE), of the object (the NHE),
and of “the possible impact of one’s action or non-action” (Sauvé 2000,
p. 82, author’s translation). This coincides with our model involving empathy
and relatedness.

These proposals have a significant impact on research methods and

pedagogical practices in education for responsibility. Indeed, a researcher
will only be able to produce knowledge at the level of the development of
their consciousness: if we theoretically learn about the ego, the two realities,
etc., and we do not train to see how they function in our own way of exper-
iencing things, then we would be like pastry chefs specializing in strawberry
tartlets without ever tasting one, or even, perhaps, without having seen a
strawberry in our lives (only reading descriptions in books); we would
produce a disembodied and probably, therefore, more limited knowledge. We
could therefore learn to distinguish these two types of realities and gain
clarity of mind, which would allow our texts to be less confused by our own
projections15. Moreover, the efficiency of “education for” seems to depend
on the educator’s questioning of their functioning and values, in order to
gain coherence (Berger et al. 2009). In this way, an educator or trainer
would gain effectiveness, credibility and legitimacy in embodying what they
are aiming for, by committing to transforming himself or herself in this way.
In summary, it seems fundamental to us that a researcher or actor in
education for responsibility should also commit to developing their
responsibility... to really know what they are talking about and to be a living
model of it (Hagège 2013).

These developments therefore lead us to ask an essential question for

education for responsibility and research in this field: how can we know and
change our own mind? We will propose some answers in Chapter 3 of this
book.

2.4.2. The motivation for innovation

In summary of the previous section, responsibility invites the subject to

choose explicit values derived from a reflexive dialogism, and also to give

15 Observing your consciousness seems more practical than observing a strawberry tartlet,
because you always have the first one with you, while the second one doesn’t necessarily last
long!
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 131

themselves the means to act in coherence with these values. Potential

obstacles to this consist of ego reflexes, which make us believe via the
reactive mind that we are not concerned by these changes: “oh well, I am
fine, I act in a coherent way with my values, therefore this story of implicit
attitudes does not concern me too much”, in other words, implicitly, “I am
someone that is good anyway”, and perhaps even “it is quite possible that I
am better than others”. Such a comparative judgment denotes a lack of
equanimity; an ego game. Such thoughts seem to be widespread, according
to psychosociological studies (Myers 2009). The logical conclusion is that
each person cannot be better than another (ibid.). We refer here too to the
incommensurability of cultures (the “best” being contextual and dependent
on values). In short, we can reasonably assume that we are no better than
others and no worse either. We may be affected by these changes. So, it is
not a question of self-congratulation or self-flagellation, but of actively
seeking, with tenderness and kindness towards oneself, our own flaws: to see
where we are not coherent, to become aware of these insufficiencies and
accept them gently. It is difficult to see, because the ego is full of resources
to hide these flaws from us; it survives thanks to our unconscious
functioning. We may wish to change this. If we are attentive, if we are sharp,
we will see that behind these buffer zones (Figure 1.6), there is suffering.

EXAMPLE.– I have a personal anecdote to share about this. I was on a

meditation retreat and probably more self-conscious than usual. I wanted to
talk to someone I noticed, because I thought it would serve some of my
explicit values. So, one day, in the canteen, I found myself next to her in the
queue and we started talking. We walked side by side once our trays were
full and the logical next step would have been for us to sit down together to
eat the meal and talk more, as I had hoped. However, at that moment, I
changed direction without saying a word and went to sit in a place where
there was only room for one person. Once seated, thoughts came up: “What
am I doing here? Why did I leave? What happened?” I didn’t understand
what had happened. I then spoke with a psychologist friend who was
participating in the retreat to help me understand. And then after a while,
everything became clear: my body, in that moment, had behaved like an
automaton, reacting to old fears buried in my psyche. I suddenly understood
a whole part of my existence, a whole set of past situations in which I had
been sorry for not having any luck, for not having access to this type of
person, because they did not come to me. I now clearly saw that I had
reproduced this pattern of unconscious flight many times without being an
ounce conscious. It was out of fear of rejection. This is the ironic aspect of
132 Education for Responsibility

the functioning of the ego: to avoid experiencing a feeling of rejection, an

automatism had been set up in which, precisely, I felt rejected. I recreated
and projected my own wound on the world, attributing purely internal causes
to the outer world. And all this was absolutely unconscious until now and
this realization was almost overwhelming for me. This personal example
thus aims to illustrate that one can live for years in total incoherence (here,
the desire to create links with a certain type of person and the action
incompatible with such creation) without being aware of it.

You have probably already had the impression that a type of situation that
you perceive as unpleasant is repeated “particularly at home” (perhaps more
than at your neighbor’s house). This can generate thoughts such as: “Again!
Why me? Do I have bad luck or what? What have I done wrong?” You can
be pretty sure that this is a repetition of a pattern shaped by buried wounds.
And the ego is such that it prevents us from seeing our share of responsibility
in the situation. One could even say that this is its ultimate purpose, because
it maintains its power. It is not pleasant or comfortable to see this at home.
This breaks our image of ourselves, which allows our ego to justify its own
existence – which is no less illusory, because it is all relative.

Also, in a similar way, when the memory of a past event manifests itself
in thought, this is the symptom that the underlying emotion is not integrated.
The more we think about it, the more it is a sign that the memory engram
corresponding to the memorized event is intense and “ready to escape”. If
instead of a thought, it is a situation that repeats itself (as mentioned above),
then it indicates the presence of an even deeper wound.

Thus, courageous is the one who looks at and accepts their own suffering
without projecting it onto others or letting the ego pretend to avoid it – by
absorbing consciousness into the reactive mind for example. Courage is
indeed linked to responsibility (Sauvé 2000). Such a change of object (from
a projective mode, which looks outside – see the first five objects of
perception – to a reflexive mode, which looks inside – see the sixth and
seventh objects of perception – then to a dialogical mode, which looks at the
interaction between inside and outside), requires a change in motivation: the
transition from a known functioning, which secures us, to an unknown
functioning, in which we innovate. This passage, commonly referred to as
“letting go” (Finley 2003), involves, among other things, the release of fears.
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 133

TESTIMONY.– “The observation of [my functionings] has allowed me to get

to know myself better, without judging myself, but simply by observing
myself with kindness and realizing how much all these things repeat
themselves and prevent me from living in the present moment with
awareness and healthy living. Mediation allows me to see better these
dynamics and to not be overwhelmed by cognitive distortions in situations
that awaken one of these tendencies. It simply allows me to take these
dynamics into account to lead a healthier and more conscious life. These few
months of practice [of meditation] have been the source of many life lessons
for me. The way I want to live now has changed” (MBER module student).

We do not suggest that a subject works on only one type of motivation,

and then can move on to another. Indeed, according to a model developed in
our previous home laboratory (Favre 2007), three motivation systems (MS)
coexist in ordinary adults. Briefly, at birth, the baby essentially uses the
safety motivation system (SM1); they function with external references
(their pleasure and relief of frustrations are brought from the outside, for
example: when they are brought food). Naturally and quickly, an innovation
motivation system (SM2) is set up where the child takes pleasure in internal
reference, in gaining autonomy, overcoming difficulties, etc. (e.g. when they
crawl to explore the environment, even if it means putting their fingers in the
plug socket!). In this system, which is typical of learning, the subject leaves
their comfort zone – and this is not always assessed as pleasant – and will
only be able to experience pleasure later, after having adapted to the new
conditions. SM1 is the basis of SM2: it seems that the subject needs to feel
safe in the known in order to dare to go towards the unknown. Thus,
paradoxically, people in an uncomfortable situation (e.g. violent environ-
ment) sometimes prefer to stay there rather than attempt change (see Box
1.4). A third motivation system, the parasitic safety system (SM1p), can be
set up at the same time. It corresponds to the internalization of “foreign
programs” (by analogy with a computer virus) that parasitize its SM2 and
create addictive phenomena (to substances, thoughts, situations, etc.). The
path towards responsibility that is proposed here implies “let loose” a known
functioning, motivated by the SM1 or the SM1p: that of the ego, where there are
strong phenomenological grasps, attempts to suppress emotions – and we have
mentioned above that they could be related to certain addictions – and a
concentrated and exogenous attention. This letting go therefore implies
cognitive defusion and decentering (see these concepts in section 1.3.2.4.2).
This new functioning to be learned is motivated by SM2: the mind, freed
from the illusion of the ego, and thus from past personal and cultural
134 Education for Responsibility

conditioning, leaves room for the new, for harmony, for creativity and for
connection. We believe that there is a form of addiction to the ego, a
parasitic security to operate according to this known pattern, even when it is
hindering and obsolete for us. It would notably result in an addiction to
grasping and to escape strategies from emotions assessed as negative. These
emotional avoidances would lead to an illusory form of pleasure (not
permanent; Dambrun and Ricard 2011) to avoid consciously experiencing
what is considered as a negative emotion.

In this regard, one of my students in the meditation module (MBER) had

observed their tendency to experience an “I want”, a grasping for the
mechanisms of the ego, a tendency they had compared to Stockholm
syndrome: the ego would be like a prison guard with whom the subject
identifies, in whom they trust and whose existence they justify, while this
prison guard imprisons the subject. The latter thus ignores the origin of their
suffering, of which they perceived only a part of. I found the picture
particularly accurate.

In short, responsibility implies daring to test new subjective functioning

oneself, which requires a motivation for innovation. It involves opening
one’s mind to the creative, to the new, more than to the reactive.

2.4.3. Harmony

Now, we will consider a third benchmark for responsibility. Given the

ordinary subjective functioning based on ego, given the fact that we are not
transparent to ourselves and that, on the contrary, part of what we do and think is
unknown to us, an obstacle to responsibility is that we may feel that we are
moving towards chosen goals, or acting in coherence with our values, although
this is not the case (see example section 2.4.2). Our consciousness, wandered too
much and restricted by frequently exogenous attention, then does not sufficiently
perceive what is happening in us and perceives our outer world in a distorted,
biased way. This narrow perception of the interaction between the outer world
and oneself causes disharmonies. The opposite of disharmony obviously
corresponds to harmony. Is a mind out of the illusion of the ego harmonious? But
what is harmony, would it be a notion that is only qualitative and subjective? We
propose below some reasoned answers (which can be summarized with a yes and
a no, respectively for each question).
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 135

2.4.3.1. Qualitative approaches to harmony

From a qualitative point of view, two aspects of harmony can be
identified.

First, meaning 2 from Littré refers to an “arrangement between the parties

of a whole, so that they compete for the same end goal” and the 4th refers to
the notion of several parties that agree (Littré 2015c). In Rousseau’s (Richir
2015) and Leibniz’s work (De Gaudemar 2015), we come across the idea of
an intrinsically harmonious nature with which humanity must resonate (or
resonates de facto in their own nature; see section 2.4.3.2, the physical
nature of resonance).

Second, meanings 3, 5 and 6 refer to the pleasant nature of an object,

discourse or sound (Littré 2015c). From an intrapsychic point of view,
obnubilant emotions, where there is a strong phenomenological grasp (often
called “passions”), lock consciousness inside and are perceived as
disharmonious. Thus, in ancient Greek philosophy, they were associated
with psychological pathologies (Richir 2015).

Harmony therefore refers qualitatively to a healthy mind and a sense of

connection that generates emotions that are considered pleasant, moderate –
implied without grasping – and open to others and the world. In other words,
empathy and relatedness are essentially harmonious. We will come back to
this later (section 2.4.3.2).

Esthetically, beauty has been defined as harmony, based on “a certain

reasonable respectability maintainted in all parts [...], so that nothing can be
added, diminished or changed, without surprisingly damaging work”
(Alberti cited by Charles 2015). This is in line with the notions of empathy
and relatedness in that there is a presence, an affective relationship (not as in
the splitting with emotions), but which is not too abundant, not overloaded
(as in affective fusion):

“Basic goodness is concerned with generosity and a sense of trust

in oneself. When that sense of trust comes through, we develop
what is known as harmony. […] Harmony has to be related to
some sense of lusciousness or richness. That is one aspect of
harmony. The other aspect is a sense of spaciousness and
openness. The lusciousness almost has the qualities of a Jewish
mother: it is plentiful, rich and there is lots of stuff on the table,
136 Education for Responsibility

so to speak. The openness and spaciousness are like a Japanese

home, where things are very sparse. There is no big furniture, no
Victorian stuffed sofa, just mats. [...] So true harmony is the
Jewish home and the Japanese home put together quite
conventiently. When such harmony takes place properly and
fully, there is also joy – for the very reason that you are not
struggling to create the harmony” (Trungpa 1979, pp. 17–18).

We find in the description of this “primordial goodness”, a characteristic

of the principled mind according to Tibetan tradition, the same idea of a
harmony that results from an intermediate attitude (or the right marriage)
between on the one hand the overabundance of a quality of mind or a
feeling, and on the other hand the absence of this quality or the emotional
deprivation. There is a warm, abundant presence, which at the same time
leaves all the space for forms and others to exist: it is not invasive (and
therefore unsuitable), nor cold or empty.

Obviously, the functioning of the relative mind, because of the ego, does
not allow it to function in the same finality as others and in resonance with
them. For example, reactive pejorative thoughts can generate physiological
disorders (e.g. stress), have judgments or reject others. In this regard, we
have referred to the case of violent radicalization. By definition, the ego is
illusorily structured in relation to what it believes itself to be distinct,
separate, or even in opposition of: what is “me”, oneself (identity), by
definition, is no other (otherness). Moreover, the phenomenological grasp of
emotions and other phenomena generates a duality that is accompanied by
fundamental dissatisfaction (Dambrun and Ricard 2011): the ego is
disharmonious and generates disharmony.

On the other hand, responsibility, which is based on unity, reliance,

equanimous consciousness, empathy and relatedness, goes hand in hand with
harmonious functioning: the latter does not create suffering in others, nor
does it destroy the non-human environment. Moreover, the reconciliation of
the Western concept of corporate social responsibility with Chinese culture
implies, according to L. Wang and Juslin (2009), to consider harmony,
which refers to the idea of respecting nature (harmony between humans and
nature according to Taoism) and to love others (interpersonal harmony
according to Confucius). This conception of responsibility includes – as
harmony – the relationship with others (see empathy) and the relationship with
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 137

the non-human (see relatedness). In Taoism, the notion of harmony, conceived

as a transformation that integrates the dialogical relationship between the
outer and inner worlds, is also linked to that of unity (Cheng 2009).

2.4.3.2. Quantitative approaches to harmony

From a quantitative point of view, in the physical and mathematical
sciences, harmony refers to a certain type of regularity. For Pythagoras, the
universe was governed by the proportionality and harmony of numbers
(Detienne and Saintillan 2015). For Kepler too, there is harmony in the
universe, via five planes (geometry, arithmetic, music, astrology and
astronomy), as he believes the regularity of the movement of the planets
testifies to this (Durand 2015). The mathematics of harmony is based on five
basic geometric relationships found in different Eastern traditions, as well as
in Greek traditions (for example, five Platonic solids; Stakhov 2006).

2.4.3.2.1. Self-referentiality
One of the five basic relationships is given by the number Phi [ϕ =
(1 + √5)/2 ~1.618], also called the “golden number”. The golden number can
be expressed in self-referential forms [ϕ = √(ϕ + 1) = 1 + 1/ϕ]16, i.e. it is
defined by referring to itself. When the proportion between two geometric
elements is of Phi size, as in ancient constructions or fractal structures found
in nature, a harmonious esthetic impression emerges (ibid.). The
mathematics of harmony is related to the mathematics of fractals. For
example, the Fibonacci sequence [Fn+2 = Fn+1 + Fn] is such that the quotients
between two consecutive terms are the best approximations of the golden
number. The Fibonacci sequence can be used as a basis for the construction
of invariant (fractal) scale geometries and, then, these are focused on their
center (such as the winding shell of a snail or galaxy). Fractals are
constructed, like the Fibonacci sequence, by recursion (one term from the
previous one). The mathematics of harmony therefore concerns objects that
have a remarkable structure and properties.

2.4.3.2.2. Resonance
The geometric proportions that respect the golden number materialize
harmony in a static way. From a dynamic point of view, music is all the
more harmonious, in the mathematical sense of the word, if it respects these
regularities. For example, Johann Sebastian Bach would have been inspired

16 The golden number is the only positive solution to these equations.

138 Education for Responsibility

by plans of cathedrals built according to the golden number to compose

pieces. Another dynamic way, which we have mentioned above with regard
to the qualitative side of harmony, corresponds to the phenomenon of
resonance.

DEFINITION.– Resonance refers to the case where a system is able to easily

store and dissipate energy in another mode, under the effect of periodic
stress. If the load is applied at a frequency equal to the natural frequency of
the system, the total energy increases and the amplitude of the oscillations of
the system increases regularly.

EXAMPLES.–

– By pushing a swing with the correct periodicity, the amplitude of

oscillations increases with each push (i.e. the swing resonates with the
pushes).
– Buildings can resonate with earthquake frequencies and dissipate
energy through collapsing. So do bridges, with the frequency of steps or
wind gusts. That is why it is forbidden to march on a bridge. The latter could
start vibrating like a rubber band before breaking. This is one reason why
modern bridges have many overhead cables rising above the bridge (clearly
visible on the Millau bridge for example): these “decorations” complicate
the natural frequencies, to the point of making it unlikely that a wave will
enter in resonance with the bridge.
– The tidal phenomenon, due to the variation of gravitational forces
(higher when the moon, earth and sun are aligned), actually affects the entire
surface of the globe, including the earth’s crust. The amplitude and
frequency of the tide varies according to various parameters, including
the texture (rheology) and the surface’s geometry. For example, the Atlantic
and the Mediterranean do not have the same shape, so waves, due to the
comings and goings of water (due to the variation of the gravitational force),
do not propagate in the same way. These waves resonate more or less with
the regional basins (depending on their layout): the greater the resonance, the
greater the amplitude of the tide.

So now, if we take the example of a musical instrument, we can see that it

can resonate several notes, not just one. Similarly, a professional singer
learns to send each note, according to its pitch, into the appropriate
resonator. Each resonator can amplify a set of vibration frequencies. In the
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 139

latter case, resonators are bones of the body. For example, those of the rib
cage for low-pitched sounds, those of the face for median sounds, and the
upper part of the skull for high-pitched sounds (that’s why sopranos often
sing with the chin retracted: to better send sound waves upwards). If you
have already heard live opera, you have been able to appreciate how much
sound can be amplified in this way! We speak of a resonance spectrum, to
designate all the frequencies that can be amplified by a resonator. Moreover,
in this respect, we call harmonics the frequencies of higher orders. Have you
ever listened to the sound of a Tibetan singing bowl? I recommend it to you.
The appropriate stimulation of a metal alloy bowl with a stick, known as a
striker, simultaneously produces sounds of different pitches, producing a
harmonious accord (in the qualitative and quantitative sense of the term).

2.4.3.2.3. Electromagnetic phenomena in humans

Let us now turn to what is of most concern to us in this book. A human
body also has a complex natural frequency (just like the Millau Bridge).

Verbal thinking, which can be assumed to correlate at the cerebral level

with some internal communication (i.e. with transmissions of an electro-
chemical nature), also corresponds to a vibration, materialized in the form of
a small electromagnetic field. An emotion also vibrates at a certain
frequency. It seems clear that the frequency of joy is higher than that of
sadness, for example. In terms of thoughts and emotions, a depressed person
and a happy person do not vibrate in the same way. Moreover, when you
know a person, you can sometimes feel their inner state, even though they do
not let it appear outwardly (though this can also happen when you don’t
know them). This psychic state can also be seen in the pitch of their voice,
often lower in the case of sadness and higher in the case of joy. In the same
vein, it is probably thanks to these vibratory frequencies that an animal can
feel instantly if you are afraid, for example – those who practice horseback
riding know it well. It therefore seems likely that the Pygmalion effect (see
section 1.3.2.3.1) proceeds from this type of process, involving a vector that
is in part physical (which is therefore matter, energy and information).

Experimental evidence of this type of process, with regard to intercellular

communication, has been provided over the decades. These involve
electromagnetic radiation (in the ultraviolet, visible or near-infrared
wavelengths), sound (reviewed by Scholkmann et al. 2013) and/or
biophotons (Fels 2009). In other words, a cell seems to be able to perceive
the vibrations of a distant cell by this type of wave.
140 Education for Responsibility

The extrasensory perception of physical phenomena mentioned in section

1.3.1.1.3 (referring to what we have called “direct knowledge”) probably has
these electromagnetic vibrations as its physical support.

We thus postulate that a subject can feel, at least unconsciously, by these

kind of waves, what another person thinks, even if this thought is not
expressed aloud. Add to this the fact that our thoughts also have an impact
on ourselves, because of the trends, beliefs, judgments, etc. that they
reinforce in us, and therefore indirectly on our environment (human and non-
human). Such an indirect effect has been clearly demonstrated in the
psychotherapeutic field (Cottraux 2007a) and in experimental psychology
(Myers 2009). Thus, our responsibility also clearly includes that of our own
thoughts (“even if no one else hears them”... consciously).

With experience, I was able to appreciate the inherently morbid and

confining nature of my reactive mind. It makes us automatons, and makes us
suffer in a very direct, very immediate way. It generates tensions in the body
and mind. It is a bit like walking with heavy chains on your feet: every
reactive thought produces in the mind – at least unconsciously – a similar
effect as that of the sensation of heavy metal on an already bruised ankle.
Cultivating inner calm means taking care of yourself in a very basic, and
very fundamental way. It means being softer, more loving towards yourself.
Indeed, there is ample experimental evidence of the impact of a person’s
state of mind (calm or agitated) on mental and physiological health (see
section 3.2.4).

TESTIMONY.– “I also realized during this module that there was a profound
lack of kindness towards myself, a profound lack of gentleness. That the
judgments I had of myself were much harsher than those I would have of an
outsider. I am now trying to show more acceptance, less judgment about
myself. I find that this process makes my thoughts much healthier, much
more positive than before and makes me less prone to panic attacks”
(MBER module student).

We have just argued in favor of the idea that mental phenomena have
ethical consequences, because they have a physical dimension, therefore an
impact on the human (or living) environment, including the subject who is
the place of their emission. Now we will more precisely consider that not all
human beings have the same vibratory frequency according to their thoughts
and state of consciousness in particular, and that their natural frequency
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 141

therefore evolves. This premise may seem innovative from the point of view
of Western science, but it is quite trivial and basic in traditional Eastern
medicines (ayurveda, Chinese medicine, etc.). It is even, from a certain point
of view, a founder of these traditions.

It seems clear to me that the strength of the direct effect mentioned, for
example, in the Pygmalion effect, depends on at least three factors: the
natural frequency of the emitting individual, that of the receiving individual,
and the quality of the emitted vibration (more or less harmonious). In other
words, the premise implies that the observed effects of mind on matter
would be more intense with a subject freed from the illusion of the ego, than
with an ordinary subject, hence their greater responsibility. This is another
way of considering that responsibility increases with consciousness. It also
seems that on average (with a differential effect according to individuals)
anything that reduces the state of consciousness (psychotropic drugs,
alcohol, television, phenomenological understandings in general, etc.) also
tends to decrease the vibratory rate.

There are apparently some physical means to objectify this vibratory rate,
in relation to what is called the “aura” (Prakash et al. 2015), and which can
indeed, in accordance with the vision advanced here, be interpreted in a
purely physical way (Duerden 2004). Also, techniques are available to
evaluate biophoton flows (Korotkov et al. 2010). In other words, the state of
consciousness would correspond to certain electromagnetic vibrations that
can be detected by physical instruments.

The “placebo effect” refers to the fact that a lump of sugar can cure an
infection, as long as the subject believes they are ingesting a drug that cures
their condition (instead of sugar). This effect can affect up to two thirds of
participants with a wide range of conditions (reviewed by Price et al. 2008).
The reason why some subjects respond to the placebo effect and others do
not is scientifically unknown (ibid.). Some authors suggest that the
difference lies in the meaning that the subject attributes to their experience:
the more significant the latter, the more effective the placebo effect would be
(Moerman and Jonas 2002). Also, it seems that the verbal suggestion (by the
experimenter who mentions the presence of an active molecule) and the
subject’s previous experience (confronted beforehand with an effective or
ineffective drug) determine the magnitude of the placebo effect (reviewed by
Price et al. 2008). It would seem that this effect involves brain structures that
are also mobilized in the regulation of emotions and in reward/aversion
142 Education for Responsibility

systems (ibid.). Some of the placebo effects would be mediated by

prediction, desire of change and emotions, while another is the result of less
conscious processes, similar to classical conditioning (ibid.). In any case,
this process seems similar to the Pygmalion effect mentioned above: except
that here the result does not take place in others (a student), but in the
subject’s own body. In terms of mechanism, scientific knowledge and
assumptions seem weak.

HYPOTHESES.– The belief that one has ingested a healing drug would
resonate physically (via thoughts and emotions associated with it) with the
body in a way that promotes healing and that, literally, informs the body.
The placebo effect would therefore be related to the performativity of
thoughts (see section 1.3.2.3.1). It would simply be a partly electromagnetic
phenomenon. Also, a story, an emotion, a film, a situation can resonate
within us. It is an expression: “what you say resonates with me”. Such
resonance can be reactive (disharmonious) or creative (harmonious),
depending on whether it lowers the vibratory rate by reinforcing an aspect
of separation (and causing more grasping, feeding the ego) or whether it
increases it by intensifying the feeling of reliance and helping to let go.

In this vein, feelings towards strangers can be explained. I have often

been surprised to see that in an assembly of such people, a very fast
connection can be established with a person who shares many interests with
me. Some remained close friends for another twenty years after such a
“fortuitous” meeting. In a similar way, I was sometimes able to feel a kind of
immediate aversion towards some people, without even knowing them. “I’m
not feeling this person”, as the popular expression goes. You may also have
had this kind of experience. Obviously, in an assembly of people, there are
also some people who are hardly noticed, if at all. This includes the “I want”,
“I do not want” and “I do not see” resulting from automatic appraisal on the
basis of personal preferences. These phenomena can also be interpreted
through the notion of resonance. The “I want” and the “I do not want”
resonate with my vibrations, my engrams, my memory, while the “I do not
see”, does not.

A final example, among other possible examples, concerns recurring

thoughts or situations (whether they are interpreted as disturbing, unpleasant,
painful, etc. or, on the contrary, pleasant). Let us consider on the one hand
each non-integrated (and therefore potentially reactive) emotion as an
energetic engram vibrating according to a specific complex frequency,
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 143

embedded in the body, and on the other hand each individual as being
interdependent with their environment (and more broadly with the cosmos).
The frequency of this engram depends on the past situation in which it was
memorized, and on the specific subjective way of experiencing this
separation event (e.g. abandonment, rejection, humiliation, etc.). Thus, as
soon as there is a close situation in the individual’s environment, which
corresponds at least partially to the engram, there is a resonance
phenomenon between the two: the vibratory amplitude of the emotion
increases, the engram is no longer embedded, especially since the frequency
of the situation is similar to that of the emotion. This resonance simply
makes us feel the emotion, more or less consciously; it manifests itself
through the body in the form of physiological changes. If there is no
corresponding situation in the environment, or if a situation only vaguely
corresponds, then vibration will generally manifest itself as reactive thoughts,
associated with a corresponding repertoire of actions (see examples 1 and 2 in
section 1.3.2.4.2). In this way, all our reactive thoughts are the symptom of
the vibration of an emotional engram. We could express in a final way that
emotion awaits only that: a corresponding situation to vibrate to the
maximum, and be evacuated, to leave the body, being integrated (like an
animal in a cage waiting to be freed; Figure 1.8D). Instead of promoting this
process, the ego focuses our attention on the reactive mind (unconscious
mental mode). This leads us to avoid emotion, fight against it, or grasp it,
which has the effect of re-embedding the emotional engram in the body
(Figure 1.8B). In the last two cases, the content of thoughts generally focuses
on the external event that triggered the resonance: this projection makes us
believe that the origin of our emotion is external to us, which prevents us
from taking responsibility for it.

In conclusion to this section, the scientific study of the role of resonances

and electromagnetic phenomena in human functioning (biological and
psychological) and interpersonal relationships is still in its infancy and it
should be developed. This may be prevented for the time being by the
prevailing reductionist physicalism (see section 1.4.1), which seems to imply
the implicit belief that explaining the phenomena mentioned above would
amount to attributing some magical quality to the mind or matter. We have
argued that they can instead be interpreted in a way that is compatible with
the sciences, particularly the physical sciences. Moreover, at the fringe of the
scientific “purely theoretical” field, beyond the dichotomy between
144 Education for Responsibility

allopathic medicine and alternative medicines17, an integrative medicine is

now developing, which aims to take full advantage of the former and the
second18. This is particularly true in the United States, which, with its
pragmatic epistemology, is generally more concerned about the fact that
“rather works” it than about basing the process on solid theoretical
foundations – as we are more so in France, with our rationalist epistemology
(Dutant and Engel 2005).

In short, when we refer here to harmony or disharmony, it does not refer

to a vague qualitative, or even subjective, notion, but on the contrary to a
physical phenomenon, partly electromagnetic, potentially objectifiable and
mathematicizable, and having material, energetic and informational
dimensions.

2.4.3.2.4. Hofstadter and Gödel’s theorems

These foundations have been laid, so let us go a little further, in a more
“ultimate” point of view of understanding the relationship between
resonance and harmony.

One property of thought that Hofstadter (1979/2008)19 emphasizes is self-

referentiality: the subject can refer to themself by saying “I”. To describe
self-referential systems, Hofstadter refers to “strange loops”. He calls
“tangled hierarchy” a system where a strange loop occurs. In such a system,
when you change scale (whether it is lower or higher than the initial level),
you are in the same place. This kind of strange path is perfectly illustrated in

17 Experimental research on alternative medicines is generally published in scientific journals

dedicated to them. To my knowledge, few of their results are reported in generalist journals, which
would encourage dialogue between the different forms of knowledge.
18 Instrumental frequency therapies are a possible example.
19 In his book, Gödel, Escher, Bach (originally published in 1979), which received the
Pulitzer Prize, we implicitly find a way to reconcile the qualitative and quantitative aspects of
harmony. This book has been the object of a full module at the prestigious Massachusetts
Institute of Technology since 2007. The author, Douglas Hofstadter, initially a physicist, then
a professor of cognitive sciences, computer science, history and philosophy of science,
philosophy, comparative literature and psychology, presents a unified theory of cognition,
fractal mathematics and the esthetic aspect of harmony. One purpose of the book is to offer an
explanation of how thought emerges from unconscious components (atoms, molecules, etc.).
We do not agree with this formulation, which seems to be marked by reductionist physicalism
(and we do not share all of Hofstadter’s assertions about the mind, despite the richness and
scope of the book).
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 145

Escher’s paintings and in the reasoning on paradoxes – such as Russell’s

paradox, which says that the barber must shave all those who do not shave
(should he shave himself?) or the phrase “I’m lying” (impossible to decide if
it is true).

According to Hofstadter, the prototypical example of the strange loop

example is the self-referential structure at the heart of Gödel’s
incompleteness theorems. It seems relevant to me to note that Gödel would
have chosen the numbers to code his functions based on Kabbalah, the
esoteric text of the Jewish religion20. His first theorem, of indecidability,
demonstrates that “all axiomatic formulations consistent with number theory
include indecipherable proposals”, such as the one we will call “G”
(Hofstadter 1979/2008, p. 19, author’s translation). As it happens, G is a self-
referential function. At a high level, we can see that G is true. But at a low
level (by deriving G), we can’t say anything: we can’t decide if G is true or
false. An explanation is still possible at the higher level; “this explanation is
about understanding not just one level at a time, but how a given level
reflects its meta level [...]” (Hofstadter 1979/2008, p. 799). Thus, if G is true,
it cannot be demonstrated in the system in which it makes sense (I will say
“in its reference paradigm”, in which it has a meaning), so we can say that
the paradigm (“axiomatic system” in mathematical terms) is incomplete.
Hence the second theorem of incompleteness: a consistent (coherent) system
cannot lead to the demonstration of its own consistency, without its results
being inconsistent. It is impossible to prove intraparadigmically a “positive”
truth about the paradigm, with regard to consistency and completeness21 of
the paradigm. It is also impossible for such evidence to be external to the
system it is evaluating: there is no extraparadigmatic measuring instrument
(Kuhn 1962/2008; Box 1.2). Let us return to G: it is a proposal –
intraparadigmatic at the beginning, necessarily – which rises
extraparadigmatically to some level; it allows us to say something about the
whole system (in terms of incompleteness). It sheds light on a shadowy area
(by allowing it to be precisely identified and pointed at). And how does it do

20 In fact, there seem to me to be some very material and concrete truths about the world in
some religious texts, quite simply because in general they speak of the mind (in a direct or
pictorial way), and this latter, not only is a part of the world, but is the virtual image, as
argued throughout this book.
21 “So that the consistency of a formal system is the property that ‘any assertion generated by the
system is true’, completeness is the opposite: ‘The system generates any true assertion.’”
(Hofstadter 2008, p. 114, author’s translation).
146 Education for Responsibility

that? By talking about nothing but itself, because of its self-referential nature. In
a similar way, the consciousness placed on the ego enlightens unconscious
functions.

In other words, any mathematical proof instrument is internal to the

system in which the evidence is held (one could say that it is
“intraparadigmatic”) and there is therefore a self-referential nature of the
evidence. As a result, it is not possible to prove the completeness, full
coherence, or full truth of arithmetic (or any other mathematical system). Yet
another way of understanding this is to say that the symbols used to prove
are part of a universe of meanings: one cannot prove something about this
universe in an “absolute” or asemantic way, that is, by placing oneself
outside any universe of meanings (see the incommensurability of
paradigms). Thus, the paradox generated by these mathematical properties is
that the asemantic level (one could say extraparadigmatic) of knowledge
corresponds precisely to the formal system of these strange loops (including
self-referential functions).

Let us return to the link between harmony and resonance. Hofstadter

takes the example of a phonograph (vinyl disc player) on which a disc is
played whose grooves correspond to the phonograph’s natural frequency. It
is a self-referential system in a way, since the sound emitted is characteristic
of the device. Then a resonance phenomenon occurs that causes the
phonograph to burst. We will see in the following section that the simple,
precise and integral self-observation of the ego leads mechanically, by an
analogous phenomenon of resonance, to its bursting. It is as if the disc
pointed out the structural weaknesses of the record player and revealed them
out in the open, making them obvious. Hofstadter (1979/2008, p. 95, author’s
translation) paraphrases Gödel as follows: “for all record players, there are
discs that cannot be played on this one, because they will lead to its indirect
self-destruction”. In the example, the record player represents the axiomatic
system (the paradigm) and the disc represents a chain of the system (theorem
or non-theorem, i.e. G). We have seen that the mathematics of harmony
concerns precisely self-referential forms.

We continue this explanation in section 2.4.4, because distinguishing two

functions of the mind will allow us to see more clearly the link between
Gödel, the ego, resonance and responsibility... and to loop together the
qualitative and quantitative notions of harmony towards this model.
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 147

2.4.4. Horizon of an education for responsibility

“Whenever there is the word ‘I’, ‘me’, or ‘I am’, there is a sense

of thisness, which is extremely strong. Therefore, our sense of
thatness has to be conditioned by whatever is experienced by
this. So we begin to have problems with that. We try to reject it,
which is an expression of aggression; we try to magnetize it or
suck it in, which is an expression of passion; or we ignore the
whole thing, which is an expression of ignorance. Since
expectations relate with passion, aggression, and ignorance, if
you could see through their particular games, then the
expectations themselves would be transparent. It’s a question of
clarity, as well as self-confidence” (Trungpa 1996, p. 46).

I hope you didn’t get tangled up in a hierarchy, or stuck on the border of a

strange loop... in short, that I didn’t lose you in a small Hofstadterian
harmonic labyrinth! Especially since I haven’t finished...

2.4.4.1. At the beginning, a relative mind

Let’s go back to the start. There is the individual relative mind, with its
four horsemen. From an objective point of view, its relationship with the
world, which is biased, is rather an individuation: this relative mind and the
world are cogenerated. Thus, for an ordinary subject, the interaction between
the inner and outer worlds is based on cognitive mechanisms (projection,
phenomenological grasping, attention, appraisal, etc.) and psychosocial
mechanisms (values, attitudes, beliefs, etc.), summarized in the term “ego”,
which guide the subject in their world – and at the same time generate it – in
a subjective, biased way, conditioned by the past and the subject’s culture;
the subject does not perceive ultimate reality because of these biases. One of
these biases is when there is a phenomenological grasp of thoughts, in other
words, when waves are mistaken for the ocean (frequent confusion in the
literature in philosophy of consciousness, and in our Western culture;
Hagège 2013, 2015b).

It is important to note that because of the unconscious, by definition, our

minds ignore their biases and blindness when they manifest; it seems that we
therefore generally have the implicit impression of perceiving the ultimate
reality directly, and tend to think and act as if we are transparent to ourselves
– whereas this is not the case (Hagège 2014, 2015b). This confusion is
148 Education for Responsibility

evident in the polysemy of the terms “world” and “mind” (see introduction),
which refer to either an ultimate entity or a relative entity. The ego therefore
functions a little like an epistemological obstacle that prevents us from
accessing a true, undistorted knowledge of the ultimate reality. For this to
happen, a phenomenological revolution, internal to the mind, would be
necessary. We have seen that ego is one of the major obstacles to
responsibility (this chapter), hence the relevance of considering the
gnoseological hypothesis as the foundation of education for responsibility. It
should be remembered that this hypothesis considers, distinguishes and links
relative and ultimate realities.

We mentioned in the previous section that this functioning of the ego,

based on separation, was fundamentally disharmonious. The ego is
expressed in relation to emotions and the reactive state of mind. This
functioning, in terms of vibrations, only adds false notes to the symphony or
the ambient cacophony. It projects its own restricted and distorted vision on
the world and thus cannot harmoniously take into account itself and the
environment (human and non-human). For example, when there is a
phenomenological grasp of reactive thoughts, most of which probably
concern “me” or “I”, the field of consciousness is reduced to this (attention
is grasped by these phenomena): at this moment, the mind resonates with
this ego-centric content, with which the subject vibrates. At this moment, the
subject is not vibrating with the environment, nor with their whole being
(especially not with the reactive emotions that underlie these thoughts, and
as we have seen, it represses them like this). As these thoughts revolve
around the fears and desires of the individual, they subtly condition actions,
motivated above all by security, therefore. Let us recall the parallel between
Figures I.1 and 1.7 (money and thought): we are billions of individuals
whose ego seeks to draw cover over itself. And as argued in the introduction,
the result seems on average to be more of a disharmony. Of course, those in
positions of economic or political power have the potential to have negative
impacts on a larger part of the population or the planet. Nevertheless,
“charity begins at home” and the hummingbird policy invites everyone to do
what is within their power to make their minds more harmonious... which
will make the world the same.

We have argued in favor of the notion that, from an ultimate point of

view, ego is an illusion. Hofstadter (1979/2008) proposes in this sense that
our impression of having or being a self comes from the abstract pattern
generated by strange loops.
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 149

2.4.4.2. A harmonious transformation

On the other hand, as we have discussed with responsibility, the four
horsemen of the mind can function differently – and, fortunately, this
sometimes happens spontaneously, even in ordinary subjects. In this case,
creative thoughts or harmonious emotions vibrate in tune with oneself and the
environment: the functioning of the subject adds “musical notes” which will
contribute to an objectively more harmonious sound. Empathy and
relatedness thus involve resonating with our environment, vibrating with it,
via our consciousness. In such a case, the object of our attention, and
therefore our field of consciousness, includes in a unified way the individual,
their environment and the interaction between the two. This type of
relationship with the environment is closer to the ultimate reality, because it
is not (or is at a less ordinary level) distorted by the prism of the ego
(especially by the reactive mind); there is simply a form of communion with
what is. The reality at this moment is not imprisoned in concepts, labels of the
reactive mind, interpreted (unconscious mental mode); it is felt, lived,
perceived directly (conscious sensory mode). If we refer to the cognitive
process of grasping (section 1.3.1.2), this amounts to a perception that is free
of semantic processing. The subject is not experiencing life at this moment as
if they are encased in an “I-thou”, that is, through the illusion of an ego. In
short, the subject’s model highlighting the basics of a functioning compatible
with responsibility is the one that has also been called the “decentered-self”
(opening, overcoming the ego), in opposition to “self-centered functioning”
(based on ego; Dambrun and Ricard 2011). Such a supposedly self-
decentered functioning, in addition to being more ethically relevant, would
have the merit of being the source of authentic happiness, in the sense of
being independent of external circumstances (ibid.). We can easily
understand it: while the ego feels itself existing through phenomena
(thoughts, reactive emotions, situations, people, social roles, etc.), by
identifying with them (and therefore by cutting itself off from the
environment), consciousness is sufficient to have a proper feeling of
existence, when the subject perceives without the deforming prism of the ego.
The subject in the latter case is not identified. The harmonious emotion (e.g.
joy, gratitude, compassion) is due to the connection with the environment; not
a personal past.

Of course, neuroses, reactive thoughts and emotions are human. It’s

perfectly normal to have them and it is quite normal that the ego is afraid of
losing this, since, because it feeds on it, it feels it is existing through it. It
150 Education for Responsibility

feels that if it doesn’t have that anymore, it will disappear. And it’s not
wrong. On the other hand, it exists when we are absent; it lives through our
unconscious. It is when our mind is absorbed into a phenomenon (thought,
emotion, external phenomenon, etc.) that the ego is here, when we are not
present to everything that is in the moment, including ourselves. So it
doesn’t make us what we are. It’s the opposite. We are precisely not what it
identifies with. We are the consciousness that we have of phenomena. We
are not these phenomena. But our ego frequently makes us believe that if we
become more conscious, if we are present, we will disappear... when it is
actually the ego that will disappear! And we, on the other hand, will never have
been so alive in our lives. We will always have a personality, (harmonious)
emotions, memories and skills. We are not going to turn into some kind of
insipid vegetable. Quite the opposite, we and life will never have had so
much taste; everything will be brighter, more vivid, more colorful, more
existing... more conscious than before (Box 2.1). We can see that we are not
free vis-à-vis our neuroses, reactive thoughts and emotions: carrying our
existence at arm’s length, we act as if we are more important than others. It’s
nerve-wracking; it drains energy unnecessarily. Ethically, this is what
prevents us from taking into account in a just way of the self, of others and
the non-human environment, and, moreover, it is what makes us suffer
(Dambrun and Ricard 2011). In particular, paradoxically, by making us flee,
grasping our emotions, or fighting them (section 1.3.2.4.2).

A principled mind, on the contrary, enjoys the freedom and joy of being a
singular human among others, regardless of past or cultural conditioning. In
awake functioning, the ocean knows that it is ocean, and no wave disturbs its
tranquility. The motivation for innovation is required, and the subject
welcomes all phenomena as they arise, without resistance manifesting in
their mind (which does not imply that they let everything happen or that they
do not solve a problem... only in this case, they will calmly put in place
appropriate responses). Here, the subject is fully aware of the inner and outer
worlds... the mind embraces the ultimate reality of phenomena, without bias,
without ego. It is a fuller, happier, lighter and more ethical way of life.
Indeed, as mentioned, all ordinary beings can live this kind of functioning
episodically, but such a state can be perpetuated as some living examples
seem to show (see above) – and I therefore hypothesize that their level of
consciousness is higher than that of an ordinary subject who only
temporarily knows such a state. There is a small paradox: on the one hand,
the capacities of these beings are dependent on their past and their culture
(for example, the language they speak, what they know how to do, etc.), on
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 151

the other hand, their way of being and understanding their lives is not
a priori dependent on this, insofar as there is no ego and therefore no
identification or projection.

Moreover, leaving the illusion of the ego should, in our opinion, be a

purpose for all authentic spiritual development – which would therefore
include no longer being identified with a religion, even if it provided, along
the way, tools to achieve this goal (e.g. prayer, meditation, etc.). And as
argued throughout this book, this can be a relevant horizon for an education
for responsibility. Precisely, the advantage of problematization in terms of
education is that it invites us to think about change. These two modalities of
the functioning of the mind, ordinary and principled, are described in
traditional oriental literatures, where different stages of spiritual realizations,
that is awakening, are distinguished (Gampopa 1999; Patanjali 1991;
Vivekananda 2007). Here, we do not go into the details of these
considerations and we will endeavour to model, by analogy with
mathematical processes, such a transition from a relative mind to a
principled mind, in other words from the ego to responsibility. In the next
chapter, I will also present other theoretical and empirical arguments, which
tend to show that at the very least it is possible to instantiate in one’s mind a
functioning similar to that of a principled mind.

2.4.4.3. The dissolution of the ego by consciousness

I mentioned above the notion that an awakened being can interact with
their environment beyond social conventions, in relation to the modality of
direct knowledge. A bit like G, which reaches an asemantic level thanks to its
self-referentiality, Hofstadter (1979/2008) seems to eliminate the possibility of
leaving the system, from “transcending the self” as he writes, in other words to
have a direct, extraparadigmatic knowledge. For him, it is more a matter of
self-knowledge than self-transcendence. However, like most Westerners, he
does not distinguish between different modes of functioning of the mind, or
between different levels of consciousness. He just refers to a “self”. The point
of view defended here is as follows: the “self” could be considered as the
mind, or the ego. Here, in the aim of responsibility, it is not a question of
transcending the mind, but the ego. So, the mind does not go out from itself, it
leaves a subsystem (the ego) – existing from a relative point of view, and
illusory from an ultimate point of view22. Gödel helps us to understand why

22 In this, I agree with Hofstadter that this corresponds to a better knowledge of oneself,
considering the self as the mind.
152 Ed
ducation for Ressponsibility

such ann exit is harm monious: it is when con nsciousness is truly a puure self-
referential function, no longer conscious
c of unconsciouss processes related to
the ego (Figure 2.2B B), but conscious of itseelf (Figure 2..2C). Let us mention
here aggain the anaalogy with the t phonogrraph and thhe disc, reprresenting
respectivvely the egoo and the conscious
c fun
nction of coonsciousness. At the
beginninng of the prrocess, it is thet ego that observes thee ego, then, little by
little, a kind
k of consciousness thaat witnesses the subjectivve experiencee (Figure
2.2B), thhat observes the phenomeena (first sev ven types of objects
o of perrception,
includinng emotions;; simultaneoously mentall and sensorry consciouss mode).
Phenom mena and the conscious suubject are theerefore perceeived in a dirrect way,
closer too the ultimatte reality (whhere the ego is an illusioon). I call thee process
that leadds to this “pphenomenological reflexiv vity”. It is fuurther detaileed in the
next chaapter (sectionn 3.1.3). Theen, if consciousness conttinues to obsserve the
ego, it will
w see that it i and the lattter are of the same naturee (vacuity); itt will see
the illusory nature of the duallity on whicch it is baseed. Thereforre, when
alignmeent – the phhenomenon of o resonancee of conscioousness withh itself –
occurs, the subjecttive aligns with the ulltimate and thus experiiences a
burstingg23 of the egoo. Indeed, thhe vision of thet subject thhen becomess in tune
with thee ultimate reality, whereaas the ego manifests
m itsellf by essencee only in
the relattive subjectivve (Figure 2.22C).

Figure 2.2. Harmo onious transforrmation of the e mind through

h phenomenollogical
reflexivitty. For a color version of thiss figure, see www.iste.co.uk
w k/hagege/educcation.zip

23 Or a dissolving,
d subliimation, disappearance, etc.
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 153

COMMENT ON FIGURE 2.2.– Subject (x) projects an interpretation of their

inner world without being aware of it. They perceive the object (y) as separate
and independent from them, but this is objectively an illusion. A2) Indeed,
their consciousness reaches the object for perceiving; the perceived object
(y) is a function of the subject (x), because of the processes of projection,
attentional magnification, etc. (Figures 1.3 and 1.9). This function (⨍i) is
unconscious, because the subject is not aware of these cognitive biases; they
live in the illusion of perceiving the ultimate reality and being separated from
the object. B) They observe more and more the functioning of their mind, the
ego game and the “I want”, “I do not want”, “I do not care”, etc. At first, it is
the ego that observes itself and remains within the subsystem. But by dint of
being seen, unmasked, the disharmonious functions lose strength and shrink:
the subject begins to realize the illusory character, that is, the vacuity, of the
ego. This corresponds to the development of a conscious function (⨍c or
“witness consciousness”), which takes as its purpose the detailed functioning
in A2 (the unconscious function ⨍i). C) Progressing in the level of
consciousness, the latter takes itself as an object (as in some meditative
practices; Lutz et al. 2007; section 3.2.1); the mind instantiates the self-
referential quality of consciousness (⨍c on ⨍c) and thus realizes the vacuity of
the self and phenomena (see the asemantic level of knowledge corresponding
to the consciousness of the strange loop). If this state is stabilized, the subject
perceives everything from a non-subjective point of view, truly perceiving
themself as someone else. They have a direct knowledge of the phenomena
(also involving the third modality of perception), undistorted by any personal
or cultural bias. In other words, they perceive everything out of any reference,
out of any semantic system: their principled mind perceives the ultimate
reality. They are awake. The dotted lines indicate that they directly perceive
the impermanent and interdependent characters (i.e. vacuity) of the
phenomena and of their own existence.

2.4.4.4. Evolution of responsibility to awakening

Thus, we can explain in a pictorial way what happens when a relative
mind is transformed into a principled mind (Box 2.3). This transformation
could be called “spiritual development” and is completed by awakening,
which leads to total responsibility from an objective point of view: the
relationship and dialogism with the environment are at the maximum (see
Figure 3.1).
154 Education for Responsibility

Imagine that the wave of the real, of vacuity, corresponds to the frequency of
the A major musical note and is of very low intensity. Also, the relative mind
would function like a transistor that picks up waves automatically. The orientation
of its sensor (its antenna) corresponds to the attention beam (the field of
consciousness). All forms emit a specific and complex wave that characterizes
them. The transistor feels strongly committed to the mission of capturing waves
from the outside. But not just any waves; it has a roadmap (established by the ego)
concerning the waves it should pick up (those of “I want”). However, it has a
module (the unconscious) that emits waves itself, corresponding to thoughts,
words, actions, etc. and emotional engrams. The latter emit a tenuous wave for the
moment, as if they were muted. But they contribute well to the vibratory landscape
emanating from the transistor. This landscape constitutes a “background noise”,
which scrambles signals received from the outside. At first, this noise is simply a
huge disharmonious noise. Since it can’t see very clearly, because of the
cacophony, all the transistor is able to do is recognize on the outside the waves that
correspond to certain emanations of its own background noise. It believes that the
interesting information is there because it is the only kind that seems to emerge.
What it recognizes in this way could be, for example, a phenomenon that it labels
mentally or a situation resembling déjà vu... something that fits into the mold of a
“I want” or a “I do not want”. So in doing so, it has the impression of capturing the
outer world (which it assimilates to the real, because it ignores the “I do not see”
and its projections), while it almost only captures waves that resonate with those it
already emits. And as soon as it picks one up, it automatically compares it with its
roadmap to see if it matches or not. When something on the outside resonates with
an emotional engram, the latter is no longer embedded and the vibration becomes
very sonorous. It’s the emotion felt. If this does not fit into its roadmap, then the
transistor will try to reduce this signal by all means (fight or flight in general).
Indeed, several fears emerge at that time. Panicked that it would further confuse all
signals, it fears being no longer able to pick up signals that are in line with its
roadmap as a result. Also, it is afraid to burst if it resonates too much with it. This
reaction has the effect of maintaining or even increasing the background noise
level.

After many failures, the transistor realizes that its system does not work: that,
apart from a few details, its roadmap is impossible to achieve, and that in addition,
by trying to follow it, it damages itself and others. In short, it realizes that it is of
no use to it except to lose energy, to be generally disappointed by the signals
received and to live in a hellish hubbub. Let’s suppose that it then changes its
roadmap and now tries instead to capture the waves it emits itself
(phenomenological reflexivity). At first glance, it doesn’t seem to be of much use
either. But useless for useless, let’s say it is a player and experiences it. Then when
it picks up a strong vibration, such as that of an engram that is no longer embedded
(i.e. an emotion felt), it can remain connected to it, it is no longer afraid of this
intense sound: therefore, this vibration will no longer resonate poorly with poorly-
adapted external waves (partially corresponding), before returning to where it
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 155

comes from (Figures 1.8B and C), but it will fully resonate with the sensor, which
will be perfectly adjusted to it. As a result, this wave will burst (this is the
integration of emotion; Figure 1.8D). Why isn’t it the sensor that’s bursting?
Because by capturing the wave, it absorbs the wave’s energy, thus increasing its
vibratory rate. In other words, its properties change the moment it picks it up: its
performance increases because it picks up this vibration. As a result, on the one
hand, the engram has disappeared, so the background noise is less intense and less
complex. On the other hand, the sensor is able to detect a greater variety of waves
more accurately. Engrams that obstruct consciousness have disappeared. There is
therefore less parasitic information (background noise): the sensor has a higher
energy, capable of perceiving noise better as well as external information too24.
The transistor is therefore beginning to perceive benefits from its situation. On its
way, it therefore continues and, even if it has kept old automatisms consisting of
capturing waves coming from the outside, it is no longer on its roadmap, so it
redirects its antenna more and more easily towards the internal signals.

And then the notion of a roadmap is also crumbling. It loses meaning because
the transistor can see that in reality it has no control over everything that happens.
It also perceives the sensor trying to pick up the internal or external signals; it is as
if it was splitting (witness consciousness) and the new antenna was picking up the
signals of the first one. The two sensors together also resonate. As a result of this
duplication, the first sensor itself becomes a received signal... and is in the process
of bursting. So, the second sensor starts to realize that being a sensor and being a
received signal is fundamentally the same thing. It notices the artifactual character
of 1) the distinction between a sensor and a signal and thus of 2) the assignment of
characteristics to the sensor and signal. It therefore realizes that in fact what is
important is not what we perceive, but that we perceive (it is not the phenomena,
but the consciousness that perceives them). And it realizes that what is essential to
receive, what makes it possible to receive, is neither the sensor nor the signal, it is
that there is a vibration common to the sensors and received signals, whatever they
are: the A major (the fundamental nature of phenomena and consciousness,
vacuity), which had until then gone unnoticed because of the too intense
background noise (reactive mental state and ego). It realizes that it is not a
transistor, but that it is nothing more than this vibration. That this vibration is the
fundamental principle of the existence of all phenomena... and that it characterizes
them much more than all the differential properties they previously seemed to
have... then there is no truth other than that.

Thus, it can no longer perceive a sensor or signal as such. And it no longer has
any interest in any personal roadmap – which is the same as a sensor or signal.

24 It is a paradox: the less background noise there is, the better the transistor picks up this
noise (at home and in others’). In other words, the clearer our mind is, the better it perceives
its own confusion.
156 Education for Responsibility

Nevertheless, its life and actions are consistent with the harmonious orientations it
would have had on its previous roadmaps. It thus remains in tune with this main
note that constitutes the cosmos. Then it picks up everything simultaneously, being
in unison with the real, without duality between exterior and interior, sensor and
signal, background noise and signal...

Box 2.3. Metaphor expressing awakening as the completing of

a vibratory transformation from a relative mind to a principled mind

Now, we are considering in particular the evolution of the notion of

responsibility with regard to this spiritual development.

Initially, in the ordinary functioning related to the ego, we take partial

responsibility for our life and functioning. Because of projections, we tend to
attribute the causes of our emotions and situations to the outside (to
situations, to people, etc.). Thus, in psychosociology, there has been
described a “fundamental  attribution error” or “correspondance bias”: most
subjects tend to underestimate in others the influence of these external
factors and overestimate it in themselves (Myers 2009). In other words, it is
easier to attribute responsibility for our functioning to others than it is to take
responsibility for our actions ourselves. We feel alienated from our own
emotional engrams (we tend to slam the door in the face of the child who
knocks on it or ignore it). In short, from a subjective point of view, we do
not feel responsible for all our operations and we live on the basis of a
duality with the environment. We are therefore not responsible from an
objective point of view either, because we do not consciously perceive in
real time the dialogism at work with the environment.

In order to develop, we first need to consciously and more largely

endorse the responsibility for our own subjective functioning, which implies
a reduction in projection mechanisms.

Two prerequisites could be to feel emotionally secure (see SM1 as

necessary for the development of SM2; section 2.4.2) and to have some form
of basic mental health. Well-being therefore intervenes here as a means to
serve the ethical purpose. Indeed, it is often difficult to direct one’s mind
towards a fair consideration of oneself, others and the non-human
environment if, on the one hand, one is in a form of precariousness:
dissatisfaction with basic needs (eating enough, having a roof over one’s
head, having access to care), stress, anxiety or serious illness, for example;
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 157

or on the other hand, a mental pathology (depression25, obsessive-

compulsive disorder, schizophrenia, manic depression, etc.) can also prevent
people from being motivated for the ethical aim or from understanding it in a
fair way. If we perceive the outer world as being full of danger, it can be too
destabilizing to look at our own projections: we would risk evaluating
engrams and emotions as other dangers, which would increase the feeling of
insecurity and could slow down the evolution, or reinforce the pathology.
Indeed, seeing consciousness or the idea of the vacuity of the self can be
frightening. At the elementary level, we need to rely on something... so if we
can’t rely on the certainty of our own existence (as Descartes proposed),
everything shakes! This can cause more anxiety.

Emotional security will also help us to take responsibility for our

functioning without feeling guilty. That is, to acknowledge our mistakes, in
order to be motivated to change, without despising what led us to them, and
without judging ourselves for it. It is a matter of feeling tenderness towards
this “small-mindedness” or our limitations. Indeed, guilt only generates
reactive emotions and thoughts (e.g. “it’s bad; I am a bad person; I acted
wrongly, I should have acted differently”) that come from our ego and
maintain it (see Box 1.5). This tenderness refers to the benevolent attitude
towards oneself advocated in the practices known as “mindfulness” (Shapiro
et al. 2006). To achieve these conditions, psychotherapeutic support can
sometimes help: to acquire elementary well-being and mental health, to be
more aware of one’s subjective functioning, to take responsibility for it,
without feeling guilty (Welwood, 2000). Indeed, this type of work generally
allows us to know more precisely our thought-action repertoires, and
therefore indirectly our emotional engrams, and could in this way facilitate a
cognitive defusion and a decentration when these engrams appear (ibid.).
Such facilitation requires that the subject does not mentally grasp their
functioning by identifying more with it (this is one of the risks of these
therapies). If we progress in this direction, then subjective responsibility
increases. And from an objective point of view too, consciousness will be a
little more aligned with the real, including more clearly the subject’s own
functioning.

Then, a total subjective responsibility can follow, coupled with a

recognition of one’s own powerlessness.

25 This should be qualified, as there appear to be exceptions (see note 13 in this chapter).
158 Education for Responsibility

On the one hand, the observation of our own functioning will allow us to
see that situations are only the resonance of our emotional engrams. At this
stage, it is not important whether this is ultimately and systematically the
case or not: the subject will see that the important, relevant information lies
in the remanence of an emotional engram (i.e. in their emotional reactivity),
and not in the situation that awoke it (or un-embedded it). Each of these
situations will therefore be an opportunity for the subject to integrate an
emotion, and they will be aware that this is what counts. They may even be
happy about it. They will no longer see what is commonly referred to as
“suffering” as such. They will see this as an opportunity to be free. The ego,
on the contrary, will seek to know whether, in the absolute “I am
responsible”, or not, for this emotion – and will often either refuse to accept
responsibility or take it on as guilt. However, this question is irrelevant.
Here, the only function of believing in total responsibility is to promote the
integration of engrammed emotions, by thwarting projections and ordinary
duality. It is a question of efficiency (belief as a tool): if belief and the
associated attitude allow the integration of the engram, then it is
performative. Indeed, believing oneself responsible for something is giving
oneself power over the evolution of things; it is responding instead of
reacting. Similarly, in ordinary reactive thinking, the belief that its content is
not important and is only worthwhile to the extent that it is a bridge to reveal
the underlying emotion and that only the latter is important and worthwhile,
allows liberation.

On the other hand, certainly there may be power over the subsequent
evolution of the process and over the subjective way of experiencing it in the
moment, but the more the subject consciously opens up to any present
experience, the more they realize that they have no power over what
manifests in that moment, that their only power is to be aware of it or not.
They come out of the illusion of control or power (of free choice, of free
will) generated by the ego and thus realize the illusory nature of the feeling
of control or the belief of control that they had before. The subject then finds
themself in a double bind: on the one hand responsible for everything that
happens to them, on the other hand they can do nothing about it. So at this
stage, their subjective responsibility is at the maximum, but objectively the
four horsemen of the mind still sometimes work in a disharmonious way.

The only possible way out of this double bind is by letting go: focusing on
the present experience, stopping the projection of one’s own mind on
phenomena and dissolving engrams in one’s consciousness of the present
 Responsibility and Functioning of the Mind 159

moment as they emerge. A devolution of will, life and responsibility then

takes place. Devolution consists of relying totally on someone or something
other than oneself, or here, than the ego (on God for believers or life in a
secular spirituality, for example). This devolution is called – paradoxically for
us Westerners – a mastering in martial arts: the body perfectly conducts
energies other than those of its own subjectivity (those of the Earth and
Heaven in Chinese symbolism), because it does not hinder them with its
engrams and its grasp. Indeed, it is this devolution that allows harmony. Here,
devolution takes place with regard to one’s own consciousness. That is, “I stop
trying to influence things; I rely on this awareness of the phenomena I
experiment with” (see Box 3.2). This devolution and the dissolution of the
engrams that accompany it can be experienced as a form of mourning: with
each integration of the emotional engram, the ego sees in it the loss of a piece
of self, of a functioning the subject identified with and which they will never
see again. Like flakes of skin that are removed (de Souzenelle 1991), causing a
tear similar to that caused by the loss of a loved one. Confidence in the
meaning of the process, however, allows these successive removals to be
welcomed with open arms, without struggle or avoidance.

NOTE.– It is fundamental to note that this subjective devolution of

responsibility, in order to be compatible with an ethical path, can only occur
after the experience of a total and sincere subjective endorsement of one’s
responsibility (free of guilt). Without it, indeed, cognitive defusion and
decentration could be experienced as an irresponsible omnipotence: “since I
don’t really exist and neither do others from an ultimate point of view, then
everything is allowed!” (everything is equal, nothing is serious). This would
mean considering the ultimate reality at the expense of relative reality: to
move from the latter to the former by denying relative reality. This is why it
is necessary to have touched as closely as possible one’s own subjective
suffering to always keep this in mind: in oneself and in others, suffering is
all the more significant because it is grasped and appraised as such. An
authentic experience of non-duality (free of ego) would therefore not induce
a subject to treat someone any worse than they would like to be treated
themself (see the spontaneous harmonious character of the principled mind).
This remark highlights the indispensable nature of the gnoseological
hypothesis, which includes the unfailing solidarity of the ultimate and
relative points of view (i.e. ontological and phenomenological hypotheses).
Thus, when the ultimate and relative reality are perfectly aligned at home,
the consideration of a gap in others between these two realities and the
160 Education for Responsibility

awareness that they subjectively live through a relative reality will only be
the reasons for even more harmonious actions towards them.

Finally, after a sufficient iteration of this process, having led to the

disappearance of the reactive phenomena (thoughts and emotions) and any
trace of disharmonious functioning in the subject’s mind (from any grasp,
‘for-me-ness ”, projection, etc.), the subject no longer lives as a separate
individual. This is awakening. In unison with vacuity, in unity with the
cosmos, the subject’s point of view is no longer relative. There is no longer
any lived duality between the self and the non-self. Their subjective point of
view is fully in tune with the objective point of view of a dialogism, of the
interdependance between inside and outside. With regard to responsibility,
we therefore arrive at a paradox: the perfect alignment of the subjective and
ultimate points of view, and therefore the advent of objective responsibility,
which coincides with the irrelevance of this notion from a subjective point of
view. Indeed, we have mentioned that, philosophically, this notion
presupposes a subject that responds and an otherness to which one can
respond to. However, at this stage, from a subjective point of view, there is
no longer any lived duality between oneself and others. Awakening therefore
corresponds, after a devolution of responsibility, to its sublimation.

In conclusion, according to the conceptualization here advanced, the

development of responsibility implies engaging in a process to become more
coherent, harmonious and conscious (including of one’s own
inconsistencies).

So now the question arises: more concretely, how can such a process be
promoted? This is the subject of our next chapter.
 3

Education for Responsibility Guidelines

It seems important, from an ethical point of view, that everyone should be

able to understand their actual operating methods, their potential ways of
functioning, and the different types of consequences of these and those, in
order to be able to make a conscious and deliberate choice about their own
lives. This would offer a possibility of questioning and re-assessment to
which this book intends to contribute. Without this, the subject would be
analogous to a pinball ball, tossed around by circumstances, having endorsed
the goals and values of their environment without questioning their validity,
undergoing the turpitudes of the ego without being aware of it.

In this chapter, we make well-argued proposals, submitted to community

criticism, which, according to this analysis, could serve as a guide for
educational curricula or training for responsibility. If we really want to
contribute to training citizens, responsible subjects, then we will have to give
ourselves the means to do so. Using only surface methods may not change
much... It is impossible to change the world without changing the mind, as
argued in this book.

3.1. Reflexivities

Let’s start by considering this question of means with the notion of

reflexivity. In the field of physics, reflection refers to the phenomenon
“which occurs when a body endowed with a certain speed meets another
body that obstructs it, and which forces it to follow another direction”
(Littré 2017). As Favre (2007) pointed out, this is the opposite of
projection, which, according to the geometric meaning of the term,

Education for Responsibility, First Edition. Hélène Hagège.

© ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
162 Education for Responsibility

corresponds to the transfer of a shape from one space to another (meaning

without obstacle). In the psychological sense, reflexivity would therefore
correspond to the process by which thought encounters an obstacle and
incidentally changes direction. This transfer can be considered as a return of
thought on itself (Legault 2004), insofar as its initial content is called into
question and potentially becomes the object of an evolution. At the
phenomenological level, this intra-individual psychological process thus
implies a mental phenomenon (seventh type of perceptual object).

3.1.1. Cognitive reflexivity

It is in this sense of “reflexive thought” that we refer to “cognitive

reflexivity” (or “epistemic reflexivity”). The notion of obstacle has been
extensively studied in the didactics of scientific disciplines, and has been
associated with the notion of (socio-)cognitive conflict. These studies led to
the conclusion that if these obstacles remain unconscious, they prevent the
evolution of the subject’s thinking, and then the subject may remain stuck in
their learning process. On the contrary, if this thought consciously
encounters an obstacle, then it becomes reflective and the subject
experiences a cognitive conflict, a conflict favored by social interactions
(Doise and Mugny 1981). This last point corresponds to the dialogical aspect
of reflexivity that we discuss in section 3.1.2. Other authors have
emphasized the notions of problem and problematization, as tools to bring
about thinking to explicitly confront and overcome the obstacle (Orange
2005).

But in these studies, if the notion of reflexivity was mobilized, it was

only marginally or implicitly so. In general, when it was done centrally, it
was more in line with data from English literature. For Dewey (1933),
reflexive thinking can only emerge in the face of a problematic situation that
formal logic alone is not sufficiant to solve. He defined it as a thought
conscious of its causes and consequences. This notion of reflexive thinking
appears very close to those of critical and creative thinking1. Indeed, Lipman
and Dewey sometimes use “critical thinking” and “reflexive
thinking” as interchangeable synonyms (King and Kitchener 1994), while

1 And these three notions are interconnected with those of metacognition and personal
epistemology (discussed in section 1.3.2.3.1; Baffrey-Dumont 2002; see in particular the
notion of the development of reflexive judgment; King and Kitchener 1994).
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 163

critical and creative thinking would not be differentiable in quality, but only
in degree (Slade 2002). When the authors distinguish these three notions,
they do not subordinate them to each other in a similar way (sometimes
critical thinking is an attribute of reflective thinking, sometimes the opposite,
for example). In France, in connection with the teaching of philosophy and
the work of Lipman (1995), the term “reflexive thinking” would be
preferably used. The latter then refers to “an entry into reflection through
questioning, clarification of opinions, awareness of their origin, questioning them
as prejudices, formulation of relevant questions, openness to a plurality of
possible solutions, attempts to answer them with arguments...”  (Tozzi 2012,
p. 261, author’s translation). The notion of constructive critical thinking has
been theorized in Quebec, based in particular on a broad perspective of
Ennis’ work. The latter proposed a somewhat logical understanding of
critical thinking (and, in my opinion, even scientist-positivist). According to
him, critical thinking corresponds to a set of skills and dispositions, for
example. In reasonably and reflectively going about deciding what do
believe or do, a person characteristically needs to do most of these things
(and do them interdependently):
1) Judge the credibility of sources.
2) Identify conclusions, reasons, and assumptions.
3) Judge the quality of an argument, including the acceptability of its
reasons, assumptions, and evidence.
4) Develop and defend a position on an issue.
5) Ask appropriate clarifying questions.
6) Plan experiments and judge experimental designs.
7) Define terms in a way appropriate for the context.
8) Be open-minded.
9) Try to be well-informed.
10) Draw conclusions when warranted, but with caution. (Ennis 1993,
p. 180)
Daniel (2016) has taken over the role of the above-mentioned logical
operations, also drawing inspiration from Lipman’s work and placing greater
emphasis on the return of the reflexion on oneself. She defined constructive
critical thinking as “a thoughtful and logical act that aims to evaluate
principles and facts before making a judgement of appreciation of these
164 Education for Responsibility

principles and facts [...and that] underlies and mobilizes a creative mind, a
willingness to innovate and advance” (Daniel 2016, p. 3, author’s translation).
In this respect, this thinking is opposed to the impulse of an unreflected
negative critical thinking, driven by the fear of the new (see also section
1.3.2.3.1).

Cognitive reflexivity (ethical implication) and constructive critical

thinking share the same modalities. Their differences consist of their objects
and purposes: while constructive critical thinking could a priori serve, any
type of knowledge or purpose (e.g. to be cultivated in a scientific field, to
improve academic performance, etc.), cognitive reflexivity has the following
specificities:
– three basic objects: the inner world, the outer world, their interactions;
– two related objects: the causes and consequences of these functioning
and interactions, at the level of oneself, others and the NHE;
– an ethical purpose: to act (words, thoughts and actions) in a coherent
way with harmonious values and goals resulting from a conscious choice; 
– a phenomenological purpose: phenomenological reflexivity (section
3.1.3).

3.1.2. Dialogical reflexivity

Studying philosophical exchanges in elementary school, Daniel et al.

developed more precisely the notion of dialogical (also constructive) critical
thinking and distinguished four ways of thinking that would underlie it:

“Logical thinking implies the ability to be coherent and

articulated; creative thinking refers to the ability to create new
relationships and ask unexpected questions that will trigger
reflection; responsible thinking implies a balance between the
right to express oneself and the responsibility to do so in respect
of others and with a concern for improving experience; and
finally metacognitive thinking refers to the ability to deliberate
internally and have retrospection for improvement” (Daniel
2016, p. 4, author’s translation).

This thinking is called “dialogical” because it emerges from the dialogues

between students. Indeed, in discussions with a democratic and philosophical
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 165

focus, it seems clear that students develop both cognitive and psychosocial
skills related to socialization and citizenship (Connac 2012b). This is a clear
recognition of the Greek tradition of the love of wisdom, which is
constructed in argumentation and debate within the city.

The sense in which we use the term “dialogical” includes these aspects of
social interactions. However, we refer in particular to the theoretical
framework of responsibility as a dialogical relationship (sections 2.2 and
2.3). In this respect, the aim is not so much to know what to think or do
about a given problem, but above all to get to know oneself better and, in
general, to learn to guide one’s life and actions consciously (see the specific
objects and purposes of cognitive reflexivity; section 3.1.1). The
recommended means include (1) awareness of one’s initial or implicit
values, beliefs, personal norms and (2) their confrontation with those of
others, in order to foster this dialogue between the two forms of ethos
(section 2.2). This meaning therefore includes the notion of a dialogue with
oneself (1). The difference with cognitive reflexivity is that the latter refers
to the epistemic dimension of the mental content involved. Here, dialogical
reflexivity emphasizes the “round trip” process of this thought, and the role
of “surface” on which the thought “bounces back and forth”. We can
therefore consider cognitive and dialogical reflexivities as two sides of the
same process. In the rest of the text, “dialogical reflexivity” will therefore
also include the cognitive aspect presented in section 3.1.1.

In a dialogue with oneself (1), the surface that allows one to step back
from one’s own functioning can be a written medium. It can typically be a
diary (Hess 1998) or a logbook (Hagège 2015b), in which the subject records
thoughts, opinions, emotions, etc.

In a dialogue with several people (2), it is the other who plays the role of
reflector (Jorro 2005). The other can be a peer: we have discussed the role of
debates, for which researchers have proposed ground rules for encouraging
constructive critical thinking (at the expense of negative critical thinking;
Connac 2012a ; Reynaud 2008). The other may also be a teacher (or trainer
or educator).

In the case of problematic knowledge (Fabre 2014) or socially vivid

knowledge (Simonneaux 2011), to facilitate the learner’s openness to the
implementation of reflexivity, the teacher’s posture would preferably be that of
committed impartiality (Kelly 1986). That is, the teacher or trainer expresses
what he or she thinks by presenting it as one of several possible points of view.
166 Education for Responsibility

They contextualizes it and encourages the consideration and analysis of opposing

positions. If, on the contrary, they sought to hide or impose their point of view,
they would risk being counterproductive. In the first case, they would probably
still implicitly guide the discussions on the basis of their point of view. In the
second case, they could cut short the learner’s dialogical process by suggesting
that only one point of view is correct.

Box 3.1. The teacher’s (or trainer’s) committed impartiality

Also, whether they like it or not, the teacher is a living model for the
learner. They therefore have a responsibility to cultivate their own
responsibility. This implies everything we are talking about here and also to
choose your language, consciously. For example, the teacher would practice
banning guilt words from their lexicon (“bad student”, “bad score”) (Hagège
2017d). Using an authority-autonomization model, they would seek to
distinguish the person from their actions or skills, assigning the former an
unconditional value, and the latter a contextual value, sometimes requiring
reframing (Favre 2007). They could also ensure that they are aware of the
prejudices that emerge in their mind, concerning the subjects to which they
address, and would try to cultivate prejudices that are favorable to all
(Hagège 2017d).

In a debate, a learning subject can change their point of view by listening

to others debate. However, it is likely that they could then more easily retain
implicit opinions without even being aware of them. Whatever the reflector,
the subject comes into contact with this surface through the favored means
of expression (verbal or written). The latter has the virtue of making it
possible to make latent and implicit thoughts conscious, and then possibly
maintaining them at a distance.

3.1.3. Phenomenological reflexivity

Since the crux of the problem comes from the gap between relative and
absolute realities, an education for responsibility aims to align them.
However, consciousness of an absolute reality would necessarily be beyond
language and cultures. It is therefore unspeakable. Such reflexivity cannot
therefore occur at the cognitive level, in the sense that it would involve
verbal or mental phenomena. The process here at stake involves
concentrating on observing “in all its glory” the relativity of the reality
experienced at the individual and collective level, which may allow us to
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 167

detach ourselves from it. It is a question of implementing a reflexivity free of

a reflector: that of a self-reflective consciousness.

Pay. Attention. To the present. Experience. Make a list of everything that’s

important to you, everything you want, on all levels: personal, professional,
spiritual, other, your goals, your values, etc. Phenomenological reflexivity is when
you have crossed everything off this list except one line. Not because you have
achieved these goals, but because they no longer matter to you. This line is as
follows: “Pay attention to my present experience.” If nothing else matters to you, if
your only goal, your only ambition from moment to moment is to see yourself, to
be aware of your own experience, if your reactive mind has let go of everything
else – so on everything in fact – then harmony can begin to develop. Then the ego
can be observed for what it is: an illusion that creates disharmony. Then it will start
to shrink and then disappear. Basically, there is nothing else to do to make it
disappear: be aware of it. For the ego is an illusion: consciousness is without ego,
and the ego feeds on your unconscious. For example, you’re a little agitated, a little
stressed. You become aware of this state. Simply observe it, without trying to
change it. Let the following thoughts eventually arise in your mind: “What do I
feel?” Do not answer it with another thought. Feel the sensations in your body.
Absorb the emotions in your consciousness. “Look at yourself.” Just observe that
there is a human being here who is experiencing stress. As if you were looking at it
from the outside. Don’t even try to ease these tensions. You’ll see that this state
will fade away as if it doesn’t really exist. Because it doesn’t really exist. Like
everything else, it’s evanescent. Only its reification by the ego gives it consistency.
On the contrary, consciousness, closer to the ultimate reality, dissolves the illusions
of relative realities. Because the ego is full of inconsistencies, illusions, clumsiness
and lies. It’s like a movie made by a bunch of incompetent people. If you look at it
distractedly, you can let yourself be taken by the story it tells and believe in it. But
if you look carefully, you will see that it is a fabrication: the boom of the sound
recorder visible in the camera field, the actor’s costume which is not connected, the
incongruities of the scenario... And then, when we can observe the lack of unity
and beauty of what we take for a self, of what we identify with, then there is a
decrease, even a fall, of the motivation to identify with it. There is not much left to
do except to observe this poor distracted sound recorder, this visually impaired
director, this amnesiac stage manager who has not updated his files. All this little
world struggling clumsily to make a film exist in which you are the main character,
that your mind projects on the real, thus cutting your consciousness of this unique
truth, of life.

When the absurd and artefactual character of these dynamics is fully

perceived, then naturally a compassion towards this small world arises. And
from this, a compassion towards others, which we understand, from then on, that
they are the unconscious objects of a similar functioning.

Box 3.2. Phenomenological reflexivity reveals the deceit of the ego

168 Education for Responsibility

However, in dialogical reflexivity, it is a question of setting goals, values,

seeking to consciously endorse them, question them, etc.; it is therefore a
question of maintaining a certain form of mental activity, and not simply
passively observing our functioning. Does this reflexivity contradict
phenomenological reflexivity?

Yes and no. In “cognitive dialogical reflexivity”, there may be an impression

of willingness. That is, the illusion that it is “me-ness” that decides to do this. It’s
not a problem. The point to identify is the effective attitude to do this, to choose,
to discuss these goals and values: the one with which you throw a message into a
bottle in the sea. A sensible person who sends a message like this does not hope
to find a decent recipient, that he or she understands the language in which the
word is written, that he or she responds to it, etc. We’re doing this for fun.
Almost with humor. Or rather totally with humor. A humor rather in self-
mockery. Like a wide smile open to the cosmos. Once you have thrown the
bottle into the sea, you stay focused on the current experience. After that, it’s like
forgetting that we threw that bottle away. We let the sea do its work. Maybe the
bottle will be swallowed by a shark, maybe it will float endlessly and get caught
in the seventh continent (continent of waste), or maybe it will find a recipient.
Anyway, we don’t have to know. This is none of our business! This does not
concern us. Nor do we have to hold the elements accountable. “So, sea, and the
wind, it’s now been three years, three months, and three days since I threw this
bottle... Where is it? Where is my return on investment? I’m waiting!” No, a
sensible person doesn’t do that. The ego does that. In their madness, they spend a
lot of time holding life and the universe accountable... reproaching them even!
‘Why is my life is like this? Why don’t I have a job / a friend / a father / a child /
a mobile phone / a pair of pants /... as I would like? This is not what I ordered
from Santa Claus; he must have misread my letter.” Like a capricious child and
so far from the reality of life. So in this case, in phenomenological reflexivity,
we don’t do that. Or if we do, we see that it’s being done. We observe with
curiosity and benevolence the twisted game of the ego that demands
accountability from the universe. But we’re not playing with it. A bit like a
referee: you look where the ball goes, but you don’t touch it. Or rather as a
witness, because we don’t judge what’s going on. We observe. Quietly. The
noise of the ego. The reactive mind. At this stage of the text, this idea of a
witness may seem abstract. However, phenomenologically, it can become very
concrete (see section 2.4.4.2). Thanks to this practice of phenomenological
reflexivity. By dint of everything, it’s going to happen on its own. There is no
need to seek to do so. You are not required for that to happen. A consciousness is
enough. That’s good, everyone is gifted! An awareness and intention to observe
oneself, to see oneself, in connection with goals, as chosen in a dialogical
reflexivity.

Box 3.3. Articulation between dialogical and phenomenological reflexivities

 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 169

So dialogical reflexivity is rather like an educational premise that will

allow us to understand the interest of all this, that can motivate us to engage
in such a process and that is useful as long as a reactive mind lasts. It allows
us to reframe these mental phenomena in a way. And phenomenological
reflexivity is the targeted process in fact (like a horizon that is not
necessarily reached). The two are complementary. The first involves verbal
phenomena: mental for the cognitive dimension and expressed for the
dialogical dimension. But what, more precisely, about the material of this
dialogical reflexivity, likely to motivate the implementation of
phenomenological reflexivity?

3.1.4. Objectives and material for the implementation of these

reflexivities

3.1.4.1. An aim for dialogue and conscious endorsement of values

and objectives
As we understand it, a dialogical (cognitive) reflexivity has as its main
aim to encourage the orientation of the subject’s functioning towards more
responsibility. Such an orientation requires the conscious choice of values
and goals that are congruent with responsibility as we have defined it here.
An essential aspect of such a development is that the subject’s intentions are
consciously oriented towards that; that they wish to develop empathy,
relatedness and coherence. Thus, the fact that they set goals with an ethical
motivation, or more generally that they have the goal of becoming
responsible, also appears to be required (Hagège 2014). Berger et al. (2009)
have highlighted the importance of implementing reflexivity to promote
coherence at this level. Thus, for example, the subject could consciously set
the goal of becoming responsible and conscious of their functioning and ego
in order to act harmoniously towards themselves and the environment.

As previously argued, the subject’s attention, values and norms (their

orientation) depend on the other three horsemen of the mind (cognition,
emotion and relationships). By habit and cultural bias (Hagège 2013, 2015b),
it is likely that the subject is more aware of their beliefs and values, than of
their emotions and relational modalities. And yet, they are not fully aware of
them. When I ask second- or third-year undergraduate students each year
what their values are (to name them, list them, rank them in order of
importance), and why they do these studies (reasons and goals), most
discover with surprise that they have never asked themselves these
170 Education for Responsibility

questions. As a result, it is for the most part difficult, at least at first, to put
words to their values. Thus, the implementation of cognitive and dialogical
reflexivity should aim to make the implicit explicit, in other words the
unconscious. In this way, subjects will be able to become aware of possible
inconsistencies between their lifestyles, actions and values, for example.
Thus, in various modules, I make students list their regular activities (daily,
weekly, etc.) and invite them to identify the corresponding values, then
compare them with the list initially established (of priority values). This also
implies an active comparison with the norms and values of the environment.
In this regard, the reflexive attention has been “defined by the fact that the
individual can pay attention to the dynamics, constraints, devices, and especially
to the developments, which condition their attention. [...] Asking […] questions
about objects or mechanisms that attract, stimulate, awaken, orient, captivate
or alienate our attention necessarily means asking questions about the value
of these objects or mechanisms” (Citton 2014, p. 201, author’s translation).

Such work, at the cognitive level, certainly seems necessary. However,

given our ability to be blind to ourselves, it is limited. It is not enough to
know intellectually that such-and-such an incoherence exists in our lives,
for example. It is also important to be aware of it at the moment it occurs: to
observe it in a neutral way so that it can then be domesticated and then lose
strength. As mentioned earlier, responsibility implies, for example, looking
at how each of us are “aspiring jihadists”, how the same mechanisms are at
work in our own mind. It is about seeing how we project our vision of the
world, closing our minds, sometimes being violent towards others or to
ourselves (in one way or another), grasping our thoughts, seeing that they are
formulated in a language that induces culturally biased meaning, etc., rather
than pointing the finger at the problem from the outside. This cannot be done
only at the mental level. This implies looking directly at our own subjectivity
and its relative character, by implementing phenomenological reflexivity.

3.1.4.2. Reference knowledge for dialogical reflexivity, likely to

motivate phenomenological reflexivity
As Sauvé (2000) expressed it, responsibility implies awareness and
knowledge of the possible choices, of the consequences of acting, and thus
of being informed, while critically processing information. This implies, as
we have mentioned, making the implicit explicit (or the conscious). What
implicit are we talking about more precisely? Well, the implicit existing in
the three co-emerging phenomena at stake, namely: the inner world, the
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 171

outer world and their interactions. So far, we have talked extensively about
the inner world and its interactions with the outer world. To use a metaphor
used by Quirion (personal communication), it is a question of understanding
intellectually (and then seeing phenomenologically) that the projective
attitude of the ego is as if I was scratching in the mirror to remove a stain on
my face. If I understand and see this, then, naturally, I will try to work on my
face instead. Such a process of looking inside, instead of outside can
obviously be facilitated by being accompanied by someone who knows the
path, who has already been there, can reassure and help the subject to
identify the many traps of the ego. To encourage this observation of the
discrepancy between relative reality and ultimate reality, internal
inconsistencies in the subject and their regrettable ethical consequences,
much knowledge – in particular psychological knowledge such as that
presented in this book – can serve as a reference. The subject will thus be
able to have models concerning their own functioning (e.g. the four
horsemen of the mind) and try to compare their direct observation with these
models – thus already entering into a reflexivity.

This type of knowledge is also important to foster critical thinking and the
possibility of choice in our societies: on the whole, salespeople, advertisers,
media professionals know the techniques of manipulation and individual’s
cognitive functioning. They use them to format opinions, infuse emotions and
shape behavior. People are the objects of these processes. In order for them to
regain their status as subjects in the face of these control systems, it seems
necessary to teach them how these human processes work so that they can
become aware of them and learn to detect their effects on themselves. This
will allow them to have more control over their choices and behaviors.

NOTE.– It does not surprise me that the political authorities do not put energy
into this: if citizens were aware of the processes of manipulation and
influence to which they are subjected, if they all became subjects responsible
for their lives, it would undoubtedly do a lot of damage to the market
economy. However, the latter seems to have much more influence in
government decisions than the emancipation of the citizen and the future of
the planet. There are clear economic interests in maintaining “sleeping
people” and the beautiful momentum of the Enlightenment stipulating that it
is important that the people be enlightened seems to have fallen back like
bellows. “Knowledge is liberating”, however, it is not just maths, English,
the arts and other school subjects that allow this freedom; it would be
172 Education for Responsibility

especially those that encourage a critical look at the functioning of our inner
and outer worlds.

As far as knowledge about the outer world is concerned, descriptions can

be found in the other “educations for”, of which it is often a major topic.
This knowledge concerns the complexity of the outer world and its different
dimensions. We cite, as examples, the knowledge concerning:
– epistemology (notions of paradigm, epistemological obstacle, etc.);
– economic functioning (financialization and globalization of the
economy, unequal distribution of wealth, role of money, stock markets, etc.);
– human resource use (quantitative aspects, waste production, ecological
and health consequences, economic links, etc.);
– the functioning of political institutions (inter-state links, roles and
responsibilities of lobbies, time scales and reasons for political actions, etc.);
– evolution of food (link with pollution, production methods, holders of
means of production, animal treatment, health, etc.);
– the functioning of the media (see below);
– some academic knowledge useful for a critical understanding of the
world in which we live (e.g. historical, geographical, scientific, etc.).

In these different processes, by coupling with knowledge about the inner

world, we can also understand where and how the ego2 of Humanity comes
into play. The testimonies of two students in the MBER module illustrate
this.

TESTIMONIALS.– “This approach [...] allowed me to see things [...] from a

point of view that I had never explored before without meditation and
learning this ethical approach. I have always taken care of my physical
appearance by paying attention to every detail of clothing and other things,
and before that, it was what I used to call ‘taking care of myself’. I
understood that I was off topic and I was able to adopt a different way of
working, because this need to always have the latest watch of such a brand
or the latest trendy jeans is, I realize, far from being a vital need.”

2 Or the ratio of reactive thoughts-emotion to creative thoughts and harmonious emotions.

 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 173

“Detaching myself from the ego helps me to understand the world better,
I act less subjectively. I am less self-centered, which gives me a broader
view of the world. I pay more attention and thus give more importance to
others, but also to the non-human environment, which, like us, deserves
respect and recognition. ... I have made progress in my relationships and this
really makes me happier, because... I now feel freer to act, connected with
the outside world.”

Thus, this knowledge about the external and internal worlds will allow us to
reflect on values, their meanings and consequences, in particular by learning to
distinguish those that nourish the ego (consumerism, competition, etc.) from
those that promote harmony (solidarity, fraternity, etc.).

To conclude, whether it is the inner world, the outer world or their

relationship, the central objectives of an education for responsibility are that
the subject has an explanatory model of the object of interest, sets goals in
terms of action and correspondence of these actions with responsible values,
and trains to become more aware of their functions at the moment they
manifest themselves (beware of their thoughts, emotions, modalities of
relations with the environment, power plays etc.).

EXAMPLE.– These could include, with regard to the media: (1) recognizing their
historical evolution, their modes of action and psychological and biological
consequences, the roles and functioning of advertising, social networks,
economic issues, modes of governance, their links with the political sphere, the
use of resources, etc.; (2) taking a critical look at these data; (3) setting
themselves a goal, for example (if the subject finds it relevant), stop watching
reality TV shows and buying products seen in advertising; and (4) training
oneself to be aware of desires or impulses when they arise, such as to ‘lose
oneself’ when watching TV or buy a product because one remembers seeing it
elsewhere. Without this awareness, the subject continues to act contrary to their
own choices, and this, without even being aware of it. And, as illustrated by the
previous testimony, to motivate the subject concerning points (3) and (4), they
would (5) learn models concerning the functioning of the ego to (6) identify it as
such at the moment it manifests itself, and thus coincidentally be able to
disidentify from it.

Thus, the same student specifies: “Personally, the meditation and lessons
received during this module allowed me in part to ignore this behavior
dictated by mental phenomena and to learn to better control the ego.”
174 Education for Responsibility

Points (1) and (2), and even (3), of the above example, already seem to be
proposed in the other “educations for” – each one focusing on one of its
themes (in the example, the media, if not health, the environment, etc.). The
originality of our approach therefore concerns points (4), (5) and (6). And we
have argued that these seem to us essential to an education for responsibility.

Points (4) and (6), specific to phenomenological reflexivity, involve

being aware of a phenomenon (external or internal) at the very moment it
manifests itself, without the attention being accompanied by a
phenomenological grasp – that is, without being unconscious of oneself or
one’s environment at this moment in time. However, because of system 1
and unconscious processes in general, it is not easy to look at yourself or to
perceive your inconsistencies. However, the subject can practice different
techniques dedicated to learning the skills required for phenomenological
reflexivity, techniques that we group under the generic name of
“meditation”.

3.2. Meditation

3.2.1. Meditation and its phenomenological effects

The term “meditation” refers to a disparate set of practices consisting of

body and mind training (Lutz et al. 2007 ; reviewed by Braboszcz et al.
2010). These practices constitute a “family of complex emotional and
attention regulatory strategies developed for various ends, including the
cultivation of well-being and emotional balance” (Lutz et. al. 2008b, p. 163).
Based mainly on Buddhist practices, from which most of the meditations
practiced in the West are probably derived, three main types of meditation
can be distinguished (Lutz et al. 2007; unless otherwise indicated, it is on
this publication that I base myself for the following three points). They all
aim at the development of endogenous attention, to the detriment of exogenous
attention (see definitions in section 1.3.2.1.1).

3.2.1.1. Training for focused attention3

Focused attention refers to a state where the mind is consciously focused
on an object for an indefinite time: with clarity, determination and

3 Via a single perceptual channel and also concentrated on one point.

 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 175

constancy. The object can be perceptive (sound, visual object, etc.),

sensorimotor (breathing) or mental (image visualized and previously
chosen). That is, it falls under one of the seven types of collection object
(section 1.3.1.1). The physical posture is important, and generally implies
that the spine is straight and vertical, while the rest of the body is neither too
relaxed nor too tense.

This training cultivates the ability to perceive whether attention is always

focused on the object or whether it has been distracted from it – in other
words, whether it has been grasped by some phenomenon and has therefore
become exogenous. The latter faculty, which can be called “meta-
awareness”, is not awareness of the object of focus, but awareness of the
inner world.

Indeed, in the process of learning this meditative technique, when the

novice tries to focus their attention on the object, they are frequently
distracted (often grasped by a mental phenomenon or a phenomenon arising
in their environment such as a noise). At first, it takes them a long time to
realize that the attention has been distracted from the intended objective.
Thus, they must develop three skills (Lutz et al. 2008b): (1) the faculty of
vigilance that allows them to remain vigilant to distractions without being
diverted from the chosen object. If this first one is not implemented, the
subject needs to mobilize, (2) the ability to disengage their attention from a
phenomenon by which it has been grasped, that is to escape from the
phenomenological grasp of that phenomenon and, (3) the ability to then
quickly redirect their attention to the chosen object. Novices, who have more
frequent distractions, must frequently develop and then mobilize these last
two skills. On the contrary, advanced practitioners can focus their attention
on the chosen object longer without being distracted; they therefore have
much less need to mobilize these two skills (ibid.). They have transformed
the way their minds work, much more frequently based on endogenous
attention than when they were novices. This has the effect, on the one hand,
of reducing the frequency and intensity of phenomenological grasping, and
on the other hand calming the mind (ibid.). In the long run, an inner silence
can take place, so that reactive verbal mental phenomena disappear: the
subject becomes fully present to what is within (inner world) and what
surrounds (outer world). Their perception is then much less conditioned
by the distorting effects of the ego.
176 Education for Responsibility

3.2.1.2. Training for open presence

Focused attention skills are required for the development of open
presence, the latter requiring a calm and a no more than slightly distracted
mind (ibid.). Open presence is a state of vigilance in which attention detects
at all times any phenomenon perceptible by the mind, without there being
any phenomenological grasp or focus on an object: the field of
consciousness remains broadened, and makes it possible to perceive all the
phenomena of the inner world and the outer world that can be.

NOTE.– Open presence corresponds to the simultaneous implementation of

conscious sensory and mental modes, such that any phenomenon emerging
in the subject’s mind, whether it comes from their inner or outer world, is
consciously perceived within the widest possible field of consciousness. The
training to ensure that this diffused attention is equanimous corresponds to
the notion of perceiving all these phenomena on an equal footing: without
ignoring some (of them) (“I do not see”), obviously, nor preferring the others
(“I want”) or rejecting (“I do not want”). In fact, as long as there is a reactive
mind in the subject, there is a dose of unconscious and grasping in the
perception of these phenomena. That said, the subject can train to perceive
them consciously without appraisal, as is done in meditations called
Vipasyana in Sanskrit (Vipassanā) or Laktong in Tibetan. When the spiritual
realization of the subject has made their mind free of reactive phenomena,
then their diffused attention is equivalent (with the exception of a few
creative thoughts) to the conscious sensory mode.

This attention is therefore ideally also equanimous: then it would involve

vigilant attention characterized by an openness to all phenomena, in which
there is neither magnification nor attentional inhibition, and where
everything that manifests itself is perceived with equal interest (section
3.3.2). Thus, it implies a dissociation of attention and phenomenological
grasp, in other words, of perceptions and their semantic processing: it
corresponds to a direct phenomenological experience, unbiased by personal
or cultural preferences, and thus approaches the perception of ultimate
reality by a principled mind (thus awakening; Hölzel et al. 2011; Lutz et al.
2007). It is indeed a question of having a phenomenological experience
consistent with the actual experience (Hagège 2014).

Experiments in neurophenomenology have shown that the

metaconsciousness developed in open monitoring meditation allows better
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 177

access to the richness of each phenomenal experience, particularly to the

intensity of this experience, to the emotional tone and to mental phenomena
(Lutz et al. 2008b). Nevertheless, it is as if these components of experience
remained in the second plane of consciousness, without there being any
particular foreground, other than the presence at the knowing experience
(ibid.). Thus, the subject’s inner and outer worlds (relative realities) seem to
be able to be perceived on an equal footing, in the background, such as
consciousness (the principled mind then united with the ultimate reality) is
perceived in the foreground. It would be the consciousness that begins to
perceive itself (Figures 2.2B and 3.1B), in a phenomenological reflexivity.

At first, the novice is prey to the phenomenological grasp of phenomena

that appear. Their learning requires the skills that allow them to disengage
their attention from these phenomena and to keep their mind out of any
phenomenological grasp, without any point of focus. Before that, being able
to focus their attention on an object, they disengage their attention from that
object to take as an object their own subjectivity. The practice contains a
discursive aspect: the practitioner contemplates questions such as: “Is the
perceived object inside or outside consciousness?”, “Where does it come
from?”, etc. As they progress, they become able to disengage their attention
from their own subjectivity to observe what is invariant in any phenomenal
experience: what makes possible the experience of the subject-object
relationship, namely their awareness of phenomena. This last state of
consciousness is probably stabilized only in a limited number of
practitioners.

Even at a lower level, this training has the effect of transforming

cognitive and emotional habits: to be less emotionally reactive (i.e. to grasp
emotions less and therefore not assess the situation and then act on them), to
have a more sensitive and flexible mind, to finely perceive the functioning of
the ego (projections, grasp, “for-me-ness”, etc.; Lutz et al. 2008b). It is then
easier to develop certain qualities such as compassion. Practitioners at the
highest level can even free themselves from the ego.

NOTE.– Phenomenological reflexivity corresponds to a training for open

presence practiced in an informal way (i.e. in one’s daily life, by doing other
activities, instead of sitting on a meditation cushion “to do only that” for
example), without containing an especially discursive aspect. It involves the
development of a witness consciousness – one that observes in a neutral and
178 Education for Responsibility

detached way the subjective experience that is unfolding. Such awareness

has been thematized in mindfulness practices with the term reperceiving
(Shapiro et al. 2006).

3.2.1.3. Training for non-referential compassion

This training aims to produce a particular emotional state: an intense
feeling of Lovingkindness, which involves the dual aspiration that all beings
are happy (love) and that they are free from suffering (compassion). This
state is centered on others, but it is impersonal, because in its purpose it has
no specific object or focus, such as a particular person or group of people. It
therefore promotes equanimous empathy. And also, ideally, the subject
meditates from a non-personal “It’s me who is giving to others”. It contains
two aspects: that of impersonal compassion and that of open presence, which
are mobilized alternately in practice. The latter uses several techniques in
sequence, such as discursive strategy, a set of visualizations, and sometimes
some recitations. Advanced practitioners can do without such sequences and
instantly generate a state of compassionate love, directly within diffused and
equanimous attention. This practice of Lovingkindness meditation generates
an general well-being antagonistic with anger or irritation, which is
communicative to the people around.

3.2.1.4. Outcome of meditative practices

Meditation differs from traditional approaches to change (e.g.
psychotherapeutic), which generally involve cognitive control based on
re-evaluation (see section 1.3.2.1.2). Instead, it involves observing what is
happening, without intervening (except in the particular case of meditation
on compassion), which constitutes attentional regulation (Chambers et al.
2009 ; Braboszcz et al. 2010). Also it differs in this respect from the ordinary
functioning of the relative mind, because it leads to not grasping emotions
and thoughts, not identifying with them, and not reacting according to these
phenomena. Contrary to the perception of emotions as ‘negative’, they can
for example, lead to a flight or fight reflex and the implementation of a
particular and egocentric thought-action repertoire (Chambers et al. 2009;
section 1.3.2.4.2). We can compare these emotions with ‘caged animals’.
Subjects have the option to confront and ‘knock them out’ (fight) or withdraw
from them to consciously forget their existence (flight). The attitude
developed by meditation makes it possible to learn to stay next to the cage,
to observe, and, for more advanced practitioners, to open the cage to let the
emotional wave surge (or roll in) while remaining calm internally – without
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 179

moving, without being afraid of the animal and without identifying with it
(Figure 1.8D). And the objective is to develop the same attitude, whatever
the value of the emotion (or thought: considered pleasant or not), because the
process to be thwarted by meditation is that of grasping (ibid.). However, if
this grasp is operational with emotions considered pleasant, it will also be
operational with emotions considered unpleasant (ibid.): it is impossible to
identify only with emotions judged as pleasant (as the ego would like). It is
about generating other functional habits of the mind and learning to stop
judging phenomena.

In short, meditative practices make it possible to train the mind to move

from a mode where attention is exogenous, absorbed by phenomena
(perceptions, thoughts, emotions, etc.), where the mind is prey to
phenomenological grasping, and to interaction with a relative world, to a
mode where attention is endogenous. In the latter mode, the field of
consciousness and the orientation of attention can be customized. The
relaxation of the mind thus generated, by reducing the phenomenological
grasp, creates a space that allows the subject to observe themselves and to
better perceive their own functioning (Hagège 2014). A thorough training for
open presence makes it possible to pass from a dual phenomenology to a
non-dual phenomenology, freed from the ego, where the mind experiences
the unity of consciousness with phenomena: in other words the unity of the
(principled) mind with the (ultimate) reality (see section 3.3).

Meditative practices also make unconscious information more accessible

(Strick et al. 2012), and develop the ability to detect initially subconscious
mental phenomena – to make unconscious content conscious (Welwood
1977 ; Hagège 2014). In particular, unconscious emotions and thoughts
would initiate the appraisal processes mentioned above and meditative
practices would make it possible to become conscious of them (Cottraux
2007a).

The states of consciousness thus generated have been characterized as

“modified” and not ordinary (Braboszcz et al. 2010). They are considered to
be “psychologically induced”, as well as relaxation and hypnosis. Other
modified states of consciousness induced by other biases, include those
corresponding to sleep, dreams, near-death experiences, fasting, sexual
orgasm, or psychotropic effects (reviewed by Vaitl et al. 2005).
180 Education for Responsibility

3.2.2. Clinical protocols and practices including meditation

One meditation protocol that has been widely popularized in the West is
the Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) protocol. Its inventor,
Kabat-Zinn (2003) formalized it in 1979 by secularizing Buddhist practices
to help patients with various disorders where drug approaches are limited,
such as depression and chronic pain. It defines mindfulness as “the
awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present
moment, and nonjudgmentally to the unfolding of experience moment by
moment” (ibid., p. 145).

The term mindfulness is defined in different ways in literature. A consortium

of researchers proposed an operational definition with two components: (1)
attentional self-regulation, which allows attention to be maintained on the
immediate experience, with an increased awareness of mental phenomena in the
present moment, (2) this according to a particular state of mind, characterized by
curiosity, openness and acceptance (Bishop et al. 2004). Then this first
component was split into the component of attention (here and now) and
intention (sometimes defined either as the purpose of the practice or as the
endogenous character of attention) (Shapiro et al. 2006). Other researchers focus
more on the result than on the process, defining it as a higher order awareness of
the phenomenal experience of the seven types of perceptual objects in the
present moment (Desbordes et al. 2015), which refers to diffused attention.
Mindfulness can also be defined rather in terms of capacity: that of “maintaining
the object of attention in working memory, whether this object corresponds to an
external sensory stimulus, an interoceptive sensation from inside the body, a
chain of discursive thoughts going through the mind, or even a memory from the
past” (ibid.).

One reason for the polysemy of the term mindfulness is that it was originally
used as the English translation of different Sanskrit terms: smrti and samatha,
which refer to the ability to focus the attention of consciousness, and also
vipasyana, which expresses the notion of diffused and equanimous attention
(Lutz et al. 2007). It is rather the latter sense that seems to prevail today,
although in the MBSR protocol there are more samatha techniques than
Vipassanā ones.

Box 3.4. Polysemy of the term “mindfulness”

NOTE.– The definition of mindfulness, in its sense of open presence, may

seem close to the notion of phenomenological reflexivity as we have defined it
above. We prefer to keep the distinction for several reasons:
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 181

– the polysemy of the term mindfulness mentioned in the box above,

which refers, in the practices taught in the MBSR protocol and other related
protocols (Mindfulness Based Interventions), to different techniques and
therefore to different phenomenological experiences. In this respect, this
term can be a barrier to a subject’s detailed understanding of their own
experience;
– phenomenological reflexivity refers to the process of self-observation
by which such consciousness could emerge (not to consciousness or its
state);
– the notion of mindfulness semantically suggests the notion of an
initially partially empty container that would become filled by
consciousness, while, as we will detail in section 3.3, phenomenological
reflexivity causes a change in the information perceived in quantity, but also
in quality (the information being less distorted by the ego); 
– the term “mindfulness” also evokes that the container would be full to
the brim, as if the subject were then free of any form of unconscious.
However, we assume that, even in an awakened being, certain physiological
processes and some information (e.g. subliminal) is not available to the
consciousness;
– this term refers, in common use and sometimes in research, sometimes
to techniques, sometimes to their supposed outcome. Thus, I have heard
beginners in meditation make statements such as: “I crossed the street with
mindfulness.” They probably expressed the idea that by crossing the street,
they trained their attention to be present at emerging phenomena perceived
by their minds, and that they therefore perceived them more than usual.
However, this could be understood as the fact that they experienced a
transient awakening when crossing the street;
– in addition, mindfulness-based techniques have been developed to
satisfy relatively personal goals (well-being, performance, physical health),
while we understand phenomenological reflexivity from an ethical
perspective. Despite these distinctions, we do not seek to oppose these aims
and consider them more as complementary: taking care of- and being gentle
with oneself seems to be a prerequisite for caring for others and the
non-human environment.

In short, the notion of mindfulness is polysemic, ambiguous and suggests

misconceptions. It has the advantage of being widely publicized. The notion
182 Education for Responsibility

of phenomenological reflexivity, on the other hand, emphasizes the process

of first observing one’s own functioning and then one’s consciousness, from
an ethical perspective. To facilitate this process, the techniques used are
dialogical reflexivity and meditation (including the development of
impersonal compassion, and therefore equanimous empathy).

In any case, the use of this term is quite popular among the general public
and in research, thanks in particular to the success and growing study of
MBSR. This protocol takes place over six to eight weeks, with a weekly
face-to-face session and practices to be done at home. The sessions include
training in different meditation techniques, mainly focused on attention and
open presence, as well as some explanations on the functioning of the
mind – particularly on the link between thoughts-emotions-actions (ibid.).

Cognitive and behavioral therapies (CBTs) have also integrated

mindfulness-based approaches into what is called “the third wave of CBTs”
(Cottraux 2007a). The general goal of such therapies is unconditional self-
acceptance (ibid.). The ordinary mode of operation is considered as an
“autopilot” mode, given the exogenous attention, the phenomenological
grasp of reactive thoughts, and the automatic orientation of appraisals and
actions according to the “I want” and the “I do no want” (Philippot 2007):

“[It is then] a question of becoming as fully aware as possible

of all the facets of our current state, whether positive or
negative, [...] not to let ourselves be carried away by these
judgments, to not to let them govern our attention, [... therefore]
learning to ‘disengage’ from the judgments of our experiences
that occur spontaneously.” (ibid., p. 69, author’s translation)

This distance – that is the space thus generated in the mind – makes it
possible not to act automatically according to the appraisals, and thus, for
example, for depressed people, to change their relationship to their thoughts
and emotions in a way that is positive for their well-being (meta-analyzed by
Hofmann et al. 2010; Gauchet et al. 2012), or for those with obsessive-
compulsive disorders to stop repeating compulsive actions (Fairfax 2008).
Robust evidence of the effectiveness of meditation-based therapeutic
approaches has been provided, particularly for the regulation of anxiety,
depression and pain (reviewed by Goyal et al. 2014).

Various professional ethics programs are based on meditation approaches

(Udayashankar 2015). This is the case, for example, of continued
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 183

professional development for mental health professionals, often focused on

impersonal compassion training (Cheng and Tse 2015).

3.2.3. Techniques related to meditation

A technique related to meditation, which has recently developed, is

cardiac coherence. It is more generally part of biofeedback techniques
(Gauchet et al. 2012). These techniques involve voluntarily controlling
physiological parameters to regulate thoughts and emotions (ibid.). In the
case of cardiac coherence, it is a matter of setting your breathing for a certain
time on six breathing cycles per minute. This requires attention to be focused
on a stopwatch, breathing cycles and their synchronization, and therefore has
features inherent in meditation based on focusing attention. Heart rate is
directly related to the functioning of the autonomic nervous system and
cardiac variability seems to be a good indicator of the ability to regulate
emotions (Servant et al. 2008). Meditation also modulates heart rate and its
combination with biofeedback techniques seems to be optimal (ibid.). Used in
therapy, cardiac coherence “supports the development of patients’ cognitive
and emotional resources, allowing them to better cope with stress and maintain
a healthy optimal state” (Gauchet et al. 2012, p. 131, author’s translation).

Sophrology (Etchelecou et al. 2012) and yoga (Duraiswamy et al. 2007)

also involve training to control breathing and to pay endogenous attention to
the inner world (mental phenomena, emotions, bodily feelings) in the present
moment, and thus to emerge from the phenomenological grasp. Both
techniques also have therapeutic applications (ibid.). Note that yoga, in its
original sense, includes a set of disciplines, including meditation itself
(Patanjali 1991). It has been defined as “stopping the automatic activity of
the mind [...] which reveals our Center, established in it-itself” (ibid., p. 20,
author’s translation). Thus, certain very specialized esoteric techniques,
generally combining work involving the body and mind, make it possible to
actualize extraordinary modified states of consciousness far beyond (or
below) the functioning of the ego (Namgyal 2011).

Finally, although this list does not claim to be exhaustive, I mention

martial arts to finish this section. More specifically, Masciotra, Roth and
Morel (2008) describe with specific concepts, derived from enaction theory,
the effectiveness of a karate master (‘sensei’). This description is
semantically very similar to what is described here about open presence: the
184 Education for Responsibility

master is in a “relationship of interiority”, as he or she is in “unity with

nature”, “entirely available”, with “a panoramic vision that embraces the
whole situation and transcends it”, to the detriment of a biased and restricted
vision, which would have made the subject act on the basis of “a pre-
determined answer” (ibid., p. 123–124, author’s translation). In fact,
knowledge of martial arts implies that the mind is fully in the present
moment, with an expanded field of consciousness that encompasses the
present reality, with the freshness in terms of its renewal, without subjective
preference.

3.2.4. Psychobiological effects of meditation

The disparity of meditation techniques makes it imprecise to state

generalities about the effects of “the” meditation. In addition, the growing
number of studies of these effects can compare expert meditators (who
accumulate tens of thousands of hours of practice) with novice meditators, as
well as groups that have followed a few weeks of training – typically an
MBSR program – with groups that have not followed one. Study subjects
may be healthy or have pathologies (such as depression), and measurements
may be made during or outside meditation practice. Worse, sometimes it is a
question of evaluating the impact of a practice on “mindfulness”, while the
study only measures the self-reported “mindfulness”4 (without considering
the subject’s meditation experience). Finally, as suggested above, most
meditative training contains not only meditative practices, but also teachings
and reflections about mind functioning and emotional regulation. Thus, it is
often the combined effect of these two aspects that is actually appraised, and
not only that of meditation (Hagège 2014). Moreover, the “trainer” effect is
generally ignored: it can reasonably be assumed that the vibratory quality of
the teacher, and their adequacy with that of the subjects following the
training, influences the effectiveness of learning. Subjectively, we can
indeed see that we do not learn as easily from different people (depending on
affinity, the manner of explaining, etc.). Empirical publications on
meditation are growing exponentially (Braboszcz et al. 2010). Among these,

4 That is, the subject answers a questionnaire on their ability to be conscious. We know that
this type of questionnaire has many biases, including the subject’s limited ability to recognize
themselves (because of unconscious processes) and their tendency to want to give a socially
acceptable answer (called the “social desirability bias”).
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 185

studies of the meta-analytical statistical type5 seem to identify the most

statistically significant effects of these meditation-based approaches.

3.2.4.1. Concerning the mind

Cognitive abilities are mainly measured by the success of tasks that
involve them.

A set of studies has shown effects of expert meditation practice on

perception, attention (reviewed by Lippelt et al. 2014 and by Van der Velden
et al. 2015), reactive thoughts and their regulation, self-understanding,
mental intelligence, learning and memory (ibid.). The effects are more or
less contrasted according to the type of practice implemented (reviewed by
Lippelt et al. 2014). The effects are of moderate magnitude for attention, and
of smaller magnitude for more cognitive measures (mental intelligence, etc.;
meta-analyzed by Sedlmeier et al. 2012). For mindfulness-based
interventions (MBSR type), a strong effect on cognitive reactivity, a
moderate but consistent effect on mindfulness (self-reported6), rumination
and concern were measured, in line with what is expected by the theory
(meta-analyzed by Gu et al. 2015).

Expert practitioners in focused attention, and those in open presence may

perceive conflicting stimuli (e.g. a different stimulus in front of each eye;
reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010 and by Lippelt et al. 2014). This shows
increased capacities of their consciousness. In addition, meditation increases
attention to perceptions, detection of perceptual stimuli (Lutz et al. 2008a)
and decreases perceptual habituation (reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010).

EXAMPLE.– (1) Meditators notice more changes in flickering scenes, and

more quickly, (2) they identify more perspectives in multiple perspective
images and (3) they are less distracted by irrelevant elements suddenly
arising in a task of selective visual attention than non-meditators (Hodgins
and Adair 2010).

They also perform better in cognitive flexibility (Grant et al. 2013; Fan
et al. 2014). Even short (four-day) meditative training can improve visual

5 These studies calculate statistical effects by combining a set of empirical studies that have
already been published. Their statistical power is therefore increased.
6 See note 4 in this chapter.
186 Education for Responsibility

spatial information processing, working memory and executive functions

(Zeidan et al. 2010b). Also some studies have focused on the impact on
creativity, for which we can distinguish: convergent thinking allowing us to
pertinently select elements in a set to find an original solution, and divergent
thinking which allows us to imagine different suitable possibilities. It would
seem that focused attention meditation increases convergent thinking, while
open monitoring meditation would more specifically promote divergent
thinking (reviewed by Lippelt et al. 2014).

Also, the cognitive decline associated with aging can be offset by

meditation that develops attention, memory, executive function, speed of
information processing and cognition in general (reviewed by Gard et al.
2014).

As expected, meditation seemingly reduces the grasping of thoughts

(mind wandering or mental ruminations; Kemeny et al. 2012; reviewed by
Braboszcz et al. 2010 ; and by Van der Velden et al. 2015), increases meta-
awareness (reviewed by Van der Velden et al. 2015) and mindfulness (ibid.;
meta-analyzed by Galante et al. 2014). In addition, studies suggest that
meditation reduces cognitive biases: those that manifest themselves in the
appraisal of situations (Hafenbrack et al. 2014; Kiken and Shook 2011) and
individuals (Lueke and Gibson 2015) – in other words, meditation would
reduce implicit attitudes towards exogroups. It has also been shown (in line
with the positive impact of meditation on well-being, see below) that
meditative practice reduces attentional bias towards emotions that are
considered unpleasant (Pavlov et al. 2014). Last, but not least, a body of
evidence suggests that meditation allows a more objective knowledge of
oneself (reviewed by Carlson 2013).

In short, these results suggest that meditation tends to promote the

development of a finer perception, vigilant attention (therefore diffused and
equanimous), and the widening of the field of consciousness. All this
allowing us to better perceive stimuli, in a way less hindered by the grasp of
thoughts and less biased by the functioning of the ego, its habits and
blindness.

3.2.4.2. Concerning emotions

It is at the level of emotions and changes in the relationship with the other
that the results are statistically the strongest (reviewed by Braboszcz et al.
2010; meta-analyzed by Sedlmeier et al. 2012). Corresponding variables
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 187

include interpersonal relationships, anxiety, emotions considered unpleasant,

stress, emotions considered pleasant, empathy, well-being and emotion
regulation (ibid.). The empathic response (and its neural correlates) is higher
in meditators who are experts in non-referential compassion than in novices
(Lutz et al. 2008; Mascaro et al. 2012). Also, this type of meditation causes
a decrease in depressive symptoms, an increase in compassion towards
oneself and in emotions considered pleasant (meta-analyzed by Galante et al.
2014). Even in novices, there is an increase in well-being, a feeling of
connection to others (Hutcherson et al. 2008) – the strongest effect – and a
decrease in self-centered considerations (Seppala et al. 2014). In contrast
the effect on empathic response seems to be little noticeable after a short
MBSR-type training, while an increase in compassion towards oneself is
significant after this training (Birnie et al. 2010), as is the reduction of
emotions considered unpleasant, depression, hostile reactions, the increase in
emotions considered pleasant and the recognition of others’ emotions
(Kemeny et al. 2012). However, for mindfulness-based interventions
(MBSR type), the effect on compassion towards oneself is to be confirmed,
in contrast with the decrease in emotional reactivity, the effect of which
seems strong and robust (meta-analyzed by Gu et al. 2015). Finally,
meditation seems to improve resilience in abused children (Waechter and
Wekerle 2014) and medical staff (Seppala et al. 2014).

Finally, we include in this section the impact of meditation on pain,

because it is in particular the emotional component of pain that it influences,
probably altering the negative appraisal of nociception7. Mindfulness-based
approaches appear to have a non-specific effect on the reduction of chronic
pain (meta-analyzed by Chiesa 2010). Such interventions, even very short
ones, could be remarkably effective on acute pain (Zeidan et al. 2010a) and
more effective than morphine-type analgesics (reviewed by Zeidan and Vago
2016). They would involve in particular the anterior cingulate cortex, the
insula and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (reviewed by Bilevicius et al.
2016). Also, it seems clear that meditation expertise allows a decrease in the
subjective feeling of experimentally induced acute pain, and this effect could
be mediated by different brain structures, depending on the type of
meditation (reviewed by Nakata et al. 2014). Finally, the analgesic effects of

7 Three non-exclusive causes of physical pain are traditionally considered: excess nociception
(of a painful stimulus), neuropathic aspect (due to a problem in nerve transmission) and
psychological dimension (due to reactive emotions and thoughts). However, this effect could also
imply a feedback on the neuropathic component.
188 Education for Responsibility

meditation would be more specific to open monitoring meditation, while

attention focusing techniques would have few or no similar effects (reviewed
by Grant 2014).

Thus, in general, meditation brings about various positive psychological

effects, such as an increase in subjective well-being and compassion, a
reduction in psychopathological symptoms and emotional reactivity
(reviewed by Guendelman et al. 2017; Keng et al. 2011 and by Van der
Velden et al. 2015).

3.2.4.3. About the body

With regard to physiological changes, meditation causes a decrease in
respiratory and cardiac rhythms, blood pressure and increased activity of the
parasympathetic autonomic nervous system, sensitivity of baroreceptors, and
synchronization of cardiac and respiratory rhythms (like in cardiac
coherence; reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010).

In addition, the emerging field of research in psychosocial genomics has

studied changes in gene expression associated with yoga and meditative
practices. It has thus been shown that circulating immune cells have a
genetic expression profile suggesting an enhancement of immune function
(reviewed by Saatcioglu 2013). In this sense, it has been shown that humoral
and cellular immune responses are respectively faster and more intense in
non-referential compassion practitioners, or after an MBSR program, than in
control subjects (reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010). Also, a day of
intensive meditation causes among expert meditators an epigenetic
regulation of gene expression8 and a decrease of the expression of pro-
inflammatory genes (Kaliman et al. 2014). In the same vein, various other
studies have confirmed that meditation affects gene expression in favor of a
reduction in the inflammatory response9 (reviewed by Buric et al. 2017).

In line with these observations, meditation improves remission in various

cardiovascular, neurological, autoimmune and renal diseases, including
changes in the cerebral cortex, prefrontal areas, neurotransmitters, white
matter, autonomic nervous system, limbic system and various circulating

8 Through reduced expression of histone deacetylase genes and changes in the acetyl and
methyl groups of histones.
9 In particular the NFκB pathway, also involving interleukins. N.B: a decrease in this
response, exacerbated in pathologies, is potentially beneficial to health.
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 189

molecules such as cytokines, endorphins and hormones (reviewed by Jindal

et al. 2013).

At the cerebral level, eight regions were found to be systematically

modified specifically in meditators, including key regions in meta-
awareness, external and interoceptive body conciousness, memory
consolidation and reconsolidation, emotion and self-regulation, and intra-
and interhemispheric communication (reviewed by Fox et al. 2014). In
addition, meditative practice seems to increase connectivity between the
attentional brain network and other distant brain areas supervising attention,
plus self-reference and emotional processes (reviewed by Lippelt et al.
2014). In line with what has been mentioned above, cortical thickness (gray
matter) is greater in expert meditators (reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010;
Grant et al. 2013) and the latter have a lower atrophy of grey matter as they
age than non-practitioners (Luders et al. 2015).

Also, in meditators, the electroencephalographic signatures are

comparable to those that seem specific to the emotions considered pleasant
(reviewed by Vaitl et al. 2005). In particular, lateralized activation (left) of
anterior brain regions, related to emotions considered pleasant and group-
oriented behaviors, is found in meditators (reviewed by Braboszcz et al.
2010). Also, in those who practice non-referential compassion, brain
networks involved in empathy and in the representation of the state of mind
of the self and others are modified in response to emotional stimuli
compared to control group subjects (Lutz et al. 2008a).

Moreover, in the latter, the default mode network of the brain is that
which corresponds to mind-wandering, which correlates with the absence of
joy (Brewer et al. 2011) and with the processing of information in reference
to oneself (self-referential processing; reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010).
In resting meditators, these areas are deactivated, while functional
connectivity between other brain areas involved in cognitive and self-
regulation is stronger at rest, and during meditation than in control subjects
(Brewer et al. 2011; reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010; and by Tang et al.
2015). In addition, meditation recruits brain areas involved in attention more
intensely in intermediate meditators than in expert meditators, suggesting
that the latter, accustomed to endogenous attention, mobilize fewer brain
resources to implement it effectively (reviewed by Braboszcz et al. 2010 and
Lutz et al. 2008b). Indeed, as explained above, novices require more
attention skills than experts, for whom endogenous attention has become
190 Education for Responsibility

common. However, brain responses to sensory distractions suggest that

expert meditators perceive stimuli more sensitively and finely, even when
they focus their attention on another stimulus (reviewed by Braboszcz et al.
2010): their attentional resources, instead of being allocated to the
phenomenological grasp of mental phenomena, are more available for
sensory information processing. This data, therefore, makes it possible to
explain the neuro-atomic support of the decrease in grasping (especially of
mental phenomena), the widening of the field of consciousness and a more
diffused and equanimous attention, and tend to empirically validate these
supposed effects of meditation.

With regard to behavior regulation, there are fewer studies, but meditation
seems to improve it in general (reviewed by Keng et al. 2011). For example,
mindfulness-based sexual therapies reduce sexual desire and activity
disorders (reviewed by Mize 2015); mindfulness-based approaches have a
small but positive effect on the remission of pathological gamblers (meta-
analyzed by Labuzienski 2015); improves sleep quality in seniors (Black
et al. 2015) and appears potentially effective in helping weight loss and
regulating eating behaviors (reviewed by Mantzios and Wilson 2015  and by
Olson and Emery 2015).

In short, meditation leads us not to grasp phenomena (even if they

concern our personal history), by bypassing basic automatic cognitive
mechanisms, such as the semantic processing of perception, via, among
other things, changes in functional brain organisation. This new habit allows,
for example, to feel an emotion without its meaning or cause being
interpreted by the reactive mind, or to perceive a “recognized” external
phenomenon without mentally associating it with a name. Meditation thus
leads us to recognize things as they are (what is sometimes called
“thusness”), and not as our personal past or our culture has conditioned us to
conceive them. In this respect, we can say that knowing (the ultimate reality)
and phenomenological grasping are antagonistic.

SUMMARY.– With regard to the empirically-proven effects of meditation on

the mind, emotions and body, first, meditation improves mind flexibility as
well as cognitive (learning, memory, concentration, etc.) and perceptual
performance, while counteracting brain aging. Fostering equanimity, it
induces a reduction of attentional biases, therefore of the ego. Second, its
most pronounced effects concern emotions and mental health, with an
increase in well-being in particular. Finally, for the body, impacts are
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 191

measured at the physiological (better blood circulation, strengthening of the

immune system and reduction of inflammation) and cerebral (change in
functionality and connectivity of certain areas) levels. Finally, meditation
also allows the regulation of pathological behavior involving, for example,
addictions.

Note that the idea that emotion and thoughts on the one hand, and mind
and body on the other, are separated is part of a traditionally typically
Western dualistic epistemology, and that neuroscientific and physiological
data suggest instead an interdependence between emotions and thoughts, and
between body and mind (Chambers et al. 2009). This brief literature review
clearly shows that meditation affects three levels of being, distinguished for
the purposes of this presentation (mind, emotions and body; tables 1.2 and
1.3) and reveals their indissociated nature. As mentioned above, attention,
emotions and behaviors are at the heart of the world-mind relationship.

In conclusion, the empirical data10 available, briefly reviewed here,

support the supposed impact of meditation on responsibility (Hagège 2014):
meditative practices have the potential to foster the development of vigilant
attention, empathy (and relatedness) and a better self-knowledge conducive to
the coherence of the subject, by acting at the level of the four horsemen of the
mind, such that the latter generate more harmony.

Now, we will present a much smaller number of studies focusing on the

impact of meditation in a school or university context.

3.2.5. Effects of meditation in school and university contexts

3.2.5.1. On cognition
In middle school students, training to practice “mindfulness” in everyday
situations would increase awareness and acceptance of what is (Viafora et al.
2015). Also, a decrease in mental ruminations and the reactive verbal mind
has been measured following various meditation programs at school
(reviewed by Waters et al. 2015) or university (Mrazek et al. 2013). In the
latter context, a two-week focused attention training led to a significant
increase in working memory (ibid.). According to a qualitative study,

10 We could also have reviewed the theoretical psychological mechanisms of the mode of
action of meditation (Chambers et al. 2009; Hölzel et al. 2011).
192 Education for Responsibility

meditation seems to promote thought awareness and better sleep quality

among specialized educators and guidance counsellors in initial training
(Tarrasch 2015). Also, according to a meta-analysis compiling studies
conducted on thousands of children, overall very significant effects of these
approaches on cognitive performance were measured (Zenner et al. 2014).
Finally, adolescents who have completed a seven-month meditation program
in an alternative school report better self-knowledge and self-regulation11
(Wisner and Starzec 2016).
3.2.5.2. On emotions and well-being
Overall, various meditation programs implemented at schools show a
moderate improvement in well-being and emotion regulation, in terms of
reduction of: violent ideas towards oneself (Britton et al. 2014), stress,
anxiety, emotional excitement and emotions considered unpleasant, which
reflects a more peaceful state in general (reviewed by Waters et al. 2015). A
meta-analysis showed a particularly strong effect of various interventions on
stress resilience (Zenner et al. 2014). Effects are measurable even on short
interventions, although they are stronger with longer programs and where
young people meditate more frequently (reviewed by Waters et al. 2015).
These effects would also be stronger in older students and when a teacher
teaches meditation, rather than an external intervener (ibid.). The impact on
emotions considered pleasant (absent or weakly positive) is not clear at this
time (ibid.). In addition, a quasi-experimental study of homeless high school
students found that they experienced an increase in well-being and emotional
regulation (Viafora et al. 2015). Also, according to qualitative studies,
meditation seems to promote awareness of emotions and behaviors, reduce
stress among specialized educators and pre-service guidance counsellors
(Tarrasch 2015) and make students more aware and compassionate (Crowley
and Munk 2017).

Consistent with all these results, self-reported measures of mindfulness

among students showed a significant positive correlation with measures of
well-being12 and negative correlation with perceived stress (Singh et al.
2016) and reported harassing behavior (Abid et al. 2017). In addition, it has
been shown in elementary schools that students who have followed a
meditation program do indeed see their self-reported scores increase in
mindfulness and well-being (Devcich et al. 2017; Dove and Costello 2017).

11 Emotionally, cognitively and behaviorally.

12 But an absence of correlation with life satisfaction (Agarwal and Dixit 2017).
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 193

3.2.5.3. On behaviors
Studies that have assessed relational behaviors have shown that different
meditation programs promote prosocial behaviors and social skills in
general, to the detriment of antisocial behaviors (reviewed by Waters et al.
2015). The qualitative appraisal of a seven-month program in an alternative
school showed an improvement in interpersonal relationships among
adolescents – with their families and in their ability to trust (Wisner and
Starzec 2016).

The impact of meditative training on academic performance (measured

by standard tests) has been little studied so far. After meditation training,
high school students improved their results in language (especially
vocabulary and reading skills) and mathematics significantly compared to
control group students (reviewed by Waters et al. 2015). In line with this, a
study among undergraduate students showed that a two-week training
session for focused attention significantly improves the performance of a
reading and comprehension task (Mrazek et al. 2013).

One of the common barriers to academic success is attention deficit and

hyperactivity disorders. Although research still needs to be supported (Evans
et al. 2017), several studies have shown that meditative practice can reduce
these disorders in adolescents (reviewed by Meppelink et al. 2016; and by
Mitchell et al. 2015), and even more clearly in adults (reviewed by Mitchell
et al. 2015).

In summary, these first studies, to be completed, have shown the

feasibility, acceptability and potential effectiveness of meditation programs
among different age groups and cultural contexts (Burke 2010; Waters et al.
2015).

3.3. General principle: reflexivities, meditation and responsibility

3.3.1. Meditation and dialogical reflexivity would synergistically

promote phenomenological reflexivity

3.3.1.1. “Negative” effects of meditation

We have mentioned above many observed beneficial effects of
mediation. However, like any active practice (e.g. taking medication, sports,
194 Education for Responsibility

etc.), “undesirable” effects seem likely to occur in some cases. A few rare
publications are devoted to these effects.

Among the notable effects, depersonalization-derealization (Castillo

1990), anxiety and recollection of traumatic experiences have been identified
(Cebolla et al. 2017; Lindahl et al. 2017), the majority of these effects being
transient and benign (Cebolla et al. 2017) and their specificity is likely to
depend on other factors (Lindahl et al. 2017).

Depersonalization consists of feeling separated in two, as if there were a

self that does, feels, etc. and a second self that observes this first self – that
is, a witness consciousness (Castillo 1990). It is often accompanied by
derealization: the subject has the impression of living as if in a dream, as if
their world were no longer real (ibid.). More than two-thirds of adults would
experience such a phenomenon in their lives, even if only temporarily, but
subjects may find it disruptive in their professional and social lives, to the
extent that it triggers anxiety in them (ibid.).

Given the spiritual changes induced by meditation (see above), it seems

normal that meditation causes depersonalization and derealization (the
appearance of this witness consciousness is even a desired effect), that it
brings back experiences considered traumatic (emotional engrams becoming
conscious13) or anxiety (the anxiety that the ego would have to disappear, in
particular) – see the following anecdote. However, the fact that these
phenomena are experienced – in very rare cases, in a pathological way – is
typical of people meditating without a particular purpose, for an
inappropriate (egocentric) purpose and/or not having correctly understood
the changes they were experiencing: the mind not being oriented in a
meaningful direction for the subject, their detachment from the ego is
experienced as a regrettable loss. Moreover, derealization is generally treated
using symbols, which will essentially allow them to give a positive meaning
to what happens to them (ibid.). Also, without going as far as pathology, if
respondents to these surveys (Cebolla et al. 2017; Lindahl et al. 2017) have
reported such effects as undesirable, this seems to be symptomatic of a
misunderstanding or self-centered purpose.

13 In particular, focused attention meditation voluntarily reduces the field of consciousness

and thus places it in a state close to that in which past wounds or emotions have been
internalized, which has the effect of bringing them to the surface of consciousness (by
resonance). Thus, its regular practice encourages confrontation with these “caged animals”
and thus multiplies the opportunities to free them.
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 195

ANECDOTE.– At the beginning of my meditative practice, I was intrigued by

the experience of practitioners who followed long-term retreats: they spend
three years, three months and three days locked in groups meditating up to
16 hours a day, without external distraction (tobacco, music, TV, etc.) and
with only one day off per year. Every time I asked them if it wasn’t too hard
to be locked up and not see outside for so long, the answer was similar and
consisted of saying: “Being locked up is nothing; the hardest part is the
emotions.”

Obviously, subjects experiencing these phenomena and feeling detached

from themselves and the world could probably also, more easily than other
subjects, according to their values, commit misdeeds incompatible with an
ethical aim (as many subjects commit virtually by playing video games for
example): greater clarity of mind without orientation towards altruistic goals
can reinforce egocentrism, as long as there is ego. Like any practice that
brings about change in body and mind, its impact depends on the goals14
(and values) in which it is embedded: meditation is a tool. As such, its use
depends on the goals served: U.S. Army snipers are trained in meditative
techniques to reach their target better. A kitchen knife can be used to kill or
cut strawberries to decorate a tartlet.

This section therefore highlights the effects of a practice that becomes

negative, if it is either too distorted from its original use (aimed at liberation
from the ego) or not properly understood. In Buddhism, for example, it is all
study, reflection and meditation that is considered effective for awakening:
these techniques can contribute to well-being, but they were invented to free
us from our dark areas, by confronting us with them. However, studies of the
adverse effects of meditation have so far focused on the type and modalities
(frequency, duration, etc.) of meditative practices. It would therefore now be
useful to also investigate what accompanies the practice, in particular the
goals sought by practitioners, their motivations and their level of
understanding or study of the action mechanisms linked to these practices.

14 It is interesting to note that in moral philosophy, responsibility and adjustment to goals are
close concepts. Indeed, responsibility is delimited by the so-called “volitionist” researchers, as
belonging to what the subject can control (Knobe and Doris 2010). Control is also defined as
the adjustment of functions to a goal (Suhler and Churchland 2009; Hagège 2014). So the
notion of responsibility, like that of feedback, refers to the idea of adjusting one's actions to a
goal (idea expressing an aspect of coherence; Hagège 2014, 2015b).
196 Education for Responsibility

3.3.1.2. Importance of the meaning and understanding of the process

This is why, on the one hand, the meaning given to the practice, the
understanding of its potential effects and what is learned from the models that
gives meaning to the change in phenomenology brought about by meditation.
On the other hand, reflection on oneself and on one’s values seem essential so
that this practice can help to develop responsibility. The fact of directing
one’s mind towards goals and practicing meditation allows the action to be
automatically oriented towards these goals (argued in Hagège 2014). Among
these goals, a central goal concerns liberation from the illusion of the ego,
because the latter directs our functioning in a dual way, contrary to
responsibility. The following is a summary of the central aspects to which,
according to this analysis, responsibility education should encourage subjects:
– understanding of the functioning mechanisms of the inner and outer
worlds and their consequences, in particular through the appropriation of
models that explain the functioning of the relative mind, the principled mind,
the outer world and their interactions: to understand intellectually one’s own
functioning, one’s relationship with the world, one’s possibilities for change,
one’s possibilities for awakening, and thus be motivated to change in this
sense; 
– reflection on values, choice of values, and wishes to be consistent with
them (dialogical cognitive reflexivity): freely and consciously setting goals
(e.g. to feel relatedness, empathy, to be fair, coherent, free from the illusion
of the ego, to develop love and compassion, etc.), learn to direct your
intention towards what you deliberately have chosen;
– training for endogenous attention (meditation): reduction of
phenomenological grasping and development of open presence;
– in situ comparison of the models learned in the first stage with one’s
own experience, thanks to direct observation of how they work at the
moment they manifest themselves (phenomenological reflexivity); 
– metacognition on one’s own functioning as object;
– readjustment of values, goals, etc.

These aspects, which can be considered as more or less separate and

relatively synchronous stages of the educational process, are interdependent
and are intended to be repeated in such a way as to create the path of an
expansion and transformation of consciousness, marked by questioning. As
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 197

it is a work on one’s own mind as we have defined it here, and which aims
among other things to increase the share and quality of consciousness, we
can call this journey “spiritual”.

Thus, if the subject experiences a phenomenology similar to the

depersonalization and derealization described above, understands them as
beneficial phenomena of detachment from the ego, cultivates the desire to be
useful to others, to their harmonious development, and, for example,
practices meditations of non-referential compassion, their experience will be
quite significant for them. Their phenomenological reflexivity will be
consciously appraised as positive (and not as a loss). More detached from
their ego, they will be much better able to help others and develop their
responsibility.

In conclusion, in the sense presented here, responsibility would involve

clarifying goals that promote connectedness (empathy and relatedness),
deliberately choosing them and giving oneself the means to achieve them.
As we have already argued, these goals can be expressed in terms of
harmony. We have argued (section 2.4.3.2.4) how phenomenological reflexivity
would de facto allow the subject to function harmoniously. In the following
section, we will consider how the transition from an effective dialogism (from the
objective point of view)15, but largely unconscious – therefore associated with the
illusion of dualism – to a conscious dialogism (from the subjective point of view),
proceeds, and how the latter allows us to act more according to ourselves, others
and the NHE than according to the ego (favoring ipseity over identity). In other
words, we will propose an answer to the question: what is the link between
phenomenological reflexivity, harmony, relatedness and empathy?

3.3.2. Phenomenological reflexivity promotes empathy and

relatedness by instantiating harmony

We considered reflexivity as a conscious self-reference. As in open

monitoring meditation, consciousness takes itself as its object and this makes
it possible to free oneself, with training, from any subjective filter of
perception of reality (Figure 2.2). Such a release is called the realization of
“emptiness” in Buddhism (Epstein 1989). In other words, it would seem that

15 Since the subject emerges from an effective dialogism between the inner and outer worlds,
dialogism refers to an is “individuation” (a process that jointly modifies the individual and the
environment; Hagège 2014).
198 Education for Responsibility

consciousness can recognize the ultimate reality. In a way analogous to the

role of self-referential functions in Gödel’s theorems, phenomenological
reflexivity, in which the mind (in this case its conscious part) takes itself as
an object, allows a clearer perception of the world-mind relationship, such as
the shadow areas (the ego, projections, the unconscious, etc.; Figures 1.6 and
1.9), illuminated by light, then disappear. We have already argued this point
in section 2.4.4.3 using the example of Hofstadter’s phonograph16 (2008).
We use it here in a slightly different way using the notion of isomorphism,
defined as a “transformation preserving information” (Hofstadter 2008,
p. 57, author’s translation). This is when “we can establish associations
between two complex structures in such a way that each part of one structure
corresponds to a part of the other. (This correspondence must be in line with
the roles played by these parties in their respective structures)” (ibid.).
Hofstadter (2008) notes that isomorphisms induce meanings. The meaning is
explicit when you don’t see isomorphism, because it is so obvious. We can then
speak of an implicit isomorphism. When, on the contrary, we must seek
isomorphism, we must make it explicit, and then it is the meaning that is implicit.
Let us illustrate this. In the ordinary ego-driven functioning (Figure 2.2A), the
implicit isomorphisms corresponding to the projections (by definition
unconscious) provide the explicit meanings of our relative worlds (in this
case, subjective at the individual level). Thus, the subject recognizes
themself in the world they see. They feel they exist through these meanings
emanating from their own mind – explicit meanings for them – which they
wrongly believe to be intrinsic to the outer world (which they implicitly
attribute to the real in fact). It is as if, in terms of the phonograph, discs of
variable frequencies had passed (corresponding to the different meanings
that the ego projects): the ego remains there and the subject has a distorted
vision of reality (since the frequency of the disc does not correspond well to
either the inner world or the outer world; there is a partial isomorphism at
the relative level, but no isomorphism at the ultimate level). Then the subject
seeks to observe their own subjectivity (Figure 2.2B). At first, they try to

16 The latter also reflected on the brain-thought-consciousness link with these entangled
hierarchies. He seems convinced that consciousness (and free will) is based on a kind of
strange loop, and would perhaps correspond, like G, to a high level mode (an emergence),
undecipherable at lower levels. He evokes the idea that “me” is born from the moment it can
be reflected. He then speaks of a resonance that reinforces itself. However, Hofstadter
probably considers consciousness and thought as processes of a given quality. He does not
attempt to explain a change in their quality, as we do. In any case, the models and analogies
he sets out in his book are nevertheless appropriate for our purpose.
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 199

look at themselves, they try to explain isomorphism, but because of

unconscious psychological defence mechanisms, they do not immediately
perceive their implicit attitudes, inconsistencies and shadows: it is as if they
are playing the right disc, but that the phonograph uses a program
(defending the ego) that leads the phonograph to rearrange its structure so
that it does not resonate with the disc. And then, by dint of perseverance and
letting go, developing their phenomenological reflexivity, the phonograph’s
defense programs are exhausted and the phonograph ends up reading a disc
that resonates fully with the machine: the isomorphism is completely explicit
and the phonograph explodes (the illusion of the ego is fully perceived,
because the subject is no longer mentally disturbed by the phenomenological
grasp of phenomena and projections). Then consciousness perceives reality
without subjective distortion. It embraces the real: consciousness and the real
are isomorphic, while this isomorphism is undifferentiated, because without
reference (Table 3.1).

Meaning of Structure
Figures Process Isomorphism Structure 1
the word 2
2.2A
Outer
and Projection Explicit Implicit Ego
world
3.1A
2.2B
Phenom. Ego → Inner/out
and Implicit Explicit
reflexivity consciousness er worlds
3.1B
2.2C
Perceptual
and Asemantic Undifferentiated Consciousness the real
emptiness
3.1C

Table 3.1. Evolution of isomorphism between the mind and the world

COMMENT ON TABLE 3.1.– In the first column are indicated the figures to
which the lines of the table refer. Isomorphism refers to that between
structure 1 and structure 2 (last three columns of the table). In the case of
projection, the relative, subjective point of view leads to seeing explicit
meanings projected on the outer world by the functioning of the ego. In the
case of phenomenological (“phenom.”) reflexivity, a consciousness develops
beyond the ego, which perceives the inner world and its interaction with the
outer world (in particular, the implicit isomorphism of the projection
becomes explicit). When the implicit meaning of the search for a sense of
existence through phenomena is perfectly updated, the latter loses its
meaning (last line). The emptiness of the ego and the thusness of the
200 Education for Responsibility

consciousness are perceived. The awakened being17 perceives reality with a

principled mind (ultimate point of view).

We have mentioned above the notion of a witness who develops on their

own, that there is nothing to do and that simply by observing the disharmony
in us, harmony will develop on its own. Let us recall that the orientation of
the mind towards a goal (formulated in terms of harmony, responsibility,
empathy, relatedness, etc. for example), through the exercise of dialogical
reflexivity, seems useful. In short, it may be necessary to have thrown a
bottle into the sea anyway. We can even throw one away every day, or every
two minutes, if it helps. The same bottle eventually helps. The message
could be for example: “I wish a mind free from the illusion of the ego for a
more harmonious life.” This adds some nuance to the terms “on their own”
and “on its own”.

Applied to the relationship with the human or non-human environment,

with an appropriate orientation of the mind, such a process can foster the
development of a harmonious relationship that includes empathy and
relatedness (Figure 3.1). Indeed, at the formal level, the principled mind
corresponds to a consciousness embracing the individual and their
environment (co-emerging phenomena) as illustrated in Figures 2.1C and
3.1C. At an ordinary level, in this sense, it has been shown that the
development of consciousness promotes well-being, empathy and
clarification of values, which can contribute to sustainable development, in a
harmonious relationship with the non-human environment (reviewed by
Ericson et al. 2014). With regard to the process of transforming a relative
mind into a principled mind (i.e. spiritual development), Trautwein et al.
(2014) explain how the relationship with oneself and the relationship
between oneself and others evolves through meditation. The ordinary
functioning (Figures 2.1A and 3.1A) is divided between self-centeredness and
the connection between the self and others. It is self-centeredness or connection
that takes precedence depending on the situation and the subject’s
dispositions (ibid.). As explained above, it also depends on the culture, the
world in which the subject has evolved, etc. For example, Chinese subjects have
higher median prefrontal cortex activity during self-judgment or other judgments,
whereas in Western subjects, this area is activated only for self-judgment
(Trautwein et al. 2014). Of course, even in ordinary functioning, subjects are

17 The term “subject” seems less appropriate here because the perceived reality is no longer
subjective.
 Educ
cation for Respo
onsibility Guidelines 201

capable of empathy, but they can also experien nce emotiona contagion orr splitting
with emmotions, depeending on thhe moment in time (Figgure 1.4). W When the
phenom menological grrasp decreasees and the sub
bject begins to
t see and unnderstand
how theey function (Figures
( 2.1BB and 3.1B), instead of perceiving
p thhe self as
somethinng permanennt and sepaarate from th he rest, the self is incrreasingly
perceiveed as a channging, ephem meral, environ
nment-dependdent element,, without
real consistency (Trauutwein et al. 2014).

Figure 3.1. Developmen nt of empathy and relatedne essthanks to

phenom menological re
eflexivity. For a color versio
on of this
figu
ure, see www.iiste.co.uk/haggege/education n.zip

COMME ENT ON FIGU URE 3.1.– The e clearer thee backgroundd of the drawwing, the
more thhe subject’s consciousneess penetratees it. HE = human h envirronment;
NHE = non-human environment. A1) When W the suubject dream ms, their
consciousness illum minates onlyy a part off their inneer world, annd their
attention is totally caught by thhe dream. A2) A When ann ordinary suubject is
awake, their attentiion is mainlyy exogenous and either focusedf on tthe outer
world (diagram)
(d orr grasped byy inner pheno omena (thouughts, emotioons, etc.;
not reppresented). AsA a result of the grasp sp, even in the latter ccase, the
inner world
w is relattively not ligghted by connsciousness, as the subjeect is not
aware that
t there is a phenomennological grrasp (see fi, Figure 2.2A) A). B) By
meditatiing, the subjject returns their
t attentio
on to their innner world aand their
field off consciousnness widenss: they can n then moree easily expperience
202 Education for Responsibility

relatedness and empathy, because they are more conscious of themselves

(inner world) and of what is around them (outer world). They can establish a
more enduring and profound dialogical relationship between their inner and
outer worlds. C) Rare expert meditators realize the emptiness of the self and
phenomena (Lutz et al. 2007). In this case, attention is diffused and
equanimous, and the subject perceives both their interiority and exteriority,
themselves, others and the non-human: the field of consciousness is mingled
with space, there is no longer any personal preference. The subject, of great
wisdom, “ never ceases to have everything constantly in mind, never forgets
the world, thinks and acts in relation to cosmos” (Groethuysen cited by
Morin 1999, p. 33, author’s translation). The coherence of the subject
(between saying and doing) is then presumed to be perfect (Hagège 2013).

This change would be made possible in particular by focused attention

meditation, which causes disidentification with regard to mental phenomena,
and, coincidentally, a decrease in self-centered functioning (ibid.).
Lovingkindness meditation would more specifically allow an increase in
empathy towards oneself (which involves entering into an “ I-you”
relationship with oneself) and connectivity with others, which is much more
corporeal than conceptual (ibid.). Open monitoring meditation would
promote the development of an external point, capable of apprehending
oneself and the other on an equal footing (Figures 2.1C and 3.1C). In other
words, in such a state of consciousness, Ricœur’s “oneself as another”
corresponds to a phenomenological experience, not just an ideal. Indeed,
four types of perception modification are encountered in expert meditators:
an increase in the quality of perception (i.e. the quantity and accuracy of
perceived information), an understanding of the interdependencies at work in
the perception process itself, a cessation of perception based on
subject/object duality (i.e. self/other), and a non-conceptual perception (i.e.
where the semantic processing of perception disappears; Full et al. 2012).

To conclude this chapter, we propose that the synergy between

meditation and reflection on values and goals (dialogical reflexivity) allows
us to change our mind, our relationship with the world, and therefore our
relative world, through a process of phenomenological reflexivity. As the
subject is part of the world, it changes it in this way18. In this case, this process
promotes empathy and relatedness through a broadening of the field of
consciousness and a liberation from the conditioning of the ego. An

18 QED: How can we change the world? By changing the mind.

 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 203

important aspect in these changes is the relationship with thoughts and

emotions, which clears space in the mind to better perceive oneself, others
and the NHE. It is not a question of suppressing these mental and emotional
phenomena, but of no longer apprehending them in an egocentric manner
(partly by evaluating them). Basically, what prevents us from being
responsible (and therefore fair and connected to ourselves, others and the
environment) is the dual and unconscious functioning of the ego. The
process of adjustment with the self, the other and the NHE coincide with the
development of responsibility, and is therefore accompanied by a change in
mind that becomes more conscious through vigilant attention (Figure 1.6).
Thus the subject’s world changes, and becomes “more ultimate”: the subject
can become more self-transparent and act more consistently with their
values.

3.4. Summary of the competences targeted in responsibility

education

In summary, to gain in emotional maturity and ethical action, and

therefore in responsibility, subjects should probably learn to take into
account (1) their inner world, by understanding and seeing in situ their own
functioning (Hagège 2014), and (2) their outer world, in a less biased way,
and to better perceive the interactions between these worlds. Paradoxically,
it is the passive acceptance of these observations, and the coincident gain of
consciousness, that will change these two worlds. The mind, the subject,
seeing themself more clearly, is thus fundamentally changed; their
reflexivity opens the barriers of their consciousness and reduces the
influence of their ego (Figures 2.1 and 3.1):

“The important thing, in essence, is to work first on your own

development before engaging in anything else. We can’t do
much more than that” (Trungpa 1979, p. 37).

In order to formulate in an even more precise way the targeted

transformations in the form of educational objectives, we will mobilize a
notion that is now authoritative, without getting into the debates on the
relevance of its use. This is the notion of competence. The major advantage
we see here is that the current trend of curriculum development in France is
based on this notion. It thus seems appropriate to us to propose foundations
for a curriculum of education for responsibility, especially since, according
204 Education for Responsibility

to Le Boterf (cited by Sauvé 2000, p. 83, author’s translation),

“responsibility characterizes competence”.

I think you will have understood the general principle. As we have argued
above, the four horsemen of the mind select the composition and coloration
of the relative worlds. To use the biblical metaphor, they can be at the
service of apocalypse or harmony. So, to change the world, it is these four
horsemen that will be targeted in an education for responsibility. And one of
them (orientation) will be divided into two competences (attentional and
axiological).

3.4.1. Notion of competence

The notion of competence is defined in official texts as “the ability to

mobilize resources (knowledge, skills, attitudes) to perform a task or deal
with a complex or unprecedented situation” (Ministère de l’Éducation
nationale 2015, author’s translation). Historically, it has gained in
importance in the educational sciences and especially in didactic sciences in
response to the following observation: memorizing information (or
“possessing knowledge”) is not enough to make this knowledge operational,
that is, capable of solving problems (Giordan and DeVecchi 1994). In fact,
programs seem to increasingly integrate the notion of competence alongside
that of knowledge. Initially, in the field of didactic research, the notion of
competence was thought out to consider the transposition of expert reference
practices from the professional context to the school context (Perrenoud
1998). It is the reference to the effective performance of tasks in a
professional context that has motivated more complex definitions than those
of the French Ministry of National Education, including for example the
sense of duty (Le Boterf 1994) or the originality of the response to situations
(Bosman et al. 2000). These expert reference practices are never free of
knowledge, but this knowledge is often implicit, poorly reflected or not
constituted as a corpus, in contrast with academic knowledge (Perrenoud
1998). According to this pioneering reflection by Perrenoud (1998) on the link
between didactic transposition and competences, a competence is made up of
“mobilized cognitive  resources ([...] theories, [...] methods, [...] skills, attitudes)”
and “operational  schema that allow, in real time, the effective mobilization of
cognitive resources” (Perrenoud 1998, p. 505, author’s translation).

The different disciplines that mobilize the notion of competence approach

it in various ways (Jonnaert et al. 2009). A review of the literature in the
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 205

educational sciences suggests that the notion of competence refers to the

successful processing of a situation (ibid.).

The abstraction of the notion of competence therefore implies considering

the following frameworks (ibid.):
– a situational framework in which the competence is valid, that is, a
family of situations in which this processing is efficient;
– a framework for action to clarify what constitutes or may constitute
effective processing for this family of situations; 
– an appraisal framework to determine whether or not the situation has
been effectively addressed and why;
– a framework of resources (external or internal) mobilized by the subject
to address the situation.

Any competence would therefore have a contextual aspect, and would be

constrained by past experiences and previous knowledge of the subject,
which will be more or less adapted to the situation (ibid.). As I expressed
above with the quotation from Sartre (1970; see section I.6), the frameworks
of action and situation concerned by responsibility are all the actions and
situations of life, because it is a question of training the mind to change
functional habits and because, in accordance with our epistemology of
complexity, every action, word or thought contributes to building a certain
world. Here, responsibility is not a matter of domain, but it is a matter of
state of mind. Therefore, one could say that the context, if any, is that of
spirituality or ethical reflection on our daily experiences and actions. In
sections 3.4.2 to 3.4.6, we will outline five types of competences that can be
used as benchmarks for education and training, on the one hand, and as
criteria for research to assess, for example, the impact of educational (school
or other) dispositives on responsibility, on the other.

According to enaction theory, a competence corresponds to the

implementation of positional enactive intelligence, which concerns the
controlling of situations (Masciotra et al. 2008). This enactive intelligence is
distinguished from two other intelligences: dispositional intelligence which
corresponds to self-realization and concerns self-control, and gestural
intelligence which corresponds to performance and concerns dexterity
(ibid.). Thus, in this sense, the notion of competence refers more to
adaptation to situations than to individuals’ dispositions.
206 Education for Responsibility

The operational definition of competences adopted here is broader than

the previous one and overlaps quite well with the one proposed by the
French Ministry of National Education. Also, it is more limited than the
definitions resulting from the issues of didactic transposition of professional
practices, because this is not such an issue here.

It has been proposed for emotional competences which, according to

Mikolajczak and Bausseron (2013), include three levels:
– implicit and explicit knowledge, which refers to the richness and
complexity of the conceptual network concerned by the phenomenon (e.g.
emotional);  
– abilities that refer to maximum performance, to being able to apply
your knowledge in situations sometimes when you try;
– traits, or dispositions, that correspond to an ability so well incorporated
that it constitutes a propensity to behave in a certain way. It therefore refers
to a typical performance, integrated into the subject’s habits.

In this model, the three levels interact, but are not necessarily correlated,
as shown by empirical studies: a subject may exhibit certain abilities, without
being able to mobilize them in each relevant situation, that is, without it
being a trait or disposition (Mikolajczak and Bausseron 2013).

I will now present five competences, which summarize what has been
covered in this book so far. For each, I will present only two aspects: the
knowledge required and the abilities or dispositions, the latter two referring
to a performance respectively being acquired or already acquired. And I will
clarify each one’s relationship with the other four. Indeed, these five
competences are considered as interdependent to promote education for
responsibility.

3.4.2. Emotional competences

“What is not thoroughly understood will repeat itself” (quote

attributed to Krishnamurti)

Emotions strongly influence, in positive or negative terms, depending on

the case, the chances of survival, decision-making and social interactions
(Mikolajczak and Bausseron 2013). It is from an attempt to reconcile these
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 207

two valences that the notion of emotional competence has been developed
(ibid.). It originates from the notion of emotional intelligence, which has
“evidenced that the ability to identify, understand, manage and use one’s
emotions and those of others are at least as important for success as so-called
cognitive or intellectual abilities” (ibid., p. 133, author’s translation; Box
3.5). An important idea of this work on intrapersonal and interpersonal
emotional intelligences is that it can be learned.

These same authors propose, based on a literature review and their work,
five basic emotional competences, from which we draw inspiration
(Table 3.2), and which we can relate to others (Box 3.6).

The term “manage” (or “control” emotions, stress, etc.) seems inappropriate to
us. Indeed, this term used in economics in particular suggests that it is enough to
decide, to want to modify or do something about one’s emotion for change to
take place. But you can’t manage an emotion like you manage capital or an
institution... As we mentioned, it doesn’t work that way. Thus, the word
“regulation” would be more appropriate to refer to the way in which emotions
(or subjective functioning in general) can be modulated, than the words “control”
(Hagège 2014) or “management”. This regulation operates on its own by
consciously choosing goals for change, being aware of its current functioning
and welcoming it as it is, in the moment, without grasping the phenomena. The
effectiveness of this process has been understood, described and studied in the
third wave of the behavioral and cognitive therapies (Cottraux 2007b). That said,
as long as there is a dose of identification of the subject with their functioning
(and an illusory ego), we will talk about “regulation”. Indeed, some regulation
techniques (for example, distracting attention by focusing on breathing) do not
allow the emotional engram, which will manifest itself later, to be evacuated. Thus,
at a more advanced level, emotions can be integrated. That is, their energy is
transformed into an open-mindedness and the corresponding engram (see step 6 of
Figure 1.3) is definitively released from the body (Figure 1.8D). This process and
the methods that allow it will be the subject of a future book.

Box 3.5. From “management” to the integration of emotions

Self Others
Being able to identify one’s own Being able to identify those of
Identification
emotions others
Understanding their functioning Understanding their
Understanding
and consequences functioning and consequences
Allowing others to express
Being able to express emotions their own emotions and
Expression
in a benevolent way welcome them with
benevolence
208 Education for Responsibility

Being able to regulate stress and Being able to help others to

Regulation emotions that are inappropriate
to the context
Using emotions to facilitate
Use
harmonious thoughts and actions
regulate their stress and
inappropriate emotions
Using others’ emotions with
kindness to promote harmony

Table 3.2. Five basic emotional competences

COMMENT ON TABLE 3.2.– This table has been adapted from Mikolajczak
and Bausseron’s work (2013, Table 5.1, p. 135, author’s translation).
References to benevolence and harmony have been added because of our
focus on responsibility here19. It is understandable that these authors have
not done so, because, as they explain, there is a debate in this field of
research at the moment around work that tends to show that subjects with
strong emotional competences can misuse them (i.e. to satisfy their ego’s
needs), by manipulating others to their detriment for example (ibid.).

We can note that the regulation and use of emotions is achieved by distancing
oneself from them and thus reducing the phenomenological grasp of emotions.
Thus, these emotional competences require attentional competences (see below).
Also, we characterized empathy and relatedness as relational attitudes, not
emotions (section 1.3.2.2). Indeed, they have an emotional (affective) and also a
cognitive component (see Figure 1.4), the latter involving an understanding of
the other’s emotion (or the situation of the non-human element) and a distinction
between oneself and another (or non-human self phenomenon; Grynberg 2013).
They also involve emotional regulatory competence, which helps to maintain the
subject’s emotion at a conscious but not too high level, and thus avoid splitting
from emotions and fusion (ibid.). Also, these emotional competences are linked
to epistemic and axiological competences, in that, for example, regulating
emotions facilitates debate, critical thinking and the adoption of extrinsic goals.

Box 3.6. Linking emotional competences with the other competences

Of the five competences proposed by these authors, emotional regulation

is a pivotal one: the first three (identification, understanding and expression)
help to regulate, while the last one links emotion regulation to action. In the

19 In the common base of knowledge, skills and culture framed by the French Ministry of National
Education, there is a formulation of these competences (with the exception of the “comprehension”
competence) (Ministère de l’Education nationale 2015). They are clearly formulated in the sense of
responsibility.
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 209

present theory, beyond the regulation of emotions – which seems to us to

have a social function – it is the integration of emotions that is targeted,
because it allows us to free ourselves from inappropriate and egocentric
thought-action repertoires. Indeed, as already seen, becoming responsible for
one’s own subjectivity requires releasing our caged animals (emotional
engrams), which make us act on the basis of the ego (by generating “I want”
and “I do not want”, and by being blind to “I do not care”). Thus freed from
past conditioning, the mind becomes more conscious of itself and the
environment.

To conclude, I will complete Table 3.2 by specifying the knowledge and

abilities/dispositions required (Table 3.3).

Emotional competences
– Coping strategies (Table 1.1)
– Emotional/ego/responsibility link (appraisal mechanisms,
engrams, wounds and reactive thoughts, etc.)
Knowledge – Welcoming, regulation and integration techniques
– Distinction of error and fault; own relationship with mistake,
error or fault
– Complexity of the subject (different motivation systems)
– Experiencing your emotions without avoidance,
phenomenological grasp, or struggle – or failing that, being aware of it
– Applying the techniques learned
– Mastering techniques for regulating and integrating emotions
Abilities/
dispositions – Accepting the risk of making mistakes without feeling guilty
– Recognizing the different types of motivation at home when they
occur
– Fostering the motivation for innovation, coinciding with letting
go

Table 3.3. Other emotional competences that promote responsibility

3.4.3. Epistemic competences

Epistemic competences refer to what we have discussed about the three

modalities of cognition (sections 1.3.2.3 and 2.3.1). We prefer the term
“epistemic” to “cognitive” in order to avoid semantic ambiguity. Indeed, as
far as the noun is concerned, the distinction between cognition and emotion
210 Education for Responsibility

seems clear. However, since the rise of cognitive sciences, which also
include the study of emotions, conation, decision-making, etc., the adjective
“cognitive” can be confusing. Also, the term “epistemic” is more appropriate
here than the term “epistemological”20. Epistemic competences therefore
involve considering beliefs and thoughts (their content, cultural biases),
including those related to knowledge (see personal epistemology) and also
the relationship with them (see dogmatism or cognitive flexibility). In
literature, personal epistemology is mainly studied in its relationship with
academic learning (Fagnant and Crahay 2010). Here, we are more interested
in its relationship with acting (coherence) and feeling (reliance; see
relational competences).

Epistemic competences are related to other competences basically, insofar as

the latter involve reference knowledge.

Also, responsibility implies a connection with others. However, we have

explained how cognitive flexibility, in contrast with dogmatism, makes it
possible to open up to others, and that it is facilitated by a weak, if not non-
existent, phenomenological grasp of thoughts. These epistemic competences are
therefore linked to attentional and relational competences.

Epistemic and emotional competences are also dependent; for example,

cognitive flexibility facilitates the acceptance of emotions.

Finally, as argued by a pioneering researcher in the field of personal

epistemology, a contextualist epistemology should induce the subject to choose
their activities and life according to their values, which naturally leads to ethical
considerations (Perry 1999). In this respect, epistemic competences are related to
axiological ones. Indeed, according to a contextualist epistemology, knowledge
is recognized as having validity in a given context (linked to values in particular)
and the choice to value this knowledge rather than another engages the subject’s
responsibility. This choice would come, in an education for responsibility, from
cognitive and dialogical reflexivity – the cognitive component of which is purely
epistemic competences – and from constructive critical thinking.

Box 3.7. Linking epistemic competences with other competences

To conclude, a summary of the knowledge and abilities/dispositions of

epistemic competences that promote responsibility is proposed in Table 3.4,
based on everything that is argued about it in the book.

20 See Chapter 1, footnote 49.

 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 211

Epistemic competences

– In epistemology (reflection on knowledge, reality and human

activity, and the link between the three). For example,
distinguishing epistemology of simplification from epistemology
of complexity
– Beliefs / phenomenological grasp / ego / responsibility links
– Distinction between dogmatic and non-dogmatic modes of
Knowledge expression
– Distinction between negative and constructive critical
thinking
– Dimension of self-knowledge of metacognition: knowing
one’s own implicit attitudes, the functioning of the ego and the
unconscious, the processes of phenomenological grasp
– Link between mind/world/action

– Contextualist personal epistemology

– Knowing how to consciously implement an epistemology of
simplification or complexity, a more or less dogmatic
expression, or a more or less constructive critical thinking
Abilities/dispositions
– Observation, identification and relativization of mental
content (decrease in phenomenological grasp)
– Cognitive flexibility
– Recognizing different types of own thoughts

Table 3.4. Epistemic competences that promote responsibility

3.4.4. Attentional competences

As mentioned in the common foundation of knowledge, skills and

culture, attention seems necessary for the acquisition of knowledge and
abilities/dispositions (Ministère de l’Éducation nationale 2015).

I have discussed the question of attention at length in this book, so I will

just remind you, before summarizing the content of attentional competences
(Table 3.5), that the grasping of phenomena, especially mental phenomena
(see the unconscious mental mode), prevents presence to oneself and to
the environment, and that in this it is opposed to relatedness and empathy,
and also that the only likely function of the reactive mind is to preserve the
ego by preventing the subject from feeling their reactive emotions (and
therefore from integrating them). This grasp is therefore linked to epistemic,
emotional and relational competences.
212 Education for Responsibility

In summary, these attentional competences consist of moving from

exogenous and concentrated attention to vigilant attention (by definition
endogenous, diffuse, shared and equanimous). Focused endogenous attention
is an intermediary in this transition.

Attentional competences

– Different meditation techniques

– The different modalities of attention (section 1.3.2.1.1)
– Principle of the difference between a subjective and an
ultimate perception
Knowledge
– Link between phenomenological grasp / capturing of
attention / ego / the other four horsemen
– Principle of phenomenological reflexivity and its
articulation with dialogical reflexivity

– Formal focused attention meditation:

(1) remaining vigilant to distractions without being diverted
from the chosen object, or (2) disengaging from a
phenomenon by which attention has been captured and
(3) then promptly redirecting attention to the object
– Formal open monitoring meditation: remaining without
phenomenological grasp
– Lovingkindness meditation
– Daily informal application (identifying the instant state of
mind, e.g. grasping of thoughts, emotional contagion, etc.,
Abilities/dispositions and bringing it back to the present moment; being conscious
and attentive-vigilant; feeling compassion for others in your
daily life; etc.)
Phenomenological
– Observing in situ the automatic appraisals (i.e. being
reflexivity
concious of “I want”, “I do not want” and “I do not care”
when they appear) and comparing them to declarative values
– Being concious of the seven types of perceptual objects at
the time they appear (develop equanimity)

Table 3.5. Attentional competences that promote responsibility

 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 213

3.4.5. Relational competences

Having just mentioned the links between these relational competences

and the other three types of competences presented above, the “residual”
recap is presented in Table 3.6.

Relational competences
– The fundamental error of attribution
– Concept of projection
– Different relational modalities (Figure 1.4)
– Empathy/relatedness/responsibility link
Knowledge – Social identity theory
– Cultural stereotypes, link with prejudice and discrimination
– One’s own subjective criteria for judgment
– Beliefs about the human being, the people in one’s
environment, society, one’s environment itself, etc.
– Identifying and seeing in action one’s own prejudices
(discriminating behaviors and example of a technique developed
by Katie 2016), welcoming them and aiming for equanimity
Abilities/dispositions – Equanimous empathy
– Equanimous relatedness
– Otherwise, locating the splitting or fusion with emotions at
the moment in time

Table 3.6. Relational competences that promote responsibility

COMMENT ON TABLE 3.6.– They are as much emotional as they are

epistemic in nature. These competences are to be completed with those in
Table 3.2, which relate to others (right-hand column).

At the crossroads of epistemic and relational competences, there is their

taxonomic dimension, that is, the way in which a subject identifies with an
ingroup (“us”), and thus defines outgroups (“them”). In other words, it
concerns the relationship with otherness and the corresponding subject’s
values. Through the example of violent radicalization, we have discussed the
role of this dimension in responsibility. It should be noted that the way we
consciously or unconsciously form groups is evolving and contextual: a
214 Education for Responsibility

child may perceive their parents as part of an “us” when on a family trip, and
a “them” when playing with peers.

If we feel we are rather empathetic, we can ask ourselves the following

questions: is this empathy only experienced with my loved ones, those with
whom I identify? Am I able to be empathetic towards someone unknown?
With someone whom I consider a stranger? Or even whom I consider to be
an enemy? (and on what basis do I consider them as a friend or an enemy?)
Also, in an equivalent way towards the non-human environment: am I only
in tune with what I identify as my territory, or am I able to be in any
environment (which would be an indicator of equanimity)? These reflections
lead to notions of prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination. We can also
make the link, via the projection mechanisms, with the notion of judgment
towards oneself and towards others. These judgments are related to
attentional biases (personal and cultural) and appraisal. They inhibit empathy
to the extent that they foster a closed mind and a sense of separation from
others.

3.4.6. Axiological competences

We have just discussed the types of competences, each of which is

inherent to a horseman of the mind. At present, there remain the
competences dedicated to guiding these horsemen towards a more
harmonious functioning, through the aim of dialogical reflexivity. It is about
making choices and generating commitment.

As mentioned in relation to dialogical reflexivity, the questioning of

where we are heading, the link between these aims and our actions, and
commitment, is indeed essential in an education for responsibility,
particularly to stimulate motivation. Thus, these axiological competences
could have been called “axio-teleo-logical and pragmatic”: “axio” referring
to value – a principle that should guide action – “teleo” to purpose, to
finality, and “pragmatic” to concrete action. Indeed, it is not a question here
of conducting a theoretical reflection on values in a way that is disconnected
from everyday life, but on the contrary of observing which values and goals,
unconscious or conscious, are serving our effective actions, and which
values and goals, implicit or explicit, are at work in our environment, of
consciously choosing which values and goals we would like to act upon, of
setting this as a goal, and of giving ourselves the means to implement it (this
last point is thanks to the four other types of competences).
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 215

It is these competences that link the first four to the idea of a future. For
example, it may be a conscious choice to promote harmony and solidarity, to
learn to integrate emotions, to develop cognitive flexibility, empathy or
endogenous attention, to understand which values and which type of world
serves an ego-based or non-ego-based functioning.

With regard to this reflection on values, Fabre (2016, p. 27) recommends

an “education for caution” at school, insofar as republican and secular values
would be “out of the question”. This education would involve an
“ethical reflexivity” and the search for a “fair environment” following
problematization (ibid.). However, as mentioned above and empirically
illustrated elsewhere (Hagège 2017c), the French public school, in its
operation, unfortunately presents many contradictions with these values.
How, then, can we encourage a subject to be coherent in a context which is
exempt from coherence? A responsible, self-reflective school would require
the training of reflective practitioners, who would also be reflective on their
personal and societal context. Even if the values of the Republic can be
considered out of the question in such a context, it would therefore be
important for the practitioner to be concious of the inconsistencies between
these declarative values of the school and its dominant practices, and for
discussions on this topic to be welcome in the classroom. And, moreover, we
believe that students whose explicit values are in conflict with these official
values should be encouraged to express their point of view and actively
confront it with that of others. This, as already argued, is a probable
condition for their possible evolution of values.

In conclusion, the first step would be to explain the (personal and social)
implicit values, their links with the effective functioning (of the subject and
the institution, or more generally of society), and then to promote a dialogical
reflexivity between these four types of values: (1) personal conscious,
(2) personal unconscious, (3) explicit social (republican values) and
(4) implicit social (market economy values), and also to compare these
values with regard to the ego, harmony and their respective consequences.
Thus, each subject in an education for responsibility could try to become
conscious of these four types of values, and challenge them in a dynamic and
evolving way, through dialogical reflexivity.

NOTE.– It therefore seems essential that an education for responsibility leads

subjects to become responsible for their own lives. Otherwise, they may well
endorse goals (often extrinsic nowadays; Myers 2009) without really
216 Education for Responsibility

knowing why these goals exist rather than others – in the sense of
(1) knowing what values they serve, and (2) knowing what unconscious
processes or environmental determinants led them to endorse them.

Finally, a particular point of axiological competence concerns the notion

of free will. From an ultimate point of view, if the ego is an illusion and the
subject is only a phenomenon emerging from individual/environmental
interactions (interactions considered as a process of individuation;
Hagège 2014), then free will is nonsense. If there is freedom, it is that of
consciousness with regard to the illusion of the ego. From a relative point of
view, that is, as long as there is an illusion of an ego, the subject can be
considered as having a free will if they see it as such. Belief in free will is
indeed performative (see experience below). A subject who considers
themself as a victim who is experiencing their emotions, the situations they
encounter, etc. will have no choice but to suffer them. In this alienation, the
grasp of reactive thoughts plays an essential role. On the other hand,
awareness of the possibility of choice makes free will effective. Without this,
the subject is a kind of automaton (on this topic we mentioned the agentic
state and the pin ball). In other words, free will, or more precisely, belief in
free will, is a tool for responsibility. Regardless of the notion of whether or
not it exists in the absolute (Knobe and Doris 2010), what matters to us here
is what changes if we believe in it or not.

EXPERIENCE.– Vohs and Schooler (2008) conducted two experiments. In the

first, the subjects either read a neutral text or a text defending determinism,
advocating that behavior is only the product of interactions between genetics
and the environment, and that free will therefore does not exist. Those who
have read the second text then cheated more afterwards (in a task where they
were asked to solve a problem on the computer on their own, when they
could also find it thanks to a security flaw in the program). Those who
believed less in free will were those who cheated the most. This suggests
that they were shirking responsibility for their actions. In the second
experiment, these researchers observed that subjects who had read
deterministic proposals cheated by awarding themselves supernumerary
points after a cognitive task, while subjects who had read assertions
advocating free will did not cheat.

We could see a paradox in highlighting an aim of harmonious values

(Table 3.7), while at the same time advocating a free choice of values.
However, the fact of recording this aim makes it possible to bring it into the
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 217

discussion. In addition, “putting forward”, at the pedagogical level, will

consist of presenting the ins and outs of the functioning of the ego and
responsibility. Then the subject will be invited to identify the values related
to the ego and those that, on the contrary, serve harmony. An intimate
understanding of these processes, including the limitations and sufferings
induced by the ego, should logically lead them to consciously privilege
harmonious values. In other words, the practitioner (educator or trainer for
example) will be able to present such harmonious values as possible, even
desirable, alternatives in our context, consider their consequences and
confront them with other contradictory values (for example, consumerist or
why not jihadist, if a student subject brought them into the discussion). This
choice, submitted to the subject whom the practitioner would consider as
having free will, will give the subject an opportunity to evolve towards such
values. Indeed, suggesting to a subject that they have free will lead them to
act in a more ethical way than if it is suggested that they do not (see
experience above).

Also, because of the major importance of unconscious learning by

imitation, the more the practitioner embodies harmonious values, the more
they breathe them into their being, speaking and acting, the greater their
influence will be in this sense. Indeed, unconsciously, a subject feels how
others are. By the way, there is no better way to calm a class than to be
yourself in a state of mental calm. On the other hand, achieving such a result
while being internally agitated will probably require some coercion! If you
want to be surrounded by serene and loving people, the best thing to do is to
be serene and loving yourself (see section 2.4.3.2.3).

Axiological competences
– Own values and goals, implicit and explicit, and those of the
human environment (e.g. values of relatives, the government,
jihadists, the economy, etc.)
– Links between ego/disharmony/dual systems (notion of implicit
attitudes) on the one hand, and responsibility/harmony/coherence
Knowledge on the other hand
– Link between actions, values and goals
– Concepts of choice and free will
– Concept of performative thinking
– Intertwining of language and values → cultural bias of language
and therefore of thoughts and knowledge
218 Education for Responsibility

Abilities/ – Challenge one’s own values and goals, and those of the human
dispositions environment, in a dialogical relationship21
– Distinguish values that serve the ego from those that are
beneficial to oneself and the environment
– Consciously choose and endorse harmonious values and goals
that serve them
– Engage, take responsibility, acting in a coherent way to achieve
Dialogical
these explicit goals and values (e.g. to train one’s mind for
reflexivity
reflexivity)
– Reflective distance from on thoughts and their axiological
connotations; consciously choosing mental content that promotes
harmony
– Act on the basis of the belief in the existence of one’s own free
will, on the basis of possibilities of choice of actions and life
(versus victim behavior in the face of life, others and situations)

Table 3.7. Axiological competences that promote responsibility

Axiological competences involve the other four types of competences. For

example, for humanistic values, the taxonomy is broad and the “we” is the entirety of
human beings: if this value is as implicit as it is explicit, then the subject,
equanimous, can empathize with every human being in their presence (relational
competence). In addition, identifying our implicit values requires attentional
competences. What do we bring into our subjective reality? Does this correspond to
our values and goals or not? We can enter into a dialogical reflexivity concerning
what we let our attention focus on moment after moment: it corresponds to our
values and goals, often unconscious (and sometimes therefore to social stereotypes
endorsed without our knowledge), or to their opposites: what is appraised positively
(therefore implicitly valued, “I want”) or negatively (“I do not want”). In this respect,
this journey also implies the emotional competence to face emotion, to become
responsible for it. For example, making a conscious choice as to whether or not to
maintain an addiction (SM1p ; section 2.4.2). Obviously, questioning goals and
values also involves epistemic competences: distancing oneself from thoughts and
beliefs, metacognition and thought formulation, such as those that include the
conscious choice of goals. It can be like this: do my thoughts and my relationship
with knowledge serve the values that are close to my heart or do they on the contrary
run counter to these values (cf. their performativity)?

Box 3.8. Linking axiological competences with other competences

21 Moreover, according to Dubreucq (2016), it is the nature of secularism to appraise values,

in a way “that claims to judge them without refuting them, and to recognize them without
adhering to them” (p. 211, author’s translation), and thus to consist of “the establishment of a
critical relationship with these values” (p. 212).
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 219

In short, axiological competences aim to consciously choose harmonious

values through dialogical reflexivity. The other competences will provide the
means to act in accordance with these values, in particular through
phenomenological reflexivity. Thus, responsibility education is conceived
here as the implementation of conditions prompting the subjects to
participate in a process of questioning, explicitation and attentional training,
which makes it possible to become more conscious of oneself, others and the
non-human environment, to act harmoniously – towards all three.

3.4.7. Summary of the progress within the five types of

competences

To summarize the competences and progression targeted in an education

for responsibility, a set of benchmarks and indicators can be gathered, based
on the theory presented here (Table 3.8), and represented in a diagram
(Figure 3.2).

Mind on the way

Closed, to achieving Open, principled,
Competences Criteria ordinary mind openness alert mind
(ego) (towards (responsibility)
awakening)

flight
awareness, lack of
(avoidance, “I do
Attitude to recognition, letting identification,
not care”), fight
reactive go, caring24 = appraisal and
(“I do not
Emotional

emotions22 regulation grasping =

want”), grasping
23 integration25
(“I want”)

parasitized
security or innovation
Motivation26 (extrinsic)
innovation (intrinsic)
security

22 Review of instruments in Mikolajczak and Bausseron (2013).

23 “Submerged” subject, impulsive. Lack of knowledge, fear (negative appraisal),
disconnection or strong grasping. Measurement tool, see Favre et al. (2009).
24 Neutral appraisal or non-grasping of emotion (expressed with kindness).
25 All emotions are harmonious, not linked to the illusion of an ego.
26 Theory in Favre (2007).
220 Education for Responsibility

Source of phenomena
phenomena and
emotional (external or own consciousness
consciousness
Emotional

security internal27)

Trust in “self”,
tolerance to weak on the rise unconditional
uncertainty

Information impersonal and

dogmatic28 scientific
processing without grasping

Critical
negative constructive non-dualistic
thinking

Thinking29 simplifying deliberate complex

pushed back,
Reactive
grasped or regulated absent
thoughts
unconscious
Epistemic

very structuring
of the considered as absent (perception
Beliefs personality, temporary tools for of the real not
understood as evolution distorted)
truths

Personal
dualist multiplicist contextualist
epistemology30

high (verbal neither verbal nor

Metacognition absent
mental) mental

Cognitive average or domain high in different

weak
flexibility dependent fields

mostly increasingly
diffused and
Attention exogenous and endogenous and
equanimous
Attentional

concentrated broad

Inhibition,
magnification ubiquitous common absent
based on ego

27 Thoughts, people, products, behaviors, etc.

28 Measurement scale: Shearman and Levine (2006).
29 Tool developed in Arboix Calas (2013).
30 Review of instruments in Dang (2013).
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 221

Phenomenologi-
cal grasp of strong and less frequent and/or
absent
Attentional

emotions and unconscious conscious

thoughts31

Field of
reduced broader potentially cosmic
consciousness

through splitting
Relationships or cutting with equanimous
empathy
with others32 emotions, or empathy33
unconscious

through splitting
Relationships or cutting with equanimous
relatedness
with the NHE34 emotions, or relatedness
unconscious
Relational

Preference
unconscious35,
towards
claimed or
ingroups or
reified; conscious and
own territory,
projections, unwanted, residual absent; harmonious
aversion
identification, tendency to protect “discrimination”37
towards
stereotypes, one’s ego
outgroups or
prejudices,
foreign
discrimination36
territories

serving the ego

Axiological

conscious and
Explicit38 and closure to thought out,
dialogical, serving
values otherness, poorly serving harmony
harmony
thought out

31 Instruments for measuring grasping of thoughts: Dionne et al. (2016); emotions: Fresco
et al. (2007); and perceptions: no instruments found, except eye-tracking for sight.
32 For the tool, see Favre et al. (2009).
33 Perception of the suffering and limitations inherent in the different manifestations of ego in
others (non-judgmental, benevolent perception).
34 Tools, see Hagège et al. (2009).
35 Many tools, for example: Eberhardt et al. (2003); Lai et al. (2014).
36 In this book, “discrimination” has been used mainly in its frequent meaning in psychosociology;
it is discrimination based on ego. A principled mind discriminates against others, to better take into
account their particularities and needs, perceived without judgment or duality.
37 See footnote 36 above.
38 See for example Schwartz’s (2006) theory on the different individual values.
222 Education for Responsibility

many, unknown, endangered,

Implicit values absent
unreflected conscious

Adequacy of low if values are in the process of

values/ harmonious, high improvement
perfect
behavior if values serve the (awareness of
(coherence39) ego inconsistencies)
Axiological

Awareness of
the axiological
connotation of weak high total
thoughts, goals,
actions, etc.

social roles authentic, equitably

(e.g. victim, more and more beneficial for
Behaviors
executioner or authentic oneself, others and
savior40) the NHE

Violence
(towards
frequent rare and conscious absent
oneself, others
or the NHE)

low (depression, more authentic

addictions, etc.) (linked to intrinsic
irrelevant notion
Transversal indicators

or superficial goals) and a

41 (being beyond the
Well-being (assimilated with heightened
duality of
the immediate awareness of
well-being/unease)
satisfaction of discomfort and its
extrinsic goals) causes

Need for
strong weak absent
closure42

Knowledge of
total and
internal states weak high
omnipresent
and functions

Reflexivity uncommon dialogical phenomenological

Table 3.8. Model of change enhanced through education for responsibility

39 Grid to measure the occurrences in a text or a verbatim record in Hagège (2017c).

40 See the theory of the dramatic triangle in Petitcollin (2011).
41 See tools in Shankland (2014).
42 Scale in Webster and Kruglanski (1994).
 Educ
cation for Respo
onsibility Guidelines 223

COMME ENT ON TAB BLE 3.8.– This

T table presents
p a modular
m theeoretical
framewoork that can be used in reesearch on “education
“ fo and parrticularly
for”,
on educcation for responsibility
r y. Most of thet notes inn this table refer to
psychom metric toolss that makee it possible to meassure the im mpact of
educatioonal measuures on thee different competencees associateed with
responssibility, in other
o wordss on open-m mindedness. Not all inndicators
necessaarily coincidee in a subjecct. That is to
o say: this table does nott suggest
the exisstence of carricatured subbjects corresp
sponding perf rfectly to thee column
“closedd mind”. Thiss table is dessigned to evaaluate a channge from onee extreme
to anothther. It couldd also be used
u pedagog gically for a self-assesssment of
competeences. The dootted blue arrrow (first linne) means that any charaacteristic
in the column
c “clossed mind” will
w switch to o the next column
c as sooon as it
becomess conscious (if it was not previously)). For exampple, being aw ware that
we are avoiding ann emotion iss more a cha aracteristic of an open mind (a
reflexiviity) than a closed mind.m The dotted
d arrow means tthat the
charactteristics on the right inndicate morre open-minndedness thaan those
precedinng them, butt that, howevver, they are not specific to a principlled mind
(they caan also be fouund in a mind in the proccess of openiing up).

Figurre 3.2. Symboolic representaation of the inte

ended
path in an education
e for responsibility
r

COMME ENT ON FIGUURE 3.2.2.– The box corrresponds to o the ego, itss relative
and duaal relationshhip with the world (separrate entity: closed
c box) where a
durationn is graspedd (permanennt entity: vaalidity periodd). The lotus flower
symbolizzes the mindd’s ultimate qualities:
q equ
uanimity andd emptiness oof which
one cann become conncious througgh reflexivityy practices (aand one can be more
in the prresent momennt: lemniscatte).
224 Education for Responsibility

The reason why we have placed particular emphasis on attentional

competences is that they are rarely considered in “education for” (and
education in general), despite their crucial importance. Emphasis at a
pedagogic level can therefore be placed. Their development will facilitate
the development of all other competences. On the other hand, their low level
will limit the development of other competences (in particular, because they
are necessary to achieve the characteristics typical of the principled mind;
see Table 3.8).

3.5. Integrating model of psychospiritual competences targeted

in education for responsibility

The initial question of this book was “how can we change the world?” and
the proposed answer here is “by changing the way our mind functions”.

The principles of education for responsibility proposed here consist of

working to change one’s mind and the distortion of one’s perception induced
by the ego, to bring it closer to a principled mind, transparent to itself,
perceiving the ultimate reality and allowing harmonious functioning (see
section 2.4.3). Such a change would require a conscious choice of mental
content (including the endorsement of harmonious goals), the absence of
grasping and action consistent with the chosen goals. This coherence
requires first of all an awareness and acceptance of one’s own
inconsistencies, mobilizing increasingly endogenous, diffused and
equanimous attention (open presence). To further detail the process at stake,
we have broken down the changes into the four horsemen of the mind
(emotions, cognition, orientation and relationships) and five corresponding
competences (respectively emotional, epistemic, attentional-axiological and
relational). In the initial presentation, values, attention and appraisal were all
considered as an aspect of orientation (section 1.3.2.1), while here we have
distinguished between axiological and attentional competences. Indeed,
initially, it was a question of presenting the ordinary functioning of the
individual relative mind, frequently guided by a set of processes of which the
subject is unaware. In particular, attention, often exogenous, is thus
correlated with implicit values, so that even lifestyle is not always the object
of a conscious choice, even when there is a possible freedom of action. The
subject’s actions are sometimes unknowingly the result of emotional
avoidance strategies, for example. Since responsibility implies becoming
aware of these functions (via phenomenological reflexivity), dissociating
values from other aspects of the “orientation” horseman seems more
 Educ
cation for Respo
onsibility Guidelines 225

operatioonal to consiider the educational aim m. Indeed, whhen attentionn directs

the funcctioning of the ordinaryy subject, it is often by being graspped by a
phenom menon (exogeenous attentiion). During the developpment of enddogenous
attentionn, attention itself becommes an objeect of attentiion, which aallows a
“testimoony consciouusness” to develop.
d Sincce it is a queestion of leaarning to
developp diffused annd endogenouus attention on o the one hand,
h and to question
and connsciously chooose one’s values
v and goals
g on the other hand, then, as
the minnd transform ms, attentionn becomes “meta”
“ overr other comppetences
(Figure 3.3): it makkes it possible to detach oneself
o fromm emotions, tthoughts,
even vaalues (in thee sense that the latter arre no longerr the object of an “I
want” oro a graspinng) and it is then no longer – when w it is pperfectly
equanimmous – a guiding facctor as succh. Attentionn, through witness
consciousness, allow ws us to transscend all inittial identificaation objects.

Fig
gure 3.3. Psycchospiritual competences fo or an educationn in responsib
bility.
Forr a color versio
on of this figurre, see www.is
ste.co.uk/hage
ege/educationn.zip

COMME ENT ON FIGU URE 3.3.– Em motional com mpetences are the founddation of
work onn the mind:: they are perhapsp the greatest diffficulty for ordinary
Westernn subjects andd changing the t relationsh hip with theirr emotions caan allow
a changge in beliefs fs, thoughts and relation nships (see Box 3.9). E Epistemic
competeences can “push” towardds a goal in th he extent to which
w the subj
bject who
still idenntifies with thoughts
t andd beliefs willl be attractedd to situationns where
they seee themself (via
(v their proojections). Axiological
A c
competences make it
possiblee to “pull”, too orient the functioning
f of the subject in a certain direction
(e.g. thaat of harmonnious functioning). Relatiional compettences superrvise this
change to the extennt that, throough interactions with others o and thhe NHE,
emotionns can be provvoked or calm med, and belliefs and valuues can be deeveloped,
clarifiedd and challennged. Finallyy, the develop pment of atteentional comp
mpetences
226 Education for Responsibility

allows the subject to witness their own subjectivity, their own individuation
and to adopt a perspective that, in the long run, can transcend the subjectivity
of ther own experience. Note: creativity refers to a symptom of innovation
motivation.

Here we find our wise leader Touiavii, who eloquently expresses what seems
to be particularly exacerbated among Westerners on average:

“But the Papalagi [the European] thinks so much that he has to think, needs
to think, is even forced to think. He must think at all times […] The thinking and
the fruits of his thinking – his thoughts – hold him captive. It is as if he were
intoxicated by his own thoughts. When the sun shines beautifully, he thinks at
once: ‘How nicely it shines!’. He constantly thinks ‘How beautifully it shines!’.
This is wrong. Totally wrong. Foolish. For it is better not to think, when the sun
shines. A clever Samoan stretches his limbs in the warm light and thinks nothing.
He takes the sun not only into his head, but takes it also with both his hands, his
feet, his thighs, his belly and all his body. He lets his skin and his limbs think for
themselves. And surely they think also, even if in a different way than the head
[..] He may think cheerful thoughts, but he doesn’t smile; he may think sad
thoughts, but he doesn’t cry [..] He is a human being, whose senses live as
enemies within his spirit– a human being who is split into two parts.

“The life of the Papalagi often resembles that of a man who takes a canoe ride
to Savaii and who thinks, as soon as he has pushed off the shore: ‘I wonder how
long I will take to get to Savaii?. He thinks, but doesn’t see the appealing landscape
along his way. Soon there is a hillside on the left. When he sees it, he cannot take
his eyes from it. What could be behind the mountain? Could it be a deep bay, or a
narrow one? His thoughts make him forget to chant along with the other youngsters,
and he barely hears the teasing of the maidens. Hardly have the bay and the hillside
passed, another thought torments him – whether there could be a storm before
evening. […] But the storm does not come and he reaches Savaii by nightfall
unharmed. Yet to him it seems as though he had not made this journey, because all
day long his thoughts were far away from his body and outside of the boat. [...]

“But the Papalagi loves and worhips his mind and feeds it with thoughts
from his head. He never lets it go hungry and yet it doesn’t distress him if the
thoughts eat each other. He makes much noise with his thoughts and he lets them
be loud like impolite children. He acts as though his thoughts are priceless like
blossoms, mountains and forests! [...]

“The serious sickness of thinking has befallen them. This thinking is

supposed to make the head great and high. When someone thinks much and fast,
then they say in Europe he is a great head. Instead of being pitied, these great
heads are especially honoured. The villages make them chiefs, and wherever a
 Education for Responsibility Guidelines 227

great head goes, he has to think ahead of others, which gives everyone much
pleasure and is much admired. When a great head dies, the whole land is in
mourning and people wail about what has been lost. An image of the dead head
is made of a rock and it is put in the market place for all to see. Yes, these stone
heads are made even much larger than their true size in life, so that the people
will admire them properly and will feel humbled by their own small head.

“Ask the educated one a question and he shoots back an answer before you
have closed your mouth. His head is always charged with ammunition; it is always
ready to shoot. Every European gives the most beautiful time of his life to make
his head into a fast firestick […] Most carry such a heavy load in their head, so that
their body is tired from this burden and in time becomes frail and wilted.

“Should we now, beloved brothers, after everything that I have reported here
in steadfast truth, imitate the Papalagi and learn to think like he does? I say no!
Because we should not and must not do anything which does not make us
stronger in body and happier and better in our spirit. We must guard against
anything which may rob us of our joy of life; especially that which may darken
our spirit and take away its bright light; especially that which may bring enmity
between our head and our body. The Papalagi proves with his own example that
thinking is a serious sickness, which makes the value of a human much smaller”
(Scheurmann 1997, pp. 171–185).

This text describes well the differences in functioning and effects between
the conscious sensory mode of Samoan people and the unconscious mental mode
of the Papalagi (section 2.3.3). The particular prevalence of the reactive mind in
us would therefore make all the greater our splitting with our emotions and the
reluctance to regulate or integrate them. However, mental phenomena can also
be a formidable tool in the service of ethics. Thus the models proposed in this
book could allow the reactive mind to feed itself in a way that is conducive to the
development of responsibility.

Box 3.9. Reactive thoughts... an illness?

We refer to these five competences as “psychospiritual”, in a nod to skills

that are referenced in the field of health education: the psychosocial skills of
the World Health Organization (Division of Mental Health 1993). There is a
partial overlap between these two types of psychosocial skills/competences
(psychosocial and psychospiritual), in which we find for example critical
thinking, emotion regulation and empathy. Only here, we particularly insist
on the transformation of the state of consciousness inherent in responsibility,
in particular through attentional competences. As it is a transformation of the
mind (esprit in French), these competences deserve the title “spiritual”. On
228 Education for Responsibility

the other hand, although relatively focused on the individual (see the prefix
“psycho” of psychospiritual), our approach also takes into account social
and, more generally, environmental interactions. In this respect, they are not
only psychosocial, but rather psycho-socio-environmental, and thus also touch
on the problems of environmental or sustainable development education43.
This expansion also helps to justify the term “spiritual”, which refers to
individuality as part of a whole that goes beyond the human condition.

43 There is a lack by the WHO of consideration for relationships with the NHE in their
psychosocial skills, because many studies show the importance of the relationship with nature
for well-being and mental health (Kellert et al. 2011).
 4

Discussion

“In the Indian tradition, apart from the arsenal of respiratory

and gymnastic techniques of yoga (the Greeks of Alexander the
Great’s time called yogis the gymgoers, gymnasts of wisdom),
what seems to me most interesting is this true ‘metapsychology’
that the practice of meditation allowed to develop over the ages.
Hindu sages perfectly understood that the root of all our evils
resides first in us and that ‘knowing yourself’, which was later
dear to Socrates and then to Montaigne, could give rise to a true
science of being and the psyche. Shri Aurobindo expresses it
perfectly when, in a lapidary way, he says: ‘Each mind puts its
own ideas in the place of truth”. And we could add: ‘instead of
reality’. Indeed, we know that our listening to others, our gaze
on others and on our immediate environment are constantly
polluted by our thoughts, fantasies, emotions and mental
conceptions. We must therefore, unceasingly, cleanse our
mental phenomena to find a clear conscience and a true
presence in the world.

We have not been taught that in the West.

And here is perhaps the most beautiful message, inherited from

this multi-millennial India, that we can share today. Without
having to become in any way Hindu, we can use India’s eternal
wisdom to learn how to become better, more tolerant, more open,
more lucid”. (de Smedt 1997, author’s translation, pp. 8–9)

Education for Responsibility, First Edition. Hélène Hagège.

© ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
230 Education for Responsibility

4.1. Education for responsibility, ethics and spirituality

As mentioned above, the notion of responsibility is at the heart of the

intelligibility of education. Throughout this book we have argued about the
interests of addressing the issues of “education for” from the theoretical
perspective of the notion of responsibility. In any case, from a basic point of
view, to “educate for responsibility” could be considered a pleonasm.
Educating consists of encouraging the child to be responsible, by finding the
right balance between a total absence of responsibility and a responsibility that
is too heavy and overwhelming (therefore guilt-inducing; Vieillard-Baron
1994). The expected result is that adults can therefore live in society without
parents. Despite this, it must be noted that “humanity in its most significant
part is still, psychologically speaking, in a state of infancy” (Jung 1933/1986,
p. 256, italics in original text author’s translation), since a significant
proportion of “adults” cannot do without symbolic and operational substitutes
for parents: to frame their behavior (laws, police, justice system, etc.) and to
provide – at least in appearance – for their emotional needs (spouses, sources
of distractions that allow them to forget themselves and escape their reality
such as television, drugs, etc.). Thus, most adults could probably be more
responsible, in the sense of having a psycho-emotional maturity that allows
them to behave ethically in a spontaneous manner and to find their own
emotional resources within themselves. These would therefore be two goals of
education for responsibility.

These two aspects of “immaturity” are generally based on the functioning

of the ego, and this is probably even more so in our society, which tends to
encourage capricious childish behavior in us, with low tolerance for
frustration and emotional dependence (see Introduction). Why are we acting
in a harmful way to others, to the environment, or to ourselves, and looking for
emotional nourishment from the outside? Because we perceive the world in
large part through the prism of “I want, I do not want, I do not see”; we seek
to bring to ourselves what we consider desirable for us, to avoid what we
evaluate as undesirable, and do not take the rest into consideration (see
section 1.3.2.1), and this is based on a feeling of separation with these three
types of objects. We have a partial, biased, self-centered and distorted vision
of reality that prevents us from taking into account ourselves, others and the
NHE equitably. The ego therefore obstructs the ethical aim. There is a lack of
connection, a lack of unity with what is. This lack of unity makes the ego
seek objects with which to unite. As we have explained, this quest is in vain,
because it is based on a subjective duality (whereas objectively there is a
 Discussion 231

dialogical relationship) and maintains it. In fact, it cannot bring lasting

happiness and only feeds the feeling of separation that makes us suffer
(Dambrun and Ricard 2011).

We have mentioned that one of the important determinants of this

functioning is the tendency of the mind to take refuge in our thoughts to
escape emotions (section 1.3.2.4.2 and Figure 1.7): the attention thus paid to
mental phenomena does not make the consciousness available to what is
happening more deeply within itself. On the other hand, it is in its own
consciousness that a principled mind finds its only source of emotional
security, its only refuge. Thus, ethics is based on a psychospiritual
development, involving that of responsibility:

“Spirituality is simply the attention, respect and humility given to

the life of the mind, perceived as an echo chamber of the world,
visible or invisible. Not to control it, this spirit, not to enslave it,
nor to make it a tool at the service of our ambitions, but to observe,
submit, collect, contemplate, turn to the mysteries of life without
the certainty of clear answers.

I once read this remark attributed to the Dalai Lama: ‘We can do
without tea, but not water. Just as we can do without religion, but
not spiritual life’. Spirituality can be lived perfectly in a secular
way. And also to lead to an increased quality of our faith if we are
believers”. (André 2015, author’s translation)

One day, a student returned to the meditation module in a joyful mood.

She was a Muslim and told me, excitedly, something like: “I listened to an
imam’s teaching this weekend... he was saying exactly the same thing as
you! He was talking about the ego and how it takes us away from God,
distorting our vision of life and the world!” I reassure you: I am not talking
about God in class. However, this testimony is in line with one of my
intuitions mentioned in the introduction: that the essence of any authentic
ethical or spiritual approach (whether theistic or atheistic, secular or
religious) is to go beyond one’s ego in order to have a life beneficial to
beings through an expanded and impersonal consciousness. And this implies
looking at one’s own subjectivity and relative character (phenomenological
reflexivity), instead of spending one’s energy in judging or wanting to
change others: this is also, it seems to me, the core substance of ethics and
responsibility. When religions lead to violence, it is my opinion that these
232 Education for Responsibility

toolboxes of spiritual development (religions) have been instrumentalized

by the egos of those who have seen in them objects of identification and
reasons for grasping power (and the ego can do this also through other
institutions, such as the State or the family, for example).

I sometimes tell students that if I had to choose a mandatory class bible

for all at the Public School, it would be Myers’ Social Psychology (2009)
reference book. Indeed, this book teaches many scientific aspects that I
believe are fundamental to understanding how a human being works, how
they can be manipulated or happy, for example. In short, basic conceptual
tools which can help one be a little reflexive and a little more free from the
various mental manipulations. To describe our Western societies, Myers
paints a picture of material abundance and spiritual poverty, emphasizing the
ethical importance of personal and spiritual development. He mentions that
this involves a change of consciousness and feeling responsible for
something greater than oneself, each assuming by default that they are
themself part of the global problem. This last point illustrates in particular
Morin’s hologrammatic principle. This is entirely consistent with our
approach and with the constructivist epistemology in which it is embedded.

So we affirm here, perhaps in a bold way, that an education for

responsibility must invite us to follow an ethical journey, through spiritual
development, understood in a completely secular way.

4.2. Limitations of this approach

4.2.1. Obstacles in the French context

Indeed, this may seem bold in our culture recently institutionalized on the
principle of the separation of church and state. The first few times I mentioned
the words “meditation” or “spiritual” in congresses, it did not fail to evoke a
reaction or a question suggesting something inappropriate to our secular
context. Incidentally, it is ironic to note that our word for “secular” (laϊque in
French) originally came from Catholicism, referring – even today – to those
who practise but who are neither ordained nor clerical (i.e. founding a family
life in general). But this religious origin of the term seems to have been
forgotten (Lefebvre 1998). In our dualist culture, sometimes turning to
scientism1 (Hagège 2013), secularism often seems implicitly associated with

1 See Introduction, note 4.

 Discussion 233

atheism or a-reliogisity, and spirituality assimilated to religion. Thus a badly

considered conceptual shortcut, based on mistaken amalgams, would lead to
the conclusion that spirituality has no place in the Public School. However, the
difference between spirituality and religion is, in my opinion, the difference
between a thing and a word that designates it: the thusness of a particular thing
(e.g. a given tree) cannot be enclosed in a word (“tree”). In my opinion, each
religion is like the word “tree” pronounced in a different language: it has a
meaning, connotations – in relation to the tree species present in the places
where this language is spoken, to the artistic works representing or mobilizing
trees, to the cultural values associated with nature and the forest, etc. – and a
particular shape, sound and vibration. Despite these contextual differences,
spirituality refers to the objective reality of a transformation of consciousness.
More generally, after abstractions such as the one made here, it refers to the
intellectually extractable invariants of the transformations of the mind,
inherent in the potentialities of a human being. And we have argued here that
these potentials correspond to physico-psychic properties, which can even be
scientifically supported. In this respect, a secular (non-religious) language can
be invented to say the word “tree” at the French Public School, with the aim of
promoting the development of responsibility. This is what I intend to
contribute to with this book. Moreover, many spiritual movements,
non-religious and sometimes atheist, have emerged or become popular in
recent decades in the West.

Also, many meditation techniques derive from Buddhism, and although

some have been secularized (Kabat-Zinn 2003) and widely scientifically
studied (Braboszcz et al. 2010) for nearly 40 years, some members of
society seem reluctant in principle (via critical negative thinking) to accept
this type of approach. In fact, such practices are not immune to aberrations
(sectarian, dogmatic or proselytizing), but no less than any other vision or
practice. Hard sciences are often taught in this way, that is in a dogmatic and
“proselytizing” way (Favre 2016). Fourez (2002) even argues that the
process of scientific studies includes all the attributes of brainwashing and
we have shown in the laboratory that the level of dogmatism tends to
increase with the level of scientific studies (Dang 2013). However, this is
considered safe and even welcome in France, whereas history has repeatedly
shown that the implicit epistemology at work involves serious ethical risks
(Hagège 2013). In fact, there is always resistance to novelty in a society. Sex
education was unthinkable a few decades ago in France and it is still
unthinkable in many countries today. Thus, in the latter, women marry
without knowing what it is all about, sometimes discover it in a violent way,
234 Education for Responsibility

and venereal diseases spread when this could be avoided. On the other hand,
one could easily imagine that sex education also provides an opportunity for
some adults to abuse their position. And yet, our society has recognized its
importance, particularly in terms of health. And we will see that the
approach proposed here is also of health importance (section 4.3).

Beyond these obstacles linked to a misunderstanding of spirituality and

secularism, there are still obstacles that may be more significant because they
are older historically. They are probably related to the disease of constant
thinking that seems to characterize us (Box 3.9). I have detailed them in several
articles (Hagège 2013, 2015b, 2017c) and will therefore only briefly recall their
overarching principle here. Institutional epistemology tends to make us believe
that we are rational beings transparent to ourselves who generate our actions by
conscious choice. Even in scientific articles on psychology, this seems to be the
implicitly mobilized model, despite all the scientific knowledge – partly cited
in this book – that now invalidates this model. It tends to promote a dualism,
according to which body and mind, reason and emotion are separable. It
implicitly suggests that it is the knowledge (reason, thoughts, etc.) of a subject
that determines actions and that takes precedence over everything else. As a
result, academic knowledge focuses mainly on understanding the outer world
and teachers or other practitioners do not always make the effort to be
consistent with their discourse (see (2) in section 2.3.1.2). They do not always
(not often?) realize these inconsistencies. In correlation, action in situations, the
body and the relationship with the body are largely neglected in curricular
learning for the benefit of theoretical knowledge (Masciotra et al. 2008). Thus,
for example, sport and art are considered as ancillary topics, and manual
vocationalization courses are considered as ways back-up options students who
have failed in general courses. And it seems that the system continues to make
teachers believe that the mind and body are separable and that only the first one
would be necessary for theoretical learning, which is of course scientifically
contested (ibid.).

In conclusion, the low consideration of emotions, the body and action in

situation in school practices, the virtual absence of theoretical knowledge to
understand them, of practices to regulate them in curricula2 and the

2 In the 2015 programs (common foundation and moral and civic education), a consistent
place was given to emotions and learning how to regulate them (Hagège 2017a). It remains to
be seen whether and how this will actually be taught, given that teachers are generally not
trained to do so.
 Discussion 235

erroneous doxa that makes us act as if all this were dispensable to the
transformation of the person and the citizen are obstacles to education for
responsibility. To provide a caricature, it is the implicit and erroneous belief
that education consists mainly of the training of super-intellectuals, whose
knowledge (e.g. ethical) is not relevant to their actions.

4.2.2. Some limitations of the proposed model

It is perhaps under this cultural influence that I have still given

insufficient space to the body in this book. The body has been mentioned
with regard to perceptions and their role, emotions, resonance, body-mind
indentification in the metaphysical model, and, of course, attentional
training. However, on the one hand, we could have further developed the
mechanisms of action of physical facilitators (circulation of cerebrospinal
fluid, vertebral alignment, properties of cranial bones, etc.) on changes in
states of consciousness. On the other hand, pedagogical applications
involving the body should be further explored and analyzed in relation to
education for responsibility. I am thinking in particular of singing, dancing
and certain physical disciplines. In some cultures, dancing and singing
together are almost weekly activities that bring families and communities
together in a moment of sharing, joy and awareness of the reactive mind:
implicitly, such activities teach us to be aware of our body sensations and to
connect with others in a harmonious, simple and joyful way (to resonate
physically with them). These kinds of traditions have become rare nowadays
in Western societies, especially in urban areas. If you sing, it’s rather alone
in front of your computer – maybe hoping one day to expose your talents on
TV – in a karaoke session or with a group dedicated exclusively to that (so
not necessarily with people with whom a community bond will be
developed). Dancing is mostly done in a class or in a nightclub (alone, in a
couple, rarely in a group with physical contact). There are also often issues
here that are at least implicit in the order of appearance, image or personal
pleasure (except perhaps in ballet, traditional dance balls, where the notion
of sharing would be more significant?).

The physical impact of singing on the body and on the transformation of

the mind is understood and instrumentalized in ancient traditions such as
yoga. Yoga refers, among other things, to an Indian philosophical system,
with physical practices in which breathing and movement are carried out
conciously (i.e. phenomenologically thought out). The essence of yoga
would lead to inner silence, in other words, to the disappearance of the
236 Education for Responsibility

reactive mind (Papin 1990) – which we have seen is only the expression of
the ego used to avoid the phenomenological experience of reactive emotions.
Thus, the emission of particular sounds, possibly mobilizing mantras, and
sometimes called “harmonic chanting”, aims to cleanse the body and
therefore the mind of its egotistical engrams. These sounds correspond to
harmonics in the mathematical (musical) sense of the term, that is, the body
produces at the same time sounds of different pitches whose relationships are
harmonic (like a singing bowl). Such practices are also found in Tibetan
Buddhism and Sufism. In the Taoist tradition, the role of martial disciplines
such as archery or combat is one of the foundations of spiritual practice3 and
some Qi Gong movements are accompanied by sounds. To speak in a dualist
way, these different traditions contain an elaborate science of the interactions
between body and mind. Although meditation involves working on the body,
a third term alongside “meditation” and “reflexivities” (“corporality”?)
would probably be welcome to further support the recommended methods of
education for responsiblity.

Finally, the proposed model, as such, has inherent limitations in the

simplifications it inevitably contains. These limits are partly dependent on
my own limitations in understanding and explaining the phenomena
concerned. In addition, this model could be more complex. I am thinking in
particular of the following point, which could be a topic of future
theorization.

It would be a question of integrating the modalities of interaction of the

four horsemen with interindividual differences, for example the dispositions,
temperaments, personality, different types of intelligence, etc. that we group
here under the generic term “trait” (without referring to a particular theory).
There are theories developed in different traditions, for example: the
enneagram, temperaments according to Tibetan Buddhism, according to
Taoism (the wonderful vessels), wounds (Bourbeau 2013)... The latter two
even mention a correspondence between physical and psychological traits.
On the scientific side, the best known are probably the three personality
traits (Eysenck 1991) and the Big Five personality traits (Costa and McCrae
1992). Such analyses would perhaps make it possible to develop a science
and also, surely, finer tools to help everyone to know themselves better and
understand how they work. For such a journey, the subject will probably first

3 And this has been taken up in Confucianism, rather for the “control” of the mind (and the
people).
 Discussion 237

identify with one or more traits, which will help them to better develop their
phenomenological reflexivity and to see the automatic nature of their traits.
Then they will be able to disidentify from these traits: to see that they are not
the ego and their automatisms, but the consciousness that can perceive them.

We discuss such personality traits in the MBER module.

TESTIMONIALS.– “I am now aware in these situations that it is the ego that

arises and I have the impression that simply having awareness that it is the
ego allows me to leave it less space, less importance, less control over me”.
(Student A).

“I think that I have found myself to be [anger-related trait addressed in

the module] very stubborn and clinging to this habit of assimilating
everything and putting it together in the form of a puzzle to understand. I
have the feeling that I am getting better and better at locating the boundary
that separates the ego from the consciousness”. (Student B)

“The [trait related to the desire discussed in the module] is the one that
worried me the most in terms of my relationship with my love life [...]. What
particularly alarmed me was my tendency to be blind, for example, to let
someone hurt me without paying attention to it, because I constantly ‘replay’
these moments of grasping, which leads to particularly unhealthy
relationships. I realized that in reality I didn’t know myself well enough and
that I needed to spend more time exploring who I am, what I want, the values
that are important to me in order to identify who I really am without freezing
this conception of myself, because it is constantly changing”. (Student C)

In the same vein, situational factors have only been discussed very briefly
here (“factors of risk and protection”; Shankland 2014) as to their influence
on the ego, responsibility and their particular variations. These include, for
example, family, social, environmental and other environments.

4.3. Education for responsibility and happiness

It would undoubtedly be possible to have, even after our presentation, a

vision of responsibility as something unattainable, too serious or, worse,
painful. In our Judeo-Christian culture, responsibility can go hand in hand
with guilt. The latter works like a small blow of a self-assembled psychic
whip: “assume your responsabilities!”, “take on your responsabilities!”.
238 Education for Responsibility

These are injunctions that may seem daunting, linked to heavy and
unpleasant obligations, or even leading to personal sacrifice, as if we were
forced to lose something in this process. Rest assured, since from an ultimate
point of view the ego does not exist, there is no one who possesses it and
there is nothing to lose! Even if from a relative point of view the ego exists,
as soon as its illusion is revealed, it is not a feeling of loss, but a joyful
feeling of openness that takes place.

4.3.1. Stopping the illusion of ego and lasting happiness

To show the inappropriateness of the negative connotations associated

with the notion of responsibility, we will consider how it relates to
happiness. The link between secular spirituality and happiness has already
been approached by many thinkers (Ferry 2011)4 and I will not come back to
this here, even if it would add an argument in favor of our theory.

Firstly, we have seen that the ego, through projections and identifications,
makes us look outside for problems and solutions. It even insidiously leads
us to believe that permanent solutions to our problems could be found there –
hence the eagerness to seek them. However, since the outer world
is impermanent – just as much as we are, as well as our changing desires –
this process only generates more dissatisfaction in the long term. It only
maintains an addiction and pleasure-pain cycles5. It is a bit like drinking salt
water to quench your thirst (see sections I.2 and 2.4.3); it is insatiable
(Count-Sponville 2003; see the box in section 4.1). At the individual level6,
this search for extrinsic goals is partly due to the orientation of attention
towards these goals, an attentional magnification of the corresponding
external objects of desire, the phenomenological grasp of thoughts imagining
a better life7 and erroneous beliefs such as, for example, the idea that more

4 Like Comte-Sponville (2006), Ferry (2011) associates secular spirituality with atheism. As
previously argued, in our understanding, such a spirituality is not reserved for atheists; it is
compatible with an obedience and/or belief (theist, atheist or other).
5 The media and advertisers play on appraisal by arousing desire (“I want”) and fear (“I do
not want”) to reinforce in subjects the false illusion that they will be happier by having this or
doing that. This dual approach therefore typically leads to the search for extrinsic goals; it
promotes consumption and actually makes people unhappy (Myers 2009).
6 Citton (2014) analyzed the role of the media in these processes at the social level.
7 This is described in psychosociology by the adaptation-level phenomenon and relative
deprivation, in which a subject assesses their present situation in relation to an imagined future
 Discussion 239

material possessions will increase happiness (“I want”). In other words, the
field of consciousness is reduced and the latter is absorbed into mental
phenomena. This illusory search for happiness outside oneself – in
unconscious mental mode – thus coincides with an absence from oneself (at
least in the bodily and emotional dimensions), from what is in the present
moment, and it increases emotional dependencies (see the flight coping
strategies; Table 1.1); it constitutes a kind of escape of the mind from the
outer world (Hagège 2015a), as in the optimal experience (see Box 4.1).

In positive psychology, the optimal experience, also called flow, is

considered as one of the determinants of well-being (Shankland 2014). It has
been defined as a state “of total absorption of the individual in a task that is
characterized by a commitment of the whole person with intense concentration
that can lead to a loss of consciousness of self, of their environment, of their
difficulties, and is accompanied by the feeling of being in full possession of their
means, of perfectly mastering the activity” (ibid., p. 98, author’s translation). It is
characterized by a specific goal to be achieved. It is noted that in such an
experience, time does not pass and there is a good balance between the subject’s
skills and the challenge represented by the objective – such that the situation is
free of anxiety, but also of boredom. These experiences would be more
frequently encountered at work. However, to affirm that this type of experience
is beneficial for the subject and their health seems to constitute an abusive
legitimization of activities that are often harmful to health, including addiction to
video games or work. Thus, recent studies have shown the dark side of the flow,
that is, the potentially addictive dimension, and therefore associated it with more
discomfort. It has been empirically shown, as defined above, that in the optimal
experience, the subject’s absorption of consciousness into the task is antagonistic
to self-awareness and vigilant attention (thus to mindfulness, Sheldon et al.
2015). Attention may be endogenous at first (because the task is oriented towards
a predefined goal), but it is likely that it will then become exogenous, being
automatically grasped by the sequence of actions or their consequences: the
subject is not there, they lose themself in the task – as when they are absorbed by
a phenomenon unrelated to their conscious goals. Moreover, automaticity is
mentioned as a characteristic of the optimal experience (Shankland 2014). And
we can also understand it using Figure 1.6: when our field of consciousness is
reduced and there is a strong phenomenological grasp, time seems to pass faster.
Therefore, such an experience is an excellent way to avoid emotions. Thus, the
subject can indeed report feeling good about such an experience. Despite this,

situation or a possible situation (sight by others or on television), so that the recent satisfaction of
having increased their standard of living, for example, is quickly replaced by the frustration of not
having an even higher one, leading to a sense of dissatisfaction and a desire to increase their
standard of living again (Myers 2009).
240 Education for Responsibility

the problem is only postponed: it seems to me that these experiences make it

possible to increase subjective happiness in the short term, but to decrease
happiness in the medium or long term.

In recent years, work on harmonious and obsessive passions has led to a

better understanding of how the experience of flow can be associated with
happiness or its polar opposite (Vallerand 2015). Indeed, in the case of
harmonious passion, the person can be absorbed into an activity, while
maintaining an interest and maintaining attention to the environment and the
people around. For example, a study was conducted among runners who raced
on Reunion Island and showed that those with a higher degree of mindfulness
had a more harmonious passion, that is, they appreciated both nature and
sporting achievement (Junot and Paquet 2016). Conversely, those with a lower
degree of mindfulness were more concerned with obsessive passion, which led to
more risky behaviors, less resilience following accidents and a higher degree of
uneasiness. Thus, more recent work in positive psychology provides a better
understanding of the specific determinants of lasting happiness and emphasizes
the importance of mindfulness (and therefore diffuse attention) to enable this.

Subjects who are addicted to work can frequently experience optimal

experiences, especially since it is generally socially valued to devote a lot of time
to work that we are passionate about. This is often accompanied by a strong
identification by the subject with the activity being carried out. Wouldn’t these
same people who are over-experiencing optimal work experiences also be the most
statistically prone to burnout, if the work persists, or depression in the event of
being forced to stop working (due to illness, dismissal or retirement)? This is the
assumption made here. It would indeed seem logical that, in the case of burnout,
they should in fact neglect their own health in favor of this activity that has become
a drug (N.B. drugs and optimal experience share at least three common attributes:
modification of the state of consciousness, self-forgetfulness and immediate
pleasure). In the case of stopping work, if subjects are no longer in a position to
exercise this rewarding source of emotional avoidance, they would more easily
find themselves confronted with their emotions and would have difficulty feeling
alive without this activity. Recent research in psychology thus confirms the
importance of open presence (see diffuse attention), allowing us to take care of
ourselves, others and the environment. This is the purpose of the CARE program
(from the French Cohérence, Attention, Relations, Engagement8), for example,
which was developed by Rebecca Shankland, Ilios Kotsou, Jean-Paul Durand and
Christophe André, with a view to cultivating the determinants of sustainable
well-being by avoiding falling into the traps of the pursuit of happiness (see for
example, Marais et al. 2018).

Box 4.1. Optimal experience, happiness and mindfulness

8 Coherence, attention, relationships and engagement.

 Discussion 241

Through this example, we see how the body (attention, action), emotion
and mind (thoughts, beliefs, unconscious) trio functions in a biased way that
keeps it away from the ethical aim and coincidentally from happiness. As
long as a feeling or happiness is dependent on external circumstances, it is
dedicated to temporality. On the other hand, by finding a source of
satisfaction and happiness within oneself, one can achieve more sustainable
happiness (Dambrun and Ricard 2011). And this is what the education
proposed here invites us to do. Instead of taking refuge in phenomena
(always impermanent), if our mind rests in what we really are, namely the
consciousness that we have of phenomena, then it is freed both from the ego
and from the major and recurring source of suffering and dissatisfaction.
Indeed, our mind is still there and only its state of consciousness and its
identification objects (i.e. its exogenous attention) vary. Thus, the only thing
potentially stable in us, which can be actualized with the combination of
reflexivity and meditation, is our awareness of phenomena. The latter simply
gives us the joy to be alive, independently of circumstances and authenticity,
to perceive and interact (without our mind grasping difficulties, or clinging
to circumstances considered favorable in order to make them last): we find a
feeling of existence within ourselves and not through objects or situations
occurring in the world. In this sense, experiments show that engagement in
activities that allow the subject to acquire skills increase the level of well-
being much more than passive hedonic activities that provide only short-
term pleasure (Shankland 2014).

In addition, the link between responsibility and happiness has been

indirectly addressed in the literature. Various authors thus highlight the link
between sustainable development and individual well-being (e.g. Ericson
et al. 2014 ; Wolsko and Lindberg 2013). However, these studies are not
very numerous so far. Below, we will present some points concerning the
implicit link between responsibility and health (as discussed in positive
psychology), for which there are many more studies.

4.3.2. Connections between education for responsibility and

positive psychology

Before that, we would like to highlight an epistemological similarity

between “education for” and positive psychology. Positive psychology is not
strictly speaking a discipline, but brings together work from different
242 Education for Responsibility

branches concerning human development and its optimal physical and

mental functioning (Shankland 2014). It is not only a question of studying
the condition “of absence of illness”. In this way, it differs from the
biomedical approach and thus joins the health promotion approaches
highlighted in health education (Fischer and Tarquinio 2006).

Traditionally, the educational sciences and psychology have rather

focused on “how to resolve problems”: by studying (1) the pathological
(respectively learning difficulties and mental pathologies, for example), (2)
the normal (respectively normal learning mechanisms and cognitive
functioning) (Canguilhem 1943/2013) and (3) processes for “treating” the
pathological (respectively effectiveness of educational or didactic techniques
and therapies).

In this epistemology, it is as if the standard is implicitly static and we are

interested in it and in these “inferior” anomalies (i.e. the abnormal; Figure
4.1A). However, “education for” and positive psychology further study the
anomalies “superior” to the standard (i.e. optimal; Figure 4.1A). In this way
of thinking, these disciplines do not focus on the standard and above all do
not think of it as static; they focus more on an orthogonal reference to the
standard, which the latter could be similar to (Figure 4.1B). And such a
comparison would consist of an elevation.

In other words, implicitly, the standard is thought of as evolutionary by

default and the anomalies studied are those evoking this axial reference
through vertical and “phototropic” growth, in other words “upwards”
(towards the light; Figure 4.2B). And it is also this reference from which
these disciplines try to draw the outlines.

Figure 4.1. Epistemological particularities of “education for” and positive psychology.

For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/hagege/education.zip
 Discussion 243

COMMENT ON FIGURE 4.1.– A) According to Canguilhem (1943/2013), “the

anomalous” corresponds to a statistical deviation from the standard,
without any pejorative connotation. It may therefore be above or below the
standard. The “abnormal” corresponds to the pathological (below the
norm). To qualify what is above the standard, the term “optimal
functioning” is used in positive psychology (Shankland 2014), whereas there
is not really a dedicated term in the field of “education for”. B) In
“education for” and positive psychology, we are interested in a vertical axis
of human growth, its characteristics and ways of approaching it. By analogy
with the botanical nomenclature, a “pathological” functioning can be
described as “abaxial” (or “disharmonious” for the purposes of this book)
and “adaxial” (or “harmonious” here), with reference not to the standard,
but to this growth axis9.

Indeed, the ideal optimal functioning (“adaxial”, Figure 4.1B) of a human

being includes happiness and responsibility. Positive psychology is about
well-being, positive dispositions, what allows a person to be happy and at
the best of their abilities. A particularly mobilized concept is that of positive
mental health, which describes the phototropic reference axis for mental
health (Figure 4.1B).

The attributes of this concept clearly have points in common with the
notion of responsibility. They are, for example: “the ability to develop”, “the
ability to maintain a balance between different intrapsychic tendencies
(impulses, social norms, etc.)”, “positive self-awareness, the ability to care
for others and the natural environment, openness to new ideas and other
individuals [and] creativity” (Shankland 2014, p. 29, author's translation).
This is what we have called respectively the development of consciousness
and coherence, dialogism, letting go of the reactive mind, harmonious
functioning based on empathy and relatedness, cognitive flexibility,
openness to external otherness and innovation. In addition, the personal
forces that promote optimal functioning of the subject include “critical
thinking”, “spirituality, the search for the meaning of life”, “opening of the
mind”, “perceptiveness”, “distance”, “joy and humor”, “equity”, “integrity
and authenticity”, “social intelligence”, and ”self-regulation” (Peterson and

9 Indeed, most plants have a stem that grows upwards and is phototropic, that is, oriented towards
light. The side of the leaf opposite the plant's growth axis is referred to as “abaxial” (“ab” as in
“absence”, contrary to “presence”) and the one on the axis side is called “adaxial” (“ad” meaning
“near to” as in “adrenal” meaning “near the kidney”).
244 Education for Responsibility

Seligman 2004, cited by Shankland 2014, p. 62, author's translation), many

aspects that we have mentioned more or less explicitly here.

More specifically, the “sense of coherence [...] appears [...] as a

fundamental element of good mental health: the individual perceives their
existence as meaningful through a coherent articulation of values and
actions” (Shankland 2014, p. 30, author's translation). In addition, the sense
of coherence correlates positively not only with subjective well-being, but
also with the reduction of mental disorders and circulatory diseases
(Shankland 2014). Now, the coherence between values, thoughts and
emotions on the one hand and actions on the other hand is central to the
conception of responsibility that we put forward here.

Numerous empirical studies have shown that empathy and altruism

(prosocial behaviors such as protecting or developing the well-being of
others, helping a person, volunteering or giving to charity) promote
well-being and mental health, and vice versa (ibid.). This is clearly related to
responsibility as presented here. Helping behaviors even lead to improved
physical health. According to a cohort follow-up, “altruism identified during
teenage years would have a positive impact on physical and mental health
that can still be observed up to fifty years later” (Shankland 2014, p. 140,
author's translation). Logically, well-being is inversely correlated with
antisocial behaviors (including violence and delinquence (Shankland 2014)).

The Public Health Agency of Canada’s five component positive mental

health model emphasizes spiritual values and well-being as one of its
components. This spiritual well-being “corresponds to the feeling of
belonging to a reality greater than oneself and finding meaning in one’s own
life; [it] constitutes a central element of psychological well-being” (Shankland
2014, p. 54, author's translation). And indeed, as mentioned above,
mindfulness (and therefore phenomenological reflexivity) improves well-
being on both a mental and physical health level (Shankland 2014). The
common attributes between responsibility and positive mental health are
therefore numerous, including in the involvement of spiritual development.

Finally, with regard to education more specifically, health promotion

programs seem to be the most effective means of health education (ibid.).
Thus, for example, the Penn Resiliency Program in the United States, based
on social and emotional learning of self-awareness and awareness of others,
also involves recognizing reactive thoughts as automatisms (as in MBSR;
 Discussion 245

ibid.). More than 17 studies have shown the effectiveness of this program on
well-being (including a 50% reduction in anxiety and depression) and the
reduction of antisocial behaviors (ibid.). Various studies have also provided
empirical evidence that new educational theories, when applied (as
“alternative educations”) tend to promote autonomy, creativity, interpersonal
skills and well-being (ibid.)

In conclusion, learning to be responsible for the four horsemen in your

mind is not only implementable at school, but also encourages better health.

Learning to be responsible is therefore not boring, it also means learning

to be authentically happy! An education for responsibility could therefore
contribute to restoring radiance in the eyes of children, a radiance of joy, life
and health (which, as we mentioned in the introduction, is a feeling that it
seems to us today is generally in the process of being tarnished).

TESTIMONIALS.– “I am really grateful, [...] for all this questioning about the
ego, but also the relationship with others, I feel much more benevolent
towards others but also towards myself, and much more at peace”. (MBER
student); “During the two months in which I took the module, I noticed a
real change in my way of being and seeing things, [...] I am calmer, and I no
longer seek confrontation at all costs. I feel happier [...]. I left my political
group because I realized that my vision of a better world could not be
achieved through violence. I think we must set an example, act with others
as we would like them to act with us”. (MBER student)

4.4. Building knowledge and practical implementation in

education for responsibility

4.4.1. Summary of the present argumentation

Given that “education for” aims at changes in the world, I asked the
following questions in the introduction, and I have answered them, in
substance, throughout the text, as follows.

4.4.1.1. How can we change the world ?

After having noticed some supporters of the madness of the world
encountered in the introduction, I put forward some definitions (section 1.1),
modelling the mind as being composed of consciousness and the
246 Education for Responsibility

unconscious (section 1.1.3) and distinguishing between ultimate reality and

relative worlds (section 1.1.1) on the one hand and relative and principled
minds (section 1.1.2) on the other hand. This last distinction, combined with
a dialogism between the relative and the ultimate, is at the heart of the
gnoseological hypothesis. A difference between relative and principled
minds is that the latter’s consciousness (“augmented” in quality and
quantity) allows the individual to perceive the real (i.e. the ultimate reality).
It was therefore necessary for us to understand the supporters of the
functioning of the relative mind, in order to understand that of the world. I
considered the example of relative worlds (objectives) in science (section
1.2). The meanings that have been attributed to these worlds, and which
therefore constitute them, appear as projected from the way in which the
subjects perceive themselves. This analysis led to the suggestion that the
world is the reflection of the mind. Thus, changing the world would mean
changing the mind. I have detailed a model of the functioning of the
individual relative mind (section 1.3) which highlights the oriented, biased
and egotistical aspect of this relationship with the world, through the
disharmonious functioning of the four horsemen. These functions also
involve the body10. Thus, the non-exhaustive components of the ego
(phenomenological grasp, projections, identification, attention, appraisal,
values, attitudes, etc.) are avenues of what could be changed in the mind, to
be able to change the world. And this modeling makes it possible to explain,
for example, the supporters of the violent radicalization of a mind (section
1.4.3).

4.4.1.2. What changes foster responsibility?

Responsibility, which is the object of research in disparate fields (section
2.1), implies, from an ethical point of view, a dialogical relationship between
the subject’s inner and outer worlds (section 2.2). Translated into
psycho(socio)logical terms, this relationship corresponds to empathy with
others and relatedness with the non-human environment (NHE; section
2.3.3). In phenomenological terms, it is based on an expanded field of
consciousness, and vigilant attention that allows one to be present to oneself,
to others and to the NHE (section 2.3.2). On a cognitive level, it seems to be

10 As explained in section 1.4.1: (1) the three levels (mind, emotions, and body) are
theoretically distinguished for modeling purposes, (2) they are considered to be
non-dissociated and in a dialogical relationship, and (3) they overlap the metaphysical
categories of biology (respectively information, energy, and matter; Table 1.2).
 Discussion 247

favored by constructive critical thinking, contextualist epistemology and

cognitive flexibility (section 2.3.1). These different aspects have been
summarized and grouped into five types of psychospiritual competences
(section 3.4), contributing to essential qualities of responsibility: coherence
(section 2.4.1), motivation for innovation (section 2.4.2) and harmony
(section 2.4.3). Phenomenologically, this harmony corresponds to a
principled mind, freed from the ego and the unconscious (section 2.4.4). The
inherently disharmonious ego is a particular obstacle to responsibility
(section 2.4) when it manifests itself through: the grasping of reactive
thoughts and emotions (section 2.3.2), dogmatism, a dualistic personal
epistemology (section 2.3.1) or a splitting or fusion with emotions (section
2.3.3).

4.4.1.3. How can education for responsibility contribute to this

efficiently?
It is therefore more precisely these barriers that education for
responsibility could attempt to remove, by targeting the development of the
five identified competences: emotional (section 3.4.2), epistemic (section
3.4.3), relational (section 3.4.5), attentional (section 3.4.4) and axiological
(section 3.4.6). Here, we focus on two main types of synergistic means by
which education for responsibility could help to develop these competences
(Figure 4.3): cognitive (section 3.1.1), dialogical (section 3.1.2) and
phenomenological (section 3.1.3) reflexivity. The latter can be developed in
particular through meditation, which consists of training for endogenous
attention, and possibly also for certain attitudes, such as compassion (section
3.2.1). Numerous empirical studies suggest that the meditation/dialogical
reflexivity duo could indeed promote responsibility (section 3.2.4), if the
subject’s orientation and understanding of the processes involved are
adequate (section 3.3.1). A key aspect of such effectiveness seems to be that
the educator or trainer is in a similar responsibility process (section 3.4.6).
Obstacles to this essential aspect (and also some facilitating elements) can be
identified in the French institutional context (sections 3.1.4.2 and 4.2.1).
Limitations can be considered for this model (section 4.2.2) which share
similarities with positive psychology research (section 4.3).

These outlines are summarized in Figure 4.2.

248 Ed
ducation for Ressponsibility

Figure
e 4.2. Partial graphic
g summa
ary of the principle of educa
ation for respo
onsibility

COMME ENT ON FIGU URE 4.2.– In italics is ind dicated what correspondds to the
subjectiive point of view (whichh became ulltimate on thhe right). Th The other
words inn black referr to psycholoogical indicaators that cann be used to measure
the effecctiveness of a dispositivee in terms of the responsibbility of subjjects and
thereforre of their oppen-mindedness.

4.4.2. Epistemolo
E ogical, ped ch perspectives
dagogical and researc

4.4.2.1. Place andd originalityy of educattion for resp

ponsibility ttowards
others in “educatio
on for”
This book is parttly the resultt of a biblioggraphical expploration of different
fields of
o research, scarcely
s or not
n at all prresent in thee field of “education
for”. It mobilizes diifferent objeccts (in italicss below), witthin various research
fields annd subfields (in brackets)), the main ones
o being ass follows:
– coggnitive flexiibility (cognnitive psych
hology), pers
rsonal episteemology,
dogmatiism (psychoosociology), critical thin nking (educaational sciencces) and
epistem
mology of scieence for episstemic compeetences;
– em
motional comppetences (coggnitive sciencces includingg psychologyy); 
– rellatedness (environmentaal psychoso ociology) annd empathy (moral
psychossociology and psychologyy) for relatio
onal competeences (ethics));
– meeditation, atttention, uncconscious, dual
d systemss, implicit aattitudes,
consciouusness (cognnitive sciencces includin ng psychologgy, phenom menology,
philosopphy) and phennomenologiccal reflexivity
y for attentionnal competencces;
– vallues (psychhosociology) and diallogical refleexivity (eduucational
sciencess) for axiologgical compettences.
 Discussion 249

These objects are gathered in an original way in order to study and

promote education for responsibility.

On the one hand, this work has made it possible to lay epistemological,
metaphysical and theoretical foundations leading to a better framing of the
objects and purposes of the research. In particular, the emphasis on the
coherence and transformation of the mind (the development of consciousness)
makes the gnoseological hypothesis necessary: researchers themselves are
subjected to the distorting prism of the ego, and it is important, for the clarity
of their purpose, that they specify the status of the processes studied or
concepts used (subjective, objective or ultimate point of view). Therefore,
from a theoretical and practical point of view (section 2.4.1), it seems
important to consider this hypothesis, which includes an explicit distinction
between relative reality and ultimate reality. I propose that this
epistemological breakthrough should form the basis of research in the field of
education for responsibility. Indeed, it seems futile to understand the intended
transformation without this hypothesis: (1) initially, from an objective point of
view, the relative mind (subjective point of view imbued with ego) obstructs
responsibility because of its discrepancy with reality (i.e. with the ultimate
point of view); (2) however, from an ultimate point of view, this relativity of
mind is an illusion, because the relative mind has basically the same nature of
emptiness as the ultimate mind; (3) a properly implemented transformation
process (phenomenological reflexivity) allows the relative mind to realize this
in its own consciousness and thus become undifferentiated from the principled
mind (from the “subjective” point of view, which then became ultimate and
therefore perfectly in line with the real).

On the other hand, the study of the subject’s cognitive and

psycho-affective processes is under-represented in “education for” (or even
absent, to my knowledge, for example with regard to the consideration of
dual processes, the unconscious or attention modalities). Indeed, because of
the obstacles inherent in our institutional epistemology, which tends to
overvalue rationality, the subject tends to be implicitly considered as
transparent to itself (section 4.2.1). A particularity thus highlighted in
education for responsibility is the introduction of phenomenological
reflexivity (and its necessity).

Also, except in the field of health education (Cardot 2011), emotional

aspects are often neglected, or considered at the margins in “education for”.
Health education has the particularity of being marked by the WHO’s 10
250 Education for Responsibility

psychosocial skills statement (Arboix Calas 2013). Thus, research in this

area places particular emphasis on what I might call the knowledge of one’s
inner world and the regulation of one’s relationships with others (although,
as I have just mentioned, it does not seem to detail this inner world as much
as that done in this book). However, according to the model developed here,
others are only one of two components of the subject’s environment (the
human component). On the other hand, EDD11 seems to focus mainly on the
non-human component of the outer world (NHE: climate, biodiversity, etc.),
probably because of its curricular relatedness with environmental education.
EDD research generally leaves the inner world in the shadows.

Education for responsibility has attributes of humanist and social dialectic

approaches (Fortin 2004) in that it focuses respectively on the subject and on
their interactions with the environment. On the other hand, it goes beyond
the biopsychosocial paradigm, because it aims not only for a change in
practices, conceptions or relationships (not just empowerment), but also, and
above all, at a functional change in the subject, particularly in their
relationship with emotions and thoughts (see Box 3.5).

Therefore, the theory here supported would make it possible to unite

these two trends in a coherent vision, by integrating (1) the inner world, (2)
the two components of the outer world, namely the NHE and the human
environment, and (3) the intertwining of these two worlds. This original
perspective, through a reflection on education for responsibility, highlights,
for “education for”, the important aims of the subject’s awareness of their own
functioning, and the change in their relationship with their emotions, and with
the human and non-human environments: a change in the properties of their
consciousness through psychospiritual development. The next testimony from
a student of the MBER module expresses this.

TESTIMONY.– “I can understand better the care and recognition that we must
give to nature and all that it provides us with, the vital energy necessary for
our well-being. I also think that on some points I am aware of my actions
and thoughts and I am now trying to be more open-minded and to have
values that reflect what I value most. I think I have become more sociable
and perhaps even happier through the practice of regular meditation and
questioning my thoughts and choices.”

11 Education au développement durable, a French education concept which can be translated

as “education for sustainable development” in English.
 Discussion 251

However, responsibility is, it seems to me, a common objective of

“education for” (Hagège 2014, 2015b): the aim is to create the conditions
that encourage the subject to take responsibility for the environment,
sustainable development, health, media relations, citizenship, etc., according
to the theme of “education for” concerned. I have presented here arguments
supporting the idea that meditation, combined with appropriate dialogical
reflexivity, would allow the development of responsibility. Thus, the
emphasis on this approach at the pedagogical level, and the scientific study
of its effects, seem innovative and promising for the field of “education for”.

4.4.2.2. Pedagogical and research perspectives for education for

responsibility
Many associations, on a more or less national scale, already implement this
type of approach in French schools. Thus, the international associations
SEVE12 and Mind With Heart13 promote objectives such as “living together”
and seem to propose methods for working, at least in part, with the five types
of competences we have defined. A new program, “ATtentif à l’écOLE”
(ATOLE), based on INSERM research in cognitive neuroscience, has just
been developed and focuses on attentional skills, particularly in relation to
academic success14. It contains some attributes of dialogical and
phenomenological reflexivities. Also, several associations are drawing
inspiration from the MBSR program, in particular to improve cognitive
capacities (memory, concentration, performance) and emotional capacities
(stress regulation). The associations Méditation dans l’Enseignement (AME)15,
Cogito’Z16, Enfance et Attention17, Pleine Conscience Provence18,
Mindfulness19 and Ateliers Ressources20, offer work on the body, thoughts and
reactive emotions. The latter three associations use the now popular method of

12 Available at: http://www.fondationseve.org/pages/qui-sommes-nous?locale=en.

13 Available at: http://www.mindwithheart.org/fr/qui-sommes-nous/qui-sommes-nous.
14 Available at: http://www.agence-nationale-recherche.fr/Projet-ANR-13-APPR-0011.
15 Available at: http://meditation-enseignement.com/.
16 Available at: http://www.cogitoz.com/images/formations/2017-2018/mindful_up_session_6. pdf.
17Available at: http://www.pleine-conscience-provence.com/pleine-conscience-ateliers-enfants.
php.
18 Available at: http://www.pleine-conscience-provence.com/pleine-conscience-ateliers-enfants.
php.
19 Available at: https://www.elinesnel.com/fr/formation-amt/.
20 Available at: http://www.ateliers-ressources.com/la-pleine-conscience.
252 Education for Responsibility

meditation for children, “Sitting Still Like a Frog” (Snel 2012). Two modes of
action can be distinguished according to the associations: directly involving
the association’s staff in schools, or training teachers to set up a program.

In addition, the French Ministry of National Education reports on the

Eduscol website that following four trials, each in a different department,
programs at high school and elementary school have been implemented that
include meditation exercises, with the support of the Ministry. Today, such
initiatives can be part of moral and civic education programs (Hagège
2017d).

Initiatives, both individual and institution-wide, are multiplying

nowadays. It could be useful to draw up a list of them, identify and
categorize their practices according to a shared nomenclature. Also, it is
possible to scientifically study the impact of these programs, the levers and
obstacles to their implementation and possible safeguards according to
contexts or practices. This would include the need to expand
experimentation in different contexts, including public schools. We hope
that, as a result, appropriate programs, including teacher training programs,
can be generalized in a supervised manner, because it seems to us that they
are sorely lacking in our society where attentional distraction is excessively
high. Recognized child psychologists make the same claim21, 22. It could also
involve studying the external and internal transposition of the competences
identified here, in particular so that the knowledge thus generated can guide
the organization of curricula, and thus have a concrete impact on the
functioning of institutions.

At a methodological level, the theory argued for suggests here possible

psychometric indicators of the five psychospiritual competences
(e.g. empathy, relatedness, etc.; see the notes in Table 3.8). They could be
measured by comparing educational conditions that have combined
meditation and dialogical reflexivity (“MR”), with control conditions
(“CN’). For this purpose, self-report questionnaires are often used. In other
words, the subject positions themselves in relation to verbal proposals, for
example by indicating their degree of agreement with certain sentences

21 Available at: http://lemonde-educ.blog.lemonde.fr/2012/06/15/la-meditation-comme-remede-

au-mal-de-lapprentissage/.
22 Available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/vous/article/2012/04/02/la-meditation-calme-aussi-les-
enfants_1678652_3238.html.
 Discussion 253

(Likert scale principle). However, this type of process has many biases,
including social desirability, that direct responses according to what one
thinks is socially accepted. Also, even if the subject were not sensitive to this
kind of bias, given the unconscious processes of which they are the object
and the distorting nature of their perception, their answers can only present a
subjective vision. They are valid, but limited. Thus, to assess these
approaches more objectively, they should be complemented by implicit
attitude measures23 (Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2014) or physiological
measures, for example. With regard to the latter, some emotions can be
detected, for example, by variations in the conductance of the skin (Bechara
et al. 1997). Since one of the crucial aspects of responsibility is coherence, it
could be appraised through a protocol comparing, as much as possible,
indicators of explicit (declarative) functioning, indicators of implicit
(unconscious) functioning, and actions. Also, by using first-person
methodologies (Vermersch 1994), and although this appears clearly in the
texts of students who have completed the meditation module, we could
rigorously test the hypothesis of whether the “MR” condition leads to better
self-knowledge and clarity of mind that conditions “CN” – thus a
comparison with the principled mind – by allowing the subject to become
aware of initially unconscious functions.

In addition, the effects of meditation on implicit attitudes on the one

hand, and on responsibility on the other, have been poorly researched or not
studied al all. Thus, the approaches proposed here also seem potentially
promising in the field of cognitive sciences and fields that study
responsibility, such as moral philosophy. Finally, it would be relevant to
study more precisely the link between responsibility and creativity, the latter
being the subject of a number of educational studies.

The implementation of this research would make it possible to validate

responsibility indicators to assess the impact of educational actions, useful
for research, and for which institutions are requesting. The new open field of
education for responsiblity will thus encourage the importation of techniques
from other research fields, and the development of new research protocols to
assess responsibility and, coincidentally, to test the empirical scope and
coherence of the entire model proposed here.

23 See for example: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/france/takeatest.html.

254 Education for Responsibility

With regard to the use of meditation for educational purposes (in a school
or university context), there is limited literature, primarily in English and
mainly concerning American experiments (section 3.2.5). However, the
French context has particularities (in particular its rationalist epistemology
and secularism), certainly containing specific obstacles (Hagège 2017c).
Studies focus mainly on its effects on health (stress reduction) and cognitive
performance (including academic performance). As (1) numerous empirical
studies show the beneficial effects of meditation on health (section 3.2.4),
(2) meditation has been popularized by the MBSR protocol (which aims to
reduce stress and places particular emphasis on changing the relationship
with thoughts and emotions), and (3) health education is particularly
concerned with emotional skills, the contribution of meditation to health
education seems already marked. This is not the case for other areas of
“education for”24. Here too, the field is open, especially since, as we have
mentioned, the French context will require specific studies, such as the study
of social representations of meditation by educational actors (parents,
teachers, etc.).

4.4.3. Afterword

In conclusion, I would like to remind you that we started from this

question: how can we change the world ? And I argued that this required a
change in minds, justifying which ones, why and how. My aspiration is to
contribute to the development of harmony in people’s minds, and therefore
in the world, through my research, teaching and other activities, through the
Ariadne’s thread of education for responsibility. And to do this, as I stated in
the introduction, I am first working on creating harmony in my own mind.
To be consistent, I end this book with an appeal to everyone: to acquire the
means to be themselves what they want to see in the world.

Caminante, son tus huellas

el camino, y nada mas;
caminante, no hay camino,
se hace camino al andar.
Al andar se hace camino,
y al volver la vista atras
se ve la senda que nunca

24 I only found one university degree thesis on the contribution of meditation to EDD
(Bouillon Claveau 2014).
 Discussion 255

se ha de volver a pisar.
Caminante, no hay camino,
sino estelas en la mar.
(Machado 1917)
Walker, your footsteps
are the road and nothing more.
Walker, there is no road,
the road is made by walking.
Walking you make the road,
and turning to look behind,
you see the path you never
again will step upon.
Walker, there is no road,
only foam trails on the sea.
(Translation by Willis Barnstone)
 Postface

In reading this book I was struck by the author’s dazzling erudition, as

well as Hélène Hagège’s outstanding ability to synthesize and integrate a
large range of information. The critical approach developed in this book
offers good prospects for social and societal improvement. Without trying to
paraphrase or overemphasize certain aspects of her work, I propose rather to
extend the links to the fields of application of this education for
responsibility, particularly in the field of education, and more generally in
relation to mindfulness-based interventions, which are currently undergoing
significant development. The orientation and ambition of the book echoes
the book Se changer, changer le monde by Christophe André, Jon
Kabat-Zinn, Pierre Rabhi, Matthieu Ricard, Caroline Lesire and Ilios
Kotsou, which has already sown many seeds for a transformation of
everyone at their own level, with a view to better social development.

The author’s orientations in terms of education for responsibility and the

improvement of sustainable and shared well-being are in line with the latest
reform proposals planned for French national education. These are aimed at
developing greater autonomy and empowerment on the students’ part,
particularly in the context of philosophical reflections and possible choices
at the school level. The government is also questioning the obligation of
solidarity practices led by young people in order to promote the development
of this social and societal responsibility. Such schemes already exist in the
United States. In high school, for example, every student is encouraged to
get involved in associations such as hot meals for those in need or helping
deprived people by working with religious associations. The aim is to
develop feelings of solidarity and responsibility, while reducing the tendency
towards social discrimination.

Education for Responsibility, First Edition. Hélène Hagège.

© ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
258 Education for Responsibility

Numerous studies have shown the beneficial effects of this type of

engagement, particularly because it enhances the meaning of life, which
contributes to maintaining a satisfactory level of well-being, which in turn
generates more altruism (Shankland 2012). However, it is important to stress
the importance of self-determined motivation in the implementation of
solidarity actions, otherwise the effects are much less beneficial for both the
individual and the beneficiary. As Hélène Hagège points out, well-being as
targeted by mindfulness and positive psychology interventions is not a form
of perpetual euphoria or maximization of pleasure; rather, it is about
developing a calmer relationship with oneself and others, which results in a
deconstruction of the ego and a better ability to take care of oneself, others
and the environment (Shankland 2014).

The new role that could be given to the question of responsibility and
values is particularly useful at high school level where the drop in
motivation and involvement is marked and is accompanied by an increase in
the dissatisfaction felt among young people and the teachers who work with
them. According to the amount of psychological work based on the theory of
self-determination (Deci and Ryan 2002), this sense of self-determination is
a fundamental factor in motivation and sustainable well-being.

Self-determination refers to the perception of being at the origin of one’s

choices, rather than being a passive observer who should follow instructions
without having input. Self-determination theory is based on the premise that
there are three basic psychological needs that must be addressed in order to
foster engagement in action, as well as a sense of personal fulfillment. The
first need is autonomy or self-determination, the second is the need to feel
competent in what one is undertaking and the third is the need for social
proximity. Educating for responsibility as recommended by Hélène Hagège
meets these needs. Indeed, it places the individual in a position of choice and
committing to actions that are linked to pro-social values. These actions will
help to generate a positive social bond with other individuals. Education for
responsibility could thus constitute the basis for individual and collective
well-being.

This responsible engagement can also be linked to a second model of the

determinants of well-being used in the field of positive psychology: the
PERMA model (Positive emotions, Engagement, Relationships, Meaning in
life, Accomplishment; Seligman 2011). This model summarizes the main
determinants of well-being studied over the past 40 years. The determinants
 Postface 259

most strongly associated with sustainable well-being are the quality of

relationships and engagement in actions related to values, particularly pro-
social values. Thus, education for responsibility would be a breeding ground
for this individual and collective well-being.

Education for responsibility cannot be decreed. It is not a question of

transmitting information. As Hélène Hagège’s book methodically
demonstrates, like the rest of the field of “education for”, it is, rather a
question of developing skills. The World Health Organization (2003) has
identified ten skills called “psychosocial competences” that promote better
physical and mental health and contribute to the development of constructive
relationships. These skills are presented in pairs: problem-solving
skills/knowledge of decisions; creative thinking skills/critical thinking skills;
effective communication skills/interpersonal relationship skills; self-awareness
skills/empathy skills and emotion regulation skills/stress management
skills.

Mindfulness-based practices help to develop these skills, if they are

accompanied by an education for responsibility. Here we find the
combination of meditation and reflexivity highlighted by the author. Two
recent overviews bringing together all the research evaluating the
effectiveness of mindfulness interventions offered to young people (in total
close to 1,800 young people; Waters et al. 2015 ; and 2,000 in the second
overview; Zoogman et al. 2014) have shown effects on cognitive, emotional
and relational skills. These mindfulness-based interventions proved all the
more useful as the young people found themselves in difficulty. However,
practices are essential in prevention and health promotion (Lamboy et al.
2016), because as Jon Kabat-Zinn points out in his mindfulness training, it is
not when you jump out of the plane that you build your parachute!

Mindfulness-based practices allow such effects to be achieved through

real attentional training: bringing attention back to the object of focus while
learning to welcome thoughts and emotions, without trying to catalogue
them or attach to them. This allows a step back, a decentration and an ability
to accept what happens, without feeling the urgency of having to react
immediately. Decisions and actions can thus be made without the pressure of
a presupposed urgency. They are more appropriate to the situation and more
constructive (for an overview, see Peillod-Book and Shankland 2016).
260 Education for Responsibility

Coming from a background in clinical psychology, I was first particularly

interested in the many effects of mindfulness, and in the potential of a
combination of positive psychology and mindfulness-based interventions to
improve the quality of relationships with oneself, others and the wider
environment (Shankland and André 2014). Then, gradually, the community
of researchers interested in these practices turned their attention to the ethical
issue (Grossman 2015). Certain researchers or Buddhists have called for
more caution in mindfulness-based interventions, indicating that the simple
practice of attentional training through meditation without explicit work on
ethics could lead to suboptimal or even counterproductive effects. This is
why the question today is refocusing on education for responsibility in
mindfulness programs.

Hélène Hagège, having taken the opposite pathway, from education

for responsibility to the means to ensure it, naturally developed a
mindfulness-based program grounded with a specific focus on education for
responsibility, that is, including a psycho-educational dimension from the
beginning, oriented towards the ethics of practices and not towards the
personal benefits of practices on health or well-being. This program
therefore responds to a social and scientific need. It is therefore particularly
promising today, as are all the approaches proposed in this book. The
author’s ambitious objective (changing the mind to change the world) seems
more realistic and concrete after reading this manuscript, thanks to the
thorough and thoughtful work proposed. This text encourages us to move in
this direction and to embody as much as possible the change we want to see
around us, by providing us the appropriate conceptual tools and concrete
pathways for implementation.

Rebecca SHANKLAND
Associate Professor of Psychology at the Université of Grenoble Alpes
Director of the Positive Psychology Diploma
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A attitude, 103, 106, 112, 116, 118,
affect, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 96, 116,
118, 124, 125, 135, 156, 157, 203,
208, 220, 230
appraisal, see also evaluation, 43–49,
52, 67–71, 73, 78, 81, 82, 84, 89,
95–96, 97, 99, 100, 121, 125–127,
147, 176, 179, 182, 186, 187, 193,
205, 209, 212, 214, 219, 224, 238,
246
attention, 11, 12, 14, 15, 36, 38–44,
48, 52, 55, 59, 68–76, 78, 80, 84,
88, 89, 92, 94, 98, 100, 111, 114,
116–121, 125, 127, 134, 143,
147–149, 154, 169, 172–186, 189,
191, 193, 194, 196, 197, 201–203,
207, 211, 212, 215, 218, 220, 224,
231, 237, 239, 240, 241, 246, 247,
248, 251, 259
diffused, 39, 55, 119, 180, 225
endogenous, 40, 119, 175, 183,
189, 196
exogenous, 119, 127, 174, 212
focalized, 174, 176, 191, 193
inhibition, 44, 45, 54, 87
magnification, 44, 45, 55, 87, 238
vigilant, 15, 120, 176, 186, 203,
212, 246
Education for Responsibility, First Edition. Hélène Hagège.
© ISTE Ltd 2019. Published by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Index
120, 123, 125–127, 128, 131, 136,
147, 157, 158, 168, 171, 178, 186,
204, 208, 211, 217, 219, 246–248,
253
implicit, 15, 16, 49, 50, 95, 118,
120, 127, 128, 131, 186, 199,
211, 217, 248, 253
automaton (automatism, automatic),
15, 20, 42, 43, 67, 74, 75, 111, 112,
131, 142, 183, 216, 236
awakening, 5, 14, 120, 126, 150, 151,
153, 156, 160, 176, 181, 195, 196,
219
awareness, see also consciousness, 11,
13, 30, 59, 61, 62, 69, 70, 85, 101,
116, 130, 133, 159, 163, 165, 168,
170, 175, 177, 178, 180, 186, 189,
191, 192, 216, 219, 222, 224, 235,
237, 239, 241, 243, 244, 250, 259
B
belief, 21, 34, 48, 51, 56, 59, 62, 63,
66, 92, 113, 116, 142, 143, 158,
216, 218, 235, 238
bias, 23, 24, 29, 58, 85, 89, 92, 95,
103, 116, 117, 121, 134, 147, 150,
153, 156, 169, 170, 176, 179, 184,
290 Education for Responsibility
186, 190, 203, 210, 214, 217, 241,
253
biology, 2–4, 9, 18–24, 27, 47, 80,
84–86, 121, 143, 246
C 112, 124, 130, 153, 156, 160, 197,
cognition (cognitive), 10, 22, 32, 34,
36, 38, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54–57, 60,
61, 63, 69–72, 78, 84, 93, 99, 110,
111, 113, 116, 118, 126, 144, 149,
162, 164–166, 169–171, 178, 185,
186, 189, 191, 192, 208–210, 216,
224, 242, 246, 248
cognitive
defusion, 78, 133, 157, 159
flexibility, 61, 63, 64, 116, 129,
185, 210, 211, 215, 220, 243,
247, 248
coherence (coherent), 6, 14, 24, 38,
65, 91, 114, 115, 123, 128–131,
134, 145, 146, 160, 164, 169, 183,
189, 191, 195, 196, 202, 203, 210,
215, 217, 222, 224, 240, 243, 244,
247, 249, 253, 254
conditioning, 42, 142
conscience, 81, 229,
consciousness, see also awareness,
5–15, 17, 30, 32–36, 40–42, 55, 64,
65, 69, 71, 73–75, 79–81, 89, 91, 110,
118, 120, 124–127, 129, 130, 132,
134–136, 140, 141, 146–151,
153–155, 157–159, 167, 168, 176,
177, 179–186, 190, 194, 196–200,
202, 203, 216, 220, 221, 227,
231–233, 235, 237, 239–241, 243,
245, 246, 249, 250
phenomenal, 9, 10, 11, 15, 30, 33
contextualist, 60, 114
creativity (creative), 14, 134, 142,
149, 162, 164, 186, 243, 245, 253
critique, 112
culture, 3, 18, 19, 23, 37, 73, 74, 85,
91, 103, 113, 114, 121, 122, 136,
150, 190, 200, 208, 211, 232, 237
D
decentration, 81, 133, 157, 159, 259
devolution, 158, 159, 160
dialogism, 8, 41, 101, 102, 108, 110,
243, 246, 260
discrimination, 4, 96, 97, 99, 221,
257
disharmony (disharmonious), 38, 83,
88, 134, 136, 142, 144, 148, 153,
154, 158, 160, 167, 200, 217, 243,
246, 247
dogmatism (dogmatic), 50, 54, 58,
59, 61–64, 66, 74, 96, 97, 99, 100,
111, 112, 115, 116, 210, 211, 220,
233, 247, 248
dualism (dualist), 19, 60, 94, 101,
110, 111, 113–115, 122, 197, 220,
232, 234, 236, 247
E
ego, 38, 44, 45, 74, 79, 81, 83, 87, 89,
91, 92, 94, 96–101, 104, 111–113,
115–118, 120, 121, 123, 125–134,
136, 141–143, 146, 148–151,
153–159, 161, 167–169, 171–173,
175, 177, 179, 183, 186, 190,
194–200, 202, 203, 207–209, 211,
215–224, 230, 231, 235, 237, 238,
241, 245–247, 249, 258
emotion, 9, 11, 12, 20, 33, 42–46,
48–52, 54, 55, 63, 66–89, 93, 94,
98, 99, 111, 112, 114, 117, 119,
123, 124–127, 132, 133, 135, 136,
139, 141, 142, 148, 149, 152, 154,
156–158, 165, 167, 169, 171–173,
177–179, 182, 183, 186, 187,
189–192, 194, 195, 201, 203,
206–211, 215, 216, 218, 219, 221,
223–225, 227, 229, 231, 234–236,
239–241, 244, 246, 247, 250, 253,
254, 258, 259

empathy (empathetic), 54, 55, 83, 95,
101, 123, 125, 128–130, 135, 136,
149, 169, 178, 182, 187, 189, 191,
197, 200–202, 208, 211, 213–215,
218, 221, 227, 243, 244, 246, 248,
252, 259
energy, 26, 46, 48, 50, 66, 67, 70, 72,
74, 76, 77, 81, 84, 86–88, 124, 138,
139, 150, 154, 171, 207, 231, 246,
250
engram, 132, 142, 154, 158, 159, 207
emotional, 74, 77, 143, 158
environment, 108, 110, 111, 117,
123–125, 127, 133, 140, 143, 148,
149, 151, 156, 161, 169, 173, 174,
175, 181, 197, 200, 203, 209, 211,
213, 214, 216–219, 228–230, 239,
240, 243, 246, 250, 251, 258, 260
human, 217, 218, 250
non-human (NHE), 53, 54, 156,
173, 181, 200, 214, 219, 246
epistemic, 125, 165, 213
epistemology (epistemological),
17–19, 23, 60–62, 64, 85, 94, 105,
109, 113–116, 144, 148, 162, 172,
191, 205, 210, 211, 232, 233, 241,
242, 247–249, 254
breakthrough, 4, 129, 249
contextualist, 210, 247
personal, 162, 210, 211, 247, 248
equanimity (equanimous), 81, 124,
125, 129, 131, 136, 176, 178, 180,
182, 186, 190, 202, 212, 213, 218,
220, 221, 224
ethics (ethical), 5, 17, 80, 86,
104–110, 113, 115, 116, 120, 128,
150, 156, 159, 161, 164, 169, 172,
181, 182, 195, 203, 205, 215, 217,
227, 230–232, 241, 246, 248, 260
evaluation, see also appraisal, 43,
178
Index 291
F, G, H
field of consciousness, 11, 12, 15, 33,
36, 40–42, 55, 65, 73, 75, 120, 125,
148, 149, 154, 176, 179, 184, 186,
190, 194, 201, 202, 221, 239, 246
gnoseological hypothesis, 3, 6–8,
101, 129, 148, 159, 246, 249
grasp (phenomenological), 32–40,
42–44, 46, 55, 57, 59, 61–66, 69,
70, 73, 76–78, 80, 81, 83, 88, 89,
93, 96, 100, 114–117, 124,
125–128, 134–136, 141, 142,
147–149, 159, 160, 174–177, 179,
182, 183, 186, 190, 196, 199, 201,
208–212, 216, 219–221, 223,
237–239, 246, 247
happiness, 43, 79, 80, 94, 149, 178,
227, 230,232, 237–241, 243, 245,
251
harmony (harmonious), 38, 83, 127,
129, 134–137, 141, 142, 144, 146,
148, 149, 152, 159, 160, 164, 167,
173, 191, 197, 200, 204, 208, 214,
215, 217–219, 221, 224, 225, 235,
240, 243, 247, 254
human, 53, 57, 89, 140
I
identification (identified), 12, 32,
33–36, 46, 54, 59, 61, 63, 66, 77,
83, 91, 93, 96, 98, 100, 116, 125,
126–128, 149, 151, 207, 208, 211,
219, 221, 225, 231, 240, 241, 246
identity, 34, 99, 136, 197, 213
incommensurability
(incommensurable), 19, 103, 121,
131, 146
information, 5, 10, 14, 15, 26, 29, 37,
39, 40, 46, 59, 67, 86, 89, 120, 154,
155, 158, 170, 181, 186, 220
ipseity, 109
292 Education for Responsibility
K, M
knowledge, 144, 146, 148, 151, 153,
170, 186, 191, 192, 211, 222, 250,
253
direct, 5, 31, 77, 86, 140, 151, 153
matter, 21, 43, 69, 84, 86–88, 111,
139, 141, 143, 188, 189, 246
media, 171–174, 238, 251
mass, 70
meditation, 75, 88, 126, 129, 131,
133, 134, 151, 172–174, 177, 178,
180–196, 200, 202, 212, 229, 231,
232, 236, 241, 247, 248, 251–254,
259, 260
Meditation-Based Ego Reduction
(MBER), 74, 76, 78, 79, 120, 133,
134, 140, 172, 237, 245, 250
mental phenomena, 11, 13, 27–29,
31, 36, 37, 45, 57, 71, 73, 77, 99,
104, 114, 117, 124, 128, 140, 162,
175, 177, 179, 180, 183, 190, 202,
203, 231, 239
metaphysics, 3, 5, 18, 84, 85, 86, 88,
109, 235
mind, 103, 110, 112–115, 118–120,
124–130, 133–136, 140, 141, 144,
146–156, 158–161, 163, 164, 166,
167, 169, 171, 174–185, 189–191,
194–200, 202–205, 207, 209, 211,
212, 214, 218, 219, 221, 223–227,
231, 233–236, 239, 241, 243,
245–250, 253, 254, 260
principled, 176, 177, 196, 200, 221,
224, 231, 249
relative, 178, 196, 200, 224, 246,
249
mindfulness, 157, 178, 180–182,
184–187, 190, 191, 192, 239, 240,
244, 251, 257–260
mode, 119–121, 123, 124, 132, 138,
143, 149, 150, 152, 170, 176, 179,
182, 189, 191, 198, 211, 224, 227,
239
conscious sensory, 77, 79, 176,
119, 120, 121, 123, 149, 227
open, 119, 121, 123
mental
conscious, 119, 120, 123, 239
unconscious, 119–121, 123,
227, 239
money, 87, 88, 148, 238
motivation, 36, 51, 67, 130, 132, 133,
134, 150, 167, 169, 209, 214, 219,
226, 247, 258
N, P
need for closure, 62, 222
paradigm, 18, 19, 24, 85, 121, 145,
146, 172, 250
personal, 60–62, 64, 114–116
phenomenology, 6, 8, 9, 93, 104, 105,
179, 196, 197, 248
prejudice, 16, 90, 94, 97, 99, 163,
166, 213, 214, 221
projection, 20, 21, 24, 32, 34, 35, 54,
55, 57, 60, 69, 83, 87, 89, 93, 98,
99, 115, 132, 143, 147, 151, 153,
156, 158, 160, 161, 171, 199, 213,
214
purpose, 7, 8, 68, 82, 110, 129, 132,
144, 151, 164, 180, 182, 194–196,
214
reductionist physicalism, 143, 144
R
radicalization, 50, 96, 97, 99–101,
136, 213, 246
reality, 7, 8, 13, 14, 18, 19, 24, 26,
27, 29, 35–37, 40, 41, 57, 59, 63,
67, 73, 76, 77, 83–87, 90, 91, 100,
101, 117, 118, 125, 149, 154– 157,
167, 194, 197, 199, 200, 204, 211,
220, 229, 230, 246, 249

relative, 4, 7, 17, 32, 45, 58, 89,
101, 129, 159, 171, 249
ultimate, 5, 7, 10, 14, 17, 20, 21,
30, 34, 37, 39, 58, 63, 85, 87,
89, 91, 92, 101, 105, 125, 126,
128, 129, 147, 149, 150, 152,
153, 159, 167, 171, 176, 177,
198, 224, 246, 249
reflexivity, 161, 165, 171, 218, 222,
223
cognitive, 162, 164, 165, 168, 170,
196, 210, 247
dialogical, 164, 165, 168–170, 182,
193, 200, 202, 212, 214, 215,
218, 219, 247, 248, 251, 252
phenomenological, 152, 154, 164,
166–170, 174, 177, 180–182,
193, 196–199, 201, 202, 212,
219, 224, 231, 236, 244, 247–249
relatedness, 56, 83, 101, 125,
128–130, 135, 136, 149, 169, 191,
197, 200–202, 208, 211, 213, 221,
243, 246, 248, 252
relative, 6, 25, 35, 38, 66, 69, 88, 92,
93, 103, 118, 128, 129, 136, 147,
151, 153, 154, 156, 129, 159
religion (religious), 97, 128, 145,
151, 231, 232
thought-action repertoire, 15, 46,
59, 75, 80, 82, 116, 157, 178
resonate (resonance), 135, 138, 142,
149, 154, 194, 199, 235
responsibility (responsible), 4, 14, 17,
22, 25, 36, 86, 101, 103, 105, 110,
111, 113–117, 121, 123, 127–130,
134, 136, 141, 143, 146, 147, 149,
151, 157–161, 164, 169, 174, 193,
196, 197, 200, 203, 204, 206, 208,
209, 211–219, 222–225, 227,
230–233, 235, 236, 238, 243, 245,
246, 248–251, 254, 257–259
S vacuity, 102, 152–155, 160, 199
schema, 125
scientism, 232
Index 293
secularism (secular), 123, 159, 180,
215, 218, 231–234, 238, 254
spirituality (spiritual), 25, 86, 105,
128, 151, 153, 156, 200, 230, 231,
232, 243, 244
structure, 106, 109, 114, 118, 121,
127, 136, 137, 145, 198, 199
diachronic, 12, 118, 121, 127
synchronic, 11, 127
system, 1, 2, 15, 82, 127, 174
T, U, V
thought, 109, 111–119, 121, 123,
124, 126, 127, 131–133, 136, 140,
142, 144, 147–149, 154, 158, 162,
163–167, 172, 173, 176, 178, 179,
182, 183, 185–187, 191, 201, 203,
205, 208, 210, 211, 216–218,
220–222, 225–227, 229, 233, 234,
238, 241, 244, 247, 248, 250, 251,
254, 259
creative, 29, 82, 149, 163, 164,
172, 176, 259
critical, 58, 61, 62, 112, 163, 164,
165, 208, 210, 211, 220, 227,
233, 247, 248, 259
reactive, 29, 70, 73, 77, 79, 82, 83,
87, 90, 124, 136, 140, 143, 148,
157, 158, 182, 185, 187, 216,
220, 227, 244
verbal, 11, 31, 32, 38, 40, 63, 139
unconscious, 11–16, 19, 20, 29, 30,
33, 35, 38, 40, 42, 43, 45, 48, 65,
67, 69, 72, 74–78, 80, 85, 118,
119–121, 124, 128, 131, 143, 147,
149, 150, 153, 154, 167, 170, 174,
176, 179, 181, 197, 198, 203, 211,
215, 217, 220, 221, 241, 246–249
strawberry tartlet, 2, 9, 27, 33, 38,
45, 46, 49, 84, 86, 90, 130
value(s), 2, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 36,
48–52, 56, 57, 75, 76, 78, 84, 89,
294 Education for Responsibility

97–99, 101, 105, 107, 109, 111,
114, 121–123, 128, 130, 131, 134,
147, 161, 164–169, 173, 195, 196,
200, 202, 210, 212–219, 222, 224,
225, 227, 233, 237, 244, 246, 248,
250, 258, 259
W reality, 3, 4, 5, 8, 17, 20, 22, 24,
well-being, 43, 68, 109, 156, 157,
174, 178, 181, 182, 186–188, 190,
192, 195, 200, 222, 228, 239–241,
243–245, 257, 258, 260
world, 103, 105–107, 110, 111,
113–116, 118, 120, 121, 123, 128,
132, 134, 135, 137, 145, 147, 148,
153, 157, 161, 164, 167, 170, 172,
173, 175, 176, 179, 183, 191, 194,
195, 196, 198–205, 211, 215, 223,
229, 230, 231, 234, 239, 241, 245,
250, 254, 257, 260
inner, 14, 41, 51, 65, 80, 89, 93, 94,
101, 105, 106, 110, 111, 113,
121, 153, 171, 176, 183, 198,
199, 201, 250
objective, see also reality, ultimate
25, 85, 86, 88, 128
outer, 24, 41, 43, 53, 63, 73, 87, 89,
93, 94, 105, 106, 110, 115, 116,
121, 134, 137, 157, 171, 172,
173, 176, 196, 198, 199, 201,
234, 239, 250
relative, 6, 10, 37, 39, 91, 93, 179,
202
subjective, 4, 5, 9, 25, 87, 89, 90,
92, 128
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