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ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
ARTICLE 2 – EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS & PUBLICATION
TAÑADA v. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 | December 29, 1986
Facts: This case was brought up by Lorenzo Tañada,
Abraham Sarmiento, and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism. Due process was
invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a
number of presidential decrees (Marcos Administration) which
they claimed had not been published as required by law.
The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise
provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In
the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed
the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees. The
petitioners moved for reconsideration/clarification of the said
decision.
Issue: W/N the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in
Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication
required therein was not always imperative.
Held: No. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication.
The Court therefore held that all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
DE ROY v. CA
G.R. No. L-80718 | January 29, 1988
Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by
petitioners Feliza De Roy and Virgilio Ramos collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents Bernal Family, resulting in injuries to private
respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate
their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the
former failed to do so.
The RTC rendered judgment, finding petitioners guilty
of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto by the CA.
On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day
period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which
was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution
of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in
the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
The CA correctly applied the rule laid down in
Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, that the fifteen-day
period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended.
Petitioners contended that the rule enunciated in the
Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar
owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the
Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court
of Appeals was promulgated.
Issue: W/N the decisions of the SC needs to be published in
the Official Gazette in order to become effective.
Held: No. Contrary to petitioners’ view, there is no law
requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition
to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel
as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of
the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been
clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance
reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA)
and law journals.
In the instant case, petitioners’ motion for extension
of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after
the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it
is no longer within the coverage of the grace period.
Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace
period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of
Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in
the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their
failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the
reglementary period.
ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
ARTICLE 4 – PROSPECTIVITY OF LAWS
ATIENZA v. BRILLANTES, JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 | March 29, 1995
Facts: This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross
Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge
Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the MeTC, Branch
20, Manila. Complainant alleges that he has two children with
Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy
Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in
said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in
Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his
bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant’s)
bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that
respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant
did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the
house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of
his children. Thereafter, respondent prevented him from
visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his
children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one
Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing
in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
Respondent denied having been married to Ongkiko,
although he admitted having five children with her. He alleged
that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony
before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same
was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon
the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went
through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on
June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage
license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 19 years ago, leaving
their children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in
civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he
believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes,
that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized
without a license.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of
the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil
Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place
in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Issue: W/N Article 40 of the Family Code can be given
retroactive effect.
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Held: Yes. Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party
thereto can enter into a second marriage.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under
Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given “retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that
was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow
affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and
was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he
went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he
was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage
license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is
necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given
an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he
and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to
secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his
sinister motives and bad faith.
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS v. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL
G.R. No. 179922 | December 16, 2008
Facts: Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died
intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory
heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. During
the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to
Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to
deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir,
petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
 Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and
registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
 Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now
covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was
survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos
II. Upon Teofilo’s death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in
the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo
II.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against
respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City. In the said
case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a
partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the
parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds
from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This
includes the remaining 6,691-sqm portion of said land.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts
in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally
divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action
against respondents with the following courses of action: (a)
declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c)
recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money
and damages. In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the
marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent
Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required
marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased
brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Respondents contended that the dearth of details
regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate
Felicidad’s marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that
Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo
Carlos with another woman.
Issue: (1) W/N any person can bring an action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage.
(2) W/N A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is prospective in
application.
Held: (1) No. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage.
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband
or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage. The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages
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covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.
(2) Yes. The new Rule which became effective on
March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application. It does not
apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003
although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the
Family Code.
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case
against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in
controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would
govern depends upon when the marriage took place. The
marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the
law in effect at the time of its celebration. However, the Civil
Code is silent as to who may bring an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be
construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of
marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Elsewise stated,
plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
The Court remanded the instant case. The RTC was
strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for
lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II
is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo
Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
ANITA CHENG v. SPOUSES SY
G.R. No. 174238 | July 7, 2009
Facts: Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases
before the RTC of Manila against respondent spouses William
and Tessie Sy for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce
(PBC) 2 checks for ₱300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan,
both of which were dishonored upon presentment for having
been drawn against a closed account.
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on
January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2) cases for
violation of BP Blg. 22 before the MeTC of Manila.
 On March 16, 2004, the RTC dismissed the estafa cases for failure
of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The Order
ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952 contained no declaration
as to the civil liability of Tessie Sy. On the other hand, the Order in
Criminal Case No. 98-969953 contained a statement, “Hence, if
there is any liability of the accused, the same is purely ‘civil,’ not
criminal in nature.”
 Later, the MeTC dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases on
account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused
respondents in open court. The Order also did not make any
pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused respondents.
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against
respondents before the RTC a complaint for collection of a sum
of money with damages based on the same loaned amount of
₱600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject
of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.
In the assailed Order, the RTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil
action to collect the amount of ₱600,000.00 with damages was
already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of
Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were
filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not
apply, as it must be given only prospective application.
Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any
private prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 proceedings.
Issue: W/N Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure is applicable to the present case.
Held: Yes. The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and
BP Blg. 22 cases against respondents, where the petitioner has
not made any waiver, express reservation to litigate
separately, or has not instituted the corresponding civil action
to collect the amount of ₱600,000.00 and damages prior to the
criminal action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the
criminal cases. Thus, during the pendency of both the estafa
and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil liability
was impliedly instituted and remained pending before the
respective trial courts.
In the case at bar, petitioner is in error when she
insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should not
apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is
now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases
already pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact
that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’
rights does not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application
4
of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
ADORACION CAROLINO v. GEN. SENGA (AFP CHIEF)
G.R. No. 189649 | April 20, 2015
Facts: On December 1, 1976, Jeremias A. Carolino,
petitioner’s husband, retired from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) with the rank of Colonel under General Order
No. 1208 dated November 29, 1976, pursuant to the provisions
of Sections 1(A) and 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 340, as
amended. He started receiving his monthly retirement pay in
the amount of ₱18,315.00 in December 1976 until the same
was withheld by respondents in March 2005.
On June 3, 2005, Jeremias wrote a letter addressed to
the AFP Chief of Staff asking for the reasons of the withholding
of his retirement pay. In a letter reply, respondents informed
Jeremias that his loss of Filipino citizenship caused the deletion
of his name in the alpha list of the AFP Pensioners’ Payroll
effective March 5, 2005; and that he could avail of re-
entitlement to his retirement benefits and the restoration of
his name in the AFP Pensioners’ Masterlist Payroll by
complying with the requirements prescribed under RA No.
9225, or the Dual Citizenship Act.
It appeared that the termination of Jeremias’ pension
was done pursuant to Disposition Form dated October 29,
2004, which was approved by the Chief of Staff and made
effective in January 2005. In the said Disposition Form, the AFP
Judge Advocate General opined that under the provisions of
Sections 4, 5, and 6 of RA No. 340, retired military personnel
are disqualified from receiving pension benefits once
incapable to render military service as a result of his having
sworn allegiance to a foreign country. It was also mentioned
that termination of retirement benefits of pensioner of the AFP
could be done pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1638 which provides that the name of a
retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from
the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon
such loss. It being in consonance with the policy consideration
that all retirement laws inconsistent with the provisions of PD
No. 1638 are repealed and modified accordingly.
On August 24, 2006, Jeremias filed with the RTC of
Quezon City, a Petition for Mandamus against respondents,
seeking reinstatement of his name in the list of the AFP retired
officers, resumption of payment of his retirement benefits
ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
under RA No. 340, and the reimbursement of all his retirement
pay and benefits which accrued from March 5, 2005 up to the
time his name is reinstated and, thereafter, with claim for
damages and attorney’s fees. On February 26, 2007, the RTC
rendered its Decision, granting the petition for mandamus.
Respondents sought reconsideration, but the RTC
denied the same. Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to
the CA, which was granted.
 In so ruling, the CA found that while it is true that Jeremias retired
in 1976 under the provisions of RA No. 340, as amended, which
does not contain any provision anent cessation or loss of
retirement benefits upon acquiring another citizenship, PD No.
1638, which was signed in 1979, effectively repealed RA No. 340,
as amended. Section 27 of PD No. 1638, which provides that the
name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed
from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon
such loss, was correctly made applicable to Jeremias’ retirement
benefits. Logic dictates that since Jeremias had already renounced
his allegiance to the Philippines, he cannot now be compelled by
the State to render active service and to render compulsory military
service when the need arises. The CA found that for the writ of
mandamus to lie, it is essential that Jeremias should have a clear
legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative
duty of respondents to perform the act required which petitioner
failed to show; thus, mandamus will not lie.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that her husband’s
retirement from the active service in 1976 was pursuant to the
provisions of RA No. 340 as PD No. 1638 was not yet in
existence then, and there was nothing in RA No. 340 that
disqualifies a retired military personnel from receiving
retirement benefits after acquiring foreign citizenship.
Issue: W/N the CA erred when it gave PD 1638 a retroactive
effect.
Held: Yes, the CA erred in applying PD No. 1638 to the
retirement benefits of petitioner’s husband.
Firstly, PD No. 1638 was signed by then President
Ferdinand Marcos on September 10, 1979. Under Article 4 of
the Civil Code, it is provided that laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided. It is said that the law
looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless
the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal
provisions; that all statutes are to be construed as having only
prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the
legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the language used; and
that every case of doubt must be resolved against
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retrospective effect. These principles also apply to
amendments of statutes.
PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding
its retroactive application, nor the same may be implied from
its language. In fact, Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides
that the decree shall take effect upon its approval.
As held in Parreño v. COA, there is no question that
PD No. 1638, as amended, applies prospectively. Since PD No.
1638, as amended, is about the new system of retirement and
separation from service of military personnel, it should apply
to those who were in the service at the time of its approval.
Conversely, PD No. 1638 is not applicable to those who retired
before its effectivity in 1979.
The rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the
original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights
that had accrued prior to such amendment. Moreover, Section
27 of PD No. 1638 specifically provides for the retirees to
whom the law shall be applied, to wit: Section 27. Military
personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall be
carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his
retirement benefits terminated upon such loss. Notably,
petitioner’s husband did not retire under those above
enumerated Sections of PD No. 1638 as he retired under RA
No. 340.
Secondly, it has been held that before a right to
retirement benefits or pension vests in an employee, he must
have met the stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the
nature of employment, age, and length of service. Undeniably,
petitioner’s husband had complied with the conditions of
eligibility to retirement benefits as he was then receiving his
retirement benefits on a monthly basis until it was terminated.
Petitioner’s husband acquired vested right to the
payment of his retirement benefits which must be respected
and cannot be affected by the subsequent enactment of PD
No. 1638 which provides that loss of Filipino citizenship
terminates retirement benefits. Vested rights include not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but
also an exemption from new obligations after the right has
vested.
ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
ARTICLE 6 – WAIVER OF RIGHTS
FAMANILA v. CA
G.R. No. 150429 | August 29, 2006
Facts: In 1989, respondent NFD International Manning
Agents, Inc. hired the services of petitioner Roberto G.
Famanila as Messman for Hansa Riga, a vessel registered and
owned by its principal and co-respondent, Barbership
Management Limited.
On June 21, 1990, while Hansa Riga was docked at the
port of Eureka, California, U.S.A. and while petitioner was
assisting in the loading operations, the latter complained of a
headache. Petitioner experienced dizziness and he
subsequently collapsed. Upon examination, it was determined
that he had a sudden attack of left cerebral hemorrhage from
a ruptured cerebral aneurysm. Petitioner underwent a brain
operation and he was confined at the Emmanuel Hospital in
Portland, Oregon, U.S.A. On July 19, 1990, he underwent a
second brain operation.
Owing to petitioner’s physical and mental condition,
he was repatriated to the Philippines. On August 21, 1990, he
was examined at the American Hospital in Intramuros, Manila
where the examining physician, Dr. Patricia Abesamis declared
that he “cannot go back to sea duty and has been observed for
120 days, he is being declared permanently, totally disabled.”
Thereafter, authorized representatives of the
respondents convinced him to settle his claim amicably by
accepting the amount of $13,200. Petitioner accepted the
offer as evidenced by his signature in the Receipt and Release
dated February 28, 1991. His wife, Gloria Famanila and one
Richard Famanila, acted as witnesses in the signing of the
release.
On June 11, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint with
the NLRC, praying for an award of disability benefits, share in
the insurance proceeds, moral damages and attorney’s fees.
On September 29, 1997, Acting Executive Labor Arbiter
Voltaire A. Balitaan dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription. When the motion for reconsideration was
denied by the NLRC, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with this Court (then, was referred to the CA).
On March 30, 2001, the CA promulgated the assailed
decision which dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition. Petitioner claims that he did not sign the Receipt and
Release voluntarily or freely because he was permanently
disabled and in financial constraints. These factors allegedly
6
vitiated his consent which makes the Receipt and Release void
and unenforceable.
Issue: (1) W/N petitioner’s consent was vitiated which
renders the waiver void and unenforceable.
W/N the receipt and release signed by petitioner is a
valid waiver.
Held: (1) No. Petitioner contends that his permanent and
total disability vitiated his consent to the Receipt and Release
thereby rendering it void and unenforceable. However,
disability is not among the factors that may vitiate consent.
Besides, save for petitioner’s self-serving allegations, there is
no proof on record that his consent was vitiated on account of
his disability. In the absence of such proof of vitiated consent,
the validity of the Receipt and Release must be upheld.
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to
show that petitioner’s consent was vitiated when he signed the
agreement. Granting that petitioner has not fully recovered his
health at the time he signed the subject document, the same
cannot still lead to the conclusion that he did not voluntarily
accept the agreement, for his wife and another relative
witnessed his signing.
(2) Yes. To be valid and effective, waivers must be
couched in clear and unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt as
to the intention of those giving up a right or a benefit that
legally pertains to them.
The Court have reviewed the terms and conditions
contained in the Receipt and Release and found the same to
be clear and unambiguous. The signing was even witnessed by
petitioner’s wife, Gloria T. Famanila and one Richard T.
Famanila. Famanila.
It is elementary that a contract is perfected by mere
consent and from that moment the parties are bound not only
to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but
also to all the consequences which, according to their nature,
may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Further, dire
necessity is not an acceptable ground for annulling the Receipt
and Release since it has not been shown that petitioner was
forced to sign it.
ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
MICHAEL C. GUY v. CA
G.R. No. 163707 | September 15, 2006
Facts: On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen
Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their
mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters
of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City.
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died
intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate
valued at ₱10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal
properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley
Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael,
all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the
appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly
settlement of Sima Wei’s estate. They likewise prayed that, in
the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent,
be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate.
In his Comment/Opposition, petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the petition. The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a
Joint Motion to Dismiss. In a Manifestation/Motion as
Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss, petitioner and his
co-heirs alleged that private respondents’ claim had been paid,
waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of
Remedios’ June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating
that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance
received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children
discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
The RTC denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as
the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while the
Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had
not been established that she was the duly constituted
guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of
right occurred. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was
denied. He filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which
affirmed the orders of the RTC. The CA denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals
disregarded existing rules on certification against forum
shopping; that the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by
Remedios released and discharged the Guy family and the
estate of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities; and that
private respondents do not have the legal personality to
institute the petition for letters of administration as they failed
to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in
accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.
7
Issue: W/N the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes
private respondents from claiming their successional rights.
Held: No. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be
couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt
as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a
person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an
intent to abandon a right.
In the case at bar, the Court found that there was no
waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim
does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It
merely states that Remedios received ₱300,000.00 and an
educational plan for her minor daughters “by way of financial
assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of
whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late
Rufino Guy Susim.” Considering that the document did not
specifically mention private respondents’ hereditary share in
the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of
successional rights.
 Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the
hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will
not bar the latter’s claim. Parents and guardians may not
therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without
judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an
alienation of property which must pass the court’s scrutiny
in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been
judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the
instant case is void and will not bar private respondents
from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is
the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one
lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver
of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and
waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a
mistake or misapprehension of fact.
In the present case, private respondents could not
have possibly waived their successional rights because they are
yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children
of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied
that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be
inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights
when petitioner claims that they do not have such right.
Hence, petitioner’s invocation of waiver on the part of private
respondents must fail.
ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
MABUGAY-OTAMIAS v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 189516 | June 8, 2016
Facts: Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired
Colonel Francisco B. Otamias (Colonel Otamias) were married
on June 16, 1978 and had five (5) children. On September
2000, Edna and Colonel Otamias separated due to his alleged
infidelity. Their children remained with Edna.
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit
against Colonel Otamias before the Provost Marshall Division
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Edna demanded
monthly support equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias’
retirement benefits. Colonel Otamias executed an Affidavit,
stating that he can only commit 50% of his retirement benefits
to be prorated among his wife and five (5) children.
On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a
Deed of Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and
pension benefits in favor of Edna and their children. The Deed
of Assignment was considered by the parties as a compromise
agreement. Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003.
The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006.
Edna alleged that “the Armed Forces of the Philippines
suddenly decided not to honor the agreement” between
Colonel Otamias and his legitimate family.
In a letter, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Pension and Gratuity Management Center (AFP PGMC)
informed Edna that a court order was required for the AFP
PGMC to recognize the Deed of Assignment. In another letter,
the AFP PGMC reiterated that it could not act on Edna’s
request to receive a portion of Colonel Otamias’ pension
“unless ordered by the appropriate court.”
Heeding the advice of the AFP PGMC, Edna, on behalf
of herself and Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias
(Edna, et al.), filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan
de Oro, Misamis Oriental an action for support.
The trial court ruled in favor of Edna, et al. and
ordered the automatic deduction of the amount of support
from the monthly pension of Colonel Otamias. The AFP Finance
Center was ordered to release to Edna, et al. their 50% share
of each of the monthly pension due to Colonel Otamias.
Colonel Otamias was also ordered to pay plaintiff Edna M.
Otamias, fifty (50%) percent of whatever retirement benefits
he has already received from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines AND the arrears in support, effective January 2006
up to the time plaintiff receives her share direct from the
Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
8
Edna, et al., through counsel, filed a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution. The trial court granted the
Motion, and a writ of execution was issued by the trial court.
The AFP Finance Center, through the Office of the
Judge Advocate General, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of
execution and argued that the AFP Finance Center’s duty to
disburse benefits is ministerial. It releases benefits only upon
the AFP PGMC’s approval. The trial court denied the Motion to
Quash, ruling that the “right to life” always takes precedence
over “property rights,” and that technical rules must yield to
substantive justice.
The AFP PGMC moved for reconsideration of the
order denying the Motion to Quash, but was denied. A Notice
of Garnishment was issued by the trial court on July 15, 2008
and was received by the AFP PGMC on September 9, 2008.
The AFP PGMC filed before the CA a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition. The CA granted the Petition and
partially nullified the trial court’s Decision insofar as it directed
the automatic deduction of support from the pension benefits
of Colonel Otamias, citing Section 31 of PD 1638 and Rule 39,
Section 13 of the Rules of Court on property exempt from
execution.
Edna, et al. moved for reconsideration, but the
Motion was denied. Edna, et al. filed before this Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari, arguing that the Deed of
Assignment Colonel Otamias executed is valid and legal. They
claimed that Section 31 of PD 1638 “does not include support”;
hence, the retirement benefits of Colonel Otamias can be
executed upon. Edna, et al., also argued that the CA erred in
granting respondent’s Petition because it effectively rendered
the Deed of Assignment of no force and effect. On the other
hand, the trial court’s Decision implements the Deed of
Assignment and Edna, et al.’s right to support.
Further, the AFP PGMC had already recognized the
validity of the agreement and had made payments to them
until it suddenly stopped payment. After Edna, et al. obtained
a court order, the AFP PGMC still refused to honor the Deed of
Assignment.
The AFP, through the OSG, argued that it was not a
party to the case filed by Edna, et al. Thus, “it cannot be
compelled to release part of the monthly pension benefits of
retired Colonel Otamias in favor of Edna, et al.”
In their Reply, Edna, et al. argued that the AFP should
not be allowed to question the legal recourse they took
because it was an officer of the AFP who had advised them to
file an action for support.
ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
Issue: W/N Colonel Otamias’ pension benefits can be
executed upon for the financial support of his
legitimate family.
Held: Yes. The doctrine of waiver extends to rights and
privileges of any character, and, since the word ‘waiver’ covers
every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may
waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable
right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to
him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by
contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by
constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the
individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on
the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the
right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not
contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that
everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be
dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any
public right, and without detriment to the community at large.
In the case at bar, when Colonel Otamias executed
the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his right to
claim that his retirement benefits are exempt from execution.
The right to receive retirement benefits belongs to Colonel
Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement
benefits does not infringe on the right of third persons, but
even protects the right of his family to receive support.
In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be
considered as the law between the parties, and its provisions
should be respected in the absence of allegations that Colonel
Otamias was coerced or defrauded in executing it. The general
rule is that a contract is the law between parties and parties
are free to stipulate terms and conditions that are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias
was not contrary to law; it was in accordance with the
provisions on support in the Family Code. Hence, there was no
reason for the AFP PGMC not to recognize its validity. Further,
this Court notes that the AFP PGMC granted the request for
support of the wives of other retired military personnel in a
similar situation as that of petitioner in this case. Attached to
the Petition are the affidavits of the wives of retired members
of the military, who have received a portion of their husbands’
pensions.
Fallo: The petition is granted. The RTC’s decision is
reinstated.
9
ARTICLE 9 – DUTY OF COURTS/JUDGES TO RENDER
JUDGEMENT
SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689 | October 19, 2007
Facts: On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name
and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila. Petitioner
alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to
the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes
on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as “Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio” in his certificate of live birth. His sex was
registered as “male.”
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that
is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female”
and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted
several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation.
His attempts to transform himself to a “woman”
culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter
examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a
medical certificate attesting that he had in fact undergone the
procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in
fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name
in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to
“Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female.” During trial,
petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-
Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner. The trial court was of the opinion that
granting the petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual re-assignment,
petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a
woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s
misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing
and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the court believes that no harm, injury or
prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in
granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition
would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the
petitioner and her fiancé and the realization of their dreams.
ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines,
thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the CA rendered a decision in
favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision
lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either
name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex
reassignment through surgery. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his
name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles
407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court and RA 9048.
Issue: W/N the trial court erred when it allowed petitioner’s
change of name on the ground of his sex reassignment.
Held: Yes. It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates
that “no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.”
However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial
legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the
law, not to make or amend it. In our system of government, it
is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine
what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of
sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted
are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file
petitions for change of first name and for correction or change
of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what
grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and
what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends
to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment
the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a
protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no
authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else.
The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only
apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.
In the case at bar, petitioner pleads that “the
unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and the realization of their dreams.” No
10
argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly
into the commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by
the courts.
ARTICLE 14 – OBLIGATORY EFFECT OF PENAL LAWS
DEL SOCORRO v. VAN WILSEN
G.R. No. 193707 | December 10, 2014
Facts: Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent
Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they
were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem,
who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen
(16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19,
1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate
Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18)
months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to
the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise
to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to
₱17,500.00 more or less). However, since the arrival of
petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never
gave support to the son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the
Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since
then, have been residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife
established a business known as Paree Catering, located at
Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City. To
date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City.
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel,
sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter. Because of
the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-
affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against
respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A.
No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor
child with petitioner. Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an
information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa
 11
ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY – COLLEGE OF LAW
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC- As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense
Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against respondent. charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
posted bail.
Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of
Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition. Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned.
Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved
the application of the protection order, respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over
the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein
assailed Order, dismissing the instant criminal case against
respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
respondent who is an alien.
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for
Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to
support their child under Article 195 of the Family Code, thus,
failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which
“equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are
obliged to support their minor children regardless of the
obligor’s nationality.”
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an
Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
reiterating its previous ruling. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: W/N a foreign national can be held criminally liable
under RA 9262 for his unjustified failure to support
his minor child.
Held: Yes. Under RA 9262, the deprivation or denial of
financial support to the child is considered an act of violence
against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently
living in the Philippines, the Court found strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal
law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to
the instant case, which provides that: “penal laws and those of
public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live
and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of
public international law and to treaty stipulations.”
In the case at bar, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child
with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of
the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City.

ALAG, Miguel Alleandro M. | 2-Manresa