Module code:

POL6002

Registration no:

210174856

Title:

How effective is censorship in contemporary China?

Seminar Tutor:

Dr Thomas Johnson

Word count:

1908

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Introduction

Censorship, as a well-known system, is used by the CCP to control media and the
Internet. Censorship affects a wide range from providers to receivers of information, from
business to individual, and from domestic to global. In contemporary China, especially
after allowing media to compete in the marketplace, censorship plays an essential role in
maintaining the CCP’s regime. Under globalisation and information explosion, however,
the Chinese government faces increasing challenges in terms of censorship. Therefore,
measuring the effectiveness of censorship is crucial for understanding how the CCP
stabilises its regime in the trend of the Internet and media. In this article, I begin by
defining the purpose of censorship and measuring whether the effective functioning of
censorship in contemporary China is on two bases: the threat of collective action and the
legitimacy of censorship itself. Specifically, to focus on the Internet due to its rapid
development and profound effect on society. Then to illustrate the negative impacts of
censorship, I introduce the COVID-19 example, which demonstrates that censorship could
bring injuries not only to China but to the whole world. According to the two sections, I
argue that censorship is still highly effective in contemporary China, though it has brought
some crises empirically, the Chinese government has not changed the decision to conduct
censorship.

The purpose and the effectiveness of censorship

According to the rise of the media, these commercialised, diverse, and international
information sources have invaded the Chinese relatively closed system, which forced the
Chinese Communist Party(CCP) to loosen their restrictions on the media. That is, they do
not indulge every report and speech, but they filter messages in a more moderate
approach by censorship rather than by forbidding. Censorship works through the Great
Firewall, keyword blocking, and hand censoring (KING, PAN and ROBERTS, 2013),
including both being censored and deleted before and after publication. However, as Xiao
(2011) argues, the CCP is losing its control of the mass media and information under the
influential role that the Internet plays. In this aspect, the widespread of the Internet not only
broadens the spaces of public opinion but also challenges the CCP.

Many scholars point out that the censorship program of the Chinese government is aimed
at suppressing dissent and deterring collective action. Since they do not completely forbid
criticism of the government or the party, they even attempt to establish a positive image by
showing the government is willing to acknowledge and resolve the problems through the
criticism of the media (Chen, 2017). The focus is therefore on the latter—preventing
collective action that might make the CCP’s rule unstable—which will be the basis of
measuring how effective is censorship. Additionally, by evaluating the “legitimacy” of
censorship, which concerns public awareness and acceptance of censorship, provide a
comprehensive comment.

Generally, the development of the Internet can subvert state control over information
(Ferdinand, 2000) since the Internet provides a platform for people to express their support
or dissatisfaction, organize activities, and assess any information. The Chinese
government is aware of the potential threat that the Internet might bring, and this kind of
apprehension explains why censorship is still in use today. Firstly, in terms of reducing the
possibility of collective actions, there has been none large-scale in China since the
Tiananmen protests in 1989. It is not that there is no protest at all, as Xiao’s research
(2010), the Chongqing nail house and environmental protests in Xiamen. The Internet
allowed comments on these issues even though they were set to a certain limit, and the
information still spread through the Internet to the national level. However, the protest itself
stayed at the local level. In other words, the scale of the protest did not expand and would
not become a “real problem” that could have the ability to challenge the regime to the CCP.
One of the reasons is that the sensitive issues would be censored and blocked, and as
King and Roberts’ (2013) research, most of the related articles would be deleted within 24
hours, which shows the high efficiency of hand censoring. Moreover, including those being
censored before publication which is hard to measure, we can argue that the absence of
large-scale collective actions in China owes to their effective censorship system.

On the other hand, self-censorship is another crucial point. Given the CCP’s strict control
of the media, a kind of fear is deeply rooted in the public’s perceptions, which contribute to
the CCP exploiting the emotion and relying on the self-censorship system that works
through psychological control (Perry, 2002). Self-censorship is not only applicable in China
but also extends to overseas Chinese, foreign scholars and journalists. Those who worked

to bring out Tiananmen paper, for instance, are now rejected to enter China by the
government. Consequently, when they are doing the research or reporting, they tend to
conduct more careful evaluations. Furthermore, by holding the Internet service providers
for the behaviour of their users, these operators are forced to proactively censor (Xiao,
2011), which can be seen as broader self-censorship.

For a more effective evaluation of censorship, I introduce the question of “legitimacy” here.
If the public clearly understands that the media is censored by the government, accepts
the system and does not require the government to change, it will be beneficial to the
stability of the CCP regime, whether people do not want or dare to. First of all, Internet
users can easily find that they can not access some foreign websites (Facebook, Twitter
etc.) and that sensitive words are blocked in social media. For example, Liu Xiaobo, a
Nobel Peace Prize winner from China, passed away in 2017. After his death, WeChat and
Weibo, the two major social media in China, were strictly controlled. Even the messages
simply including his name was enough to block, the scope of censorship was greatly
expanding (Crete-Nishihata et al., 2017). Thus, it can be inferred that Internet users have a
certain degree of awareness that they are censored. Secondly, as we know, people in
China use analogies, metaphors or satire to avoid censorship. Perry(2002) suggests that
rather than raising questions about the government’s rule, people tend to skirt those
political minefields. In sum, it is clear that the legitimacy of the CCP’s censorship is high,
and on this basis, the censorship will continue to operate effectively.

Potential crisis of censorship

For the CCP, censorship is an appropriate tool to manipulate information under the
appearance of accepting the public opinion, which not only leads to a lack of transparency
in information and causes a failure of people to make accurate judgements about
important issues but also reduces the credibility and reliability of the governments. A great
example of the censorship crisis is COVID-19. The Chinese government uses censorship
to suppress media press and conceal details of the disease when it first emerged,
indirectly leading to the spread of COVID-19 globally and uncountable deaths due to
deliberate official concealment.

When the first wave of Covid-19 broke out, Wuhan, where the virus first appeared,
became a victim of this virus and censorship. The local media in Wuhan was forced not to
report on related content by the Chinese government, having great impacts on the
residents. They were not alerted since the non-transparency information and even had no
awareness of the lockdown of Wuhan. At that time, an ironic sentence was widely
circulated on social media: “The whole world knows that Wuhan is cordoned off, only
Wuhan does not know it yet (Zhang and Barr, 2021).” As the pandemic spread and
became out of control, due to international and domestic pressure, the CCP leader Xi
Jinping finally issued an acknowledgement about COVID-19 in early 2020. His statement
provided media and academics with the permission and to admit more cases in official
statistics (Zhang and Barr, 2021).

This is not the first time the Chinese government had downplayed the crucial issues out of
the public view, as seen in a similar epidemic in 2003 when the government censored
reports and information of SARS. The behaviour attempted to cover up the facts allowed
the virus to spread and cause people’s death, leading to public scepticism of the Chinese
government itself and official media (Shirk, 2011). Returning to COVID-19, we have been
fighting against the epidemic for nearly two years, and these experiences have illustrated
that false rumours or information spread on the Internet can cause panic among the public
and mislead them away from experts and governments’ policy advice. Hence, the
government actively combat such information. However, once the policymakers prohibit
the dissemination and discussion of facts for other purposes, it might have negative
impacts, which might not only slow down social awareness and reaction, but also
decrease the credibility and transparency of the government (Ruan, Knockel, and Crete-
Nishihata 2020).

As mentioned above, the purpose of censorship is to prevent large-scale collective actions

and to ensure the stability of the CCP’s regime, and censorship, which aims to maintain a
“harmonious society,” has always been a priority over social politics (China Daily, 2010).
What is deleted and what is blocked by the censorship system is an open secret to the
censors and the censored. As Chinese society becomes accustomed to censorship, the
minimal discussion of sensitive issues can result in collective blindness to certain social
values, and the blindness might serve as a deterrent to social mobilisation (Zhang and

 Barr, 2021). For the CCP, maintaining social harmony is its primary mission. The Chinese
government is well aware from the crisis of the two epidemics since the 21st century that
censorship has weakened the values of the public in their thoughts and reactions. As
Zhang (Zhang and Barr, 2021) argues, many Chinese citizens even have no opportunity
for self-censorship in this context. Specific messages and issues fade from public view, if
unfortunately, as covid-19 does, spreading the adverse impacts globally.

Conclusion

In general, censorship in China continues to operate effectively, based on the absence of

collective action that might threaten the regime and the constant conduct of censorship.
Censorship is similar to fighting a disease, “preventing” it and “treating” it. Even though
people realise that what they are reading and publishing is being censored, they do not
question the government. Instead, they choose other ways to avoid it. I measure the
purpose of censorship as suggested by many scholars and the legitimacy of censorship in
Chinese society. Also, point out the harm brought by the experience and potential dangers
under the censorship system. In doing the evaluation, I only consider domestic factors in
China and do not include the influence of overseas Chinese and foreign media. Overall,
censorship has not ended or transformed in China, despite the degree of censorship that
may increase or decrease with social tensions (Peter. 2014). It shows that the CCP has
always been pursuing the same goal, which aims to create a harmonious society and
stabilise its rule. To an authoritarian regime as the CCP, they are not unaware people can
still access foreign websites and indirectly discuss specific issues on the Internet through
certain means. However, they do not care as long as it is not enough to threaten their
regime. As Shirk (2011) argues, the virtual platform of the Internet can splinter from
concrete actions and become an obstacle to a revolutionary movement. Perhaps the
interaction between the development of the media and censorship provides the Chinese
people and the CCP the stability they seek, in which case censorship will be no less
effective in the future.

Reference

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Criticism but Silences Collective Expression. American Political Science Review, 107(2),
pp.326-343.

 Shirk, S., 2011. Changing media, changing China. New York: Oxford University Press.

Xiao, Q., 2011. The rise of online public opinion and its political impact. New York: Oxford
University Press.

Chen, D., 2017. “Supervision by Public Opinion” or by Government Officials? Media

Criticism and Central-Local Government Relations in China. Modern China, 43(6),
pp.620-645.

Ferdinand, P., 2000. The Internet, democracy and democratization. Democratization, 7(1),
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[Accessed 24 November 2021].

Zhang, J. and Barr, M., 2021. Harmoniously Denied: COVID-19 and the Latent Effects of
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Ruan, L., Knockel, J. and Crete-Nishihata, M., 2020. Censored Contagion: How
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