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International Interventions

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Institutional Affiliation

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International Interventions

The security and justice sector plays a critical role in fragile and conflict-affected states.

The concept of long-term development is impossible to materialize without operational security

and justice. Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS) are a group of countries or territories

characterized by conflict and violence per their financial and security status.1 Often, both state

and non-state actors offering security and justice in fragile states are the primary sources of

insecurity and injustice. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

(OECD) provides a critical aspect in the delivery of justice and security whereby it emphasizes

the provision of adequate services to every individual while addressing elements that lead to

fragility, such as weak governance and limited accountability.

It is hard to articulate the fundamental limitation to the fragile state’s ability to deliver

security and justice. Since the mid-1900s, the concept of fragile states and security sector reform

has been the basis of debate on global development.2 Factors such as limited capacity, state

structure, and functions, the entwined issues of “who” gets to provide justice and security, and

“for whom” contribute to the system's complexities. Most importantly, security and justice in

those states are offered by various actors, including state agencies and services as well as non-

state organizations and systems.3 State fragility influences issues such as mass human rights

violations and violent conflicts, which the United States (U.S.) and European Union (E.U.)

1
World Health Organization. "Fragile and Conflict-affected States Health and WHO." World
Health Organization, 2017: 1-12.
2
Andersen, Louise Riis. "Security Sector Reform in Fragile States." Danish Institute for
International Studies, 2006, 3.
3
OECD. International Engagement in Fragile States: Can't We Do Better? Conflict and
Fragility. OECD Publishing, 2011, 11.
 3

member states perceive as a threat to both human and international security.4 Strengthening FCS,

especially in the security and justice sector, is essential.

International engagement is necessary to secure the FCSs security and justice sector

reform. According to National Security Strategy, 2017, the U.S. plans to empower fragile states

to eliminate magnified threats to the American land through state failure. International

interventions refer to one state interfering in the affairs of another state.56 Pugh (n.d) defines it as

a dramatic and abnormal shift in the relation between two states; the change is characterized by

crossing jurisdictional boundaries using armed forces by the intervener state.7 Oppenheim further

defines intervention as a dictatorial involvement by one state in the affairs of another to maintain

or change the current state of affairs.8 There are two major classifications of international

interventions, namely direct and indirect intervention. The former refers to either military or

dictatorial mode of intervention, while the latter refers to economic and diplomatic interventions.

Military interventions refer to the Movement of a country's regular forces, including

airborne, seaborne, and shelling inside another state in a political issue or dispute.910 An

economic intervention involves interference with trade and shipping, which is achieved by the

imposition of a sanction, embargoes, and boycotts, as well as denying land and water access.

Furthermore, a country might exercise Article 41 of the UN Charter, which allows the

prohibition of export and import or imposition of external economic policies by International

4
Andersen. “Security in fragile states.”, 1
5
Tsagourias, Nicholas. "Military Intervention in International Law." Oxford Bibliographies,
2017.
6
Silverstone, Scott A. "Intervention and Use of Force." Oxford Bibliographies, 2011.
7
Pugh, M.C. "International Intervention." Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS) II
(n.d.): 1-9.
8
Kaushik, Ashish. "Public International Law." ccs University, n.d.: 1-4.
9
Kansas State University. "International Military Intervention." Kansas State University, 2021.
10
Kisangani, Emizet F, and Pickering Jeffrey. "International Military Intervention, 1989-2005."
Kansas University State, 2008.
 4

Financial Institutions.11 On the other hand, diplomatic interventions include prudent measures

such as peaceful concessions, mediation, ambassador engagement, and conciliation.

Humanitarian intervention is quite prominent. It refers to the use of military forces in

another state without its Government's consent and with or without authorization from the United

Nations Security Council (UNSC) to avert gross and widespread human rights or international

humanitarian law violations.121314 In other words, humanitarian intervention is a military

interference with the intent to rescue innocent people in other states from massive human rights

violations.1516 This paper contends that the use of aggressive force cannot be justified as a means

to an end in order to resolve the political crisis that underpins the humanitarian crisis. The paper

will first explain the history of successful and failed international interventions to reinforce the

aforementioned argument. Secondly, it will elucidate the present international interventions and

the principles of the USA, U.K., and E.U. approaches to security and justice reform in fragile and

conflict-affected areas.

History of International Interventions

Humanitarian intervention is just as old as history though it gained popularity in the

nineteenth century. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), aimed to introduce new political and moral

11
Rattan, Jyoti. "Changing Dimensions of Intervention under International Law: A Critical
Analysis." Sage Open, 2019.
12
Ngwa, Neba Ridley. "The rise and decline of humanitarian intervention and responsibility to
protect." Journal of International Social Research, 2017: 121.
13
Kardas, Saban. "Humanitarian Intervention: The Evolution of the Idea and Practice." Journal
of International Affairs, 2001: 1-11.
14
Danish Institute of International Affairs. "Humanitarian Intervention." Danish Institute of
International Affairs, 1999: 11
15
Paradela-Lopez, Miguel, and Alexandra Jima-Gonzalez. "Michael Walzer's Humanitarian
Intervention Theory Applied to Multisided Conflicts: A Discussion of Intervention and Self-
Determination in the Syrian Civil War." MDPI, 2020: 1.
16
Heraclides, Alexis, and Ada Dialla. Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth
Century. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015.
 5

standards to regulate international relations.17 Grotius made refinements on the "just war"

doctrine by emphasizing that the only reason for allowing war was on the basis of legal reasons.18

He associated the principle of legitimate opposition to repression with his defense of

humanitarian intervention, which was founded on the fact that a ban on the use of force was non-

existent until the 20th century. Following this notion, numerous other legal academics supported

and built on it. They were reflected in various publications in the 19th century on the basis of

power balance, particularly the 1945 UN Charter which mirrored the long discussion conducted

regarding the use of force and its relation to humanitarian intervention.19

The terms ‘Intervention’ or ‘Interference’ were errant throughout the 19th century. They

were controversial concepts as their scope and implications were vague. Percy Winfield

furthered this claim by referring to it as the vaguest branch of international law.20 However, after

World War II, debate on international intervention carried through in the international law and

international relations literature. During the post-Cold war era, interest in the subject focused

more on humanitarian intervention due to increased interventionism.

Humanitarian intervention was a term first proposed in 1880 by the British jurist and

aesthete William Edward Hall in his acclaimed International Law, which was later changed into

A Treatise on International Law in the same year.21 For a century, 1830-1930, humanitarian

intervention was considered an interference to vindicate the law of nations against outrage in

regards to humanity’s interests to stop religious persecution and endless atrocities in times of

peace and war.22 Stowell linked humanitarian intervention with the experience of the nineteenth
17
Danish Institute of International Affairs. "Humanitarian Intervention." 11
18
Gisslen, Mikaela. "Humanitarian Intervention in History." Lund University, 2018: 1-25.
19
Danish Institute of International Affairs. "Humanitarian Intervention." 13
20
Heraclides, Alexis, and Ada Dialla. “Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth
Century”
21
Ibid
22
Heraclides, Alexis, and Ada Dialla. Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century
 6

century. He defined it as relying on a force for the legitimate intent of safeguarding other states’

residents from inhumane and unjustly oppressive treatment orchestrated by its sovereign power.23

Undoubtedly, humanitarian intervention is a nineteenth-century concept; however, saving

oppressed people has older roots.

William Grewe made an assessment whereby he stated that the humanitarian

intervention principle rapidly absorbed all other grounds of intervention.24 Before the UN Charter

and international human rights law, there lacked an international legal prohibition on inhumane

acts by states, sovereignty, and independence. The non-intervention principle was the

cornerstone of international law. Humanitarian intervention advocates provided the following

criteria to justify its use: (a) Intervention was required to prevent heinous mistreatment and

massacres that would shock humanity's moral conscience, (b) for the intervention to gain

international legitimacy and minimize the abuse factor, it had to be collective or quasi-collective,

(c) the primary motive and justification for interfering was a humanitarian concern.25 However,

the intervention was met with opposition. Only sixty-two percent of the publicists who addressed

the questions raised by the humanitarian intervention supported it.

Evolution of the Concept

Humanitarian intervention in the modern concept is still inextricably linked with state

practice in the nineteenth century. The practice was minimal in the first half of the twentieth

century partly because of the efforts to ban the use of force after World War I. As a result, the

UN Charter came up with a solution whereby it endeavored to authorize and set limitations on

the use of force in the international community. The initial step was to expand the principle of

non-intervention universally ensuring its popularization. Secondly, the use of force was allowed
23
Stowell, Ellery. Intervention in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921.
24
Heraclides, Alexis, and Ada Dialla. Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century
25
Ibid,
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in case of self-defence or collective security concerns under Chapter VII of the charter.26 As a

result, intervening in the affairs of a state was only justified if and when it was perceived risk to

international peace and security. Furthermore, the U.N. acting as the representative of the

international community was the only body that could authorize all acts of intervention.

Consequently, the U.N. Security Council has had the mandate to allow the use of force to

terminate atrocities and mass brutalities and also to enable non-forcible measures since 1945.

However, the experiences during the cold war era demonstrate that the Security Council couldn't

practice the UN Charter's provision on collective security.27 As a result, the concept of

intervention was viewed as imposed self-help by states to protect human lives in other states.

Thus, the use of unilateral interventions was classified as humanitarian intervention.

The Post-cold war period carried a considerable change in humanitarian intervention use.

The primary factor in the development was the evolving nature of the international system; the

elimination of systemic barriers to interference in domestic affairs brought about by the end of

superpower rivalry. Post-Cold War period, norms regarding the protection of human rights have

received significant attention, especially in the western states. This acceptance has yielded an

ideal political atmosphere for instituting international interventions. Subsequently, humanitarian

interventions cease to only be responses against the suffering caused by oppressive governments

but also are provided in situations such as internal conflicts, state failures, and disintegration

where human rights are gravely undermined.

From a broad perspective, the Security Council views the violation of human rights and

civil conflict as a significant risk to international peace and security. In attempts to prevent such,

it uses economic sanctions or allows the use of force in some cases. It has applied economic

26
Kardas, Saban. "Humanitarian Intervention: The Evolution of the Idea and Practice."
27
Ibid
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interventions through sanctions and authorized the use of force other than for self-defense.28

Unlike states' conventional perception of intervention as self-help, numerous post-Cold War

interventions were linked to global or regional interferences. U.N. Security Council resolutions

authorized them.

Additionally, international interventions have shaped the world’s future through

multilateralism. During the post-Cold War era, multilateralism (U.N. intervention) was critical

for humanitarian intervention. Finnemore, 1996, states that it has to be multilateral for

humanitarian military intervention to be legitimate. However, third-world countries oppose this

notion as they understand that it undermines their sovereignty. North-South division retains

conventional non-intervention ideas and state sovereignty, often resisting multilateral actions

provided by human intervention doctrine.29 Despite multilateral interventions providing a backup

global consensus and a more potent force, they can be subject to stagnation. In this context,

unilateral (state) interventions may serve more effectively for fragile and conflict-affected

states.30 The information above depicts the historical process in which international interventions

became popular.

Present International Interventions

From the information presented above, the primary purpose of implementing

international interventions is to uphold people’s dignity and eliminate human suffering. With this

in mind, identifying the connection between undermining human rights and international peace

and security is the best alternative to maintain the equilibrium between reality and global visions

of world politics.31 Over the last twenty years, the nature of humanitarian military intervention
28
Kardas, Saban. "Humanitarian Intervention: The Evolution of the Idea and Practice."
29
Ibid
30
Paradela-Lopez, Miguel, and Alexandra Jima-Gonzalez. "Michael Walzer's Humanitarian
Intervention Theory Applied to Multisided Conflicts
31
Kardas, Saban. "Humanitarian Intervention: The Evolution of the Idea and Practice."
 9

has significantly changed. The 1990s has been referred to as a ‘decade of humanitarian

intervention’ in which the U.N. licensed certain interventions on a humanitarian basis.3233 A

critical development regarding humanitarian intervention was the Responsibility to Protect

(R2P), which was published in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State

Sovereignty.34 ICISS defined sovereignty as a state’s ability to safeguard its people.

The report proposed that it was the obligation of every state to protect its citizens’ human

rights.353637 In case of unwillingness or inability to fulfill this responsibility, the states' sovereign

authority would be suspended.3839 In such a scenario, the R2P of these citizens would be

transferred to the international community.40 The language of the R2P was regularly adopted

regarding adverse humanitarian crises and military interventions following this report in 2001.

Currently, the world has embraced the different types of international interventions,

including military, economic and diplomatic interferences. For international military

interventions to occur, two critical questions need to be answered: the motivation for the

interference and the implications of this intervention on civil wars. In an analysis to determine

the specific conditions under which international interventions become successful, Regan stated
32
Wambeek, Annelie. "Humanitarian Military Intervention: Assessing the need for Revision." E-
International Relations, 2015: 1-7.
33
Jayakumar, Kirthi. "Humanitarian Intervention: A Legal Analysis." E-International Relations,
2012.
34
Brooks, Rosa. "Humanitarian Intervention: Evolving Norms, Fragmenting Consensus."
Maryland Journal of International Law, 2014,169.
35
Wambeek, Annelie. "Humanitarian Military Intervention: Assessing the need for Revision."
36
Massingham, Eve. "Military intervention for humanitarian purposes: does the Responsibility to
protect doctrine advance the legality of the use of force for humanitarian ends?" International
Review of the Red Cross, 2009.804.
37
Seybolt, Taylor B. Humanitarian Military Intervention. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008.
38
Dunn, Thomas M. "International Intervention as a Failing Concept." E-International Relations,
2013: 1-5.
39
Matthewman, Joshua. "Humanitarian Intervention: an exploration of its justification and best
practices." E-International Relations, 2012.
40
Wambeek, Annelie. "Humanitarian Military Intervention: Assessing the need for Revision.”
 10

that the end goal of interventions is to end the fighting and measure the success of intervention

through terminating military hostilities that last for a minimum of six months.41 He further

proposed that using both military and economic interventions will hasten the termination of civil

wars instead of a single intervention.

Economic interventions are gaining massive popularity as an effective international

community tool in civil wars. In the modern world, economic interventions are expressed

through smart sanctions such as financial arms embargoes and travel bans on the select elite in a

particular state.42 Sanctions provide information about the target's relative power, thus affecting

its primary belief. They allow each state involved in a war to approximate the probability of

winning to the actual likelihood of winning, enabling each party to objectively evaluate the war's

outcome.43 Economic sanctions imposed by international society lessen the amount of time

intrastate conflicts will last and promote the likelihood of settlement outcomes through

negotiations. On the other hand, unilateral sanctions are linked with victorious military

outcomes.

The international community has various forms of diplomatic interventions in case of

disputes. Mediation is the most popular applied in civil wars. Regan and Aydin concluded that

mediation forms the basis of all codified diplomatic interventions making up to 82% of

diplomatic interventions.44 Hoeffler defines mediation as a process in which domestic antagonists

41
Reagan, Patrick M, and Aysegul Aydin. "Diplomacy and other forms of intervention in civil
wars." Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2006: 50 (5): 736-756.
42
Cortright, David, and George A Lopez. The sanctions decade: assessing UN strategies in the
1990s. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.
43
Ilgaz, Huseyin. "Foreign Military, Economic, Diplomatic Interventions, and the Termination of
Civil Wars: An Integrative Approach." University of Pittsburgh, 2019.
44
Reagan, Patrick M, and Aysegul Aydin. "Diplomacy and other forms of intervention in civil
wars.”
 11

actively seek and agree to the assistance of a third party in settling disputes.45 Diplomatic

interventions are an effective tool since they do not use any force. However, certain cases might

need multiple intervention types blended.

Principles of USA/UK/EU Approaches to Security and Justice Sector in Fragile and

Conflict-Affected States

The security and justice reform sector in FSCs is a relatively new concept. OECD defines

the sector as an attempt to assist countries to formulate effective structures and mechanisms to

appropriately manage change and resolve conflicts through peaceful mechanisms.46 The efforts

were established after the partner States began to perceive failed or weak states as a threat to

national security.47 By 2011, approximately 1.5 billion individuals lived in fragile and conflict-

affected states.48 As a result, in 2007, development partners published ten guiding principles to

mitigate the complex interventions in FSCs. (1) take context as the starting point. This means

that International interveners should comprehend the country’s context and create a shared view

of the required strategic response.49 Stabilization entails assisting local and regional actors in

attaining political solutions that guarantee durable peace.50 In analyzing effective security and

justice sector stabilization, politics, strategy, and implementation are integral.

The second principle proposes that state security and justice actors pay attention to

conflict roles and engage selectively. Assumptions that violent conflicts exist from the 'partner'

45
Hoeffler, Anke. "Can international interventions secure peace?" International Area Studies
Review, 2014: 17 (1): 75-94.
46
Andersen. “Security in fragile states.”, 6
47
Kleinfeld, Rachel. "Fragility and Security Sector Reform." Fragility Study Group, 2016,1.
48
OECD. International Engagement in Fragile States: Can't We Do Better?, Conflict and
Fragility. OECD Publishing, 2011, 11.
49
Walker, Sophie. "Working effectively in conflict-affected and fragile situations." Department
for International Development, 2010: 1-17.
50
Department of State. Effective Justice & Security Sector Assistance in Conflict- affected
Areas. State. Gov, 2019.
 12

state's inability to suppress the war and that highly capable state troops and justice enforcers can

solely be equated to security is not correct. Donors ought to carefully choose whether and to

whom they shall offer appropriate help. The third principle states that one should evaluate and

mitigate the risks of external interventions. There is a possibility to do more harm than good

through poorly conceived interventions in these volatile environments. International engagement

to military and law enforcement risks encouraging conflict responses that reinforce security

enforcement while undermining necessary political solutions.51 As a result, external actors ought

to undertake a risk assessment constant checkups and assess whether the assistance might worsen

the political economy of conflict.

The fourth principle aims to comprehend community-based views of justice and security.

Among the armed conflicts is the perception of certain concepts such as inequity and abuses.

Donors must evaluate the opinions of a particular state on justice and security donors prior to

engagement and their specific needs to resolve the dispute.52 Emphasis should be put on assisting

security forces in restoring trust with residents. The fifth principle requires one to think broadly

about what stability requires. In FCSs, numerous actors are involved in delivering security and

justice. Effective stabilization strategies capitalize and build on community-based efforts.

The sixth principle elucidates the importance of cultivating local ownership and

responsibility. For security and justice reforms to succeed, authentic ownership of the locals and

political determination to facilitate its delivery is necessary. Donors should set their support in a

manner that promotes local agenda and contribution to the process as well as holding them

responsible for their commitment to peace. The seventh principle promotes inclusivity in security

and justice delivery. The effectiveness of the security and justice reforms attempts is evident
51
Ibid
Department of State. Effective Justice & Security Sector Assistance in Conflict- affected Areas.
52

State. Gov, 2019.

 13

when they are inclusive and meet the unique needs of different parts of the state.53 As a result,

security and justice sector reforms should prioritize addressing setbacks to the involvement and

inclusion of the minority groups.

The eighth principle requires external actors to experiment, evaluate, learn and adapt.

Security and justice reforms should remain flexible because of the evolution of political

dynamics. The ninth principle states that donor efforts should reinforce one another. In FSCs,

poor coordination across the Government and international actors might cause confusion and

conflicting agendas.54 Lastly, it is critical to make strategic plans to facilitate the transitioning

process to long-lasting institutional reforms. Attaining viable peace and stability is a task that

could last for a long time. Therefore, realistic strategies aimed to aid in the transition of durable

reforms and stabilization processes should be included.

Effectiveness of International Interventions Examples

There are numerous examples supporting the effectiveness of international interventions.

However, this paper will focus on two examples, namely Uganda and Kosovo invasions.

Uganda Invasion

During President Idi Amin's regime, Ugandan citizens underwent barbaric cruelties,

including the torture and murder of nearly 300,000 people.55 After two months of the military

incursion of Uganda into Tanzania borders, the latter invaded the former in late January 1979.

The military intervention was conducted weeks after Ugandan troops had retreated to their

territories.56 By April 11, Tanzanian military forces, working with a Ugandan rebel group, had

53
Ibid
54
Ibid
55
Daniel, Wolf. "Humanitarian Intervention." Michigan Journal of International Law, 1988, 348.
56
Roberts, George. "The Uganda-Tanzania War, the fall of Idi Amin, and the failure of African
Diplomacy, 1978-9." University of Warwick, n.d.
 14

taken over the capital and deposed Amin.57 Tanzania defended the action on the claims of self-

defense. Despite Tanzania's effort to assert its act as self-defense, it revealed a humanitarian

motive in the end.

The foreign minister of Tanzania stated that the fall of Amin was a historic win for the

Ugandan people and a victory for freedom, justice, and human dignity. The effects above

demonstrate that justifying Tanzania's action as self-defense is not ultimately convincing.

However, under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention that allows coercive interference in the

domestic affairs of another state to end mass human rights violations, the legality of Tanzania’s

action might be acceptable.58 The U.N. did not contest the issue, and the African union except

Nigeria and Sudan did not criticize the intervention.

Following the world community’s reaction to the Uganda invasion, academic scholars

concluded that the case was proof of a new international norm allowing humanitarian

interventions.59 However, an author debated that the legal criteria for international intervention

were not met, particularly on the disinterestedness of Tanzania's motives and its failure to

terminate operations even after accomplishing humanitarian objectives.60 Regardless of

Tanzania’s urge to oust Amin, it is evident that it would have been impossible for Uganda to

return to normalcy without its military forces.

Kosovo Crisis

NATO’s military intervention over Kosovo against the Government of Slobodan

Milosevic is one of the most debatable involvements during the post-Cold War period.

Numerous commentators and critics have termed the air operation between March and June as

57
Daniel, Wolf. "Humanitarian Intervention." 349.
58
Bailey, Walter. "Humanitarian intervention and world politics." Slideplayer, 2017, 4.
59
Daniel, Wolf. “Humanitarian Intervention.” 349.
60
Ibid, 349
 15

‘humanitarian war’ and ‘virtual war.’61 Among them is General Wesley Clark, the top-ranking

NATO military officer who stated that, while calling it ‘war’ was not permitted, it was, in fact, a

war. Academic scholar Professor Sir Adam Roberts further reinforced that term by saying that it

was a strangely asymmetrical war.62 The first declaration on the willingness to use force over

Kosovo was made in 1998 by NATO members. The decision was reached at a decisive moment

during the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement in October. The sitting American Secretary of State

at that time, Madeline Albright dispatched Holbrooke to Belgrade to emphasize the actual U.N.

Security Council Resolution 1199 and underscore timely and complete adherence.63 In a report

drafted to the Security Council by U.N. Secretary-General Annan requested the global society to

engage in prompt steps to avert a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo.

With regards to the U.N. requirements of seeking authorization before an intervention,

through Resolution 1199, the U.N. was indirectly involved in formulating the reference terms for

the Holbrooke mission as well as the consequent NATO airstrike threat and military action from

March to June 1999.64 In Annan's statement, he admitted that when all other means have failed,

there was no illusion of using force. There are claims that NATO members did seek and obtain

indirect authorization to use force from Kofi Annan two months before the launching of

Operation Allied Force.65 An argument arose that NATO members had failed to obtain an

explicit authorization of a UNSC Resolution form. NATO countered this by saying that it had

received an implicit mandate for military action from the Security Council because it would

support the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement.

61
Latawski, Paul, and Martin A Smith. "NATO, Kosovo and humanitarian intervention."
ResearchGate, 2018, 11.
62
Ibid, 17
63
Rama, sgt Maj Fatmir. "The Liberation and Independence of Kosovo." NCO Journal, 2018, 2.
64
Latawski, Paul, and Martin A Smith. "NATO, Kosovo and humanitarian intervention." 12.
65
Ibid, 12
 16

NATO justified its action in the context of previous U.N. decisions and on humanitarian

grounds. The sitting NATO secretary-general of that time Solana defended the action in a press

statement by saying that NATO military action was a last resort after attempts to engage in

negotiations and political solutions to the Kosovo crisis proved inadequate.66 He explained that

NATO’s action was not intended to wage war against Yugoslavia but rather to reinforce the

political objectives of the international community. Furthermore, he emphasized that action was

meant to avert greater catastrophe, repression, and suffering against the Kosovo population. On

humanitarian grounds, NATO intervention is perceived as a success since it prevented mass

atrocities against Kosovo citizens.

Ineffectiveness of International Interventions

In some cases, despite having the best intentions, interventions can end up doing more

harm than good. In this sector, the focus is on international interventions that did not serve and

were terrible for the security and justice sector. The paper will focus on Bosnia and Somali

crises.

Bosnia Genocide

A war erupted between Serbia and Croatia in 1991 after the death of Yugoslavian

President Tito. A full-scale war between the Serbs and Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina

broke out after president Milosevic, who succeeded Tito, directed a military invasion by the

Yugoslavian army and Serbian Militias of Bosnian towns. With the war taking its course in

Bosnia-Herzegovina in May 1992, it was reported that the war was in line with the Serbian

interior ministry’s vision of creating an ethnically homogenous Bosnia state, the Srprska

66
Ibid, 13
 17

republic, and the merging of both into a newly formed state.67 Such purpose served as

justification for using force against other ethnic groups from their homes.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnic cleansing was perpetrated by armed formations while

political groups such as HDZ and HVO engaged in the atrocious war between 1993-1994. The

U.N. appears to have intervened in the war very late for three reasons. (1) The war broke out at a

time when the U.N. was occupied with the Gulf War, (2) at the beginning the war did not appear

very serious, (3) it appeared as if the European Community would intervene since the Balkan

area was directly under its influence. U.N.'s engagement in the arms embargo created

controversy within and outside Yugoslavia mainly because it favored the Serbs.

U.N. resolution 743 required the U.N. Protection Forces to base its headquarters in

Sarajevo to retain a neutral position. Contrary to expectation, this action did not end the Bosnian

conflict primarily because the authorization permitting U.N. presence did not allow them to

engage in many areas. Furthermore, U.N. forces were understaffed and poorly armed compared

to Serbs, who were heavily armed. The gravest mistake made by the U.N. was inadequately

equipping and understaffing the U.N. peace Keeping Force.

Despite U.N.'s intervention, the war raged on with greater propensity. The U.N. mandate

was broadened between April and June, and 'Safe Areas' were created. However, ironically the

areas were not as safe since U.N. forces lacked the necessary arms to offer protection to the

people therein. This led to a massacre of over 8000 people in Srebrenica under the watch of the

U.N. peace Keeping Force.68 Due to the open failure, withdrawal of the U.N. troops was

considered, and NATO bombings were enforced, which coerced the Serbs to agree to peace

proposals.
67
Dahlman, Carl. "Geographies of genocide and ethnic cleansing: the lessons of Bosnia-
Herzegovina." Oxford Scholarship Online, n.d.
68
Yi, Gamawa. "International intervention and genocide in Bosnia." Safetylit, 2017, 2.
 18

In this case, international interventions can be perceived as ineffective and in violation of

basic humanitarian intervention ethics. It is evident that the decision to interfere undermined the

precautionary principle of preventing human catastrophes such that the implications of

interventions are seemingly higher than non-intervention. Bosnian genocide occurred

immediately after international intervention and under the watchful gaze of the U.N. forces.

Instead of averting human suffering, military intervention created room for greater human rights

violations. U.N. policies including an arms embargo and declaring ‘safe areas’ fully aware that it

could not offer protection can be seen as an indirect cause of mass murder.

Somalia Crisis

The Somalia civil war entails bulk information. This section will only focus on the fourth

military operation, regarded as an international intervention failure. A civil war began in 1988,

and in December 1990, it swept into the capital, Mogadishu, which saw the dictatorial leader

Mohammed Siyad Barre flee a month later.69 As a result, the United Somali Congress rebel took

charge of Mogadishu, splitting it into two groups. The stronger formation was called Somali

National Alliance (SNA) and was marshaled by General Muhammad Farah Aidid, while the

other group named Somali Salvation Alliance, was led by Ali Mahdi Muhammad. The war

between the two groups led to the death of 15000-40000 people between January 1991-August

1992.70 Apart from the political crisis, drought became a national tragedy rendering the country

unable to feed itself. Famine caused by drought and war led to the death of 131000-152000

people. At this point, no external interventions were made to rescue the Somali people.

UNOSOM II, which began in May 1993, was the fourth military intervention in Somalia.

The Security Council authorized it in the provision of chapter VII of the UN Charter. General

Bush, Kenneth D. "When two arnachies meet." Journal of Conflict Studies, 1997.
69

Seybolt, Taylor B. Humanitarian Military Intervention. Oxford: Oxford University Press,

70

2008, 53.
 19

Aidid took this mandate personally as he viewed it as a direct threat to his power and ambition

and was ready to frustrate the U.N. mission. UNOSOM II civilian and military part was not

prepared for severe confrontation.71 After a month of operation, Aidid tested the new mission’s

strength, killing 24 of them when militiamen forged an attack on Pakistani soldiers in southern

Mogadishu.72 The U.N. Security Council approved UNOSOM to take all measures, including

arrest.

Subsequently, the magnitude of violence in Mogadishu intensified. In October 1993, the

war reached its climax when trained USA army unsuccessfully attempted to arrest Aidid for the

seventh time.73 As a result, the USA and U.N. retreated from military intervention and engaged

in diplomatic means, which were equally ineffective. Although humanitarian relief and

rehabilitation programs were still running, they were undermined by the increased hostility from

Mogadishu. The intervention force deserves acknowledgment for helping save lives in early to

mid-1994. However, the overall implication of helping to avert human suffering was disastrous.74

The highest number of deaths was witnessed during international forces intervention in an

attempt to capture Aidid.

USA/UK/EU Approaches to Security and Justice in Fragile and Conflict-Affected

States

The Department for International Development (DFID) is concerned with the security

and justice sector in the U.K. In collaboration with other international partners, the U.K.

government has invested in enforcing the security and justice sector in FCSs for more than

71
Rutherford, Kenneth R. Humanitarianism under Fire: The US and UN intervention in Somalia.
Kumarian Press, 2008.
72
Seybolt, Taylor B. Humanitarian Military Intervention, 58.
73
Talentino, Andrea Kathryn. Military Intervention after the Cold War: The Evolution of Theory
and Practice. Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2005, 135.
74
Seybolt, Taylor B. Humanitarian Military Intervention, 59
 20

twenty years.75 The USA approach is centered on four strategic approaches and goals. However,

the approach applies to the fragile states that intensify a threat to U.S. interests and partners. The

U.S. intervention in FCSs is only effective in the condition of active involvement of key local

partners. The first approach is prevention; this is anticipating and strategic planning to prevent

instability and large-scale violence. Secondly, stabilization will be achieved through inclusivity.

Inclusion of women, youth, minority groups, and faith-based members to help resolve any

violent conflicts. Thirdly, the partnership involves public and private donors in enhancing

sustainable solutions to fragility and conflict.76 Lastly, management includes prioritization,

incorporation, and effectiveness in planning, diplomacy, and other operations in FCS.

On the other hand, the E.U. has devised a practical approach to security and justice in

situations of fragility and conflict. First, broad and appropriate cooperation and coordination to

facilitate comprehensiveness. A comprehensive approach requires the integration of both internal

and external diplomatic and security actors. Second, promote resilience; this will be achieved by

harnessing the local people's resources and enhancing their contribution to the mitigation of

present and the prevention of future crises. Third, utilize the right blend of financial

reinforcements, including instruments and tools. When addressing fragility and conflict, the E.U.

ought to use various devices and tools to regulate imminent crises. Fourth, develop and support

the most crucial aspect, namely human resources.77 Fifth, encourage regular, blended

Headquarters support, and lastly, utilize E.U.'s comparative advantages.

Conclusion

75
Watson, Charlotte. "A people-centred approach to security and justice." Saferworld, 2021, 3
76
Department of State. "United States strategy to prevent conflict and promote stability."
State.gov, 2020, 9.
77
European Communities. Operating in Situations of conflict and fragility. Brussels:
Luxembourg Publication Office of the European Union, 2015, 19.
 21

Security and development are strongly intertwined. FCSs are characterized by weak

governance and state structure, often being disadvantaged because various actors deliver security

and justice. In most cases, both state and non-state actors are the major cause of insecurity and

injustice. Issues including mass human rights violations, conflicts, and atrocities are influenced

by state fragility. International involvement is critical to safeguarding FSC’s security and justice

sector reform. There are multiple types of interventions, including military, diplomatic and

economic. Military intervention involves one country using its airborne, seaborne, and shelling

against the troops of a conflict-affected area with an aim to prevent mass destruction and loss of

lives. Economic interventions involve sanctions and banning of exports and imports of goods

while diplomatic interventions mainly avoid the use of force but rather support the application of

peaceful concessions. However, an Intervention is less critiqued by the global community under

minimal circumstances.78 Depending on the severity of the conflict, the international community

chooses the most suitable type of intervention. Although interference in another country's

domestic affairs is deemed illegal, there are exceptional instances such as in self-defense or

under humanitarian grounds. From the Uganda and Kosovo invasions, it is clear that indeed

humanitarian interventions can be helpful in preventing massive loss of lives.

On the other hand, this essay shows that international interventions might be perceived as

a political threat, particularly in developing countries, thus instigating elevated levels of conflict

and violence. The main aim of humanitarian intervention is to avert human suffering; however,

the notion of state sovereignty is the fundamental principle guiding the socio-economic and

political interactions in the global community. International interventions might fail due to

conflicting perceptions between external actors and the state. Borrowing from political realists’

Dunn, Thomas M. "International Intervention as a Failing Concept." E-International Relations,

78

2013: 1-5.
 22

notion, the use of force to promote human rights might be driven by the intervener states’

national interests.79 Sometimes the impetus for the interference of the external actors is not a

moral principle but the national interests therein.

In a broader sense, the use of force might be precluded to ascertain the submission of

the fragile states to the dominant ones. Compliance is promoted by the more robust states'

willingness to formulate concessions and adjust policies that might help eliminate the weak

states’ political-economic challenges.80 Despite external actors intervening out of good faith and

on humanitarian grounds, aggressive use of force might facilitate detrimental implications. In a

world characterized by dozens of civil wars and conflicts, it is critical for external actors to

carefully select the conflicts in which interference would not cause massive-power conflicts.81

Following the third principle of security and justice, external actors need to assess the political

risks associated with a particular intervention. Therefore, continuous monitoring of the

effectiveness of the intervention as well as involving the local government in any given state is

critical.

79
Hoag, Robert. "Armed Humanitarian Intervention." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n.d.
80
Conteh-Morgan, Earl. "International Intervention: conflict, economic dislocation, and the
hegemonic role of dominant actors." The International Journal of Peace Studies, n.d.
81
O'Hanlon, Michael E. "Doing it right: the future of humanitarian intervention." Brookings,
2000.
 23

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