FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 181293 February 23, 2015

ANA THERESIA "RISA" HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANIEL L. EDRALIN, VICTOR M. GONZALES, SR., JOSE APOLLO R.
ADO, RENE D. SORIANO, ALLIANCE OF PROGRESSIVE LABOR, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO,
LAHING PILIPINO MULTIPURPOSE TRANSPORT SERVICE COOPERATIVE, PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION EMPLOYEES
UNION (PSCEU), and PNCC TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT & SECURITY DEPARTMENT WORKERS ORGANIZATION
(PTMSDWO), Petitioners,
vs.
TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
(DOTC), PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, SKYWAY O & M
CORPORATION, and CITRA METRO MANILA TOLLWAYS CORP., Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

This is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the
following:

1. The Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement executed on 18 July 2007 between
the Republic of the Philippines, the Philippine National Construction Corporation, and Citra Metro
Manila Tollways Corporation;

2. The Memorandum dated 20 July 2007 of the Secretary of Transportation and Communications,
approving the Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement;

3. The Memorandum of Agreement executed on 21 December 2007 between the Philippine National
Construction Corporation, PNCC Skyway Corporation, and Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation;
and

4. The Toll Operation Certificate issued by the Toll Regulatory Board on 28 December 2007 in favor of
Skyway O & M Corporation.

The annulment of the above is sought for being unconstitutional, contrary to law, and grossly disadvantageous
to the government. Petitioners also seek to prohibit Skyway O & M Corporation from assuming operations and
maintenance responsibilities over the Skyway toll facilities. ANTECEDENT FACTS

The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created on 31 March 1977 by Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 11121 in order
to supervise and regulate, on behalf of the government, the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll
facilities by the private sector.

On the same date, P.D. 1113 2 was issued granting to the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (now Philippine National Construction Corporation or PNCC) the right, privilege, and authority to
construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways for a period of 30
years starting 1 May1977.

TRB and PNCC later entered into a Toll Operation Agreement,3 which prescribed the operating conditions of
the right granted to PNCC under P.D. 1113.

P.D. 1113 was amended by P.D. 1894,4 which granted PNCC the right, privilege, and authority to construct,
maintain, and operate the North Luzon, South Luzon and Metro Manila Expressways, together with the toll
facilities appurtenant thereto. The term of 30 years provided under P. D. 1113 starting from 1 May 1977
remained the same for the North and the South Luzon Expressways, while the franchise granted for the Metro
Manila Expressway (MME) provided a term of 30 years commencing from the date of completion of the
project.

On 22 September 1993, PNCC entered into an agreement 5 with PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada (CITRA), a
limited liability company organized and established under the laws of the Republic of Indonesia, whereby the
latter committed to provide PNCC with a pre-feasibility study on the proposed MME project. The agreement
was supplemented6 on 14 February 1994 with a related undertaking on the part of CITRA. CITRA was to provide
a preliminary feasibility study on the Metro Manila Skyways (MMS) project, a system of elevated roadway
networks passing through the heart of the Metropolitan Manila area. In order to accelerate the actual
implementation of both the MME and the MMS projects, PNCC and CITRA entered into a second
agreement.7 Through that agreement, CITRA committed to finance and undertake the preparation, updating,
and revalidation of previous studies on the construction, operation, and maintenance of the projects.

As a result of the feasibility and related studies, PNCC and CITRA submitted, through the TRB, a Joint Investment
Proposal (JIP) to the Republic of the Philippines.8 The JIP embodied the implementation schedule for the
financing, design and construction of the MMS in three stages: the South Metro Manila Skyway, the North Metro
Manila Skyway, and the Central Metro Manila Skyway.9

The TRB reviewed, evaluated and approved the JIP, particularly as it related to Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and
Stage 2, Phase 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway.

On 30 August 1995, PNCC and CITRA entered into a Business and Joint Venture Agreement10 and created the
Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CMMTC). CMMTC was a joint venture corporation organized under
Philippine laws to serve as a channel through which CITRA shall participate in the construction and
development of the project.

On 27 November 1995, the Republic of the Philippines - through the TRB - as Grantor, CMMTC as Investor, and
PNCC as Operator executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA)11 covering Stage 1, Phases 1
and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Under the STOA, the design and construction of
the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of CMMTC. The operation and
maintenance of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of the PNCC
Skyway Corporation (PSC), a wholly owned subsidiary of PNCC, which undertook and performed the latter's
obligations under the STOA.

CMMTC completed the design and construction of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway, which was
operated and maintained by PSC.12

On 18 July 2007, the Republic of the Philippines, through the TRB, CMMTC, and PNCC executed the assailed
Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA).13 The ASTOA incorporated the
amendments, revisions, and modifications necessary to cover the design and construction of Stage 2 of the
South Metro Manila Skyway. Also under the ASTOA, Skyway 0 & M Corporation (SOMCO) replaced PSC in
performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway.

Pursuant to the authority granted to him under Executive Order No. (E.O.) 49714 dated 24 January 2006,
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Secretary Leandro Mendoza approved the ASTOA
through the challenged Memorandum dated 20 July 2007. 15

On 21 December 2007, PNCC, PSC, and CMMTC entered into the assailed Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA)16 providing for the successful and seamless assumption by SOMCO of the operations and maintenance
of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Under the MOA, PSC received the amount of ₱320 million which
was used for the settlement of its liabilities arising from the consequent retrenchment or separation of its
affected employees.

The TRB issued the challenged Toll Operation Certificate (TOC)17 to SOM CO on 28 December 2007, authorizing
the latter to operate and maintain Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway effective 10:00 p.m. on
31December2007.
Meanwhile, on 28 December 2007, petitioner PNCC Traffic Management and Security Department Workers
Organization (PTMSDWO) filed a Notice of Strike against PSC on the ground of unfair labor practice, specifically
union busting.18 The Secretary of Labor and Employment19 assumed jurisdiction over the dispute in an Order
dated 31 December 2007 and set the initial hearing of the case on 2 January 2008. 20

On 3 January 2008, petitioners PTMSDWO and PNCC Skyway Corporation Employees Union (PSCEU) filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258 (RTC), a complaint against respondents TRB, PNCC, PSC,
CMMTC, and SOMCO. The complaint was for injunction and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or a temporary restraining order, and sought to prohibit the implementation of the AS TOA and
the MOA, as well as the assumption of the toll operations by SOMCO.21 Petitioners PSCEU and PTMSDWO also
sought the subsequent nullification of the ASTOA and the MOA for being contrary to law and for being grossly
disadvantageous to the government.22 They later filed an Amended Complaint23 dated 8 January 2008,
additionally praying that PSC be allowed to continue the toll operations. With the exception of TRB, all
defendants therein filed their Opposition.

On 23 January 2008, the RTC issued an Order 24 denying the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. According to the RTC, petitioners were seeking to enjoin a national
government infrastructure project. Under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8975,25 lower courts are prohibited from issuing
a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction against the government - or any person or entity acting
under the government's direction - to restrain the execution, implementation, or operation of any such contract
or project. Furthermore, the RTC ruled that it could no longer issue a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction, considering that the act sought to be restrained had already been consummated. 26 The AS TOA, the
MOA, and the assumption of the toll operations by SOMCO took effect at 10:00 p.m. on 31 December 2007,
while petitioners PSCEU and PTMSDWO sought to prohibit their implementation only on 3 January 2008.

In view of its denial of the ancillary prayer, the RTC required defendants to file their respective Answers to the
Amended Complaint.27

On 28 January 2008, petitioners PSCEU and PTMSDWO filed a Notice of Dismissal with Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
the Issuance of Order Confirming the Dismissal,28 considering that no Answers had yet been filed. On the basis
thereof, the R TC dismissed the case without prejudice on 29 January 2008.29

On 4 February 2008, petitioners filed the instant Petition30 before this Court. On 13 February 2008, we required
respondents to comment on the same. 31

Meanwhile, defendants PNCC32 and PSC33 filed their respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration of the Order
of the R TC dismissing the case without prejudice. Both argued that the RTC should have dismissed the case
with prejudice. They pointed out that petitioners PSCEU and PTMSDWO had acted in bad faith by filing the
complaint before the RTC, despite the pendency of a labor case over which the Secretary of Labor and
Employment had assumed jurisdiction. Defendant CMMTC joined PNCC and PSC in moving for a partial
reconsideration of the RTC Order.34

The RTC denied the Motions for Partial Reconsideration in an Order dated 13 June 2008. 35

Before this Court, SOMCO,36 PSC,37 PNCC,38 CMMTC,39 and TRB40 filed their respective Comments on the
Petition.

THE PARTIES' POSITIONS

Petitioners argue that the franchise for toll operations was exclusively vested by P.D. 1113 in PNCC, which
exercised the powers under its franchise through PSC in accordance with the STOA. By agreeing to the
arrangement whereby SOMCO would replace PSC in the toll operations and management, PNCC seriously
breached the terms and conditions of its undertaking under the franchise and effectively abdicated its rights
and privileges in favor of SOMCO.

Furthermore, the TOC granted to SOMCO was highly irregular and contrary to law, because 1) it did not
indicate the conditions that shall be imposed on SOMCO as provided under P.D. 1112; 41 2) none of the
requirements on public bidding, negotiations, or even publication was complied with before the issuance of
the TOC to SOMCO; 3) applying the stricter "grandfather rule," SOMCO does not qualify as a facility operator as
defined under R.A. 6957,42 as amended by R.A. 7718; 43 and 4) there were no public notices and hearings
conducted wherein all legitimate issues and concerns about the transfer of the toll operations would have
been properly ventilated.

Petitioners also claim that the approval by the DOTC Secretary of the AS TOA could not take the place of the
presidential approval required under P.D. 111344 and P.D. 189445 concerning the franchise granted to PNCC.

Finally, petitioners claim that the assumption of the toll operations by SOM CO was grossly disadvantageous to
the government, because 1) for a measly capital investment of ₱2.5 million, SOMCO stands to earn ₱400 million
in gross revenues based on official and historical records; 2) with its measly capital, SOMCO would not be able
to cover the direct overhead for personal services in the amount of ₱226 million as borne out by Commission on
Audit reports; 3) the net revenue from toll operations would go to private shareholders of SOMCO, whereas all
earnings of PSC when it was still in charge of the toll operations went to PNCC - the mother company whose
earnings, as an "acquired-asset corporation," formed part of the public treasury; 4) the new arrangement
would result in the poor delivery of toll services by SOMCO, which had no proven track record; 5) PSC received
only ₱320 million as settlement for the transfer of toll operations to SOMCO.

All respondents counter that petitioners do not have the requisite legal standing to file the petition. According
to respondents, petitioner Hontiveros-Baraquel filed the instant petition as a legislator in her capacity as party-
list representative of Akbayan. As such, she was only allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action when it infringed on her prerogative as a legislator.46 Presently, she has cited no such prerogative,
power, or privilege that is adversely affected by the assailed acts.47

While suing as citizens, the individual petitioners have not shown any personal or substantial interest in the case
indicating that they sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the implementation of the assailed
acts.48 The maintenance of the suit by petitioners as taxpayers has no merit either because the assailed acts do
not involve the disbursement of public funds.49 Finally, the bringing of the suit by petitioners as people's
organizations does not automatically confer legal standing, especially since petitioner-organizations do not
even allege that they represent their members,50 nor do they cite any particular constitutional provision that has
been violated or disregarded by the assailed acts.51 In fact, the suit raises only issues of contract law, and none
of the petitioners is a party or is privy to the assailed agreements and issuances.52

Respondents also argue that petitioners violate the hierarchy of courts. In particular, it is alleged that while
lower courts are prohibited from issuing temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions against national
government projects under R.A. 8975, the law does not preclude them from assuming jurisdiction over
complaints that seek the nullification of a national government project as ultimate relief.53

As a final procedural challenge to the petition, respondents aver that petitioners are guilty of forum shopping.
When petitioners filed the instant petition, the case before the R TC seeking similar reliefs was still pending, as
respondents PNCC, PSC and CMMTC had moved for the partial reconsideration of the RTC's Order of dismissal
within the reglementary period.54 Furthermore, the instant case and the one before the RTC were filed while
petitioners' labor grievances seeking similar reliefs were also being heard before the Department of Labor and
Employment.55

On the merits of the arguments in the petition, respondents argue that nothing in the ASTOA, the approval
thereof by the DOTC Secretary, the MOA, or the TOC was violative of the Constitution. It is argued that the
authority to operate a public utility can be granted by administrative agencies when authorized by
law.56 Under P.D. 1112, the TRB is empowered to grant authority and enter into contracts for the construction,
operation, and maintenance of a toll facility, 57 such as the ASTOA in this case. Also, the ASTOA was an
amendment, not to the legislative franchise of PNCC, but to the STOA previously executed between the
Republic of the Philippines through the TRB, PNCC, and CMMTC.58 In fact, PNCC's franchise was never sold,
transferred, or otherwise assigned to SOMCO59 in the same way that PSC's previous assumption of the operation
and maintenance of the South Metro Manila Skyway did not amount to a sale, transfer or assignment of
PNCC's franchise.60

There can be no valid objection to the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary, because he was
authorized by the President to do so by virtue of E.O. 497.61 Also, the phrase "subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines" in P.D. 1112 and 1113 does not in any way mean that the presidential approval
must be obtained prior to the execution of a contract, or that the approval be made personally by the
President.62 The presidential approval may be obtained under the doctrine of qualified political agency. 63

Respondents argue that there is no merit in the claim that the TOC granted to SOMCO was highly irregular and
contrary to law. First, the TOC clearly states that the toll operation and maintenance by SOMCO shall be
regulated by the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with P.D. 1112, the STOA, the toll operations and
maintenance rules and regulations, and lawful orders, instructions, and conditions that may be imposed from
time to time.64 Second, there is no need to comply with the public bidding and negotiation requirements,
because the South Metro Manila Skyway is an ongoing project, not a new one.65 Furthermore, the STOA, which
was the basis for the ASTOA, was concluded way before the effectivity of R.A. 9184 66 in 2003.67

Third, SOMCO is a Filipino corporation with substantial 72% Filipino ownership.68 Fourth, the law requires prior
notice and hearing only in an administrative body's exercise of quasi-judicial functions.69 In this case, the
transfer of the toll operations and maintenance to SOM CO was a contractual arrangement entered into in
accordance with law.70

Finally, the assumption of the toll operation and maintenance by SOMCO is not disadvantageous to the
government. Petitioners belittle the ₱2.5 million capitalization of SOMCO, considering that PSC's capitalization
at the time it was incorporated was merely ₱500,000.71

Respondents claim that under the ASTOA, PNCC shall get a direct share in the toll revenues without any
corollary obligation, unlike the arrangement in the STOA whereby PNCC's 10% share in the toll revenues was
intended primarily for the toll operation and maintenance by PSC.72

Finally, respondents assert that there is no reason to fear that the assumption by SOMCO would result in poor
delivery of toll services. CITRA and the other shareholders of SOMCO are entities with experience and proven
track record in toll operations.73 Also, SOM CO hired or absorbed more than 300 PSC employees,74 who brought
with them their work expertise and experience.

ISSUES

The instant case shall be resolved on the basis of the following issues:

Procedural:

I. Whether petitioners have standing;

II. Whether petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping;

Substantive:

III. Whether the TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility;

IV. Whether the TOC issued to SOMCO was valid;

V. Whether the approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary was valid; and

VI. Whether the assumption of toll operations by SOMCO is disadvantageous to the government.

OUR RULING

Not all petitioners have personality to sue.

Standing is a constitutional law concept allowing suits to be brought not necessarily by parties personally
injured by the operation of a law or official action, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters who sue in
the public interest.75 Determining the standing of concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters requires a partial
consideration of the substantive merit of the constitutional question,76 or at least a preliminary estimate
thereof.77

In this case, petitioners raise the power of Congress to grant franchises as a constitutional question. They allege
that the execution of the ASTOA and the MOA, the approval of the AS TOA by the DOTC Secretary and the
issuance of the TOC infringed on the constitutional power of Congress, which has the sole authority to grant
franchises for the operation of public utilities. This Court has had a few occasions to rule that a franchise from
Congress is not required before each and every public utility may operate.78 Unless there is a law that
specifically requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility, particular agencies in the executive branch
may issue authorizations and licenses for the operation of certain classes of public utilities. 79 In the instant case,
there is no law that states that a legislative franchise is necessary for the operation of toll facilities.

In PAL v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 80 this Court enunciated:

Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for, or to authorize the
operation of certain public utilities. With the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency towards the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and towards the approval of
the practice by the courts. It is generally recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state
through a duly designated agency, and to this extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been
delegated, even to agencies other than those of a legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held that
privileges conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative
franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature. 81

It is thus clear that Congress does not have the sole authority to grant franchises for the operation of public
utilities. Considering the foregoing, we find that the petition raises no issue of constitutional import. More
particularly, no legislative prerogative, power, or privilege has been impaired. Hence, legislators have no
standing to file the instant petition, for they are only allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
when it infringes on their prerogatives as members of Congress.82 Standing is accorded to them only if there is
an unmistakable showing that the challenged official act affects or impairs their rights and prerogatives as
legislators.83

In line with our ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 84 the rule concerning a real party in interest - which is
applicable to private litigation – rather than the liberal rule on standing, should be applied to petitioners.

A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.85 One's interest must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.86 The purposes of the rule are to prevent the
prosecution of actions by persons without any right or title to or interest in the case; to require that the actual
party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and to
discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy. 87

At bottom, what is being questioned in the petition is the relinquishment by PSC of the toll operations in favor of
SOMCO, effectively leading to the cessation of the former' s business. In this case, we find that among
petitioners, the only real parties in interest are the labor unions PSCEU and PTMSDWO.

PSCEU and PTMSDWO filed the petition not as a representative suit on behalf of their members who are rank-
and-file employees of PSC, but as people's organizations "invested with a public duty to defend the rule of
law."88 PSCEU and PTMSDWO cite Kilosbayan v. Ermita89 as authority to support their standing to file the instant
suit.

It is well to point out that the Court, in Ermita, accorded standing to people's organizations to file the suit,
because the matter involved therein was the qualification of a person to be appointed as a member of this
Court -"an issue of utmost and far-reaching constitutional importance."90 As discussed, the instant petition raises
no genuine constitutional issues.
Nevertheless, for a different reason, we accord standing to PSCEU and PTMSDWO to file the instant suit. With the
transfer of toll operations to SOMCO and the resulting cessation of PSC's business comes the retrenchment and
separation of all its employees. The existence of petitioner labor unions would terminate with the dissolution of
its employer and the separation of its members. This is why the petition also prays that this Court issue an order
"that would smoothly preserve the toll operations services of respondent PNCC and/or respondent PSC under its
legislative franchise."91

We have recognized that the right of self-preservation is inherent in every labor union or any organization for
that matter.92 Thus, PSCEU and PTMSDWO, as real parties in interest, have the personality to question the
assumption of the toll operations by SOMCO.

II

PSCEU and PTMSDWO are not guilty of forum-shopping.

Forum shopping refers to the act of availing of several remedies in different courts and/or administrative
agencies, either simultaneously or successively, when these remedies are substantially founded on the same
material facts and circumstances and raise basically the same issues either pending in or already resolved by
some other court or administrative agency.93 What is pivotal in determining whether forum shopping exists is the
vexation caused to the courts and litigants and the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by
different courts and/or administrative agencies upon the same issues.94

The elements of forum shopping are as follows: a) identity of parties or at least such parties that represent the
same interests in both actions; b) identity of rights asserted and the relief prayed for, the relief founded on the
same facts; and c) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in one action
will amount to res judicata in the other.95 Respondents argue that petitioners PSCEU and PTMSDWO committed
forum shopping by filing the complaint for injunction and prohibition before the RTC during the pendency of
NCMB-NCR-NS-12-188-07 entitled In Re: Labor Dispute at PNCC Skyway Corporation. It was a case they also
filed, over which the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction.

The case involves a Notice of Strike filed against PSC on the ground of unfair labor practice. While the specific
act in question is not specified, the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice 96 essentially relate to
violations concerning the workers' right to self-organization.97 When compared with the complaint filed with the
RTC for injunction and prohibition seeking to prohibit the implementation of the ASTOA and the MOA, as well as
the assumption of the toll operations by SOM CO for being unconstitutional, contrary to law and
disadvantageous to the government, it is easily discernible that there is no identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for. These cases are distinct and dissimilar in their nature and character.

For the sake of argument, let us assume that, in order to hurt the unions, PSC feigned a cessation of business
that led to the retrenchment and separation of all employees. That is an unfair labor practice. In that
complaint, the unions cannot be expected to ask for, or the Secretary of Labor and Employment to grant, the
annulment of the ASTOA and the MOA and the continuation of toll operations by PSC. The Secretary would
only focus on the legality of the retrenchment and separation, and on the presence or absence of bad faith in
PSC's cessation of business. On the other hand, the complaint before the RTC would require it to focus on the
legality of the ASTOA, the MOA and the transfer of toll operations. Ultimately, even if the Secretary of Labor and
Employment makes a finding of unfair labor practice, this determination would not amount to res judicata as
regards the case before the RTC.

We also reject the claim of respondents that petitioners PSCEU and PTMSDWO committed forum shopping by
filing the instant petition before this Court while the motion for partial reconsideration of the RTC's Order of
dismissal without prejudice was still pending. Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court states:

SECTION 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. - A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice
being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the
dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a
plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim.
In this case, petitioners PSCEU and PTMSDWO had filed a notice of dismissal of the complaint before the RTC on
28 January 2008, before respondents filed their Answers. The following day, the RTC issued an order confirming
the dismissal. Under the above-cited rule, this confirmation is the only qualification imposed on the right of a
party to dismiss the action before the adverse party files an answer.98 In this case, the dismissal of the action
therefore became effective upon that confirmation by the RTC despite the subsequent filing of the motions for
partial reconsideration.

Thus, when the instant petition was filed on 4 February 2008, the complaint before the RTC was no longer
pending. The complaint was dismissed without prejudice by virtue of the notice of dismissal filed by petitioners
PSCEU and PTMSDWO. Consequently, there was not even any need for petitioners to mention the prior filing
and dismissal of the complaint in the certificate of non-forum shopping in the instant petition,99 but they did so
anyway.100

Parenthetically, in their motions for partial reconsideration, respondents PNCC and PSC insisted that the
dismissal should have been with prejudice, because petitioners allegedly acted in bad faith in filing the notice
of dismissal, were guilty of forum shopping, and did not notify respondents of their intention to file a notice of
dismissal. With regard to the first and the third allegation, petitioners may ask for dismissal at any time before the
filing of the answer as a matter of right, even if the notice cites "the most ridiculous of grounds for
dismissal."101 As to the second, we have already ruled that there was no forum shopping as regards the
successive filings of the labor case and the complaint before the RTC.

II

TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility.

This matter has already been settled by the Court in Francisco, Jr. v. TRB,102 which ruled thus:

It is abundantly clear that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of P.D. 1894 have invested
the TRB with sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and
operate a toll facility and to issue the corresponding toll operating permit or TOC.

Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 and Section 4 of P.D. 1894 amply provide the power to grant authority to
operate toll facilities:

Section 3. Powers and Duties of the Board. - The Board shall have in addition to its general powers of
administration the following powers and duties:

(a) Subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, to enter into contracts in behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines with persons, natural or juridical, for the construction, operation and maintenance of toll
facilities such as but not limited to national highways, roads, bridges, and public thoroughfares. Said contract
shall be open to citizens of the Philippines and/or to corporations or associations qualified under the
Constitution and authorized by law to engage in toll operations;

xxxx

(e) To grant authority to operate a toll facility and to issue therefore the necessary "Toll Operation Certificate"
subject to such conditions as shall be imposed by the Board including inter alia the following:

(1) That the Operator shall desist from collecting toll upon the expiration of the Toll Operation
Certificate.

(2) That the entire facility operated as a toll system including all operation and maintenance equipment
directly related thereto shall be turned over to the government immediately upon the expiration of the
Toll Operation Certificate.

(3) That the toll operator shall not lease, transfer, grant the usufruct of, sell or assign the rights or
privileges acquired under the Toll Operation Certificate to any person, firm, company, corporation or
 other commercial or legal entity, nor merge with any other company or corporation organized for the
same purpose, without the prior approval of the President of the Philippines. In the event of any valid
transfer of the Toll Operation Certificate, the Transferee shall be subject to all the conditions, terms,
restrictions and limitations of this Decree as fully and completely and to the same extent as if the Toll
Operation Certificate has been granted to the same person, firm, company, corporation or other
commercial or legal entity.

(4) That in time of war, rebellion, public peril, emergency, calamity, disaster or disturbance of peace
and order, the President of the Philippines may cause the total or partial closing of the toll facility or
order to take over thereof by the Government without prejudice to the payment of just compensation.

(5) That no guarantee, Certificate of Indebtedness, collateral, securities, or bonds shall be issued by any
government agency or government-owned or controlled corporation on any financing program of the
toll operator in connection with his undertaking under the Toll Operation Certificate.

(6) The Toll Operation Certificate may be amended, modified or revoked whenever the public interest
so requires.

(a) The Board shall promulgate rules and regulations governing the procedures for the grant of
Toll Certificates. The rights and privileges of a grantee under a Toll Operation Certificate shall be
defined by the Board.

(b) To issue rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of this Decree.

SECTION 4. The Toll Regulatory Board is hereby given jurisdiction and supervision over the GRANTEE with respect
to the Expressways, the toll facilities necessarily appurtenant thereto and, subject to the provisions of Section 8
and 9 hereof, the toll that the GRANTEE will charge the users thereof.

By explicit provision of law, the TRB was given the power to grant administrative franchise for toll facility
projects.103 (Emphases supplied)

We cannot abide by the contention of petitioners that the franchise for toll operations was exclusively vested in
PNCC, which effectively breached its franchise when it transferred the toll operations to SOMCO. First, there is
nothing in P.D. 1113 or P.D. 1894 that states that the franchise granted to PNCC is to the exclusion of all others.

Second, if we were to go by the theory of petitioners, it is only the operation and maintenance of the toll
facilities that is vested with PNCC. This interpretation is contrary to the wording of P.D. 1113 and P.D. 1894 g
ranting PNCC the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and maintain the North Luzon, South Luzon
and Metro Manila Expressways and their toll facilities.

It appears that petitioners have confused the franchise granted under P.D. 1113 and P.D. 1894 with particular
provisions in the STOA. To clarify, the operation and maintenance of the project roads were the primary and
exclusive privilege and responsibility of PNCC through PSC under the STOA. On the other hand, the design and
construction of the project roads were the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of CMMTC.
However, with the execution of the AS TOA, the parties agreed that SOM CO shall replace PSC in undertaking
the operations and maintenance of the project roads. Thus, the "exclusivity clause" was a matter of agreement
between the parties, which amended it in a later contract; it was not a matter provided under the law.

Third, aside from having been granted the power to grant administrative franchises for toll facility projects, TRB is
also empowered to modify, amend, and impose additional conditions on the franchise of PNCC in an
appropriate contract, particularly when public interest calls for it. This is provided under Section 3 of P.D. 1113
and Section 6 of P.D. 1894, to wit:

SECTION 3. This franchise is granted subject to such conditions as may be imposed by the [Toll Regulatory]
Board in an appropriate contract to be executed for this purpose, and with the understanding and upon the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal when public interest so requires.

xxx
SECTION 6. This franchise is granted subject to such conditions, consistent with the provisions of this Decree, as
may be imposed by the Toll Regulatory Board in the Toll Operation Agreement and such other modifications or
amendments that may be made thereto, and with the understanding and upon the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment or alteration when public interest so dictates.

Section 6 of P.D. 1894 specifically mentions the Toll Operation Agreement. The STOA was one such modification
or amendment of the franchise of PNCC. So was the ASTOA, which further modified the franchise. PNCC
cannot be said to have breached its franchise when it transferred the toll operations to SOMCO. PNCC
remained the franchise holder for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the project roads; it only
opted to partner with investors in the exercise of its franchise leading to the organization of companies such as
PSC and SOMCO.

Again, considering that PNCC was granted the right, privilege, and authority to construct, operate, and
maintain the North Luzon, South Luzon, and Metro Manila Expressways and their toll facilities, we have not
heard petitioners decrying the "breach" by PNCC of its franchise when it agreed to make CMMTC responsible
for the design and construction of the project roads under the STOA.

IV

The TOC issued to SOMCO was not irregular.

Petitioners argue that the conditions provided under Section 3(e) of P.D. 1112104 were not imposed on SOMCO,
because these do not appear on the face of the TOC. Petitioners are mistaken.

The TOC, as a grant of authority from the government, is subject to the latter's control insofar as the grant
affects or concerns the public.105 Like all other franchises or licenses issued by the government, the TOC is issued
subject to terms, conditions, and limitations under existing laws and agreements. This rule especially holds true in
this instance since the TRB has the power to issue "the necessary 'Toll Operation Certificate' subject to such
conditions as shall be imposed by the Board including inter alia" those specified under Section 3(e) of P.D. 1112.
Thus, impliedly written into every TOC are the conditions prescribed therein.

In any case, part of the TOC issued to SOMCO reads:

Pursuant to Section 3(e) of Presidential Decree No. 1112 or the Toll Operation Decree, Skyway O & M
Corporation is hereby given authority to operate and maintain Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway
effective as of 10:00 p.m. of 31 December 2007.

This authorization is issued upon the clear understanding that the operation and maintenance of Stage 1 of the
South Metro Manila Skyway as a toll facility and the collection of toll fees shall be closely supervised and
regulated by the Grantor, by and through the Board of Directors, in accordance with the terms and conditions
set forth in the STOA, as amended, the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the Grantor for toll road
operations and maintenance, as well as the lawful orders, instructions and conditions which the Grantor,
through the TRB, may impose from time to time in view of the public nature of the facility.

As regards the allegation that none of the requirements for public bidding was observed before the TOC was
issued to SOMCO, this matter was also squarely answered by the Court in Francisco, Jr. v. TRB,106 to wit:

Where, in the instant case, a franchisee undertakes the tollway projects of construction, rehabilitation and
expansion of the tollways under its franchise, there is no need for a public bidding. In pursuing the projects with
the vast resource requirements, the franchisee can partner with other investors, which it may choose in the
exercise of its management prerogatives. In this case, no public bidding is required upon the franchisee in
choosing its partners as such process was done in the exercise of management prerogatives and in pursuit of its
right of delectus personae. Thus, the subject tollway projects were undertaken by companies, which are the
product of the joint ventures between PNCC and its chosen partners.107

Under the STOA in this case, PNCC partnered with CMMTC in Stages 1 and 2 of the South Metro Manila Skyway.
The STOA gave birth to PSC, which was put in charge of the operation and maintenance of the project roads.
The ASTOA had to be executed for Stage 2 to accommodate changes and modifications in the original
design. The ASTOA then brought forth the incorporation of SOMCO to replace PSC in the operations and
maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Clearly, no public bidding was necessary because
PNCC, the franchisee, merely exercised its management prerogative when it decided to undertake the
construction, operation, and maintenance of the project roads through companies which are products of joint
ventures with chosen partners.

Petitioners also insist that SOMCO is not qualified to operate a toll facility, because it does not meet the
nationality requirement for a corporation when scrutinized under the "grandfather rule." Other than advancing
this argument, however, petitioners have not shown how SOMCO fails to meet the nationality requirement for a
public utility operator. Petitioners only aver in their petition that 40% of SOMCO is owned by CMMTC, a foreign
company, while the rest is owned by the following: a) Toll Road Operation and Maintenance Venture
Corporation (TROMVC), almost 40% of which is owned by a Singaporean company; b) Asset values Holding
Company, Inc. (AHCI), of which almost 40% is Dutch-owned; and c) Metro Strategic Infrastructure Holdings, Inc.
(MSIHI), 40% of which is owned by Metro Pacific Corporation, whose ownership or nationality was not
specified.108

Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "[n]o franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens x x x." Clearly, under the Constitution, a corporation at least 60% of whose
capital is owned by Filipinos is of Philippine nationality. Considering this constitutional provision, petitioners'
silence on the ownership of the remaining 60% of the corporations cited is very telling.

In order to rebut petitioners' allegations, respondents readily present matrices showing the itemization of
percentage ownerships of the subscribed capital stock of SOMCO, as well as that of TROMVC, AHCI, and
MSIHI. Respondents attempt to show that all these corporations are of Philippine nationality, with 60% of their
capital stock owned by Filipino citizens. We need not reproduce the itemization here. Suffice it to say that in
their Consolidated Reply,109 petitioners did not refute the unanimous claim of respondents. It is axiomatic that
one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. On this matter, we find that petitioners have failed to
prove their allegation that SOMCO is not qualified to operate a toll facility for failure to meet the nationality
requirement under the Constitution.

Finally, no public notices and hearings were necessary prior to the issuance of the TOC to SOMCO. For the
same reason that a public bidding is not necessary, PNCC cannot be required to call for public hearings
concerning matters within its prerogative. At any rate, we have studied P.D. 1112 and the Implementing Rules
and Regulations Authorizing the Establishment of Toll Facilities and found no provision requiring the issuance of
public notices and the conduct of public hearings prior to the issuance of a TOC.

Approval of the AS TOA by the DOTC Secretary was approval by the President.

The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which the Constitution or the
circumstances require the President to act personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised
through executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of the
President unless disapproved by the latter.110 As explained in Villena v. Executive Secretary,111 this doctrine is
rooted in the Constitution:

x x x With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear
and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not
plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department,
begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the
Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in
an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom
confidence," and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, "are subject to the direction of the President."
Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the
projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in
the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority." Secretaries of
departments, of course, exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any way affect
the constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a matter of executive policy, they may be
granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by mere concession of the executive, in the
absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If the President, then, is the authority in the Executive
Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of a department is a man of his
confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the
executive, not any of his secretaries.112 x x x (Citations omitted)

Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, we have ruled that the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources can validly order the transfer of a regional office by virtue of the power of the President to
reorganize the national government.113 In Constantino v. Cuisia,114 the Court upheld the authority of the
Secretary of Finance to execute debt-relief contracts. The authority emanates from the power of the President
to contract foreign loans under Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution. In Angeles v. Gaite, 115 the Court ruled
that there can be no issue with regard to the President's act of limiting his power to review decisions and orders
of the Secretary of Justice, especially since the decision or order was issued by the secretary, the President's
"own alter ego."116

There can be no question that the act of the secretary is the act of the President, unless repudiated by the
latter. In this case, approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary had the same effect as approval by the
President. The same would be true even without the issuance of E.O. 497, in which the President, on 24 January
2006, specifically delegated to the DOTC Secretary the authority to approve contracts entered into by the TRB.

Petitioners are unimpressed. They cite Section 8 of P.D. 1113 and Section 13 of P.D. 1894 as follows:

SECTION 8. The GRANTEE shall not lease, transfer, grant the usufruct of, sell or assign this franchise nor the rights
or privileges acquired hereby, to any person, firm, company, corporation or other commercial or legal entity,
nor merge with any other company or corporation without the prior approval of the President of the Philippines.
In the event that this franchise is sold, transferred or assigned, the transferee shall be subject to all the
conditions, terms, restrictions and limitations of this Decree as fully and completely and to the same extents as if
the franchise has been granted to the same person, firm, company, corporation or other commercial or legal
entity. (Emphasis supplied)

SECTION 13. The GRANTEE shall not lease, transfer, grant the usufruct of, sell or assign this franchise nor the rights
or privileges required hereby, to any person, firm, company, corporation or other legal entity, nor merge with
any other company or corporation without the prior approval of the President of the Philippines. In the event
that this franchise is sold, transferred or assigned, the transferee shall be subject to all the conditions, terms,
restrictions and limitations of this Decree as fully and completely and to the same extent as if the franchise has
been granted to the said person, firm, company, corporation or other legal entity. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners insist that based on the above provisions, it is the President who should give personal approval
considering that the power to grant franchises was exclusively vested in Congress. Hence, to allow the DOTC
Secretary to exercise the power of approval would supposedly dilute that legislative prerogative.

The argument of petitioners is founded on the assumption that PNCC in some way leased, transferred, granted
the usufruct of, sold, or assigned to SOMCO its franchise or the rights or privileges PNCC had acquired by it.
Here lies the error in petitioners' stand. First, as discussed above, the power to grant franchises or issue
authorizations for the operation of a public utility is not exclusively exercised by Congress. Second, except
where the situation falls within that special class that demands the exclusive and personal exercise by the
President of constitutionally vested power,117 the President acts through alter egos whose acts are as if the
Chief Executive's own.

Third, no lease, transfer, grant of usufruct, sale, or assignment of franchise by PNCC or its merger with another
company ever took place.

The creation of the TRB and the grant of franchise to PNCC were made in the light of the recognition on the
part of the government that the private sector had to be involved as an alternative source of financing for the
pursuance of national infrastructure projects. As the franchise holder for the construction, maintenance and
operation of infrastructure toll facilities, PNCC was equipped with the right and privilege, but not necessarily the
means, to undertake the project. This is where joint ventures with private investors become necessary.
A joint venture is an association of companies jointly undertaking a commercial endeavor, with all of them
contributing assets and sharing risks, profits, and losses.118 It is hardly distinguishable from a partnership
considering that their elements are similar and, thus, generally governed by the law on partnership. 119

In joint ventures with investor companies, PNCC contributes the franchise it possesses, while the partner
contributes the financing - both necessary for the construction, maintenance, and operation of the toll
facilities. PNCC did not thereby lease, transfer, grant the usufruct of, sell, or assign its franchise or other rights or
privileges. This remains true even though the partnership acquires a distinct and separate personality from that
of the joint venturers or leads to the formation of a new company that is the product of such joint venture, such
as PSC and SOMCO in this case.

Hence, when we say that the approval by the DOTC Secretary in this case was approval by the President, it
was not in connection with the franchise of PNCC, as required under Section 8 of P.D. 1113 and Section 13 of
P.D. 1894. Rather, the approval was in connection with the powers of the TRB to enter into contracts on behalf
of the government as provided under Section 3(a) of P.D. 1112, which states:

SECTION 3. Powers and Duties of the Board. - The Board shall have in addition to its general powers of
administration the following powers and duties:

(a) Subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, to enter into contracts in behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines with persons, natural or juridical, for the construction, operation and maintenance of toll
facilities such as but not limited to national highways, roads, bridges, and public thoroughfares. Said contract
shall be open to citizens of the Philippines and/or to corporations or associations qualified under the
Constitution and authorized by law to engage in toll operations; (Emphasis supplied)

VI

Petitioners have not shown that the transfer of toll operations to SOM CO was grossly disadvantageous to the
government.

In support of their contention that the transfer of toll operations from PSC to SOMCO was grossly
disadvantageous to the government, petitioners belittle the initial capital investment, private ownership, and
track record of SOMCO.

When one uses the term "grossly disadvantageous to the government," the allegations in support thereof must
reflect the meaning accorded to the phrase. "Gross" means glaring, reprehensible, culpable, flagrant, and
shocking.120 It requires that the mere allegation shows that the disadvantage on the part of the government is
unmistakable, obvious, and certain.

In this case, we find that the allegations of petitioners are nothing more than speculations, apprehensions, and
suppositions.1âwphi1 They speculate that with its "measly" capital investment, SOMCO would not be able to
cover the overhead expenses for personal services alone. They fear that the revenue from toll operations would
go to "private pockets" in exchange for a small settlement amount to be given to PSC. Given that SOMCO has
no proven track record, petitioners deduce that its assumption of the toll operations would lead to poor
delivery of toll services to the public.

The aim in the establishment of toll facilities is to draw from private resources the financing of government
infrastructure projects. Naturally, these private investors would want to receive reasonable return on their
investments. Thus, the collection of toll fees for the use of public improvements has been authorized, subject to
supervision and regulation by the national government.121 As regards the ₱320 million settlement given to PSC,
the amount was to be used principally for the payment of its liabilities of PSC arising from the retrenchment of its
employees. We note that under the MOA, the residual assets of PSC shall still be offered for sale to CMMTC,
subject to valuation.122 Thus, it would be inaccurate to say that PSC would receive only ₱320 million for the
entire arrangement.

It is quite understandable that SOMCO does not yet have a proven track record in toll operations, considering
that it was only the ASTOA and the MOA that gave birth to it. We are not prepared to rule that this lack of track
record would result in poor delivery of toll services, especially because most of the former employees of PSC
have been rehired by SOMCO, an allegation of respondents that was never refuted by petitioners. Neither are
we prepared to take the amount of SOMCO's initial capital investment against it, as it is considerably higher
than ₱500,000, the authorized capital stock of PSC as of 2002.123

A FINAL NOTE

R.A. 8975 prohibits lower courts from issuing any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or
preliminary mandatory injunction against the government - or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or
entity, whether public or private, acting under the government's direction - to restrain, prohibit or compel acts
related to the implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects.

The rationale for the law is easily discernible. Injunctions and restraining orders tend to derail the expeditious
and efficient implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects; increase construction,
maintenance and repair costs; and delay the enjoyment of the social and economic benefits therefrom. Thus,
unless the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, judges of lower courts who shall issue
injunctive writs or restraining orders in violation of the law shall be administratively liable.

The law is clear that what is prohibited is merely the issuance of provisional orders enjoining the implementation
of a national government project. R.A. 8975 does not bar lower courts from assuming jurisdiction over
complaints that seek the nullification or implementation of a national government infrastructure project as
ultimate relief.124

There is no question that the ultimate prayer in the instant case is the nullification of a national government
project considering that the ASTOA involved the design and construction of Stage 2 of the South Metro Manila
Skyway, as well as the operation and maintenance of Stage 1 thereof. The prayer is grounded on the contract's
alleged unconstitutionality, violation of the law, and gross disadvantage to the government. Such principal
action and relief were within the jurisdiction of the RTC, which acted correctly when it ordered respondents to
file their respective answers to the complaint, even while it denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order in observance of R.A. 8975.

It was therefore error on the part of petitioners to come directly before this Court for the sole reason that the
lower courts will not be able to grant the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order to enjoin the assumption of toll operations by SOMCO. The error even takes on a
whole new meaning, because SOMCO assumed responsibility for the operations and maintenance of the
South Metro Manila Skyway at 10:00 p.m. on 31 December 2007. On the other hand, the complaint before the
RTC seeking to enjoin the assumption by SOMCO was filed only on 3 January 2008, while the instant petition was
filed on 4 February 2008.

As we held in Aznar Brothers Realty, Inc. v. CA,125 injunction does not lie when the act sought to be enjoined has
already become a fait accompli or an accomplished or consummated act.

Parties must observe the hierarchy of courts before seeking relief from this Court. Observance thereof minimizes
the imposition on the already limited time of this Court and prevents delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases.126 We do not appreciate the litigants' practice of directly seeking recourse before this
Court, relying on the gravitas of a personality yet making serious claims without the proof to support them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015

KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, REPRESENTED BY REPRESENTATIVE JAMES MARK TERRY L. RIDON AND MARJOHARA S.
TUCAY; SARAH JANE I. ELAGO, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES; VENCER
 MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON OF THE ANAKBAYAN; MARC LINO J. ABILA, NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE
COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES; EINSTEIN Z. RECEDES, DEPUTY SECRETARY- GENERAL OF
ANAKBAYAN; CHARISSE BERNADINE I. BAÑEZ, CHAIRPERSON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS; ARLENE
CLARISSE Y. JULVE, MEMBER OF ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA
MAMAMAYAN (AGHAM); AND SINING MARIA ROSA L. MARFORI, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ELECTIONS,
ON, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Rights beget responsibilities; progress begets change.

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition1 filed by herein petitioners Kabataan Party-List,
represented by Representative James Mark Terry L. Ridon and National President Marjohara S. Tucay; Sarah
Jane I. Elago, President of the National Union of Students of the Philippines; Veneer Mari E. Crisostomo and
Einstein Z. Recedes, Chairperson and Deputy Secretary-General of Anakbayan, respectively; Marc Lino J. Abila,
National President of the College Editors Guild of the Philippines; Charisse Bernadine I. Bañez, Chairperson of
the League of Filipino Students; Arlene Clarisse Y. Julve, member of Alyansa ng mga Grupong Haligi ngAgham
at Teknolohiya para sa Mamamayan (AGHAM); and Sining Maria Rosa L. Marfori (petitioners) assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA) 10367, entitled "An Act Providing for Mandatory Biometrics Voter
Registration,"2 as well as respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution Nos. 9721, 3 9863,4 and
10013,5 all related thereto.

The Facts

On February 15, 2013, President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA 10367, which is a consolidation of House
Bill No. 3469 and Senate Bill No. 1030, passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on December 11,
2012 and December 12, 2012,6 respectively. Essentially, RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a
mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters7 in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent,
and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology. 8 RA 10367 was duly published on
February 22, 2013,9 and took effect fifteen (15) days after.10

RA 10367 likewise directs that "[r]egistered voters whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit
themselves for validation."11 "Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of
application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 [E]lections shall be deactivated x x x."12 Nonetheless,
voters may have their records reactivated after the May 2016 Elections, provided that they comply with the
procedure found in Section 2813 of RA 8189,14 also known as "The Voter's Registration Act of 1996."15

On June 26, 2013, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 972116 which serves as the implementing rules and
regulations of RA 10367, thus, prescribing the procedure for validation,17 deactivation,18 and reactivation of
voters' registration records (VRRs).19 Among others, the said Resolution provides that: (a) "[t]he registration
records of voters without biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of
applications for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections shall be
deactivated in the last [Election Registration Board (ERB)] hearing to be conducted prior to said elections"; 20 (b)
"[t]he following registered voters shall have their biometrics data validated: [(1)] Those who do not have
BIOMETRICS data appearing in the Voter['s] Registration System (VRS); and [(2)] Those who have incomplete
BIOMETRICS data appearing in the VRS"; 21 (c) "[d]eactivated voters shall not be allowed to vote";22 and (d)
"[d]eactivation x x x shall comply with the requirements on posting, ERB hearing and service of individual
notices to the deactivated voters."23 Resolution No. 9721 further states that, as of the last day of registration and
validation for the 2013 Elections on October 31, 2012, a total of 9,018,256 registered voters were without
biometrics data.24 Accordingly, all Election Officers (EOs) were directed to "conduct [an] information campaign
on the conduct of validation."25cralawred

On July 1, 2013, the COMELEC, pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, commenced the mandatory biometric
system of registration. To make biometric registration convenient and accessible to the voting public, aside
from the COMELEC offices in every local government unit, it likewise established satellite registration offices in
barangays and mails.26
On April 1, 2014, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 986327 which amended certain portions28 of Resolution No.
985329 dated February 19, 2014, by stating that ERBs shall deactivate the VRRs of those who "failed to submit for
validation despite notice on or before October 31, 2015," and that the "[d]eactivation for cases falling under this
ground shall be made during the November 16, 2015 Board hearing."30

A month later, or in May 2014, the COMELEC launched the NoBio-NoBoto public information campaign which
ran concurrently with the period of continuing registration.31

On November 3, 2015, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 1001332 which provides for the "procedures in the
deactivation of [VRRs] who do not have biometrics data in the [VRS] after the October 31, 2015 deadline of
registration and validation."33 Among others, the said Resolution directed the EOs to: (a) "[p]ost the lists of voters
without biometrics data in the bulletin boards of the City/Municipal hall, Office of the Election Officer and in the
barangay hall along with the notice of ERB hearing;" and (b) "[s]end individual notices to the affected
voters included in the generated list of voters without biometrics data."34 It also provides that "[a]ny
opposition/objection to the deactivation of records shall be filed not later than November 9, 2015 in
accordance with the period prescribed in Section 4, 35 [Chapter I,] Resolution No. 9853."36 During the ERB
hearing, which proceedings are summary in nature,37 "the ERBs shall, based dn the list of voters without
biometrics data, order the deactivation of registration records on the ground of 'failure to
validate.'"38 Thereafter, EOs were required to "[s]end individual notices to the deactivated voters within five (5)
days from the last day of ERB hearing."39 Moreover, Resolution No. 10013 clarified that the "[Registration records
of voters with incomplete biometrics data and those corrupted data (biometrics) in the database shall not be
deactivated and be allowed to vote in the May 9, 2016 Synchronized National, Local and [Autonomous Region
on Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)] Regional Elections." 40

On November 25, 2015, herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics
validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all
related thereto. They contend that: (a) biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional, substantial
qualification where there is penalty of deactivation;41 (b) biometrics deactivation is not the disqualification by
law contemplated by the 1987 Constitution;42 (c) biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution,
considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling reason for state regulation
and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage;43 (d) voters to be deactivated are not
afforded due process;44 and (e) poor experience with biometrics should serve as warning against exacting
adherence to the system.45 Albeit already subject of a prior petition46 filed before this Court, petitioners also
raise herein the argument that deactivation by November 16, 2015 would result in the premature termination of
the registration period contrary to Section 847 of RA 8189.48 Ultimately, petitioners pray that this Court declare RA
10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, unconstitutional and that the COMELEC be
commanded to desist from deactivating registered voters without biometric information, to reinstate voters
who are compliant with the requisites of RA 8189 but have already been delisted, and to extend the system of
continuing registration and capture of biometric information of voters until January 8, 2016. 49

On December 1, 2015, the Court required the COMELEC to file its comment to the petition. Meanwhile, it issued
a TRO requiring the COMELEC to desist from deactivating the registration records of voters without biometric
information, pending resolution of the case at hand. 50

On December 7, 2015, COMELEC Chairman Juan Andres D. Bautista, through a letter 51 addressed to the
Court En Banc, urgently appealed for the immediate lifting of the above-mentioned TRO, stating that the
COMELEC is set to finalize the Project of Precincts (POP) on December 15, 2015, and that the TRO issued in this
case has the effect of including the 2.4 Million deactivated voters in the list of voters, which, in turn, would
require revisions to the POP and consequently, adversely affect the timelines of all other interrelated
preparatory activities to the prejudice of the successful implementation of the Automated Election System
(AES) for the 2016 Elections.52

On December 11, 2015, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its comment 53 to the
instant petition. On even date, petitioners filed a manifestation54 asking the Court to continue the TRO against
the deactivation of voters without biometric information.55

With no further pleadings required of the parties, the case was submitted for resolution.
 The Issue Before the Court

The core issue in this case is whether or not RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and
10013, all related thereto, are unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is bereft of merit.

I.

At the outset, the Court passes upon the procedural objections raised in this case. In particular, the COMELEC
claims that petitioners: (a) failed to implead the Congress, the Office of the President, and the ERB which it
purports are indispensable parties to the case;56 (b) did not have the legal standing to institute the instant
petition;57 and (c) erroneously availed of certiorari and prohibition as a mode of questioning the
constitutionality of RA 10367 and the assailed COMELEC Resolutions. 58

The submissions do not hold.

Recognizing that the petition is hinged on an important constitutional issue pertaining to the right of suffrage,
the Court views the matter as one of transcendental public importance and of compelling significance.
Consequently, it deems it proper to brush aside the foregoing procedural barriers and instead, resolve the case
on its merits. As resonated in the case of Pabillo v. COMELEC,59 citing Capalla v. COMELEC60 and Guingona, Jr.
v. COMELEC:61
There can be no doubt that the coming 10 May 2010 [in this case, the May 2016] elections is a matter of great
public concern. On election day, the country's registered voters will come out to exercise the sacred right of
suffrage. Not only is it an exercise that ensures the preservation of our democracy, the coming elections also
embodies our people's last ounce of hope for a better future. It is the final opportunity, patiently awaited by our
people, for the peaceful transition of power to the next chosen leaders of our country. If there is anything
capable of directly affecting the lives of ordinary Filipinos so as to come within the ambit of a public concern, it
is the coming elections, [x x x.]
Thus, in view of the compelling significance and transcending public importance of the issues raised by
petitioners, the technicalities raised by respondents should not be allowed to stand in the way, if the ends of
justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of procedure. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Furthermore, the issue on whether or not the policy on biometrics validation, as provided under RA 10367 and
fleshed out in the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, should be upheld is one that demands immediate
adjudication in view of the critical preparatory activities that are currently being undertaken by the COMELEC
with regard to the impending May 2016 Elections. Thus, it would best subserve the ends of justice to settle this
controversy not only in order to enlighten the citizenry, but also so as not to stymy the operations of a co-
constitutional body. As pronounced in Roque, Jr. v. COMELEC:62
[T]he bottom line is that the Court may except a particular case from the operations of its rules when the
demands of justice so require. Put a bit differently, rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Accordingly, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand in the
way, if the ends of justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of
procedure.63ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That being said, the Court now proceeds to resolve the substantive issues in this case.

II.

Essentially, the present petition is a constitutional challenge against the biometrics validation requirement
imposed under RA 10367, including COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013. As non-compliance with
the same results in the penalty of deactivation, petitioners posit that it has risen to the level of an
unconstitutional substantive requirement in the exercise of the right of suffrage. 64 They submit that the statutory
requirement of biometric validation is no different from the unconstitutional requirement of literacy and
property because mere non-validation already absolutely curtails the exercise of the right of suffrage through
deactivation.65 Further, they advance the argument that deactivation is not the disqualification by law
contemplated as a valid limitation to the exercise of suffrage under the 1987 Constitution.66

The contestation is untenable.

As early as the 1936 case of The People of the Philippine Islands v. Corral,67 it has been recognized that "[t]he
right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to
such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of the evolution
of the representative system of government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion
of the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in the modern
states has come to embrace the mass of the audit classes of persons are excluded from the franchise." 68

Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current parameters for the exercise of suffrage:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following qualifications in order to exercise the right of suffrage: first,
he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be disqualified by law; and third, he must have resided in the
Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months
immediately preceding the election.

The second item more prominently reflects the franchised nature of the right of suffrage. The State may
therefore regulate said right by imposing statutory disqualifications, with the restriction, however, that the same
do not amount to, as per the second sentence of the provision, a "literacy, property or other substantive
requirement." Based on its genesis, it may be gleaned that the limitation is geared towards the elimination of
irrelevant standards that are purely based on socio-economic considerations that have no bearing on the right
of a citizen to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good.

To contextualize, the first Philippine Election Law, Act No. 1582, which took effect on January 15, 1907,
mandated that only men who were at least twenty-three (23) years old and "comprised within one of the
following three classes" were allowed to vote: (a) those who prior to the 13th of August, 1898, held the office of
municipal captain, governadorcillo, alcalde, lieutenant, cabeza de barangay, or member of
any ayuntamiento; (b) those who own real property to the value of P500.00, or who annually pay P30.00 or
more of the established taxes; and (c) those, who speak, read, and write English or Spanish.

When the 1935 Constitution was adopted, the minimum voting age was lowered to twenty-one (21) and the
foregoing class qualification and property requirements were removed.69 However, the literacy requirement
was retained and only men who were able to read and write were given the right to vote. 70 It also made
women's right to vote dependent on a plebiscite held for such purpose.71

During the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the delegates decided to remove the literacy and property
requirements to broaden the political base and discontinue the exclusion of millions of citizens from the political
systems:72
Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Manglapus

DELEGATE MANGLAPUS: Mr. President, the draft proposal, the subject matter of Report No. 11 contains
amendments that are designed to improve Article V on suffrage and to broaden the electoral base of our
country. The three main points that are taken up in this draft which will be developed in the sponsorship
speeches that will follow might need explanatory remarks, x x x.
xxxx

(2) The present requirement, reading and writing, is eliminated and instead a provision is introduced which says,
"No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage;"

xxxx
The draft before us is in keeping with the trend towards the broadening of the electoral base already begun
with the lowering of the voting age to 18, and it is in keeping further with the Committee's desire to discontinue
the alienation and exclusion of millions of citizens from the political system and from participation in the
political life of the country. The requirement of literacy for voting is eliminated for it is noted that there are very
few countries left in the world where literacy remains a condition for voting. There is no Southeast Asian country
that imposes this requirement. The United States Supreme Court only a few months ago declared
unconstitutional any state law that would continue to impose this requirement for voting.
xxxx

It is to be noted that all those who testified before the Committee favoured the elimination of the literacy
requirement. It must be stressed that those witnesses represented all levels of society x x x.

Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Ordoñez

x x x in the process, as we evolve, many and more of our people were left to the sidelines because they could
no longer participate in the process of government simply because their ability to read and write had become
inadequate. This, however, did not mean that they were no longer responsive to the demands of the times,
that they were unsensible to what was happening among them. And so in the process as years went on,
conscious efforts were made to liberate, to free these persons who were formerly entitled in the course of
election by means of whittling away the requirements for the exercise of the right to vote. First of all, was the
property requirement. There were times in the English constitutional history that it was common to say as an
answer to a question, "Who are entitled to vote?" that the following cannot vote - - criminals, paupers,
members of the House of Lords. They were landed together at the same figurative category.

Eventually, with the wisdom of the times, property requirement was eliminated but the last remaining vestige
which bound the members of the community to ignorance, which was the persistence of this requirement of
literacy remained. And this is again preserved in our Constitution, in our Election Code, which provides that
those who cannot prepare their ballots themselves shall not be qualified to vote.

xxxx

Unless you remove this literacy test, the cultural minorities, the underprivileged, the urban guerrillas will forever
be outcasts of our society, irresponsive of what is happening. And if this condition were to continue, my friends,
we cannot fully claim that we have representative democracy. Let us reverse the cycle. Let us eliminate the
social imbalance by granting to these persons who are very responsible the right to participate in the choice of
the persons who are to make their laws for them. (Emphases supplied)
As clarified on interpellation, the phrase "other substantive requirement" carries the same tack as the other
standards alienating particular classes based on socio-economic considerations irrelevant to suffrage, such as
the payment of taxes. Moreover, as particularly noted and as will be later elaborated on, the phrase did not
contemplate any restriction on procedural requirements, such as that of registration:
DELEGATE DE LOS REYES: On page 2, Line 3, the following appears:
"For other substantive requirement, no literacy[,] property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on
the exercise of suffrage."
just what is contemplated in the phrase, "substantive requirement?"

DELEGATE OCCEÑA: I can answer that, but it belongs to the sphere of someone else in the Committee. We use
this term as distinguished from procedural requirements. For instance, the law cannot come in and say that
those who should be allowed to vote should have paid certain taxes. That would be a substantial requirement
in addition to what is provided for in the Constitution. But the law can step in as far as certain procedural
requirements are concerned like requiring registration, and also step in as far as these classifications are
concerned.73 (Emphases supplied)
As it finally turned out, the imposition of literacy, property, or other substantive requirement was proscribed and
the following provision on suffrage was adopted74 in the 1973 Constitution:
Section 1. Suffrage shall be exercised by citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election. No literacy, property, or
other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. The Batasang Pambansa shall
provide a system for the purpose of securing the secrecy and sanctity of the vote. (Emphasis supplied)
After deliberating on and eventually, striking down a proposal to exclude literacy requirements from the
limitation,75 the exact provision prohibiting the imposition of "literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement[s]" in the 1973 Constitution was fully adopted in the 1987 Constitution.

Along the contours of this limitation then, Congress, pursuant to Section 118 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, or
the Omnibus Election Code, among others, imposed the following legal disqualifications:
Section 118. Disqualifications. - The following shall be disqualified from voting:
(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one year,
such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or granted amnesty: Provided, however, That any
person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration
of five years after service of sentence.

(b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court or tribunal of having
committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition,
violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless restored to his
full civil and political rights in accordance with law: Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote automatically
upon expiration of five years after service of sentence.

(c) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.

A "qualification" is loosely defined as "the possession of qualities, properties (such as fitness or capacity)
inherently or legally necessary to make one eligible for a position or office, or to perform a public duty or
function."76

Properly speaking, the concept of a "qualification", at least insofar as the discourse on suffrage is concerned,
should be distinguished from the concept of "registration", which is jurisprudentially regarded as only the means
by which a person's qualifications to vote is determined. In Yra v. Abaño,77 citing Meffert v. Brown,78 it was
stated that "[t]he act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes
the citizen a qualified voter [and] one may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote."79 In said
case, this Court definitively characterized registration as a form of regulation and not as a qualification for the
right of suffrage:
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.80 (Emphasis
supplied)
As a form of regulation, compliance with the registration procedure is dutifully enjoined. Section 115 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides:
Section 115. Necessity of Registration. - In order that a qualified elector may vote in any election, plebiscite or
referendum, he must be registered in the permanent list of voters for the city or municipality in which he resides.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, although one is deemed to be a "qualified elector," he must nonetheless still comply with the registration
procedure in order to vote.

As the deliberations on the 1973 Constitution made clear, registration is a mere procedural requirement which
does not fall under the limitation that "[n]o literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed
on the exercise of suffrage." This was echoed in AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC81 (AKBAYAN-Youth), wherein the
Court pronounced that the process of registration is a procedural limitation on the right to vote. Albeit
procedural, the right of a citizen to vote nevertheless remains conditioned upon it:
Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing
substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of
law. Thus, as to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural
requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be
qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter,
is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the
Voters Registration Act of 1996.82 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RA 8189 primarily governs the process of registration. It defines "registration" as "the act of accomplishing and
filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or
municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the
[ERB]."83 As stated in Section 2 thereof, RA 8189 was passed in order "to systematize the present method of
registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters."

To complement RA 8189 in light of the advances in modern technology, RA 10367, or the assailed Biometrics
Law, was signed into law in February 2013. It built on the policy considerations behind RA 8189 as it
institutionalized biometrics validation as part of the registration process:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to establish a clean, complete, permanent and
updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology.
"Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of an individual such as voice,
photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable features."84

Sections 3 and 10 of RA 10367 respectively require registered and new voters to submit themselves for
biometrics validation:
Section 3. Who Shall Submit for Validation. - Registered voters whose biometrics have not been captured shall
submit themselves for validation.

Section 10. Mandatory Biometrics Registration. - The Commission shall implement a mandatory biometrics
registration system for new voters.
Under Section 2 (d) of RA 10367, "validation" is defined as "the process of taking the biometrics of registered
voters whose biometrics have not yet been captured."

The consequence of non-compliance is "deactivation" which "refers to the removal of the registration record of
the registered voter from the corresponding precinct book of voters for failure to comply with the validation
process as required by [RA 10367]."85 Section 7 states:
Section 7. Deactivation. - Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of application
for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated pursuant to this Act. (Emphases
supplied)
Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of validation, neutrally applies to all voters.
Thus, petitioners' argument that the law creates artificial class of voters 86 is more imagined than real. There is no
favor accorded to an "obedient group." If anything, non-compliance by the "disobedient" only rightfully results
into prescribed consequences. Surely, this is beyond the intended mantle of the equal protection of the laws,
which only works "against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality."87

It should also be pointed out that deactivation is not novel to RA 10367. RA 8189 already provides for certain
grounds for deactivation, of which not only the disqualifications under the Constitution or the Omnibus Election
are listed.
Section 27. Deactivation of Registration. The board shall deactivate the registration and remove the registration
records of the following persons from the corresponding precinct book of voters and place the same, properly
marked and dated in indelible ink, in the inactive file after entering the cause or causes of
deactivation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one (1) year,
such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any person
disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five
(5) years after service of sentence as certified by the clerks of courts of the Municipal/Municipal
Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan;

b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having
caused/committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion,
sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless restored
to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law; Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote
automatically upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence;

c) Any person declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent unless such disqualification has
been subsequently removed by a declaration of a proper authority that such person is no longer insane or
incompetent;

d) Any person who did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular elections as shown by their voting
records. For this purpose, regular elections do not include the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections;

e) Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the Court; and

f) Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.

For this purpose, the clerks of court for the Municipal/Municipal ( Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and
the Sandiganbayan shall furnish the Election Officer of the city or municipality concerned at the end of each
month a certified list of persons who are disqualified under paragraph (a) hereof, with their addresses. The
Commission may request a certified list of persons who have lost their Filipino Citizenship or declared as insane
or incompetent with their addresses from other government agencies.

The Election Officer shall post in the bulletin board of his office a certified list of those persons whose registration
were deactivated and the reasons therefor, and furnish copies thereof to the local heads of political parties,
the national central file, provincial file, and the voter concerned.
With these considerations in mind, petitioners' claim that biometrics validation imposed under RA 10367, and
implemented under COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, must perforce fail. To reiterate, this
requirement is not a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration
procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the
limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to the existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996.
Petitioners would do well to be reminded of this Court's pronouncement in AKBAYAN-Youth, wherein it was held
that:
[T]he act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part and
parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners'
argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory
requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the
State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate
the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to
the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner - one which is not indifferent, and so far removed from
the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.88 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other substantive
requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution - that is, one which propagates a socio-
economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person's ability to intelligently cast his vote and to
further the public good - the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case.

III.

For another, petitioners assert that biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution, considering that,
applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling reason for state regulation and hence, an
unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage.89 They cite the case of White Light Corp. v. City of
Manila90 (White Light), wherein the Court stated that the scope of the strict scrutiny test covers the protection of
the right of suffrage.91

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the regulation passes the strict scrutiny test.

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the
quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms.
Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as
well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. 92 As pointed out
by petitioners, the United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect
fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access, and interstate travel. 93

Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest,94 and the burden befalls upon
the State to prove the same.95

In this case, respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA 10367 advances a
compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and credible
elections by containing - if not eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and
multiple registrants. According to the sponsorship speech of Senator Aquilino L. Pimentel III, the objective of the
law was to cleanse the national voter registry so as to eliminate electoral fraud and ensure that the results of
the elections were truly reflective of the genuine will of the people.96 The foregoing consideration is
unquestionably a compelling state interest.

Also, it was shown that the regulation is the least restrictive means for achieving the above-said interest. Section
697 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation, whereby the registered voter is only
required to: (a) personally appear before the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence
of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded. It is, in effect, a manner of updating
one's registration for those already registered under RA 8189, or a first-time registration for new registrants. The
re-registration process is amply justified by the fact that the government is adopting a novel technology like
biometrics in order to address the bane of electoral fraud that has enduringly plagued the electoral exercises in
this country. While registrants may be inconvenienced by waiting in long lines or by not being accommodated
on certain days due to heavy volume of work, these are typical burdens of voting that are remedied by
bureaucratic improvements to be implemented by the COMELEC as an administrative institution. By and large,
the COMELEC has not turned a blind eye to these realities. It has tried to account for the exigencies by holding
continuous registration as early as May 6, 2014 until October 31, 2015, or for over a period of 18 months. To
make the validation process as convenient as possible, the COMELEC even went to the extent of setting up off-
site and satellite biometrics registration in shopping malls and conducted the same on Sundays. 98 Moreover, it
deserves mentioning that RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate registered voters to submit
themselves to validation every time there is an election. In fact, it only required the voter to undergo the
validation process one (1) time, which shall remain effective in succeeding elections, provided that he remains
an active voter. To add, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters from exercising their right to
vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they could still apply for reactivation99 following the
procedure laid down in Section 28 100 of RA 8189.

That being said, the assailed regulation on the right to suffrage was sufficiently justified as it was indeed narrowly
tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of establishing a clean, complete, permanent and updated
list of voters, and was demonstrably the least restrictive means in promoting that interest.101

IV.

Petitioners further aver that RA 10367 and the COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013 violate the
tenets of procedural due process because of the short periods of time between hearings and notice, and the
summary nature of the deactivation proceedings.102

Petitioners are mistaken.

At the outset, it should be pointed out that the COMELEC, through Resolution No. 10013, had directed EOs to:
(a) "[p]ost the lists of voters without biometrics data in the bulletin boards of the City/Municipal hall, Office of
the Election Officer and in the barangay hall along with the notice of ERB hearing;" and (b) [s]end individual
notices to the affected voters included in the generated list of voters without biometrics data.103 The same
Resolution also accords concerned individuals the opportunity to file their opposition/objection to the
deactivation of VRRs not later than November 9, 2015 in accordance with the period prescribed in Section
4,104 Chapter I, Resolution No. 9853. Meanwhile, Resolution Nos. 9721 and 9863 respectively state that
"[d]eactivation x x x shall comply with the requirements on posting, ERB hearing and service of individual
notices to the deactivated voters,"105 and that the "Reactivation for cases falling under this ground shall be
made during the November 16, 2015 Board hearing." 106 While the proceedings are summary in nature, the
urgency of finalizing the voters' list for the upcoming May 2016 Elections calls for swift and immediate action on
the deactivation of VRRs of voters who fail to comply with the mandate of RA 10367. After all, in the
preparation for the May 2016 National and Local Elections, time is of the essence. The summary nature of the
proceedings does not depart from the fact that petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard.

Relatedly, it deserves emphasis that the public has been sufficiently informed of the implementation of RA
10367 and its deactivation feature. RA 10367 was duly published as early as February 22, 2013,107 and took
effect fifteen (15) days after.108 Accordingly, dating to the day of its publications, all are bound to know the
terms of its provisions, including the consequences of non-compliance. As implemented, the process of
biometrics validation commenced on July 1, 2013, or approximately two and a half (2 1/2) years before the
October 31, 2015 deadline. To add, the COMELEC conducted a massive public information campaign, i.e.,
NoBio-NoBoto, from May 2014 until October 31, 2015, or a period of eighteen (18) months, whereby voters were
reminded to update and validate their registration records. On top of that, the COMELEC exerted efforts to
make the validation process more convenient for the public as it enlisted the assistance of malls across Metro
Manila to serve as satellite registration centers and declared Sundays as working days for COMELEC offices
within the National Capital Region and in highly urbanized cities.109 Considering these steps, the Court finds that
the public has been sufficiently apprised of the implementation of RA 10367, and its penalty of deactivation in
case of failure to comply. Thus, there was no violation of procedural due process.

V.
Petitioners aver that the poor experience of other countries - i.e., Guatemala, Britain, Cote d'lvoire, Uganda,
and Kenya - in implementing biometrics registration should serve as warning in adhering to the system. They
highlighted the inherent difficulties in launching the same such as environmental and geographical challenges,
lack of training and skills, mechanical breakdown, and the need for re-registration. They even adrnitted that
while biometrics may address electoral fraud caused by multiple registrants, it does not, however, solve other
election-related problems such as vote-buying and source-code manipulation.110

Aside from treading on mere speculation, the insinuations are improper. Clearly, petitioners' submissions
principally assail the wisdom of the legislature in adopting the biometrics registration system in curbing electoral
fraud. In this relation, it is significant to point out that questions relating to the wisdom, morality, or practicability
of statutes are policy matters that should not be addressed to the judiciary. As elucidated in the case of Fariñas
v. The Executive Secretary:111
[P]olicy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the
political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its
prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and
the serious, conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance.112 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the exercise of its legislative power, Congress has a wide latitude of discretion to enact laws, such as RA
10367, to combat electoral fraud which, in this case, was through the establishment of an updated voter
registry. In making such choices to achieve its desired result, Congress has necessarily sifted through the policy's
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.113 Whether RA 10367 was wise or unwise,
or was the best means in curtailing electoral fraud is a question that does not present a justiciable issue
cognizable by the courts. Indeed, the reason behind the legislature's choice of adopting biometrics registration
notwithstanding the experience of foreign countries, the difficulties in its implementation, or its concomitant
failure to address equally pressing election problems, is essentially a policy question and, hence, beyond the
pale of judicial scrutiny.

VI.

Finally, petitioners' proffer that Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on October 31, 2015
violates Section 8 of RA 8189 which states:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. - The personal filing of application of registration of voters
shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall,
however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election
and ninety (90) days before a special election. (Emphasis added.)
The position is, once more, wrong.

Aside from committing forum shopping by raising this issue despite already being subject of a prior petition filed
before this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 220918,114 petitioners fail to consider that the 120- and 90-day periods stated
therein refer to the prohibitive period beyond which voter registration may no longer be conducted. As already
resolved in this Court's Resolution dated December 8, 2015 in G.R. No. 220918, the subject provision does not
mandate COMELEC to conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it only provides a period which may
not be reduced, but may be extended depending on the administrative necessities and other
exigencies.115 Verily, as the constitutional body tasked to enforce and implement election laws, the COMELEC
has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to fulfil its mandate.116 Perforce, this power
includes the determination of the periods to accomplish certain pre-election acts,117 such as voter registration.

At this conclusory juncture, this Court reiterates that voter registration does not begin and end with the filing of
applications which, in reality, is just the initial phase that must be followed by the approval of applications by
the ERB.118 Thereafter, the process of filing petitions for inclusion and exclusion follows. These steps are necessary
for the generation of the1 final list of voters which, in turn, is a pre-requisite for the preparation and completion
of the Project of Precincts (POP) that is vital for the actual elections. The POP contains the number of registered
voters in each precinct and clustered precinct, the names of the barangays, municipalities, cities, provinces,
legislative districts, and regions included in the precincts, and the names and locations of polling centers where
each precinct and clustered precinct are assigned.119 The POP is necessary to determine the total number of
boards of election inspectors to be constituted, the allocation of forms and supplies to be procured for the
election day, the number of vote counting machines and other paraphernalia to be deployed, and the
budget needed. More importantly, the POP will be used as the basis for the fmalization of the Election
Management System (EMS) which generates the templates of the official ballots and determines the voting
jurisdiction of legislative districts, cities, municipalities, and provinces.120 The EMS determines the configuration of
the canvassing and consolidation system for each voting jurisdiction. Accordingly, as the constitutional body
specifically charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall,121 the COMELEC should be given sufficient
leeway in accounting for the exigencies of the upcoming elections. In fine, its measures therefor should be
respected, unless it is clearly shown that the same are devoid of any reasonable justification.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED due to lack of merit. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court
on December 1, 2015 is consequently DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

G.R. No. 212472

SPECIFIED CONTRACTORS & DEVELOPMENT, INC., AND SPOUSES ARCHITECT ENRIQUE O. OLONAN AND CECILIA R.
OLONAN, Petitioners
vs.
JOSE A. POBOCAN , Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1under Rule 45 urges this Court to reverse and set aside the November 27,
2013 Decision2 and April 28, 2014 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 99994, and to
affirm instead the June 4, 2012 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 92, in Civil Case
No. Q-11-70338. The court a quo had granted the Motion to Dismiss5 of Specified Contractors & Development
Inc. (Specified Contractors), and Spouses Architect Enrique O. Olonan and Cecilia R. Olonan (collectively
referred to as petitioners), thereby dismissing the action for specific performance filed by respondent Jose A.
Pobocan. The dismissal of the case was subsequently set aside by the CA in the assailed decision and
resolution.

It is undisputed that respondent was in the employ of Specified Contractors until his retirement sometime in
March 2011.1âwphi1 His last position was president of Specified Contractors and its subsidiary, Starland
Properties Inc., as well as executive assistant of its other subsidiaries and affiliates.

Architect Olonan allegedly6 agreed to give respondent one (1) unit for every building Specified Contractors
were able to construct as part of respondent's compensation package to entice him to stay with the
company. Two (2) of these projects that Specified Contractors and respondent were· able to build were the
Xavierville Square Condominium in Quezon City and the Sunrise 1-foliday Mansion Bldg. I in Alfonso, Cavite.
Pursuant to the alleged oral agreement, SpeCified Contractors supposedly ceded, assigned and transferred
Unit 708 of Xavlerville Square Condominium and Unit 208 of Sunrise Holiday Mansion Bldg. I (subject units) in
favor of respondent.

In a March 14, 2011 letter7 addressed to petitioner Architect Enrique Olonan as chairman of Specified
Contractors, respondent requested the execution of Deeds of Assignment or Deeds of Sale over the subject
units in his favor, along with various other beriefits, in view of his impending retirement on March 19, 2011.

When respondent's demand was unheeded, he filed a Complaint 8 on November 21, 2011 before the RTC of
Quezon City praying that petitioners be ordered to execute and deliver the appropriate deeds of conveyance
and to pay moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.

On January 17, 2012, petitioners, instead of filing an answer, interposed a Motion to Dismiss 9 denying the
existence of the alleged oral agreement. They argued that, even assuming arguendo that there was such an
oral agreement, the alleged contract is unenforceable for being in violation of the statute of frauds, nor was
there any written document, note or memorandum showing that the subject units have in fact been ceded,
assigned or transferred to respondent. Moreover, assuming again that said agreement existed, the cause of
action had long prescribed because the alleged agreements were supposedly entered into in 1994 and 1999
as indicated in respondent's March 14, 2011 demand letter, supra, annexed to the complaint.

The RTC, in granting10 the motion, dismissed the respondent's complaint in its June 4, 2012 Order. While the RTC
disagreed with petitioners that the action had already prescribed under Articles 114411 and 114512 of the New
Civil Code, by reasoning that the complaint is in the· nature of a real action which prescribes after 30 years
conformably with Article 114113, it nonetheless agreed that the alleged agreement should have been put into
writing, and that such written note, memorandum or agreement should have been attached as actionable
documents to respondent's complaint.

On appeal, the CA reversed14 the RTC's June 4, 2012 Order, reasoning that the dismissal of respondent's
complaint, anchored on the violation of the statute of frauds, is unwarranted since the rule applies only to
executory and not to completed or partially consummated contracts. According to the CA, there was
allegedly partial performance of the alleged obligation based on: (1) the respondent's possession of the
subject units; (2) the respondent's payment of condominium dues and realty tax for Unit 708 Xavierville Square
Condominium; (3) the endorsement by petitioners of furniture/equipment for Unit 208 Sunrise Holiday Mansion I;
and (4) that shares on the rental from Unit 208 Sunrise Holiday Mansion I were allegedly received by the
respondent and-deducted from his monthly balance on the furniture/equipment account.

Petitioners countered that while there is no dispute that respondent had been occupying Unit 708 - previously
Unit 803 - of Xavierville Square Condominium, this was merely out of tolerance in view of respondent's then
position as president of the company and without surrender of ownership. Petitioners also insisted that Unit 208
of Sunrise Holiday Mansion I continues to be under their possession and control. Thus, finding that the motion to
dismiss was predicated on disputable grounds, the CA declared in its assailed decision that a trial on the merits
is necessary to determine once and for all the nature of the respondent's possession of the subject units.

Aggrieved, petitioners sought reconsideration of the CA decision, but were unsuccessful. Hence, the present
petition raising three issues:

1. Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the respondent's complaint considering that the
allegations therein invoked a right over the subject condominium units as part of his compensation
package, thus a claim arising out of an employer-employee relationship cognizable by the labor
arbiter;15

2. Whether or not the respondent's cause of action had already Prescribed; 16 and,

3. Whether or not the action was barred by the statute of frauds.17

Resolution of the foregoing issues calls for an examination of the allegations in the complaint and the nature of
the action instituted by' respondent. As will be discussed later, there is merit in petitioners' insistence that
respondent's right of action was already barred by the statute of limitations.

What determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.18 In his complaint, respondent claimed that petitioners
promised to convey to him the subject units to entice him to stay with their company. From this, respondent
prayed that petitioners be compelled to perform their part of the alleged oral agreement. The objective of the
suit is to compel petitioners to perform an act, specifically, to execute written instruments pursuant to a previous
oral contract. Notably, the respondent does not claim ownership of, nor title to, the subject properties.

Not all actions involving real property are real actions. In Spouses Saraza, et al. v. Francisco19 , it was clarified
that:

x x x Although the end result of the respondent's claim was the transfer of the subject property to his name, the
suit was still essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it sought Fernando's execution of a
deed of absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously made.
Similarly, that the end result would be the transfer of the subject units to respondent's name in the event that his
suit is decided in his favor is "an anticipated consequence and beyond the cause for which the action [for
specific performance with damages] was instituted." 20 Had respondent's action proceeded to trial, the crux of
the controversy would have been the existence or non-existence of the alleged oral contract from which
would flow respondent's alleged right to compel petitioners to execute deeds of conveyance. The transfer of
property sought by respondent is but incidental to or an offshoot of the determination of whether or not there is
indeed, to begin with, an agreement to convey the properties in exchange for services rendered.

Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction & Development Corporation21explains thus:

A close scrutiny of National Steel and Ruiz reveals that the prayers for the execution of a Deed of Sale were not
in any way connected to a contract, like the Undertaking in this case. Hence, even if there were prayers for the
execution of a deed of sale, the actions filed in the said cases were not for specific performance.

In the present case, petitioner seeks payment of her services in accordance with the undertaking the parties
signed.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.22 We therefore find that respondent correctly designated
his complaint as one for specific performance consistent with his allegations and prayer therein. Accordingly,
respondent's suit is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation and indeed cognizable by the RTC of Quezon
City where both parties reside. As stated in Surviving Heirs of Alfredo R. Bautista v. Lindo:23

Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation, viz:

1. Actions for specific performance;

While the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action, nevertheless, the party raising
such question may be estopped if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions and
he only objects to the court's jurisdiction because the judgment or the order subsequently rendered is adverse
to him.24 In this case, petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, Reply25 to the opposition on the motion, and Sur-
rejoinder26 only invoked the defenses of statute of frauds and prescription before the RTC. It was only after the
CA reversed the RTC's grant of the motion to dismiss that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of
jurisdiction in their Motion for Reconsideration. 27 Clearly, petitioners are estopped from raising this issue after
actively taking part in the proceedings before the RTC, obtaining a favorable ruling, and then making an issue
of it only after the CA reversed the RTC's order.

Even if this Court were to entertain the petitioners' belated assertion that jurisdiction belongs to the labor arbiter
as this case involves a claim arising from an employer-employee relationship, reliance by petitioners
on Domondon v. NLRC28is misplaced. In Domondon, the existence of the agreement on the transfer of car-
ownership was not in issue but rather, the entitlement of a former employee to his entire monetary claims
against a former employer, considering that the said employee had not paid the balance of the purchase
price of a company car which the employee opted to retain. In the present case, the existence of the alleged
oral agreement, from which would flow the right to compel performance, is in issue.

As the Court has ascertained that the present suit is essentially for specific performance - a personal action -
over which the court a quo had jurisdiction, it was therefore erroneous for it to have treated the complaint as a
real action which prescribes after 30 years under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. In a personal action, the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of
damages.29 Real actions, on the other hand, are those affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein.30 As a personal action based upon an oral contract, Article 1145 providing a prescriptive period of six
years applies in this case instead. The shorter period provided by law to institute an action based on an oral
contract is due to the frailty of human memory. Nothing prevented the parties from reducing the alleged oral
agreement into writing, stipulating the same in a contract of employment or partnership, or even mentioning
the same in an office memorandum early on.
While the respondent's complaint was ingeniously silent as to when the alleged oral agreement came about,
his March 14, 2011 demand letter annexed to his complaint categorically cites the year 1994 as when he and
Architect Olonan allegedly had an oral agreement to become "industrial partners" for which he would be
given a unit from every building they constructed. From this, Unit 208 of Sunrise Holiday Mansion I was allegedly
assigned to him. Then he went on to cite his resignation in October of 1997 and his re-employment with the
company on December 1, 1999 for which he was allegedly given Unit 803 of the Xavierville Square
Condominium, substituted later on by Unit 708 thereof.

The complaint for specific performance was instituted on November. 21, 2011, or 17 years from the oral
agreement of 1994 and almost 12 years after the December 1, 1999 oral agreement. Thus, the respondent's
action upon an oral contract was filed beyond the six-year period within which he should have instituted the
same.

Respondent argued that the prescriptive period should not be counted from 1994 because the condominium
units were not yet in existence at that time, and that the obligation would have arisen after the units were
completed and ready for occupancy. Article 134731 of the New Civil Code is, however, clear that future things
may be the object of a contract. This is the reason why real estate developers engage in pre-selling activities.
But even if we were to entertain respondent's view, his right of action would still be barred by the statute of
limitations.

Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. N-1834 732 for Unit 708 of Xavierville Square Condominium, copy of
which was annexed to the complaint, was issued on September 11, 1997 or more than 13 years before·
respondent's March 14, 2011 demand letter.CCT No. CT-61333 for Unit 208 of Sunrise Holiday Mansion Building I;
also annexed to the complaint, was issued on March 12, 1996 or 14 years before respondent's March 14, 2011
demand letter. Indubitably, in view of the instant suit for specific performance being a personal action founded
upon an oral contract which must be brought within six years from the accrual of the right, prescription had
already set in.

Inasmuch as the complaint should have been dismissed by the RTC on the ground of prescription, which fact is
apparent from the complaint and its annexes, it is no longer necessary to delve into the applicability of the
statute of frauds.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' November 27, 2013 Decision and April
28, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 99994 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. We sustain the dismissal of Civil Case
No. Q-11-70338, but on the ground that the action for specific performance had already prescribed.

SO ORDERED.