James Ient and v.

Tullet Prebon
G.R. No. 189158, 11 January 2017

Petition for Review 

Facts: 
Petitioner James A. Ient and Maharlika C. Schulze assail the Court of Appeals' Decision
affirming the Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in LS. No. 08-J-8651. The Secretary of
Justice, through its Resolutions, ruled that there was probable cause that holds the petitioner
conspiring with the officers and directors of the respondent (Tullet), criminally liable to Section
31 and 34 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code. 

Issues:

1. Whether or not violating Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code entail criminal
liability
2. Whether or not Justice Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the
City prosecutor's dismissal of the criminal complaint
3. Whether or not penalties prescribed under Section 144 constitute a penal provision 

Ruling: 
First issue: 

No, the court held that Sections 31 and 34 entail civil liability, not a criminal one. They find it
lacks specific language imposing criminal liability that shows the legislative intent on the
provided sections limiting the consequences to civil liability. Only section 74 expressly states
violating thereof is considered an offense under Section 144. Notwithstanding the Deliberations
of the Legislator of the Corporation Code manifest their intent in not criminalizing the above
provisions. 

Second issue: 
Yes, the court held that the action of the Secretary of Justice is tainted with arbitrariness, an
aggrieved party (petitioner) may seek judicial review via certiorari on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion. They find a lack of uniformity in the ruling of the Justice secretary on the issue of
whether a violation of Section 31 entails criminal or only civil liability. They added it is an
anathema to an orderly administration of justice. 
 
Third issue: 
No, the court declared that Section 144 of the Corporation Code is not a purely penal provision.
They explained that “when a corporation violated the Corporation Code, it may be dissolved in
appropriate proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission. The involuntary
dissolution of an erring corporation is not a criminal sanction but an administrative penalty.” 

Conclusion: Therefore, the court explained that Corporation Code is a regulatory measure, not a
penal statute. Sections 31 to 34 intended to impose exacting standards of fidelity on corporate
officers and directors, but without unduly impeding them in the discharge of their work with
concerns of litigation. Furthermore, the court refrain from constitutional questions on the said
provisions and grant the petition for review based on these reasons. 
Doctrine: The “rule of lenity” was applied in this case since the said provisions needs
interpretation on whether violating it constitute criminal liability or criminal sanctions. Citing the
jurisprudence of US v. R.L.C, Justice Scalia, in his view, textual ambiguity in a penal statute
suffices for the rule of lenity to be applied. The rule is applied when the court is faced with two
possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused, and another is
favorable to the accused. Further, it was applied to examine if the Section 144 was a penal
statute. 

Minucher v. Scalzo
G.R. No. 142396, 28 January 2000
Facts: 

Petitioner Khosrov Minucher and Abbas Torabian were charged in violation of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972". Minucher
claims that the arrest against them on May 26, 1986, was false and framed them up by Arthur
Scalzo (respondent), an American arresting officer at that time. Subsequently, they were
acquitted of the charge on January 8, 1988. Petitioner filed charges against Scalzo on the
damages that they incurred during and after the arrest. 

On June 14, 1990, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, as an agent of the United
States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to "diplomatic immunity". He attaches
in his motion the Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the United States Embassy, addressed to the
Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna
Woodward that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. On October 31, 1990, the Court
of Appeals, through its petition, sustained Scalzo's diplomatic immunity and ordered the
dismissal of the complaint against him. 

Conversely, Minucher filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 97765 and
entitled "Khosrow Minucher vs. the Honorable Court of Appeals, reversing the above decision
and remanded it to the lower trial court for two reasons (a) that the appellate court granting the
motion to dismiss Scalzo for lack of jurisdiction over his person without even considering the
issue of the authenticity of Diplomatic Note No. 414 and (b) that the complaint contained
sufficient allegations to the effect that Scalzo committed the imputed acts in his personal
capacity and outside the scope of his official duties, and absent any evidence to the contrary, the
issue on Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity could not be taken up.

Issues: 

1. Whether or not the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, following the decision

rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 97765, should have precluded the Court of Appeals
from resolving the appeal to it in an entirely different manner
2. Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity

Ruling: 

First Issue: 

No, the court held that the appellate court has not resolved with finality the diplomatic immunity
of Scalzo and still a pivotal question. The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment requires (1)
finality of a prior judgment, (2) valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties, (3)
judgment on the merits, and 4) an identity of the parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
Hence, it cannot be applied in this case since the former suit is still in question. 

Second Issue: 
No, the court finds that Diplomatic Note No. 414's authenticity has not yet been proven. Scalzo
asserted that he was an Assistant Attaché of the US diplomatic mission. Conversely, the court
argued that the said official is not regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. The court
added that the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity
is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. 

Citing the Shauf v. Court of Appeals: 

"The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply where the public official sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be
liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction"

“The job description of Scalzo was to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after
having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers expected to make the arrest”. Scalzo
participated in the buy-bust operation, became a principal witness, and arrested Minucher shows
that he acted beyond his scope of authority or function. Hence, Scalzo acted in his personal and
private capacity, not in the State's interest. 

Conclusion: Therefore, the diplomatic immunity cannot be invoked by Scalzo because (1) his
position as assistant attaché cannot be regarded as an agent with a diplomatic mission, (2) the
diplomatic note’s authenticity is still questionable, and (3) his acts are inconsistent with
diplomatic nature and his job description. 

Liang v. People of the Philippines                                                                                                  

G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000

Facts: 

Petitioner Jeffrey Liang, an economist working in the Asian Development Bank (ADB), was
charged with two counts of grave oral defamation for uttering defamatory words. He was issued
a warrant of arrest by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong. He bailed for 2,400 pesos
per criminal charge. The following day after his arrest, the Metropolitan Trial Court received an
"office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that the petitioner is
covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB
and the Philippine Government. As a result, the MeTC dismissed the two criminal cases. 
Issue: 

Whether or not Jeffrey Liang is entitled to diplomatic immunity under Section 45 of the
Agreement between ADB and the Philippine Government

Ruling: 

No, the immunity mentioned under Section 45 has an exception. It refers to the acts performed
by officers or staff of ADB in their “official capacity”. The court held that slandering a person is
not covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. Liang was inconsistent with his official
capacity when he defamed a person. Therefore, Liang cannot invoke this immunity since he
acted inconsistent with his official capacity and committed a crime, which is oral defamation. 

Del Socorro v. Van Wilhelm,                                                                                       

G.R. No. 193707, 10 December 2014

Facts: 

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilhelm were married in Holand on
September 25, 1990. In 1995, Van Wilhelm obtained a divorce decree from Holand. 

After the divorce, Norma's baby was 18 months old and went back to the Philippines. Afterward,
Ernst came to the Philippines and remarried in Cebu city. Since then, he resided thereat. All
parties were in Cebu City, including his son and Del Socorro.

On August 28, 2009, Del Socorro, through its counsel, send a letter demanding support from Van
Wilhelm. The latter refused. As a result, Del Socorro filed a complaint against Van Wilhelm for
violating Section 5, paragraph E (2) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjust refusal to support their minor
child.

Issues: 

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and
 2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to support his minor child

Ruling: 

First issue: 

The court agrees with Van Wilhelm that Del Socorro cannot rely on Art. 195 of the New Civil
Code in demanding support since Art. 15 applies only to Filipino citizens. As such, Philippine
law is not obligatory upon him since he is a foreigner citizen. 

However, Van Wilhelm failed to prove that there was a Netherland law that not supporting a
child is not unlawful. As such, the court applies the “doctrine of processual presumption”.
Under it, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume
that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic, or internal law. 

Hence, it is presumed by the court that it is the same with the Philippine law concerning the
obligations of the parents to support their child and penalize non-compliance. Moreover,
regardless of his nationality, since he failed to prove the existence of Netherlands law on
obligations, he is bounded by the Philippine law. 

Second Issue: 

Yes, under the special law, the denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of
violence against women and children. The court held that the act of denying support to a child
under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense, which started in 1995 but
is still ongoing at present.

Also, the court finds strength in accordance with Art. 14 of the NCC (territorial principle). Under
the article, penal laws shall be obligatory upon those who live within Philippine territory. The
court held that it is indisputable that Van Wilhelm committed the crime (denial of financial
support to his child) here in the Philippines since all the parties are residents of the Province of
Cebu. Hence, he is bound to follow the laws in the Philippines concerning Family obligations
regardless of his nationality. 
Gonzalez v. Abaya,                                                                                                        
G.R. No. 164007, 10 August 2006

Facts: 

On July 27, 2003, 321 heavily armed soldiers led by Antonio Trilllanes took over the premises of
Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They intended to
destabilize the government. They disarmed security guards and planted explosives around the
building. They withdrew their support for the administration of President Gloria Arroyo on the
reason of her involvement in graft and corruption and demanded her resignation. The
government tried to negotiate and dialogue with soldiers. Eventually, they surrendered to
authorities. 

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated and charged the soldiers with coup
d'etat under Art. 134-A of the Revised Penal Code. Meanwhile, General Narciso Abaya ordered
the arrest of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood mutiny incident. On October 29, 2003, the
Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the AFP Chief of Staff
recommending that the military personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be charged before a
general court-martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War. 

Meanwhile, on February 11, 2004, Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an Order stating all
charges before the court-martial against the accused... are declared not service-connected but
absorbed crime of coup d'etat. Subsequently, Petitioners hold this Order that the offense for
violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War
is not service connected but is absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat. As such, they interposed that
the military tribunal cannot compel to submit to its jurisdiction. Conversely, Solicitor General,
representing the respondents, interposed that Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97 of R.A No.
7055 are service connected.   

Issues: 

1. Whether or not Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of R.A No. 7055 charged to petitioners are
service-connected and subject to the jurisdiction of the court-martial 
2. Whether or not the doctrine of absorption of crime can apply to the case at the bar

Ruling: 

First issue: 
Yes, the court finds in the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of R.A No. 7055 that identifies the service-
connected crimes as limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles
95 to 97" of the Articles of War. Service-connected crimes are within the jurisdiction of the court
martial. Here, petitioners charged with violating Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 were covered in
the above provision and considered as service-connected crimes. Hence, the court held that
violation of these articles is triable by court-martial. 

Second issue: 

No, the doctrine of absorption of crimes only applies to crimes by the same statute. Here, Article
134-A in the Revised Penal Code and Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97of R.A. 7055 were charged
to petitioners but show these two are different statutes. The former is a penal law, while the latter
is special law penalizing offenses related to service-connected in the military. Hence, the
doctrine cannot apply to this case since the statutes charged to petitioners are different. 
People v. Tulin,                                                                                                              
G.R. No. 111709, 30, August, 2001
Facts: 

“M/T Tabangao manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second
Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, sailing off the coast of Mindoro. Suddenly,
armed pirates (i.e., Tulin, Loyola, and Infante) armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber
handguns, and bolo boarded M/T Tabangao. They detained the crew and took complete control
of the vessel. They sailed and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline.
Beside them is the vessel 'Navi Pride' manned and supervised by the accused appellants Emilio
Chanco and Cheong San Hiong. Thereat, M/T Tabangao transferred cargo to Navi Pride. 

Accused-appellant San Hiong was arrested and charged with qualified piracy under Art. 122 of
the Revised Penal Code but was convicted as an accomplice. He appealed that he cannot be
convicted of a crime of piracy in Philippine waters since Sections 2[d] and 3[a] of PD 532
because Republic Act No. 7659, which amended Art. 122, has impliedly superseded PD 532. He
argued that R.A 7659 amending Art. 122 excludes him since it applies to offenders who are
neither members of the complement nor passengers of the vessel. As such, he holds those two
laws: P.D 532 and R.A 7659, need to be reconciled.

Issues: 

1. Whether or not the P.D 532 and R.A 7659 need to be reconciled as to the interpretation 
2. Whether or not Cheong is an accomplice of the crime of piracy
3. Whether or not Cheong is liable of piracy since he committed it outside the Philippine
water
Ruling: 

First issue: 
No, the court finds the two different statutes have no contradiction and exist harmoniously. The
court contemplates that P.D 532 amending Art. 122 only includes any person who is a passenger
or a member of the complement of the said vessel in Philippine waters. While the R.A 7659
amending Art. 122 refers to the term "committed to Philippine waters”, which is absent in the
original provision of Art. 122 limited only "on high seas”. Notwithstanding the court stressed
that it only widens the coverage of the law, R.A. 7659 neither superseded nor ambiguity present
in the amendment. 

Second issue: 
Yes, the court found San Hiong's participation indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio
Changco and his band of pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532. Under the said provision, any person who falls within this section
shall be considered an accomplice of the principal officers. Here, San Hiong failed to disprove
his participation or benefited from the transfer of cargo. In fact, he profited from it by buying the
hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd and records show that he aided the pirates in
the disposition of the cargo. Hence, he falls within the category of this section. 
Third issue: 
Yes, although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and
its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its
cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy. Hence, it needs not to be proven that he committed
the crime in Philippine waters. 
People v. Lol-lo and Saraw,                                                                                                        
G.R. No. 17958, 27 February 1922

Facts: 

On June 30, 1920, twenty armed Moros boarded one of the two Dutch boats and took charge of
one of those. Moros attacked men inside the boat and raped women. Lol-lo and Saraw were one
of those Moros. Upon return to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, they were arrested and
charged with the court of the first instance of Sulu, Tawi, with the crime of piracy. The trial court
finds them guilty of the charge. The counsel de officio of the two Moros objected (demurrer) to
the said charge and argued that the offense committed was not within the jurisdiction of the
Court of the First Instance of Tawi-Tawi, nor within the courts of the Philippine Islands, and the
facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands.

Issues: 

Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crimes committed by Lol-lo and
Saraw

Ruling: 

Yes, the court held that jurisdiction of piracy has no territorial limits, unlike other crimes. Piracy
is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo
furandi (intention to steal), and universal hostility. Piracy is a crime not against any particular
state, but all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried. Therefore, regardless of jurisdiction, two
Moros are still liable for the offense and triable by the Philippine courts. 
AAA v. BBB,                                                                                                                                   
G.R. No. 212448, 11 January 2018
Facts: 

Petitioner AAA and BBB (respondent) were married on August 1, 2006, in Quezon City. They
have two sons: CCC and DDD. In May 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef and
acquired permanent resident status thereat. AAA and her sons are residents of Quezon City but
later moved to Pasig City. 

As reflected in the Information, BBB has an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok.
Aside from the alleged varied forms of abuse such as sexual and physical abuse, abandonment,
and no financial support, the investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with
causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity.

AAA argues that mental and emotional anguish is an essential element of the offense charged
against BBB, which is experienced by her wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore, where
the extra-marital affair occurred. Thus, AAA filed charges against BBB in the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City.

Issue: 

Whether or not the Philippine courts may have jurisdiction over an offense constituting
psychological violence under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,1 otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, committed through marital infidelity,
when the alleged illicit relationship occurred or is occurring outside the country

Ruling: 

Yes, the court held that the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over offenses committed outside
the Philippines so long that the victim is a resident of the Philippines and filed it in the country.
“It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of
violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 and Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed
outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed
because of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense.” Hence, the Philippine
courts may have jurisdiction under R.A No. 9262, and this law is not limited to territorial limits. 
Benedicto v. CA,                                                                                                                              
G.R. No. 125359, 4 September 2001
Facts: 

Petitioners (Benedicto, Rivera, and Marcos) were indicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular
No. 960 related to Section 342 of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in
five Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioners assail these charges
because Circular No. 960 and R.A. No. 265 were repealed by Circular No. 1353 and Republic
Act No. 7653. Section 34 of the R.A. 7653 removed the applicability of any special sanction for
violations of any non-trade foreign exchange transactions previously penalized by Circular No.
960. 

Issue: 

Whether or not the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by
Circular No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners? 

Ruling:

No, the court held that there is an exception to the rule of depriving the courts of their authority
to punish a person charged with a violation of the old law before its repeal. 

The exception is the inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing statute that provides that the
repeal shall not affect pending actions. (Buscayno v. Military Commission Nos. 1, 2, 6, and 25,
109 SCRA 273, 287 (1981) Here, the repealing circulars of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 show
that both contain a saving clause, expressly providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall
not affect pending actions for violating the latter Circular. 

Another exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former statute and punishes the act
previously penalized under the old law. Section 34 of R.A. 265 was reenacted in Section 36 of
Republic Act No. 7653. (People v Concepcion, 44 Phil. 126, 132 (1922) citing US v. Cuna, 12
Phil. 241 (1908), Ong Chang Wing and Kwong Fok v. United States, 40 Phil. 1046 (1910)

Therefore, the repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653 did not extinguish the
criminal liability of petitioners for violating of Circular No. 960 and cannot, under the
circumstances of this case, be made a basis for quashing the indictments against petitioners.
White Light Corp. v. City of Manila,                                                                                            
G.R. No. 122846, 20 January 2009
Facts: 
Petitioners (White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation, and Sta. Mesa Tourist &
Development Corporation) seek the reversal of the Decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the
Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments
in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance). 

The Regional Trial Court strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously
guarded by the Constitution. Petitioners alleged that the equal protection rights of their clients
are also being interfered with. 

Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to
privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power, and it is an
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

Issue: 

Whether or not the Ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting the wash-up rates and short-time
stay in a hotel is unconstitutional 

Ruling: 

The court held that the Ordinance is an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
establishments and their patrons. The Ordinance restrains the operation of the businesses of the
petitioners and restricts the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. Hence, the
Ordinance intrudes on the liberty of these establishments, which is a constitutional right.
Therefore, the court declared the Ordinance unconstitutional.   
Garcia v. Drilon,                                                                                                                                     
G.R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013
Facts: