1.

Classification of felonies

General elements of felony:

a. there must be an act or omission;

ACT/OVERT ACT OMISSION

Definition Any bodily movement tending It is the failure to act which
to produce some effect in the constitutes an actus reus and
external world give rise to liability only when
a law imposes a duty to act
An overt or external act is and the defendant is in breach
defined as some physical of that duty.
activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a
mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its
complete termination
following its natural course,
without being frustrated by
external obstacles nor by the
spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense.
Raison d’etre why direct act is The conduct of the accused
required by law consisting merely of acts of
preparation has never ceased
to be equivocal, and this is
necessarily so, irrespective of
his declared intent.

Thus, if the act has not been

established, an accused
cannot be convicted of the
crime charged.

b. the act or omission must be punishable under the RPC; and

c. the act is committed by means of dolo or culpa

Dolo/deceit (deliberate intent) Culpa(Fault or constructive

intent)
Definition There is deceit when the act is There is fault when the wrongful
performed with deliberate act results from imprudence,
intent. negligence, lack of foresight, or
 lack of skill.

Nature Intentional/Voluntary or freely Unintentional

committed
Elements 1. Freedom- an act done with deliberation and with power to choose
between two things.

2. Intelligence- the ability to determine the morality of human acts,

as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act.

It is the moral capacity to determine what is right from what is

wrong and to realize the consequences of one’s act.

This is negated by IIM: Insanity, Imbecility, and Minority.

3. Intent- the aim or 3. Negligence or imprudence

determination to do a certain
act. The state of mind
accompanying an act, especially
a forbidden act.
This is negated by mistake of
fact. The act or omission which is
the result of a misapprehension
of acts that is voluntary but not
intentional
Kinds:
Negligence- the failure to
observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand,
whereby such another person
suffers injury.
TEST TO DETERMINE
NEGLIGENCE: Forseeability

General- an element of all DEGREE OF PRECAUTION: It

crimes. It is presumed from the
criminal act and in the absence
of any general intent is relied
upon as a defense, such absence
must be proved by the accused.
It need not be alleged in the
information since it is presumed.
Specific- a definite and actual
purpose to accomplice some
particular thing. It is an element
of a crime, thus it must be
specifically alleged in the
information and then prved
either by direct or circumstantial
evidence. It must be established
by the State since it cannot be
varies
Reckless negligence/imprudence
consists of a voluntary act done
without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury
or material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution or advertence on the
part of the person committing it.
Simple negligence/imprudence
comprises an act done without
grave fault, from which an injury
or material damage ensues by
reason of a mere lack of
foresight or skill.
 presumed.
Example a. Quai-offense or reckless
imprudence (Art. 365)- it is the
mental attitude that is being
punished;
b. Judgment rendered through
negligence (Art. 205);
c. Unjust interlocutory order
( Art. 206);
d. Betrayal of trust by an
attorney (Art. 209);
e. Malversation (Art. 217);
f. Evasion thru negligence (Art.
224);

1. Intentional and Culpable; elements

Felonies according to the means by which they are committed

INTENTIONAL CULPABLE or CRIMINAL
NEGLIGENCE
Definition Act which involves those wrongs
done as a result of an act
performed without malice or
criminal design.
Elements Dolus malus- that the act or The injury inflicted on another is
omission be done WILLFULLY, unintentional, the wrong done
MALICIOUSLY, with deliberate evil being simply the result of an act
intent, and with malice performed without malice or
aforethought. criminal design.

a. Intelligence (discernment) and freedom of action (voluntariness); Intent and negligence

check the tables above

· Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea

· Alfredo De Guzman, Jr. vs. People GR 178512, November 26, 2014 (factors to determine intent to
kill)

FACTS: On the fateful midnight of Christmas, 1997, while Alexander Flojo (Alexander) is fetching water,
Alfredo de Guzman (Alfredo) suddenly appeared  and stab Alexander in the left part of his body causing
him to sustain two stab wounds.

Cirilino Bantaya, Alexander’s son-in-law, who saw the incident, rushed him to the hospital. The attending
physician said that one of the stab wounds is fatal and would have caused Alexander’s death if he did
not get rushed to the hospital quickly.

RTC found Alfredo guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of frustrated homicide and was
sentenced six months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and one day of prision
mayor as maximum.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that his intent to kill was not established, and
that any person could have inflicted the wounds. The petitioner also insisted that he should only be
guilty of slight physical injuries, not frustrated murder.

Issue: Whether or not, there was no intent to kill on the part of Alfredo?

There was. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external
manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately
thereafter. In Rivera v. People,9 we considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent
to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the
killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of
the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the
words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.10

Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur with them.
Contrary to the petitioner’s submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks
inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and
used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained
two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his face. The
petitioner’s attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his
submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent to kill. There is also to be no doubt about the
wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical
intervention.
Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove
by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent,
which is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.

Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external
manifestations, such as the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and
immediately thereafter.

· Read: Ivler and Sevilla, and cases under Art. 365

14. Ivler and Sevilla, and cases under Art. 365 -

G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before
the MTC of Pasig City with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. The petitioner
elevated the matter to the RTC of Pasig in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from
the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his
arraignment as a prejudicial question.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the two criminal case filed against ivler involves the "same offense."

HELD:

YES. It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." - that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely
separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
".

The Court found: Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty.

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses

It is held that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge
will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged
and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court

NOTES:

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC
succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually
incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining
and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the
Revised Penal Code.

Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling

under either of two categories:

1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus
excluding from its operation light felonies; and
 2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving
multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious
crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but
"the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight x x x," a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus,
Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

How should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted?

Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple
(non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be
tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively
alleging all the consequences of the single quasicrime, to be penalized separately following
the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved
the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its
multiple consequences unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case
charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less
grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand,
resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.
Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce
invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original
jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision
correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts
penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of
double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the
other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not
deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all
the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number
or severity, penalizing each consequence separately. By prohibiting the splitting of charges
under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant
occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to
mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, it is held that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge
will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged
and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court

G.R. No. 194390 August 13, 2014

VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

REYES, J.:

FACTS:

Venancio Sevilla, a newly elected councillor of Malabon City, was charged with the crime of
Falsification of Public Document when he allegedly stated in his Personnel Data Sheet, an
official document, that he had no pending criminal case when in fact he is accused in a
criminal case for Assault Upon an Agent of A Person In Authority. Thereby peverting the
truth.

In his defense, he alleged that he merely signed the prepared PDS which he ordered copied
from his old PDS. This prepared PDS was brought to his home by his secretary as he still
had no office then. After trial, the Sandiganbayan found him liable for the crime of
Falsification of Public document thru Reckless Imprudence.

In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Venancio theorises that he cannot be held liable for
Falsification of Public Document thru Reckless Imprudence because the Information
charged him with Intentional Falsification of Public Document

ISSUE: Whether or not Sevilla can be held liable for the crime of Falsification of Public
Document thru Recklesss Imprudence.

HELD:
No. At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan’s designation of the felony
supposedly committed by Sevilla is inaccurate.

The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence, punished under Article 365
of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of a public document. However, the
Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as "falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence."

The foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct
and separate crimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime

Recklessimprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is

necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being
the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the
willful act of falsification of public documents.

b. Intent and Motive (variance in felony)

1. Stages of execution (Subjective phase and objective phase)

SUBJECTIVE PHASE OBJECTIVE PHASE

Definition That portion of the acts It is the result of the acts of
constituting the crime the execution, or the
included between the act accomplishment of the crime.
which begins the commission
of the crime and the least act The period between the point
performed by the offender where he begins and the
which, with the prior acts, points where he voluntarily
should result in the desists.
consummated crime.

Between these two points, the offender is stopped by reason of

any cause outside oh his voluntary desistance, the subjective
phase has not been passed, and then it is an attempt.
 If he has not so stopped but continues until he performs the
last act, it is frustrated.

If SP and OP are present = CONSUMMATED FELONY

Felonies according to their stages of their execution

Consummated Frustrated Attempted
Definition A felony is It is frustrated when the There is an attempt
consummated when all offender performs all when the offender
the elements necessary the acts of execution commences the
for its execution and which would produce commission of a felony
accomplishment are the felony as a directly or overt acts,
present. consequence but which, and does not perform
nevertheless, do not all the acts of execution
produce it by reason of which should produce
causes independent of the felony by reason of
the will of the some cause or accident
perpetrator. other than this own
spontaneous
desistance.

This never passes the

subjective phase. The
offender is interrupted
by the intervention of
outside causes before
the subjective phase is
passed.
ELEMENTS 1. The offender 1. The offender
performs all the acts of commences the
execution; commission of the
felony directly by overt
2. All the acts acts;
performed would Elements of
produce a felony as a overt acts:
consequence; 1. there be an
external act;
3. The felony is not and,
produced by reason of 2. such have
causes independent of direct/causal
the will of the offender. connection with
the crime
The Subjective phase is intended to be
completely passed. committed.

2.He does not perform

 all the acts of execution
which should produce
the felony;

3. The offender’s act be

not stopped by his own
spontaneous
desistance; and

4. The non-performance
of all acts of execution
was due to cause or
accident other than his
spontaneous
desistance.

· People vs. Aurelio Lamahang, GR L-43530, August 3, 1935 (overt act, vague intent)

FACTS:

At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado
and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making an opening with an
iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street. At that time the owner
of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in
breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who
instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.

The fact above stated was considered and declared unanimously by the provincial fiscal of Iloilo, the trial
judge and the Solicitor-General, as constituting attempted robbery

ISSUE: Whether or not, the overt acts done by Lamahang constitute robbery?

RULING:

It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has
a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the
offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The
attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is
ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. There is no doubt that in the
case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence, passing
through the opening which he had started to make on the wall, in order to commit an offense which,
due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing, did not develop beyond the first steps of its
execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively
performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable
connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its
consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary
to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in case of robbery, in order
that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be
considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to
take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. In the instant
case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred.
From the fact established and stated in the decision, that the accused on the day in question was making
an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical
conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its
owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical
injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete
finding.1avvphil.ñet

It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is
wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must
be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be
such that by their very nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the
persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must show without any
doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double interpretation ,
that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act,
must not and can not furnish grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated crimes. The relation
existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to
produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary,
in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from them the
intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This must have been the intention of the
legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to exist, the offender must commence the commission
of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the acts performed must be such that, without the
intent to commit an offense, they would be meaningless.

Viada (Vol. I, p. 47) holds the same opinion when he says that "the overt acts leading to the commission
of the offense, are not punished except when they are aimed directly to its execution, and therefore
they must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense."
Considering — says the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of March 21, 1892 — that in order to
declare that such and such overt acts constitute an attempted offense it is necessary that their objective
be known and established, or that said acts be of such nature that they themselves should obviously
disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended, said objective and finality to serve as ground for the
designation of the offense: . . . .

so hold that the fact under consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass
to dwelling

· People vs. Domingo Arcega, GR 237489, August 27, 2020 (attempted Art 266-A vs. Art 336)

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

· Alfredo De Guzman, Jr. vs. People GR 178512, November 26, 2014 (frustrated homicide vs. Serious
Physical Injury)

3. Gravity (Arts. 9, 25-26)

Felonies according to gravity

Grave felonies Less grave felonies Light felonies
Definition
Elements
Example
 4. Formal, material, and crimes without frustrated stage

FORMAL MATERIAL CRIMES WITHOUT

FRUSTRATED STAGE

EXAMPLES 1. Theft
2. Robbery
3.Rape
4. Adultery and
Concubinage
5. Bribery and
corruption of public
official
6. Physical injuries
7. Act of lasciviousness
Distinctions The purpose is The desire of the
accomplished offender is not
accomplished
FACTORS IN 1. Manner of the commission of the crime;
DETRMINING THE 2. Elements of the crime;
STAGE OF FELONY 3. Nature of the felony itself

a. People vs. Noel R. Bejim, GR 208835, January 19, 2018 (consummated rape)

18. People vs. Noel R. Bejim, GR 208835, January 19, 2018 (consummated rape) -

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS.

Seven counts of rape were charged against accused Noel Bejim by three minor-victims, who
are cousins. As testified by the victims, they were raped by making them lie on the sofa,
greasing their vaginas and the accused brushing his greased penis to theirs vaginas. The
trial court found the accused guilty as charged while the appellate court affirmed the lower
court’s ruling with modifications.

ISSUE.

Is the accused guilty of 7 counts of consummated rape?

RULING.

No. Accused is guilty only of 2 counts of statutory rape and 5 counts of acts of
lasciviousness in relation to the Sexual abuse Act or RA 7610l

In so ruling, the Court held that mere brushing of accused penis to the victim’s of the mons
pubis or the pudemdum does not constitute a consummated rape. At most, it could only be
attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. The word “touching” in the phrase “mere touching
of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to
constitute carnal knowledge”, means the act of touching should be understood as
inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ.

Nevertheless, accused is guilty of two counts of statutory rape as to victim CCC because
based on the latter’s testimony the Court is convinced that there was a slight penetration
on "CCC's" genitalia. Although CCC’s genitalia was not fully penetrated as the accused’s
penis is “big” as described by the victim, it is a settled law that complete penetration
is not required to consummate the crime of rape.

b. People vs. Cielito Orita, GR 88724, April 3, 1990 (attempted rape)

19. People vs. Cielito Orita, GR 88724, April 3, 1990 (attempted rape) -

FACTS: In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant Cristina S. Abayan, a 19-year
old freshman student at the St. Joseph’s College in Borongan, Eastern Samar, arrived at her
boarding house after her friends had brought her home from a party.

Shortly after her classmates had left, while she was knocking at the door of her boarding
house, somebody held her and poked her with a ‘balisong’. She recognized him as Ceilito
Orita, a Philippine Constabulary officer and also a frequent visitor of her boarding house.

She pleaded with him to release her but he ordered her to go upstairs with him.

When they reached the second floor, he commanded her to look for a room. They entered
complainant's room. Upon entering the room, he pushed her causing her to hit her head on
the wall. He undressed using one hand and ordered her to take off her clothes. Scared, she
took off her t-shirt then he pulled off her bra, pants, and panty. He ordered her to lie down
and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina as he
continued to poke the knife to her.

However, given the position, the appellant could not fully penetrate her and only a portion
of his penis entered her as she keep on moving. Appellant then laid down on his back and
ordered her to mount him. Still, only a small part was inserted into her vagina.

Seeing an opportunity to escape, she dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. She
fled to another room and jumped out through a window. Still naked, she ran to the
municipal building about 18 meters in front of the boarding house and knocked on the
door.

Policemen found her outside naked sitting on the stairs crying.

Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house. They heard a sound
at the second floor and saw somebody running away. Due to darkness, they failed to
apprehend appellant.

Upon physical examination, the resident physician Dr. Maria Luisa Abude issued a medical
certificate showing that she had multiple pinpoint marks at the back and abrasions at the
left and right knees but no visible abrasions in the vulva.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch found appellant guilty of the crime of frustrated rape.

Court of Appeals which then modified the decision on December 29, 1998 and found him
guilty of the crime of rape sentenced with reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify
complainant the amount of thirty thousand. On January 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals
issued a resolution setting aside its December 29, 1988 decision and forwarded the case to
this Court, considering the provision of Section 9, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
in conjunction with Section 17, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

ISSUES: WON the accused's conviction for frustrated rape is proper

HELD: NO. The trial court was of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of
penetration of the genital organ of the victim and thus convicted the accused of frustrated
rape only.
The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape, a contention with which the
Solicitor General agrees. In light of Arts. 335 and 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is no
doubt that the attempted and consummated stages are applied to rape. Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of rape: "ART. 335.
When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.”

Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a
woman (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 193). On the other hand, Article 6 of the
same Code provides: "ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. -
Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are
punishable. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. There is an
attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance."

In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his
victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished. Thus, the frustrated stage is not
applicable to rape. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has
performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is
consummated. For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential.
Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Necessarily, rape
is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil.
559; People v. Rabadan, et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434) because not
all acts of execution was performed.

c. Jovito Canceran vs. People, GR 206442, July 1 2015 (theft)

Facts:

· In an Information, Petitioner Jovito Canceran was accused of frustrated theft. Allegedly,

was caught stealing 14 boxes of Ponds Whitening Cream by hiding the said item inside a
box of Magic Flakes.

· The accused was caught trying to pass the said items when he was paying for the items
as Magic Flakes.

· When the guard inspected the said box, he discovered the 14 boxes of Ponds. After the
discovery of the items, the accused ran, but was apprehended by the Mall employees.

· The accused was charged of Frustrated Theft.

· RTC: held that Theft has no Frustrated stages hence, based on the evidence presented,
sentenced the accused of Consummated Theft.

· CA: affirmed with modification the ruling of RTC. It debunked Canceran’s contention
that there was no taking because he merely pushed the cart loaded with goods to the
cashier’s booth for payment and stopped there. The appellate court held that unlawful
taking was deemed complete from the moment the offender gained possession of the thing,
even if he had no opportunity to dispose of the same.

Issue:

WON Canceran should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was not charged in the
information

Ruling:

Yes.

The Constitution guarantees that the right of every person accused in a criminal
prosecution to be informed of the nature of and causes of the accusation against him. It is
fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the
complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to
be set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.

As stated earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can never be read
to charge Canceran of consummated Theft because the indictment itself stated that the
crime was never produced. Instead, the Information should be construed to mean that
Canceran was being charged with theft in its attempted stage only. Necessarily, Canceran
may only be convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted Theft.
An accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was charged in
the complaint or information and on which he was tried. It matters not how conclusive and
convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted in the courts of any
offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried, or
necessarily included therein. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense
with which he is charged before he is put on trial, and to convict him of an offense higher
than that charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried would be an
unauthorized denial of that right.

Under Article 308, RPC, the essential elements of theft are:

(1) the taking of personal property;

(2) the property belongs to another;

(3) the taking away was done with intent of gain;

(4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and

(5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against person or
force upon things.

“Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which
produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as
an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.”

d. People vs. Ferdinand M. Buniag, GR 217661, June 26, 2019 (Sec. 26b-sale of drugs)

FACTS.

Ferdinand Buniag was arrested pursuant to a buy-bust operation conducted by police

officers. He was charged and convicted by the trial court guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of attempt to sell and/or delivery of a dangerous drug and delivery of a
dangerous drug as he had in fact given and delivered to the poseur-buyer the bag
containing marijuana fruiting tops and stalks as per Sections 5 & 26 of RA 9165.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of RTC holding that Ferdinand’s
violation only pertains to Section 26(b) Article II of RA 9165. Ferdinand further apepaled
his conviction before the Honorable Court. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE.

Whether accused is guilty of violation of both the assailed provisions of RA 9165.

RULING.

Ferdinand may be held liable only for violating Section 26 of RA 9165.

Ferdinand cannot be convicted of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs because the
sale was never consummated, he may be convicted for the attempt to sell as it is necessarily
included in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

In the present case, Ferdinand attempted to sell shabu and commenced by overt acts the
commission of the intended crime however, the sale was aborted when the poseur-buyer,
upon confirming that Ferdinand had with him the marijuana, made the pre-arranged signal,
and the rest of the team rushed to the area and placed Ferdinand under arrest. Thus, the
CA correctly ruled that the accused may only be held liable for attempted illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.

Nevertheless, the Court acquitted Ferdinand because the police authorities were found
non-compliant with the rules on chain of custody for drug cases.

e. US vs. Valdez, GR 14128, December 10, 1918 (frustrated arson)

FACTS: The house Mrs. Lewis was seen to have smoke issuing from its lower floor by their
neighbor Mrs. Auckback. Mrs. Lewin ordered her servant Paulino Banal to look for the
source, a piece of a jute sack and a rag were burning between a post of the house and a
partition of the entresol. At that moment the defendant Severino Valdes was in the entresol,
engaged in his work of cleaning while the other defendant is cleaning the horses. On the
same morning of the occurrence, the police arrested the defendants, having been called for
the purpose by telephone. Severino Valdes, after his arrest, according to the statement,
drawn up in the police station, admitted before several policemen that it was he who had
set the fire to the sack and the rag, which had been noticed on the date mentioned. and he
also who had started the several other fires which had occurred in said house on previous
days. That he had performed such acts through the inducement of the other prisoner, Hugo
Labarro, for they felt resentment against, or had trouble with, their masters. That he acted
as he did under the promise on Labarro's part to give him a peso for each such fire that he
should start. Defendant Hugo Labarro was dismissed due to lack of evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused has committed the crime of frustrated arson?

HELD: Yes. The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and
placed beside an upright of the house and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus
endangering the burning of the latter, constitutes the crime of frustrated arson of an
inhabited house, on an occasion when some of its inmates were inside of it. The crime is
classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the acts
conceive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless., owing to causes independent of his
will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense committed cannot
be classified as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited house, for the reason
that no part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and
the rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near partition of the entresol, the partition
might have started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time.

There is no extenuating or aggravating circumstance to be considered in a connection with

the commission of the crime, and therefore the penalty of presidio mayor immediately
inferior in degree to that specified in article 549 of the Penal Code, should be imposed in its
medium degree.

f. People vs. Edgar Gutierrez, GR 100699, July 5, 1996 (consummated arson)

23. People vs. Edgar Gutierrez, GR 100699, July 5, 1996 (consummated arson) -

Facts:

· An Information charged against the accused Edgar Gutierrez alleged that on December
14, 1989 in Kalookan City, accused, motivated by a desire for revenge, with deliberate
intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire to
the house of one JOSEFA ARROYO y ALANO.

· The fire caused damage to the front wooden-made walling located at the ground floor
thereof in the amount of P500.00, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount
of P500.00.

· After due hearing on both sides, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of arson.

· The accused now contends that the corpus delicti of the crime of arson has not been
established. According to him, corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of arson.

Issue:
WON the presence corpus delicti was proven to warrant the ruling of the RTC that arson
was committed

Ruling:

Yes, corpus delicti was proven. Under the law, Corpus delicti means the substance of the
crime; it is the fact that a crime has actually been committed. In arson, the corpus delicti
rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and of its having been
intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible,
may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.

In this case, the charge against appellant was amply supported in evidence by the
eyewitness accounts of Felipe Enriquez and Mario Alano. Also offered in evidence were
copies of the police “blotters” of two barangays reflecting the report that appellant had
thrown a bag of gasoline at the house of Mario Alano, then lit it and, after setting a portion
of the house on fire, fled.

With regard to the alleged violation of PD 1613, the information charges appellant with
violating the said law without specifying the particular provision breached. The
information having failed to allege whether or not the burnt house is inhabited, and not
having been established that the house is situated in a populatedor congested area,
appellant should be deemed to have only been charged with plain arson under Section 1 of
the decree. Kalookan City might be a densely populated part of the metropolis but its entire
territory cannot be said to be congested.

In arson, it is enough that a portion of a property is shown to have been destroyed.

Although the whole 2-storey wood and galvanized iron house has not been completely
gutted by the fire ,the crime committed is still consummated arson.

g. Gregory James Pozar vs. CA, GR L-62439, October 23, 1984 (corruption of public official; no
frustrated stage)

FACTS:

The petitioner was an applicant for probation. He went to the office looking for a Probation
Officer named Danilo Ocampo. Since the latter was not around at that time. Two days later,
he was able to give such envelope to the said Ocampo which contained some official papers
connected with the appellant’s application for probation and attached thereto was a P100
bill. Such bill was given under the circumstance which would make the receiving public
officer liable for bribery. He was then charged for violating the Article 212 of the Revised
Penal Code and was found to be guilty

ISSUE:

WON petitioner liable for Corruption of Public Officials.

HELD: The Supreme Court said that the circumstance attending the alleged commission of
the crime would not show that the petitioner is guilty. The said petitioner is a foreigner,
and is unfamiliar with the said transaction. Such bill might be for advancing the expenses of
whatever documentation might be needed in the application for probation. Hence, the
Supreme Court acquitted such person for the crime of corruption of public officials

The trial court ruling that the accused was guilty of the offense of Corruption of a Public is
erroneous. The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of Corruption of
Public Official as consummated offense (which is affirmed by the respondent appellant
court) for it is clear from the evidence of the prosecution as recited in both decisions of the
trial and appellate courts, that the complainant Probation Officer did not accept the one
hundred peso bill. Hence, the crime would be attempted corruption of a public official.