Table of Abbreviations

& And

AC Appeal Cases

CJM Chief Judicial Magistrate

Crl Criminal Referred Case

CrPc Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

IPC Indian Penal Code, 1860

MLA Member of Legislative Assembly

M.P Madhya Pradesh

Ors. Others

Crl. Rev. Pet. Criminal Revision Petition

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

Vs/ V/ V. Versus
 Table of Cases

7
• Attorney General of Ceylon vs de Livera, [1963] AC 103
• Lokayukta, Justice Ripusudan Dayal v. State of M.P., (2014) 4 SCC 473 7

• M.N Sankarayaraynan Nair vs P.V Balakrishnan, (1972) 1 SCC 318 5,10

• P.V. Narasimha Rao vs State (CBI/SPE), (1998) 4 SCC 626
4, 8
• Sheonandan Paswan vs State of Bihar & Ors., (1987) 1 SCC 288
• State of Bihar vs Ram Naresh Pandey, AIR 1957 SC 389 5,14

5,10

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 Table of Statutes
• The Constitution of India
- Article 105
- Article 136
- Article 194
- Article 208(1)
• Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
- Section 161
- Section 173
- Section 321
- Section 397
• Section 494 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
• Indian Penal Code, 1860
- Section 427
- Section 447
• Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act 1984
- Section 3(1)
- Section 7
- Section 10
- Section 11
- Section 12
- Section15
- Section 19
- Section 34
• Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act 1872
• Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Kerala Assembly
• Section 26 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978
• Kerala Prevention of Damage to Private Property and Payment of Compensation Act 2019
(Act No. 09 of 2019)

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Page of
 Table of Contents

Table of Abbreviations 1
Table of Cases 2
Table of Statutes 3
Table of Contents 4
Case Details 1
Name and Date of Judgement 1
Name of the Judges 1
Bench 1
Number of Opinions 1
Types of Opinions 1
Judge Who Delivered the Opinion 1
Facts of the Case 2
Concrete Facts 2
Immaterial Facts 9
Material Facts 10
Generalisation of Material Facts 12
Questions of Law 13
Questions formulated by the Court 13
Questions identified 13
Arguments 14
Arguments by the Petitioner 14
Arguments by the Respondent 14
Arguments by the Intervener 15
Judgement in personam 17
Judgement in rem 18

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 Case Details

Name and Date of Judgement

State of Kerala v. K. Ajith
2021 SCC OnLine SC 510

(28.07.2021 - SC)

Name of the Judges

The bench constituted of the following judges:

• Justice Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud

• Justice M.R Shah

Bench
The judgement was delivered by a Division Bench.

Number of Opinions
In this case one opinion was delivered by the bench.

Types of Opinions
The type of opinion delivered by the bench was unanimous.

Judge Who Delivered the Opinion

The concurring opinion was delivered by Justice Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud.

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 Facts of the Case

Concrete Facts
The concrete facts of the case are as follows: -

1. The petition for Special Leave was filed against the ruling issued by a Single Judge of the
Kerala High Court dated 12.03.2021 in response to Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 641 of 2020.
2. The order of the Kerala High Court dated 12.03.2021 upheld the order of the Chief Judi-
cial Magistrate, Thiruvananthapuram, declining to consent to the Public Prosecutor’s ap-
plication to withdraw the prosecution of the first to sixth respondents under Section 321
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction un-
der Section 397 of the CrPC.
3. On 13.03.2015, in the Kerala Legislative Assembly, the budget for the financial year
2015-2016 was being presented by the then Finance Minister.
4. Respondent Nos 1 to 6 in SLP (Crl) No 4009 of 2021, henceforth referred to as ‘respon-
dent-accused’, who were members of the Legislative Assembly at the time and belonged
to the opposition party, disrupted the budget presentation by climbing over to the
Speaker's dais and damaging furniture and articles such as the Speaker's chair, computer,
mike, emergency lamp, and electronic panel, resulting in a loss of Rs. 2,20,093/-.
5. The Legislative Secretary reported the incident in the Museum Police Station. Upon
which Sections 447 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code 1860, read with Section 34, and
Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act 1984 were used to reg-
ister Crime No. 236 of 2015.
6. The final report under Section 173 of the CrPC was submitted after the inquiry was com-
plete, and the Additional CJM, Ernakulam, took cognisance of the said crimes.
7. The Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted Crl. MP 2577 of 2019 an application under
Section 321 of the CrPC on 21.07.2018, requesting that the case against all of the respon-
dent-accused be dismissed. The following are the reasons for the Prosecutor's decision to
seek such a sanction:.
A. The incidents took place in the floor of the assembly. The Immunities and privileges un-
der Art. 194(3) of the Constitution safeguard MLAs' actions during a session in the as-
sembly

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B. The actions of the MLAs are offences against the authority of the Legislative Assembly.
The speaker of the assembly is exclusively empowered to punish such actions as con-
tempt of the house.
C. The police need such “competent authority” to authorise or obtain a sanction so as to in-
vestigate any law violations that occur in the Legislative Assembly.
D. The said privileges are granted for the purpose of efficient functioning of democracy and
are subject to the powers of the Speaker or the criminal courts with the sanction of the
Speaker. The further pursuance of the trial of the MLAs degrades the dignity of the As-
sembly and affects public interest.
E. The incident in question occurred during a protest by opposition leaders against the delib-
eration of the budget. Thus, the mens rea in the ‘reus’ of the offence is hard to determine.
F. The testimonies of witnesses made under Section 161 of the CrPC are vague, and there is
no adequate identification of the people involved or their involvement in the alleged
crime. The Investigating Officer neglected to record the statements of natural eye wit-
nesses, that is, MLAs who were present in the Assembly at the time of the incident. Al-
though this calls into question the nature of the inquiry, it suggests that the prosecution
has little probability of proving its case. Moreover, not only was the video clip of the in-
cident secured from the Electronic Control Room of the Legislative Assembly, without
the sanction of the speaker, it also lacks authentication under Section 65B of the Indian
Evidence Act 1872, bringing into question the admissibility of this piece of evidence dur-
ing the trial.
G. Lastly, the government of Kerala, owner of the destroyed property, consented to the with-
drawal of the prosecution by an order dated 9 February 2018.
8. The CJM rejected to consent to the Prosecutor's application in an order dated 22.08.2020,
for the following reasons:The case, was registered with prior sanction of the secretary of
the Legislative Assembly so it is understood to have been done with the knowledge of the
Speaker. Thus, the contention regarding lack of the speaker’s sanction does not stand.

A. The immunity and privileges are given only in pursuance of free speech and voting rights
as held by the Supreme Court in the case of P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE) 1 etc.
The alleged offence here, does not come within the ambit of free speech or voting rights.

1 (1998) 4 SCC 626

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B. The Government of Kerala cannot be identified as the owner of the property and such
identification is erroneous because damage to public property causes a loss to the public
exchequer.
C. The use of Section 321 is to be made in good faith, in the interests of justice and public
policy. The application by the prosecution fails to establish in this court, how the with-
drawal of prosecution in this case would aid in upholding these interests and not in sti-
fling the process of the law. Thus, leaving the court to conclude that this application was
filed without good faith and was an effect of external influence.
9. The State of Kerala filed Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 641 of 2020 before the High Court which in
the order dated 12.03.2021 dismissed the petition, affirming the order of the CJM, while
observing the following:

A. The actions of the MLA’s cannot be regarded as to be in pursuance of democratic rights

or their voting rights, as a result cannot be justified with immunities and privileges
granted to MLAs.

B. There is no provision in the constitution or in the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of

Business in the Kerala Assembly or other such statute, made under Article 208(1) of the
Constitution warranting that the police must seek the consent of the Speaker before regis-
tering a crime against MLAs.
C. Arguments regarding the lack of evidence for successful conviction of the accused as
held in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sheonandan Paswan vs State of Bihar 2
must be raised by the accused while seeking a discharge before the Magistrate.
D. However, the High Court did not find any ground to believe that the petition for with-
drawal was filed without good faith and on external influence as declared in the Magis-
trate Court.

10. The State of Kerala and the respondent-accused have now filed separate SLPs in this
Court challenging the High Court's decision.

11. The case of State of Bihar vs Ram Naresh Pandey3 was referred to for determining the
question of the purpose of Section 321 of the CrPc. It was noted that The judicial func-
tion under 321 of CrPc is not to act judicially but to see whether the

2 (1987) 1 SCC 288.

3 AIR 1957 SC 389

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 ‘the executive function of the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised, or
that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate
reasons or purposes’

12. In the case of M.N Sankarayaraynan Nair vs P.V Balakrishnan 4 the object of the law in
Section 321 of the CrPc was determined be as the ‘administration of justice’, and for the
courts to see that there is no malafide intention or an ulterior motive in seeking such a
withdrawal.
13. In the judgement of Sheonandan Paswan vs State of Bihar 5 held that while considering an
application for withdrawal on the ground of lack of evidence, the Court has to scrutinise
whether there is in fact this insufficiency but restrict itself to see whether the prosecutor
has used this provision for the right reasons.
14. The principles formulated upon perusal of such cases are as follows:
A. Even though Section 321 entrusts the decision to withdraw from a prosecution to the pub-
lic prosecutor, it requires the permission of the court.

B. Mere paucity of evidence is not sufficient grounds for withdrawal. It must serve the ad-
ministration of justice.
C. Such withdrawal must be a result of application of the prosecutor’s own independent
mind.
D. While the Government can initiate such withdrawals, the public prosecutor ought to have
formulated his own opinion to convince the court that such an application is for good rea-
sons and court must truly believe it.
E. The role of the court here is supervisory in nature and not judicial and to consent to the
withdrawal it must see that:
“(a) The provision has not been improperly exercised to interfere with the nor-
mal process of law;

(b) The application has been made in good faith, in the interest of public pol-
icy and justice, and not to thwart or stifle the process of law;

(c) The application does not suffer from such improprieties or illegalities as
would cause manifest injustice if consent were to be given;

(d)  The grant of consent sub-serves the administration of justice; and

4 (1972) 1 SCC 318.

5 ibid.

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 (e)  The permission has not been sought with an ulterior purpose unconnected
with the vindication of the law which the public prosecutor
is duty bound to maintain;”

15. The court may assess the nature and seriousness of the offence, as well as its influence on
public life, when establishing whether the withdrawal of the prosecution furthers the ad-
ministration of justice, particularly when public finances and the fulfilment of a public
trust are involved.

16. When both the trial judge and the revisional court agree on whether to give or deny con-
sent, this Court, exercising its competence under Article 136 of the Constitution, would
proceed with care before overturning concurrent conclusions. The Court may intervene in
a matter if the trial judge or the High Court made an error of law in deciding whether to
give or withhold consent, in accordance with the well-established principles linked to the
exercise of this competence.
17. Members of Parliament have privileges and immunities under Articles 105 and 194 of the
Constitution. Prior to Section 26 of the 44th Amendment to the constitution, any such la-
cunae in the law was treated by the application of the laws of the House of Commons of
the Parliament of U.K as were in existence at the time of adoption of the constitution.
18. The lack of immunity from the application of criminal law is a standout aspect of the
privileges and immunities of members of the House of Commons.
19. Consequently with respect to positions in U.K., it was noted that person who commits a
criminal offence within the House precincts does not have absolute privilege. Instead, he
would have a limited privilege, with immunity granted only if the activity is related to the
member's effective participation in the House.
20. In Lokayukta, Justice Ripusudan Dayal v. State of M.P. 6 the Court differentiated legisla-
tive and non-legislative functions to determine the boundaries of the privilege, stating
that they are available only as far as they are essential in carrying out legislative func-
tions.
21. Thus, in Attorney General of Ceylon vs de Livera 7, the criteria for determining whether
an activity/function was on the basis of vitality of the function of the member in fulfilling
legislative purposes.

6 (2014) 4 SCC 473

7 [1963] AC 103.

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22. While approaching the question of gravity of the offences, it was observed that destruc-
tion of public property should not be tolerated. The Court also noted that, the Kerala Leg-
islative Assembly has also enacted Kerala Prevention of Damage to Private Property and
Payment of Compensation Act 2019 (Act No. 09 of 2019).
23. The requirement of Sanction of Speaker, was deduced from P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State
(CBI/SPE)8 to be limited to offences under Sections 7,10,11,12 and 15 of the Prevention
of Corruption Act 1988. Thus, not relevant in this instance.
24. The incident's video recording was obtained from the Electronic Control Room. On the
same day, many local and national news stations broadcast excerpts of the March 13,
2015 event. As a result, the publishing was viewed as sanctioned. Clause 7 of the 2002
Instructions, on the other hand, prohibits recording any interruption or disturbance during
the presentation.
25. Additionally, only individuals who are aware of incident can bring legal action against it,
which means either those who have witnessed in the House or those who learn about it
when the speech, vote, or other document is published. It prohibits 'any individual' from
bringing legal action against the exercise of freedom of expression inside the House if
they learn of the same via a publication.
26. Because the phrases linked with the phrase 'proceedings' allude to activities taken by
members in their official capacity and in support of their official responsibilities, the defi-
nition of the word 'proceedings' must be limited to such actions only.

8 ibid.

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Immaterial Facts

The immaterial facts of the case are as follows: -

1. The budget for the financial year 2015-2016 was being presented by the then Finance
Minister On 13.03.2015, in the Kerala Legislative Assembly.

2. The accused, who were leaders of opposition during this time disrupted the budget pre-
sentation by climbing over to the Speaker's dais and damaging furniture and articles such
as the Speaker's chair, computer, mike, emergency lamp, and electronic panel, resulting
in a loss of Rs. 2,20,093/-.
3. The Legislative Secretary reported the incident the Museum Police Station. Upon which a
report was submitted, subsequently the Additional CJM, Ernakulam, took cognisance of
the said crimes.
4. The Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted a withdrawal under Section 321 of the CrPC
on 21.07.2018, requesting that the case against all of the respondent-accused be dis-
missed.
5. The CJM rejected the request upon which a similar request was made in the High Court
of Kerala. This court too, rejected to consent to the withdrawal while observing that there
was no ground to believe that the petition was without good faith.
6. Mr Ranjit Kumar on behalf of the State of Kerala and Mr Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-accused have now filed separate SLPs in
this Court challenging the High Court's decision.
7. The origin of the political protest inside the House, traces back to the event of physical
assault of certain women MLAs that lead to an FIR being registered. The protest in the
House was thus, a demonstration against the Finance Minister. Given the nature and the
genesis of the incident, the Government deemed it appropriate to suggest withdrawal of
the prosecution.

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Material Facts
The material facts of the case are as follows: -

1. Dismissal to grant permission to withdraw prosecution under Section 321 of the CrPc by
the CJM and subsequently the High Court, led to petition for Special Leave in the
Supreme Court against the ruling of the High Court.

2. For the purpose of defining the intent of Section 321 of the CrPc, the case of State of Bi-
har versus Ram Naresh Pandey9 was referred to. It was noted that The judicial function
under 321 of CrPc is not to act judicially but to see whether the—

‘the executive function of the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised, or
that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate
reasons or purposes’

3. The goal of the provision under Section 321 of the CrPc was declared to be the 'adminis-
tration of justice,' and for the courts to see that there is no malafide intention or ulterior
motive in requesting such a withdrawal in the case of M.N Sankarayaraynan Nair versus
P.V Balakrishnan10.
4. The Court has to determine whether there is an insufficiency in the evidence while re-
stricting itself to see whether the prosecutor has used this provision for the legitimate rea-
sons.
5. When determining whether the withdrawal of the prosecution furthers the administration
of justice, the court may consider the nature and degree of the offence, as well as its im-
pact on public life, especially when public funds and the fulfilment of a public trust are at
stake.
6. The Court may intervene in a matter if the trial judge or the High Court made an error of
law in deciding whether to give or withhold consent, in accordance with the well-estab-
lished principles linked to the exercise of this competence.
7. The Court separated legislative and non-legislative tasks to define the limitations of the
privilege noting that they are available only to the extent that they are necessary in carry-
ing out legislative responsibilities.

9 ibid.
10 ibid.

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8. While approaching the question of gravity of the offences, it was observed that destruc-
tion of public property should not be tolerated and does not come within the ambit of
freedom of speech or voting rights.
9. Many local and national news stations broadcasted excerpts of the March 13, 2015 event.
As a result, the publishing was viewed as sanctioned by the ‘competent authority’. How-
ever, it was also observed that there is a prohibition of recording any interruption or dis-
turbance during the presentation.
10. Furthermore, only people who are aware of the occurrence can file a lawsuit, which im-
plies either those who observed it in the House or those who hear about it when the
speech, vote, or other record is released. It forbids 'any individual' from pursuing legal
action against the House's use of freedom of speech if they hear about it through a publi-
cation.
11. Because the expressions associated with the term 'proceedings' refer to acts done by
members in their official capacity and in support of their official obligations, the meaning
of the term 'proceedings' must be confined to strictly legislative functions.

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 Generalisation of Material Facts
1. Dismissal to grant permission to withdraw prosecution by the CJM and subsequently the
High Court, led to petition for Special Leave in the Supreme Court against the ruling of
the High Court.

2. It was observed that in this instance, the Court is to perform a role that is supervisory in
nature, rather than function judicially.
3. The underlying objective of such a provision under Section 321 of the CrPc was deter-
mined to be ‘administration of justice’ and for the courts to see that there is no malafide
intention or ulterior motive in requesting such a withdrawal.
4. Paucity of evidence, a ground for seeking this withdrawal was determined to be insuffi-
cient as decided in earlier cases. Additionally, it was observed that the Court here was not
to decide on the basis of the merits of the case.
5. The court may examine the type and degree of the offence, as well as its influence on
public life, while considering whether the withdrawal of the prosecution furthers the ad-
ministration of justice, especially where public expenditures and the fulfilment of a pub-
lic trust are at issue.
6. To establish the limits of the privilege, the Court differentiated legislative and non-leg-
islative duties, stating that they are available only to the degree that they are required in
carrying out legislative obligations.
7. When considering the seriousness of the offences, it was noted that destroying public
property should not be condoned and does not fall under the purview of free expression
or voting rights of the MLAs.
8. Since many local and national news stations had broadcasted excerpts of the 13.03.2015
event. The publishing was viewed as sanctioned by the ‘competent authority’. However,
it was also noted that recording any disruption or disturbance during the presentation is
prohibited.
9. The term ‘proceedings’ was redefined to be strictly restrictive of only those activities that
are carried out to effectively fulfil legislative functions.

Questions of Law

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Questions formulated by the Court
1. “Whether the decision of the High Court was in consonance with Sheonandan Paswan
case ?

2. Whether the admission of absence of malafide intentions should have in itself resulted in
reversing of the CJM’s decision?
3. Whether the incident that transpired on 13 March 2015 was a ‘proceeding’ under Article
194(2), thus bestowing the appellants with absolute immunity?”

Questions identified
1. Whether the exercise of power by the Public Prosecutor under Section 321 of CrPc in this
instance is legitimate?

2. Whether the CJM had jurisdiction to hear the case?

3. Whether mere lack of evidence is an adequate ground to allow withdrawal of prosecu-
tion?
4. Whether the actions of the MLAs where legislative functions, justified by right to free-
dom of speech given under Article 19(a)?
5. What is the extent of the Court’s power to interfere with the lower Court’s findings of
fact in such cases?

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 Arguments

Arguments by the Petitioner

Mr Jaideep Gupta, counsel appearing on behalf of the accused, in support of the appeal sub-
mitted the following:
1. In the judgment Sheonandan Paswan vs State of Bihar11, relied upon, require the courts to
determine whether the prosecution while exercising Section 321, has not improperly in-
terfered with the process of the law or used it for illegitimate purposes. While the minor-
ity imposes conditions that restricts the scope of Section 321.
2. Hence, CJM did not apply appropriate principles. The High Court in its place ought to
have rectified the decision.
3. The deciding factor here is whether the exercise of Section 321 was consistent with fur-
thering interests of public policy and justice.

Arguments by the Respondent

Mr Mahesh Jethmalani, Mr V. Chitambaresh, and Mr Ramesh Babu, Advocates-On-Record,
who appeared to challenge the appellants' and accused's positions, argued that:

1. Exercise of freedom of speech by way of protest by the MLAs inside the house does not
comprise of right to destroy public property. Violent actions are not justified by the use
of Article 194.

2. A claim of privilege is invalid in criminal cases as decided by SC in the case of

Lokayukta, Justice Ripusudan Dayal v. State of M.P.
3. The requirement of prior Sanction of the Speaker is limited to prosecution under the Pre-
vention of Corruption Act, 1988, as provided in Section 19 of the Act set in the judge-
ment of P.V Narasimha Rao.
4. Section 197 of the CrPC does not apply to MLAs since they cannot be removed from of-
fice by or with the sanction of the Government which is a condition for its application.
Furthermore, even if it did apply it is not required at preliminary stages of investigation
or prosecution.

11 (1987) 1 SCC 288.

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5. It was submitted that the application of the minority opinion in Sheonandan Paswan is er-
roneous. However, relying on the majority opinion, it was urged that this Court must re-
frain from interfering with concurrent judgments of lower courts under Article 136 by ei-
ther accepting or rejecting the Public Prosecutor's withdrawal petition.
6. It is thus, submitted that, in the this instance directed by: “(a) the concurrent findings on
the illegality of the application for withdrawal; (b) the overriding aspect of public inter-
est; and (c) the object of the law.”— with respect to the third point, Section 3 of the Pre-
vention of Damage to Public Property Act of 1984 establishes a six-month minimum
penalty, and Section 5 adds an unique provision on bail, requiring the prosecution to op-
pose the application for bail. These provisions are comparable to the bail requirements of
the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act, 1951, which show that the Parlia-
ment intends to treat damage to public property as a serious crime.

Arguments by the Intervener

Submission by Mr Ranjit Kumar on behalf of the State of Kerala in support of the appeals:

1. As established in Rajendra Kuman Jain vs State through Special Police Establishment &
Ors, the Public Prosecutor's ability to withdraw from prosecution for one or more of-
fences for which the accused is being prosecuted can only be utilised to pursue social,
economic, and political justice. The respondents here are accused of committing the of-
fence during the presentation of the State budget on the Legislative Assembly's premises.
In light of the foregoing ruling, their activities constitute indications of effective political
engagement and are in advancement of a political goal, which is a valid reason for the
prosecution to be dropped.

2. The court that grants permission to withdraw from prosecution has a supervisory rather
than an adjudicatory role. It must not bear the duty of reviewing the Public Prosecutor's
grounds for withdrawal; rather, it must decide whether the Public Prosecutor has used the
mind as a ‘free agent, uninfluenced by irrelevant and extraneous factors.’
3. The High Court erred in relying on Chief Justice Bhagwati's dissenting opinion in the
Sheonandan Paswan ruling, where the majority opinion was written by Justice Khalid for
himself and Justice Natarajan, and Justice Venkataramiah wrote a separate but concurring
judgement.

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4. In the judgement of P.V. Narasimha (supra) it was held that the requirement of proper
sanction of the Speaker is not restricted to cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988. Here, in the absence of the said sanction of the Speaker, prosecution cannot be in-
stituted as the events transpired in floor of the Kerala Legislative Assembly, during the
deliberation of the budget by the Finance Minister.
5. The origin of the political protest inside the House, traces back to the event of physical
assault of certain women MLAs that lead to an FIR being registered. The protest in the
House was thus, a demonstration against the Finance Minister. Given the nature and the
genesis of the incident, the Government deemed it appropriate to suggest withdrawal of
the prosecution.
6. The protests in the floor of the assembly by the accused MLAs was an exercise of the
right to freedom of speech and expression. This exercise of freedom of speech under arti-
cle 194 of the constitution cannot be tried in court for having occurred inside the assem-
bly during the presentation of the budget and so is in close proximity in time to the right
to vote which is protected under Article 194.
7. The video clip of the incident presented as evidence, was procured as a result of the pub-
lication of the proceeding of the House. Thus, this piece of evidence is questionable be-
cause under Article 194(2)— ‘No member shall be held liable for any proceedings inside
the House that are published.’’
8. By admitting to finding that there were no male fides that can be attributed to the petition
and yet rejecting the appeal on grounds provided by the prosecution, the High Court has
taken an adjuratory role rather than restricting itself to conduct a supervisory function.

Judgement in personam

The court held that it can be safely deduced that the appellants in this case do not bear any
immunity for their actions. Consequently, the continuance of the trial does not breach their
privilege as MLAs. The proximity of the event to the presentation of the budget does not
qualify the said incident as ‘proceedings’. To the contention regarding the illegitimacy of the
obtained evidence due to absence of Sanction and certification under the Evidence Act, the

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court held that with respect to the withdrawal of prosecution under Section 321 of the CrPc
this stands irrelevant.

“We do not believe that this submission is relevant and merits consideration by this
Court in an application for withdrawal of prosecution under Section 321 of the CrPC.
In our opinion, the High Court has correctly observed that questions of insufficiency
of evidence, admissibility of evidence absent certifications etc., are to be adjudged by
the trial court during the stage of trial.”

Hence, the appeals were dismissed.

Judgement in rem
The court held that destruction of property does not come within the purview of Article
194(2). The appellants' reference to P.V. Narasimha Rao (above) to establish that the respon-
dent-actions of the accused inside the House were a manner of protest with a tight link to
freedom of expression, and thus protected by Article 194(2), is unsatisfactory. Moreover, acts
of vandalism and violence cannot be deemed as manner of protest or exercise of freedom of
speech and voting rights that qualifies as ‘proceedings’ or ‘legislative functions’. Addition-
ally, the HC was held to be right in declaring paucity of evidence as an inadequate ground for

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withdrawal. However, in the absence of any malafide intentions, the application does not con-
sequently result in its approval. Since, the video recording qualifies as ‘publication’ yet due
to lack of approval of competent authority members cannot be granted immunity. It also
deemed it erroneous to delve into merits of the case at this stage of the trial.

“As held by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Sheonandan Paswan (supra), it is
not the duty of this Court, in an application under Section 321 of the CrPC, to adjudi-
cate upon evidentiary issues and examine the admissibility or sufficiency of evi-
dence.”

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