Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • Flores and Nooruddin 2016 Chapter3

    Uploaded by

    papi K
    20 views12 pages

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    Report this Document

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as pdf
    20 views12 pages

    Flores and Nooruddin 2016 Chapter3

    Uploaded by

    papi K

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as pdf
    of 12
    Elections in Hard Times Building Stronger Democracies in the 21 Century THOMAS EDWARD FLORES CAMBRIDGE published in asucaion with Wilson Cntr ress, ‘Washing, DC 3 | the Third Wave(s) and the Electoral Boom ‘We are confronted with a troubling fact the democratic dividend from elections define jas as they became globally derigucur and improved dramatically in competitiveness. Our explanation for thie lemocratc decine recs heal onthe difering structural contexts in which elation ake pee. Some election winner nei atively ‘ep stocks of what we eal performance and democratic nstiutional Iegitimacy from their predecessors; oners do not Leaders are more lily to perform in oie in a manaer that promos democratic change when they inkei elaively deeper stocks, Counties ran the rise becoming entangled in alow-esiimacy tap i which even transparent elections yield governments whose road 10 reeecthn ‘ces om coerapeion and weakening democratic rl this dso ‘ng voters and lowering the integrity of four clon. We teorae iat elections are more likely to promote demacacy where thee is 1 previous history of democratic rule, fs space is teatively ample, ud the county iar peace ‘Our theory operates atthe election level, predicting which cetons wil be moeesuceesfalin promoting democracy. I the theory olde vwter, We should obseve that che global decline in che democratic Alvin fom elections afer 1985 coincided with sinilar decline in ‘he sacral cicumstance in which the eecons took place. Thats, ‘our theory makes predictions no only about particular eletons, but sso about tn. I elections have generated vialy no democcaie ividend since the dawn af the eecorl boom, ii becuse those tletons have bees held in countries with less democratic experience less fal space, and a more rece history of violent confit hat the ‘mes in which elections were held before the electoral oom, In this caper, we unfold short history of lations since 1946 ‘hae confine thi expectation. At fst lance, this explanation seems unhaivable Ar ally have we noe witesed por development fiom Lain America wo Soh Asi over the ls sty years? The 58 From Elections to Democracy: Theory and Evidence answee to his puzl ies in examining which counties have Begun to hold eens, Three major geopolitical and economic shocks hat predated the electoral boom played an important role in defining the sructral content in wich elections took place: dsolonization herween 1946 and 197, the global debe eri of the 1970s and 1980s, and the denouement ofthe Cold War inthe late 1980 and cel 1990s. The coincidence of these msjoe pola and economic upheavals with dhe lecoral boom erated ane, daunting challenge {or democracy promosos:cections spread o younger, poorer, ad ‘more ethnically divided counties with es deocrati experience and Sscal Space and a longer histocyof violent civil confit As the Thied ‘Wave spread he only countries lf to democratze were the dificult cases. Gone are the days when relatively stable, rich counties - such {5 Chile or Poland ~ eure to re elections Instead, new eecton- holding countries day Toke more like Afghanistan or Seta Leone. ‘This chapter offers the ft evidence in favo ofthe theory of elosone presented in Chapter 2 lections inthe Thied Wave(s) of Democracy Figure 31 shows the number f democratic countries ad competitive executive elections in each year between 1946 and 2010.1 ‘Several tends vse in Figure 31 deserve special atention. The Second Wave of Democracy began in 1946, as Wester Europe returned to democracy from the ashes of Wor War il During this time; the numberof democracies ness doubled from a post wal? ‘of aout ewenty to about forty by the early 1960s. The Second Wave eas guikly succeded by a countervave that led for nary Bf teen jes, daring which the global aumiber of demacaces mained roughly the sams Mic 1974, i would be more proper 10 tlk about the hid ‘Waves of Dernosracy, rather than of single Thid Wave, The Tied ‘Wave commence in 1974 withthe Carnation Revol in Port tah ning what we call Wave 3.0, which ierased the number (oF democeacies from thigh in 1974 to fify-t0a in 1989, The wave mr the rt to democracy in Latin Americs 36 the word ‘wide debe cris, human ight abuses, and Argentina’ aston war for he Falkln dered milary reins and evap presen til demoersy hack 10 the wegion. Wave 31 Isa ith heen of ‘The Third Wave(s) and the Electoral Boom 39 e L AS Ie i i ® i a ee Fe The hind Wave wos actual thee saves, we elas ‘sae in ae bare ‘he Cold War and send democrtey to Eastra European post Soviet ‘ete, Figure 31 shows how Wave 3.1 dramatically aceeeated eal "expansion ~ by 1994, eghty-aine counties counted as democracies Yet Ware 3.1 tale within several years ofthe breakup ofthe Soviet, Union nd he mamber of democracies fel acto eighty-four beeen 1994 and 1999, Wave 32 regnted the spread of democracy, how ‘ver pushing che number of democracies to roughly one hundred for the ise time in world bistry. This seb wave was more spread out froxraphialy than presione sub-eaes, bat many ofthe Wave 32 Chutes could be found in Sul-Sharan Af, The growth in competitive excetive cecions, however, dd not expand in tandem with our three sub-aves. Instead, Figure 3.1 shows in eletoral boon that oscured viualy ovimght afer the mid "sth, Between 1946 and 1987, she numbe of compere executive sletions per year averaged about thiten and eanged between sx and hineten There was teow during this period, even asthe mum Ter countries expe with decolonization and the Benning of « From Elections to Democracy: Theory and Evidence Wave 30, The electoral oom instead cuted jst before Wave 3. ‘The average numberof lotions held more than double to event. rine per jeat andthe minimim mame of compete executive ‘lesions eld was ighten daring his period, which had been roughly ‘he maximum number of such elections in 1946-1987. Neither did ‘Wave 32 relly increase the umber of etons significant, though itincreased the number af democracies, Thre wignifcant volaity Inthe numberof elecions held fom eaeso far, ofcourse, snc the ‘umber depends onthe vagaries of counties letra calendars, but the ea chang is ater lee ‘Younger, Poorer, and More Fractionalized Elections We koow hat the umber of elections beng hel in given year dr rmavaly expanded with the advent of the electoral boom i 1988 Bur wha do we know about the countries holding elections ring the letra! boom? How were they diferent than countries balding ‘lesions benveen 1945 and 1987? Before we adds the question of socks of legitimacy, we offer three answers here: counties holding lesions during the electoral boom were Youngs, poorer ad more ‘sical frectonaied ‘Two politcal earthquakes entry reshaped the international sys- ter bork efor and daring the dectorl boom: devolonzation and he breakup ofthe Sovee Union. At the conclusion of World WaT, oxe ata coun only seveny-onesoerelgn counties? By 1975, that tum ber had more than doubled co 148 meer, nother words, between to and theee countries were hen inthe typical year beeen 1946 tnd 1975, In 1960 alone, eighteen new counties were hoen. Decal ‘nization had mostly ended by about 1975, but the disintegration of the Sove: Union early instantly rete twenty new sovereign states inthe thre years between 1990 and 1993, By the nd of oe dat we count 170 sovereign counties ‘Wha were the implications of thee two geoplitsl upheavals for the condact of elections? For an anewer, consider Figure 3.2, whieh displays the number of compeiive executive decons before and uring the electoral boom, which we break down by whether they ‘wer held in an "ld tte that exist In 1946 oi competitive excetive elections tak place mail tol slates, Fewer The Thin Waves) andthe Electoral Boom “1 Conte eee sect kt Figue 32 Thelen loom seal eeton fo young counts ‘han one quart of competitive excetie elections took pce in new ‘ester, in Fae. The pirate changes deamatclly ding the electoral Im, shen neaely half ofall eompetiive executive elecons cook place in new states. We can make ehis point in sll a stferen way. The median age ofa county holding a competitive executive election Ire the elecoral boom was roughly sevensy'six years, The same Face ding the elctoral Boom is seventy-t6o years ~ four years wntgee ~ despite the face that counces have aged over this time evi This, of cours, reflects largely where eleions tok place. Before the cloctral hoor, only 7-5 percent of compertive executive ele tims tok place in Sub-Saharan Acs «share that neal pled to TL percent dasing the electoral boom. Roughly sorties of lesions took place ia the Americas and Wester Eacope before the ‘lecorl booms that proportion declined by nearly half ding the lector boom. The dramatic expansi ofthe sate system meant that clos tok place in starkly younger comntes lated out side of elections previo home eons of Wenten Europe and the Aeris. e ‘From Elections fo Democracy: Theory and Evidence ‘cor srsae = edn GOP prepa, a uaras ovate OP percepts. ccna cote gue 3.3 BleionSoling eunies haveBsome poor ee a he word ze scone rer ations not only acrived in younger counties: they aso eae poorer countries Figre 3.3 illest his urpisingly complex try Init we overlay thee plots? Ft, the box plo show per capita ‘Geos Domes Produce (GDP) for elation holding counses ony, by decade. The line within ach box indicates the median GDP pr capita fora election holding county, while the box lf shows the dance beeween the 2th and 75th prcasles. The "whiskers" show the tal lengh ofthe dstebuton of GDP per capita for election holding coun- tres! Second the dashed line shows she median GDP pe capita for all counteesy wears of whether they held eetons. Fall, the bot line displays the median GDP per capita for courier olding Founding eketons. Figure 3.3 recounts two competing store inthe post-wac history ‘of economic development and elections. The fies sry i happy one ‘the ype county registered important developmental ans over ove time petiod. The median couatty sa ies GDP per capita move than ‘The Third Wave(s) and the Electoral Boom “6 lonble between the 19608 and 2000s, fom oughly $2,700 to neatly 536,000. "This rise came despite nancial and economic rum dar Ing the Laci American debe ers, the end ofthe Cold War, and the Have Asan financial crit ofthe Ite 1990s. Our data concur withthe aecounes of economists sich st Charles Kenny, who arpuet that @ numberof indicators of Kaman devepment have deamat tall improved, and Pol Cols, who argues that poverty bas allen ‘in rowghiy 8D percent ofthe word, withthe zemaisig 20 percent ube the “be lon." The second woryis nore ambivalent: lions have spread pro- reste poorer counties, meaning that they ate more often eld in Condisons of poverty. The typical elction-olding country became ‘cher beseen the 1950s and the 1970s, By the 1970s, the tpl “ounty holding an elstion had a GDP pe capita of eaty $5,000. The epi lesion holding county, infact, was fe cer than the typical country, which had a GDP per capita of only $3,200. How ver aver the net thc eats, he peal eesion-holding couatey ‘ctaly pot poorer, even a the world became sicher. By the 1990s, the median GD? per expits of «country holding an eleton was stl ium below $5,000. During the 20005, his suation improved and the typical ecson-holing country became riches But elections had also “pecad to nresingly pooer counties. The lower whiskers show is "ecad most deamatially: the poorest countries hong elections inthe 2000s ad per eapia income of about $214 ~ or onl ity

    You might also like