SAGGI

Il Pensiero: rivista di filosofia : LXI, 1, 2022 pp. 13-34

Double Ontology and the Unemployed God

Mou Zongsan’s Transformation of Kant’s Intellectual Intuition*
Jana Rošker

1. The Reception of Kant’s Philosophy in China: Parallels and Inspirations

The importance of Kant’s work, as well as its worldwide reception and im-
pact, is quantitatively apparent if we consider the thousands of books, essays,
and articles about it that continue to be published. A substantial number of
these studies are written and published in Chinese. Kant is doubtless one of
the most debated non-Marxist Western philosophers in China1, and this at-
traction has a relatively long history.
Already at the end of the nineteenth century, Chinese intellectuals were
increasingly interested in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Kant’s theory
first came to China through Japanese translations2. He has profoundly influ-
enced many important premodern intellectuals, whose work and political ac-
tivities significantly shaped the beginning of specifically Chinese modernity
and its ideational foundations.
Between 1903 and 1904, Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873-1929) published a
series of articles in the journal Xinmin congbao新民叢報 entitled The Teach-
ings of the Greatest Philosopher of Modern Times: Kant 近世第一大哲康德
之學說. This series has often been regarded as the formal beginning of an
explicit Chinese reception of Kant.
Kant was particularly important for Wang Guowei 王國維 (1877-1927),
who made significant contributions to philosophical ethics and aesthetics in

* The present article was published in the framework of the research project Modern and
Contemporary Taiwanese Philosophy (RG004-U-17), which is financed by the Taiwanese
Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for scholarly exchange. The author also acknowledges the
financial support from the Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS) in the framework of the re-
search core funding Asian language and Cultures (P6-0243), and the research project N6-0161
Humanism in Intercultural Perspective: Europe and China.
1
 See M. Müller, Aspects of the Chinese Reception of Kant, in «Journal of Chinese Philoso­
phy», vol. 41, n. 1, 2006, pp. 141-157: p. 141.
2
 M. Lee 李明輝, Kangde zhexue zai Dong Ya 康德哲學在東亞 (Kant’s Philosophy in
Eastern Asia), Taida chuban zhongxin, Taibei 2016, p. 10.
14 Jana Rošker

China. He read Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason four times and Kant’s influ-
ence is clearly visible in most of his work, which provided ample evidence
that the spirit and methods of continental philosophy appealed to many Chi-
nese intellectuals, who found it more compatible with traditional Chinese
philosophical writings than most other works of Western analytical philoso-
phy3. Many other important scholars of the early republican period, such as
Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (1869-1936), Yan Fu 嚴復 (1852-1921), and Cai Yuan-
pei 蔡元培 (1868-1940), also wrote numerous essays and treaties on Kant’s
philosophy.
Kant also profoundly influenced several later researchers of Chinese and
comparative theory of knowledge and epistemology, for instance the creator
of the specifically Chinese “panstructural epistemology”, Zhang Dongsun
張東蓀 (1886-1973).
But in the second half of the twentieth century, Kant’s philosophy (espe-
cially his ethics) certainly found its greatest – albeit very critical – admirer in
the Taiwanese philosopher Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909-1995), whose theo-
retical work will be at the center of this study. As we shall see, Mou was an
advocate of the Confucian revival. He was convinced that all philosophies
from ancient Greece to early modernity converged on Kant, and every strain
of post-Kantian philosophy developed from Kant4. Mou actually believed
that Kant’s moral philosophy was the only Western philosophical discourse
that could truly engage in dialogue with Chinese thought5. Kant’s enlighten-
ment philosophy was of utmost importance for Mou’s endeavor to seek for a
Confucian modernity, i.e. a specifically Chinese modernization, in which the
Chinese ideational tradition could serve as a remedy against social alienation
and wholesale Westernization. For Mou, «the name of Kant at times seems
to function like an authoritative signifier for modernity as a normative project
grounded in the category of moral autonomy (zilü 自律)»6.
The intercultural encounters between Kantian and Chinese philosophy
also bore great significance for later developments of Chinese culture in the
20th century, because Kant’s reception in China certainly contributed to the
even stronger reception of Hegel and Marx in later times.

However, more than Hegel and Marx, Kant has consistently concentrated on the
rational and moral natures of individual human beings, and this intense effort and
attentiveness on the part of Kant inevitably appeals to the Chinese mind at all
times. In this regard, one cannot but also speculate on certain common under-

3
 See R. Littlejohn, Chinese Receptions of Western Philosophy, in «ASIANetwork Ex-
change», vol. 22, n. 1, 2014, pp. 38-48: p. 40.
4
 Z. Mou, Zhongguo zhexuede tezhi 中國哲學的特質 (The Specific Features of Chinese
Philosophy), Xuesheng shuju, Taipei1963, p. 39.
5
 R. Littlejohn, Chinese Receptions of Western Philosophy, p. 45.
6
 A. Van den Stock, The Horizon of Modernity. Subjectivity and Social Structure in New
Confucian Philosophy, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2016, p. 273.
Double Ontology and the Unemployed God 15

lying ground or perspectives between Kant and Confucianism, which I title the
theoretical links between the two.7

At first glance, this Chinese interest in Kant is rather surprising. However,

after a more detailed view, there are indeed numerous similarities in Kan-
tian and Confucian philosophy8. They are not limited to the general fact that
both discourses deal primarily with ethics and moral philosophy. It is for in-
stance well known that virtues such as humaneness (ren 仁) and reciprocity
(shu 恕) are not only cornerstones of Confucian thought, but also appear in
a prominent role – albeit in a slightly different form – in Kantian ethics. In
these respects, Confucius and Kant certainly share an identical motif. In their
views, the correlative relation between humanness and reciprocity is certain-
ly a universalizable field. This common teleological push and deontological
pull, intrinsic to their otherwise distinctive themes, indicates the basic iden-
tity of their outlooks9. It is therefore unsurprising that Kant and Confucius
have often been compared, mostly with respect to issues of morality10. This is
only natural, for both of them are influential scholars, and both created sys-
tems of deontological ethics11. Although Kant writes a lot about both duties
and rights, he clearly gives priority in his theory to duties. In this regard, he

7
 C. Cheng, Preface, in «Journal of Chinese Philosophy», vol. 33, n. 1, 2006, pp. 1-2: p. 1.
8
 Some similarities can also be found between Kant and the philosophy of Sinicized Bud-
dhism. In his abovementioned series of articles, Liang Qichao stressed the similarity between
Kant’s transcendental philosophy and Chinese philosophical traditions such as Buddhism and
the Buddhist-inspired Neo-Confucianism, especially regarding the concepts of ultimate reality
(zhen ru 真如) and innate knowledge (liang zhi 良知). See M. Müller, Aspects of the Chinese
Reception of Kant, p. 148.
9
 M. Schönfeld, From Confucius To Kant. The Question Of Information Transfer, in «Jour-
nal of Chinese Philosophy», vol. 41, n. 1, 2006, pp. 67-81: p. 69.
10
 However, even though moral philosophy was in the center of these intercultural encoun-
ters, it is by no means the only field in which Confucian philosophy could be compared to
the Kantian. Christian Helmut Wenzel, for instance, regrets that much less has hitherto been
written on their aesthetics: «In Kant, aesthetics is part of his third Critique, which unifies his
system of transcendental philosophy as a whole, and in Confucius one soon feels that some sort
of aesthetics is central to his ideas about education, person, and interpersonal relationships»
(C.H. Wenzel, Beauty in Kant and Confucius: A First Step, in «Journal of Chinese Philosophy»,
vol. 33, n. 1, 2006, pp. 95-107: p. 95).
11
 According to Lee Ming-huei, both theories are rooted in deontological ethics (M. Lee,
Confucianism: Its Roots and Global Significance, University of Hawai‘i Press, Honolulu 2017,
p. 94), and based on human autonomy and inner freedom. While Mou Zongsan has never
explicitly defined Confucian ethics as of the deontological type, Lee proves that it is a kind of
deontology in several of his writings, especially in his interpretations (e.g. Id., Konfuzianischer
Humanismus: Transkulturelle Kontexte, Transcript Verlag, Bielefeld 2013, pp. 21-41; Id., Con-
fucianism, p. 95; Id., Rujia yu Kangde 儒家與康德 [Confucianism and Kant], Lian jing. Xinbei
2018, pp. 50-52) of the famous dialogue between Confucius and his disciple Zai Wo (Lunyu
論語, 17, 21; accessible at: Chinese Text Project. Pre-Qin and Han, http://chinese.dsturgeon.
net/text.pl?node=3925&if=en (accessed: July 7, 2020). He believes this passage of the Analects
shows that Confucius strictly advocated an ethics of conviction (Gesinnungsethik), which is a
type of deontology (M. Lee, Confucianism, p. 96).
16 Jana Rošker

represented the minority among Western philosophers by arguing that rights

are an epiphenomenon of duty, rather than the other way around. Hence, it
is logical that in his system, “practical reason” has priority over “theoretical
reason”. All such propensities appeal to Chinese philosophers, for they seem
familiar to them. Therefore, it is by no means a coincidence that comparisons
of Confucian and Kantian ethics have functioned as a trigger for many inter-
cultural philosophical dialogues, especially from the Chinese side12.
As Confucius is mainly concerned with issues such as morality, humanity,
and rituality, one naturally looks to Kant’s moral, social, and political writings
for similarities; and indeed, many parallels are to be found there13. Moreo-
ver, since in the West, as well as in China itself, Confucianism has often been
seen as a certain type of humanism14, Mou Zongsan (and many later Confu-
cian scholars, such as, for instance, the most important contemporary Tai-
wanese expert on Kant, Lee Ming-huei) believed that it was precisely Kant’s
philosophy that could provide a solid link between Chinese and European
humanism15.
On the other hand, morality, deontological ethics, and humanism are doubt-
lessly issues that lie in the center of interests of those Chinese theoreticians
who strove (and continue to strive) for a theoretically grounded revival of Con-
fucian philosophy. In the following, we will therefore shortly introduce the cur-
rent of Modern New Confucianism, in which such endeavors were manifested
in a most unambiguous way, and its most famous representative Mou Zongsan.

2. Modern New Confucianism and Mou Zongsan

Modern New Confucianism (Xiandai xin ruxue 現代新儒學) is a philo-

sophical current that emerged in China on the threshold of the 20th century.
It is grounded in the conviction that traditional Confucianism, understood
as a specifically Chinese social, political, and moral system of thought, can,
if refreshed and adapted to meet the conditions of the modern era, serve as
the foundation for an ethically meaningful modern life, while also providing
a spiritual antidote to the alienation that these same Modern New Confu-
cian philosophers see as the collateral effect of the capitalistic glorification
of competition and the single-minded pursuit of profit.
These thinkers thus proceeded with a dual approach: on the one hand,
reformulating certain key approaches of traditional (Confucian) thought that

12
 See S.R. Palmquist, How “Chinese” Was Kant?, in «The Philosopher», vol. 84, n. 1, 1996,
pp. 3-9: pp. 7-8.
13
 C.H. Wenzel, Beauty in Kant and Confucius, p. 95.
14
 See C. Huang, Mencian Hermeneutics. A History of Interpretation in China, Transaction
Publishers, New Brunswick-London 2010, pp. 9, 11-12; M. Lee, Konfuzianischer Humanismus).
15
 See C. Huang, Mencian Hermeneutics, p. 19.
Double Ontology and the Unemployed God 17

they believed were capable of transcending the prevailing ideological trends,

thereby preserving Chinese cultural identity, while at the same making their
own original contributions to the development of a philosophical and theoreti-
cal dialogue between Western and Chinese cultures. This current, which after
1949 defined to a great extent the spirit of Chinese modernization, engaged in
a wide-ranging effort to revitalize traditional (primarily Confucian and, even
more so, Neo-Confucian)16 thought by means of new input and stimulation
from Western philosophical systems. In its general tension towards synthe-
ses, the spirit of German idealism was especially important, while among its
more theoretical components considerable attention was also given to the
substance and approaches of the Viennese circle. However, in their search
for antidotes and alternatives to social alienation (in Asian modernization, as
well) and the “vacuum of values”, these theorists instead looked primarily to
the framework of classical Confucian thought17. Their revitalization of the
Chinese tradition remains one of the most important theoretical currents in
contemporary Chinese theory. Due to its potentially stabilizing social func-
tion and its harmonious compatibility with capitalism, many scholars see it as
the Asian equivalent of Max Weber’s “protestant ethic”.
For the Modern New Confucians, the solution to the modern world cri-
sis lay in placing morality at the center of human concerns. While specific
methods for resolving the main problems of human existence would be found,
these methods could not be solely technical, organizational, or contractual
in nature, but had to derive from a deep awareness of the importance of the
ethical conditionality of human life. As Heiner Roetz18 points out, as a mor-
al being (ens morale), everyone has the potential to maintain and constantly
re-formulate this moral priority, thereby laying the foundation for a moder-
nity of solidarity. This priority was clearly expressed by the contemporary
Confucian philosopher Lee Ming-huei in his attempts to restore Confucian
ethics19 through the concept of a «creative transformation» to «modern con-

16
 Neo-Confucianism is the philosophy of the so-called second reform of Confucianism,
which took place during the Song (960-1279) and Ming (1368-1644) Dynasties. The main
representatives of this intellectual current were Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and Wang Yangming (1472-
1529). The Neo-Confucian philosophers mainly interpreted original Confucianism through the
ideas and approaches of Mencius (Mengzi, 372 BC-289BC), and they were defined by their
manifest critique of (and simultaneously by latent amalgamation with) Buddhist and Daoist
thought.
17
 Classical Confucianism denotes the ethical, but partly also epistemological and logical
discourses from the so-called pre-Qin era, which mainly covered the last part of the Eastern
Zhou Dynasty, namely the period of the Warring States. It generally refers to the philosophies
of Confucius, (Kongzi 551-479 BC), Mencius (Mengzi 372-289 BC), and Xunzi. (313-238 BC).
18
 H. Roetz, Confucianism between Tradition and Modernity, Religion, and Secularization:
Questions to Tu Weiming, in «Dao. Journal for Comparative Philosophy», n. 7, 2008, pp. 367-
380: p. 379.
19
 M. Lee, Ru jia yu Kangde 儒家與康德, Lianjing, Taibei 1990; Id., Dangdai ruxuede ziwo
zhuanhua 當代儒學的自我轉化, Zhongguo shehui kexue chuban she, Beijing 2001.
18 Jana Rošker

sciousness [xiandai yishi 現代意識]»20. However, an important methodologi-

cal step in this direction had already been taken previously by Mou Zongsan,
with his concept of the self-negation of the moral Self (daode ziwode kanxian
道德的自我坎陷), which will be discussed below.
The present article focuses on this latter philosopher, because he is the most
famous transformer of Kant’s thought in the Sinophone region. Mou’s study
of Kant’s theory has been regarded as a vital part of the development his phi-
losophy. His analysis, interpretation, and critique of Kant’s philosophy func-
tioned as a significant effort to bring together Chinese and Western philosophy.
Mou Zongsan was a member of the so-called second generation of Mod-
ern New Confucians. It consisted of philosophers who have after 1949 mi-
grated to Taiwan and Hong Kong respectively, and who lived and worked
there until the end of their lives. Their philosophy was thus largely defined by
these societies’ cultural and political characteristics between 1950 and 1980.
Besides Mou, the most important members of this “generation” were Tang
Junyi 唐君毅, Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, and Fang Dongmei 方東美. Most of the
members of the second generation tried to revitalize their cultural identity,
in what they termed «replanting the old roots [重整舊學的根基]»21, of their
tradition. Due to the challenge posed by Western cultures, they saw this as
the only way for their own cultural tradition to survive. However, if this revi-
talization of the “roots” is carried out properly, it should not only guarantee
the survival of this culture, but also ensure an active and innovative role for
Modern Confucianism and modern Chinese philosophy in the international
polylogue among modern societies22.
Mou was the most important Taiwanese philosopher from 1980 to the time
of his death. An innovative theorist, he was the best-known second-generation
Modern Confucian. He wrote mostly on logic and metaphysics, but also occa-
sionally delved into political theory. He was an open and radical opponent of
Marxism and Marxist theory, and thus of the then dominant ideology in the P.
R. China. In terms of general methodology, Mou followed his teacher Xiong
Shili 熊十力, but he also reevaluated the Chinese philosophical tradition
through the perspective of Modern European philosophy, especially Kant.
Like Zhang Dongsun and other Chinese theorists of the early 20th cen-
tury, Mou Zongsan used logic to counter Marxism and refute dialectical ma-
terialism. However, with his book Logical Paradigms (Luoji dianfan)23, his
interest in logic took a new direction. The book is an attempt to go beyond
logical formalism, which Mou saw as not only as conditioning but as hinder-
ing true philosophy. In this work, he began to focus on the concept of the

 M. Lee, Ruxue yu xiandai yishi 儒學與現代意識, Wenjin chuban she Taibei 1991, p. 194.
20
21
 Y. Feng 馮耀明, Cong «zhitong» dao «qucheng» – dangdai xin ruxue yu xiandaihua
wenti 從 «直通» 到 «曲成» – 當代新儒學與現代化問題, in «Hanxue yanjiu», vol. 10, n. 2.
pp. 227-251: p. 227.
22
 See ibidem.
23
 Z. Mou, Luoji dianfan 邏輯典範, Shangwu yinshu guan, Hong Kong 1941.
Double Ontology and the Unemployed God 19

reason, its functions, operation, and structure. Underlying this approach was
a very close study of Kant’s philosophy, especially the three critiques. Mou’s
aim in reading Kant was to find a way that would lead him through logic to
metaphysics. The results of his attempt to connect the two disciplines can be
found in his work, Criticism of Cognitive Heart-mind24, which was written
over a ten-year period and appeared in 1965. One basic premise of this work
is that logic does not depend on actual reality and the relations within it; he
rather sought the ultimate origin or source of all logical methods.
In his later years he rediscovered Buddhism; this interest is reflected in
his book Buddha Nature and Prajñā25, which is dedicated to the epistemo-
logical aspects of the Huayan 華嚴 and Tiantai 天台 schools. In these works,
he examined certain characteristics typical of specific periods, orientations,
or schools in the history of Chinese philosophy. However, they are anything
but academic overviews, and instead represent the search for an original phil-
osophical starting point and important steps in the development of his own
philosophical system. Although in essence, these works grew from his ear-
lier periods, they were also a necessary preparation for his later philosophi-
cal system of moral metaphysics. In this context, we should note that these
many voluminous works on the history of Chinese thought, including those
dedicated to Buddhism, should not be considered as mere academic exercis-
es, for they embody Mou’s very real efforts to develop his own philosophical
system, a system that he would formulate with ever greater clarity over the
course of his career.
In 1971, he published what is generally considered his most important
work, Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy (Zhide zhijue yu Zhong-
guo zhexue), in which he examined the specific Chinese understanding of the
structure of existence. In doing so, he drew certain parallels with Heidegger’s
ontology26 and pointed out inconsistencies in Kant’s theories. Until the end
of Mou’s philosophical career, Kant was for him both a fundamental source
of inspiration and the object of harsh criticism. Due to the existential signifi­
cance Kant ascribed to morality27, Mou considered him the pinnacle of Eu-

24
 Z. Mou, Renshi xinde pipan 認識心的批判, Lianjing, Taibei 2003.
25
 Z. Mou, Foxing yu banruo 佛性與般若 (1977), Lianjing, Taibei 1991.
26
 In his article on Mou and Heidegger, Selusi Ambrogio (S. Ambrogio, Mou Zongsan and
Martin Heidegger: Reopening a Debate on Ontology and Ethics, in «Frontiers of Philosophy
of China», vol. 13, n. 1, pp. 55-71, doi: 10.3868/s030-007-018-0005-0) proposes that, despite
their differences, the ontological theses of Mou and Heidegger have several striking similarities.
In his view, Kant’s refusing the intellectual intuition and precluding human beings from the
comprehension of noumena was more threatening for Mou’s system than Heidegger’s proposing
a philosophy of finitude and an ontology of action. Ambrogio also emphasizes that Mou Zongsan
was certainly aware of this problem. As we shall see in later sections of this paper, Mou indeed
sharply criticized Kant’s restriction of intellectual intuition only to God.
27
 As is well known, Mou greatly admired Kant’s moral philosophy and argued that only with
Kant did Western philosophy begin to have a real understanding of the nature of morality. Kant
was the first in the West to say that «being moral is determined by moral rule and not by exter-
20 Jana Rošker

ropean and Western philosophy. At the same time, he was convinced that his
theoretical system was flawed and logically inconsistent. Indeed, one is some-
times left with the sensation that «for Mou, Kant’s greatest failing was not
having had a solid classical Confucian education, which would have helped
him to fill the gaps in his worldview»28. Not surprisingly, much of Mou’s work
is dedicated to performing a series of “upgrades” and “repairs” on Kant’s phi-
losophy. Mou was convinced that along this line of thought he could build a
valid moral metaphysics, which Kant did not succeed in building29. For Mou,
moral metaphysics refers to the existence of things with moral substance that
are reflected by moral consciousness. Thus, for him, this clear consciousness
is the «moral substance, and, at the same time ontological substance»30.
In working out his thesis, Mou relied on his earlier (and aforementioned)
study, Criticism of Cognitive Heart-mind (Renshi xinde pipan 認識心的批判),
in which he had laid the groundwork for his Confucian rehabilitation model
and his expansion thereof, especially as regards Chinese onto-epistemology31.
Contemporary scholars generally consider Appearance and the Thing-
in-itself (Xianxiang yu wu zishen 現象與物自身) and On summum bonum
(Yuan shan lun 圓善論) as his second-most important works. In Appearance
and the Thing-in-itself he uses traditional Chinese philosophy to redefine the
concepts of noumenon and phenomenon and their reciprocal relation. While
writing this work, he also translated Kant’s three Critiques into Chinese32. In
this regard, Mou focused upon the specific distinction between phenomena

nal objects». Mou nonetheless sharply criticized Kant’s claim that the existence of God was a
necessary precondition for the existence of an integral realm of morality and happiness: Z. Mou,
Yuan shan lun 圓善論 (On summum bonum), Xuesheng shuju, Taibei 1985, pp. 239-240.
28
 J. Rošker, The Rebirth of the Moral Self. The Second Generation of Modern Confucians
and their Modernization Discourses, Chinese University Press, Hong Kong 2016, p. 70.
29
 Z. Mou, Zhongguo zhexuede tezhi, p. 37.
30
 Ivi, p. 40: «知體明覺是道德的實體, 同時亦即是存有倫的實體».
31
 In the Chinese holistic tradition ontology is inseparable from epistemology, as in its
worldview every object of cognition is also cognition itself; the manner of its existence is thus
linked to our understanding of it. Because this connection goes both ways, i.e. their relation
is not a relation of single-sided dependency and determination, but an interaction that in-
cludes mutual co-dependency, we cannot state that this is a solipsistic conceptualization of the
world. The same as for the perception of the existing world holds true also for its perception
and interpretation. This can also not be separated from the wholesome, but changeable and
totally individualized existence of objects of cognition; this is clearly manifested in the theo-
retical system of the so-called onto-hermeneutics (benti quanshi xue), which was developed
by Chung-ying Cheng, a representative of the third generation of Modern New Confucianism:
see O. Ng (ed.), The Imperative of Understanding: Chinese Philosophy, Comparative Philoso­
phy, and Onto-Hermeneutics. A Tribute Volume Dedicated to Professor Chung-ying Cheng,
in «Journal of Chinese Philosophy», vol. 38, n. 1, 2011.
32
 Lee Ming-Huei, (Dangdai ruxuede ziwo zhuanhua, p. 68) ascertained that Mou could not
be considered an expert in Kant’s philosophy, for he did not know understand German, thus his
translations into Chinese were based on the English translations of this philosopher. However,
even if his translations were secondary and thus surely less reliable, we have to admit that Mou’s
comments, with which he equipped them, contributed valuable additions to Kant’s philosophy,
with which he opened quite a few new, philosophically innovative problems and issues.
Double Ontology and the Unemployed God 21

and “things in themselves” and hence, this differentiation represented the ba-
sis of most of his crucial onto-epistemological concepts, including his idea of
“double ontology”. It is precisely the latter concept with which we will begin
our investigation of the specific relationship between Kant and Mou, since it
is tightly linked to Mou’s interpretation of intellectual intuition.

3. Double Ontology

For the Modern New Confucians, modernization was essentially a ra-

tionalization of the world. In their search for its philosophical foundations,
they mainly focused on questions related to ontology, which had been (as a
distinct philosophical discipline) introduced to China by Western systems of
thought33. It was their belief that questions related to the ultimate reality of
the cosmos, the substance of Being and the Absolute determined the meaning
of life and were essential for the creation of a new value system compatible
with both contemporary social conditions and the preservation of an integral
cultural and personal identity.
They looked to ontology as the philosophical discipline that would provide
clear solutions to the problems they faced, and particularly to that of West-
ern modernization, in the conviction that only through a genuine and clear
comprehension of the cosmic substance would modern man be able to find
his spiritual home again. The crucial task, therefore, was to find the “proper”
orientation, meaning a series of new, clearly marked “signposts” that pointed
the way towards modern culture, while also providing the basic criteria for
solving practical problems in the political and economic spheres. Without
such a framework of orientations, society would slip into a general spiritual
malaise in which people and their actions would be determined by the pure-
ly mechanistic laws of technocratic utility. If this were to occur, the compre-
hension of Western thought for the purposes of finding spiritual guidelines
for the modernization already underway would necessarily remain fragmen-
tary, incoherent,and superficial, and would therefore not only be incapable
of enriching the Chinese spiritual world but would actually accelerate the
processes of spiritual disorder and alienation34.
In this context, Mou Zongsan developed the concept of double or a two-­
level ontology. This is a notion that divides the realm of existence into the nou-

33
 Traditional Chinese philosophy did not develop ontology as a discipline that deals with
questions of existence in the sense of Being and its diverse forms. The reason for this lies in the
fact that, in its very nature, Chinese philosophy is a processual philosophy of flux and continuous
change. This fact has also been reflected in the Chinese language, which does not include any
direct and comprehensive counterpart for the verb “to be”. However, as we shall see below,
this does not imply that Chinese philosophy did not exhaustively deal with questions related to
the ultimate nature of existence.
34
 J. Rošker, The Rebirth of the Moral Self, p. 42.
22 Jana Rošker

menal and phenomenal, or (in Mou’s words) into “attached” and “detached”
ontology. Within these two ontologies (or these two ontological realms), he
defines detachment and attachment as follows: «“Detached” corresponds to
“the free and unlimited heart-mind” […]. “Attached” corresponds to the “at-
tachment of the cognitive subject”»35.
Confucian metaphysics, which inter alia preconditions the noumenal realm
of this double ontology, is understood as not only «detached» (wuzhi 無執) but
also «transcendent [chaoyue 超越]»36. A metaphysics of this kind is possible
due to intellectual intuition (zhide zhijue 智的直覺). Hence, the «detached
ontology» corresponds to the free and unlimited heart-mind (ziyoude wuxian
xin 自由的無線心)37. Parallel to this ontology of detachment is the «attached
ontology». Thus, both the «detached» and «attached» ontology are linked to
the cognitive subject or cognitive perception.
From the above quotation, we have also seen that the cognitive subject
has two dimensions, the limited (finite), and the unlimited (infinite) one. This
double nature of the subject preconditions Mou’s two-level ontology:

If we start from the assumption that “a human being is finite as well as infinite”,
we must apply ontology on two levels. The first is the ontology of the noumenal
sphere, or the “detached ontology”. The second is the ontology of the sphere of
appearances, or the “attached ontology”.38

With this idea, Mou aimed to answer the question that was raised by Hei-
degger in the last chapter of his book Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,
in which he wrote:

Does it make sense and is it justifiable to think that man, because his finitude
makes an ontology, i.e., a comprehension of Being necessary to him, is “creative”
and therefore “infinite” when nothing is so radically opposed to ontology as the
idea of an infinite being?39

According to Mou, the ontology that Heidegger had in mind was a «phe-
nomenal ontology»40. In such an approach, this was the only ontology, because

35
 Z. Mou, Zhongguo zhexuede tezhi, p. 39: «“無執” 是相應 “自由的無線心” […] “執”
是相應 “識心之執” 而言».
36
 Ibidem.
37
 The Neo-Confucian idealistic philosopher Wang Yangming (1472-1529) called this type
of cognitive perception a «clear understanding of the substance of knowledge» (zhiti mingjue
知體明覺).
38
 Z. Mou, Zhongguo zhexuede tezhi, p. 30: «我們以 “人雖有限而可無線”, 需要兩層存有論,
本體界的存有論, 此亦曰 “無執的存有論”, 以及現象界的存有論, 此亦曰 “執的存有論”».
39
 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. by J.S. Churchill, Indiana
University Press, Bloomington 1965, p. 254.
40
 Z. Mou, Xianxiang yu wu zishen 現象與物自身 (Appearance and the Thing-in-itself),
Xuesheng shuju, Taipei 1990, p. 30.
Double Ontology and the Unemployed God 23

absolutely infinite beings (such as, for instance, God) do not need an ontology.
The same applies for the noumenon as such. However, if we proceed from hu-
man beings, who are «finite, but at the same time, also infinite», we do need a
double ontology. Such beings cannot remain confined to an existence limited
to the sphere of phenomena, but on the other hand, they are not absolutely
and solely infinite. Therefore, they also need a noumenal ontology, because
it is precisely the noumenon that is their substance and that preconditions
their specific being. Hence, without a noumenal realm, without a substance,
human beings could not become truly creative and, hence, infinite41. This
is nevertheless a higher kind of being, a «real being» – not one that is limit-
ed to the phenomenal realm42. Mou believed that ontology of human beings
has to correspond this double nature or double dimension of their existence.
In this way, Mou constructed his “two-leveled ontology”. His double on-
tology was based on certain Buddhist approaches. As we have seen, the first
level refers to the empirical, and the second to the transcendent realm. Both
levels are part of the one and the same reality, which is composed of two as-
pects. In delineating the fundamental features of this model, Mou was in-
spired by the Mahayana Buddhist text The Awakening of the Faith (Da cheng
qi xin lun 大乘起信論) and its central supposition, according to which «one
mind can open two gates» (Yi xin kai er men 一心開二門). This implies that
the subject of recognition has access to two approaches to this reality. On the
other hand, Mou simultaneously based his idea of “double ontology” on the
Kantian distinction between phenomena and “things in themselves”. Nev-
ertheless, the human mind’s ability to connect the two realms of his double
ontology, and to achieve the possibility of the unification of goodness and hap-
piness, is closely connected to its access to intellectual intuition.

4. From summum bonum to Human Intellectual Intuition

In his work, On summum bonum (Yuan shan lun 圓善論), Mou Zongsan
examines Kant’s moral philosophy, and its conclusion that happiness and the
ultimate good (summum bonum; yuan shan圓善) are impossible to achieve
on earth, and can only exist in the perfection of God’s world. In this context
Mou emphasized the value and contribution of practical philosophy, upon
which traditional Chinese – especially Confucian – philosophy is based. This
discourse is focused on the earthly life, on the here and now, in which there
is no need to escape into other, “supernatural” worlds. Of course, even Chi-
nese philosophy could not “save” Kant’s summum bonum problem; nonethe-
less, in his work with the same title, Mou exposes certain problems linked
to the elaboration of this question in Western, especially Kantian discourses.

 Ibidem.
41

 Ibidem.
42
24 Jana Rošker

According to Liu Shu-hsien43, the Chinese people know only too well that,
in real life, happiness and the good rarely go together. However, in his Yuan
shan lun Mou Zongsan showed that the Chinese people need not look forward
to another worldly kingdom of God. No matter what happens in human lives
and how imperfect the earthly world is, human beings can always find fulfil-
ment here. Consequently, they can always find fulfilment in non-fulfilment.
In such a view, the summum bonum is realized here and now44, and there is
no need to look for a kingdom of God in the other world.
Mou took Kant to task for the artificial division of the three essential pos-
tulates of practical mind, i.e. free will, the immortality of the soul, and the
existence of God. In Mou’s view, all three postulates are infinite and absolute.
Since it is impossible for multiple, infinite, and absolute entities to coexist,
the three postulates are, in fact, a single substance, that can be epitomized
in the term original heart-mind (ben xin 本心), which is one of the forms of
the infinite heart-mind (wuxiande zhixin 無限的知心)45. This infinite heart-
mind is simultaneously a basic constitution of the moral Self that is expressed
through the natural moral substance (xingti 性體) and unites in itself all three
aforementioned postulates.

As soon as the infinite perception of substance materializes within me, free will,
immortality, and God can no longer exist.46

Mou concludes that the moral Self, or original heart-mind, which is its es-
sence, offers the only real possibility for merging happiness and goodness47.
Mou’s saw Kant as “entangled” with the idea of God, and this idea constituted
a superfluous and disturbing element in his theoretical system. Kant should
have eliminated God, as in all other coherent moral philosophies (e.g. Bud-
dhism). According to Kant, given that the world was created by God, it could

43
 S. Liu, Mou Zongsan (Mou Tsung-san), in A.S. Cua (ed.), Encyclopedia of Chinese Phi-
losophy, Routledge, London-New York 2003, pp. 480-485: p. 485.
44
 See K. Huang, Dissemination and Reterritorialization: Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and
the Renovation of Contemporary Confucian Philosophy, in «Asian Studies», vol. 8, n. 3, 2020,
pp. 15-33: p. 27; https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2020.8.3.15-33.
45
 Mou also finds notions similar to the original heart-mind (ben xin 本心) in the Daoist
(heart-mind of the Way – dao xin 道心) and Buddhist (empty heart-mind – kong xin 空心)
discourses. He understands these three terms as various forms or manners of naming the infinite
(or unlimited) heart-mind (wuxiande zhixin 無限的知心, Z. Mou, Yuanshan lun 圓善論 (On
summum bonum), Jilin chuban jituan zouxian zeren gongsi, Changchun 2010, pp. 198-205).
This pure, primary and unlimited heart-mind is a form of heritage with which every person
is born. Unfortunately – at least in Mou’s opinion – most of us do not know how to preserve
it. A human being who manages to preserve it becomes a Confucian sage (sheng ren 聖人), a
Daoistic truly perfected man (zhen ren 真人) or a Buddha.
46
 Z. Mou, Zhongguo zhexuede tezhi, p. 45: «當吾人展露一唯一的本體無線心時, 吾人即
不復有自由, 不朽, 以及上帝存在, 這三者之並列».
47
 See Z. Mou, Yuan shan lun, pp. 334-335.
Double Ontology and the Unemployed God 25

not change in accordance with the moral development of man. Kant was thus
unable to explain the idea of summum bonum.
Contrary to current views of Confucianism as authoritarian, Mou argued
convincingly that moral autonomy was implicit in Confucian philosophy48.
Even Kant was inadequate in this case. Limited by his Christian background,
Kant treated free will as a postulate of practical reason, which in this system
is necessarily linked to the religious notions of the immortality of the soul and
the existence of God. Hence, he could only establish a metaphysics of morals
or, at best, a moral theology, but never a moral metaphysics. Mou felt that the
Chinese tradition went further than Kant in this respect49.
In Mou’s later years, it became increasingly clear that his philosophical
approach presupposed a moral metaphysics. As he clearly demonstrates in
his work, Nineteen Lectures in Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexue shijiu
jiang), this approach is also the main starting point of classic Confucian phi-
losophy50. Like most Modern Confucians, he believed that the traditional
Tian 天 (Nature, Heaven) concept represented the origins of everything that
exists, or the reason because of which all things exist51. The merger of self
with this proto-origin of all that exists can only take place through the infinite
heart-mind, i.e. when one allows the effects of their innate moral substance
(xingti) to take control. When this takes place, one intuitively comes to know
their true self (neibude zhijue, 內部的直覺)52. This experience or discovery
is not a concept, nor is it the result of dialectical reasoning. However, this
moral Self, or self-intuition, which pours out spontaneously from one’s in-
ner self, also – through its conscious awareness – permeates everything else
that exists53, for

it is omni-inclusive and the source of everything. It not only determines each in-
dividual’s moral behavior, but also the existence of every plant and tree.54

In this context, Mou’s views regarding the existence of the concept of au-
tonomy within traditional Chinese or Confucian thought is of particular im-
portance, for he thereby refutes one of the key arguments of the May 4th

48
 Z. Mou, Cong Lu Xiangshan dao Liu Jishan 從陸象山到劉蕺山 (From Lu Xiangshan to
Liu Jishan), Xuesheng shuju, Taibei 1979, p. 224.
49
 See Z. Mou, Yuan shan lun, pp. 330-335.
50
 See Z. Mou, Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang 中國哲學十九講, Xuesheng shuju, Taibei
1983, pp. 71-76.
51
 Ivi, p. 75.
52
 Z. Mou, Zhide zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexue 智的直覺與中國哲學, Shangwu yinshuguan,
Taibei 2006, p. 132.
53
 Z. Mou, Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang, p. 200: «本心仁體的誠明自照照他 (自覺覺他)
之活動».
54
 Z. Mou, Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang, p. 191: «他是涵蓋乾坤, 為一切存在之源的.
不但吾人之道的行為由他而來, 即一草一木, 一切存在… 因而有其存在».
26 Jana Rošker

movement55, which posited that personal autonomy was necessarily linked

to individualism. In other words, Mou Zongsan demonstrates that Mencius’s
concept of innate morality (renyi neizai 仁義內在) corresponds to Kant’s un-
derstanding of autonomy56.
This conclusion is significant, for it shows that Weber’s criticism of Con-
fucianism is mistaken, rooted as it is in a misapprehension of the core tenets
of Chinese philosophy. In Weber’s view (and Hegel’s before him), Confu-
cianism was a kind of folk morality that did not offer any potential for spec-
ulative philosophy. In such a misleading view, it was basically an uncreative
ideology that merely helped people adapt to the conditions of the external
world. Instead, Mou’s analysis unmasks the considerable bias and prejudice
implicit in these views.
The emphasis on ethical issues, which is characteristic of modern Confu-
cianism, is clearly evident throughout Mou Zongsan’s work. However, Mou
did not consider moral philosophy to be the only priority of ancient Chinese
thought. He argued forcefully against the idea that Confucianism is con-
cerned merely with morality and has nothing to do with existence57. Moreo-
ver, he believed that Confucian morality implied a moral metaphysics, that
is, a metaphysics based on morality58.
In his view, all three classic central Chinese philosophical discourses deal
with metaphysics in various ways. However, they all are based upon a mental
level, which surpasses mere rational recognition:

Regardless of whether we are referring to Daoism, Confucianism, or even Bud-

dhism, which entered these discourses much later, their most significant teach-
ings all go beyond rational intellect. This means that insights and recognitions
that in Western philosophy could only be obtained through divine consciousness,
the Chinese sages view as attainable by the human mind.59

The contrast between finite and infinite does not mean that Mou thought
both areas needed be excluded, but that ultimately there are two perspec-
tives that are aimed at the same reality and that therefore require two differ-
ent, but not mutually exclusive, forms of knowledge. The form of the finite is
characterized by empirical recognition or the cognitive mind. Mou denoted
the form of knowledge that characterizes the infinite realm of noumena with

55
 This was a Chinese cultural and political movement that grew out of student protests in
Beijing on May 4th, 1919. Its main orientation was anti-imperialist, but due to its anti-traditional
orientation, it is also often seen as the Chinese Enlightenment movement.
56
 See Z. Mou, Yuan shan lun, pp. 1-58.
57
 See Z. Mou, Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang, p. 71.
58
 Z. Mou, Xianxiang yu wu zishen, p. 37.
59
 Z. Mou, Wushi zishu 五十自述, Penghu chuban she, Tabei 1989, p. 527: «無論道家, 儒家,
深者後來所加入佛教, 皆在此超知性一層上大顯精彩, 其用心幾全幅都在此. 西方所認為只
能屬於神心者, 而中國聖哲則認為在人心即可轉出之».
Double Ontology and the Unemployed God 27

the term “intellectual intuition”. In Mou’s view, it is not only a comprehen-

sive method for the recognition of reality, but also an all-embracing source
of everything that exists.
Mou’s interpretation leads to a positive interpretation of the thing-in-it-
self and intellectual intuition, although both concepts have but the func-
tion of a “negative concept” within the critique of pure reason. According
to Mou, however, both the realms of the finite and infinite emerge from the
subject and can hence be developed in a positive sense. Although Kant re-
jects human beings’ ability to possess and apply intellectual intuition60 and
ascribes this ability to God alone, the three major teachings of Chinese phi-
losophy, namely Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism, all admit that hu-
mankind has intellectual intuition, for humans are not only finite, but also
infinite subjects.
It thus becomes clear that Mou Zongsan accepted Kant’s system merely
as a good analysis of our finite aspect; that is, our experience as beings limit-
ed in space and time, as well as in understanding. However, Mou saw Kant
as having overlooked the fact that, in our pursuit of intellectual intuition, we
exceed our limitations.
Mou argued that Kant’s refusal to consider intellectual intuition had ex-
tensive implications, for without the integration of this concept into his epis-
temology, Kant’s entire construct of the autonomous subject would collapse,
while the metaphysical construct of the world and of human existence also
rests on very fragile foundations. The same was true for Eastern thought,
for without this concept traditional Chinese philosophy would likewise be
deprived of its ideational foundation. The concept of human intellectual in-
tuition thus occupies the center of Mou’s philosophy. As Sébastien Billioud
writes61, this concept underpins both his interpretation of Chinese philoso-
phy, and his critique and superseding of Kant’s thought. Hence, Mou writes:

If we do not recognize that human beings in their limited existence possess the
possibility of intellectual intuition then, given Kant’s interpretation of the signifi-
cance and function of such intuition, all of Chinese philosophy is impossible. And
not only this, but Kant’s entire moral philosophy would also become a hollow dis-
course. But there is no way I can resign myself to this fact. Thus, by means of the
Chinese philosophical tradition, we must establish the conditions for the possi-
bility of human intellectual intuition.62

60
 In his Critique of Pure Reason, for instance, Kant wrote: «Those transcendental questions,
however, that go beyond nature, we will never be to answer, even if all of nature is revealed to
us, since it is never given to us to observe our own any other intuition that of our inner sense»
(I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. by P. Guyer and A.W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press., 1998, pp. 375-376; B 334).
61
 S. Billioud, Thinking Through Confucian Modernity. A Study of Mou Zongsan's Moral
Metaphysics, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2012, p. 70.
62
 See Z. Mou, Zhide zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexue, p. 2.
28 Jana Rošker

5. The Unemployed God and the Self-negation of the Transcendental Subject

In the introduction to his work On summum bonum (Yuan shan lun), Mou
Zongsan emphasized the value and contributions of the practical philosophy
that defines the Confucian system of ideas. Confucian pragmatics were pri-
marily directed towards “real life” and thus saw no need escape into “super-
natural” worlds. Modern New Confucian critiques of the Western God (but
also the Buddhist concept of Nirvana) are grounded on the problem of alien-
ation as a consequence of the modern development of science and philoso-
phy, which increasingly split knowledge into disciplines and subdisciplines.
This loss of the comprehensive unity of our recognition caused modern indi-
viduals to lose their ability for intuitive holistic insights into the original na-
ture of reality, and their originally divine consciousness. In this context, Mou
Zongsan criticized the very concept of God, due to God’s inability to unite
goodness and happiness.
While Chinese philosophy was neither quite capable of “solving” this prob-
lem, in On summum bonum Mou at least illustrated the problematic nature
of the European, and especially the Kantian philosophical tradition in this
regard. The problem of uniting happiness and goodness can only be resolved
within a holistic philosophy that does not impose any artificial division be-
tween the Self, time, and space. Precisely because Chinese philosophy nev-
er implied the need for attaining transcendence or some “Kingdom of God”,
it could focus its discourses on the refinement of the subject in the world in
which it was embedded, within the actuality of here and now. In short, the
summum bonum can only be realized in the here and now. The need for a
transcendent God condemns this realization to failure in advance63.
In Mou’s system, the idea of God as formulated in Kant’s philosophy is
completely redundant and even disturbing. In fact, the Chinese theorist be-
lieved that Kant should have eliminated God from his theory altogether.
Morality, even of a kind grounded on the autonomy of a higher (infinite)
heart-mind, i.e. on a basis that far surpasses the simple pragmatism of inter-
personal life, does not require any higher force beyond this a-priori reflexive
awareness. It was in this way that the European God became unemployed. If
we stipulate (as Kant did) the creation of the unique and unrepeatable world
in which we live on a static and immutable line of time and space, then this
world, which was “created” by God, cannot be changed or improved, in con-
trast to a human being, who – as a subject – possesses the possibility and ur-
gent need for moral development.
Mou argued that this inconsistency in Kant’s philosophy was due to the
possibility of intellectual intuition being attributed only to God and to divine
consciousness or divine recognition (shende zhixing 神的知性)64.

 See S. Liu, Mou Zongsan, p. 485.

63

 Z. Mou, Zhide zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexue, p. 51.

64
Double Ontology and the Unemployed God 29

According to Kant, due to their limited perceptive potential, human be-

ings cannot gain access to this kind of reason. For Mou, this “theoretical in-
consistency” was fraught with far-reaching consequences, for if intellectual
intuition were indeed limited to the domain of God, and if human beings were
a priori completely separated from it, then Kant’s entire theoretical system
was logically inconsistent and could not be validated.
If human consciousness were not infinite in this sense, then it could not
be connected to the moral imperative, which is also infinite. Hence, the cate-
gorical imperative could not figure as the basis of morality65. This meant that,
in its essence, human consciousness had to be equal to divine consciousness,
a supposition that reflected the Neo-Confucian tradition of Modern Confu-
cianism, which was rooted in the Mencian view on the a-priori goodness of
innate human qualities or “human nature”. Mou’s interpretation is thus based
on the view that freedom is a cause and not an effect66; hence, it can limit
other principles, but it cannot be limited by them.
Mou denied the existence of God as a higher force separated from men,
and he viewed Confucianism as a kind of atheistic religion, trying to refute in
this way the widespread prejudice that Confucianism was, in essence, only a
code of regulations prescribing proper moral behavior.
Despite denying the existence of God in the sense of a higher force sep-
arated from men, Mou viewed Confucianism as a kind of religion, albeit an
atheistic one, and tried to refute the widespread prejudice that Confucianism
was, in essence, only a code of regulations prescribing proper moral behav-
ior. While this code certainly implied elements of “primitive” religion, which
were rooted in superstition and the worship of idols, it did not possess any
inner spiritual foundation67. Mou instead argued that:

This mistaken view was a result of the influence of Western missionaries and state
missions, who saw only the external forms of life of the common Chinese people.
They never understood, therefore, that at its spiritual core the Chinese moral ethic
also implies religious feelings. Confucian transcendent religious feelings must not
be confused with superstition, which is widespread among the common people.68

In formal terms, while Confucianism does not include any religious cere­
monies, it still acknowledges the idea of a creator. This creator manifests it-

65
 R. Tang, Mou Zongsan on Intellectual Intuition, in C. Cheng - N. Bunnin (eds.), Con-
temporary Chinese Philosophy, Blackwell, Malden-Oxford 2002, pp. 235-346, p. 333.
66
 See ibidem.
67
 Q. Han 韓強 - G. Zhao 趙光輝, Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing – Gang Tai xin rujia Tang
Junyi yu Mou Zongsande wenhua zhexue 文化意識與道德理性 – 港台新儒家唐君毅與牟宗
三的文化哲學, Liaoning renmin chuban she, Shenyang 1994, p. 165.
68
 Z. Mou, quoted ibidem: «這種錯誤顯然是受了西方傳教士和外交管的影響, 因為他們
只看到中國一般人民生活的外表, 並不理教界了解中國倫理道德在內心精神生活的根據上
包含著宗教感情. 儒家道德的超越宗教感情不同與民間流行的宗教迷信».
30 Jana Rošker

self in the Way of Heaven/Nature (tian dao 天道), which is essentially pure
creativity, similar to the theological God. Where they differ is in the fact that
Confucian creativity is not anthropomorphized. However, Confucianism still
acknowledges the idea of creation or creativity. The Chinese had anthropo-
morphic deities in the periods of the Shang (Yin, ca. 1600-1050 BC) and Zhou
(ca. 1046-256 BC) Dynasties, but Confucius and Mencius transformed this
anthropomorphic form of Heaven (Tian 天) into the concept of the Heavenly
Mandate (Tian ming 天命), which was a moral or ideal concept. The Confu-
cians were thus uninterested in the personification of the Way of Heaven, as
well as in its transformation into an external, anthropomorphic God. Rather
than seeking to establish a symbolic form of creativity, they were looking for
methods for its internalization by the individual69.
Mou also argued that, given that an anthropomorphic God is an ideal con-
struct, it must be illusory:

The reason for God’s ability to create nature is his infinite consciousness. Hence,
it is precisely this attribute that is responsible for existence, while existence also
necessarily implies (or includes) infinite consciousness. But infinite conscious-
ness is not necessarily conditioned by individual (or particular) existence. Thus,
the anthropomorphization of infinite consciousness (and its transformation) into
individual existence is merely a projection of human consciousness and, as such,
is necessarily illusory.70

For most Modern Confucians, ethical systems based on religion actually

belonged to earlier phases of social development, when most individuals were
still unable to establish their inner strength and autonomy, in order to endure
the transience of life and accept their lack of control over the (external) world.
God, as a manifestation of a higher, incomprehensible, and uncontrollable
power that can cause destruction or salvation, appears as a consolatory notion,
and merely as the inverted projection of the individual’s actual state of impo-
tence and their inability to deal with facts that enable, determine and limit
their existence. The need for religion is childlike in the sense that it betrays
a child’s inability to free itself from the care and prohibitions of its parents.
In an ethics based upon the idea of God, the subject cannot be autonomous
in the sense of its truly internalized (or innate) ability to assume ethical re-
sponsibility for its actions. As Mou Zongsan explains:

Existence is perfect and cannot be controlled by us. Likewise, human beings

cannot create existence. Even so, the supposition that “infinite existence” is re-

 Ibidem.
69

 Z. Mou, Xianxiang yu wu zishen, p. 243: «上帝所以能創造自然, 是因為祂的無限的智心,

70

因此, 本是無限的智心擔負存在. 說到存在, 必須涉及無限的智心; 但是無限的智心並非必

是人格化的無限性的個體存有, 是故將此無限的智心人格化而為一個體性存有, 是人的心
的作用, 是有虛幻性的».
Double Ontology and the Unemployed God 31

sponsible for existence, is not necessarily wrong. The problem arises with the per-
sonalization of infinite existence and its transformation into individual existence.71

Precisely due to their access to intellectual intuition, human beings are ca-
pable of overcoming their finiteness and of penetrating into the realm of de-
tached ontology. Intellectual intuition can thus overcome the limited subject
of the ontology of attachment. However, with the mastery of this higher level
of onto-epistemological states of reality, the dialectical process of human re-
alization is not yet complete. The subject subjects itself to forms and catego-
ries in a process that Mou calls the «self-negation» (ziwo kanxian 自我坎陷)
of the transcendental subject. At this lower level of comprehension, which
Mou calls the «cognitive heart-mind» (renzhi xin 認知心), the mind uses em-
pirical intuition and the related cognitive processes to grasp things as discrete
objects that are subjected to causal laws. At this level, objects are separated
from one another and from reason; they are embedded into particular tem-
poral and spatial positions and possess numerical identities. However, the
self-negation of the subject was seen as a temporary phase in a «dialectical
process»72, for if the static, primary position of morality precluded a recogni-
tion of the full plurality of knowledge, its total absence would have devastat-
ing consequences for society, which would become like «a lone boat without
a compass, tossed in a stormy, limitless sea»73. In the dialectical process that
linked the possible acquisition of scientific knowledge with axiological regu-
lation (or moral guidance), the moral Self (daode lixing 道德理性) was thus
seen as a «bridge connecting Confucianism with modern democracy»74. For
numerous scholars, this is Mou’s main contribution to Modern Confucian at-
tempts to develop and modernize the seeds of democracy and science already
present within the Chinese intellectual tradition:

When viewed in terms of developing democracy and science, the dialectical devel-
opment of the moral Self is, of course, not the only possibility… But when viewed
in terms of Confucianism, which has been the dominant factor in determining
value systems in Chinese culture, then Mou Zongsan’s theoretical framework of
incorporating democracy via the inner dialectical development of Confucianism

71
 Z. Mou, Yuan shan lun, p. 243: «存在是既成的, 不是我所能掌握的, 人不能創造存在,
這也是對的. 必須肯定一 “無限存在”, 來負責存在, 這也未償不對. 但是這無限存有若人格
化而為一無限性的個體存有, 這卻有問題».
72
 See for instance He Xinquan 何信全, Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu – Dangdai xin rujia
zhengzhizhexue yanjiu 儒學與現代民主 – 當代新儒家政治哲學研究 (Confucianism and the
Modern Democracy. Research in the Political Philosophy of the Contemporary new Confucians),
Zhongyang yanjiu yuan, Taibei 1996, p. 93; some scholars (e.g. A. Van den Stock, The “Learning
of Life”: On Some Motifs in Mou Zongsan’s Autobiography at Fifty, in «Asian Studies», vol. 8,
n. 3, 2020, pp. 35-61: p. 48; https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2020.8.3.35-61) even see this type of
self-negation as a kind of Hegelian sublation.
73
 He Xinquan, Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu, p. 95.
74
 Ivi, p. 97.
32 Jana Rošker

appears very significant for the preservation of China’s long-running national sov-
ereignty.75

However, Mou Zongsan was primarily a philosopher and, as such, he was

the 2nd-generation thinker who dedicated the most effort to creating a new,
active subject that, in his view, was indispensable to developing any kind of
modern science and democracy. His approach here was essentially twofold:
on the one hand, seeking to renew the subject based on the fundamental as-
sumptions and tendencies of Confucian philosophy, while at the same time
correcting certain deficiencies in the concept of the subject, as found in Ger-
man classical philosophy. He did this by focusing on three fundamental at-
tributes that constitute the indispensable features of this concept, i.e. reason,
essential for the development of science, and free will and autonomy, as the
two elements that underpin democracy. In spite of the Buddhist and Kantian
inspirations, Mou’s approach represents a dialectical model that can only be
understood and explained within the classical Chinese referential framework
of process philosophy, determined by dynamic correlative complementarity.

6. Conclusion

Mou Zongsan criticizes Kant for denying human beings what Kant called
intellectual intuition (intellektuelle Anschauung)76. Through his “humanistic”
interpretation of intellectual intuition, Mou Zongsan showed that the nature
or the very foundation of Kant’s metaphysics of morality was a religious one.
In contrast to such a theological system, he saw Confucianism as providing a
system of morality that had its own religiousness or sense of transcendence
in terms of a forceful form of moral life, its practice, and its reflective think-
ing on humanity77. On the basis of his double ontology, Mou ascribes to hu-
man beings a divine consciousness in the form of intellectual intuition, even
though Kant himself would certainly find this highly problematic78, because
he insists on a strict distinction between intuition (Anschauung) and under-
standing (Verstand)79, and does not allow for any kind of immediate or “in-

 Ivi, pp. 97-98.
75

 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, cit., p. 361 (B 309).

76
77
 C. Cheng, Religious Foundation of Morality and Religiousness of Moral Practice: Kant
and Confucianism, in «Journal of Chinese Philosophy», vol. 41, n. 1, 2016, pp. 567-586: p. 567.
78
 C.H. Wenzel, Beauty in Kant and Confucius, p. 95.
79
 Kant made this undoubtedly clear already in the beginning of his Groundwork for the
Metaphysics of Morals: «I here ask only whether the nature of the science does not require the
empirical part always to be carefully separated from the rational, placing ahead of a genuine
(empirical) physics a metaphysics of nature, and ahead of practical anthropology a metaphysics
of morals, which must be carefully cleansed of everything empirical, in order to know how much
pure reason could achieve in both cases; and from these sources pure reason itself creates its
teachings a priori, whether the latter enterprise be carried on by all teachers of morals (whose
Double Ontology and the Unemployed God 33

tuitive understanding” or “intellectual intuition”. By allowing human beings

access to this kind of noumenal understanding, Mou reveals, on the one hand,
certain aspects of traditional Chinese philosophy that are not quite compati-
ble with the Kantian theory (and neither with other philosophies embedded
into the referential framework of modern European philosophical theory).
Indeed, Gregory Reihman80 is not alone in his observation, which leads to the
following conclusion: «If Chinese philosophy is right, then much of Kantian
philosophy is impossible». On the other hand, Mou Zongsan also observed the
opposite case and he stated that if Kant was right, then Chinese philosophy
was impossible81. If we take into consideration the basic paradigms of these
two discourses, however, it might be possible to see them as a source of inter-
cultural inventiveness. Indeed, in spite of their mutual incompatibility they
can simultaneously exist in two different, separate frameworks of reference.
Although these two systems are basically incompatible, it might be easier to
understand Kant from the viewpoint of Chinese philosophy than vice-versa,
because the referential framework embedding Chinese philosophy is root-
ed in a processual and dynamic changeability82, while the former is basically
static. As we all know, dynamic systems can incorporate the static ones, but
this does not apply the other way around. In this sense, a different reconcil-
iation can be reached, but one that is limited to the level of comprehension
and cannot be applied as a basis for a unified theoretical system. However,
we might ask ourselves whether it is not precisely this very level that – due
to its openness and due to the fact that it is not bounded to any borderlines
mutually delimiting different systematic theories – can open up possibilities
of transcultural and genuinely new philosophical dialogues, which are needed

name is legion) or only by some who feel they have a calling for it» (I. Kant, Groundwork for
the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and transl. by A.W. Wood, Yale University Press, New Haven
2002, p. 5).
80
 G. Reihman, Categorically Denied: Kant’s Criticism of Chinese Philosophy, in «Journal
of Chinese Philosophy», vol. 41, n. 1, 2006, pp. 52-65: p. 61.
81
 See Z. Mou, Zhide zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexue, p. 2. M.C. Fistioc, Mou Zongsan and
Kant on Intellectual Intuition, in S.R. Palmquist (ed.), Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian
Philosophy, de Gruyter, Berlin-New York 2010, pp. 585-591, proposes that the two systems
could be reconciled, for discursive (or conceptual) understanding, which is given to human
beings according to Kant, imitates intuitive understandings, which are, as we have seen, only a
part of God’s all-embracing and complete comprehension of reality: «While Kant does indeed
claim that human beings have only a discursive understanding, he also characterizes such a
discursive understanding as attempting to approximate an intuitive one. Human beings, one
might say, have “as if” intuitive understanding» (ivi, pp. 585-586). In her view, such an “imitation”
is the reconciliation between Mou Zongsan’s and Kant’s positions. Despite my general sympathy
towards reconciliations and harmonizations, I am quite sure that this is a compromise Mou
Zongsan would not be willing to accept, because for him, intellectual intuition is perfect and
as such a fundamental basis and the necessary condition for his double ontology, as well as his
Summum bonum project.
82
 This is also the reason for the mutual, non-contradictive nature of finite and infinite
aspects of the human mind.
34 Jana Rošker

today more than at any other time in our past. On this basis, we could perhaps
understand that, precisely because of their mutual incompatibility, Kant and
Mou together can serve as a challenging inspiration, indicating a new form
of interculturally conditioned dialectics that can sublate seemingly unsolva-
ble contradictions into new insights.
Double Ontology and the Unemployed God 35

Abstract

The present article deals with a Chinese transformation of Kant’s meta-

physics of morality. It analyses Mou Zongsan’s view on intellectual intuition,
which is, in his system, not merely a form of purely transcendental and ex-
ternal divine consciousness, but also a human trait and possession. The ar-
ticle reveals the structure – and the consequences – of this transformation,
which is based upon Mou’s concept of the so-called double ontology. It opens
by introducing the processes of Kant’s reception in China and illuminating
the reasons for the immense interest showed by Chinese scholars in Kant’s
philosophy, especially his ethics. It focuses on the interpretations of this phi-
losophy elaborated by the representatives of the 20th-century Modern Con-
fucian movement and places Mou’s work into the context of this Confucian
revival, but also reveals some Buddhist elements that enabled him to con-
struct intellectual intuition as a crucial point connecting the noumenal and
phenomenal ontology.

Keywords: intellectual intuition, Mou Zongsan, Immanuel Kant, Modern

Confucianism, double ontology.