3- Jurisdiction and powers

1.1 Jurisdiction and powers of courts...............................................................................................................1

1.1.1 High Court.......................................................................................................................................................................1
1.1.2 District Court...................................................................................................................................................................2
1.1.3 Magistrate’s Court..........................................................................................................................................................3
1.1.4 Registrar..........................................................................................................................................................................4

1.2 Transfer of proceedings.............................................................................................................................4

1.2.1 Transfer of classes of proceedings..................................................................................................................................4
1.2.2 Transfer of proceedings..................................................................................................................................................5
1.2.3 Transfer of proceedings involving counterclaims...........................................................................................................6
1.2.4 Transfer after interlocutory judgment............................................................................................................................8
1.2.5 Costs consequences – for proceeding in the wrong courts **Must consider on top of transfer courts....................10

1.3 Inherent power........................................................................................................................................11

1.3.1 Vexatious proceedings..................................................................................................................................................15
1.3.2 Irregularities..................................................................................................................................................................18

Difference between jurisdiction and powers: Jurisdiction is authority to hear and determine dispute VS Re Nalpon
Power is capacity to give effect to determination of dispute by making orders/granting reliefs Zero
Geraldo
 Difference: The jurisdiction of a court is its authority to hear and determine a dispute brought before it.
Mario
The powers of a court constitute its capacity to give effect to its determination by making or granting
(2013)
the orders or reliefs sought by the successful party. [31] Sir Jack had defined the concept of inherent
SGCA
jurisdiction in terms of a reserve or fund of powers. [28]
 The distinction between jurisdiction and power is recognised in the SCJA. [31] Ss 16 and 17 set out the
circumstances in which the SGHC is seized of jurisdiction. S 18 sets out what the SGHC is empowered to
order to give effect to its determination. [32]
 The so-called inherent jurisdiction of the court is no more than the exercise by the court of its fund of
powers conferred on it by virtue of its institutional role to dispense justice, rather than an inherent
authority to hear and determine a matter. [34]

1.1 Jurisdiction and powers of courts

1.1.1 High Court

General civil jurisdiction of SGHC SCJA, s 16

 The SGHC shall have jurisdiction to hear and try any action in personam where:
o D is served with a writ or other originating process:
 In Singapore in the manner prescribed by Rules of Court; or (s 16(1)(a)(i))
 Outside Singapore in the circumstances authorised by and in the manner prescribed by

1
 Rules of Court; or (s 16(1)(a)(ii))
o D submits to the SGHC’s jurisdiction. (s 16(1)(b))
 Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the SGHC shall have such jurisdiction vested by
any other written law. (s 16(2))

Specific civil jurisdiction of SGHC Without prejudice to the generality of s 16, the SGHC’s civil jurisdiction SCJA, s
shall include: 17(1)
 jurisdiction under any written law relating to divorce and matrimonial causes; (s 17(1)(a))
 jurisdiction under any written law relating to matters of admiralty; (s 17(1)(b))
 jurisdiction under any written law relating to bankruptcy or to companies; (s 17(1)(c))
 jurisdiction to appoint and control guardians of infants and generally over the persons and property
of infants; (s 17(1)(d))
 jurisdiction to appoint and control guardians and keepers for people lacking mental capacity and
their property; (s 17(1)(e))
 jurisdiction to grant probates of wills and testaments, letters of administration of the estates of
deceased persons; and (s 17(1)(f))
 jurisdiction under the Mediation Act 2017 to record a mediated settlement agreement made in a
mediation, in relation to a dispute for which no proceedings have been commenced in court, as an
order of court. (s 17(1)(g))

Concurrent civil jurisdiction of SGHC with Syariah Court in certain matters SCJA, s 17A

Powers of SGHC SCJA, s 18

 The SGHC shall have such powers vested by any written law. (s 18(1))
 Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the SGHC shall have power to:
o Issue prerogative orders; (s 18(2) read with First Schedule, para 1)
o Grant injunctions for:
 Interim preservation of property; (s 18(2) read with First Schedule, para 5(a))
 Preservation of evidence; and (s 18(2) read with First Schedule, para 5(b))
 Preservation of assets for satisfaction of judgment; (s 18(2) read with First Schedule, para
5(c))
o Extend time; (s 18(2) read with First Schedule, para 7)
o Stay proceedings by reason for res judicata, multiplicity of proceedings or forum non
conveniens; (s 18(2) read with First Schedule, para 9)
o Order discovery; (s 18(2) read with First Schedule, para 12)
o Award costs; and (s 18(2) read with First Schedule, para 13)
o Grant remedies at law and in equity. (s 18(2) read with First Schedule, para 14)

1.1.2 District Court

General civil jurisdiction of SGDC
SCA, s 19
 The SGDC shall have the jurisdiction as the SGHC to hear and try any action in personam where:
o D is served with a writ or other originating process:
 In Singapore in the manner prescribed by Rules of Court; or (s 19(2)(a)(i))
 Outside Singapore in the circumstances authorised by and in the manner prescribed by
Rules of Court; or (s 19(2)(a)(ii))
o D submits to the SGDC’s jurisdiction. (s 19(2)(b))
 Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the SGDC shall have such jurisdiction vested
2
 by any other written law. (s 19(6))
General rule: SGDC limit is $250k
SCA, s 19(4)
 An SGDC has no jurisdiction where:
read with s 2
o The amount claimed in an action exceeds the SGDC limit; or (s 19(4)(a))
o Any remedy or relief sought in an action is in respect of a subject-matter whose value exceeds
the SGDC limit. (s 19(4)(b))
 “District Court limit” means $250,000. (s 2)
Note: The President (of Singapore) may, after consulting the Chief Justice, by order vary the SGDC limit
mentioned in any of the foregoing provisions. (SCA, s 30) But the President has not varied it (with the
exception of SCA, s 28) (State Courts (Variation of District Court Limit) Order). ( Here is the main
difference with the High Court)
Exception 1: Equity cases where claim amount is ≤$250k, even though subject-matter’s value exceeds SCA, s 26
$250k
 The SGDC has jurisdiction to hear equity cases where the claim amount is within the SGDC limit,
even if the subject-matter’s value exceeds the SGDC limit.

Exception 2: Where P abandons claim amount over $250k SCA, s 22

 Where the amount claimed in an action exceeds the SGDC limit, or any remedy or relief sought in
an action in respect of a subject-matter whose value exceeds the SGDC limit, P may abandon the
excess amount or the remedy or relief (because he is worried about the cost in the high court), and
thereupon the SGDC shall have jurisdiction, provided that:
o P shall not recover in the action an amount exceeding the SGDC limit; and (s 22(1)(a))
o P shall not obtain any remedy or relief in respect of a subject-matter whose value exceeds the
SGDC limit. (s 22(1)(b))
 The judgment of the SGDC shall be in full discharge of all demands in respect of the cause of action.
(s 22(2))

Exception 3: Where parties agree that SGDC has jurisdiction (even though claim amount is >$250k) SCA, s 23
 Where the parties to an action agree, by a memorandum signed by them or their solicitors, an
SGDC shall have jurisdiction notwithstanding that:
o The amount claimed in the action exceeds the SGDC limit; or (s 23(a))
o Any remedy or relief sought in the action is in respect of a subject-matter whose value exceeds
the SGDC limit. (s 23(b))

Powers of SGDC same as powers of SGHC (as regards any action within SGDC jurisdiction) SCA, s 31

1.1.3 Magistrate’s Court

General civil jurisdiction of SGMC SCA, s 52(1)

 The SGMC shall have the jurisdiction as the SGHC to hear and try any action in personam where:
o D is served with a writ or other originating process:
 In Singapore in the manner prescribed by Rules of Court; or (s 52(1)(a)(i))
 Outside Singapore in the circumstances authorised by and in the manner prescribed by
Rules of Court; or (s 52(1)(a)(ii))
o D submits to the SGMC’s jurisdiction. (s 52(1)(b))

SGMC limit is $60k SCA, ss

3
 52(1A)(b)–
52(1A)(c)
 An SGMC has no jurisdiction where:
read with s 2
o The amount claimed in an action exceeds the SGMC limit; or (s 52(1A)(b))
o Any remedy or relief sought in the action, in addition or as an alternative to the amount
claimed in the action, is in respect of a subject-matter the value of which exceeds the
Magistrate’s Court limit. (s 52(1A)(c))
 “Magistrate’s Court limit” means $60,000. (s 2)
Note: The President (of Singapore) may, after consulting the Chief Justice, by order vary the SGMC limit
mentioned in any of the foregoing provisions. (SCA, s 52(3)) But the President has not varied it (State
Courts (Variation of Magistrate’s Court Limit) Order).

SGMC also has no jurisdiction if there is no claim of money Note: SGMC can hear mixed claims (of SCA, s 52(1A)
money and non-monetary reliefs). You can bring a claim for property and you can have a non-monetary (a)
claim as well

Powers of SGMC same as SGHC and SGDC (subject to same limitations and provisions applicable to SCA, ss
SGDC) 52(1B)–52(2)

1.1.4 Registrar

The Registrar of the Supreme Court generally has the same jurisdiction and powers as an HCJ in O 32 r 9(1)
chambers
 The Registrar of the Supreme Court shall have power to transact all such business and exercise all
such authority and jurisdiction under any written law as may be transacted and exercised by a Judge
in Chambers except such business, authority and jurisdiction as the Chief Justice may from time to
time direct to be transacted or exercised by a Judge in person or as may by any of these Rules be
expressly directed to be transacted or exercised by a Judge in person.
 Registrar (includes deputy/assistant registrars) generally is the adjudicator of interlocutory
applications. However, he will not adjudicate where the Chief Justice directs that the matter be Pinsler slide
presided over by a judge. 87
 As a general rule, applications for an injunction are normally heard by a judge in chambers.

The Registrar of the State Courts generally has the same jurisdiction and powers as a DJ/Magistrate O 32 r 9(2)
in chambers read with r
9(1)
 Rule 1 shall apply in relation to the jurisdiction of the Registrar of the State Courts.

 “Judge” means a judge of the High Court or a District Judge and includes, in cases where he is O1r4
empowered to act, a Magistrate or the Registrar, as the case may require. (O 1 r 4(1))
 “Court” means the High Court or a District Court, or a judge of the High Court or District Judge,
whether sitting in Court or in Chambers, and includes, in cases where he is empowered to act, a
Magistrate or the Registrar. (O 1 r 4(2))

1.2 Transfer of proceedings

1.2.1 Transfer of classes of proceedings

CJ may transfer (but has not transferred) classes of proceedings from SGHC to SGDC SCJA, s

4
  The Chief Justice may, where he considers it necessary or expedient to improve efficiency in the 28A(1)
administration of justice and to provide for more speedy disposal of proceedings commenced in the
High Court, by order direct such class or classes or description of proceedings as may be specified in
the order to be heard and determined by the District Court or Family Court.
Note: The CJ has not made any order.

CJ may transfer (but has not transferred) classes of proceedings from SGDC to SGHC SCA, s 41(1)
 The Chief Justice may, where he considers it necessary or expedient to improve efficiency in the
administration of justice and to provide for more speedy disposal of proceedings commenced in the
District Courts, by order direct such class or classes or description of proceedings as may be
specified in the order to be heard and determined by the High Court.
Note: The CJ has not made any order.

1.2.2 Transfer of proceedings

1.2.2.1 Magistrate’s Court to District Court

SGDC may, on application, transfer from SGMC to SGDC for sufficient reason SCA, s
54A(1)
 Where it appears to a District Court, on the application of a party to any civil proceedings pending in
a Magistrate’s Court, that the proceedings, by reason of its involving some important question of
law, or being a test case, or for any other sufficient reason, should be tried in the District Court, it
may order the proceedings to be transferred to the District Court.

1.2.2.2 District Court to Magistrate’s Court

SGDC may, on application, transfer from SGDC to SGMC for sufficient reason and if within SGMC limit SCA, s
54D(1)
 A party to any civil proceedings pending in the District Court may for any sufficient reason at any time
apply to the District Court for an order that the proceedings be transferred to a Magistrate’s Court. (s
54D(1))
 The District Court may, on application, order that the proceedings be transferred accordingly
notwithstanding any other provision of this Act. (s 54D(2))
 An order may only be made if the value of the claim had been within the Magistrate’s Court limit. (s
54D(3))

SGDC may, on its own motion, transfer from SGDC to SGMC if within SGMC limit SCA, s
54D(2)
 The District Court may, on its own motion, order that the proceedings be transferred accordingly
notwithstanding any other provision of this Act. (s 54D(2))
 An order may only be made if the value of the claim had been within the Magistrate’s Court limit. (s
54D(3))

1.2.2.3 District Court/Magistrate’s Court to High Court

SGHC may, on application, transfer from SGDC/SGMC to SGHC for sufficient reason SCA, s
54B(1)
 Where it appears to the High Court, on the application of a party to any civil proceedings pending in a
State Court, that the proceedings, by reason of its involving some important question of law, or being a
test case, or for any other sufficient reason, should be tried in the High Court, it may order the

5
 proceedings to be transferred to the High Court.

Intended enforcement overseas is sufficient reason for transfer to SGHC SCA, s 54B,
Explanation
 The intended enforcement overseas of any judgment obtained in the High Court, under any
enforcement arrangements currently in force, would ordinarily be sufficient reason for transferring the
proceedings to the High Court.
Note: S 54B (including the Explanation thereto) was added after Cheong Ghim Fah.

Facts: P sued in SGHC and recovered $217k. P argued that: (1) it reasonably supposed that it could Cheong
recover $300k-$400k; (2) it intended to enforce judgment in Malaysia; (3) there were (allegedly) Ghim Fah
interesting and difficult points of law and fact. (2004)
SGHC
Held: (+) SGHC costs awarded.
 It was appropriate to initiate proceedings in the SGHC. If a (State Court) judgment cannot be enforced
as a foreign judgment in another jurisdiction, this could be a sufficient reason for initiating the action in
the SGHC. [15] > Because proceedings may not even have ended because there might be an appeal

1.2.2.4 High Court to District Court/Magistrate’s Court

SGHC may, on application, transfer from SGHC to SGDC/SGMC for sufficient reason and if within SCA, s
SGDC/SGMC limit 54C(1)
 A party to any civil proceedings pending in the High Court may for any sufficient reason at any time
apply to the High Court for an order that the proceedings be transferred to a State Court. (s 54C(1))
 The High Court may, on application, order that the proceedings be transferred accordingly
notwithstanding any other provision of this Act. (s 54C(2))
 An order may only be made if the value of the claim had been within the District Court or
Magistrate’s Court limit. (s 54C(3))

SGDC may, on its own motion, transfer from SGDC to SGMC if within SGMC limit SCA, s
54C(2)
 The High Court may, on its own motion, order that the proceedings be transferred accordingly
notwithstanding any other provision of this Act. (s 54C(2))
 An order may only be made if the value of the claim had been within the Magistrate’s Court limit. (s
54C(3))

Intended enforcement overseas can prevent transfer to SGDC/SGMC SCA, s 54C,

Explanation
 The fact that the proceedings fall within the civil jurisdiction of the State Courts would not, by itself,
ordinarily constitute sufficient reason for transferring the proceedings to the State Courts, if
enforcement overseas is intended of any judgment obtained in the High Court under any
enforcement arrangements currently in force.
Note: S 54C (including the Explanation thereto) was added after Cheong Ghim Fah.

Facts: P sued in SGHC and recovered $217k. P argued that: (1) it reasonably supposed that it could Cheong
recover $300k-$400k; (2) it intended to enforce judgment in Malaysia; (3) there were (allegedly) Ghim Fah
interesting and difficult points of law and fact. (2004)
SGHC
Held: SGHC costs awarded.

6
 It was appropriate to initiate proceedings in the SGHC. If a (State Court) judgment cannot be
enforced as a foreign judgment in another jurisdiction, this could be a sufficient reason for initiating
the action in the SGHC. [15]

1.2.3 Transfer of proceedings involving counterclaims

1.2.3.1 Magistrate’s Court to District Court

SGDC may, on application, transfer (whole, part or none of the proceedings) from SGMC to SGDC if SCA, s
counterclaim beyond SGMC limit 54F(1)
 Where, in any civil proceedings pending in a Magistrate’s Court, any counterclaim or set-off and
counterclaim of any defendant involves a matter beyond the Magistrate’s Court limit, any party
to the proceedings may apply to the District Court, within such time as may be prescribed by
Rules of Court, for an order that the whole proceedings, or the proceedings on the counterclaim
or set-off and counterclaim, be transferred to the District Court. (s 54F(1))
 The SGDC may order:
o That the whole proceedings be transferred to an SGDC; (s 54F(2)(a))
o That the whole proceedings be tried in an SGMC; or (s 54F(2)(b))
 The SGMC shall have jurisdiction notwithstanding any other provision of this Act.
(s 54F(4))
o That the counterclaim be transferred to an SGDC, and the claim be tried in an SGMC. (s
54F(2)(c))
 Execution of SGMC judgment shall be stayed until SGDC proceedings are
concluded. (s 54F(3))

SGDC may, on its own motion, transfer (whole, part or none of the proceedings) from SGMC to SGDC SCA, s
54F(2)
 On its own motion, the SGDC may order:
o That the whole proceedings be transferred to an SGDC; (s 54F(2)(a))
o That the whole proceedings be tried in an SGMC; or (s 54F(2)(b))
 The SGMC shall have jurisdiction notwithstanding any other provision of this Act.
(s 54F(4))
o That the counterclaim be transferred to an SGDC, and the claim be tried in an SGMC. (s
54F(2)(c))
 Execution of SGMC judgment shall be stayed until SGDC proceedings are
concluded. (s 54F(3))

1.2.3.2 District Court/Magistrate’s Court to High Court

SGHC may, on application, transfer (whole, part or none of the proceedings) from SGMC/SGDC to SGHC SCA, s
if counterclaim beyond SGDC limit 54E(1)
 Where, in any civil proceedings pending in a State Court, any counterclaim or set-off and
counterclaim of any defendant involves a matter beyond the District Court limit, any party to the
proceedings may apply to the High Court, within such time as may be prescribed by Rules of
Court, for an order that the whole proceedings, or the proceedings on the counterclaim or set-off
and counterclaim, be transferred to the High Court. (s 54E(1))
 The SGHC may order:
o That the whole proceedings be transferred to an SGHC; (s 54E(2)(a))

7
 o That the whole proceedings be tried in an SGDC/SGMC; or (s 54E(2)(b))
 The SGDC/SGMC shall have jurisdiction notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act. (s 54E(4))
o That the counterclaim be transferred to an SGHC, and the claim be tried in an
SGDC/SGMC. (s 54E(2)(c))
 Execution of SGDC/SGMC judgment shall be stayed until SGHC proceedings are
concluded. (s 54E(3))

SGDC may, on its own motion, transfer (whole, part or none of the proceedings) from SGMC to SGDC SCA, s
54E(2)
 On its own motion, the SGHC may order:
o That the whole proceedings be transferred to an SGHC; (s 54E(2)(a))
o That the whole proceedings be tried in an SGDC/SGMC; or (s 54E(2)(b))
 The SGDC/SGMC shall have jurisdiction notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act. (s 54E(4))
o That the counterclaim be transferred to an SGHC, and the claim be tried in an
SGDC/SGMC. (s 54E(2)(c))
 Execution of SGDC/SGMC judgment shall be stayed until SGHC proceedings are
concluded. (s 54E(3))

1.2.4 Transfer after interlocutory judgment

Approach 1: Cannot transfer after interlocutory judgment Ricky

Charles
Facts: P sued in SGDC. Consent interlocutory judgment entered. P then applied to transfer to SGHC, as his
(2002)
medical expenses increased.
SGCA
Held: Transfer not allowed.
 It is not within the spirit of (the relevant provision) to permit a transfer of a case where interlocutory
judgment has already been obtained in the SGDC. This would be to truncate a single proceeding and
blur the distinction between the two jurisdictions. By obtaining an interlocutory judgment in the
SGDC, P had affirmed his claim within the jurisdiction of that court. [16]
 In light of the medical reports, P ought to have known that his damages might exceed the
jurisdictional limit of the SGDC. He ought to have considered transferring the proceedings to the
SGHC at that stage. Instead, he chose to obtain an interlocutory judgment against D by consent. [19]

Approach 2: Can transfer after interlocutory judgment if there is sufficient reason or genuine mistake, Keppel
but not if there is express agreement or prejudice Singmarin
e (2008)
Facts: P sued in SGDC. Consent interlocutory judgment entered for 70% liability by D. Question was
SGCA
whether SGDC limit was 70% or 100% of the total award. (Not an application for transfer.)
Held: Transfer can be allowed.
 Ricky should not be followed as it proceeded on the wrong assumptions. [32]
o The affirmation of jurisdiction approach plainly extends only to the limit of the claim then
being sought, which limit is premised purely on an existing expectation at that point in time
by P as to the quantum potentially recoverable. The entering of an interlocutory judgment is
not a legal affirmation of a lower court’s jurisdiction for the entire duration of the
proceedings. [32]
o D cannot complain of being prejudiced if the law indeed permits P to have his claim assessed

8
 to its full extent in the proper court. [32]
o There is in principle no difference between a transfer before and after interlocutory
judgment. The pre and post-interlocutory judgment phases in an action are discrete and
distinct. [32]
 Express agreement:
o Of course, if liability has actually been settled on the basis of an express agreement that the
matter is to be tried and dealt with in its entirety in the SGDC, an application for a transfer
should not be acceded to. [32]
 Sufficient reason:
o The possibility of P’s damages exceeding the SGDC limit would ordinarily be regarded as a
sufficient reason for a transfer of proceedings (citing Ricky). [38]
 P’s injuries, especially in personal injury cases, may have worsened, or are of a
continuing nature, such that he (may need) to revise his claim. [37]
 The allowable damages might have been raised by court decisions that dealt with similar
cases. [37]
 Genuine mistake:
o Even if a P mistakenly enters a consent interlocutory judgment in the wrong court, there is no
reason why the assessment of damages cannot be transferred to the SGHC, if no real
prejudice would be caused to D. [39]
 Prejudice:
o Some form of irreversible change of position or deviation from a prior express agreement on
damages must be shown, to demonstrate that transfer would cause D real prejudice that
cannot be compensated by costs. [39]
o Prejudice cannot possibly consist of the fact that the damages awarded would exceed the
SGDC limit. [39]

Facts: P then applied to transfer. Keppel

(2010)
Held: Transfer not allowed (albeit on the facts).
SGCA
 Sufficient reason:
o The likelihood that P’s damages would exceed the SGDC limit would, ordinarily, be
regarded as sufficient reason for transfer. [16]
 Prejudice:
o The mere existence of a sufficient reason does not automatically entitle a party to
transfer. A holistic evaluation of all the material circumstances needs to be undertaken;
in particular, the prejudice that might be visited upon D. It requires a balancing of the
respective competing interests of the parties. [17]
o D would suffer prejudice:
 D had agreed to the consent judgment on the basis that the extent of its liability
would be capped at the SGDC limit. At the time the parties entered the consent
interlocutory judgment, it was thought that, following Ricky, the parties would be
barred from transferring proceedings to the SGHC. It may be more difficult for a
transfer to be resisted only on this ground if an interlocutory judgment is entered
after Keppel (2008). [18]
 The application to transfer was made almost 4 years after the consent
interlocutory judgment had been entered. Both parties had accepted and relied
on the consensual agreement for a substantial period of time. D’s After the

9
 interlocutory judgment was entered, D’s insurers had set aside only a reserve of
$250k. [19]
 Parties might have to re-litigate their respective liabilities (more than 6-7 years
after the accident took place). Many practical difficulties might arise if the issue
of liability had also to be re-opened, including the length of time from the
accident, the availability of witnesses, and the ensuing prejudice. [20]

Facts: P sued in SGDC. Consent interlocutory judgment entered for 85% liability by D. P then applied to Tan Kee
transfer to SGHC, as his medical expenses increased. Huat
(2012)
Held: Transfer allowed.
SGHC
 Sufficient reason:
o P had prima facie established the material change in circumstances necessary to support
his application for transfer. [35] The hearing of the application was not the correct forum
to determine which doctor’s evidence was more credible. [33]
 Prejudice:
o P had taken steps to carry proceedings in the SGDC beyond the entry of the interlocutory
judgment. However, the work done by both sides would be as useful in the SGHC as in
the SGDC; the work was not wasted. It was not wholly P’s fault that both assessment
hearings had not gone on. [39]
o D’s argument about his inability to recover costs from P as P is legally aided was not
convincing. To accept it would mean that legally aided litigants could never apply for a
transfer of their proceedings from the SGDC to the SGHC, no matter how good their
reasons were. [45]
o Although the time lapse (of 4 years) was not ideal, there was no evidence that it had led
to any particular difficulty in conducting the litigation. [47]

1.2.5 Costs consequences – for proceeding in the wrong courts **Must consider on top of transfer courts

General rule: If P sues in SGHC and recovers no more than SGDC/SGMC limit, P is only entitled to SCA, s 39(1)
SGDC/SGMC costs
 Subject to subsections (3) and (4), where an action is commenced in the SGHC which could have been
commenced in a State Court, then if P recovers a sum not exceeding the SGDC limit, P shall not be
entitled to any more costs of the action than those which he would have been entitle to if the action
had been brought in an SGDC. (s 39(1)(a))
 Subject to subsections (3) and (4), where an action is commenced in the SGHC which could have been
commenced in a State Court, then if P recovers a sum not exceeding the SGMC limit, P shall not be
entitled to any more costs of the action than those which he would have been entitle to if the action
had been brought in an SGMC. (s 39(1)(a))

Exception 1: If P had sufficient reason to sue in SGHC, SGHC may award SGHC costs (in whole or in part) SCA, s 39(4)
(a)
 In any action, if the SGHC is satisfied that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the
SGHC, it may make an order allowing the costs (or any part thereof) on the SGHC scale or on the State
Courts scale.

Intended enforcement overseas alone is insufficient reason for awarding SGHC costs (even if sufficient Cheong
reason for transfer) > Safer to sue in SGDC/SGMC and apply for transfer to SGHC Ghim Fah

10
Facts: P sued in SGHC and recovered $217k. P argued that: (1) it reasonably supposed that it could (2004)
recover $300k-$400k; (2) it intended to enforce judgment in Malaysia; (3) there were (allegedly) SGHC
interesting and difficult points of law and fact.
Held: SGHC costs awarded (for several reasons).
 If (State Courts) proceedings are entertained in the SGHC, only on the basis of intended enforcement in
a foreign jurisdiction, the (State Courts) scale of costs should continue to be applicable. Such matters
are heard by the SGHC purely to facilitate enforcement, and an additional layer of costs should not be
added. [16]
 The proper course of procedure is to file the proceedings in the (State Courts) in the first instance, and
thereafter apply for the transfer of the proceedings to the SGHC. [12]
 In the result (reasonable supposition it could recover more than SGDC limit + intended enforcement
overseas), P was entitled to have commenced the proceedings in the SGHC, and their costs are to be
assessed on the SGHC scale. [18]
 Sufficient reason eg. Enforcement of a judgement abroad, because the defendant does not have
enough assets locally and are based overseas.
 Safer procedure: sue in State Court and apply for transfer if it turns out to be necessary to enforce
abroad.

Exception 2: If D had objected to transfer to SGDC/SGMC, SGHC may award SGHC costs (in whole or in SCA, s 39(4)
part) (b)
 In any action, if the SGHC is satisfied that D or one of the Ds objected to the transfer of the action to
a State Court, it may make an order allowing the costs (or any part thereof) on the SGHC scale or on
the State Courts scale.
 Ie, the plaintiff believes he will recover more than $250,000 and there is a reasonable basis for this
belief. > possibly personal injuries claim. In this case he will still get High Court cost because there
was a reasonable basis at the time of the claim!!

Exception 3: If P reasonably supposed that the amount recoverable exceeded the SGDC/SGMC limit, SCA, s 39(6)
SGHC may award SGHC costs
 This section shall not affect any question as to costs, if it appears to the SGHC that there was
reasonable ground for supposing the amount recoverable in respect of P’s claim to be in excess of
the amount recoverable in an action commenced in a State Court.
 There must have been a reasonable basis at the time of the claim!!

Facts: P sued in SGHC and recovered $217k. P argued that: (1) it reasonably supposed that it could Cheong
recover $300k-$400k; (2) it intended to enforce judgment in Malaysia; (3) there were (allegedly) Ghim Fah
interesting and difficult points of law and fact. Held: SGHC costs awarded. (2004)
SGHC
 The test is not one of hindsight but of reasonableness refracted through the factual prism existing
when the proceedings were initiated. [14]
 Needless to say, if solicitors realise that the upper limit of recoverability falls within the (State Courts’)
jurisdiction prior to the commencement of a hearing, steps ought to be taken to immediately transfer
the proceedings to the appropriate forum. [14]
 In the result, P was entitled to have commenced the proceedings in the SGHC, and their costs are to be
assessed on the SGHC scale. [18]

11
1.3 Inherent power

Concept of inherent power: The inherent jurisdiction of the court may be defined as the reserve or fund Sir Jack,
of powers, a residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just approved
or equitable to do so, and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent in Nalpon
improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between (2013)
them. (51) SGCA [27]

Certainly, it would be pointless to have a provision such as Order 92, rule 4 (RC) to enable the court to Pinsler,
exercise ‘powers’ beyond the rules (which are stated not ‘to limit or affect’ those powers), if such role is approved
not permitted. It is in the nature of the common law system that the court must have some flexibility to in Wellmix
enable it to operate effectively within the parameters of statutory regulation. Certainly, procedural (2006)
developments in recent years have emphasised the courts’ more active role. The cases which have been SGHC [84]
considered reflect a range of approaches from the restrictive to the intrusive. It is not practical, and
perhaps not possible, to identify specifically the ideal role of the court in areas not clearly or
appropriately regulated by the rules. The court should always consider the state of the rules (which are
usually the primary source of procedure), the circumstances of the case, and the abuse or injustice which
would result if it did not exercise its inherent powers.

Acknowledgement of inherent power O 92 r 4

 For the removal of doubt, it is hereby declared that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or
affect the inherent powers of the Court to make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice
or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court.
Note: This provision does not create (only acknowledges) inherent power.

Old approach 1: Don’t wait for the Rules Committee The Siskina
(1977)
 To wait for the Rule Committee would be to shut the stable door after the steed had been stolen.
EWCA
And who knows that there will ever again be another horse in the stable? I ask, why should the
judges wait for the Rule Committee? The judges have an inherent jurisdiction to lay down the
practice and procedure of the courts: and we can invoke it now. To the timorous souls I would say in
the words of William Cowper: “Ye fearful (judges), fresh courage take/ The clouds ye so much dread/
Are big with (justice), and shall break/ In blessings on your head.” And you will find a good way to law
reform. (235–236) (Lord Denning MR)

Old approach 2: Don’t pre-empt the Rules Committee The Siskina

(1977)
 The jurisdiction of the Rules Committee is statutory, and for judges to pre-empt its functions is for
UKHL
the courts to usurp the function of the legislature. Quite apart from this, the Rules Committee is a far
more suitable vehicle for discharging the function than a panel of three judges, however eminent,
deciding an individual case after hearing arguments from advocates representing the interests of
opposing litigants, however ably. (262) (Lord Hailsham)

Current approach: Criterion is need Wellmix

(2006)
 It is commonsensical that O 92 r 4 was not intended to allow the courts carte blanche to devise any
SGHC
procedural remedy they think fit. That would be the very antithesis of what the rule is intended to
achieve. The key criterion justifying invocation of the rule is therefore that of “need” – in order that
justice be done and/or that injustice or abuse of process of the court be avoided. [81]

12
This inherent jurisdiction should only be invoked in exceptional circumstances where there is a clear Relfo
need for it and the justice of the case so demands. The circumstances must be special. [36] (2009)
SGHC

(The inherent) jurisdiction should be exercised judiciously. An essential touchstone was the need for its Then Khek
invocation. In addition to the question of prejudice to either party, there must be reasonably strong or Khoon
compelling reasons showing why that jurisdiction should be invoked. [14] (2012)
SGHC

(+) Example of inherent power exercised: Intervention The

Nagasaki
Facts: Arrested vessel berthed at shipyard. Shipyard owner applied to intervene, claiming hardship due
Spirit
to congestion. O 76 r 16 only allowed a non-D who “has an interest in the property or money” to
(1994)
intervene in the action.
SGHC,
 o76 r 16: ‘Where property against which an action in rem is brought is under arrest or money applying
representing the proceeds of sale of that property is in court, a person who has an interest in that The
property or money but who is not a defendant in the action may, with the leave of the Court, intervene Mardina
in the action.’ Merchant
Held: Shipyard owner allowed to intervene pursuant to inherent power (despite having no interest in the (1974)
property itself). EWHC

 The rule is not exhaustive of the powers of the court to do justice in particular cases. There must be an
inherent jurisdiction in the court to allow a party to intervene if the effect of an arrest is to cause
that party serious hardship or difficulty or danger.
 The court must have power to allow the party who is affected by the working of the system of law
used in admiralty actions in rem, to apply to the court for some mitigation of the hardship or the
difficulty or the danger. If it were not so, then there would be no remedy available for such persons at
all. [13]

(-) Example of inherent power not exercised: Wee Soon

Kim
CA endorses approach in Mardina Merchant on the basis of real need for inherent power to be exercised
Anthony
to prevent injustice and observes that an application to be joined in the proceedings which does not
(2001)
come within O 15 r 6(2)(b)(i) or (ii), may be permitted if joinder would be in the interest of justice
SGCA,
Facts: P complained to Law Society about 2 solicitors (DS and HRK). DS and HRK applied to intervene. approving
Held: Not allowed to intervene (albeit on the facts). Because there was no real need The
Mardina
 We can easily understand why in The Mardina Merchant the court invoked its inherent jurisdiction. An Merchant
essential touchstone is really that of need. [27] Inherent jurisdiction must be exercised judiciously. (1974)
 The circumstances do not warrant the court invoking its inherent jurisdiction. There is no need of such EWHC
gravity for the solicitors to intervene, even though the solicitors have an interest in the outcome. [29]
Fact application: CA distinguishes facts before it:
 Case concerned an application requiring the Law Society to apply to the Chief Justice to appoint a
Disciplinary Committee under s 96 of the Legal Profession Act to investigate the complaint against the
solicitors.
 The solicitors applied to be added as interveners in the action on the ground that they had a real and
substantial interest in the outcome of the application.
 The Court of Appeal determined that the High Court should not have exercised its inherent

13
 jurisdiction to order joinder as there was no real need.
 The invocation of the court’s inherent jurisdiction was unwarranted. While the two solicitors may
have an interest in the outcome of, and wished to intervene in, the application, that did not mean
that there was a necessity, or a need of such gravity to warrant the court’s invocation of its
inherent jurisdiction. Even if they were allowed to intervene, their counsel would essentially do what
the Law Society’s counsel would, ie, to support the IC’s recommendation and the Council’s decision
(at [29])
(+) Example of inherent power willing to be exercised: Consent unless order Wellmix
(2006)
Facts: D failed to file AEICs within time. SGHCR made unless order. P argued that it was a consent unless
SGHC
order.
 D failed to file and serve affidavits of the evidence-in-chief in time. The plaintiff applied for an unless
order against the defendant (that unless the defendant filed and served the affidavits by a certain date,
the defence would be automatically struck out). Prior to the hearing of the application, counsel for
both parties discussed the circumstances of the anticipated unless order but the details of the
conversation were not entirely clear. The registrar granted the unless order but the defendant failed to
comply with it.
 A primary issue before the High Court was whether the unless order was made pursuant to a binding
agreement between the parties (so that it was a consent unless order), or whether the defendant
simply did not object to the order (in which case there was no contract between the parties).
 Andrew Phang J concluded that the facts did not establish a binding contract between the parties, so
that there was no issue of the court interfering with a binding agreement. His Honour went on to
consider whether the court would have the right to intervene if the parties had been found to have
contracted with each other on the terms of the order. Having addressed the legal issues which arise in
such a situation, his Honour thought it appropriate for the court to have a residuary discretion to
control the consequences of a consent unless order
 Explanation of consent only orders: If Party A has been in default; eg, by not doing something required Pinsler PCP
by the court within the time prescribed by a rule or order of court (in this case, D failed to file AEICs by at 1.037-
certain date ordered by the court), he may agree with Party B that he (Party A) will act by a certain time 1.038
and that if he fails to do so, his action/defence may be automatically struck out.
o A consent unless order (or an unless order pursuant to a party’s consent) may be made by the
court when the parties agree that in the event of a subsequent default by one of them, certain
consequences will automatically follow. It normally arises when the defaulting party faces
sanctions and agrees to the unless order so that he has a final opportunity to comply before the
consequences of his default kick in.
o It is important to distinguish between a situation in which the defaulting party does not raise any
objection to an unless order (here he is not consenting to its terms), and one in which he expressly
agrees to be bound by its consequences should he default. In the latter scenario, a contract is
formed between the parties and is embodied in the unless order made by the court. The question
arises as to whether the court may interfere with the parties’ contractual rights by preventing the
consequences which would automatically follow on from non-compliance with the consent unless
order.
o On the facts of case, not a consent unless order because no clear agreement. May court interfere
with enforcement of consent unless order? Phang J: Yes because court has ultimate control over
its own procedure (see [86]–[91]).
Principle: Wellmix is the first case in which a Singapore court has positively considered the exercise of
its inherent power in the context of consent unless orders. Although there is previous authority to the

14
effect that a consent unless order (which constitutes a binding contract between the parties) cannot be
interfered with, the principle of a residuary discretion in the context of how a court is to conduct its
own process makes considerable sense. Simply put, the rights acquired under contract law should never
be permitted to affect procedural outcomes which only the courts are entitled to govern. Accordingly,
Wellmix shows how a procedural mechanism, such as inherent power, may impact upon a party’s
private rights in order to effectuate overall substantive justice.
Held: If a consent unless order, could set aside. (But not a consent unless order on the facts - concluded
that the facts did not establish a binding contract between the parties, so that there was no issue of the
court interfering with a binding agreement.)
 It would be desirable to allocate to the court a residuary discretion (to decide whether enforcement of
the consent unless order should be effected). [79, 89]
 A consent unless order, whilst technically a contract between the parties, is one that allows one party
to wholly deprive the other party of its legal rights in the context of litigation. There may arise special
circumstances where it would be unjust for the party in whose favour the consent order operates to
insist on its enforcement in the absence of a high degree of intentionally contumacious or
contumelious conduct. [90]
 Such a discretion is merely an aspect of the court’s power to have ultimate control over its own
procedure. This is not at all unreasonable and conduces to justice and fairness. The focus is still on
procedure rather than substance. It might be argued that P’s substantive rights would be adversely
affected, but an unless order is part of the procedural armoury and is not based on the substantive
merits of the case. An unless order (whether by consent or not) deals with the litigation process and,
on this score, the courts ought to have the final say. [91]

SGHC willing to exercise inherent power to vary all consent orders (not only consent procedural orders) Airtrust
– extended to substantive contractual consent orders (eg, P and D come to an agreement about who (2014)
would have the substantive right to pursue a derivative action) . SGHC
Facts: P and D previously entered consent order. P then made application contrary to consent order.
Held: Application dismissed (albeit on the facts).
 Even in the case of a contractual consent order, the court retains the residual discretion to vary its
terms where this is necessary to prevent injustice. This is especially so where the court is dealing with a
consent unless order. [22]
 Even in the case of a contractual consent order, the court retains the residual discretion to vary or set
aside the terms of the consent order (citing O 92 r 4). Whether a distinction is to be made between a
contractual consent unless order and other forms of contractual consent order is not a matter which
this court must rule on today. [23]

c.f. SGCA frowns upon exercising inherent power to vary consent substantive orders (only consent Turf Club
procedural orders)  View in Airtrust not accepted by CA - Mistake made by judge in Air Trust: cannot (2017)
interfere directly with the substantive rights SGCA
Facts: P and D previously entered consent order. P applied to set aside consent order.
Held: Application allowed (albeit on other grounds).
 With respect, we do not agree with Airtrust. While we agree that the court has a residual discretion not
to enforce contractual or consensual unless orders, or other consensual procedural orders, such a
discretion does not extend to contractual consent orders that relate to the substantive issues in the

15
 case and the substantive rights of the parties, much less to set aside such orders. [159]
 We can see no reason for distinguishing between consensual unless orders and other procedural
orders that are reached by consent, insofar as they are concerned purely with the procedures of the
court and not with the substantive rights of the parties. [164]
Note: This means that the inherent power is limited to procedural and not substantive matters >
Substantive rights if decided will be unprincipled.

1.3.1 Vexatious proceedings

AG may apply to SGHC to restrain vexatious litigant SCJA, s

74(1)
 If, on an application made by the Attorney-General, the High Court is satisfied that any person has
habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings
in any court or subordinate court, whether against the same person or against different persons, the
High Court may, after hearing that person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, order that:
o no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the High Court be instituted by him in any court
or subordinate court; and (s 74(1)(a))
o any legal proceedings instituted by him in any court or subordinate court before the making of
the order shall not be continued by him without such leave, and such leave shall not be given
unless the High Court is satisfied that the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the
court and that there is prima facie ground for the proceedings. (s 74(1)(b))

For an application under s 74(1) of the SCJA to be granted, the court had to be satisfied that the Attorney-
defendant “habitually” and “persistently” and without any reasonable ground instituted “vexatious” General v
legal proceedings. Mah Kiat
Seng
Facts: D was convicted on two charges under the Registration of Criminals Act (Cap 268, 1985 Rev Ed)
[2013]
and fined $500 on each charge. D continually filed motions that had been dismissed
SGHC
 “Habitually” would suggest that the institution of legal proceedings occurred as a matter of course,
or almost automatically when the appropriate conditions existed; “persistently” would suggest
determination, and continuing in the face of difficulty or opposition, with a degree of stubbornness;
and “vexatious” proceedings would include proceedings which, irrespective of the motive of the
litigant, were so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless: at [15].
 The court had to take an objective view of the facts, meaning that it was immaterial that a defendant
acted in good faith and/or honestly believed in the correctness and justice of his cause. The court
should take a broad view of the legal proceedings instituted by a defendant, meaning that the court
should consider the general character and result of all those proceedings, and not merely whether
there may not have been possible causes of action in some of those proceedings: at [17].
o The number of legal proceedings previously instituted by a defendant was not determinative
of the question of whether an order under s 74(1) of the SCJA should be made against him,
nor was it necessarily an important factor: at [16].
 Application: (+) On the present facts, considering the history of the legal proceedings instituted by
the defendant, he had exhausted all possible recourse to the courts provided for by law in respect
of his conviction. By filing first Criminal Motion No 45 of 2011 and then Criminal Motion 15 of 2012,
he sought to go beyond that to impeach final judicial determinations without having any valid basis
to do so, and in so doing had instituted legal proceedings which were utterly hopeless and hence
“vexatious”. He instituted legal proceedings almost as a matter of course whenever a decision went
against him, and thus did so “habitually”. He also did so “persistently” in that he stubbornly refused

16
 to yield in the face of impossibility. Therefore the defendant’s actions and behaviour fell within the
words of s 74(1) of the SCJA: (at [19] and [20])
When courts make an order and what are the interests it seeks to serve
 the court retained a residual discretion to decline to make an order under s 74(1) of the SCJA. Such
discretion was to be exercised keeping in mind the objective of the statutory provision, which was to
ensure that judicial time and resources was not diverted away from potentially meritorious cases
by persons pursuing vain causes. An order against a litigant under s 74(1) of the SCJA was thus for
the protection of the court, in the interests of other people in society, especially the litigant’s
opponent, and for the benefit of the litigant himself: at [20] and [24].
 In the present case, the order sought by the Attorney-General was a narrow and targeted one, in that
it would limit the defendant’s access to the courts only in relation to his conviction. This meant that
the adverse effect of the order on the defendant’s liberty would be contained. An order under s
74(1) of the SCJA should be made against the defendant because it would be in the interests of the
court, society in general, the Public Prosecutor and even the defendant himself: at [26].

Facts: Defendant attempted to file an application in the Supreme Court for leave for an investigation to Attorney-
be made into a complaint of misconduct against the AG and 12 (alleged) Legal Service Officers General v
Tham Yim
Section 74(1) of the SCJA could be analysed in terms of three conditions that had to be fulfilled for a
Siong and
court to have jurisdiction to grant an order thereunder.
others
a) First, the litigant in question had to have “habitually and persistently … instituted … legal [2017]
proceedings” (“the First Condition”). SGHC
b) Secondly, the legal proceedings had to have been “vexatious” and instituted “without any reasonable
ground” (“the Second Condition”).
c) Thirdly, the litigant had to be heard or given “an opportunity of being heard” before an order is made
under s 74(1) (“the Third Condition”): at [33] to [36].
First condition:
 The legislative purposes of s 74(1) of the SCJA – to prevent abuse of the process of the court, to
protect the opposing party who faced a litany of legal proceedings brought by the vexatious
litigant and to protect the vexatious litigant from himself or herself – warranted a broad reading of
the phrase “instituted … legal proceedings” to encompass both successful and failed attempts to
file proceedings. A broad reading of the word “institute” was also in accordance with Parliamentary
intention. Thus, a step taken that, if successful, would set in train the machinery of the court, would
amount to the institution of proceedings under s 74(1) of the SCJA. The Summary Judgment, LPA and
Renewal Applications were therefore proceedings that had been instituted for the purpose of s
74(1): (at [51] to [54], [56], [57] and [59])
 Application: It was plain that the first defendant had habitually and persistently instituted legal
proceedings. The second and third defendants had only been parties to OS 1051 and the Renewal
Application. However, the number of proceedings that had been commenced should not be given
undue weight; there was no magic number of proceedings that had to be brought before s 74(1)
would apply. The Summary Judgment and LPA Applications were based on the same factual issues as
OS 1051. The first defendant had effectively brought those applications on behalf of the second and
third defendants. The second and third defendants had been at the very least either unwilling or
unable to stop the first defendant from using their names and involving them in her endeavours. For
these reasons, the First Condition had been satisfied in respect of all of the three defendants: (at [60]

17
 and [61]).
Second condition:
 OS 1051 and the Summary Judgment, LPA and Renewal Applications were vexatious proceedings.
First, they were brought with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the named defendants and
for collateral purposes. Secondly, they were so obviously untenable or groundless as to be utterly
hopeless. Thirdly, the Summary Judgment, LPA and Renewal Applications were attempts to re-
litigate OS 1051: at [62].
 OS 1051 and the Summary Judgment, LPA and Renewal Applications were brought without any
reasonable ground, as they were devoid of merit whatsoever: at [63].
Third condition:
 It was not necessary for a litigant to attend the hearing of an application for an order under s 74(1)
of the SCJA to have been given “an opportunity of being heard”. The contrary conclusion would
render the phrase “giving him an opportunity of being heard” in s 74(1) superfluous, and stymie the
purpose of s 74(1): at [67].
 The defendants knew of the date, time and location of the hearing of OS 334. They had received the
cause papers and were well aware of the purpose of the application and the orders that were being
sought. Furthermore, they could have stated their case in the reply affidavits and submissions that
they were ordered to file; however, they did not do so. The defendants had been given ample
opportunity to be heard: at [68].
Conclusion: (at [71])
(+) It was apposite and necessary to restrain all the defendants from instituting or continuing any
proceedings, against any persons, without the leave of the High Court, to prevent the defendants from
commencing further vexatious legal proceedings
Side observation: It was unclear whether the court’s inherent powers to prevent the abuse of its
process extended to restraining proceedings other than the vexatious proceedings before the court,
and to protecting parties other than the vexed defendants before the court. If the court’s inherent
powers were so broad, s 74 would seem somewhat otiose: (at [72].) This was clarified below by the new
rules in the SCJA.

Fact: respondent continually filed for appeals against the criminal offence of giving false evidence at the Attorney-
Tribunal under s 193 of the Penal Code General v
Tee Kok
S 74(1) applies to criminal proceedings (private prosecutions) as well. (at [77] to [82])
Boon
[2008]
SGHC

Court has inherent power to to guard its own process by restraining improper proceedings as when a SCJA, ss
litigant makes multiple meritless applications. Note: With effect from 1 Jan 2019. - Measures for dealing 73A–73D
with unmeritorious or vexatious proceedings and vexatious litigants
 A court may, if satisfied that a party is conducting any legal proceedings in the court in a vexatious
manner, order that those proceedings be stayed on such terms as the court considers appropriate. (s
73A(2))
 A court may, if satisfied that the filing of further documents by a party in any legal proceedings in the
court would be vexatious or for an improper purpose, order that no further documents be filed by

18
 that party in relation to those proceedings. (s 73A(3))
 A court may, if satisfied that a party has made 2 or more applications that are totally without merit,
make a limited civil restraint order against the party. (s 73B(1))
 A court may, if satisfied that a party has persistently commenced actions or made applications that
are totally without merit, make an extended civil restraint order against the party. (s 73C(1))
 A court may, if satisfied that a party has persisted in commencing actions or making applications that
are totally without merit, in circumstances where an extended civil restraint order would not be
sufficient or appropriate, make a general civil restraint order against the party. (s 73D(1))
Eg. an order that no further applications may be made without leave.

Held: (+) Restraining order made pursuant to both SCJA, s 74 and inherent power. Chua
Robert
 Such an order by a court does not undercut a litigant’s rights of access to the courts. If the
(2000)
proceedings are shown to be arguably meritorious, leave would no doubt be given. I may add that
SGHC
the inherent power of the court as exercised above is in addition to the power that is conferred by s
74 of the SCJA on an application made by the AG to have a person declared as a vexatious litigant.

Held: (+) Restraining order made pursuant to SCJA, s 74. Lai Linda
(2016)
 it may be possible for the court to make a restraining order against a vexatious litigant on its own
SGCA
accord even if the AG has not made any application under s 74(1) of the SCJA. The English courts
have taken the position that the court has an inherent jurisdiction to do this as it must be able to
protect its processes from abuse, but this power must be exercised only in exceptional
circumstances. We leave this issue open to be decided in a future case that engages it. [18]

1.3.2 Irregularities

 Where, in beginning or purporting to begin any proceedings or at any stage in the course of or in O2r1
connection with any proceedings, there has, by reason of anything done or left undone, been a
failure to comply with the requirements of these Rules, whether in respect of time, place, manner,
form or content or in any other respect, the failure shall be treated as an irregularity and shall not
nullify the proceedings, any step taken in the proceedings, or any document, judgment or order
therein. (O 2 r 1(1))
 The Court may, on the ground that there has been such a failure as is mentioned in paragraph (1),
and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks just, set aside either wholly or in part the
proceedings in which the failure occurred, any step taken in those proceedings or any document,
judgment or order therein or (allow amendments). (O 2 r 1(2))
 The Court shall not wholly set aside any proceedings or the originating process by which they were
begun on the ground that the proceedings were required by any of these Rules to be begun by an
originating process other than the one employed. (O 2 r 1(3))
Explanation: <Refer to part 4 for further information>
 The position under the governing rule (Order 2 rule 1) may be summarised in the proposition that while
irregularity does not automatically nullify the proceeding which it has tainted (nor any other aspects
of the proceedings),the court does have the discretion to set aside “wholly or in part the proceedings Pinsler PCP
in which the failure occurred, any step taken in those proceedings or any document, judgment or order at 1.039
therein”, or it may permit an amendment or to give any direction as it considers appropriate.
 Where, however, the irregularity concerns the use of the wrong originating process, the court is not
to set aside the originating process and any subsequent proceedings on this ground alone. In these

19
 circumstances, the court will normally make the necessary orders to adapt the proceedings and give
directions as to how the action is to proceed.

Waiver of right to challenge irregularity: An application to set aside for irregularity any proceedings, any O 2 r 2
step taken in any proceedings or any document, judgment or order therein shall not be allowed unless it
is made within a reasonable time and before the party applying has taken any fresh step after
becoming aware of the irregularity. (O 2 r 2(1)) (ie waiver)
 An application under this Rule may be made by summons and the grounds of objection must be
stated in the summons or supporting affidavit. (O 2 r 2(2))

 The Court may, on such terms as it thinks just, by order extend or abridge the period within which a O3r4
person is required or authorised by these Rules or by any judgment, order or direction, to do any act in
any proceedings. (O 3 r 4(1))
EXTENSION OF TIME
 The Court may extend any such period as is referred to in paragraph (1) although the application for
extension is not made until after the expiration of that period. (O 3 r 4(2)) (ie application can be made
before or after deadline)
 The period within which a person is required by these Rules, or by any order or direction, to serve, file
or amend any pleading or other document may be extended by consent (given in writing) without an
order of the Court being made for that purpose, unless the Court specifies otherwise. (O 3 r 4(3)) (ie
parties can agree to extend time, subject to control by court)
 In this Rule, references to the Court shall be construed as including references to the Court of Appeal.
(O 3 r 4(4))
 Paragraph (3) shall not apply to the period within which any action or matter is required to be set down
for trial or hearing or within which any notice of appeal is required to be filed. (O 3 r 4(5))

Explanation:
As in the case of the court’s discretion to extend time, it is not possible to produce an all-encompassing
formula to address all types of irregularities. The court’s primary concern is to do justice by taking into
account all the circumstances of the case. Bearing in mind that there is no fixed rule as to how the court Pinsler PCP
should exercise its discretion in any case (because of its unique circumstances), it is possible to identify 1.040
various categories of cases in which the courts have decided to set aside the proceedings in question as
opposed to curing the irregularity pursuant to Order 2 of the Rules of Court:
These include: (a) the circumstances in which a curative approach would be unjust (or cause prejudice) to
the innocent party; (b) the situation in which the error is so serious or fundamental that it cannot, in
principle, be validated; (c) where the mandatory nature of the rule breached may be construed as
ordinarily excluding cure; (d) where the rule is sufficiently comprehensive to govern non-compliance (so
that resort to Order 2 is inappropriate); and (e) where, although the error is not fundamental, the court
will not exercise its discretion to cure it because the substantive application would fail.
 With regard to limbs (a) to (c), if a writ is improperly served out of the jurisdiction (for example, leave
was not obtained for this purpose or the service did not comply with the procedures in the foreign
state), the irregularity may cause prejudice and/or might be regarded as being sufficiently fundamental
or mandatory as to warrant its setting aside. [ITC Global Holdings Pte Ltd v ITC Ltd [2011]]
 Regarding limb (d), Order 6 rule 4 (concerning the extension of the validity of a writ) and Order 24 rule

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 16 (which provides for the consequences of non-compliance with the discovery rules) may operate
independently of Order 2. In the case of limb (e), it would be pointless to let the defaulting party
proceed as he has no basis on which to continue with the litigation [Sinwa SS (HK) Co Ltd v Morten
Innhaug [2010]]

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