South European Society and Politics

ISSN: 1360-8746 (Print) 1743-9612 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fses20

Europeanisation or De-Europeanisation? Media

Freedom in Turkey (1999–2015)

Gözde Yılmaz

To cite this article: Gözde Yılmaz (2016) Europeanisation or De-Europeanisation? Media

Freedom in Turkey (1999–2015), South European Society and Politics, 21:1, 147-161, DOI:
10.1080/13608746.2016.1148102

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2016.1148102

Published online: 23 Mar 2016.

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South European Society and Politics, 2016
VOL. 21, NO. 1, 147–161
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2016.1148102

Europeanisation or De-Europeanisation? Media Freedom in

Turkey (1999–2015)
Gözde Yılmaz

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The European Union (EU) has successfully been exercising its De-Europeanisation;
transformative power through both its enlargement and its democracy; Europeanisation;
neighbourhood policies for decades. Nonetheless, transformation media freedom; press
towards a more European model of governance through freedom; Turkey
Europeanisation is not a linear process, but a differentiated one.
Adverse consequences for Europeanisation (i.e. de-Europeanisation)
have often been neglected. The case of media freedom in Turkey,
with a deteriorating trend across time, exemplifies such an outcome.
This article explores media freedom in Turkey in the last decade. It
argues that media reforms have been reversed over time in a de-
Europeanising trend, with the EU losing its position as a reference
point for reforms.

From the European Union (EU) member states to the candidate states and later to the
neighbourhood, the Europeanisation phenomenon has travelled across Europe and beyond
in the last decades. The EU has successfully exported its rules, values and norms to a wider
area through both the Enlargement policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).
Yet, the Europeanisation process in various candidate and neighbourhood states has
proved that the transformation towards a more European model of governance is not a
linear process. It has ups and downs across time and variations across issue areas as well as
targeted countries, the impact of the EU depending on the different association frameworks
(e.g. Enlargement policy, the ENP), the involvement of other international institutions and
networks in the process, and the domestic environment. The previous Enlargement rounds
proved that the EU has tremendous impact on candidate states through conditionality
(e.g. Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005). However, the literature on external
Europeanisation has neglected adverse consequences within the Europeanisation process.
As Börzel and Risse (2009, p. 11) argue, there is not much focus in the literature on
undesired consequences of Europeanisation (i.e. retrenchment and/or de-Europeanisation).
Most importantly, as Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber (2016) emphasise, various cases of policy
change, in positive and negative directions, may emerge in the pre-accession phase despite
a de-Europeanisation process meaning the ‘loss or weakening of the EU/Europe as a
normative/political context and as a reference point in domestic settings and national public
debates’. In this respect, de-Europeanisation is not a concept denoting the non-existence of

CONTACT  Gözde Yılmaz  gozde.yilmaz@atilim.edu.tr

© 2016 Taylor & Francis
148    G. Yılmaz

Europeanisation, but a reversal from European rules, norms and values (see Aydın-Düzgit &
Kaliber 2016). Therefore, de-Europeanisation in this article refers to reforms reversed from
European ways of doing, and recent developments in Turkey, especially in the media and
freedom of press and speech, have provided empirical cases (see Yılmaz 2016) that need
an explanation.
Notably, the role of the media in Turkey as a building block of democracy has seen a
deteriorating trend, especially in recent years. Such a development has attracted international
and domestic criticism of the country’s democratic credentials. The role of the media in Turkey
as a forum, watchdog and mobilising agent that puts pressure on political actors from below
has become more and more limited over time. Such a development in an EU candidate
country subject to the Europeanisation process is quite puzzling.
Taking this empirical puzzle as its starting point, this article aims to analyse media freedom
in Turkey and changes in this sector denoting either Europeanisation or de-Europeanisation
over the last 15 years. It argues that the EU has lost its primary position as a reference point
in Turkey’s media reforms, and that reforms are being reversed in a de-Europeanising trend.
The article starts by discussing EU standards with regard to media freedom and continues
by exploring the historical background, landscape and ownership of Turkish media. Next, it
explains Turkey’s Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation in this area through providing a
diachronic analysis. The time period is divided on the basis of four governments: the coalition
government of 1999–2002 followed by the governments of 2002–06, 2007–11 and 2011
under the rule of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – Justice and Development Party). Last,
it offers some concluding remarks.

EU standards on media freedom

In the accession process, the EU sets media freedom as a requirement for candidate
countries to fulfil in order to move towards membership. Chapter 10 of the negotiation
chapters, called ‘Information and media’, addresses some issues with regard to the media,
but it mostly focuses on the regulatory frameworks and the elimination of barriers in the
telecommunications market (Dunham 2014). Chapter 23 of the negotiation chapters, on
‘Judiciary and fundamental rights’, also scrutinises media freedom, although it is quite limited
and vague in comparison with other priorities set by the EU for candidate states (Dunham
2014). Other than these chapters in the negotiating framework, no EU standards were valid
for and demanded from all candidate states with regard to media freedom until the launch
of the ‘Guidelines for EU support to media freedom and media integrity in Enlargement
countries, 2014–2020’ in February 2014 (European Commission 2014a).
These guidelines finally provided the candidate states with clear standards and benchmarks
for media freedom. With this document, the EU put in place four objectives for media freedom:
an enabling legal, regulatory and policy environment for exercising the rights of freedom of
expression and media and media integrity; media outlets (owners/editors) assume responsibility
for improved internal governance and production, increased resilience of media against
external pressures, and growing audience confidence in the media; qualitative and trustworthy
investigative journalism available to citizens; and representative media and journalist professional
organisations capable of taking responsibility for sector-relevant issues in dialogue with the
authorities as well as providing services to their members (European Commission 2014b).
While the fulfilment of these standards signifies a trend of Europeanisation in media freedom,
 South European Society and Politics   149

developments signifying the opposite of these standards (e.g. repressive legal, regulatory and
policy environment, self-censorship, firings of journalists) denote de-Europeanisation in candidate
countries. Although the guidelines were announced recently, they can be used as objective
benchmarks for Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation. As the basis for all aspects of media
freedom is an enabling legal, regulatory and policy environment, this article focuses on this aspect
to map Europeanisation or de-Europeanisation of media freedom in Turkey in the following
sections. Additionally, the article will stress implementation problems as a complementary aspect
of the big picture in media freedom.

Historical background and landscape of Turkish media

Historical background of media freedom in Turkey
In the early single-party regime of the Republic in the years between 1923 and 1950, there
was no freedom for the media, which were instrumentalised by the state in the name of
promoting modernisation in Turkey (Kaya & Cakmur 2010, pp. 523–524; Elmas & Kurban 2011,
p. 17). Transition to a multiparty regime in 1946 brought discussions for more liberal media,
and the electoral victory of the DP (Demokrat Parti – Democrat Party) in 1950 promised such
freedom. However, increasing criticism of the government for its economic policies over the
years pushed the DP to tighten its grip over the media and to build clientelistic relations with
media owners and journalists (Kaya & Cakmur 2010, p. 524). In the meantime, a commercial
press entered the media landscape of Turkey. After the 1960 military intervention, the
freedoms in the country, including freedom for the media, were extended, but the strong
relationship between media owners and the state persisted (Kaya & Cakmur 2010, p. 525).
In the 1980s, media ownership was handed over to giant corporations through economic
liberalisation (Elmas & Kurban 2011, p. 23). Those business groups acquired existing daily
newspapers or established new ones with strong motivation to gain a power base for a share
in the privatisation process resulting from the liberal policies of the 1980s (Sümer 2011,
p. 56). With the breaking of the public television broadcaster monopoly in 1990s, such
holdings increased their activities in the media (Sözeri 2015, p. 10).
In the 1990s, media holdings, which have extensively mushroomed across time, developed
clientelistic relations with the government and other political actors due to their economic
interests in other sectors (Somer 2010, p. 560). Therefore, by the 1990s the media had become
a tool for manipulation in the hands of big holdings aiming to further their interests through
relations with government, a situation that persists today (Elmas & Kurban 2011, p. 24). As
Somer (2010, p. 557) emphasises, in Turkey ‘different media organisations are divided along
distinct political orientations, have close connections to political parties and other political
orientations, and journalists are active in political life and try to influence, not merely inform,
public opinion’. Moreover, the tabloidisation of newspapers and the commercialisation of
the media in the 1990s led to the development of sensationalist journalism in the country
(Bek 2004, p. 375; Elmas & Kurban 2011, p. 23). Such a remarkable change in the Turkish
media emerged as a result of many factors, such as competition among media groups for
ratings or the low levels of investment in experienced media employers and, therefore, in
investigative reporting (Bek 2004, p. 376).
To sum up, problems in the Turkish media remained unresolved in the 1980s and 1990s,
despite the transformation to a richer media landscape through the economic liberalisation
150    G. Yılmaz

of the country. In particular, the issue of media ownership and the problems associated with
it carried over into the next decade, a situation that will be examined in the following section.

Turkish media landscape and ownership

By the 1980s, the media landscape had radically changed through the shift in media ownership
– a shift from family-owned media outlets to media conglomerates (Christensen 2007,
p. 186). The 1990s brought an acceleration of this process and by 1995 five business groups
(Doğan, Bilgin, Aksoy, İhlas and Uzan Groups) dominated the Turkish media landscape (Sümer
2011, p. 56). In the meantime, the shift from traditional ownership to the new conglomerate
ownership brought a competitive corporate mentality to the media (Christensen 2007,
p. 187).
The 1999 banking crisis and 2000 and 2001 economic crises led to an extended restructuring
of media ownership, though this time a compulsory one. Operating in many areas including the
banking sector, some holdings lost their banking licences, and their debts led to the confiscation
of their media assets (e.g. Aksoy Group, Uzan Group) (Sümer 2011, p. 57). Those media assets were
transferred to the TMSF (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu – Savings Deposit Insurance Funds) and
later sold through tenders (Sözeri 2015, p. 11). By 2004, media ownership was quite different from
before and it was to be further restructured in the following years. In those years and after, the
Turkish media were dominated by four major players (Doğan Group, Merkez Group, Çukurova
Group and Star [Uzan] Group) and four smaller ones (İhlas Group, Doğuş Group, Samanyolu
Group and Aksoy Group) (Gül 2011, p. 35). As mentioned previously, these media outlets were
divided along diverse political orientations, and their business interests in other areas, such as
in construction, have compelled them to form links with the government (Elmas & Kurban 2011,
p. 24; Somer 2010, p. 557).
By mid-2007 new business groups, known as ‘pro-government circles’, began to enter the
media landscape. Merkez Group’s media assets were confiscated and later sold to the Çalık
Group (Turkuvaz Media Group), which is known to have closer ties with the government
(Sümer 2011, p. 57). In turn, this media group was sold to pro-government Zirve Holding
in 2014 (Sözeri 2015, p. 12). In 2013, Ethem Sancak, a businessman who openly supported
the government and Prime Minister Erdoğan, bought Çukurova’s media properties after
another confiscation due to the debt of Çukurova Group to the state (Corke et al. 2014,
p. 13). Ultimately, the pro-government media have become increasingly vocal across time.
This becomes very obvious when multiple newspapers run the same headline in favour
of the government’s political interests. For instance, when Erdoğan and Deputy Prime
Minister Bülent Arınç disagreed on using the police to investigate co-ed student houses,
six newspapers ran the headline, ‘We will solve it amongst ourselves’ (Corke et al. 2014, p. 13).
Developments outside the reconfiguration of the media towards a more pro-government
orientation also contributed to the change of balance in the media landscape. Most
importantly, fines against media outlets that are critical of the government have become
more common in recent years. The case of Doğan Media Group’s dispute with the government
in 2008 illustrates this. An open conflict between Doğan Group and Prime Minister Erdoğan
emerged when the AKP-led municipality refused to grant a property demanded by Doğan
holdings (Kaya & Çakmur 2010, p. 532). In response, Doğan Media Group began to voice
criticisms of the AKP government (Kaya & Çakmur 2010, p. 532). After Erdoğan publicly
instructed the authorities to fine Doğan Media Group for alleged tax irregularities, a fine of
 South European Society and Politics   151

3.75 billion Turkish lira was issued in 2009 (Çarkoğlu & Yavuz 2010, p. 618). After the fine in
2011 Doğan Group sold two newspapers (Milliyet and Vatan) to another holding, Demirören
Group, which has a pro-government orientation (Corke et al. 2014, p. 7).
The outcome was that media holdings with different political orientations either chose
to sell some of their media outlets and downsize their operations in the media or to adopt a
more pro-government approach (Sözeri 2015, p. 15). While Doğan Group, mostly associated
with secularists, was among the first group to downsize media outlets, Doğuş Group adopted
a pro-government orientation (Sözeri 2015, p. 15). Moreover, the conglomerates that own
media outlets benefit from government contracts (e.g. Doğuş Holding’s winning of a US$702
million bid for the operation of Istanbul’s Galataport in Karaköy in 2013) and such contracts
have led to an increasing atmosphere of censorship and self-censorship in a large part of the
Turkish media (Corke et al. 2014, pp. 12–13; Çarkoğlu & Yavuz 2010, p. 618). Most recently,
in October 2015, government-chosen trustees were appointed to the Koza İpek Holding,
known to have close ties with the Gülen Movement; and the administration of the media
outlets owned by the İpek Group, KanalTürk television and the Bugün and Millet newspapers,
was transferred to a pro-government trustee (Srivastava & Güler 2015). In the end, pro-
government media groups have become increasingly dominant in the Turkish media.
It is important to note that, outside the mainstream media formed mainly by big media
corporations, there are alternative media in Turkey composed of various outlets of limited
financial means such as Agos (a minority newspaper) or Bianet (an online news portal
established with EU support), and also new social media such as Facebook and Twitter (Kaya
& Çakmur 2010, p. 533; Elmas & Kurban 2011, p. 9).
To summarise, the media landscape is quite fragmented in Turkey and ownership is fluid,
changing hands quickly. With regard to political orientations, the Turkish media landscape
covers a wide and diverse spectrum (e.g. secularists, Gülenists, pro-government groups,
minority groups) (see Table 1). Dominated by the big corporations, which have affiliated

Table 1. Media ownership groups in Turkey, January 2014.

Ownership group Newspapers TV Other business interests
Dogan Group Hurriyet CNNTürk Energy, retail, industry,
Radikal Kanal D tourism
Posta
Dogus Group NTVStar Finance, automotive,
construction, energy, retail
Feza Media Group Zaman Not available
Today’s Zaman
Ethem Sancak Aksam SkyTurk 360 Pharmaceuticals
Star Media Group Star Kanal 24 Energy (50 per cent owned
by the State Oil Company of
Azerbaijan)
Kalyon Group Sabah ATV Construction
Takvim
Ciner Group Haberturk Show TV Energy, mining, services
Haberturk TV
Demiroren Group Milliyet Energy, mining, industry,
Vatan construction, tourism
Ihlas Group Turkiye TGRT Haber Construction, industry,
tourism, mining
Albayrak Group Yeni Safak TVNET Construction, industry,
logistics, energy, services
Koza Ipek Group Bugun Kanalturk Mining
Source: Corke et al. (2014).
152    G. Yılmaz

business in many different areas such as energy or construction, the Turkish media have
become vulnerable to pressures from the authorities and open to instrumentalisation by the
state (Çarkoğlu & Yavuz 2010, p. 618; European Commission 2015, p. 24). Most importantly, the
lack of transparency in media ownership has led to suspicions concerning the independence
of editorial policies and, therefore, the media as a whole (European Commission 2015, p. 24).

Europeanising or de-Europeanising? Media reforms and media freedom in

Turkey
In 1999, the EU granted candidate country status to Turkey and around that time many legislative
and regulative actions were taken in Turkish media policy. These will be unpacked next.

1999–2002: Europeanisation upheld but limited

In 1999–2002, reforms in various areas were launched by the coalition government of the DSP
(Demokratik Sol Parti – Democratic Left Party), ANAP (Anavatan Partisi – Motherland Party)
and MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – Nationalist Action Party), including reforms touching
upon media freedom. Such reforms influenced the legal environment for media freedom
and demonstrated some Europeanisation of the media, although remaining quite limited.
To start with, the 2001 constitutional reform enhanced the freedom of expression and the
press. Through the constitutional amendments, the prohibition on using minority languages
in broadcasting, education and publishing under Articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution was
removed (Elmas & Kurban 2011, p. 45).
In February 2002, as part of the first EU harmonisation package, Article 8 of the Anti-terror Law
was amended to reduce the maximum closure period for radio or television channels charged
with issuing propaganda against the unity of the state to seven days (European Commission
2002, p. 34). In April 2002, the second EU harmonisation package amended Supplementary
Articles 1 and 2 of the Press Law to remove some activities listed in Article 1 within the context
of offences in regard to the press and to reduce the maximum penalty for a publishing company
found guilty of acting against the basic principles of the ‘integrity of the nation, republican order,
or the country’s national security’ (European Commission 2002, p. 33; Secretariat General for EU
Affairs of Turkey 2007, p. 7). In May 2002, parliament amended the Broadcasting Law that limited
the sanctioning powers of RTÜK (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu – Supreme Council of Radio and
Television) (Elmas & Kurban 2011, p. 47). However, the provisions relating to the appointments
of the RTÜK board and media ownership were vetoed by the President of the Republic, Ahmet
Necdet Sezer. When parliament adopted the amendments without revising them, President
Sezer brought the law before the Constitutional Court, which suspended the implementation
of the provisions vetoed by the President before suspending them altogether in 2004 (Elmas &
Kurban 2011, p. 45).
The third EU harmonisation package adopted in August 2002 brought amendments to
Article 31 and Supplementary Article 31 of the Press Law, replacing prison sentences for
criminal offences relating to the press with heavy fines (Secretariat General for EU Affairs of
Turkey 2007, p. 9). The package also amended the Law on the Establishment of Radio and
Television Enterprises, lifting the bans on broadcasting in minority languages, and aligning
the re-transmission of foreign broadcasting with the European Convention on Trans-frontier
Television (Secretariat General for EU Affairs of Turkey 2007, p. 9).
 South European Society and Politics   153

Table 2. Developments in Turkish media freedom, 1999–2002.

Positive Europeanisation Negative de-Europeanisation
2001 constitutional reform enhancing freedom Many instances of bad practice BUT cannot be counted as
of press de-Europeanisation, since Europeanisation newly begun
2002 first harmonisation package amending Article 8 of
the Anti-terror Law
2002 second harmonisation package amending Articles 1
and 2 of the Press Law
2002 amendment of the Broadcasting Law
2002 third harmonisation package amending Article 31
and Supplementary Article 31 of the Press Law and
the Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television
Enterprises
Source: Author’s own elaboration.

As we have seen, the coalition government adopted reforms to improve media freedom,
although these remained highly limited (see Table 2). Increasing pressure from the EU led to
reforms, albeit ones restricted in scope and extent (Cengiz & Hoffmann 2013, p. 11). Eventually,
disagreements within the coalition government and the pressure to launch reforms as part
of the EU accession process led to a split in the government and brought about the 2002
elections, which resulted in the exclusion of the coalition parties from parliament and the
subsequent ascendancy of AKP rule.

2002–06: Europeanisation although with problems

In the 2002 elections, the AKP government came to power and continued Europeanising
reforms with regard to the media, although in a wider context than in the previous period.
To begin with, through the fourth EU harmonisation package of 2003, the Press Law was
amended to protect periodicals’ owners, editors and writers from compulsory revelation of
their sources (European Commission 2003, p. 30). In July 2003 the sixth EU harmonisation
package was adopted, extending broadcasting in minority languages to private stations
in addition to the public television broadcaster TRT (Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu -
Turkish Radio and Television Corporation), and also reducing the restrictions with regard to
monitoring (European Commission 2003, p. 31; Secretariat General for EU Affairs of Turkey
2007, p. 14).
In 2004, a number of reforms were launched Europeanising the legislative and regulative
framework of the media in Turkey. In May 2004, constitutional amendments strengthened
the freedom of press through amending, for instance, Article 30 of the Constitution regarding
the protection of printing facilities (European Commission 2004, p. 17). Parliament adopted
a new Press Law in June 2004, in an attempt to promote freedom of expression and of the
press, although it remained limited and contradictory in many aspects (Freedom House 2005,
p. 3; Elmas & Kurban 2011, p. 46). The law strengthened the right of journalists to protect
their sources; reinforced the right to reply and correction; replaced prison sentences with
fines; removed sanctions such as confiscating printing machines; and allowed foreigners
to edit and own Turkish publications (European Commission 2004, p. 38). However, the law
was limited in the sense that it did not provide the necessary arrangements for independent
media to be widely promoted (e.g. Article 19 adopting heavy fines for those publishing
154    G. Yılmaz

information about ongoing court proceedings).It was also contradictory, as it shifted the
powers to control the media from the executive to the judicial branch (European Commission
2004, p. 38; Elmas & Kurban 2011, p. 46).
In May 2005, parliament adopted amendments to the new Penal Code regarding the
freedom of expression, leading to the use of such provisions against the media (European
Commission 2005, p. 25). Despite the amendments, some provisions that could be used
against journalists still remained intact in the Penal Code, and in order to eliminate Penal
Code restrictions on freedom of the press a new Legal Assistance and Support Service was
established by the Press Council in 2005 (European Commission 2005, p. 26; Freedom House
2007, p. 4). In June 2005, Article 133 of the Constitution was amended in conjunction with
the election of RTÜK members by parliament (European Commission 2005, p. 27). Moreover,
broadcasting in minority languages started to be implemented by public television in 2005,
although to a limited extent.
In January 2006, the Ministry of Justice issued a circular urging prosecutors to consider
both Turkish national legislation and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
on cases of freedom of expression in the media, and establishing a monitoring mechanism
for investigations against the media (European Commission 2006, p. 14). However, Article
301 criminalising insulting Turkishness continued to be used to charge many, including
journalists such as the editor of the bilingual Turkish–Armenian newspaper AGOS, Hrant
Dink, who then became the target of a political murder, as well as writers and publishers,
on the basis of insulting Turkishness and the state as well as its institutions (European
Commission 2007, pp. 14–15; Freedom House 2008, p. 17). The use of Article 301 to charge
media workers created a climate of self-censorship in the country. An example was the
cessation of publication of the journal Nokta by its owner, following its articles on issues
relating to the military (European Commission 2007, pp. 15, 61).
Even though reforms extending the freedom of expression and of the press led to open
debate in the media on many issues, including sensitive ones, prosecution for the expression
of nonviolent opinions doubled in 2006 compared with 2005 and increased further the
next year (European Commission 2007, p. 14). Moreover, the sanctions imposed by RTÜK,
including fines and suspension or cancellation of programmes or broadcast licences, have
continued to raise questions about the independence of the media (European Commission
2005, p. 27; 2007, p. 43). Thus, this period is characterised by the Europeanisation of media
freedom but with room for further improvement (see Table 3).

Table 3. Developments in Turkish media freedom (2002–06).

Positive Europeanisation
2003 fourth harmonisation package amending the Press
Law
2003 sixth harmonisation package extending
broadcasting in minority languages to private stations
and reducing the restrictions in monitoring
2004 Constitutional amendment strengthening the
freedom of press through amending Article 30 of the
Constitution
2004 new Press Law strengthening the freedom of press
2005 amendments to the Penal Code2005 establishment
of new Legal Assistance and Support Service
2005 amendment of Article 133 of the Constitution
2006 circular on freedom of expression and media
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
Negative de-Europeanisation
The use of Article 301 for censorship (e.g. shutting down
the journal Nokta)
Doubled prosecution for the expression of nonviolent
opinions in 2006 compared with numbers in previous
years
Continuing pressure from the RTÜK through fines,
suspension or cancellation of programmes or broadcast
licences
 South European Society and Politics   155

Table 4. Press freedom score of Turkey, 2002–15.

Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Press freedom score 58 55 52 48 48 49 51 50 51 54 55 56 62 65
Source: Author’s own elaboration of data derived from the Freedom House Freedom of Press Reports for Turkey in 2002–15.
Note: 0 = best; 100 = worst.

As may also be seen from Turkey’s press freedom scores (see Table 4), media freedom
improved in 2002–05 (from 58 to 48), entered a steady phase in 2005–06 (48 in 2005 and
48 in 2006) and deteriorated from 2007 (from 49 in 2007 to 65 in 2015) (Corke et al. 2014;
Freedom House 2007–15). What needs particular attention in the process is the dramatic
deterioration in media freedom after 2007, which will be explored in the next sections.

2007–11: towards de-Europeanisation

By 2007, problems in media legislation and regulations were leading to increasing
implementation problems. Although some areas were subjected to legislative developments –
some in the direction of Europeanisation and others towards de-Europeanisation – their
implementation led to further deterioration in media freedom. For instance, an Internet
Law regulating internet content was adopted in 2007. However, rather than reforming
the internet regulations in the direction of a more European model, the law restricted the
freedom of expression and the right to information (Akdeniz 2010, p. 3; Elmas & Kurban
2011, p. 48). Subsequently, the frequent banning of websites such as YouTube became a
common phenomenon in the country (Akdeniz 2010, p. 3; European Commission 2008, p. 16;
Freedom House 2009, p. 3). In April 2008, parliament adopted amendments to Article 301
including a requirement that permission had to be obtained from the Ministry of Justice in
order to launch a criminal investigation (European Commission 2008, p. 69). In contrast to
the Internet Law, this development signified a Europeanising move.
Despite some improvements such as the elimination of the use of Article 301 to restrict the
freedom of expression, including the freedom of the media, prosecutions continued on the
basis of other articles in the Criminal Code (European Commission 2009, p. 71). In essence, both
legal uncertainties and political pressures influenced media freedom in a negative trend, very
apparent by 2007 (European Commission 2009, p. 71). For instance, the filing of civil procedures
against journalists, publishers or writers by politicians has become a common practice; some
media outlets criticising the government face discrimination in regard to journalist accreditation;
senior political leaders have called on their supporters to boycott certain media outlets (e.g.
Doğan Media Group); high tax fines have been used against media holdings that are critical of the
government, such as Doğan Media Holding; the banning of publications such as a Kurdish daily,
Azadiye Welat, and charging journalists on the basis of the Anti-terror Law have continued; and
defamation, as a criminal offence under the law, has become the source of many cases against
journalists and writers (European Commission 2009, p. 18; 2010, p. 20; 2011, p. 25; Freedom House
2008, pp. 16–18; 2009, p. 3; 2010, p. 3).
Importantly, in the 2008 Ergenekon case charging military officials, 1 lawsuits were
launched against representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil
society, academics and journalists, and many journalists faced prosecution and trial for
reporting on the case on the grounds that they were violating the principle of confidentiality
for an ongoing judicial case (European Commission 2010, p. 20). Moreover, in 2011 the case
156    G. Yılmaz

led to increasing criticism in both the domestic and international arenas, especially with
regard to freedom of expression and of the press, when an unpublished book by Ahmet Şık, a
journalist arrested during the Ergenekon investigation, was confiscated as evidence of crime
on the basis that it was ‘a document of a terror organisation’ (European Commission 2011,
p. 6). In the same year, the increasing trend of charging writers and journalists dealing with
the Kurdish issue continued and many journalists were convicted of terrorism propaganda
(European Commission 2011, p. 25).
Despite continuing selective Europeanisation in many issue areas (e.g. civil–military
relations, the Kurdish issue) during this period, media freedom remained limited and even
deteriorated (press freedom score 49 in 2007 and 54 in 2011; see Table 2 and Table 5) (Corke et
al. 2014; Freedom House 2007–15; Yılmaz 2014). It is clear that an independent media comes
with the package of critiques of the government. An independent media creates checks and
balances on government in democratic countries through acting as a civic forum in which
pluralistic debates are fostered, a watchdog guarding the public interest and a mobilising
agent that encourages public learning (Börzel 2000; Çarkoglu & Yavuz 2010; Somer 2010).
Therefore, the media have tremendous power to influence public opinion by providing
information to the public on both political actors and their rulings. Such power has begun
to be restricted in many ways in Turkey. In view of Doğan Media Group’s dispute with the
government, it has become clearer that criticisms of the government will not be tolerated.
Such a development demonstrates the weakness of the Turkish media concentrated in the
hands of big corporations and easily instrumentalised by state actors (Çarkoğlu & Yavuz
2010, p. 618; Freedom House 2009; Somer 2010, p. 560). Therefore, in cases of clashes of
interest between big corporations owning media establishments and the government, the
media holdings use their media as a tool to disturb the government with criticisms and
the government uses its power of enforcing laws and taxation to pressure these media
holdings to adopt a pro-government approach. Moreover, the pro-government media have
become more vocal, especially since 2007, through the reconfiguration of the Turkish media
landscape and developments leading to monopolisation of the mainstream media (Kurban
& Sözeri 2012, p. 50). This has been followed by the open usage of pro-government media
by political elites in many instances (e.g. the Gezi Park protests). In the years following 2011,
further deterioration of media freedom was observed, which will be explored in the next
section.

Table 5.  EU priorities for media freedom and positive and negative developments in Turkish media
freedom (2007–10).
Positive Europeanisation Negative de-Europeanisation
The elimination of Article 301, often used against 2007 internet law restricting the freedom of expression
journalists and the right to information
Banning of various websites (e.g. YouTube)
Continuing prosecutions on the basis of the Criminal Code
Increasing judicial cases against media workers
Selective justice – discrimination against some media
outlets
Increasing number of lawsuits against journalists and
writers for defamation
Increasing charges against journalists on the basis of the
Anti-terror Law
Banning of several publications
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
 South European Society and Politics   157

2011 and onwards: de-Europeanisation dominates

Media freedom in Turkey has deteriorated from day to day since 2011. Despite new legislation
in the area, the problematic implementation of the rules adopted in regard to media freedom,
as well as controversial developments in the country (e.g. the Gezi Park protests), show an
increasing trend of de-Europeanisation. Let us look first at the legislative developments. A new
broadcasting law was adopted in February 2011, albeit bringing only partial improvement in
the broadcasting arena (European Commission 2011, p. 26). The law detailed the ownership
issue and doubled to 50 per cent the company share that foreigners may own, opened the
way for broadcasting in languages other than Turkish and gave the authority to the prime
minister to temporarily halt broadcasting (Hürriyet Daily News 2011). Moreover, the third
judicial reform package of 2012 prohibited the confiscation of unpublished work and eased
restrictions on reporting criminal investigations (European Commission 2012, p. 21).
Despite the introduction of such legislation in 2011, that year marked a remarkable
deterioration with regard to media freedom: senior officials within the government, military
or state publicly turned against the media; the judicial cases initiated by them against
journalists increased; many journalists were fired or forced to resign due to their criticism
of the government; an increasing tendency to imprison journalists and media workers has
emerged; self-censorship increased due to growing pressure on the media and its workers;
bans on the internet became frequent; and warnings and fines imposed by the RTÜK on
television stations became a common phenomenon in the country (European Commission
2012, pp. 21–22; European Commission 2013, pp. 13, 52; Freedom House 2013, 2015).
A dramatic drop in Turkey’s press freedom score is observed between 2010 (Freedom
House freedom of press score of 51) and 2011 (score of 54). The situation deteriorated
every year until 2014 (score of 62) (see Table 2). As the Freedom House reports (2011–15)
evaluate the process, in 2011 the Turkish media were lively but this does not mean a high
quality of media freedom: many journalists were incarcerated; almost all media institutions
belonged to giant holding companies with ties to political parties; many journalists lost
their jobs when they seemed critical of the government; and, therefore, self-censorship was
a common phenomenon in the country. Moreover, censorship has gradually been imposed
on the internet: many sites have been blocked by Turkish cyber-police at different times; a
filtration system for the internet was introduced in 2011; and in 2014 a law on internet use
was adopted which brought many restrictions, such as denying access to certain websites
that violate the right of privacy (Freedom House 2013; Eldem 2013; Milliyet 2014).
Moreover, in this period, increasing international and internal criticism of the Turkish
government led to a debate in the domestic arena on the possible dangers of democracy,
referring to the majority rule of the AKP government and the argument of Tocqueville: democracy
turning into the tyranny of the majority, leading to a crushing of liberties and rights in the name
of the people. Such arguments came to a tipping point in May and June 2013 with the Gezi
Park protests. Sparked by a few environmentalists protesting to preserve Gezi Park in Istanbul’s
central Taksim Square from the authorities, who had decided to reconstruct the Taksim military
barracks to include a shopping mall, the protests widened in influence, attracted further support
and spread all over Turkey (e.g. Ankara, Izmir and Hatay), rapidly gaining an anti-government
character. During the protests, many were injured and six people died due to excessive use of force
by the Turkish police (European Commission 2013, p. 5). While the protests were taking place,
the AKP government censored the media from broadcasting the events; took harsh measures
158    G. Yılmaz

against the protestors; accused them of being tools of external forces, such as the Jewish diaspora;
and demonstrated scant tolerance for them (Amnesty International 2013, p. 6; Corke et al. 2014,
pp. 8–12; European Commission 2013, pp. 5–6; Freedom House 2014). All in all, the response
to the protests exemplifies the recent trend of de-Europeanisation in the country, including
‘the denial of the right to peaceful assembly, excessive use of force by police officers and the
prosecution of legitimate dissenting opinions while allowing police abuses to go unchecked’
(Amnesty International 2013, p. 7).
Most importantly, the media as the fourth estate of democracy faced tremendous pressure
from the government during and after the protests: censorship and self-censorship were
common; many media workers lost their jobs; TV stations that aired the protests were fined
on the basis of inciting violence; and social-media platforms such as Twitter were declared
a ‘menace’ due to their use by the protestors to organise the protests (Corke et al. 2014;
Freedom House 2014). In the meantime many media outlets were slow to cover the protests
although some caught up with the news later on (e.g. CNNTürk); pro-government media
outlets pushed the government’s arguments upfront (e.g. NTV); and protesters gathered
in front of several media outlets (e.g. NTV) to raise awareness among the public about the
clientelistic relationship between the media channels of the big holdings and the state,
with slogans such as ‘We do not want purchased media’ (Bianet 2013; Corke et al. 2014, p. 8).
Government pressure on the media and even direct intervention from the Prime Minister’s
office through phone calls to media outlets ‘to change stories, to downplay coverage, or to
fire reporters or columnists’ during and after the Gezi Park protests was reported by editors
and journalists in the mainstream media (Corke et al. 2014, p. 9). The words of one such
journalist, Can Dündar, who was fired in August 2013 from Milliyet, also reflect the pressure
from the government on the media: ‘They told me at [Milliyet], I don’t want news that will
irritate the prime minister, but I don’t know what news will irritate him. Anything can be
irritating, and once we irritate them they fire us’ (Corke et al. 2014, p. 9). In November 2015,
Dündar was imprisoned along with another journalist, Ekrem Gül, on allegations of espionage
and divulging state secrets through the media, due to reports in the Cumhuriyet newspaper
on the search of MİT (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı – National Intelligence Agency) trucks heading
to Syria (Guardian 2015).
After the Gezi Park protests, media freedom further deteriorated due to new legal
amendments and other developments (Freedom House 2015). In April 2014, an amendment
to the Law on State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence was adopted. The
amendment extended the powers of the MİT and instituted a clause to imprison media
workers for up to nine years if they published leaked intelligence material (Freedom House
2015). Recent years have also demonstrated a decrease in Turkish media freedom through
incidents including: increasing numbers of convictions of journalists, primarily due to
defamation; deportations of journalists (e.g. the deportation of Azerbaijani journalist and
Today’s Zaman columnist, Mahir Zeynalov); raids on media outlets (e.g. Zaman newspaper
known to have close ties with the Gülen Movement); arrests of journalists (e.g. the General
Manager of the Samanyolu Broadcasting Group – known to be close to the Gülen Movement
– in 2014); firing of journalists for critical reporting (e.g. the resignation or forced resignation
of the editor-in-chief of Hürriyet newspaper, Enis Berberoğlu); censorship and self-censorship
in both public and private media outlets; biased coverage (e.g. public television TRT’s
disproportionate coverage of the AKP in the 2014 local elections); blocking of several
websites, such as Twitter in 2014; discriminatory and selective media accreditation; and
 South European Society and Politics   159

Table 6. Developments in Turkish media freedom, 2011–15.

Positive Europeanisation
2011 new Broadcasting Law
2012 third judicial reform package
Source: Developed by the author.
Negative de-Europeanisation
2014 Internet Law imposing restrictions
Increasing judicial cases against media workers
Increasing firings of journalists
Forcing journalists to resign
Increasing imprisonment of journalists and media workers
Increasing censorship and self-censorship
Increasing bans on the internet (bans or blocking of
websites)
Increasing warnings and fines to media outlets about their
broadcasting from the RTÜK
Selective justice
Prosecutions of journalists
Banning and restriction of various websites

media blackouts on information regarding sensitive issues (e.g. terrorist attacks in Ankara
and Suruç) (European Commission 2015; Freedom House 2015). Such developments in the
Turkish media signify a trend of de-Europeanisation in the country in this era.
All in all, as the Progress Reports by the European Commission (2015, p. 7) stress, reforms fall
short regarding the freedom of expression and of the press, and ‘media freedom [remains] an area
of serious concern’ (see Table 6). The change across time in press freedom mapped by Freedom
House for the period 2002–15 (data not available for the 1999–2002 period) demonstrates this
as well (see Table 3). The table shows considerable improvement in Turkey’s press freedom score
in 2002–06, deterioration in 2007–10 and a very dramatic decrease in press freedom in 2011–15.

Conclusions: from Europeanisation to de-Europeanisation

Europeanisation, transforming countries within and beyond the EU, has proved a great
success in the last decades, although the research on this process remains somewhat limited
due to its focus on positive outcomes. However, the case of Turkey demonstrates adverse
consequences of Europeanisation, namely de-Europeanisation.
This article has explored if and to what extent the media in Turkey have been Europeanised
or de-Europeanised. The analysis has demonstrated a shift across time from Europeanisation
to de-Europeanisation in media freedom, the EU losing its role as a reference point for limited
legislative reforms, and the increasing violation of EU norms and values in the sphere of
implementation. Interestingly, the case of media freedom denotes not only a trend towards
de-Europeanisation but also a simultaneous process of selective Europeanisation from a legal
point of view. Such a process has also been observed in other cases examined in this volume
(see Saatçioğlu 2016). This simultaneous process in various cases in Turkey’s Europeanisation
suggests the primacy of the political preferences of the Turkish government, which may
choose to cherry-pick reforms in either direction (i.e. Europeanisation or de-Europeanisation)
in line with its political agenda (Yılmaz 2016).

Note
1. 
The Ergenekon case is a judicial case, launched in 2008, charging military officials and civilians
for plotting military intervention against the government.
160    G. Yılmaz

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor
Gözde Yılmaz is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at Atılım University,
Turkey. She received her PhD from the Department of Political Science at Freie Universität Berlin. Her
research focuses on Europeanisation theories, Europeanisation and domestic change, EU Enlargement
policy, ENP and the Europeanisation of Turkey and Ukraine.

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