Other References:

• A.M.No.99-10-09-SC--dated25Jan.2000--procedurein securing SW in heinouscrimes

• RANo.10175--Anti-CyberCrimePreventionActof2012

Notable Cases Involving Search, Seizures and Arrests

Nature of the Proceedings:

• United Laboratories, Inc. versus Isip, 461 SCRA574

Facts:
Rolando H. Besarra, Special Investigator III of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), filed an application, in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, for the issuance of a search warrant concerning the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building, located at
No. 1571, Aragon Street (formerly No. 1524, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila) occupied and/or used by Shalimar Philippines,
owned/operated by Ernesto Isip; and for the seizure for the violation of Section 4(a), in relation to Section 8, of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8203. The Search Warrant is crystal clear: The seizing officers were only authorized to take possession of "finished or unfinished
products of United Laboratories (UNILAB), particularly REVICON Multivitamins, and documents evidencing the counterfeit nature
of said products. 

Issue:
Whether the search conducted by the NBI officers of the first and second floors of the Shalimar building and the seizure of the sealed
boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid?

Ruling:
NO. We agree with the petitioner’s contention that a search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action 37 or the
commencement of a prosecution.38 The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get possession
of personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity. It
resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John Doe proceedings. 39 While an application for a search warrant is
entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an action.

A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to procure relevant evidence
of crime.40 It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. 41 A search warrant is a police weapon,
issued under the police power. A search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the Philippines. 42

The incriminating nature of the evidence becomes apparent in the course of the search, without the benefit of any unlawful search or
seizure. It must be apparent at the moment of seizure. In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to
prove the essential requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine.

• Chemise Lacoste versus Fernandez, 214 Phil.332

Facts:
La chemise Lacoste is a French corporation and the actual owner of the trademarks “Lacoste,” “Chemise Lacoste,” “Crocodile
Device” and a composite mark consisting of the word “Lacoste” and a representation of a crocodile/alligator, used on clothings and
other goods sold in many parts of the world and which has been marketed in the Philippines (notably by Rustans) since 1964.  In 1975
and 1977, Hemandas Q. Co. was issued certificate of registration for the trademark “Chemise Lacoste and Q Crocodile Device” both
in the supplemental and Principal Registry.In 1980, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed for the registration of the “Crocodile device” and
“Lacoste”. Games and Garments (GobindramHemandas, assignee of HemandasQ.Co.) opposed the registration of “Lacoste.” In 1983,
La Chemise Lacoste filed with the NBI a letter-complaint alleging acts of unfair competition committed by Hemandas and requesting
the agency’s assistance.A search warrant was issued by the trial court. Various goods and articles were seized upon the execution of
the warrants.Hemandas filed motion to quash the warrants, which the court granted. The search warrants were recalled, and the goods
ordered to be returned.La Chemise Lacoste filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge erred in issuing the Search Warrant?

HELD:
NO. The records show that the NBI agents at the hearing of the application for the warrants before respondent court presented three
witnesses under oath, sworn statements, and various exhibits in the form of clothing apparels manufactured by Hemandas but carrying
the trademark Lacoste. The respondent court personally interrogated Ramon Esguerra, Samuel Fiji, and MamertoEspatero by means of
searching questions. After hearing the testimonies and examining the documentary evidence, the respondent court was convinced that
there were good and sufficient reasons for the issuance of the warrant. And it then issued the warrant.

The respondent court, therefore, complied with the constitutional and statutory requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant.
At that point in time, it was fully convinced that there existed probable cause. But after hearing the motion to quash and the
oppositions thereto, the respondent court executed a complete turnabout and declared that there was no probable cause to justify its
earlier issuance of the warrants.
• SantosversusPryceGases,GR165122,23Nov.2007

Facts:
PO2 Vicente D. Demandara, Jr. applied before the RTC of Iloilo City for a warrant to search the premises described as No. 130,
Timawa Avenue, Molo, Iloilo. The application alleged that petitioner was in possession of Pryce LPG tanks, the Pryce logos of some
of which were scraped off and replaced with a Sun Gas, Inc. marking, and other materials used in tampering Pryce gas tanks. 4 It also
averred that petitioner was illegally distributing Pryce LPG products without the consent of respondent, in violation of Section 2 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 623,5 as amended by R.A. No. 5700.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash 9 the search warrant on the grounds of lack of probable cause as well as deception and fraud
employed in obtaining evidence in support of the application therefor, in violation of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and
Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court. Respondent opposed petitioner’s Motion to Quash.

Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari, 14 arguing that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in quashing the search warrant. The petition essentially questioned the quashal of the search warrant despite
a prior finding of probable cause and the failure of petitioner to prove that he bought the seized items from respondent. It also
challenged petitioner’s personality to file the motion to quash.

Issue:
Whether or not CA’s order to return the LPG’s was proper?

Ruling:

NO. The Court of Appeals, however, erred in ordering the return of the seized items to respondent. 1âwphi1 Section 4, Rule 12629 of
the Revised Criminal Procedure expressly mandates the delivery of the seized items to the judge who issued the search warrant to be
kept in custodia legis in anticipation of the criminal proceedings against petitioner. The delivery of the items seized to the court which
issued the warrant together with a true and accurate inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is mandatory in order to preclude the
substitution of said items by interested parties. The judge who issued the search warrant is mandated to ensure compliance with the
requirements for (1) the issuance of a detailed receipt for the property received, (2) delivery of the seized property to the court,
together with (3) a verified true inventory of the items seized. Any violation of the foregoing constitutes contempt of court.

The CIDG operatives properly delivered the seized items to the custody of the trial court which issued the search warrant. Thereafter,
the trial court ordered their return to petitioner after quashing the search warrant. When the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
quashal of the search warrant, it erred in ordering the return of the seized items to respondent because it would seem that respondent
instituted the special civil action for certiorari in order to regainpossession of its LPG tanks. This cannot be countenanced. The seized
items should remain in the custody of the trial court which issued the search warrant pending the institution of criminal action against
petitioner.

Who may apply for and who may issue SW:

• MarimlaversusPeople,G.R.No.158467,16Oct.2009

Facts:
On February 15, 2002, Special Investigator (SI) Ray C. Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division filed two (2) applications
for search warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking permission to search: (1) petitioners’ house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta.
Trinidad, Angeles City3 and (2) the premises on Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga, 4 both for Violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended. The said applications uniformly alleged that SI Lagasca’s
request for the issuance of the search warrants was founded on his personal knowledge as well as that of witness Roland D. Fernandez
(Fernandez), obtained after a series of surveillance operations and a test buy made at petitioners’ house. 

Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant on the ground that the application of the SW was filed outside the territorial
jurisdiction and judicial region of the Court. Judge Omar Viola denied the said Motion.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Orders dated September 6, 2002 and April 21, 2003, denying petitioners’ Motion to Quash Search Warrant?

Ruling:
NO. The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 22 In this
case, the Court opts to take cognizance of the petition, as it involves the application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the
exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution.23

At the heart of the present controversy are A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application for the Enforceability
of Search Warrants, which was enacted on January 25, 2000; and A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
which took effect on December 1, 2000, specifically, Section 2, Rule 126 thereof. We quote the pertinent portions of the two issuances
below:

[Administrative Matter No. 99-10-09-SC] Resolution Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application for the Enforceability of Search
Warrants

In the interest of an effective administration of justice and pursuant to the powers vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution, the
following are authorized to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and
illegal possession of firearms.

The Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Manila and Quezon City filed by the Philippine National
Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and the
Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF) with the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City.

The applications shall be personally endorsed by the Heads of the said agencies, for the search of places to be particularly described
therein, and the seizure of property of things as prescribed in the Rules of Court, and to issue the warrants of arrest, if justified, which
may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of said courts.

[TAKE NOTE!!! Gi discuss nini Atty. Galgo during class. Take note of AM # 99-10-09-SC as an Exception of Section 2, Rule
126 ROC]

This Section shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. (italics ours)

In sum, we cannot find any irregularity or abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Omar T. Viola for denying petitioners’ Motion to
Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized. On the contrary, Judge Guariña III had complied with the
procedural and substantive requirements for issuing the questioned search warrant.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 6, 2002 and April 21, 2003, both issued
by respondent Judge Omar T. Viola of the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57, are hereby AFFIRMED.

Issuance of SW and Probable Cause:

• SantosversusPryceGases,GR165122,23Nov.2007
(Repeated case pero ang issue is on probable cause)

Facts:
Facts:
PO2 Vicente D. Demandara, Jr. applied before the RTC of Iloilo City for a warrant to search the premises described as No. 130,
Timawa Avenue, Molo, Iloilo. The application alleged that petitioner was in possession of Pryce LPG tanks, the Pryce logos of some
of which were scraped off and replaced with a Sun Gas, Inc. marking, and other materials used in tampering Pryce gas tanks. 4 It also
averred that petitioner was illegally distributing Pryce LPG products without the consent of respondent, in violation of Section 2 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 623,5 as amended by R.A. No. 5700.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash 9 the search warrant on the grounds of lack of probable cause as well as deception and fraud
employed in obtaining evidence in support of the application therefor, in violation of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and
Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court. Respondent opposed petitioner’s Motion to Quash. RTC granted the motion and
quashed the SW.

Issue:
WON RTC erred in issuing the SW for lack of probable cause?

Ruling:
NO. Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides with more particularity the requisites in issuing a
search warrant, viz:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.

Indeed, the aforesaid facts and circumstances are sufficient to establish probable cause. It should be borne in mind that the
determination of probable cause does not call for the application of the rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction
requires after trial on the merits. As the term implies, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral
certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full blown
trial.3

• ManlySportwearversusDadodetteEnterprises,470SCRA384

Facts:
On March 14, 2003, Special Investigator Eliezer P. Salcedo of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) applied for a search warrant
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, based on the information that Dadodette Enterprises and/or Hermes Sports
Center were in possession of goods, the copyright of which belonged to Manly Sportswear Mfg., Inc. (MANLY). 5 After finding
reasonable grounds that a violation of Sections 172 and 217 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293 6 has been committed, Judge Estrella T.
Estrada of RTC-Quezon City, Branch 83, issued on March 17, 2003 Search Warrant.

After denial of its motion for reconsideration on September 15, 2004, MANLY filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising
the sole issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in
declaring in the hearing for the quashal of the search warrant that the copyrighted products of MANLY are not original creations
subject to the protection of RA 8293.

Issue:
WON Manly Sportwear’s contention is correct?

Ruling:
NO. The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested with the trial judges in the exercise of their judicial function. 11 As such,
the power to quash the same also rests solely with them. After the judge has issued a warrant, he is not precluded to subsequently
quash the same, if he finds upon reevaluation of the evidence that no probable cause exists.

In the instant case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it entertained the motion to quash considering that no
criminal action has yet been instituted when it was filed. The trial court also properly quashed the search warrant it earlier issued after
finding upon reevaluation of the evidence that no probable cause exists to justify its issuance in the first place. As ruled by the trial
court, the copyrighted products do not appear to be original creations of MANLY and are not among the classes of work enumerated
under Section 172 of RA 8293. The trial court, thus, may not be faulted for overturning its initial assessment that there was probable
cause in view of its inherent power to issue search warrants and to quash the same. No objection may be validly posed to an order
quashing a warrant already issued as the court must be provided with the opportunity to correct itself of an error unwittingly
committed, or, with like effect, to allow the aggrieved party the chance to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous.

• SketchersUSAversusInterPacificIndustrialTrading,509SCRA 395

Facts:
The present controversy arose when petitioner filed with Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila an application for the
issuance of search warrants against an outlet and warehouse operated by respondents for infringement of trademark under Section 155,
in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. 2 In the
course of its business, petitioner has registered the trademark "SKECHERS" 3 and the trademark "S" (within an oval design) 4 with the
Intellectual Property Office (IPO). Two search warrants5 were issued by the RTC and were served on the premises of respondents. As
a result of the raid, more than 6,000 pairs of shoes bearing the "S" logo were seized. Later, respondents moved to quash the search
warrants, arguing that there was no confusing similarity between petitioner’s "Skechers" rubber shoes and its "Strong" rubber shoes.
RTC denied said motion. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

Issue:
WON COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SEARCH WARRANT COURT ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW IN HOLDING THAT
THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT?

Ruling:
YES. This Court cannot agree with the observation of the CA that the use of the letter "S" could hardly be considered as highly
identifiable to the products of petitioner alone. The CA even supported its conclusion by stating that the letter "S" has been used in so
many existing trademarks, the most popular of which is the trademark "S" enclosed by an inverted triangle, which the CA says is
identifiable to Superman. Such reasoning, however, misses the entire point, which is that respondent had used a stylized "S," which is
the same stylized "S" which petitioner has a registered trademark for. The letter "S" used in the Superman logo, on the other hand, has
a block-like tip on the upper portion and a round elongated tip on the lower portion. Accordingly, the comparison made by the CA of
the letter "S" used in the Superman trademark with petitioner’s stylized "S" is not appropriate to the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 30, 2006 is
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.

• PeopleversusEstelaTuan,GR176066,11Aug.2010

Facts:
SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. At around one o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, he gave
Tudlong and Lad-ing₱300.00 to buy marijuana, and then accompanied the two informants to the accused-appellant’s house. Tudlong
and Lad-ing entered accused-appellant’s house, while SPO2 Fernandez waited at the adjacent house. After thirty minutes, Tudlong
and Lad-ing came out of accused-appellant’s house and showed SPO2 Fernandez the marijuana leaves they bought. After returning to
the CIDG regional office, SPO2 Fernandez requested the laboratory examination of the leaves bought from accused-appellant. When
said laboratory examination yielded positive results for marijuana, SPO2 Fernandez prepared an Application for Search Warrant for
accused-appellant’s house. Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing, after which, she issued a
Search Warrant, being satisfied of the existence of probable cause.

Issue:
WON the SW issued was issued validly based on probable cause?

Ruling:
YES. A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court,
as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought
out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. 37 Such substantial basis exists
in this case.

Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for accused-appellant’s residence after said judge’s personal
examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants.

• JosefinoRoanversusHon.RomuloGonzales,GR71410,25 Nov.1986
Facts:
The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. 2 The petitioner's house was searched two days
later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises
one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the
petitioner. To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge or some other authorized
officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. No less important, there must be a specific description of
the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. 5

Issue:
WON the SW is valid based on probable cause?

Ruling:
NO. It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant and articles may be taken validly as a
result of that search. For example, a warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, 22 as when the person being arrested
is frished for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent
smuggling of aliens and contraband 23 and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause. 24 Vessels and aircraft are also
traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's
jurisdiction. 25 The individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an illegal search. 26 And it has also been held
that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon them
inadvertently. 27

Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The respondents cannot even claim that they
stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is that these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they
were taken. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner's pistol and
bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle. The SW was declared null and void.

• Yao Sr. versus People, GR 168306, 19 June2007

Facts:
On 3 April 2003, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent Ritche N. Oblanca (Oblanca) filed two applications for search warrant
with the RTC, Branch 17, Cavite City, against petitioners and other occupants of the MASAGANA compound located at Governor’s
Drive, Barangay Lapidario, TreceMartires, Cavite City, for alleged violation of Section 155, in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act
No. 8293, otherwise known as "The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines." 8 The two applications for search warrant uniformly
alleged that per information, belief, and personal verification of Oblanca, the petitioners are actually producing, selling, offering for
sale and/or distributing LPG products using steel cylinders owned by, and bearing the tradenames, trademarks, and devices of Petron
and Pilipinas Shell, without authority and in violation of the rights.

Issue:
WON the requirement of giving a particular description of the place to be search was complied with?

Ruling:
YES. The long standing rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or
description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to
it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. 41

Moreover, in the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has
been held that the executing officer’s prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be
especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had been issued, and when he knows that the
judge who issued the warrant intended the compound described in the affidavit.42

• ElidadKhoversusHon.EnricoLanzanas,489SCRA445

Facts:
Shun Yih Chemistry Factory (SYCF), a business existing and operating in Taiwan and engaged in the manufacture and sale of Chin
Chun Su Creams/Cosmetics, appointed Young Factor Enterprises in the Philippines, owned and operated by Quintin Cheng also
known as Kho Seng Hiok, as its distributor of Chin Chun Su products in the Philippines. Summerville General Merchandising applied
for the issuance of a search warrant against the Spouses Elidad and Violeta Kho and Roger Kho, since they persisted in manufacturing
and selling Chin Chun Su products despite the BFAD order directing them to refrain from doing so. Elidad, Violeta and Roger Kho
filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 7, a motion to quash the search warrant and for the return of the items unlawfully seized. The
motion was opposed by Summerville General Merchandising which was denied.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE INFORMATION
FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IN BRANCH 1 OF RTC-MANILA AS A RESULT OF THE
RESOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSE?

Ruling:
NO. In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. It being the duty of the issuing officer to issue, or refuse to issue, the warrant as soon as
practicable after the application therefor is filed, the facts warranting the conclusion of probable cause must be assessed at the time of
such judicial determination by necessarily using legal standards then set forth in law and jurisprudence, and not those that have yet to
be crafted thereafter.

Clearly, probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant as shown by the affidavits of the above affiants who had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that an offense involving violation of intellectual property rights was being committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The surveillance conducted by SPO4
NeditaBalagbis on the basis of reliable information that Elidad, Violeta and Roger Kho were engaged in the illegal manufacture and
sale of fake Chin Chun Su products enabled her to gain personal knowledge of the illegal activities of the Khos. 53 This fact was
sufficient justification for the examining judge, in this case Judge Lanzanas, to conclude that there was probable cause for the issuance
of the search warrant.

• PeopleversusOliveMamaril,GR171980,06Oct.2010

Facts:
On 25 March 2003, at 9:30 o’ clock in the evening the police officers arrived at appellant’s house and showed her a search warrant.
Thereafter, the policemen searched her house but found nothing. Then a certain Police Officer Pangilinan asked her where she was
sleeping. When she replied that she was inside the hut, the police officers proceeded to and searched the place and found the plastic
sachet containing the shabu.

The contention of the accused-appellant, as asserted through the Public Attorney’s Office, is that the issued search warrant was not
based on probable cause.36 The accused-appellant relied heavily on its argument that SPO4 Gotidoc, as the applicant of the search
warrant, did not testify on facts personally known to him but simply relied on stories that the accused- appellant was peddling illegal
drugs.

Issue:
WON the SW issued was issued validly based on probable cause?

Ruling:
YES. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Section 6, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that:

If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they
exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)It is presumed
that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s determination of a probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid with great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for
that determination.

• CentralBankversusMorfe,20SCRA507,L-20119,30June 1967

Facts:
Governor of the Bank directed the coordination of "the investigation and gathering of evidence on the activities of the savings and
loan associations which are operating contrary to law." Soon thereafter, or on May 18, 1962, a member of the intelligence division of
the Bank filed with the Municipal Court of Manila a verified application for a search warrant against the Organization, alleging that
"after close observation and personal investigation, the premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila" — in which the offices of the
Organization were housed — "are being used unlawfully," because said Organization is illegally engaged in banking activities, "by
receiving deposits of money for deposit, disbursement, safekeeping or otherwise or transacts the business of a savings and mortgage
bank and/or building and loan association . . . without having first complied with the provisions of Republic Act No. 337"

Issue:
WON the SW issued was issued validly based on probable cause?

Ruling:
NO. Organization does not seriously contest the main facts, upon which the action of the Bank is based. The principal issue raised by
the Organization is predicated upon the theory that the aforementioned transactions of the Organization do not amount to " banking,"
as the term is used in Republic Act No. 337. We are satisfied, however, in the light of the circumstance obtaining in this case, that the
Municipal Judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was probable cause that the Organization had
violated Sections 2 and 6 of the aforesaid law and in issuing the warrant in question, and that, accordingly, and in line with  Alverez vs.
Court of First Instance (64 Phil. 33), the search and seizure complained of have not been proven to be unreasonable.

• United Laboratories, Inc. versus Isip, 461 SCRA574

Facts:
Rolando H. Besarra, Special Investigator III of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), filed an application, in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, for the issuance of a search warrant concerning the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building, located at
No. 1571, Aragon Street (formerly No. 1524, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila) occupied and/or used by Shalimar Philippines,
owned/operated by Ernesto Isip; and for the seizure for the violation of Section 4(a), in relation to Section 8, of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8203. The Search Warrant is crystal clear: The seizing officers were only authorized to take possession of "finished or unfinished
products of United Laboratories (UNILAB), particularly REVICON Multivitamins, and documents evidencing the counterfeit nature
of said products. 

Issue:
WON the SW issued was issued validly based on probable cause?

Ruling:
NO. The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of discovery of the object or the facts therein
available to him, determine probable cause of the object’s incriminating evidence. 57 In other words, to be immediate, probable cause
must be the direct result of the officer’s instantaneous sensory perception of the object. 58 The object is apparent if the executing officer
had probable cause to connect the object to criminal activity. The incriminating nature of the evidence becomes apparent in the course
of the search, without the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It must be apparent at the moment of seizure.

Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would warrant a
man of reasonable caution and belief that certain items may be contrabanded or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime. It
does not require proof that such belief be correct or more likely than true. A practical, non-traditional probability that incriminating
evidence is involved is all that is required. The evidence thus collected must be seen and verified as understood by those experienced
in the field of law enforcement.64

• BernardNalaversusJudgeBarroso,Jr.,GR153087,07Aug. 2003&

Facts:
On June 25, 2001, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser applied for the issuance of a warrant to search the person and residence of petitioner
Bernard R. Nala, who was referred to in the application as "Rumolo8 Nala alias Long"9 of "Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao,
Bukidnon."10 The application was filed in connection with petitioner’s alleged illegal possession of one caliber .22 magnum and one 9
mm. pistol in violation of Republic Act No. 8294, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1866, or the law on Illegal Possession of
Firearms. On the same day, after examining Alcoser and his witness Ruel Nalagon, respondent Presiding Judge of RTC of Malaybalay
City, Branch 10, issued Search and Seizure Warrant No. 30-01, against "Romulo Nala alias Lolong Nala who is said to be residing at
Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon."

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion13 seeking to – (1) quash Search and Seizure Warrant No. 30-01; (2) declare inadmissible for any
purpose the items allegedly seized under the said warrant; and (3) direct the release of the air rifle seized by the police officers.

Issue:
Was there probable cause for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant against petitioner?

Ruling:
NO. In the case at bar, the search and seizure warrant was issued in connection with the offense of illegal possession of firearms, the
elements of which are – (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not
have the license or permit to possess the same. 26 Probable cause as applied to illegal possession of firearms would therefore be such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a person is in possession of a firearm
and that he does not have the license or permit to possess the same. Nowhere, however, in the affidavit and testimony of witness Ruel
Nalagon nor in PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser’s application for the issuance of a search warrant was it mentioned that petitioner had no
license to possess a firearm. 

• BernardoBetoySr.versusMamertoColiflores,MTJ-05-1608,28 Feb. 2006

Facts:
Petitioner alleges that the SEARCH & SEIZURE ORDER (S/W #0854) dated September 17, 1999 by the Honorable Judge
MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES should be declared NULL & VOID because it violates the CONSTITUTION, the fact issuance of it
solely relies (sic) on the mere affidavits of deponents police officers which should be considered hearsay and not information
personally known to the responding (sic) judge as required by settled jurisprudence through examination with probing and exhaustive
questions of witnesses in determining probable cause in order for the Honorable Judge to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of
the WARRANT and therefore hold liable for PERJURY the herein respondent police officers, CESAR KYAMKO ARQUILLANO et
al. for false declaration.

Issue:
WON the SW issued was issued validly based on probable cause?

Ruling:
YES. In the case at bar, the search and seizure warrant was issued in connection with the offense of illegal possession of firearms, the
elements of which are – (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not
have the license or permit to possess the same. Probable cause as applied to illegal possession of firearms would therefore be such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a person is in possession of a firearm
and that he does not have the license or permit to possess the same.

• FrankUyversusBureauofInternalRevenue,G.R.No.129651, 20 Oct.2000

Facts:
On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing
Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of the BIR, applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish. Thus, three (3) search warrants
were issued for three different violations.

On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the Philippine National Police, on 2 October 1993,
searched the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of petitioner
corporation. A return of said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.

On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants with Branch 28 of the Cebu RTC. The RTC,
however, denied petitioners' motions to quash as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the subject search warrants and that two warrants were
issued for one time for one crime and for one place.

Issue:
WON the SW issued was issued validly based on probable cause?

Ruling:
YES. In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court require an examination of the witnesses under
oath. The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma. The examining magistrate must not simply
rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. 25 Asking of leading
questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy
the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.

The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners’ submission, the inquiries made by the judge were far from leading or being a
rehash of the witness’ affidavit. We find such inquiries to be sufficiently probing.
Descriptionofpersonorplacetobesearchedanditemsthat may beseized:

• PeopleversusRaulNunez,GR177148,30June2009

Facts:
Before proceeding to appellant’s residence in Barangay San Antonio, the group summoned Barangay Captain Mario
Mundin and Chief Tanod Alfredo Joaquin to assist them in serving the search warrant. Upon arriving at appellant’s
house, Mundin called on appellant to come out. Thereafter, Commanding Officer Pagkalinawan showed Nuñez the
warrant. SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Crisostomo then surveyed appellant’s room in his presence while his family, PO2
Ortega and the two barangay officials remained in the living room. SPO1 Ilagan found thirty-one (31) packets of
shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters, and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a lady’s wallet containing
₱4,610 inside appellant’s dresser. The group also confiscated a component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill,
jigsaw, electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in exchange for shabu.
Following the search, SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property Seized 6 and a Certification of Orderly Search 7 which
appellant signed.

Appellant insists that the shabu found in his room was planted. More importantly, appellant assails the validity of the
search warrant as it did not indicate his exact address but only the barangay and street of his residence . He
maintains that none of the occupants witnessed the search as they were all kept in the living room. Finally, appellant
questions why the prosecution did not call the barangay officials as witnesses to shed light on the details of the search.

Issue:
Whether or not the search may be considered invalid for the reason that it did not indicate the exact address?

Whether or not the authorities have properly confiscated the things described in the SW?

Ruling:
1. NO. As a rule, the warrant must sufficiently describe the premises to be searched so that the officer
executing the warrant may, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended.

2. As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by the authorities. 23 In
the case at bar, Search Warrant No. 42 24 specifically authorized the taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
and paraphernalia(s) only. By the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class or
kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar
nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statement which would repel
such inference.25

Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search conducted. Certainly, the lady’s wallet, cash,
grinder, camera, component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not
encompassed by the word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing the said
items then, the police officers exercised their own discretion and determined for themselves which items in appellant’s
residence they believed were "proceeds of the crime" or "means of committing the offense." This is, in our view,
absolutely impermissible.26

The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to
limit the things to be taken to those, and only those particularly described in the search warrant  -- to leave the officers
of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority
empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to a crime. 27 Accordingly, the objects taken which were not specified in the search warrant should be restored
to appellant.1avvphi1

• FrankUyversusBureauofInternalRevenue,G.R.No.129651, 20 Oct.2000

Facts:
On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners
Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities constituting violations of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of the BIR,
applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The application sought permission to
search the premises of Unifish. Thus, three (3) search warrants were issued for three different violations.

On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the Philippine National Police, on 2
October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records
and documents of petitioner corporation. A return of said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of
Cebu , Branch 28.

On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants with Branch 28 of the Cebu RTC.
The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to quash as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the subject search warrants and that two
warrants were issued for one time for one crime and for one place.

Issue:
WON the SWs are valid?

Ruling:
YES. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil, 384); or when the description expresses
a conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem.,
dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense
for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court).

• PeopleversusModestoTee,G.R.Nos.140546-47,20Jan.2003

Facts:

Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by
operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP
NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana.

On July 20, 1998, appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and that the NBI
had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The pendency of said motion,
however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges against appellant.

Appellant initially contends that the warrant, which directed the peace officers to search for and seize "an
undetermined amount of marijuana," was too general and hence, void for vagueness. He insists that Abratique could
already estimate the amount of marijuana supposed to be found at appellant’s residence since Abratique helped to
transport the same.

Issue:
WON the SW issued is valid?

Ruling:
YES.The search warrant in the present case, given its nearly similar wording, "undetermined amount of marijuana or
Indian hemp," in our view, has satisfied the Constitution’s requirements on particularity of description. The description
therein is: (1) as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2) expresses a conclusion of fact – not of law –
by which the peace officers may be guided in making the search and seizure; and (3) limits the things to be seized to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. 40 Said warrant imposes a
meaningful restriction upon the objects to be seized by the officers serving the warrant. Thus, it prevents exploratory
searches, which might be violative of the Bill of Rights.

• AndyQuelnanversusPeople,G.R.No.166061,06July2007

Facts:
On 27 August 1996, a team from the Police Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), composed of Chief Inspector Carlos Acosta, SPO4 IsaganiIlas, SPO2
Manubay, SPO2 Sanggalang, SPO2 Teodoro Sinag, SPO2 Mario Magno, SPO2 de Leon, SPO2 Cecil Fajardo, SPO3
Marcelo Alcancia, SPO3 Dennis Zarcal, and PO1 Eraldo Lectura, 6 was formed to implement a search warrant issued
by the RTC of Manila on 26 August 1996.

At around 3:00 p.m., the team proceeded to the Cityland Condominium in South Superhighway, Makati. Upon arrival,
they went directly to the Security Office of said building to seek assistance in serving the warrant. Security Officer
CeledonioPunsaran (Punsaran) accompanied the group and they proceeded to Unit 615.

That on or about the 27th day of August, [sic] 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control 27.7458 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu), a regulated drug.

Meanwhile, the group also went to Unit 418 of the same building to serve the warrant and search the place. The police
operatives did not find any occupant in the room.

Issue:
Whether the search warrant was properly enforced?

Ruling:
YES.Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the requisites for the issuance of
search warrant, to wit:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Nowhere in said rule or any other provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is it required that the search
warrant must name the person who occupies the described premises.

• Pangandaman versus Casar, GR 71782, 14 Apr.1988

Facts:
On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at least five persons dead
and two others wounded. What in fact transpired is still unclear. According to one version, armed men had attacked a
residence in Pantao, Masiu, with both attackers and defenders suffering casualties. 4 Another version has it that a group
that was on its way to another place, Lalabuan, also in Masiu, had been ambushed.

The petitioners further assert that the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation of the charges "... in
total disregard of the Provincial Fiscal ..." who, as said respondent well knew, had already taken cognizance of the
matter twelve (12) days earlier and was poised to conduct his own investigation of the same; 17 and that issuance of a
warrant of arrest against fifty (50) "John Does" transgressed the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants
should particularly describe the persons or things to be seized.18

Issue:
WON the said seizure is valid?

Ruling:
NO. Upon the facts and the law, therefore, the warrant of arrest in question validly issued against the petitioners, such
issuance having been ordered after proceedings, to which no irregularity has been shown to attach, in which the
respondent Judge found sufficient cause to commit the petitioners to answer for the crime complained of.

Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) "John Does" not one of whom the witnesses to the
complaint could or would Identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as
unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." 30 Clearly violative of the
constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized, 31 the
warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.

• People versus Veloso, 48 Phil.169

Facts:
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling
house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified
this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied
for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to
raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found the doors to
the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone
pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.

Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the
defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read
it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search
the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it
contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five minutes
was consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on searching Veloso,
and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search.

Issue:
WON the search warrant and the arrest of Veloso was valid?

Ruling:
YES! The search warrant was valid. The defendant has been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of
resistance of agents of the authority.The affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself describes the
building to be searched as “the building No.124 Calle Arzobispo , City of Manila, Philippine Islands.” This,
without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. It is the prevailing rule that a description of
the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify
the place intended. The description in the warrant was sufficient and indicated clearly the proper person upon whom
the warrant is to be served. The search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the
building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the
manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.

• UyKheytin versus Villareal, 42 Phil.886*

Facts:
Ramon Gayanilo, corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, presented to the judge of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo an application for search warrant, stating in his application; "That in the house of Chino UyKheytin, Sto. Niño
St., No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing desk in his store, there is kept a certain amount of opium." Upon that application
the said judge, on the same day, issued a search warrant. Armed with that search warrant, the respondent M. S.
Torralba, accompanied by some of his subordinates, on the same day (April 30th) searched the house of the petitioner
UyKheytin and found therein 60 small cans of opium. They wanted to search also the bodega on the ground-floor of
the house, but UyKheytin positively denied that it was his or that he rented it. Lieutenant Torralba wanted to be sure,
and for this reason he placed a guard in the premises to see that nothing was removed therefrom, and then went away
to find out who the owner of the bodega was. The next morning he learned from the owner of the house, one Segovia,
of the town of Molo, that the Chinaman UyKheytin was the one who was renting the bodega. Thereupon Lieutenant
Torralba and his subordinates resumed the search and then and there found and seized other articles such as opium
liquid, empty opium containers, opium pipe and the like. Furthermore, officers seized books, papers, etc.

A criminal complaint was filed charging the petitioners with a violation of the Opium Law. They were duly arrested,
and a preliminary investigation was conducted by the justice of the peace, after which he found that there was probable
cause for believing that the crime complained of had been committed and that the defendants were the persons
responsible therefor. Petitioners herein filed a petition in the Court of First Instance, asking for the return of "private
papers, books and other property" which the Constabulary officers had seized from said defendants, upon the ground
that they had been so seized illegally and in violation of the constitutional rights of the defendants. Petitioners contend
that the search was illegal and therefore asking for the return of the items seized.

Issue:
May the opium, books, papers, etc. be returned?

Ruling:
In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant in question in that the judge did not
first examine the complainant or any witnesses under oath. But the property sought to be searched for and seized
having been actually found in the place described by the complainant, reasoning by analogy from the case of an
improper arrest, we are of the opinion that irregularity is not sufficient cause for ordering the return of the opium found
and seized under said warrant, to the petitioners, and exonerating the latter. That the officers of the law believed that
the books, papers, etc., which they seized might be used as evidence against the petitioners herein a criminal action
against them for a violation of the Opium Law, is no reason or justification under the law for the seizure: First, because
they were not "particularly described" or even mentioned in the search warrant; second, because, even if they had been
mentioned in the search warrant, they could not be legally seized, for a search warrant cannot be used for the purpose
of obtaining evidence; and third, because to compel a person to produce his private papers to be used in evidence
against him would be equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself.

From all of the foregoing our conclusions are:

1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with the requirements of
section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium and its paraphernalia
which were found and seized under said warrant, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such
omission of the judge.
2. That the search made on May 1st was a continuation of the search begun on the previous day, and, therefore, did not
require another search warrant.
3. That the seizure of the petitioner's books, letters, telegrams, and other articles which have no inherent relation with
opium and the possession of which is not forbidden by law, was illegal and in violation of the petitioners'
constitutional rights.

Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that each and all of the respondents herein, their assistants or successors,
be, and they hereby are, forbidden from examining or making any use of said books, letters, telegrams, etc., and they
are hereby ordered to immediately return the said articles to the petitioners.

• StonehillversusDiokno,GR19550,19June1957&

Facts:
Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which
they were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as
“the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used
as the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to above as “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”

The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the
Rules of Court for being general warrants.

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two
(2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Issue:
Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the corporation?

Ruling:
With regards to the search issued in the corporation – valid; with regards to the search in the houses – void.

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by
the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.”

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners
herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records
of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat
its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

• Twentieth Century Fox versus CA, 164 SCRA 655&

Facts:
Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation through counsel sought the National Bureau of Investigation's (NBI)
assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection with the latter's anti-film piracy campaign.
Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute a flagrant violation of
Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property).

Armed with the search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized
the items described therein. An inventory of the items seized was made and left with the private respondents.

Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and release seized properties filed by the private respondents, the lower
court issued an order dated October 8, 1985, lifting the three (3) search warrants issued earlier against the private
respondents by the court. The court denied such motion.

Issue:
WON SW is valid?
Ruling:
YES. Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution which substantially reproduces Section 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution on illegal searches and seizures provides to “x xx  particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.”

All in all, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court when it lifted the search warrants it earlier
issued against the private respondents. The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets
which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner
pursuant to P.D. 49. Petition dismissed.

• ColumbiaPicturesCA,262SCRA219(cf.20thCentruryFox Case!!!)

Facts:
As a consequence of a complaint filed by the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., NBI agents
conducted surveillance operations on certain video establishments, among them respondent FGT Video Network, Inc.
(FGT), for “unauthorized sale, rental, reproduction and/or disposition of copyrighted film," a violation of PD 49 (the
old Intellectual Property Law). After an NBI agent was able to have copyrighted motion pictures “Cleopatra” (owned
by 20th Century Fox) and “The Ten Commandments” (owned by Paramount) reproduced in video format in FGT, the
NBI applied for and was able to obtain from the respondent judge the subject Search Warrant 45.

In the course of the implementation of the search warrant in the premises of FGT, the NBI agents found and seized
various video tapes of copyrighted films owned and exclusively distributed by petitioners. Also seized were machines
and equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories, rewinders, tape head cleaners, statements of
order, return slips, video prints, flyers, production orders, and posters.

FGT moved for the release of the seized television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners,
accessories, equipment and other machines or paraphernalia seized by virtue of the subject warrant. It argued that as a
licensed video reproducer, it had the right possess the seized reproduction equipment, which are not illegal  per se, but
are rather exclusively used and intended to be used for reproduction and not in the “sale, lease, distribution or
possession for purposes of sale, lease distribution, circulation or public exhibition of pirated video tapes.”

Finding that FGT was a registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances and under special instructions
and conditions reproducer of videograms and that, therefore, its right to possess and use the seized equipment had been
placed in serious doubt, the lower court ordered the return of the “television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders,
tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines or paraphernalia” to FGT.

Issue:
Did the respondent judge act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the
immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the search warrant?

Ruling:
NO, the respondent judge DID NOT act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering
the immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the search warrant.

Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the test of legality. This is more so because the Court has previously decided a
case dealing with virtually the same kind of search warrant. In 20th Century Fox vs. CA, the Court upheld the legality
of the order of the lower court lifting the search warrant issued under circumstances similar to those obtaining in the
case at bar. A striking similarity between this case and 20th Century Fox is the fact that Search Warrant No. 45,
specifically paragraph (c) thereof describing the articles to be seized, contains an almost identical description as the
warrant issued in the 20th Century Fox case.

The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No. 45 is thus too all-embracing as to include all the
paraphernalia of FGT in the operation of its business. As the search warrant is in the nature of a general one, it is
constitutionally objectionable.

The Court concluded that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering the immediate release
of the enumerated items, but that he was merely correcting his own erroneous conclusions in issuing Search Warrant
No. 45. This can be gleaned from his statement that “. . . the machines and equipment could have been used or
intended to be used in the illegal reproduction of tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films, yet, it cannot be said
with moral certainty that the machines or equipment(s) were used in violating the law by the mere fact that pirated
video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films were reproduced. As already stated, FGT Video Network, Inc. is
a registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances and under special instructions . . . reproducer of
videograms, and as such, it has the right to keep in its possession, maintain and operate reproduction equipment(s) and
paraphernalia(s).”

• YaoSr.versusPeople,525SCRA108,GR168306,19June 2007

Facts:
On 3 April 2003, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent Ritche N. Oblanca (Oblanca) filed two applications for
search warrant with the RTC, Branch 17, Cavite City, against petitioners and other occupants of the MASAGANA
compound located at Governor’s Drive, Barangay Lapidario, TreceMartires, Cavite City, for alleged violation of
Section 155, in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as "The Intellectual Property Code
of the Philippines."8 The two applications for search warrant uniformly alleged that per information, belief, and
personal verification of Oblanca, the petitioners are actually producing, selling, offering for sale and/or distributing
LPG products using steel cylinders owned by, and bearing the tradenames, trademarks, and devices of Petron and
Pilipinas Shell, without authority and in violation of the rights.

Issue:
WON the requirement of giving a particular description of the place to be search was complied with?

Ruling:
YES. The long standing rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. 41

Moreover, in the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient
particularity, it has been held that the executing officer’s prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is
relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the
warrant had been issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the compound described
in the affidavit.42

• Kho versus Makalintal, 306 SCRA70

Facts:
May 15, 1990 – NBI Agent Salvador applied for a search warrant against Benjamin Kho in his residence at BF Homes,
Paranaque. On the same day NBI Agent Arugay also applied to the same court for a warrant against the Kho for in his
house at Brgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The warrants were applied for after NBI trams had conducted personal
surveillance and investigation in the two houses based on the confidential information they received that the places
were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and “chop-chop” vehicles. NBI sought the issuance of the
warrants in anticipation of criminal cases to be filed against Kho. On the same day, the Judge Makalintal conducted
the necessary examination of the applicants and their witnesses, after which he issued the warrant. May 16, 1990 –
Armed with the search warrant, the NBI agents searched the subject premises and recovered various high-powered
firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition, explosives, and various radio and telecommunication equipment. (In
both houses) The items were confiscated. Upon verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit, the NBI agents
found out that no license has ever been issued to any person/entity for the confiscated items. May 22, 1990 – NBI
submitted separate returns to Judge Makalintal requesting that the items seized be in the continued custody of the NBI.
May 28, 1990 – Petitioners presented a Motion to Quash the said warrants; Judge Makalintal dismissed their petition.

Issue:
 WON the subject search warrants are prohibited under the Constitution for being ‘general warrants’?

Ruling:
NO. Petitioners claim that subject search warrants are general warrants proscribed by the Constitution; that the things
to be seized were not described and detailed out.But the records on hand indicate that the search warrants under
scrutiny specifically describe the items to be seized.The use of the phrase “and the like” is of no moment and does not
make the search warrants in general warrants.The said warrants comply with the Constitutional and statutory
requirements. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to
leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the
applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things are looking for.In this case, the NBI
agents could not have been in the position to know beforehand the exact caliber or make of the firearms to be
seized.Verily, the failure to specify detailed descriptions in the warrants did not render the same general.

Issuance, Form and Implementation of the Search Warrant:

• People versus Court of Appeals,291SCRA400

Facts:
A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which quashed search warrant issued
by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant.
An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his
possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F. BagonBuhay Avenue, Sarang Palay,
San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served not at Abigail
Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani
nationals and the seizure of a number of different explosives and firearms.

Issue: whether or not a search warrant was validly issued.

Ruling:

No. Despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration of the store and the apartments behind
the store, the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the
warrant. Even after having received the warrant — which directs that the search be "limited only to the premises
herein described," "Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207" — thus literally excluding the apartment units at the rear of the
store — they did not ask the Judge to correct said description. They seem to have simply assumed that their own
definite idea of the place to be searched — clearly indicated, according to them, in the sketch they claim to have
submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their application — was sufficient particularization of the general
identification of the place in the search warrant.

It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim
that the place actually searched — although not that specified in the warrant — is exactly what they had in view when
they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence.The place to be searched, as set out in the
warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence
they adduced in support of their application for the warrant.

• People versus Court of Appeals,347SCRA453

Facts:

Operatives of the PNP-CISC were conducting a surveillance of suspected drug-pushing activities at the Regine
Condominium, Makati City. Among their targeted suspects Valentino "Toto" Ortiz. Spotting the latter alighting from
his Cherokee jeep the police officers immediately moved in and accosted him. The officers were able to yield several
firearm and ammunition from the body of Ortiz and his vehicle and they also found shabu. The police then took
private respondent into custody.

Later that same day, the PNP-CISC applied for a search warrant against private respondent for violation of P. D.
18663 . Supporting the application, of two police officers asserts that they had personal knowledge that private
respondent was keeping in his residence several firearms. On the same day, the MTC judge issued Search Warrant.
Armed with aforesaid warrant, a PNP CISC team went to private respondent’s residence in Parañaque at about 7:30
P.M. of the same date and searched the premises.The search resulted in the seizure of the several unlicensed firearms
and ammunition.The investigating state prosecutor ruled the warrantless search of private respondent’s person and jeep
in Makati invalid. However, the prosecutor found the search conducted in Parañaque valid.

Issue:
WON the search conducted in the residence of the private respondent was implemented validly.

Ruling:
Yes.The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime. However, the rule allows an
exception. The policy behind the prohibition of nighttime searches in the absence of specific judicial authorization is
to protect the public from the abrasiveness of official intrusions. 17 A nighttime search is a serious violation of
privacy.18 In the instant case, there is no showing that the search which began at 7:30 P.M. caused an "abrupt intrusion
upon sleeping residents in the dark" 19 or that it caused private respondent’s family such prejudice as to make the
execution of the warrant a voidable act. In finding that the duration of the search could have caused "inconvenience"
for private respondent’s family, the appellate court resorted to surmises and conjectures. Moreover, no exact time limit
can be placed on the duration of a search.

Also, there was no violation relative to witness-to-search rule, since the searchers were justified in availing of two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion, after respondent’s wife and maid refused. The regularity of the search is best
evidenced by the "Certification of Orderly Search" and the receipt of the property seized signed by respondent’s wife.

• Panuncio versus People, GR 165678, 17 July2009

Facts:
The LTO and a special task force with search warrant raided the residence of Panuncio, a jeepney operator in Quezon
City. They confiscated LTO documents and 17 pieces of private vehicle plates, copying machine, typewriters and
other tools. Panuncio signed a certification of orderly search with Brgy. Chairman Manalo, Panuncio's employee
Velasco and Nidua and signed the receipt of property seized. Panuncio and one Jaime Lopez were arrested.

During the trial, the falsified documents was presented (showing Manlite as the owner) but which the petitioner denied
that she was the source of falsified documents. She alleged that Manlite which she co-own with her husband before
has stopped operating and her business now is under the name of Rosario Panuncio. She alleged that she was not at
home when the raid took place, that she was just forced to sign the search warrant, inventory receipt and certificate of
orderly search.

Issue:
Whether the search was regularly conducted.
Ruling:
Yes. Even assuming that petitioner or any lawful occupant of the house was not present when the search was
conducted, the search was done in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality.  Manalo was the barangay chairman of the place while Velasco was petitioner’s employee. Petitioner
herself signed the certification of orderly search when she arrived at her residence.  Clearly, the requirements of
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court were complied with by the police authorities who conducted the search.
Further, petitioner failed to substantiate her allegation that she was just forced to sign the search warrant, inventory
receipt, and the certificate of orderly search. 

• Santos versus Pryce Gases,GR165122,23Nov.2007

Disclaimer: Probable cause lngjudgatuyok ang issue ani nga case IN RELATION TO SEARCH WARRANT, so
wlakoy choice kundimaoninga ruling ang ibutangbisanmuranaxaog duplicate sa topic under “Issuance of SW and
Probable Cause”. PEACE OUT!

Facts:
Pryce noticed the decline of return of LPG cylinders for refilling. Pryce employees suspected that LPG cylinders had
been removed from market circulation and refilled by their competitors, one of whom is Sun Gas and Santos as the
manager. Figueroa, Pryce's sales manager sought the assistance of CIDG to recover LPG cylinders allegedly in
possession of Sun Gas. CIDG conducted surveillance on the warehouse of Sun Gas then later requested the Bureau of
Fire Protection (BFP) to conduct a routine fire inspection at Sun Gas. CIDG operatives entered the warehouse and
were able to take photographs of LPG cylinders.
Demandara applied before RTC Iloilo for a warrant to search the premises with the allegation that Pryce LPG
cylinders were tampered and replaced with Sun Gas marking, averred also that Sun Gas is distributing Pryce LPG
products without the consent of Pryce. RTC issued the search warrant with the authority to seize some pertinent items.

Issue: WON the issuance of search warrant was valid.

Ruling:

Yes. Supporting jurisprudence thus outlined the following requisites for a search warrant's validity, the absence of
even one will cause its downright nullification: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must
be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized.

As pointed out by respondent in its petition for certiorari, the failure of the CIDG operatives to confiscate articles and
materials used in tampering with the Pryce marking and logo did not negate the existence of probable cause. The
confluence of these circumstances, namely: the fact of possession and distribution of the gas cylinders and the claim
by respondent that it did not authorize petitioner to distribute the same was a sufficient indication that petitioner is
probably guilty of the illegal use of the gas cylinders punishable under Section 2 of R.A. No. 623, as amended. More
importantly, after hearing the testimonies and examining the documentary evidence, the trial court was convinced that
there were good and sufficient reasons for the issuance of the same. Thus, it issued the search warrant. The trial court's
unwarranted turnabout was brought about by its notion that the seized items were not sufficient to indict petitioner for
the crime charged.

Objections to the Issuance or Implementation of Search Warrant

• Buenaventura versus People,529SCRA500,08Aug.2007

Facts:

Accused-Appellant Herminio Buenaventura was arrested during a buybust operation and subsequently charged before
the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong for violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (R.A. 6425), otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act for sale and possession of marijuana. During the arrest of Buenaventura, other
members of the teams searched his house where they recovered the black traveling bag which contained nine (9)
bricks of marijuana. After apprising appellant of his constitutional rights, the policemen searched his person from
whom they recovered the marked money. The RTC found Herminio Buenaventura guilty of both charges, it holding
that as between the straightforward and positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the bare and negative
testimony of Buenaventura, the former indubitably deserves greater weight and credence. Buenaventura appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA), but the same affirmed the RTC‘s decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Buenaventura
alleges that the warrantless arrest made by the Drug Enforcement Unit of Malate was invalid.

Issue:
Whether or not Buenaventura may still assail the invalidity of the arrest and search.

Ruling:

No. Following pronouncement in People v. Bagsit:

x xx It is long settled that where the accused, by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, as shown by
the counsel-assisted plea he entered during the arraignment and his active participation in the trial thereafter,
voluntarily waives his constitutional protection against illegal arrests and searches. We have consistently ruled that any
objection concerning the issuance or service of a warrant or a procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 15

As correctly observed by the appellate court, appellant failed to move for the quashal of the informations filed against
him. He instead submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. With the assistance of counsel, he entered a not
guilty plea, and presented evidence in his defense. He thus clearly waived his objection to the validity of his arrest.

• People versus Macatingag,GRNo.181037,19Jan.2009

Facts:
Members of PNP after having conducted a buy-bust operation arrested SaidamenMacatingag and subsequently
charged with Violation of R.A. No. 9165. Macatingag pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. the trial court
rendered judgment convicting Macatingag of the offense charged. Aggrieved, he appealed to Court of Appeals which
which affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court. Macatingag maintained that he was at home with his wife when
four armed men suddenly entered their house, seized his money, placed handcuffs on his wrists, and forcibly brought
him to the police headquarters in Bgy. Canlubang. He also alleged that he was a victim of a frame-up and that he was
not arrested pursuant to a valid buy-bust operation. He also assails the validity of his arrest because the police officers
were not armed with any warrant when he was arrested.

Issue:
WON the appellant may still assail the validity of the arrest and search.

Ruling:
No. The appellant failed to assail the legality of the arrest and the seizure of the sachet of shabu prior to his
arraignment or at any stage in the proceedings of the trial court. Evidence shows that appellant was the subject of a
buy-bust operation. In this jurisdiction, the conduct of a buy-bust operation is a common and accepted mode of
apprehending those involved in illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs. It has been proven to be an effective way
of unveiling the identities of drug dealers and of luring them out of obscurity. 20 It catches the violator in flagrante
delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the
violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime.

• Santos versus Pryce Gases,GR165122,23Nov.2007

Facts:
Pryce noticed the decline of return of LPG cylinders for refilling. Pryce employees suspected that LPG cylinders had
been removed from market circulation and refilled by their competitors, one of whom is Sun Gas and Santos as the
manager. Figueroa, Pryce's sales manager sought the assistance of CIDG to recover LPG cylinders allegedly in
possession of Sun Gas. CIDG conducted surveillance on the warehouse of Sun Gas then later requested the Bureau of
Fire Protection (BFP) to conduct a routine fire inspection at Sun Gas. CIDG operatives entered the warehouse and
were able to take photographs of LPG cylinders.
Demandara applied before RTC Iloilo for a warrant to search the premises which was granted by the RTC with the
authority to seize some pertinent items. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash9 the search warrant.

Issue:
WON the petitioner has the authority to seek the quashal of the Search Warrant.

Ruling:

Yes.Well-settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties.

Petitioner is the real party-in-interest to seek the quashal of the search warrant for the obvious reason that the search
warrant, in which petitioner was solely named as respondent, was directed against the premises and articles over which
petitioner had control and supervision. Petitioner was directly prejudiced or injured by the seizure of the gas tanks
because petitioner was directly accountable as manager to the purported owner of the seized items. It is noteworthy
that at the time of the application for search warrant, respondent recognized the authority of petitioner as manager of
Sun Gas, Inc. when the application averred that petitioner had in his possession and control the items subject of the
alleged criminal offense. Respondent should not be allowed thereafter to question petitioner's authority to assail the
search warrant. Moreover, the search warrant was directed against petitioner for allegedly using Pryce LPG cylinders
without the authority of respondent.

• Ruben Castillo versus People,G.R.No.185128,30Jan.2012

Facts:
Police Officers headed by SPO3 BienvenidoMasnayon went to serve a search warrant to Petitioner Ruben Del Castillo
in search of illegal drugs. Upon arrival, somebody shouted “raid” which prompted the police officers to immediately
disembark from the jeep they were riding and go directly to Del Castillo’s house and cordoned it off. Police men found
nothing incriminating in Del Castillo’s residence, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa
hut several articles including four (4) plastic packs of shabu.

An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with violation of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972). During the arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not guilty. The RTC found Del Castillo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision. Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA,
insisting that there was a violation of his constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.

Issue:
WON the search warrant was implemented validly.

Ruling:

No. This Court, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search
warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by
a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the
questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be
seized are in the place sought to be searched.A review of the records shows that in the present case, a substantial basis
exists.

It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized in order for it to be valid. In the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24specifically
designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized
by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having
been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure.
Search Incident to Arrest:

• Adams versus Williams, 47 U.S.143

Facts:

Acting on a tip supplied moments earlier by an informant known to him, a police officer asked respondent to open his
car door. Respondent lowered the window, and the officer reached into the car and found a loaded handgun (which had
not been visible from the outside) in respondent's waistband, precisely where the informant said it would be.
Respondent was arrested for unlawful possession of the handgun. A search incident to the arrest disclosed heroin on
respondent's person (as the informant had reported), as well as other contraband in the car. Respondent's petition for
federal habeas corpus relief was denied by the District Court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence
that had been used in the trial resulting in respondent's conviction had been obtained by an unlawful search.

Issue:
WON the search was valid as incident to a lawful arrest.

Ruling:
Yes. As Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, recognizes, a policeman making a reasonable investigatory stop may conduct a
limited protective search for concealed weapons when he has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and
dangerous. Here, the information from the informant had enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer's forcible
stop of petitioner and the protective seizure of the weapon, which afforded reasonable ground for the search incident to
the arrest that ensued.

• NolascoversusPano,139SCRA152
(Note:Studyalso dissentingopinion&theResolutiontotheMFR)

Facts:
Mila Aguilar Roque was arrested on board a public vehicle for alleged rebellion. The military officers, armed with a
void general search warrant, at the instance of the arrest, searched not only her person, but also her residence for the
recovery of various subversive documents. . 428 documents and written materials were seized, together with a
portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. They allege that the search was made incident to a lawful arrest.

Issue:
WON the search was valid as incident to a lawful arrest.

Ruling:
No. The warrantless search can only be made upon the person lawfully arrested, and in the place where the arrest was
made, and not elsewhere. Roque was not even in her house during the time when the arrest and the search were made.
Given the fact that the evidence was obtained clearly in violation of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, any evidence obtained therefrom is deemed inadmissible. The so-called “exclusionary rule” is the only
practical means of preventing violations of the above principle.

• Espano versus Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA588

Facts:
Pat. Romeo Pagilagan and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and
ErlindoLumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets,
Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw Rodolfo Espano selling "something" to another
person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached Espano, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The
search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that
there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. Espano was charged with possession of prohibited drugs.

Issue:
WON the warrantless search is within the purview of incident to a lawful arrest.

Ruling:
Yes, except for the marijuana found at the house of accused. Espano's arrest falls squarely under Rule 113 Section 5(a)
of the Rules of Court. He was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on
the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets,
Manila. The police officer saw Espano handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched
him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of
marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
As for the 10 cellophane bags of marijuana found at Espano's residence, however, the same inadmissible in evidence.
The articles seized from Espano during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful
arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became
unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach
and control of Espano.

• People versus Leangsiri, 252 SCRA213

Facts:
Suchinda Leangsiri was arrested in the NAIA in the act of bringing into the country approximately more than * kilo of
heroin. In his arrest, he informed the arresting officers that the heroin is meant to deliver to three other people in Las
Palmas Hotel in Manila. Immediately, the NARCOM formed a group for a follow up operation in the said Hotel. In the
accused’s cooperation, he was allowed to check in to Room 504, where the others will meet him to give the drugs.

After the transaction of Omogbolahan and Bhola, Amidu and Leangris, the appellants started to leave the hotel room
with the contraband, they were immediately arrested. In Amidu's room, a paper with the name "SUCHINDA
LEANGSIRI and Amidu's other possessions were confiscated. In the case of the two other, the police confiscated a
suit case and masking tape and empty transparent bag, allegedly will be use in transporting the drugs.

The appellants were charged and was convicted in conspiring to transport heroin violative of RA 6425. Hence
this petition, alleging that the search is illegal being conducted not in the direct premises of the arrest.

Issue:
WON the warrantless search in the other room is invalid, thus making the seized items inadmissible as evidence.

Ruling:
Yes. The reach of a valid warrantless search goes beyond the person of the one arrested and includes the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control. In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas
Hotel. The piece of paper bearing Leangsiri's name was obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the
same hotel, and found tucked within the pages of appellant Amidu's telephone and address book. Clearly, the
warrantless search is illegal and the piece of paper bearing Leangsiri's name cannot be admitted as evidence against
appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however, exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy
the prosecution's case against appellants. The remaining evidence still established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• People versus CubcubinJr., 360 SCRA690

Facts:
Cavite City police station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot. A tricycle driver told that Fidel
AbrenicaCucubin Jr. and the victim were last seen together. The policemen proceeded to Cucubin and asked
permission to enter and look around the house. As they went to the house and upon entering, SPO1 Malinao noticed a
“bloodied” white Hanes t-shirt. As he picked up the shirt, two(2) spent .38 caliber shells fell. As they proceeded the
search, PO3 Estoy found on top of a plastic water container outside the bathroom a homemade Smith and Wesson
caliber .38 revolver and five live ammunitions. The police station then took custody of Cubcubin and the evidences
found. After an evaluation of the evidence, a formal criminal complaint was then filed against the accused-appellant.
Accused now claimed that the policemen did not have any search warrant nor a warrant of arrest when they took him
into custody.

Issue:
WON the warrantless search is within the purview of incident to a lawful arrest.
Ruling:
No. The arrest of the accused-appellant was shortly after the victim was killed. However, the arresting officers did not
have ‘personal knowledge of the facts as their knowledge of the circumstance from which they allegedly inferred that
the accused was probably guilty was based entirely on what they had been told by others. They merely relied on
information given to them by others.
 As to the validity of the search and seizure, even assuming that the warrantless arrest to be valid as the prosecution
contends, the search cannot be considered incidental thereto. A valid warrantless search incidental to a valid arrest
allows only the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either in the person of the one arrested or within the area of
his immediate control. It is clear that the warrantless arrest cannot be justified on this ground for neither the t-shirt nor
the gun were within the area of accused-appellants control. Nor the warrantless search is justified under the “plain-
view doctrine”. The alleged evidences against the accused did not merely stumble upon the police officers as such they
are purposely sought it. Hence the things obtained as a result of the search are illegal and are inadmissible evidence
against the Cubcubin.

• People versus Estella, 395 SCRA553

Facts:
Appellant was sitting on a rocking chair located about two (2) meters away from a hut when police officers showed the
search warrant and explained the contents to him. The team searched the hut and found a plastic container under the
kitchen with dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber revolver. The team seized the prohibited drug, the revolver and
ammunitions and arrested the appellant. He was held guilty of illegal possession of the illegal drug found therein.

Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure was an incident to lawful arrest.

Ruling:
No. Never was it proven that appellant, who was the person to be arrested, was in possession of the subject prohibited
drug during the search. It follows, therefore, that there was no way of knowing if he had committed or was actually
committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. Without that knowledge, there could have been no
search incident to a lawful arrest.
Assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officers, and that
the arrest without a warrant was lawful, it still cannot be said that the search conducted was within the confines of the
law. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. However, the scope of the search should be limited to the area within which the person to be
arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she can destroy. [32] The prevailing rule is that the arresting
officer may take from the arrested individual any money or property found upon the latters person -- that which was
used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may provide the prisoner with the means of
committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.
In the case before us, searched was the entire hut, which cannot be said to have been within appellants immediate
control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of that which may be considered to be incident to a lawful arrest.

• Valeroso versus Court of Appeals,GR164815,03Sept.2009&&

Facts:
Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house of his children. He was awakened by four (4) heavily
armed men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at him and pulled him out of the room. The raiding team tied his
hands and placed him near the faucet (outside the room) then went back inside, searched and ransacked the room.
Moments later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuhaakongbarilsaloob!" Disuanco, a
police officer included in the raiding team, informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his arrest.
However, the raiding team was not armed with a search warrant.

Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure was an incident to lawful arrest.

Ruling:
No. The warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest. The arresting officers would have
been justified in searching the person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed
weapon that might be used against the former. But under the circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable
justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room
itself. It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to
protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon,
and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained
beyond what is needed to serve its purpose.In the case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot
be said to have been within Valeroso’s immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be
considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Search at Checkpoints and of Moving Vehicles:

• Valmonte versus de Villa, GR 83988, 24 May1990

Facts:
Due to the alarming lawlessness and violence prevalent in urban areas and the threat of the NPA, LOI No. 02-87
created the NCR District Command (NCRDC) to establish an effective territorial defense and to provide an
atmosphere of peace and order in Metro Manila. It mandated the creation of checkpoints placed in various strategic
locations manned by military personnel. It conducted regular searches and check-ups of vehicles without a warrant or
court order. There was once an instance when a person was fired at and killed for speeding off and refusing to submit
to the search. Thus, the petitioner challenges the measure alleging that it serves as a vehicle for harassment or abuse.

Issue:
WON the search made in the checkpoint lawful.

Ruling:
Yes. Under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the
lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit
in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have
absolutely no reason to remain. Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's
right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of
travellers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a
visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search.

• People versus Mikael Malmstedt,GR91107,19June1991

Facts:
Responding to certain intelligence reports regarding a Caucasian carrying drugs, the NARCOM set up a temporary
checkpoint for the purpose. Without any warrant, they stopped the bus that Malmstedt was riding and conducted a
search therein. One of the soldiers noticed a bulge in Malmstedt’s waist. Their suspicion was aroused as well by his
failure to present valid IDs. They found hashish in his pouch. There were some that were likewise stashed inside teddy
bears in his luggage. He was thus arrested and prosecuted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Issue:
WON the search made in the checkpoint is valid.

Ruling:
Yes. There is no search warrant required for that made incidental to a lawful arrest. Accused was searched and arrested
while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was
caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely to a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the
search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused
was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the
officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to
present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed
to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity.

• People versus Tuazon, 532 SCRA 152, 03 Sept.2007

Facts:

Police Station received an information that a Gemini car would deliver an unspecified amount of  shabu in Marville
Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said tip, Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana dispatched a team of policemen
to the area. The team saw the said Gemini car and immediately flagged it down. The driver of the car pulled to a stop
and opened a window. It was then that PO1 Manuel Padlan (PO1 Padlan) saw a gun tucked on appellant's waist. PO1
Padlan inquired about the gun and appellant allegedly replied it did not belong to him nor could he produce any
pertinent document relating to said firearm. Appellant was ordered to get down from the car. As soon as appellant
stepped down from the vehicle, PO3 Bueno saw five plastic sachets on the driver's seat, the contents of which
appellant allegedly admitted to be shabu. Appellant was thereafter immediately brought to the police station.

Issue:
WON the search was valid.

Ruling:
Yes. When a vehicle was flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held
to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the
search that they would find instrumentality or evidence pertaining to crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to effect the warrantless search of the Gemini car
driven by appellant. A confidential informer tipped them off that said car was going to deliver shabu at Marville
Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo City police sent a team to Marville Subdivision to monitor said vehicle.
The information provided by the informer turned out to be correct as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in the place
where it was said to be bringing shabu. These circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause
for the warrantless search of the Gemini car and the eventual admission into evidence of the plastic packets against
appellant.

• People versus Vinecario, GR 141137, 20 Jan.2004

Facts:
Policemen were manning a checkpoint in Davao City to enforce the COMELEC gun ban when a motorcycle boarded
by three men sped by past hem. A police officer blew his whistle and ordered them to return to the check point which
they obliged. One of the men introduced himself as soldier but he could not produce an identification card. Vinecario
carried a backpack and when he was asked about its contents, he replied that it merely contained a mat. The men
passed the bag to each other. Suspecting that it contained a bomb, the policeman ordered them to open the bag. The
officer noticed something wrapped in paper, he told Vinecario to take the same out. AgainVinecario obliged, albeit
reiterating that it was only a mat. Officer Goc-ong then touched the stuff wrapped in paper upon which Vinecario
grabbed it, resulting to the tearing off of the paper wrapper. Soon the smell of marijuana wafted in the air.

Issue:
WON the search was lawful.

Ruling:
Yes. There is a probable cause which justified the warrantless search. In light then of appellants’ speeding away after
noticing the checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous
gestures when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of
Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the
Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there
existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of
the law or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of some offense.

• Abenes versus CourtofAppeals,GR156320,14Feb.2007

Facts:
Rodolfo Abenes, a barangay chairman, was charged with illegal possession of high powered firearm and its
ammunitions during the election period. Two Informations were filed for (1) illegal possession of firearms and its
ammunitions; and (2) violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The firearm was confiscated from Abenes at a
checkpoint wherein his vehicle was stopped and he was asked to alight the same for routine inspection. The police saw
the firearm tucked in his waist, and asked him to produce a license for it. When Abenes could not produce one, the
police confiscated the firearm. It was then found that Abenes was not a registered nor a licensed firearm holder. The
trial court then convicted Abenes on both charges. Now, petitioner insists that the prosecution should have produced
the mission order constituting the checkpoint, and invokes Aniag, Jr. v. Comelec, 15 where the Court purportedly held
that firearms seized from a motor vehicle without a warrant are inadmissible because there was no indication that
would trigger any suspicion from the policemen nor any other circumstance showing probable cause.
Issue:
WON the search was valid.

Ruling:

Yes. The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC
would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would
also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would
know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs.

The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal
search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those
whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely
direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the car’s doors or subjecting its passengers to a
body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands.

Buy-Bust Operations:

• People versus Doria, 301 SCRA 668&

Facts:
Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that one “ Jun” [Doria] was engaged in illegal drug
activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest him in a buy-bust operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did
not find the marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the house of his associate “ Neneth ”
[Gaddao], so he led the police team to her house.

The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. “ Jun” identified her as “Neneth, ” and she was asked by
SPO1 Badua about the marked money. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining
table. One of the box’ s flaps was open, and inside it was something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared similar to the
marijuana earlier sold to him by “ Jun. ” His suspicion aroused, so he entered the house and took hold of the box. He
peeked inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1 Badua recovered the
marked bills from “ Neneth ” and they arrested her. The bricks were examined and they were found to be dried
marijuana leaves.

Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrests of Doria and Gaddao are lawful.

Ruling:
The warrantless arrest of Doria is lawful. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113, a person may be arrested without a
warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Herein, Doria was caught
in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust
operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. The warrantless
arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills,
however, are different matters.
For Gaddao, the arrest was unlawful. Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to
give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding
of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot
pursuit”. Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused, Doria. Save for
Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there
is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating
the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. Since the warrantless
arrest of Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the
marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.
• People versus Lim, GR No. 187503, 11 Sept.2009

Facts:
The PNP Narcotics Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City, received information from their reliable informant that
appellant Lim is engaged in illegal drug activities. Immediately, a buy-bust operation was planned and executed. The
buy-bust team proceeded to the designated place on board three vehicles.Transaction ensued. After the sale was
consummated, the appellants were immediately arrested. . Afterwards, both appellants were brought to the office of
the PNP Narcotics Group.Lim claimed that the police authorities who arrested him never gave him any chance to talk
because, whenever he would try to do so, they would hit him on his mouth. Appellant Flores on the other hand stated
that during the interrogation, he was tortured. The RTC rendered decision finding both appellant guilty. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Hence, this case.

Issue:
WON the arrest was lawful.

Ruling:

Yes. Primarily, a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose
of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. Unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit. When the police officers
involved in the buy-bust operation have no motive to falsely testify against the accused, the courts shall uphold the
presumption that they have performed their duties regularly.The courts, nonetheless, are advised to take caution in
applying the presumption of regularity. It should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the
constitutionally protected rights of the individual.

In this case, the trial court correctly upheld the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, i.e., PO1 Amerol and P/Sr.
Insp. Mata, the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It did not err in applying the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty by law enforcement agents

• People versus VictorioPagkalinawan,GR184805,03Mar.2010

Facts:

An informant reported the illegal activities of a certain "Berto". Immediately, Police Senior Inspector Romeo Paat,
formed a buy-bust team with PO1 Memoracion as the poseur-buyer and the rest of the group as back-up.Afthe
transaction was consummated, Berto was arrested and was later was identified as appellant Pagkalinawan. He was
brought to its headquarters in Taguig City for investigation. A qualitative examination was conducted on the
specimens, which tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Both RTC and CA found the
accused guilty charged. In this appeal, appellant argues that the buy-bust operation conducted was invalid and that
what really happened was instigation, not entrapment. Such contention lacks basis and is contrary to jurisprudence.

Issue:
WON the buy-bust operation was validly conducted.
Ruling:

Yes. One form of entrapment is the buy-bust operation. It is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.In order to
determine the validity of a buy-bust operation, this Court has consistently applied the "objective" test.

In the instant case, the evidence clearly shows that the police officers used entrapment, not instigation, to capture
appellant in the act of selling a dangerous drug. It was the confidential informant who made initial contact with
appellant when he introduced PO1 Memoracion as a buyer for shabu. Appellant immediately took the PhP 500 buy-
bust money from PO1 Memoracion and showed him three pieces of sachet containing shabu and asked him to pick
one. Once PO1 Memoracion got the shabu, he gave the pre-arranged signal and appellant was arrested. The facts
categorically show a typical buy-bust operation as a form of entrapment. The police officers’ conduct was within the
acceptable standards for the fair and honorable administration of justice. Moreover, contrary to appellant’s argument
that the acts of the informant and the poseur-buyer in pretending that they were in need of shabu instigated or induced
him to violate the Anti-Drugs Law, a police officer’s act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust
operation, or what is known as a "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and does not render the buy-bust
operation invalid.

• People versus Ramos, GR 180508, 04 Sept.2009

Facts:
Pulido, together with other operatives of the MADAC, conducted a surveillance operation on the activities of appellant
whose name appeared in the Drug Watch List, he was observed to be selling shabu to tricycle drivers at the tricycle
terminal. The positive result of surveillance operation led the Makati City Police SAID-SOTF to form a buy-bust team
which headed by PO3 Esterio Ruiz, PO2 Aseboque, who was designated as the poseur-buyer and two other as back-
up. When the transaction is consummated, Aseboque handcuffed appellant as he introduced himself as a police officer,
and recovered from his right front pocket 8 the yellow tin case which yielded two other plastic sachets also containing
white crystalline substances. With the seized items, appellant was brought for investigation to the Makati City Police
SAID-SOTF. Appellant denied the accusation and claimed that the evidence against him was "planted."

Issue:
WON the law enforcement officers had observed the procedure the requirement essential to preserving the integrity of
the corpus delicti.

Ruling:
No. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to apprehend prohibited drug law
violators in the act of committing a drug-related offense. Because of the built-in dangers of abuse that the operation
entails, it is governed by specific procedures on the seizure and custody of drugs, separately from the general law
procedures geared to ensure that the rights of people under criminal investigation and of the accused facing a criminal
charge are safeguarded. The records indicate that the buy-bust team did not follow the outlined procedure on the
inventory and photographing of the seized drugs, despite its mandatory character as indicated by the use of the word
"shall."

In fine, the failure of the police officers to comply with the procedure in the custody of seized drugs puts to doubt their
origins,22 and negates any presumption of regularity accorded to acts undertaken by police officers in the pursuit of
their official duties.23 Appellant's acquittal is thus in order.

• People versus Joey Tion, GR 172092, 16 Dec.2009

Facts:

P/Supt. Caranguian directed P/Insp. Castillo, along with a police informant, to conduct a test buy operation to verify
the information that marijuana was being sold there. On that day, the police informant initially bought marijuana from
drug pushers. Castillo on the following day was also able to buy marijuana sticks from the drug pushers. On his
initiative, Castillo negotiated to buy a bigger quantity of marijuana which the drug pushers agreed.

The following day Castillo and two police informants meet the pushers to consummate the sale. The drug pushers,
however, told the undercover policeman that they could not make the delivery since they did not have money to source
the five kilos of marijuana. P/Insp. Castillo used the PhP 6,250 "marked money" to pay the drug pushers half the
contracted price, with the agreement that the balance would be paid upon delivery of the marijuana. Later, of the same
day, Joey, Allan, and Ronald, delivered the marijuana to Castillo in their agreed place. Thereafter, the pushers were
arrested and brought to police station.

Issue:
WON there was a valid buy-bust.

Ruling:
Yes. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment legally employed by peace officers as an effective way of
apprehending drug dealers in the act of committing an offense. Such police operation has judicial sanction as long as it
is carried out with due respect to constitutional and legal safeguards. There is no rigid or textbook method in
conducting buy-bust operations.
There is no showing that Joey was merely prevailed upon to buy marijuana in behalf of P/Insp. Castillo. The fact that
two test buys were made on March 2 and 3, 1999 shows that Joey was involved in selling marijuana. There is likewise
no showing that the police officers framed up Joey. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of
the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies
on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit. 22 Settled is the rule that in cases involving violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill motive on the
part of the police officers or deviation from the regular performance of their duties.The records do not show any
allegation of improper motive on the part of the buy-bust team. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of duties of the police officers must be upheld.

• People versus Sembrano, GR 185848, 16 Aug.2010

Facts:
Operatives of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs of the Novaliches Police Station arrested appellant in broad daylight, in
the course of a buy-bust operation and after a follow-up search on him.
Two days after the arrest, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City in the National Capital Region filed two
separate Informations against him: for illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug. Qualitative
examination was conducted by the forensic chemical officer on specimens of the substance retrieved from the buy-bust
operations. The findings showed that the specimens were composed of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug. Sembrano was arraigned and with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant was legally arrested.

Ruling:
Yes. Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto delivering 0.12 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu to
PO2 Manaol, the poseur-buyer, for a consideration of P200.00. Upon frisking after his arrest, another 0.27 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride was recovered from him.A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in
recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. Consequently, the
warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure conducted on the person of appellant were allowed under the
circumstances. The search, incident to his lawful arrest, needed no warrant to sustain its validity. Thus, there is no
doubt that the sachets of shabu recovered during the legitimate buy-bust operation, are admissible and were properly
admitted in evidence against him.

• People versus Araneta, GR 191064, 20 Oct.2010

Facts:
Confidential informant arrived at the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Pasig City Police Station to report
the alleged peddling of illegal drugs of live-in couple Rolando Araneta and Marilou Santos . SPO4 de Lara
immediately formed a team to confirm the veracity of the informant’s report and conduct a buy-bust operation. The
team proceeded to the target area. After the transaction was consummated, PO2 Damasco arrested Marilou while
SPO2 Zigapan arrested Rolando. Officers recovered the marked P100 bill and one plastic sachet of what looked like
marijuana and eight plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. They were then brought to the precinct.

Issue:
WON the warrantless arrest, search and seizure are lawful.

Ruling:

Yes. Absent any convincing countervailing evidence, the presumption is that the members of the buy-bust team
performed their duties in a regular manner. It was certainly a job well done. Hence, the Court gives full faith and credit
to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible. A search warrant or warrant of arrest was not needed
because it was a buy-bust operation and the accused were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of, and selling,
dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely legal for the buy-bust team to arrest, and search, them on the
spot because a buy-bust operation is a justifiable mode of apprehending drug pushers. A buy-bust operation is a form
of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in
the execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proven to be an effective
method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken. The
illegal drugs seized were not the "fruit of the poisonous tree" as the defense would like this Court to believe. The
seizure made by the buy-bust team falls under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Rule 126, Sec. 13 of the
Rules of Court. Since the buy-bust operation was established as legitimate, it follows that the search was also valid,
and a warrant was likewise not needed to conduct it.

• People versus Feliciano, GR 190179, 20 Oct.2010

Facts:
PO2 Monte received a telephone call from a concerned citizen reporting that an illegal drug trade was being operated
by a certain Janggo at the Rodriguez Compound at Pasig City. A buy-bust operation against Janggo was then
organized along with the concerned citizen named Buboy. PO2 Monte was designated as poseur-buyer and, for that
purpose, he was given two P100 marked bills. After coordinating with the PDEA, the buy-bust team and the
confidential informant went to the target area.  
After the transaction was consummated, PO2 Monte identified himself as a police officer and grabbed the left arm of
Janggo. When PO2 Caparas arrived at the scene, PO2 Monte shouted that there were more persons inside the
house. PO2 Caparas then apprehended the woman standing near the doorway, while PO1 Vega and PO1 Mapula
cornered the three other persons inside the house. Janggo was identified as accused-appellant Feliciano, along with the
other accused-appellant. All of them were brought to the police station for further investigation, after which they were
brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for the mandatory drug
examination.

Issue:
WON the warrantless arrest, search and seizure lawful.

Ruling:
Yes. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment that is resorted to for trapping and capturing criminals.   It is legal
and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional
and legal safeguards is undertaken. Appellant’s argument that the police officers should have instead secured an arrest
warrant is misplaced and untenable considering the nature of the offense involved, the obscurity of the transgressors
thereof, and the unpredictability of the transaction subject of the offense.”  Moreover, it has ruled time and again that a
buy-bust operation is employed to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto.

• People versus Naquita, GR 180511, 28 July2008

Facts:

A confidential informant reported to PO3 Joel Borda that one alias Inday (appellant) was selling shabu , immediately a
team was organize to conduct surveillance for a possible buy-bust operation. The team, together with the informant,
proceeded to Maypajo, Caloocan City and conducted a surveillance. Later, they decided to start the buy-bust operation
against appellant. After the consummation of the transaction, the appellant was arrested. The officers retrieved the
buy-bust money which appellant was still holding and recovered two plastic sachets. With the arrest of appellant, the
team immediately returned to their office.

Appellant contends that the alleged buy-bust operation suffered from severe infirmity, both factual and legal. She
argues that not only was there no Pre-Operation and Coordination Report prior to the actual drug operation as required
in Section 8649 of Republic Act No. 9165, Section 21 thereof was also violated by the buy-bust team when it failed to
make a physical inventory of the drugs seized and confiscated and to take photographs thereof in the presence of
persons mentioned in said section.

Issue:
WON the arrest, search and seizure lawful.
Ruling:

Yes. Non-compliance with the aforesaid sections does not mean that no buy-bust operation against appellant ever took
place. The failure of the police operatives to comply with Section 86 will neither render her arrest illegal nor the
evidence seized from her inadmissible. Neither would non-compliance with Section 21 render an accused’s arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.

IN ALL, the evidence for the prosecution established that appellant was apprehended in flagrante during a buy-bust
operation in which she sold a sachet of shabu to PO1 Cosme, who acted as poseur-buyer, and was thereafter caught by
PO1 Llanderal in possession of two more sachets of shabu. In the instant case, appellant miserably failed to show that
the members of the buy-bust team were impelled by any improper motive or that they did not properly perform their
duty. This being the case, we uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

• PeopleversusAmarillo,G.R.No.194721,August15,2012

Facts:

A buy bust operation against John Brian Amarillo alias JaoMapa was conducted when PO1 Mendoza
received a telephone call that JaoMapa was selling prohibited narcotics at Laperal Compound. The buy bust team
prepared a 300 pesos worth of marked money. During the operation, PO1 Mendoza confirmed that Jao was selling
shabu therefore, he was convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA. No. 9165.

Issue: WON the conviction was proper.

Ruling:
Yes, To prove illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be present: “(a) the identities of the buyer
and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for
the thing.18 And, to secure conviction, it is material to establish that the transaction or sale actually took place, and to
bring to the court the corpus delicti as evidence. In this case, all the aforementioned elements were present.

• People versus Agulay, GR 181747, 26 Sept.2008

Facts:

At around 6:30 in the evening, an informant arrived at police station 5 and reported to the Chief of the
Station Drug Enforcement that a certain Sing had been selling shabu at Brgy. Sta. Lucia in Novaliches. A buy bust
operation was then conducted and the accused was arrested. However, in defense, it presented 3 witnesses Narciso
Agulay, his brother and de Leon. It was narrated that Narciso was manning a store when a car stopped in front and
poked a gun at him. They put a handcuff on him and brought him in the police station where PO2 Herrera told him that
if he would not be able to give them 500000, they would file a case against him.
Accused maintained that his arrest was illegal and the subsequent seizure of shabu allegedly taken from him
is inadmissible as evidence against him.

Issue: WON the accused was arrested in a legitimate buy-bust operation.

Ruling:

In this case the elements to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, were present.

As to the validity of the arrest, It is a well-established rule that an arrest made after an entrapment operation
does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid “warrantless arrest”; In a buy-bust operation, the idea to
commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense.

In line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit: Section 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of
apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without
anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense.

There are eight (8) instances when a warrantless search and seizure is valid, to wit: (1) consented searches;
(2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug
laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the
prohibited articles are in “plain view;” (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building
regulations; and (8) “stop and frisk” operations.

• People versus Bohol, GR 171729, 28 July2008

Facts:

At around 8:30 pm, an informant reported to police station that Ricardo Bohol is engaged in illegal drug
trade in Isla Putting Bato. They then started a buy-bust entrapment against Bohol. After the elicit transaction has been
consummated, they arrested Bohol and recovered from him the buy-bust money and 3 plastic sachets of shabu. Bohol
questioned the legality of the arrest as well as the search.

Issue:whether Bohol’s arrest and the search on his person were illegal

Ruling:
The arrest of Bohol is legal. The Constitution proscribes unreasonable arrests and provides in the Bill of
Rights that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by competent judicial authority.
However, it is a settled exception to the rule that an arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a
warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, which states: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—a peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
Considering the legality of Bohol’s warrantless arrest, the subsequent warrantless search that resulted in the
seizure of the shabu found in his person is likewise valid. In a legitimate warrantless arrest, the arresting police officers
are authorized to search and seize from the offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be used
as proof of the commission of the offense. The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures
admits of certain exceptions.
This Court has ruled that the following instances constitute valid warrantless searches and seizures: (1)
search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4)
seizure of the evidence in plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

• PeopleversusElizabethMarcelino,GR189278,26July2010

Facts:
A buy-bust operation was conducted wherein SPO1 Dela Cruz served as a poseur-buyer. Once Elizabeth
had handed the shabu to SPO1 Dela Cruz, the group approached them and recovered from her the marked money and
another sachet of shabu. She was then apprised of her constitutional rights. In her defense, Elizabeth claimed that she
was at her home when 3 men suddenly entered the house and announced that they were police officers. Elizabeth also
argued that the evidence presented against her was inadmissible as it was acquired during her unlawful arrest.

Issue: whether or not the evidence were inadmissible due to unlawful arrest.

Ruling:
No, The accused is caught in the act and must be apprehended on the spot; From the very nature of a buy-
bust operation, the absence of a warrant does not make the arrest illegal.—In People v. Villamin, 612 SCRA 91
(2010), involving an accused arrested after he sold drugs during a buy-bust operation, the Court ruled that it was a
circumstance where a warrantless arrest is justified under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court. The same ruling
applies to the instant case. When carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, it is a judicially
sanctioned method of apprehending those involved in illegal drug activities. It is a valid form of entrapment, as the
idea to commit a crime comes not from the police officers but from the accused himself. The accused is caught in the
act and must be apprehended on the spot. From the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the absence of a warrant does
not make the arrest illegal.
Since the buy-bust operation was established as legitimate, it follows that the search was also valid, and a
warrant was likewise not needed to conduct it.—Since the buy-bust operation was established as legitimate, it follows
that the search was also valid, and a warrant was likewise not needed to conduct it.

• PeopleversusSPO3SangkiAra,GR185011,23Dec.2009 (Surveillance)

Facts:
` A Confidential informant (CI) reported that three (3) suspected drug pushers had contacted him for a deal
involving six (6) plastic sachets of shabu.
During the operation, SPO 3 Ara, Jordan Musa and Talib were identified and arrested. Recovered from the group were
plastic sachets of white crystalline substance: six (6) big sachets, weighing 26.6563 grams, from Ara by PO1 Ayao;
five (5) big sachets, weighing 14.2936 grams, from Musa by SPO1 Furog; and a small sachet, weighing 0.3559 gram,
from Talib by PO2 Lao.
Accused-appellants decry their arrest without probable cause and the violation of their constitutional rights.
They claim that the buy-bust team had more than a month to apply for an arrest warrant yet failed to do so.

Issue: WON warrantless arrest and seizure was valid

Ruling:

Owing to the special circumstances surrounding the drug trade, a buy-bust operation has long been held as a legitimate
method of catching offenders. It is a form of entrapment employed as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in
the act of commission of an offense. We have ruled that a buy-bust operation can be carried out after a long period of
planning. The period of planning for such operation cannot be dictated to the police authorities who are to undertake
such operation. It is unavailing then to argue that the operatives had to first secure a warrant of arrest given that the
objective of the operation was to apprehend the accused-appellants in flagrante delicto. In fact, one of the situations
covered by a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court is when a person has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a peace officer or private
person.
In this case, the illegal sale of shabu inside accused-appellants’ vehicle was afterwards clearly established.
Thus, as we have previously held, the arresting officers were justified in making the arrests as accused-appellants had
just committed a crime when Ara sold shabu to PO1 Ayao. Talib and Musa were also frisked for contraband as it may
be logically inferred that they were also part of Ara’s drug activities inside the vehicle. This inference was further
strengthened by Musa’s attempt to drive the vehicle away and elude arrest.

• PeopleversusConcepcion,GR178876,27June2008 (Surveillance)

Facts:
A confidential informant reported that an alias Totoy was engaged ins selling shabu in Bulacan. A buy-bust
operation was planned, during the operation, the shabu was given but the boodle money was no longer given to Totoy.
Appellants in this case insisted that surveillance should have been conducted to verify their illicit activities.

Issue: WON absence of a prior surveillance or test buy affects the legality of the buy-bust operation.

Ruling:
NO, Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the
buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the
discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers.40 A prior surveillance,
much less a lengthy one, is not necessary especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant
during the entrapment.41 Flexibility is a trait of good police work.42 In the instant case, the entrapment or buy-bust
operation was conducted without the necessity of any prior surveillance because the confidential informant, who was
previously tasked by the buy-bust team leader to order dangerous drugs from appellant Alfredo Concepcion,
accompanied the team to the person who was peddling the dangerous drugs.

• PeopleversusHernandez,GR184804,18June2009(Blotter notreqired)

Facts:
 An informant went to station and reported the drug trafficking activities of Larry and appellants in Tondo,
Manila. They conducted a buy-bust operation in the house of Larry. The buy-bust money as well as sachet of shabu
was recovered from the accused.
Accused claimed that they were framed. They also asserted that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
were fabricated because the alleged buy-bust operation and buy-bust money were not recorded in the police blotter
making the operation invalid.

Issue: WON buy-bust money is required to be recorded in the police blotter

Ruling:
No, the buy-bust operation conducted on appellants was duly recorded in the police blotter, as shown in the
Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet made and signed by Inspector Tiu. With regard to the non-recording of the buy-
bust money in the police blotter, suffice it to state that neither law nor jurisprudence requires that the buy-bust money
be entered in the police blotter.
The non-recording of the buy-bust operation and buy-bust money in the police blotter is not essential, since
they are not elements in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. As earlier discussed, the only elements necessary to
consummate the crime is proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
dangerous drug seized as evidence. Both were satisfactorily proved in the present case.

Plain View:

• JudgeFelimonAbelitaversusPSupt.Doria,GR170672,14Aug. 2009&

Facts:
Judge Felimon filed a complaint for damages against P/Supt. German and SPO3 Cesar. He alleged that when
he parked his car in front of their house, SPO3 Ramirez grabbed him, forcibly took the key, barged into the vehicle,
and conducted a search without a warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun. Petitioner presented
the shotgun’s license to respondents. Thereafter, SPO3 Ramirez continued his search and then produced a .45 caliber
pistol which he allegedly found inside the vehicle.
P/supt. Doria alleged that certain William Sia was wounded while petitioner, who was implicated in the
incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle
beside the driver’s seat as petitioner opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver’s seat. The
police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested petitioner.

Issue: WON the seizure of the firearms was justified under Plainview doctrine.

Ruling:

The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.9 The plain view doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.10

In this case, the police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the
chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took
place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the
firearms may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms. Abelita III vs. Doria, 596
SCRA 220, G.R. No. 170672 August 14, 2009

• Zalameda versus People, GR 183656, Sept.2009

Facts:
At around 5:15 a.m SPO4 Mignelito received a call reporting an on-going pot session in Makati City. They
then went to the place and saw Villaflor sniffing smoke. The police likewise found on top of the bed aluminum foils
(later confirmed to have traces of shabu), three (3) plastic sachets containing traces of white crystalline substance, a
pair of scissors, a disposable lighter, a bag with a plastic zipper, and an improvised tooter. Petitioner alleges that the
items confiscated from him were inadmissible.

Issue: WON seizure of the various drug paraphernalia were inadmissible.

Ruling:
No, Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer who has a right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
This doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure.

• PeopleversusNuevas,516SCRA463,GR170233,22Feb. 2007

Facts:
PO3 Fami testified that he and SPO3 Cesar conducted a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal
drug trafficking along Olongapo City. They had received an information that a person would make a delivery of
marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag,
later identified as Jesus Nuevas (Nuevas).They accosted Nuevas and informed him that they are police officers.
Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff in the possession of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two other
male persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained
marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape charges, Nuevas disclosed
where the two (2) other male persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos. They
went to his companions and recovered the said marijuana.

Issue: WON searches were justified under the plain view doctrine

Ruling:

No, An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the
package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious
to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an
experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed
in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din were carrying and were
not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In Nuevas’s case, the dried marijuana leaves found inside the
plastic bag were wrapped inside a blue cloth. In Din’s case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag was
“packed in newspaper and wrapped therein.” It cannot be therefore said the items were in plain view which could have
justified mere seizure of the articles without further search.

On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevas’s case was made with his consent. In Din’s
case, there was none.

Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
detention and search, i.e., the consent was unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress
or coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.

Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be
seized without a warrant; If the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it
contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view.

"Stop and Frisk" Rule (The 'Terry Doctrine')

• TerryversusOhio,392U.S.1,20L.Ed.2nd889(1968)orRead This

Facts:
The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the “Petitioner”), was stopped and searched by an officer after the officer
observed the Petitioner seemingly casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer approached the Petitioner for
questioning and decided to search him first.
The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street corner while repeatedly walking
up and down the same street. The men would periodically peer into a store window and then talk some more. The men
also spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the street. The officer believed that the Petitioner and the
other men were “casing” a store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the men for questioning, and
given the nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of the men before questioning. A quick
frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed
weapon.

Issue: Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable search 

Ruling:

The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) held that it is a reasonable search when an
officer performs a quick seizure and a limited search for weapons on a person that the officer reasonably believes
could be armed. A typical beat officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited from searching individuals that
the officer suspects to be armed.

An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the
officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and dangerous.
 Esquillo versus People, GR 182010, 25 Aug.2010

Facts:
On the basis of an informant’s tip, PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Angel conducted a surveillance on the activities of an alleged
notorious snatcher operating in the area known only as “Ryan.” PO1 Cruzin glanced in the direction of petitioner who was standing
three meters away and seen placing inside a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing white substance. While he was not sure what the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started
acting strangely as he began to approach her. He then introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the plastic sachet.
Instead of replying, however, petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then
requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the cigarette case.

Appellant questioned as illegal her arrest without warrant to thus render any evidence obtained on the occasion thereof
inadmissible.

Issue: WON the search was invalid making the evidence inadmissible

Ruling:
The search was valid. A search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search warrant;
Exceptions; In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, the determination of what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into account, among other things, the uniqueness of
the circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.—That a search may be
conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search warrant is settled. The same, however, admits of exceptions, viz.: (1)
consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and
drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited
articles are in “plain view;” (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) “stop and
frisk” operations. (emphasis underscoring supplied) In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
seizure, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into
account, among other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence
or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured.

Stop and Frisk; A “stop-and-frisk” practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he
deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.—What is, therefore,
essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a “stop-and-
frisk” practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes
of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. From these standards, the Court finds that the
questioned act of the police officers constituted a valid “stop-and-frisk” operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabu initially
noticed in petitioner’s possession—later voluntarily exhibited to the police operative—was undertaken after she was interrogated on
what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of
her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer had identified himself.

Same; Same; Same; A Terry protective search is strictly limited to what is necessary for the discovery of weapons that may be used to
harm the officer of the law or others nearby—there must then be a genuine reason to believe that the accused is armed and presently
dangerous.—To me, all the foregoing case law cumulatively shows that a Terry protective search is strictly limited to what is
necessary for the discovery of weapons that may be used to harm the officer of the law or others nearby. There must then be a genuine
reason to believe that the accused is armed and presently dangerous. Being an exception to the rule requiring a search warrant, a Terry
protective search is strictly construed; hence, it cannot go beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed. Anything
beyond is no longer valid and the fruits of the search will be suppressed.

Same; Same; Same; For purposes of a valid Terry stop-and-frisk search, the test for the existence of reasonable suspicion that a person
is engaged in criminal activity is the totality of the circumstances, viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, prudent police officer.—
For purposes of a valid Terry stop-and-frisk search, the test for the existence of reasonable suspicion that a person is engaged in
criminal activity is the totality of the circumstances, viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, prudent police officer. Yet, the totality
of the circumstances described by PO1 Cruzin did not suffice to engender any reasonable suspicion in his mind. The petitioner’s act,
without more, was an innocuous movement, absolutely not one to give rise in the mind of an experienced officer to any belief that she
had any weapon concealed about her, or that she was probably committing a crime in the presence of the officer. Neither should her
act and the surrounding circumstances engender any reasonable suspicion on the part of the officer that a criminal activity was afoot.
We should bear in mind that the Court has frequently struck down the arrest of individuals whose overt acts did not transgress the
penal laws, or were wholly innocent.

Stop and Frisk; Plain View Doctrine; The officer can lawfully seize contraband that should come into view in the course of
a justified stop-and-frisk or pat-down search, and the contraband will be admissible in evidence—the justification in such a situation is
the plain view doctrine.—Even so, I hasten to clarify that the officer can lawfully seize contraband that should come into view in the
course of a justified stop-and-frisk or pat-down search, and the contraband will be admissible in evidence. The justification in such a
situation is the plain view doctrine, for, as explained in Minnesota v. Dickerson: We have already held that police officers, at least
under certain circumstances, may seize contraband detected during the lawful execution of a Terry search. In Michigan v. Long, x x x.
x x x. (t)he Court then held: “If, while conducting a legitimate Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the officer should, as
here, discover contraband other than weapons, he clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the Fourth Amendment
does not require its suppression in such circumstances.” Id., at 1050, 103 S.Ct., at 3481; accord, Sibron, 392 U.S., at 69-70, 88 S.Ct.,
at 1905-1906 (WHITE, J., concurring); id., at 79, 88 S.Ct., at 1910 (Harlan, J., concurring in result). The Court in Long justified this
latter holding by reference to our cases under the “plain-view” doctrine. See Long, supra, at 1050, 103 S.Ct., at 3481; see also United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, 683-684, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (upholding plain-view seizure in context *375 of
Terry stop). Under that doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character
**2137 is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. See
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-137, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2307-2308, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,
739, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1541-1542, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (plurality opinion). If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that
an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object—i.e., if “its incriminating character [is not]
‘immediately apparent,’ ” Horton, supra, 496 U.S., at 136, 110 S.Ct., at 2308—the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure.
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). Esquilo vs. People, 629 SCRA 370, G.R. No. 182010<br/>
August 25, 2010

• Valdez versus People, 538 SCRA 611, 23 Nov.2007

Facts:
Bautista was c conducting a routine patrol along the national highway together with Aratas and Ordono when they noticed
petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be
looking for something. They approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under arrest
and thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain where he was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioner’s bag
allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and
cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the police station for further investigation.

Petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the
warrantless search of his bag that followed was invalid, and that the marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in
evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous tree.

Issue: WON there was a valid search and seizure

Ruling:
No, A stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2nd 889 (1968), must precede a warrantless
arrest, be limited to the person’s outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.—The
supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal
activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest. If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing
backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based on petitioner’s behavior. However, a
stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2nd 889 (1968), must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited
to the person’s outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.

• Malacat versus Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159&

Facts:
Police officer Yu testified that in response to a bomb threats reported, he was on foot patrol with 3 police officers. They
chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the
corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with “[t]heir eyes . . . moving very
fast.”The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu
caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner’s
“front waist line.”

Issue: WON there was a valid warrantless search

Ruling:
NO, valid warrantless searches, are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure
of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a “stop and frisk.”

In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a “stop and frisk” with “the seizure of the grenade from the
accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest,” hence necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the
warrant requirement.

At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in
their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest
is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. At bottom,
assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a
weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit
of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing
violence.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal
knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just
been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.

Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been
one incidental to a lawful arrest.

a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes
of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
“Stop-and-frisk” as a “limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons,” as laid down in Terry,

“stop-and-frisk” as a “limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons,” as laid down in Terry,

• PeopleversusChua,GR128222,17June1999,396SCRA660&

Facts:

Police officer Lagasca went to Brgy. Tammocalao after the Brgy. Captain requested for a police assistance regarding an
unfamiliar speedboat. When the speedboat landed they went to check but the man suddenly changed direction and run upon seeing the
officers. The man was prevented from fleeing and was requested using “sign language” to open the bag.A search of the bag yielded
several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances.

Issue:WON the search and seizure was valid

Ruling:
No, because the search was not incidental to an arrest.
There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court.—The
search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions
allowed by the Rules of Court as already shown. From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. It is worth
mentioning here that after introducing themselves, the police officers immediately inquired about the contents of the bag. What else
could have impelled the officers from displaying such inordinate interest in the bag but to ferret out evidence and discover if a felony
had indeed been committed by CHUA—in effect to “retroactively establish probable cause and validate an illegal search and seizure”

• Epie Jr. versusUlat-Marredo,518SCRA641,22Mar.2007

Facts:
SPO2 Ngina received and information that a jeepney with plate no. AYB 117 was loaded with Benguet pine Lumber. A
check point was then established. They flagged it down but it did not stop, hence they chased the vehicle. They saw 5 persons inside
and found pieces of lumber in it and have no permit to transport such.
Petitioners filed a “Motion to Suppress Evidence of the Prosecution” on the ground that the pieces of Benguet pine lumber
were illegally seized.

Issue: whether there was probable cause to justify such warrantless search and seizure.

Ruling:
In warrantless searches, probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has
been committed or is about to be committed, of which there is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula in determining probable cause for
its determination varies according to the facts of each case.—The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In People v. Sarap,
399 SCRA 503 (2003), we listed the exceptions where search and seizure may be conducted without warrant, thus: (1) search incident
to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain
view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances. The only requirement in these exceptions is the presence of probable cause. Probable cause is
the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched. In People v. Aruta, 288
SCRA 626 (1998), we ruled that in warrantless searches, probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or
belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. There is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula in determining
probable cause for its determination varies according to the facts of each case.

In this case, here a vehicle was flagged down but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it, there exists probable cause to
justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that the vehicle contained objects which were instruments of some offense.

• SummervilleGeneralMerchandisingversusCourtofAppeals, 529 SCRA 602, 26 June2007

Facts:
The president of petitioner Summerville went to Criminal Investigation and Detective Division to personally complain and
file a letter-complaint against several persons or establishments engaged in the unauthorized manufacturing, distribution and sale of
Royal brand playing cards, the design and mark of which are claimed to have been duly patented/copyrighted and registered. A search
warrant was issued.
Private respondents filed a motion to quash the search warrant and asked for the return of the items seized because the
playing cards seized are not the subject of the offense, fruits of the offense or used or intended to be used as means of committing an
offense.

Issue: WON the seized Crown Playing Cards are subject of the offense.

Ruling:

No. Where there is no allegation that the design and/or mark of a particular brand of playing cards is a reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of another registered mark legally owned by another, there is no crime of trademark
infringement that appears to have been committed or perpetrated to warrant the inference that said playing cards are “subject of the
offense” as contemplated by Sec. 4 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.—Petitioner Summerville does not dispute that the design and/or
mark of the Crown brand playing cards is owned by private respondents. In fact, there is no allegation that the design and/or mark of
such Crown brand playing cards is a reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of another registered mark legally owned
by another; hence, no crime of trademark infringement appears to have been committed or perpetrated to warrant the inference that the
Crown brand playing cards are “subject of the offense” as contemplated by Sec. 4 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. All the more
telling is the contention of petitioner Summerville that it is the plastic container/case and its marking that bear the reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of its registered mark. In other words, it is the design of the plastic container/case that is
alleged to have been utilized by private respondents to deceive the public into believing that their Crown brand playing cards are the
same as those manufactured by petitioner Summervile.

Notes.—A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to procure
relevant evidence of crime—it is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions and not a process for
adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private rights. (United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip, 461 SCRA 574 [2005])

The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized
by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006]) Summerville General
Merchandising Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 525 SCRA 602, G.R. No. 158767 June 26, 2007