Afrika Korps

Seminar Paper for “Advanced Military English I”

Created for the Advanced Military English I Module Summer Semester 2021
in Wiener Neustadt – Austria

Author:
OCdt Dragan Lajsic

Student of the Theresian Military Academy

Austria

Wiener Neustadt, May 2021

LAJSIC Dragan Afrika Korps

Table of Contents
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………..3
2. Afrika Korps……………………………………………………………4
2.1. Erwin Rommel………………………………………………………..4
2.2. Rommel´s approach to warfare……………………………………….6
2.3. The Desert Fox ……………………………………………………….8
3. Troops, Tactics and Strategy…………………………………………...9
3.1. German combined arms operations…………………………………..9
3.2. Flankenangriff: Flank attack…………………………………………12
3.3. Einkreisung und Flugelangriff: Encirclement and Wing Attack…….13
3.4. Einbruch und Durchbruch: Penetration and Breakthrough………….13
4. Logistics and Materiel…………………………………………………14
4.1. Logistics of Afrika Korps……………………………………………14
5. Conclusion……………………………………………………………..15
6. Annexes………………………………………………………………..16
7. Affidavit.................................................................................................18

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1. Introduction

An in-depth analysis of the Deutsche Afrika Korps and their commander Erwin Rommel, this
paper will explain the core arguments of why the Afrika Korps was able to be so successful in
the North African Theatre of Operations. The paper aims to analyse the parameters that the
Afrika Korps found itself operating in.

Figure 1: Panzer Forces of the Afrika Korps advancing through the African desert1

Firstly, the German force had an outstanding leader, and probably one of the best generals of
World War 2, Erwin Rommel ‘The Desert Fox’. Secondly, the Afrika Korps was better
trained in combined arms warfare and used better tactics that had been developed over the
1930’s and brought to perfection in the years of the war, which included maneuver warfare,
bypassing and isolating enemy strongpoints in order to engage the more vulnerable supply,
communication and command positions behind the front. This paper also looks at the central
role of logistics in the North African campaign; it will show that the British by methodically
building up their supplies before going on the offensive gave the initiative back to the Afrika
Korps and allowed them to continue their offensives even when their overextended supply
lines should have forced them to halt, by looting and capturing supplies.

1
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2. Afrika Korps

The Afrika Korps was initially deployed under Hitler’s Directive No. 22 as a Sperrverband
(blocking force)2 in support of the Italian forces in Libya who had been routed by the British
Commonwealth’s Western Desert Force on the 9th December 1940 3. Hitler handpicked Erwin
Rommel to be their commander and the latter arrived in Libya on 12th February 1941. He
initially commanded the fifth Light Division made up of the 5th leichte (Light) “Afrika”
Panzer Regiment, along with the second regiment of the 3rd Panzer division and various sub
units for water treatment, medical care and other support functions. In late April and early
May of 1941 the 5th light Division were joined by the 15th Panzer Division from Italy. This
happened after Rommel had launched his counter-offensive, re-taken most of Cyrenaica,
began the siege of Tobruk and gone back on the defensive.

2.1. Erwin Rommel

Erwin Rommel was a highly decorated officer of the First World War; he had proved himself
as a small unit commander with the sixth Württemberg Infantry Regiment, capturing 1,500
men and 43 officers with just 3 riflemen and 2 officers. He earned the distsinction “Pour le
Mérite” for his exploits on the Italian Front as well as a reputation for great courage and
tactical aptitude4 as part of the Württemberg Mountain Battalion of the Alpenkorps. In World
War 2, he would go on to distinguish himself even further as commander of the 7th ‘Ghost’
Panzer Division during the invasion of France, so named because of its rapid movements.
Few knew exactly where the division was. However, it was during his command of the
German and Italian forces in the North African Campaign that he was to be established as one
of the most capable commanders of the war, and especially of desert warfare, it was also
during the fighting in Cyrenaica that he earned the nickname of “Desert Fox” from the British
Press for being ‘cunning, ubiquitous, fast-moving’5.
On the 6th February 1941, Rommel was unexpectedly recalled from leave and instructed at

2
Cf.: Lewin. Life and Death of Afrika Korps. P. 87
3
Cf.: Playfair I. (2004). The Mediterranean and Middle East. Vol. III: British Fortunes reach their Lowest Ebb
(September 1941 to September 1942). History of the Second World War. Naval & Military Press. Uckfield. P.
56
4
Stone, N. (2008). World War One: A Short History. Penguin Books. London. P. 40
5
Schmidt. With Rommel In The Desert. P. 93

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Figure 2: Erwin Rommel6

Hitler’s HQ by the Fuhrer himself that he was to proceed to Libya to take command of a small
German expeditionary force that would be arriving shortly. Operation “Sonnenblume”
(Sunflower) was launched in order stabilize the routing Italian forces. It strictly laid down that
German units had to be employed as a unified force under one commander rather than being
scattered across a wide front. This gave Rommel an incredible amount of freedom from the
OKW, “Hitler intended for the Afrika Korps to be a stone wall: Rommel made it an
avalanche, moving under laws of its own”7.
Though Rommel and his troops were nominally subordinate to their Italian superiors as
Generalleutnant (Lieutenant General) of the Afrika Korps, Rommel treated his counterparts
with what could only be described as contempt, potentially because of his World War 1
experiences on the Italian front. During battles, he frequently disregarded their views and
orders, and regularly decided not to inform them of his own operations. Whilst he held the
Italian High Command in distain, he did hold several individual Italian senior officers in very
high regard and often went out of his ways to commend regimental soldiers for their hard
work or courageous actions, regardless of nationality. When it came to tactics and strategic
thought he found Italian doctrine too static, cautious, and defensive, and so continued to act as
a law to himself.8

6
Pinterest. URL: https://pinterest.at [24-05-21]
7
Rommel, E. (2013). Infantry Attacks. Pen and Sword Books Ltd. Barnsley. P. 48
8
Cf.: Liddell Hart, B. (1963). The Rommel Papers. Collins. London. P. 65

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2.2. Rommel’s approach to warfare

What is worthy of study is how Rommel was able to exert an almost hypnotic influence on
not only his own troops but also those of the British Commonwealth forces in the Eighth
army. The war in the desert was as much a battle of personality as of arms. Rommel was an
excellent tactical commander, being both versatile and aggressive. He was adept at using
terrain and intelligence to his advantage in seeking out and exploiting enemy weaknesses.
Rommel set out his approach in “Infanterie Greift” an (Infantry Attacks), his memoirs and
day-to-day journal from the First World War, used throughout the Western World as a
resource for tactical infantry movements. General Patton was among the many that were
reported to have read Rommel’s work.
During fighting at the French town of Bleid early in World War One as a platoon commander
Rommel was faced by a French unit that had set up defences in a farmhouse at the entrance to
the town. He had two options: ‘Should I wait until other forces come up or storm the entrance
of Bleid with my platoon? The latter course of action seemed proper’. He utilized shock troop
tactics that emphasized small teams’ fast movement. It was important for these attacks to be
launched with the intention of deceiving the enemy as to the point of the attack while the main
body of the force moved round the flank, followed by a deep penetration and exploitation.
Between the World Wars Rommel served in various positions; including in the War Ministry
as liaison officer with the Hitler Jugend (Hitler Youth) and as commandant of the War
Academy in Wiener Neustadt. During the Polish campaign in September 1939 Rommel
served as the head of Hitler’s personal guard, the Führerbegleitbrigade. As a Swabian
Rommel felt uncomfortable in the company of the traditional Prussian aristocracy that
dominated the German high command, electing instead to serve as a frontline officer.
Following the Polish Campaign, Rommel requested his commission to be transferred to the
Regular Army. He was given command of 7th Panzer Division, one of the four light divisions
he had seen while with Hitler in Poland, which were being built up to full panzer division
strength. Although Rommel had no training or practical experience in tank warfare, his
successes in World War 1 were based on surprise and manoeuvre, two elements central to
armored warfare.9

9
Cf.: Lewin. Rommel As Military Commander. P. 37

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Figure 3: 7th Panzer Division (Ghost Division) under the command of Erwin Rommel10

Their speed and mobility had appealed to him, and the decision to give him command over a
Panzer division was soon shown to have been an excellent one. During the push into France,
when the German attack stalled along the River Meuse due to French destroyed bridges,
artillery and rifle fire, Rommel brought up his tanks and light flak units to provide suppressive
counter-fire. Several houses upwind were set afire to improve a smoke screen for his infantry,
who were sent forward in rubber boats. Appropriating bridging material from the neighboring
5th Panzer Division, Rommel himself aided his engineers in lashing together the pontoons
constructing a bridge which the 7th Panzer were able to use to cross the Meuse, moving out of
the Ardennes and into the heart of France. This speed of action was central to Rommel’s
approach to warfare, tactical with a focus on speed and movement.11

10
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Cf.: Von Luck, H. (1989). Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck. Random House. New
11

York. P. 110

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2.3. The Desert Fox

Rommel landed in Libya on 12th February 1941 where he immediately took command of the
Afrika Korps which was preparing to land in Tripoli. Rather than waiting for the full force to
arrive he began launching offensive operations immediately sending his reconnaissance forces
of the 5th Light Regiment and the 2nd regiment of the 3rd Panzer Division forward in a
probing attack. This attack rapidly developed into a general offensive that drove the British
Commonwealth forces out of Tripolitania, a region of modern day Libya.
To outwit British Intelligence, Rommel used some of his supply trucks covered in tarpaulin to
disguise them as Panzers and got his forces to put up large amounts of dust to make their
numbers appear much greater. Heinz Schmidt writes; “Was it possible that his (Rommel’s)
dummy panzers, knocked together out of wood and canvas, had actually bluffed the enemy’s
air reconnaissance into believing that we intended to launch a major offensive? (...) He
exploited the situation to the utmost. He improvised two attacks – one along the coast towards
Benghazi by Italian troops, the other a German thrust towards Mechili (...) now it was
imperative that the truth should not be discovered. Rommel’s order was ‘Panzers to the head
of all formations. Rear vehicles to raise dust, nothing but dust!’ Who in the desert could
distinguish more than the leading vehicles of a column, if in the rear the dust clouds rose thick
and turbulent?”12
In Rommel, we have an officer ideally suited to leading the fledgling German desert
expeditionary force and who was central to the success of the Afrika Korps. Rommel deserves
his reputation as one of the greatest commanders of the war.

Figure 4: Shows the initial German attack that rapidly developed. With the initiative
handed to the Germans, it was vital for commanders at every level to have all the tools
they were required.13

12
Hoffman, Karl. (2004). Erwin Rommel. Brassey's. London. P. 73
13
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3. Troops, Tactics and Strategy

In the previous chapter, we spoke of the crucial role that the Afrika Korps commander
played in shaping the nature and style of the North African campaign. We are now going
to analyse how the German forces adopted different solutions for the tactical and strategic
problems posed by the North African theatre of operations.
German forces adopted elements of combined arms warfare, an approach to operations
that aimed to give the commanders all the tools required to concentrate combat forces and
this achieve mutually complimentary effects greater than those that would have been
possible had they been used separately or sequentially. Combined arms included close
artillery fire, air support and cooperation between tank and infantry forces.
When the Afrika Korps began its first offensives in March 1941, it met only partially
trained British troops equipped with worn out equipment whose commander, Auchinleck,
under pressure from Churchill was having to constantly contemplate and launch
offensives without having the time to properly plan or analyse previous mistakes. The
British army troops in the early months of the North African campaign were often
squandered before they had the chance to fully acclimatise to the desert environment in
which they were deployed, as the British Official history observed in its comments on the
first battle of El Alamein, “The German soldier always seemed capable of making one
more supreme effort”.14
The Germans on the other hand were deployed to North Africa with a developed system
of combined arms battlegroups, flexible commanders and variable tactics to concentrate
combat power, This was achieved as a result of battle drills and training carried out in the
interwar years and the experiences gained prior to their desert deployment.

3.1. German combined arms operations

The main purpose of the tank is to carry out operational envelopments and turning movements
in the open field; to act at the tactical level, making breakthroughs, which theoretically would
allow the commanders to destroy the enemy in a decisive Vernichtungsschlacht (battle of
annihilation). The commanders and officers of the Afrika Korps were keen to break the
imposed stalemate in North Africa and to make a speedy and far-reaching movement, which
allowed for a swift and decisive advancement in the battle. Tanks, and other mechanised
forces, were no longer constrained by the other arms of the German military. At this point in
the Second World War artillery had the ability to be towed by powered vehicles or mounted
into armoured and self-propelled carriages and therefore no longer did tanks have to wait for

14
Frieser, K. Greenwood, J. (2005). The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West. Naval Institute
Press. Annapolis. P. 25

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horse drawn artillery to redeploy or catch up. As Guderian writes in Achtung-Panzer! “The
tank must not follow the artillery, but the other way round”. 15
The combined arms structure of a German Division, having tanks, infantry, artillery, and
support units formed together, exists to bring the armour and infantry forces into action
against the enemy with sufficient firepower and shock.
The key elements of the offensive are:
• Surprise and speed
• Superiority in force
• Employment of armour
Once launched, the attack had to drive straight on to its objective regardless of opposition.
Coordination between the combined arms was an absolute requisite to the success of these
shock tactics. This became truer over the course of the North African campaign as the British
forces developed more effective antitank weapons and adopted deeper defences, thus limiting
the self-sufficiency of the German mechanised forces especially during the battles for El
Alamein. Germany attempted to counter this by increasing the mobility and armour protection
of their mechanised forces and having a portion of their direct and indirect heavy support
weapons on self-propelled carriages.
An attack on a narrow section of the front must have military weapons and equipment in
sufficient quantities in order to enable a widening of the penetration while maintaining the
speed of advance and protection of the flanks of the penetrating forces; however, the Germans
realised that even the largest concentrations of forces were not always sufficient for
overwhelming superiority along the entire front. They would therefore select a point of
Schwerpunkt (main effort) for the breakthrough, at which they massed the bulk of their heavy
weapons and reserves. The other frontline sectors were engaged by weaker, diversionary
forces in order to distract the enemy from the main objectives.
When selecting the main point, the Germans considered weaknesses in the enemy’s defensive
position, suitability of the terrain for a breakthrough and exploitation: with consideration for
tanks and combined arms battle groups, approach routes, and possibilities for supporting fire,
especially artillery. If any of the diversionary attacks meet with unexpected success, then the
Germans had drawn up plans to allow them to shift forces to that sector, alongside ensuring
sufficient reserves under a strong unified command.16
Most of the German successes prior to the Second Battle of El Alamein were achieved with
armoured and mechanised formations. The original German blitzkrieg tactics were based on

15
Guderian, H. (1999). Achtung-Panzer. The Development of Tank Warfare. Cassell. London. P. 78
16
Cf.: Atkinson, R. (2003). An Army At Dawn. Abacus. St Ives. P. 93

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the belief in the irresistible power of tank formations working independently and supported by
aerial dive-bombers. By the time of El Alamein the offensive tactics were less bold than they
had been in the September of 1939, but the fundamental theories behind them had changed
remarkably little.
Armoured tactics stressed the importance of tank-mechanised infantry cooperation; each
requiring the support of the other as unlimited Luftwaffe support was not guaranteed to be
available at the Afrika Korps command in North Africa. This cooperation failed during the
battle of Alam el Halfa and during the First Battle of El Alamein in 1942. The limited number
of tanks and artillery provided to the Afrika Korps meant that the punch wasn’t sufficient to
break through decisively, which led to much greater losses as reserves were successively
mobilised and British reserves were deployed to counter attack. Rommel wrote in one of his
letters “A kind of apathy took hold of us as we issued orders for all positions to be held on
instruction from the highest authority. I forced myself to this action” 17, this push by Hitler
which forced the Afrika Korps to penetrate through the British lines cost the Germans five
hundred tanks, leaving Rommel in a perilous position of having just twelve operational by 4th
November 1942.
The main brunt of the major German attacks was borne by the Panzer corps, a combined arms
mixed group of tanks, mechanised forces, and artillery. Where infantry divisions were
employed singularly, they were limited to local attacks on a minor scale or mopping up in the
rear of the Panzer corps. Unsurprisingly during the North African campaign, the Germans
were unable to consider a full-scale attack by Infantry formations on fixed defences. German
tactics were to outflank or encircle the main area of the enemy defences with tank formations
and to have the infantry roll up the defences from the rear.

17
Liddell Hart, B. (1970). A History of the Second World War. Cassell. Oxford. P. 59

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3.2. Flankenangriff: Flank attack

The most effective attack, it moves in against the enemy’s flanks, that means against the right
or left side of the enemy. The flank attack develops either through a turning movement or
from flank marches. It attempts to surprise the enemy and permit him no time for
countermeasures. Since mobility and surprise are required, the flank attack is most successful
when launched from a long distance as it hinders enemy observation and reconnaissance;
however, the troop movements needed for this type of attack can be executed close to enemy
forces, but only in favourable terrain or at night, when the movements can be hidden from the
enemy. Attacks on both flanks were only achievable when the German forces were considered
superior. North Africa provided ideal circumstances, as terrain was not a limiting factor for

the manoeuvres,
Figure 5: The battle of Gazala, showing a flank attack by the Afrika Korps on the
British forces at the Gazala line, notice the turning movement around Bir Hacheim 18
for example in the battle of Gazala.

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3.3. Einkreisung und Flugelangriff: Encirclement and Wing Attack

Encirclement is a decisive form of attack, but usually more difficult than a flank attack or an
envelopment, especially in the desert. In an encirclement, the enemy is bypassed, the
objective being to manoeuvre him out of position. This is a risky tactic, as it requires extreme
mobility and deception by the mechanised forces involved. The wing attack is directed at
either one or both of the enemy’s wings. These are units in an enemy army that are distinct to
the ‘centre’ of the formation. This has a better chance of success than simply striking in a
central frontal attack, since only part of the enemy’s firepower is correctly faced and only one
flank of the attacking forces is exposed to enemy fire. If the attack is successful, it will give
the opportunity for a flank attack or an envelopment of the enemy positions.

3.4. Einbruch und Durchbruch: Penetration and Breakthrough

Penetration and breakthrough are not separate forms of attack; they are the exploitation of a
successful attack on the enemy’s front, wing, or flank. Successive effective attacks can
destroy the enemy’s position and broaden the penetration; the deeper into the enemy’s rear
supply and command positions the attack can be driven, the higher the chances of success.
Strong reserves are then deployed to throw back enemy counterattacks against the flanks of
the penetration.
German Wehrmacht soldiers were trained to exploit a penetration to the maximum so it could
develop into a complete breakthrough before an effective hostile counter attack could be
launched. The deeper the attack into the rear echelons of the enemy, the more effective it was
in preventing the enemies closing their front again by withdrawal. The follow up forces could
then roll up the front along the newly created flanks and reduce individual strongpoints by
encirclement and isolation.
The main objective of a penetration and breakthrough was to overcome the enemy’s artillery
and command positions, as these were normally at the rear of the enemy lines; this was
usually assigned to the tank and mechanised forces.19

19
Cf.: Dimbleby, J. (2012). Destiny in the Desert: The Road to El Alamein – The battle that turned the tide.
Profile Books. London. P. 91

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4. Logistics and Materiel

Having looked at the commanders in the North African theatre we now look at the role of
logistics in the success of the Afrika Korps. Logistics is the planning and carrying out of
movement and maintenance of military forces. At its most basic level it includes the:
• Storage, distribution, maintenance and disposition of materiel
• Transport of personnel
• Acquisition or construction of facilities for the storage and distribution of materiel
• Acquisition and distribution of medical and service support20
In the North African campaign, the first stage for the distribution of supplies for the
German forces was by ships to the ports of Benghazi and Tripoli for the Afrika Korps.
From these ports, the second stage held a number of options for the German Forces: they
could move on the supplies by train, truck, pack animals or coastal ships. All of these
options had advantages and disadvantages during the North African campaign.

4.1. Logistics of Afrika Corps

The logistics of the mechanised Afrika Korps raised two important questions:
• How would the army be supplied with fuel, spares, and replacement vehicles?
• How would they move large mechanised formations, and especially the ones that were
road-bound?
Logistics were an integral part of operational planning for the Afrika Korps. The initial plans
had to be prepared quickly in order to stabilise the Italian forces; the main concern was to
provide transport of materiel for the German troops by rail to Italian ports and by Italian or
German ships to Benghazi and Tripoli in North Africa. This initial stage of the operation fell
under the remit of a special branch of the military, ‘the Branch for Transportation to Africa’,
which operated under the command of the German military attaché in Rome.
When the supply ships arrived in the North African ports, they were then under the remit of
the supply and administration officers of the Afrika Korps, who were responsible for the
further transportation of the supplies and personnel to their respective units. This role was
later handed over to the chief supply and administration officer of Panzergruppe Afrika (later
Panzer Army Afrika).
Initially, all bulk commodities, including troops, were transported by sea. When the shipping
losses mounted, officers and men began being transported by plane. However, over the course
of the campaign in North Africa, various situational changes necessitated alterations in the
supply and distribution for the Afrika Korps.21

20
Cf.: Von Clausewitz, C. (1993). On War. Everyman’s Library. London. P. 51
21
Cf.: Caviggia, J. (1990). British and German Logistics Support During The World War Two. North African
Campaign. P. 97

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5. Conclusion

The German arrangement of their Order of Battle into combined arms battle groups gave
officers the tools they needed to surprise and outmanoeuvre enemy forces, apply superior
force at the main point of the attack and to more efficiently deploy their mechanised
reserves. The Afrika Korps was both effective on the offensive because of this system and
able to absorb huge amounts of damage when on the defensive. Due to the combined arms
system, they were easily and quickly able to reform and reorganise. Logistics proved to be
much more important in the North African campaign than in any other theatre of action.
Every need of the soldiers had to be transported from Germany to ports in Italy before
being shipped to the two main harbours of Tripoli and Benghazi and then transported up
to the frontline. The lengths of the supply line were a deciding factor in the success of the
Afrika Korps.
Rommel was able to exert an almost hypnotic influence on both his own troops and those
of his enemy. His cult of personality was further reinforced by the élan of the Afrika
Korps, who saw themselves as an elite unit in the Wehrmacht, especially after their early
successes. Due to the combined arms system they were easily and quickly able to reform
and reorganise, something that the enemy commanders in the North African theatre, were
unable to match.

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6. Annexes

6.1 List of Figures

No. Description Page
01 Panzer Forces of the Afrika Korps advancing through the Afrikan desert 3
02 Erwin Rommel 5
03 7th Panzer Division (Ghost Division) under the command of Erwin Rommel 7
Shows the initial German attack that rapidly developed. With the initiative handed
04 to the German’s it was vital for commanders at every level to have all the tools they 8
required
The battle of Gazala, showing a flank attack by the Afrika Korps on the British
05 12
forces at the Gazala line, notice the turning movement around Bir Hacheim

6.2 List of Literature

1. Atkinson, R. (2003). An Army At Dawn. Abacus. St Ives.

2. Caviggia, J. (1990). British and German Logistics Support During The World War
Two. North African Campaign.

3. Dimbleby, J (2012) Destiny in the Desert: The Road to El Alamein – The battle that
turned the tide. Profile Books. London.

4. Frieser, K. and Greenwood, J. (2005). The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in
the West. Naval Institute Press. Annapolis.

5. Guderian, H. (1999). Achtung-Panzer. The Development of Tank Warfare. Cassell.

London.

6. Hoffman, Karl. (2004). Erwin Rommel. Brassey's. London.

7. Lewin. Life and Death of the Afrika Korps.

8. Lewin. Rommel As Military Commander.

9. Liddell Hart, B. (1970). A History of the Second World War. Cassell. Oxford.

10. Liddell Hart, B (1963) The Rommel Papers. Collins. London. [24-05-21]

11. Play fair I. (2004). The Mediterranean and Middle East. Vol. III: British Fortunes
reach their Lowest Ebb (September 1941 to September 1942). History of the Second World
War. Naval & Military Press. Uckfield.

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12. Pinterest. URL: https://www.pinterest.com [24-05-21]

13. Rommel, E (2013) Infantry Attacks, Pen and Sword Books Ltd. Barnsley.

14. Schmidt. With Rommel In The Desert.

15. Stone, N (2008) World War One: A Short History. Penguin Books. London.

16. Von Clausewitz, C. (1993). On War. Everyman’s Library. London.

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7. Affidavit
I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly
marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented
their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded
as a previous scientific paper earlier on.

I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of

another person’s thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarise, paraphrase,
condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them.

I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others,

consequences may include nullification of the essay. These consequences also apply
retrospectively, i.e. if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I
am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.

Dragan Lajsic
…………………………………

(Dragan Lajsic)

Wiener Neustadt, Austria in June 2021

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