CHAPTER 3 

THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

1. The scope of the equal protection clause, 95 SCRA  420

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate . It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.

2. Requisites for a valid classification-

 (1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
 (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. 

Case
 1. People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12

Facts Cayat is a native of Baguio and a member of the non-Christian tribe. He was
found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having in his possession
one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and
liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make
prior the passage of Act No. 1639
         Act no. 1639 makes it unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a
member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen
hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent
spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native
wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves
to make prior to the passage of this Act.

Hence, Cayat challenged the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that it is
discriminatory and denies equal protection of the laws

The law Act no 1639, exempts only the so-called native wines or liquors
which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take
Ruling ISSUE:
Whether Act No. 1639 is violative of equal protection for being discriminatory.

RULING:
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. Act No. 1639 is NOT violative of
equal protection.

RATIONALE:
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of the equal
protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation
 based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable,
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. 

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements:

First, The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions. It is based upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term
'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical
area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization,
usually living in tribal relationships apart from settled communities."
Second, it is germane to the purpose of the law. The prohibition is unquestionably
designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been
the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the
free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in
lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their
standard of life and civilization.ch
Third, the law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its
enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist.
The Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that
hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.
Lastly, it is evident that the act applies equally to all members of the class. That it
may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their
degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
Case
2. Association of Small Landowners vs.  Sec. of Agrarian Reform, July 14, 1989

Facts
R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had
already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with
the principles of social Justice and Human Rights. This was substantially superseded
almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972,
along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for
distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners.
The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized
the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino
issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D.
No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as
well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential
Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and
E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.
Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines
took over legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations,
including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The
result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President
Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier
mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not
inconsistent with its provisions.
Petitioners questioned PD No. 27  and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on the ground,
 among others, that equal protection was violated.
 
Contention of petitioners as to equal protection: (1)They contend that equal
protection clause was violated because the order places the burden of solving the
agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is
imposed on the owners of other properties.   (2)They also contend that sugar planters
have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a
separate group with problems exclusively their own.

ISSUE:
         Whether the questioned PD and EO are violative of equal protection.

Petitioners who are small agricultural landowners question the constitutionality of

several agrarian reform laws alleging that the implementation of agrarian reform
discriminates agricultural landowners and favors other property owners.
Ruling RULING:
         Petition is dismissed. The questioned PD and EOs are constitutional.
RATIONALE:
         Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be
treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners
have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment.
The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be
made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except
to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.
         The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection
because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There
is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian
reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a
particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been
submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.
**This case also emphasized the requisites of valid classification cited above in People
vs Cayat.

Case
4.   IMBONG VS. OCHOA, GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014;

Facts Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

14 petitions challenged the constitutionality of RA 10354 for the ff grounds: The RH Law violates the
right to life of the unborn, The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products, The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom, RH Law threatens
conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it
compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to
other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and
service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law
discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that
promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the
 number of the poor.

March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo
Ante

Ruling One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which
is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is
embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness
in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It
"requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner."
"The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue
or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however,
to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It
is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the
members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity
will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long
as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the
law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who
may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude"
those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program
is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by
 providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law
admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1)
explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not
impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the
assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a
truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply
provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic
reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive
health education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of
those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial
distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests
between public educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there
is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive
health education.
Case
5.   BIRAOGO VS. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, GR No. 192935,
December 7, 2010

Facts two consolidated cases5 both of which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled “Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010.”

1. special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his
capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being
violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution6 as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public
office and to appropriate funds therefor.
2. petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando
B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of
Representatives.

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May
2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch
condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, “Kung walang corrupt,
walangmahirap.” The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry
 out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a
special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed
during the previous administration.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive
Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).

the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an “independent
collegial body,” it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to
his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable.

OSG 4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.

Contention of petitioners: The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this
constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same
class such that the intent of singling out the “previous administration” as its sole object makes
the PTC an “adventure in partisan hostility.”66 Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the
commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations
previous to that of former President Arroyo.

the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption solely during the said
administration.71 Assuming arguendo that the commission would confine its proceedings to
officials of the previous administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is committed
against the equal protection clause for “the segregation of the transactions of public officers
during the previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification
based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks to
correct.”72 To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, 
Ruling Yes EO 1 is violative of the equal protection clause,

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means
that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
 differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court
has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of
the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration”87 only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order. 

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby created the PHILIPPINETRUTH

COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the “COMMISSION,” which shall primarily seek and find
the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and
magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private
sector, if any, during the previous administration; 

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. 

“The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination.”

The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand
the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption
committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the
future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of
the President. If he would decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless.
This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was “crafted to
tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration.”
Case
6. JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO VS. DOJ & COMELEC, GR No. 199082, September 18, 2012

Facts Before the Court are three (3) consolidated petitions and supplemental petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Jose Miguel T.
Arroyo (Mike Arroyo) in G.R. No. 199082, Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. (Abalos) in G.R. No.
199085 and Gloria Macapagal

Acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and the surfacing of new witnesses
indicating the occurrence of massive electoral fraud and manipulation of election results
in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9266
approving the creation of a joint committee with the DOJ, which shall conduct preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004
and 2007 elections.    

The COMELEC and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials
from the DOJ and the COMELEC. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team
concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections
 in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed
perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation for
electoral sabotage.
 
         After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a
resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed
against GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among
others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
         Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-
DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court as it
violates the equal protection clause.
         Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team is in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because its
sole purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents
SPECIFICALLY THOSE INVOLVING THE 2004 AND 2007 ELECTIONS TO THE
EXCLUSION OF OTHERS, IN VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE IN BIRAOGO V.
TRUTH COMMISSION AND COMPANION CASE. They insist that the Joint Panel
was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials
linked to the Arroyo Administration.

ISSUE: Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection
clause

Ruling
NO. Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal protection clause.
         While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary
investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public
officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the
performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the
investigation by the Joint Committee.
         The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It
is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not demand
absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and
conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.

Case 7. ELEAZAR QUINTO VS. COMELEC, February 22, 2010

Facts
Petitioners hold appointive positions in the government. The main issue in this
case is whether or not the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, providing that appointive officials are deemed
automatically resigned from their jobs upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy (while the elected officials are not) violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.

(1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the
differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those holding elective
positions;
 (2) They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants holding
appointive posts: (a) without distinction as to whether or not they occupy
high/influential positions in the government, and (b) they limit these civil servants'
activity regardless of whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or whether
they be in the national, municipal or barangay level; and

(3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right
of these public appointive officials.

        

         On December 1, 2009, the Supreme Court through Justice Antonio Nachura
held that the questioned provisions of the above-mentioned laws are
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause. The COMELEC
moved for a reconsideration of the said Decision.

ISSUE: WON the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No.
9369,  Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause

Ruling
Held:

         The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute,
but is subject to reasonable classification. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test
developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has
four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purpose

s of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 

         If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.

         Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and

appointive officials. Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate
of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and
are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority.

Case
8.   GUTIERREZ VS. DBM, G.R. No. 153266, March 18, 2010
Facts
FACTS: RA 6758 (Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the
compensation of government employees)

Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation already being
enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates. But it exempted certain additional
compensations that the employees may be receiving from such consolidation.

These consolidated cases question the inclusion of certain allowances and fringe
benefits into the standardized salary rates for offices in the national government, state
universities and colleges, and local government units as required by the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 and implemented through the challenged
National Compensation Circular 59 (NCC 59).

A law was passed integrating the COLA to the standard pay of govt employees
wherein it did not include military and police. The govt employees coming from different
departments excluding goccs filed consolidated petitions alleging that such law is
violative of the equal protection clause.

ISSUES:WON the exclusion of the other govt employees violate the equal protection
clause.

Ruling
HELD: 

No, the intention of the COLA is to offset the high cost of living of some military
men in some areas the Court is not persuaded that the continued grant of COLA to the
uniformed personnel to the exclusion of other national government officials run afoul the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. The fundamental right of equal protection of
the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane
to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.

To be valid and reasonable, the classification must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.

It is clear from the first paragraph of Section 11 that Congress intended the uniformed personnel to be
continually governed by their respective compensation laws. Thus, the military is governed by R.A.
6638, as amended by R.A. 9166 while the police is governed by R.A. 6648, as amended by R.A.
6975.

Certainly, there are valid reasons to treat the uniformed personnel differently from other national
government officials. Being in charged of the actual defense of the State and the maintenance of
internal peace and order, they are expected to be stationed virtually anywhere in the country. They
are likely to be assigned to a variety of low, moderate, and high-cost areas. Since their basic pay
does not vary based on location, the continued grant of COLA is intended to help them offset the
effects of living in higher cost areas.
Case 9.   People. vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
Facts 1. This case involves the constitutionality of the old probation law. Private
respondent (Cu-Unjieng) was convicted of a criminal charge by trial court of Manila.
 2. He filed several motions for reconsideration or new trial but was denied. On 1936, the
SC remanded the case to the original court of origin for the execution of judgment.
3. While waiting for the new trial, he appealed to Insular Probation Office (IPO) for
probation but was denied.
4. However, Judge Vera, upon another request by petitioner, allowed the petition to be set
for hearing for probation.
5. Petitioners then filed a case to Judge Vera for the latter has no power to place the
petitioner under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 of the Act 4221 (i.e., the
grant to the provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted
person.)

Petitioner’s contentions:
1. Judge Vera has no power to place the petitioner under probation because it is in
violation of Sec. 11 of the Act 4221 because nowhere it states that it is to be made
applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila.
2. Assuming if includes cities, it violates equal protection clause for being an invalid
classification because its applicability is not uniform throughout the country for each
provincial board has its own discretion to provide or not to provide a probation system,
allocate funds for the probation officers based on the discretion of each provincial
boards as regards their own locality, etc.

ISSUES: Whether the assailed provision is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause.

Ruling HELD: YES, the assailed provision is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause.

Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification
on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification,
however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only,
and must apply equally to each member of the class.

In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the
unwarranted delegation of legislative power. Each provincial board has its own discretion to
provide or not to provide a probation system, allocate funds for the probation officers based
on the discretion of each provincial boards as regards their own locality, etc. What if the
other province decides not to adopt probation system, or it decides not to have salary for the
probation officer?

it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination
and inequality are permitted or allowed. Section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of
the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad.

The Challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads “This Act shall
apply in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial
fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be
subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that
can provide appropriation of a probation officer may have a system of probation within
their locality. This would mean to say that  convicts in provinces where no probation
 officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

Case 10.   IMELDA MARCOS VS. CA, 278 SCRA 843

Facts
Imelda Marcos was charged for violating Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
banned residents, firms, associations and corporations from maintaining foreign
exchange accounts abroad without permission from the Central Bank. Several
information were filed against her. During the pendency of the cases, Central Bank
Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 (Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulations) were
issued which basically allowed residents, firms, associations and corporations to
maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad but the circulars have a saving clause
exempting from the circular pending criminal actions involving violations of C.B. Circ.
960. Marcos filed a Motion to Quash the information filed against her based on the new
circulars. The RTC denied the Motion so did the CA hence the appeal. Marcos averred
that her right to equal protection has been violated, among others, as the new circular
was purposely designed to preserve the criminal cases lodged against her.

She also averred that C.B. Circ. 960, as well as the Central Bank Act (which
allowed the Central Bank to issue circulars) is an undue delegation of legislative power
because the said law allowed the Central Bank to legislate (define crimes) penal laws
and determine penalties therefore.

The saving clause in CB Circular No. 1318, which petitioner questions, provides:

Sec. 111. Repealing Clause. All existing provisions of Circulars 363, 960 and 1028,
including amendments thereto, with the exception of the second paragraph of Section 68
of Circular 1028, as well as all other existing Central Bank rules and regulations or parts
thereof, which are inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, however, that regulations, violations
of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered
repealed insofar as such pending action or investigations are concerned, it being
understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at
the time the cause of action accrued shall govern (Emphasis ours).

ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Marcos are correct.

Ruling
HELD: No. Anent the issue of equal protection, the Supreme Court said Marcos’
lamentations that the aforementioned provisions are discriminatory because they are
aimed at her and her co-accused do not assume the dignity of a legal argument since
they are unwarranted conjectures belied by even the text of the circulars alone. Hence,
as respondent appellate court correctly concludes, the foregoing facts clearly disprove
petitioner’s claim that her constitutional right to equal protection of the law was violated.
Should she nonetheless desire to pursue such objection, she may always adduce
additional evidence at the trial of these cases since that is the proper stage therefor, and
not at their present posture.”

Case 11.   HIMAGAN VS. PEOPLE, October 7, 1994

Facts
FACTS: 

Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was

 charged for murder and attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan
was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the
filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of
the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1)
day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case
is terminated. Such cases shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated
within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the
suspension averring that  Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his
suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of
preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be
a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 47 of R.A. 6975 violates Himagan’s constitutional right to
equal protection of the laws.

Ruling
RULING: 

No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other
classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the
rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the
badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as
succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally
charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his
victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus
easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The
imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not
violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

Case
12.   PHIL. JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO, November 11, 1993

Facts Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the
franking privilege from the Judiciary but retains the same for the President of
the Philippines; VP; Legislative and the general public in the filing of complaints
against public offices or officers.

Franking privilege allows for members of Congress and their staff to send

mail to their constituents or supporters without having to pay postage. 

Respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. Franking privilege was withdrawn
not only from the Judiciary but also other offices.

Issue: Whether the classification is violative of the equal protection clause.

Ruling If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it
seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not
need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially
where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all,
and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes
 the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege,
there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the
Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme
Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the
National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not
greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.

We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid
exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing
clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It
is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the
grantees of the franking privilege.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
Case 13.               Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420
Facts Petitioners Gumabon were sentenced to reclusion perpetua after pleading guilty
for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and
kidnapping. While in People v Hernandez (prision mayor) the supreme court rules
that there is no complex crime of rebellion and was reaffirmed in the case of
people vs Lava.

Same law, same crime but different punishment.

Ruling They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal protection,
people similarly situated were not similarly dealt with. What is required
under this required constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal
norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded
the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: "Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not
identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest."
Case 14.               PANFILO LACSON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, January 20, 1999
Facts
Note: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Section 1, Article III,
1987 Constitution). 

Facts:

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 — an act which
further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan — is being challenged in this
petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-
 intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the
Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for
multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang were killed by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine
National Police (PNP). headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC,
that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a
rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano 

Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,

including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases
pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof."

Issue: WON   section 4 and 7 R.A. 8249  is constitutional and the equal protection is
violated.

Ruling
Held: The court ruled that an established precept in constitutional law that the guarantee
of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
concurrence of four elements, namely:(1)it must rest on substantial distinction; (2)it must
be germane to the purpose of the law;(3)must not be limited to existing conditions only,
and (4must apply equally to all members of the same class,all of which are present in
this case.

The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials
whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases
where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences.

In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the
latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and
presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction
of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, 37 it can be reasonably anticipated
that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is
why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner
and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different
category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4
provides that it shall apply to "all cases involving" certain public officials and, under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to
petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the
Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in
the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng
cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had
already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new
law (R.A. 8249).
Case 15.                BASCO VS. PAGCOR, May 14, 1991
Facts Facts: 
Basco filed a petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order.

PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR —
conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution,
drug trafficking and other vices

Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D.
1067-A and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B "to establish, operate and maintain gambling
casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."

The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to
fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed for PAGCOR to fully
attain this objective. Subsequently, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the
Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law.

It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs.

Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most gambling are
outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" 

Issue: Whether or not it  violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it
legalizes PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are
outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices?

Ruling We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-
accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not prevent
classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not
have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).

The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The
Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).

Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection
is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting
(P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA
1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited,
does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.

"If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown
because there are other instances to which it might have been applied." (Gomez v.
Palomar, 25 SCRA 827) "The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not
mean that all occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the
state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those
cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that
would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact." (Dominican Hotel
v. Arizana, 249 US 2651)
Case 16.               TATAD VS. SECRETARY OF ENERGY, 281 SCRA 330
Facts
FACTS: RA8180,or the Downstream Oil Industry Regulation Act of 1996, was for the
purpose of deregulating the downstream oil industry. Under The deregulated environment,
any person or entity may import or purchase quantity of crude oil and petroleum products
from foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other
downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own
requirement, subject to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Considering that oil is
not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding
ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws to accommodate
innovations in the oil industry. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims,
among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and
imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends
that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and
discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not
have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from
abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not RA 8180 violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling
RULING: Yes. RA 8180 violated the equal protection clause. The law only strengthens
oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our
downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign
oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the
oil market. All other players belong to the Lilliputian league. The “new players” are
discriminated against insofar as it places them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the
established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being
observed by the latter.

Case
17.               Taxicab Operators vs. BOT, September 30, l982

Facts
FACTS: To insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances
and in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and
safety, the Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular phasing out the
old and dilapidated taxis. Pursuant to OT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of
Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular formulating a schedule of
phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.
The Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation
filed a petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order", to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular of the
Board of Transportation and Memorandum Circular of the Bureau of Land Transportation.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the implementation and enforcement of the assailed

memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional right on  Equal protection of
the law.
Ruling
RULING: The law being enforced in Metro Manila only and was directed solely towards
the taxi industry does not violate their right to equal protection of the law for the
traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so
that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit
all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate
property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate
even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded".
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is
concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the
same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or
similarly situated. It permits classification of the object or subject of the law provided
classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which makes for real
differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required
under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all
persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment
both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy
the foregoing criteria.

Substantial distinction: distinction is based on reasonable standards – Metro Manila cabs

only because they are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use
compared to other places. (Page 299 De Leon)

Case 18.                Bautista vs. Juinio,127 SCRA 329

Facts
NO VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND DUE PROCESS

Promote economic security

FULLTEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1984/jan1984/gr_l50908_1984.html 

FACTS: 

Mary Concepcion Bautista and her husband are assailing the constitutionality of Letter of
Instruction No. 869 (LOI) issued in 1979 which classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra
Heavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles during weekends and holidays from 5am
Saturday until 5am Monday. Purpose of this law was to curb down petroleum
consumption as bigger cars consume more fuel. Pursuant to the LOI, Alfredo Juinio,
then the Minister of Public Works, together with other cabinet members issued a circular
implementing the LOI. Bautista claimed the LOI to be discriminatory as it made an
assumption that Heavy and Extra Heavy cars are heavy on petroleum consumption when
in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on fuel consumption. Further, the law
restricts their freedom to enjoy their car while others who have smaller cars may enjoy
theirs. Bautista avers that there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on
vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH).

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Letter of Instruction violates equal protection.

Ruling No. The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention. The Supreme Court ruled
that the measure was a valid exercise of police power.

Anent the issue on equal protection, the classification of cars on its face cannot be characterized as an
affront to reason. The ideal situation is for the law’s benefits to be available to all, that none be placed
outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men
governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law. The
actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law
susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. To assure that the
general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to
liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection
clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment
of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds
no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under
similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group are equally binding on the rest.

Rational basis exists for the classification – The LOI is valid as it is justified under the police power
of the state to conserve energy. There is rational basis for the classification followed. To assure that
the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights
to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired
by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason.

. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. (page 324 De Leon)
19.               Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392

FACTS: Election code disqualifies retires from running for the same elective post from
which they retired

BP Blg 52 is assailes as contrary to the equal protection clause.

Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his
office and has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. In 1980, he filed for re-election for
the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted, Section 4 of which
disqualifies any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall
have been 65 years old at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected from running for the same elective local office from which he has retired.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 violates the equal protection
and due process guarantee of the Constitution.
RULING:
NO. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments.
The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid. The
need for new blood assumes relevance.
Paragraph 1, Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is declared VALID. Portion of Paragraph 2,
Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is declared NULL AND VOID.
Page 321 De Leon

20.                Villegas vs. Hiu, 86 SCRA 270

SEE FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1978/nov1978/gr_29646_1978.html

FACTS:
Ordinance No. 6537 was passed and was signed by Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila
on March 27, 1968. This ordinance prohibits aliens from being employed or
engaged in any position or occupation or business in Manila, whether permanent,
temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor
of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila then filed a petition for writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order for Ordinance No. 6537 as well as
declaration of said Ordinance as null and void.

Judge Francisco Arca issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17,
1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 6537 is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
HELD: The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its
principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit.  the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money
under the guise of regulation.

Yes. The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider
valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although
the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial
differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.
The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether he is
casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly
paid executive.

The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to
all persons, both aliens and citizens.
The Decision of the RTC is affirmed.
21.               Ceniza vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763
SEE FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1980/jan1980/gr_52304_1980.html
FACTS:

On December 22. 1979, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51
providing for local elections on January 30, 1980. Section 3 of the statute provides for
reclassification of cities into:
1.    Highly urbanized cities- Cities having annual regular income of 40 million pesos. The
registered voters of which shall not participate nor vote in the election of the officials of
the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located.

2.    Component cities- all other cities. The registered voters of which may be entitled to
vote in the election of the officials of the province of which that city is a component, if its
charter so provides.

To implement the act, COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which enumerated
cities not entitled to participate in the election of provincial officials. Cebu City and
Mandaue City are two of them.

Petitioners, taxpayers and registered voters in the Cities of Cebu and Mandaue, filed a
petition for writ of preliminary injunction assailing Section 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51.
In order to allow the registered voters in the cities, particularly Cebu City and Mandaue
City, to participate in the election of, and vote for, provincial officials.

1 contention of the petitioners: that classifying cities including Cebu City as highly
st

urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial
officials is unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial
distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates
the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification
amounts to a denial of equal protection.

2 contention of the petitioners: that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal
nd

protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for
provincial officials.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of Batas Blg. 885 is violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
HELD: No.

1 : The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on
st

the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The
revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development
as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show
whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity to warrant its independence
from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need
the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued
participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.

2 : The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city
nd

to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another
component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution
nor the voter's right of suffrage.
The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar rights
and privileges granted by law. It would have been discriminatory and a denial of the
equal protection of the law if the statute prohibited an individual or group of voters in the
city from voting for provincial officials while granting it to another individual or groups of
voters in the same city.
22. UNIDO vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 38

FACTS: 

In 1981, the Batasang Pambansa proposed amendments to the 1973

Constitution. The amendments were to be voted upon in a plebiscite for the people’s
approval/disapproval. The YES vote was being advanced by Kilusan ng Bagong
Lipunan – President Marcos’ political party. On the other hand, the NO vote was
being advanced by the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO). To ensure parity and
equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469 which basically provided that there
be equal opportunity, equal time and equal space on media use for campaigns for
both sides. On 12 March 1981, Marcos campaigned for the YES vote via TV and
radio from 9:30pm to 11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by 26 TV stations
and 248 radio stations nationwide. UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they
be granted the same opportunity as Marcos had pursuant to Resolutions 1467-1469.
COMELEC denied the demand. UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of the equal
protection clause.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal protection by virtue of COMELEC’s
denial of their request.

RULING: 
No. The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied due process. They were also not
denied equal protection. It is the considered view of the SC that when Marcos
conducted his ‘pulong-pulong’ or consultation with the people on March 12, 1981,
he did so in his capacity as President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as
the head of any political party. Under the Constitution, the ‘Prime Minister and the
Cabinet shall be responsible . . . for the program of government and shall determine the
guidelines of national policy’. In instances where the head of state is at the same time
the president of the political party that is in power, it does not necessarily follow that he
speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the governed. The president is
accorded certain privileges that the opposition may not have. Further, the SC
cannot compel TV stations and radio stations to give UNIDO free air time as they
are not party to this case. UNIDO must sought contract with these TV stations and
radio stations at their own expense.

Anent the equal time, equal space and equal quality of exposure claimed by petitioner, it should be
informative to quote the pertinent constitutional provisions, laws and Comelec resolutions:

Section 5 of Article XII-C of the Constitution circumscribes the relevant powers of the Comelec this
wise:

SEC. 5. The enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of

transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, may be supervised or regulated by the Commission during the
election period for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections.
Section 41 of the Election Code of 1978 pertinently reads as follows:

SEC. 41. Regulation of election propaganda through mass media. – (a) The

Commission shall promulgate rules and regulations regarding the sale of air time for
political purposes during the campaign period to insure that time equal as to duration
and quality is available to all candidates for the same office or political parties, groups
or aggrupations at the same rates or given free of charge; that such rates are
reasonable and not higher than those charged other buyers or users of air time for
non-political purposes; that the provisions of this Code regarding the limitation of
expenditures by candidates and contributions by private persons and certain classes
of corporations, entities and institutions are effectively enforced; that said radio
broadcasting and television stations shall not be allowed to schedule any program or
permit any sponsor to manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party,
group or aggrupation by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including said candidate
and/or political party, group or aggrupation respecting, however in all instances the
right of said stations to broadcast accounts of significant or newsworthy events and
views on matters of public interest.

Sections 7 and 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 1468 read thus:

SEC. 7. Free air time. – Any radio broadcasting or television station that grants free of
charge the use of air time to any supporter, oppositors political party, group or
aggritpution shall also give similar air time free of charge to other supporters,
oppositors, political party group or aggrupations except when such use of air -time is
part of a news program or coverage involving a newsworthy event.

A radio, television station giving air time free of charge to any supporter, oppositor,
political party/group for campaign purposes shall inform the Commission of such fact
within two days from the use of such free time.

SEC. 8. Failure to agree on equal time. – In case the supporter, oppositor, political
party group and the radio-television station, despite mediation by the Ministry of
Public Information, cannot agree on the equal time to be sold or given free, the
controversy shall be referred to the Commission whose decision on the matter shall
be final and immediately executory.

23. Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433(Read also the dissenting opinion of
Justice Makasiar

Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1982/jan1982/gr_l_50581_50617_1982.html

Facts:

Information were filed against Rufino V. Nunez before Sandiganbayan on 21

February and 26 March 1979 for the crime of estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents committed in connivance with his co-accused, all
public officials, in several cases. Thereafter, on 15 May, upon being arraigned, he filed
a motion to quash on constitutional and juridical grounds. A week later, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed a day later,
and was likewise denied. Nunez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Supreme Court, claiming that Presidential Decree 1486, which created the
Sandiganbayan, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto
clauses of the Constitution.
Petitioners contend that The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner’s
right to equal protection, because:

1. appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of

discretion;
2. appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding
a review of the facts and trial evidence; and
3. there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the
Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other
estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering
both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court
of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the trial of the accused, a public official, by the Sandiganbayan unduly
discriminates against the accused, in light of the difference of the procedures (especially
appellate) in the Sandiganbayan vis-a-vis regular courts.

Held: NO.
The Constitution provided for but did not create a special Court, the
Sandiganbayan, with “jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt
practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may
be determined by law.” It came into existence with the issuance in 1978 of a Presidential
Decree.

Classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make real

differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited
to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the
Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, i.e. dishonesty in the public
service, the urgency of which cannot be denied. It follows that those who may
thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as 17
January 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different
procedure for the accused therein, whether petitioner is a private citizen or a
public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Further, the omission of the Court of Appeals as intermediate tribunal does
not deprive protection of liberty. The innocence or guilt of an accused in the
Sandiganbayan is passed upon by 3-judge court of its division. Moreover, a
unanimous vote is required, failing which “the Presiding Justice shall designate
two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with
them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such
division shall be necessary for rendering judgment.” If convicted, the
 Sandiganbayan en banc has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any
error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment.
The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special
court, the Sandiganbayan precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of
which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that
those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far
back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a
different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner
is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling of this
Court in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno a 1949 decision, that the general guarantees of
the Bill of Rights, included among which are the due process of law and equal
protection clauses must “give way to [a] specific provision, ” in that decision, one
reserving to “Filipino citizens of the operation of public services or utilities.” The
scope of such a principle is not to be constricted. It is certainly broad enough to
cover the instant situation.

DISSENTING OPINION by J. MAKASIAR: 

Some provisions in the Sandiganbayan violate not only the constitutional
guarantees of due process as well as equal protection of the law and against the
enactment of ex post facto laws, but also the constitutional provisions on the
power of supervision of the Supreme Court over inferior courts as well as its rule-
making authority.
The basic caveat for the embattled citizen is obsta principiis - resist from the very
beginning any attempt to assault his constitutional liberties.
Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to
the government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right
to appeal to two appellate courts - first, to the Court of Appeals, and thereafter to
the Supreme Court. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same
category as graft and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the
Decree creating the Sandiganbayan. are only allowed one appeal - to the Supreme
Court (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a
collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this
invidious discrimination Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a
quality of justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge.
The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and
integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case
certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.
P.D. NO. 1606 VIOLATES THE GUARANTEE AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS
SECTION 9 OF P.D. NO. 1606 CLASHES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE-
MAKING AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT
P.D. NO. 1606 SUBVERTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF SUPERVISION
OVER INFERIOR COURTS INCLUDING THE SANDIGANBAYAN

Page 292, De Leon

24.               Sison vs. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1984julydecisions.php?id=321
FACTS:
This is a petition assailing the validity of Batas Pambansa 135 Section 1 which further
amends Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. Petitioner, Antero
Sison, as taxpayer alleges that by virtue thereof, he would be unduly discriminated
against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the
exercise of his profession vis-à-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or
salaried individual taxpayers.  He characterizes the above section as arbitrary
amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character.
  
For petitioner, therefore, there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision violates the equal protection and due process of the
Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation?
RULING:
The petition is without merit, considering the (1) lack of factual foundation to show the
arbitrary character of the assailed provision; (2) the force of controlling doctrines on due
process, equal protection, and uniformity in taxation and (3) the reasonableness of the
distinction between compensation and taxable net income of professionals and
businessman certainly not a suspect classification.
 
It is manifest that the field of state activity has assumed a much wider scope, hence, the
need for more revenues. The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of
to assure the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public
funds.
 
The petitioner alleges arbitrariness. A mere allegation, as here does not suffice. There
must be a factual foundation of such unconstitutional taint. Absent such a showing, the
presumption of validity must prevail.
 
For equal protection. It suffices that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all
persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the
same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. That same formulation applies as well to taxation
measures.
 
Petitioner likewise invoked the kindred concept of uniformity. "Equality and uniformity
in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be
taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and
natural classifications for purposes of taxation. There is quite a similarity then to the
standard of equal protection for all that is required is that the tax "applies equally to all
persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situations."

Doctrine: Uniformity in taxation quite similar to the standard of equal protection.

As clarified by Justice Tuason, where “the differentiation” complained of

“conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity” it “is not discriminatory
within the meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform.” There is quite a
similarity then to the standard of equal protection for all that is required is that the
tax “applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar
situations.”

Page 318 De Leon

25.               Citizens Surety vs. Puno, 119 SCRA 216

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1982/dec1982/gr_l_34669_1982.html

Facts:

On October 10, 1966, Maria Barcelon mortgaged his land in Barrio Obrero to
Citizens' Surety and Insurance Co. After the expiration of the period of
redemption, the purchaser sought to consolidate its ownership but the Register of
Deeds of Manila refused to register the consolidation. On April 6, 1971, the
corporation instituted Civil Case No. 82820 in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against the Register of Deeds of Manila and the City of Manila. It prayed that Resolution
No. 542 be declared null and void and that the Register of Deeds be ordered to register
the consolidation of title.

It is provided in the Section 4 of Res. No. 542 that  “only laborers earning
not more than P180.00 a month or P6.00 a day are qualified to buy lands in Barrio
Obrero, Tondo, Manila- Employees working in offices or establishments and
earning as much but who are not laborers cannot buy lands in that area. Also
persons who are engaged in some calling or occupation earning as much are not
also qualified. It should not be overlooked that the intention of the pertinent
provisions of the Charter of the City of Manila contained in Sections 97, 98 and 100
of said lands on easy terms.”

This is an appeal where petitioner Citizens' Surety and Insurance Co claims that
Resolution No. 542 is unconstitutional because it is unreasonable and violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 542 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

Ruling:
The petition was dismissed. Judge Puno said that “there is no merit in the
pretension that the questioned resolution does not apply to forced sales. It is
implemented in sales upon foreclosure or on execution by limiting bids to those persons
legally qualified to purchase. The legal intent and purpose of the resolution would be
rendered utterly nugatory if the same be restricted in its application to voluntary sales.” 
The lot in question is situated in Barrio Obrero. Obrero means laborer or manual
worker. There is, therefore, a justifiable and reasonable basis to limit the sale of the lots
in the barrio to obreros only if they are birds of the same feather.
The petitioner also claims that the resolution is unreasonable because it bars a
non-laborer to buying a lot in Barrio Obrero even if he does not earn more than P180.00
a month or P6.00 a day. The petitioner, which is a corporation and not a lowly paid
worker, is not competent to raise this claim. 
The petitioner will nonetheless be disqualified to acquire the lot since the City of
Manila is tasked by its Charter "to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide the
same into home lots for sale on easy terms to residents, giving first priority to the bona-
fide tenants or occupants of said lands, and second priority to laborers and low-salaried
employees." Obviously, the questioned resolution merely seeks to implement the Charter
provision.

An analysis of the provision of Sec. 4 of Resolution No. 542 will show that the classification
made thereby does not fulfill the above-mentioned requisites. The classification of laborer does not
have a substantial distinction from low-salaried employees or persons engaged in some calling with a
limited income, because all of them are under like circumstances in their lives, in their liberty, in their
property, and in the pursuit of happiness.

26.                Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30

Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1978/mar1978/gr_47771_1978.html

Facts: 

Pedro Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang
Pambansa Elections. He, along with others, assailed the constitutionality of PD 1269
or the 1978 Election Code. Sections 140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 28, of the
1978 Election Code, grants the voter the option to vote either for individual
candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he
desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or
aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of
the political party, group or aggrupation (office-block ballot). 
1978 Election Code grants the voters the option for straight party or block voting where the
vote for a party or group would be counted as a vote for all its candidates.

Peralta was vehement in contending that the optional block voting scheme is violative
of this provision of the Constitution: “Bona fide candidates for any public office shall
be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.” He invoked the protection of
independent candidates who, according to him, would be thus made to suffer if the
assailed provision is not nullified. For Peralta, an independent candidate would be
discriminated against because by merely writing on his ballot the name of a political
party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage which
the independent candidate does not enjoy; a candidate who is not a party-member is
deprived of the equal protection of the laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in
relation to Sec 9 of Article XII, of the 1973 Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the 1978 Election Code is violative of equal protection.

Ruling: 

No. The SC ruled that the 1978 Election Code is valid. Before a voter prepares his
ballot, the voter will be able to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will
receive more than one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a candidate of a
party group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual candidates or to
vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is his. No one can compel him to do
otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent
candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to their
discretion. Certainly, before filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of
the advantages under the law accruing to candidates of a political party or group. If he
wishes to avail himself of such alleged advantages as an official candidate of a party,
he is free to do so by joining a political party group or aggrupation. In making his
decision, it must be assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and considered
the relative advantages and disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the
application of the rule depends on his voluntary action or decision, he cannot, after
exercising his discretion, claim that he was the victim of discrimination.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classifications. What is proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by a reasonable classification
based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and
applies equally to all those belonging to the same class.   The equal protection clause is not
14

infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if
it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within the class and those who do not.   There is, of course,
15

no concise or easy answer as to what an arbitrary classification is. No definite rule has been or can
be laid down on the basis of which such question may be resolved. The determination must be made
in accordance with the facts presented by the particular case. The general rule, which is well-
settled by the authorities, is that a classification, to be valid, must rest upon material
differences between the persons, activities or things included and those excluded.' There
must, in other words, be a basis for distinction. Furthermore, such classification must be
germane and pertinent to the purpose of the law. And, finally, the basis of classification must,
in general, be so drawn that those who stand in substantially the same position with respect
to the law are treated alike. It is, however, conceded that it is almost impossible in some matters to
foresee and provide for every imaginable and exceptional case. Exactness in division is impossible
and never looked for in applying the legal test. All that is required is that there must be, in general,
some reasonable basis on general lines for the division.  16

Classification which has some reasonable basis does not offend the equal protection clause merely
because it is not made with mathematical nicety.  17

In the cases at bar, the assailed classification springs from the alleged differential treatment
afforded to candidates who are party members as against those who run as independents. It
must be emphasized in the election law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon a
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.   The factual foundation to demonstrate invalidity must
18

be established by the litigant challenging its constitutionality.   These principles are predicated upon
19

the presumption in favor of constitutionality.

27.               Ormoc Sugar Co. vs. Ormoc City, 22 SCRA 603

 Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1968/feb1968/gr_l-23794_1968.html

Facts: A municipal ordinance imposed a tax on any and all productions of centrigufal sugar
milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc
In 1964, Ormoc City passed an ordinance which provides: “There shall be paid to the
City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc
Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax equivalent to one per
centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign
countries.” Though referred to as a “production tax”, the imposition actually amounts
to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For
production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar
produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) under protest  averring
that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides: “It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any
form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of
the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the
guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be
void.” And that the ordinance is violative of equal protection as it singled out Ormoc
Sugar as being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.

Ruling: 

Yes. The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar, Inc.. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of
the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which
effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their
turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is
discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing
ordinance’s enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only
sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance
should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar
central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if
later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Ordinance is not applicable to similar future conditions and the ordinance is

singular and exclusive in coverage. Page 327 De Leon