evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
PART ONE · Referred to by Wigmore as evidence by “autoptic
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Rule128: General Provisions
Section 1. Evidence defined. — Evidence is the means,
sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. (1)
Section 2. Scope. — The rules of evidence shall be the same in
all courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise
provided by law or these rules. (2a)
Bustos v. Lucero: R128, §1 provides the legal definition of
evidence – Evidence is the mode and manner of proving
competent facts in judicial proceedings.
Proof: result or effect of evidence.
Proof of such fact: when requisite quantum of evidence of a
particular fact has been duly admitted and given weight
Factum probandum: ultimate fact; fact sought to be
established. Refers to the proposition
Factum probans: evidentiary fact; fact by w/c the factum
probandum is to be established. Refer to the materials which
establish that proposition
Law of evidence
· fundamentally a procedural law (Bustos v. Lucero)
· §5[5], Art. VIII, Consti: SC shall promulgate rules
concerning pleadings, practice and procedure w/c shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade & shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights
o new rules may be validly applied to cases pending at
time of such change (Aldeguer v. Hoskyn)
o BUT in criminal cases, if alteration of evidence
rules would allow reception of lesser quantum of
evidence than what the law required at the time
the offense was committed in order to convict =
retroactive application is unconstitutional for being
ex post facto
primarily found in RoC (R 128-133)
special laws (Ex. RA 4200 [Anti-Wiretapping Law], Code of
Commerce, CC)
Consti – see Part B.
The rules of evidence are specifically applicable ONLY in
judicial proceedings.
· Quasi-judicial proceedings: the same apply by analogy, or
in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient (R1 §4) EXCEPT where the governing law or that
particular proceeding specifically adopts the rules of evidence
in RoC
Classification of evidence according to form
1) Object (real) evidence (§1, R130)
That which is directly addressed to the senses of the court
and consists of tangible things exhibited or demonstrated
in open court, in an ocular inspection, or at a place
designated by the court for its view or observation of an
exhibition, experiment or demonstration.
· The ascertainment of the controverted fact is made
through the direct use of the different senses of the presiding
magistrate or his authorized delegate.
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preference,” i.e. by presenting in open court the evidentiary
articles for the observation or inspection of the tribunal
2) Documentary evidence (§§2-19, R130)
Evidence supplied by written instruments or derived from
conventional symbols, such as letters, by which ideas are
represented on material substances.
· Specific definition found in §2, R130
3) Testimonial evidence
That which is submitted to the court through the testimony
or deposition of a witness
Other classifications of evidence
1) Relevant, material, and competent evidence
a) Relevant evidence: evidence having any value in
reason as tending to prove any matter provable in an action
b) Material evidence: evidence directed to prove a fact
in issue as determined by the rules of substantive law and
pleadings
c) Competent evidence: one that is not excluded by the
Rules, a statute, or the Constitution
Test of relevancy
The logical relation of the evidentiary fact to the fact in
issue, i.e. whether the former tends to establish the
probability or improbability of the latter
Materiality of evidence
Determined by whether the fact it intends to prove is in
issue or not, w/c is in turn determined by the substantive
law, the pleadings, the pre-trial order and by the
admissions or confessions on file
2) Direct and circumstantial evidence
a) Direct evidence: that which proves the fact in dispute
w/o the aid of any inference or presumption
b) Circumstantial evidence: the proof of (a) fact/s from
which, taken either singly or collectively, the existence of the
particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or
probable consequence
3) Cumulative and corroborative evidence
a) Cumulative evidence: evidence of the same kind and
to the same state of facts
b) Corroborative evidence: additional evidence of a
different character to the same point
4) Prima facie and conclusive evidence
a) Prima facie evidence: that which, standing alone,
unexplained, or uncontradicted, is sufficient to maintain the
proposition affirmed
b) Conclusive evidence: that class of evidence which the
law does not allow to be contradicted
5) Primary and secondary evidence
a) Primary evidence: that which the law regards as
affording the greatest certainty of the fact in question. Referred
to in RoC as the best evidence
b) Secondary evidence: that which is inferior to the
primary evidence and is permitted by law only when the best
evidence is not available. Also called substitutionary evidence
6) Positive and negative evidence
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012 ysr
a) Positive evidence: when the witness affirms that a
fact did or did not occur · Ong Chia v. Republic: The rule on formal offer of
b) Negative evidence: when the witness states he did not evidence is not applicable to a case involving a petition for
naturalization.
see or know of the occurrence of a fact
· Sasan, Sr. v. NLRC: Technical rules of evidence are not
Positive testimony is entitled to greater weight since the binding in labor cases.
witness represents of his personal knowledge the presence
or absence of a fact. In negative testimony, there is a total · Bantolino v. Coca Cola Bottlers, Inc.: The rules of
evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before
disclaimer of personal knowledge, hence without any
administrative bodies where decisions may be reached on the
representation or disavowal that the fact in question could basis of position papers only.
or couldn’t have existed or happened.
Within the field of administrative law, while strict rules of
When a witness declares of his own knowledge that a fact evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings,
did not take place that is actually positive testimony since nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of substantial
it’s an affirmation of the truth of a negative fact. evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence
cannot be disregarded. (Marcelo v. Bungubung)
RIANO:
Not every circumstance which affords an inference as to the Application of the Rules on Electronic Evidence
truth or falsity of a matter alleged is considered evidence. The provisions of the REE apply to all civil actions and
· Not evidence if it’s excluded by the law or RoC even if it proceedings, as well as quasi-judicial and administrative cases.
proves the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue. (§2, R1, REE)
Definition under §1, R128 significantly considers “evidence” Scope of the rules of evidence
not as an end in itself but merely as a “means” of ascertaining The rules of evidence in the RoC are guided by the principle of
the truth of a matter of fact. uniformity. As a general policy, the rules of evidence shall be
the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings. (§2, R128)
Purpose of evidence
Ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact in a judicial Evidence in civil cases v. Evidence in criminal cases
proceeding (§1, R128) EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL
Evidence is required because of the presumption that the court CASES
is not aware of the veracity of the facts involved in a case. It is
The party having the burden Guilt of accused has to be
incumbent upon the parties to prove a fact in issue through the
of proof must prove his claim proven beyond reasonable
presentation of admissible evidence.
by a preponderance of doubt (§2, R133)
evidence (§1, R133)
When evidence is required; when not required
Offer of compromise is not An offer of compromise by
· Where no factual issue exists in a case, there is no need to
an admission of any liability, the accused may be received
present evidence because where the case presents a question of
and is not admissible in in evidence as an implied
law, such is resolved by the mere application of the relevant
evidence against the offeror admission of guilt, EXCEPT in
statutes or rules of this jurisdiction to which no evidence is
(§27, R130) criminal cases involving
required.
quasi-offenses (criminal
· When the pleadings in a civil case do not tender an issue negligence) or those allowed
of fact, a trial need not be conducted since there is no more by law to be compromised
reason to present evidence. Case is ripe for judicial
Generally there is no The accused enjoys the
determination through a judgment on the pleadings per R34
presumption of innocence constitutional presumption of
· Evidence may be dispensed with by agreement of the for or against a party EXCEPT innocence (§14, Art. III,
parties. The parties to any action are allowed by the Rules to in certain cases provided for Constitution) by law
agree in writing upon the facts involved in the litigation and to
submit the case for judgment upon the facts agreed upon,
without the introduction of evidence.
Distinction between evidence and proof
· Evidence is not required on matters of judicial notice (§1,
R129) and on matters judicially admitted (§4, R129) · Evidence is the medium or means by which a fact is
proved or disproved.
Applicability of the rules of evidence · Proof is not the evidence itself. It is merely the probative
§4, R1 provides for the non-applicability of RoC, including effect of evidence and is the conviction or persuasion of the
necessarily the rules of evidence, to certain specified mind resulting from a consideration of the evidence. o Proof is
proceedings. the effect of evidence because without
evidence there is no proof.
· Administrative bodies are not bound by the technical o Bare allegations unsubstantiated by evidence are not
niceties of the rules obtaining in a court of law. equivalent to proof.
· CSC conducts its investigations for the purpose of
ascertaining the truth without necessarily adhering to technical Positive and negative defenses
rules of procedure applicable in judicial proceedings. GENERAL RULE: Positive evidence is more credible than
negative evidence.
· Reason: the witness who testifies to a negative may have
forgotten what actually occurred, while it is impossible to

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remember what never existed. (Gomez v. Gomez-Samson)
A denial evidence is the weakest defense and can never
overcome a positive testimony particularly when it comes from
the mouth of a credible witness. (People v. Mendoza)
· Evidence that is negative is self-serving in nature and
cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of witnesses
who testify on clear and positive evidence. (People v.
Larranaga)
· Denial, like alibi is an inherently weak defense vis-à-vis
positive identification.
Factum probans and factum probandum
Evidence signifies a relationship between two facts, namely:
a) the fact or proposition to be established (factum
probandum); and
b) the facts or material evidencing the fact or proposition to
be established (factum probans).
Factum probandum: the fact to be proved; the fact which is in
issue and to which the evidence is directed.
Factum probans: the probative or evidentiary fact tending to
prove the fact in issue
The factum probandum in a certain case may be affected by the
judicial admissions of a party.
· Ex. If the defendant in a suit based on a culpa aquiliana
theory admits his negligence in his answer to the complaint,
there is no more need to prove negligence. Hence, negligence
ceases to be a factum probandum in the case.
If the factum probandum “signifies the fact or proposition to be
established,” then matters of JN, conclusive presumptions and
judicial admissions cannot qualify as parts of the factum
probandum of a particular case, because such matters need not
be established or proven.
In practical terms, the factum probandum in a civil case refers
to the elements of a cause of action from the point of view of
the plaintiff and the elements of the defense from the
defendant’s standpoint.
Example: Suit for collection of a sum of money – in the
absence of any admission by the defendant,
· The factum probandum of the plaintiff would be:
1) The existence of the debt of the defendant
2) The maturity of the debt
3) The demand made by the plaintiff upon the defendant
to pay
4) Failure to pay despite the demand
· The factum probandum for the defendant: the fact of
payment of the obligation or the prescription of the debt or the
elements of any defense he may interpose
Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. v. Tanjangco For
a tort case under CC 2176, plaintiff has to prove:
1) Damages suffered by the plaintiff
2) The fault or negligence of the defendant or some other
person for whose act he must respond
3) The connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence and the damages incurred.
In a criminal case, the factum probandum includes all matter
that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt in
order to justify a conviction.
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Section 3. Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of
these rules. (3a)
Section 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. — Evidence must
have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall
not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree
to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.
(4a)
Requisites for admissibility of evidence (§3)
1) It must be relevant to the issue sought to be proved
· §4: Evidence is relevant when it has “such a relation
to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence.”
· Relevancy is determinable by the rules of logic and
human experience
2) It must be competent
· §3: Evidence is competent when it “is not excluded
by the law of these rules.”
· Competency is determined by the prevailing
exclusionary rules of evidence
Restated by Wigmore – axioms of admissibility:
1) That none but facts having rational probative value
are admissible
2) That all facts having rational probative value are
admissible unless some specific rule forbids their admission
Note: under this concept, relevant evidence is any class of
evidence which has “rational probative value” to establish
the issue in controversy.
Admissibility of evidence is determined at the time it is offered
to the court (§35, R132)
· Object or real evidence is offered to the court when the
same is presented for its view or evaluation (ex. Ocular
inspections or demos)
· Documentary evidence formally offered by the proponent
immediately before he rests his case
· Testimonial evidence offered by the calling of the witness
to the stand
Every objection to the admissibility of evidence shall be made
at the time such evidence is offered, or as soon thereafter as the
objection to its admissibility shall be considered waived.
· Objections to object or real evidence must be made either
at the time it is presented in an ocular inspection or
demonstration or when it is formally offered.
· Objections to documentary evidence must be made at the
time it is formally offered.
· In the case of testimonial evidence, objection to the
qualifications of the witness should be made at the time he is
called to the stand
o If the witness is otherwise qualified, the objection
should be raised when the objectionable question is
asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable
features became apparent by reason of such answer.
Doctrines or rules of admissibility sanctioned by SC
· Conditional admissibility
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Where the evidence at the time of its offer appears to be
immaterial or irrelevant unless it is connected with the
other facts to be subsequently proved, such evidence may
be received on condition that the other facts will be proved
thereafter, otherwise the evidence already given will be
stricken out.
o This doctrine was applied by SC in a criminal case
and in a civil case subject to the qualification that there should
be no bad faith on the part of the proponent. – Such a
qualification appears necessary to avoid unfair surprises to the
other party.
· Multiple admissibility
Where the evidence is relevant and competent for two or
more purposes, such evidence should be admitted for any
or all the purposes for which it is offered provided it
satisfies all the requirements of law for its admissibility
therefor.
RIANO:
Ex. Depending upon the circumstances, the declaration of
a dying person may be admissible for several purposes:
o Dying declaration (§37, R130)
o Part of the res gestae (§42, R130)
o Declaration against interest (§38, R130)
Ex. The statement by a bus driver immediately after the
collision that he dozed off while driving may be
admissible as:
o An admission under §26, R130; or
o As part of the res gestae per §42, R130
· Curative admissibility
Treats upon the right of a party to introduce incompetent
evidence in his behalf where the court has admitted the
same kind of evidence adduced by the adverse party
What should determine the application of the rule of
curative admissibility are:
1) Whether the incompetent evidence was seasonably
objected to, and
2) Whether, regardless of the objections vel non, the
admission of such evidence will cause a plain and unfair
prejudice to the party against whom it was admitted.
o Lack of objection to incompetent evidence
constitutes waiver by the party against whom it
is introduced but does not deprive the opposing
party of his right to object to similar rebutting
evidence. However, this technical rule should be
relaxed if one party would suffer a plain and
unfair prejudice.
RIANO:
It is submitted that in our jurisdiction, the principle of
curative admissibility should not be made to apply where
the evidence was admitted without objection because the
failure to object constitutes a waiver of the inadmissibility
of the evidence. In our jurisdiction, inadmissible evidence
not objected to becomes admissible.
Stonehill v. Diokno: Documentary evidence, illegally obtained,
is inadmissible on a timely motion or action to suppress.
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· Same rule now also applies to illegally obtained
confessions.
Collateral matters
Matters other than the facts in issue and which are offered as a
basis for inference as to the existence or non-existence of the
facts in issue.
Not all collateral matters are prohibited by the Rules.
· Where the collateral matters are relevant to the fact in
issue because “they tend in any reasonable degree to establish
the probability or improbability of the fact in issue,” evidence
of such collateral matters is admissible.
· What the Rules prohibit is evidence of irrelevant collateral
facts.
Circumstantial evidence
· Evidence of collateral facts or circumstances from which
an inference may be drawn as to the probability or
improbability of the facts in dispute
· Circumstantial evidence is legal evidence and, if
sufficient, can sustain a judgment.
· Evidence of relevant collateral facts
Admissibility is an affair of logic and law, as admissibility of
evidence is determined by its relevance and competence. On the
other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once
admitted, depends on judicial evaluation w/in the guidelines
provided in R133 and the decisional rules of the SC.
While evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little
or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have
evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule
forbids its reception.
NOTE: Special rules of evidence regarding electronic
documents have been introduced by the Electronic Commerce
Act (RA 8792)
RIANO:
Liberal construction of the rules of evidence
· §6, R1
· Procedural rules must be liberally interpreted and applied
so as not to frustrate substantial justice. (Quiambao v. CA)
However, to justify relaxation of the rules, a satisfactory
explanation and a subsequent fulfillment of the requirements
have always been required. (Barcenas v. Tomas)
No vested right in the rules of evidence
Reason: the rules of evidence are subject to change by the SC
pursuant to its powers to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure (§5[5], Art. VIII, Constitution)
The change in the rules of evidence is, however, subject to the
constitutional limitation on the enactment of ex post facto laws
(§22, Art. III, Constitution)
B. Rules of Exclusion
1. Secs. 2 & 3, Art. III, Consti
§2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
§3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety and order require otherwise as prescribed
by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
NOTE: right against self-incrimination can’t be invoked in
situations covered by immunity statutes (ex. RA 1379 grants
immunity to witnesses in proceedings for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired property; PD 749 grants immunity in
bribery and graft cases)
2. Sec. 12, Art. III, Consti
§12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
3. Sec. 17, Art. III, Consti
§17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
4. Sec. 201, Tax Reform Act of 1997
§201. Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable Document. - An
instrument, document or paper which is required by law to be
stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted or
transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded,
nor shall it or any copy thereof or any record of transfer of the
same be admitted or used in evidence in any court until the
requisite stamp or stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.
5. RA 4200, Anti-Wiretapping Law
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING
AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY
OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
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Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone
or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or
not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence,
to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record,
or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after
the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this
law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing,
or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial,
to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or
any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof,
shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who
shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to
be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the
provisions of the following section or of any order issued
thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall,
upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not
less than six months or more than six years and with the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from
public office if the offender be a public official at the time of
the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien
he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.
Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render
it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is
authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the
acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in
cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war
and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas,
rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting
to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to
sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and
violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage
and other offenses against national security: Provided, That
such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of
the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing:
(1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the
crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being
committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however,
That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy
and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition,
conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such
authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion
or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are
being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the
conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the
prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no
other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
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The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the
person or persons whose communications, conversations,
discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted,
or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic
communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number
involved and its location; (2) the identity of the peace officer
authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the
communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words;
(3) the offense or offenses committed or sought to be
prevented; and (4) the period of the authorization. The
authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the
order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of
issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court
upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the
public interest.
All recordings made under court authorization shall, within
forty-eight hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the
order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or
sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the
peace officer granted such authority stating the number of
recordings made, the dates and times covered by each
recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the
deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole
or any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such
duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package
deposited with the court. The envelope or package so deposited
shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in
evidence, or their contents revealed, except upon order of the
court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due
notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons
whose conversation or communications have been recorded.
The court referred to in this section shall be understood to
mean the Court of First Instance within whose territorial
jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be
executed.
Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Section 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or accordingly amended.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
RA 4200 prohibits the admission in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation of any
communication or spoken word or any information procured by
wiretapping and related means specified in said law EXCEPT
in the cases therein specially permitted.
RIANO:
§4, RA 4200
The provisions of §1, RA 4200 does not consider it unlawful to
record open and public communications. What the law protects
are private conversations and communications. It’s considered
unlawful to a) secretly overhear, b) intercept, or c) record
private communication or spoken word when doing so is w/o
the authority of all the parties to such private
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communication. If only one party authorizes the recording and
the other does not, there is a violation of the law.
6. RA 1405, Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits
AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF OR INQUIRY
INTO, DEPOSITS WITH ANY BANKING INSTITUTION
AND PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFOR.
Section 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
Government to give encouragement to the people to deposit
their money in banking institutions and to discourage private
hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized by banks in
authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the
country.
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or
banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in
bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political
subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as
of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office, except upon written permission of the
depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a
banking institution to disclose to any person other than those
mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning
said deposits.
Section 4. All Acts or parts of Acts, Special Charters,
Executive Orders, Rules and Regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Section 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon
conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a
fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the
discretion of the court.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
7. Sec. 55, RA 8791: General Banking Act of 2000
Section 55. Prohibited Transactions. 55.1. No director, officer,
employee, or agent of any bank shall -
(a) Make false entries in any bank report or statement or
participate in any fraudulent transaction, thereby affecting the
financial interest of, or causing damage to, the bank or any
person;
(b) Without order of a court of competent jurisdiction, disclose
to any unauthorized person any information relative to the funds
or properties in the custody of the bank belonging to private
individuals, corporations, or any other entity: Provided, That with
respect to bank deposits, the provisions of existing laws shall
prevail;
(c) Accept gifts, fees, or commissions or any other form of
remuneration in connection with the approval of a loan or other
credit accommodation from said bank;
(d) Overvalue or aid in overvaluing any security for the
purpose of influencing in any way the actions of the bank
or any bank; or
(e) Outsource inherent banking functions.
55.2. No borrower of a bank shall -
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
(a) Fraudulently overvalue property offered as security for a
loan or other credit accommodation from the bank;
(b) Furnish false or make misrepresentation or suppression of
material facts for the purpose of obtaining, renewing, or
increasing a loan or other credit accommodation or extending
the period thereof;
(c) Attempt to defraud the said bank in the event of a court
action to recover a loan or other credit accommodation; or
(d) Offer any director, officer, employee or agent of a bank
any gift, fee, commission, or any other form of compensation in
order to influence such persons into approving a loan or other
credit accommodation application.
55.3 No examiner, officer or employee of the Bangko Sentral
or of any department, bureau, office, branch or agency of the
Government that is assigned to supervise, examine, assist or
render technical assistance to any bank shall commit any of the
acts enumerated in this Section or aid in the commission of the
same. (87-Aa)
The making of false reports or misrepresentation or suppression
of material facts by personnel of the Bangko Sental ng Pilipinas
shall be subject to the administrative and criminal sanctions
provided under the New Central Bank Act.
55.4. Consistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405,
otherwise known as the Banks Secrecy Law, no bank shall
employ casual or non regular personnel or too lengthy
probationary personnel in the conduct of its business involving
bank deposits.
8. Secs. 16 & 18, PD 946
Section 16. Rules of Procedure. The Courts of Agrarian
Relation shall adopt uniform rules of procedure on matters not
provided for in this Decree in order to achieve a just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding filed before them. The rules of Court shall not be
applicable to agrarian cases, even in a suppletory character. It is
the spirit and intention of this Decree that the Courts of
Agrarian Relations shall utilize and employ every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in
accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities of law and procedure. To this
end, each Court of Agrarian Relations shall have the authority
to adopt any appropriate measure or procedure in any situation
or matter not provided for or covered by this Decree and in the
uniform rules of procedure of the Courts of Agrarian Relations.
All such special measures or procedures, and the situations to
which they are applied shall be reported to the Supreme Court
by the individual Judges through the Executive Judge who shall
furnish copies of such reports to all the other Judges.
Where there is doubt in the application of uniform rules or in
the construction and interpretation of this Decree or of any
contract between the parties, the doubt shall be resolved in
favor of the tenant-farmers, agricultural lessees, settlers, owner-
cultivators, amortizing owner-cultivators, the Samahang
Nayon, compact farms, farmers' cooperatives and other
registered farmers' associations or organizations.
In criminal and expropriation cases the Rules of Court shall
apply.
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In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question
or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be
allowed and are admissible in evidence.
Direct testimonies of witnesses shall be in narrative form
subject to cross examination.
In cases where the tenurial status of a person is in issue, the
Court of Agrarian Relations shall not issue an order restraining
the actual tiller from cultivating the land, or impounding the
harvest without providing him with at least fifty percent of the
net harvest.
Should the impounding of the harvest be at the instance of the
landholder, he shall file a cash bond to be fixed by the Court, to
answer for such damages as may be suffered by the tiller who is
found to be a lawful tenant. In case of the malicious denial of
the tenancy relationship by the landholder, he shall be subject
to the payment of exemplary damages equivalent to at least the
value of the harvest impounded.
Where a party is a tenant-farmer, agricultural lessee or tiller,
settler, or amortizing owner-cultivator, he shall be entitled to
the rights of a pauper and/or indigent litigant and the privileges
of an indigent litigant under Republic Act numbered sixty
hundred and thirty-five without further proof thereof. He shall
continue to enjoy such status as pauper and/or indigent litigant
in the appellate courts and until the case is finally disposed of.
An agricultural tiller, tenant or lessee who has been allowed to
litigate as a pauper and/or indigent litigant shall be entitled to
the issuance of a duly certified copy of the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearing, which shall be given to him
free of charge. Any undue delay in the transcription of the
stenographic notes or in the issuance of a duly certified copy of
said transcript in favor of said party and any charging of fees
against him in connection therewith shall be dealt with
administratively.
Section 18. Appeals. An appeal may be taken to the Court of
Appeals by giving an oral or written notice of appeal with the
trial court within the period of fifteen (15) days from notice of
order or decision. A copy of the written notice of appeal shall
be served within the same period upon the adverse party. In
case the notice of appeal is orally made, the clerk of court shall
reduce the same to writing, which shall be signed by the
appellant and a copy thereof served within the same period by
the clerk of court to the adverse party.
In case a motion for reconsideration is filed within that period
of fifteen (15) days, the notice of appeal shall be filed within
ten (10) days from notice of the resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration. Only one motion for reconsideration shall
be allowed a party.
The Court of Appeals shall affirm the decision or order or the
portions thereof appealed from if the findings of fact in the said
decision or order are supported by substantial evidence as basis
thereof, and the conclusions stated therein are not clearly
against the law and jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals shall
not be precluded from taking into consideration any issue,
question or incident, even if not raised, if resolution thereof is
necessary for a complete and just disposition of the case.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
The Court of Agrarian Relations shall forward to the Court of
Appeals the complete records of the case within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a notice
of appeal, if no motions for reconsideration are filed. In the
event that motions for reconsideration are filed, the records
shall be forwarded to the appellate court within a like period
from receipt by the party concerned of denial of the last motion
for reconsideration.
Appeal shall not stay the decision or order except where the
ejectment of a tenant-farmer, agricultural lessee or tiller, settler,
or amortizing owner-cultivator is directed.
Upon receipt of the records of the case from the Court of Agrarian
Relations, the Court of Appeals may, if it deems necessary, require
the parties to file simultaneous memoranda within a non-extendible
period of fifteen (15) days from notice; the appellate court shall
decide the case within thirty (30) days from receipt of said records
or memoranda.
No motion for rehearing or reconsideration shall be allowed in
the Court of Appeals.
All cases of the Courts of Agrarian Relations now pending
before the Court of Appeals shall remain in the Division to
which they have been assigned, and shall be within sixty (60)
days from the effectivity of this Decree: Provided, however,
That if the decision or order be an affirmance in toto of the
dispositive conclusion of the judgment appealed from, then the
Court of Appeals may, instead of rendering an extended
opinion, indicate clearly the trial court's findings of fact and
pronouncements of law which have been adopted as basis for
the affirmance.
Upon the effectivity of this Decree, the Court of Appeals shall
designate at least two (2) of its Divisions to which all appealed
agrarian cases shall be assigned, and these cases shall have
priority over other cases.
The decisions or orders of the Court of Appeals may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari only on questions of law, within a non-extendible
period of thirty (30) days from receipt by the appellant of a
copy of the decision or order.
In cases before the then Court of Agrarian Relations, the RoC
were not applicable even in a suppletory character, except in
criminal and expropriation cases (§16, PD 946)
· NOTE: such procedure has been SUPERSEDED by
provisions of RA 6657
C. Cases
KNAPP V. STATE, 79 NE 1076 (1907)
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: W/N evidence relevant of a particular
item if it tends to support whether proof of that evidence would
assist to resolve the central issue of a case – YES. Evidence of
the old man’s death was relevant.
While it is laid down in the books that there must be an open
and visible connection between the fact under inquiry and the
evidence by which it is sought to be established, yet the
connection thus required is in the logical processes only, for to
require an actual connection between the two facts would be to
exclude all presumptive evidence… Within settled rules, the
competency of testimony depends largely upon its tendency to
persuade the judgment… As said in 1 Wharton,
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Evidence… § 20: "Relevancy is that which conduces to the
proof of a pertinent hypothesis." In Stevenson v. Stewart
(1849)… it was said: "The competency of a collateral fact to be
used as the basis of legitimate argument, is not to be
determined by the conclusiveness of the inferences it may
afford in reference to the litigated fact. It is enough if these
may tend, in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry, or to
assist, though remotely, to a determination probably founded in
truth."…
STATE V. BALL, 339 SW 2D 783 (1960)
· Wigmore: The mere possession of a quantity of money is
in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of money
charged as taken, because in general all money of the same
denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the
money found is the same as the money taken is too forced and
extraordinary to be receivable.
· In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the
record that the money in Ball's possession at the time of his
arrest came from or had some connection with the robbery and
in the absence of a plain showing of his impecuniousness
before the robbery and his sudden affluence (State v. Garrett),
the evidence was not in fact relevant and in the circumstances
was obviously prejudicial for if it did not tend to prove the
offense for which the appellant was on trial the jury may have
inferred that he was guilty of another robbery.
MAMBA V. GARCIA , 359 SCRA 426 (2001)
The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-recorded
conversation between Bulatao and the two police officers is
erroneous. The recording of private conversations without the
consent of the parties contravenes the provisions of RA 4200 …
and renders the same inadmissible in evidence in any
proceeding. The law covers even those recorded by persons
privy to the private communications, as in this case. Thus, the
contents of the tape recorder cannot be relied upon to determine
the culpability of respondent judge.
MARQUEZ V. DESIERTO , 359 SCRA 772 (2001)
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: W/N petitioner may be cited for
indirect contempt for her failure to produce the documents
requested by the Ombudsman - And whether the order of the
Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned
account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of
bank deposits (RA 1405)
An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (RA 1405)
would reveal the following exceptions:
1. Where the depositor consents in writing;
2. Impeachment case;
3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases
against public officials;
4. Deposit is subject of litigation;
5. Sec. 8, RA 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in
the case of PNB vs. Gancayco
The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera
inspection the subject accounts with the Union Bank of the
Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a pending
investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado
Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R. A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and
(g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public
Estates Authority and AMARI.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed ,
there must be a pending case before a court of competent
jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the
inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case
before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel
and the account holder must be notified to be present during the
inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account
identified in the pending case.
Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:
Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as
amended, declares bank deposits to be “absolutely
confidential” except:
(1) In an examination made in the course of a special or
general examination of a bank that is specifically authorized by
the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious
irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is
necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or
irregularity,
(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired
by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the
examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof
shall be for the exclusive use of the bank,
(3) Upon written permission of the depositor,
(4) In cases of impeachment,
(5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or
(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any
court of competent authority. What is existing is an
investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what
the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for
additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et.
al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case
in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account
for inspection.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The
Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts
several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of
another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any
private individual liable for damages for any violation of the
rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the
privacy of letters and other private communications. The RPC
makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, the
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to
dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like
the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act,
and the Intellectual Property Code.
EJERCITO V. SANDIGANBAYAN , 509 SCRA 190 (2006)
The accused claimed that information about his bank accounts
i.e. trust funds, was obtained in violation of the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Law (RA 1405) and moved to have them be excluded
as evidence. HELD: RA 1405 nowhere provides that an
unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the
evidence there from inadmissible in evidence. If Congress has
both established a right and provided exclusive remedies for its
violation, the court would encroaching upon the prerogatives
of congress if it authorizes a remedy not provided for by
statute. Absent a specific reference to an
9
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exclusionary rule, it is not appropriate for the courts to read
such a provision into the act.
Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to RA
1405, otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Law, applicable in
cases of bribery must also apply to cases of plunder. The “fruit
of the poisonous tree” principle, which states that once the
primary source (the “tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the “fruit”)
derived from it is also inadmissible, does not apply in cases of
unlawful examination of bank accounts. RA 1405 does not
provide for the application of this rule. At all events, the
Ombudsman is not barred from requiring the production of
documents based solely on information obtained by it from
sources independent of its previous inquiry.
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: W/N the Trust Account No. 858 and
Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 are excepted from the
protection of R.A. 1405 – NO. Plunder is excepted from the
protection of RA 1405 otherwise known as The Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Law
RA 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.
However, the protection afforded by the law is not absolute.
There being recognized exceptions thereto, as above-quoted
Section 2 provides. In the present case, two exceptions apply, to
wit: (1) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation.
xxx
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Magsino: “Section 2 of [RA 1405] allows
the disclosure of bank deposits in cases where the money
deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Inasmuch as
Civil Case No. 26899 is aimed at recovering the amount
converted by the Javiers for their own benefit, necessarily, an
inquiry into the whereabouts of the illegally acquired amount
extends to whatever is concealed by being held or recorded in
the name of persons other than the one responsible for the
illegal acquisition”
In light then of the Court’s pronouncement in Union Bank, the
subject matter of the litigation cannot be limited to bank
accounts under the name of President Estrada alone, but must
include those accounts to which the money purportedly
acquired illegally or a portion thereof was alleged to have been
transferred. Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No.
0116-17345-9 in the name of Ejercito fall under this description
and must thus be part of the subject matter of the litigation.
Hence, these accounts are no longer protected by the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Law, there being two exceptions to the said law
applicable in this case, namely: (1) the examination of bank
accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery
or dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Exception (1) applies since the plunder case pending against
former President Estrada is analogous to bribery or dereliction
of duty, while exception
(2) applies because the money deposited in Ejercito’s bank
accounts is said to form part of the subject matter of the same
plunder case.
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: W/N the “fruit of the poisonous tree”
doctrine or the exclusionary rule, which states that once the
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
primary source (the “tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the “fruit”)
derived from it is also inadmissible, applicable in cases of
unlawful examination of bank accounts – NO. The “fruit of
the poisonous tree” doctrine or the exclusionary rule is
inapplicable in cases of unlawful examination of bank
accounts.
Ejercito’s attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to
the instant case fails. R.A. 1405, it bears noting, nowhere
provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall
render the evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in
evidence. Section 5 of R.A. 1405 only states that “[a]ny
violation of this law will subject the offender upon conviction,
to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not
more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of
the court.”
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the exclusionary rule
applies in principle to cases involving R.A. 1405, the Court
finds no reason to apply the same in this particular case. The
“fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine presupposes a violation of
law. If there was no violation of R.A. 1405 in the instant case,
then there would be no “poisonous tree” to begin with, and,
thus, no reason to apply the doctrine.
Hence, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” principle, which states
that once the primary source (the “tree”) is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
“fruit”) derived from it is also inadmissible, does not apply in
this case. In the first place, R.A. 1405 does not provide for the
application of this rule. Moreover, there is no basis for applying
the same in this case since the primary source for the detailed
information regarding Joseph Victor G. Ejercito’s bank
accounts – the investigation previously conducted by the
Ombudsman – was lawful.
II. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
A. Judicial notice (§§1-3, R129)
Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall
take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and
their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)
Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may
take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions. (1a)
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During
the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a
party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper
court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
(n)
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Judicial notice
The cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take
and act on without proof because they already know them
JN is based on considerations of expediency and convenience.
It displaces evidence since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills
the object which the evidence is intended to achieve and,
therefore, makes such evidence unnecessary. (Alzua vs.
Johnson)
JN of a fact may be taken by a court
a) on its own motion, or
b) when it is requested or invited by the parties or either of
them to do so.
In either case, the court may allow the parties to be heard on
the matter in question. It has been held, however, that the
power to take JN must be exercised with caution and every
reasonable doubt on the subject must be resolved in the
negative.
Rule regarding judicial notice of ordinances
· Municipal courts required to take JN of ordinances of the
municipality or city wherein they sit
· RTCs must take such JN only
a) when required to do so by statute; and
b) in a case on appeal before them and wherein the
inferior court took JN of an ordinance involved in said case
· Appellate courts may also take JN of municipal or city
ordinances not only where the lower courts took JN thereof but
because these are facts capable of unquestionable
demonstration.
For the same reason, courts may take JN of administrative
regulations.
Courts are required to take JN of the decisions of the appellate
courts but not of the decisions of coordinate trial courts, nor
even of a decision or the facts involved in another case tried by
the same court itself, unless the parties introduce the same in
evidence or where the court, as a matter of convenience, may
decide to do so.
JN court required to take ≠ personal knowledge of judge
· A fact may be of JN and not be of the judge’s personal
knowledge, and vice versa, as this rule refers to facts which
“ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.”
Question as to what are the laws of a foreign state is one of
fact, not of law.
· Foreign laws may not be taken JN of and have to be
proved like any other fact
o Exception: where said laws are within the actual
knowledge of the court such as when they are well
and generally known or they have been actually ruled
upon in other cases before it and none of the parties
claim otherwise.
· To prove a foreign written law, the requirements of §§24
& 25, R132 must be complied with (by an official publication
or by a duly attested and authenticated copy thereof)
o Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Guerrero
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
 SC noted that while certain exceptions to the
requirements in §§24 & 25, R132 for proof of foreign law have
been recognized, the evidence presented for that purpose in this
case is unacceptable.
 Instant case – petitioner submitted affidavit of
NY attorney which doesn’t even state the specific NY law on
the issue of damages involved, but merely contained the
affiant’s interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis-
à-vis the alleged law and jurisprudence therein. Further, said
affidavit was taken ex parte abroad and the affiant never
testified in court.
· Provisions of foreign law may also be the subject of
judicial admission under §4, R129.
· To prove an unwritten foreign law, the provisions of §46,
R130 supply the evidential sources or remedies.
· GENERAL RULE: Absent any of the foregoing evidence
or admission, the foreign law is presumed to be the same as that
in the Philippines – doctrine of processual presumption
RIANO:
JN is based on the maxim, “what is known need not be
proved,” hence, when the rule is invoked, the court may
dispense with the presentation of evidence on judicially
cognizable facts.
Function of JN
To abbreviate litigation by the admission of matters that need
no evidence because JN is a substitute for formal proof of a
matter by evidence
When JN is mandatory
A matter of JN may either be mandatory or discretionary.
When the matter is subject to a mandatory JN, no motion or
hearing is necessary for the court to take JN of a fact because
this is a matter which a court ought to take JN of.
Matters subject to mandatory JN
1. The existence and territorial extent of states
2. The political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality of states
3. The law of nations
4. The admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their
seals
5. The political constitution and history of the Philippines
6. The official acts of legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines
7. The laws of nature
8. The measure of time
9. The geographical divisions.
When JN is discretionary
The principles of discretionary JN will apply where the ff.
requisites are met:
1. The matter must be one of common knowledge
2. The matter must be settled beyond reasonable doubt (if
there is any uncertainty about the matter, then evidence must be
adduced)
3. The knowledge must exist within the jurisdiction of the
court
11
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Cases
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. V. CA, CTA (2000)
As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard
or are actually pending before the same judge."
Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may
take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions.
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST V. GUERRERO
(2003) There can be no summary judgment where questions of
fact are in issue or where material allegations of the pleadings
are in dispute. The resolution of whether a foreign law allows
only the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far
as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our courts. Foreign laws are not a matter of
judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether NY
law or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims present a
clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only
by a trial on the merits.
Under §24 of R 132, the record of public documents of a
sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by (1) an official
publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy
must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the
legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of
the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
· CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS (Asiavest Limited v. CA)
Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in
accordance with the above rule, however, the Supreme
Court held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works
v. Muzzal, that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court) does not exclude the
presentation of other competent evidence to prove the
existence of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme Court
considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law
of San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a
section of California Civil Code and who stated that the
same was in force at the time the obligations were
contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the existence
of said law. Accordingly, in line with this view, the
Supreme Court in the Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Fisher et al., upheld the Tax Court in considering the
pertinent law of California as proved by the respondents
witness. In that case, the counsel for respondent testified
that as an active member of the California Bar since 1951,
he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the
State of California. When asked by the lower court to state
the pertinent California law as regards exemption of
intangible personal properties, the witness cited Article 4,
Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the California Internal and
Revenue Code as published in Derrings California Code,
a publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co., Inc. And as part of
his testimony, a full
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence by
respondents. Likewise, in several naturalization cases, it
was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign
country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of
citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of
practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable
action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is
satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered.
Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the
Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate
General of Manila was held to be competent proof of that
law. (Emphasis supplied)
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s
personal interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis-
à-vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law
in particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various
US court decisions do not constitute proof of the official
records or decisions of the US courts. While the Bank attached
copies of some of the US court decisions cited in the Walden
affidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule
132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts.
The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to
prove NY law and jurisprudence. However, because of the
failure to comply with §24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a
foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden
affidavit did not prove the current state of NY law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not
proved, what NY law and jurisprudence are on the matters at
issue.
PEOPLE V. RULLEPA (2003)
Several cases suggest that courts may take “judicial notice” of
the appearance of the victim in determining her age.
· On the other hand, a handful of cases holds that courts,
without the requisite hearing prescribed by §3, R129 of the
RoC, cannot take judicial notice of the victim’s age.
· Judicial notice signifies that there are certain “facta
probanda,” or propositions in a party’s case, as to which he will
not be required to offer evidence; these will be taken for true by
the tribunal without the need of evidence. Judicial notice,
however, is a phrase sometimes used in a loose way to cover
some other judicial action. Certain rules of Evidence, usually
known under other names, are frequently referred to in terms of
judicial notice.
· The process by which the trier of facts judges a person’s
age from his or her appearance cannot be categorized as
judicial notice. Judicial notice is based upon convenience and
expediency for it would certainly be superfluous, inconvenient,
and expensive both to parties and the court to require proof, in
the ordinary way, of facts which are already known to courts.
As Tundag puts it, it “is the cognizance of certain facts which
judges may properly take and act on without proof because
they already know them.” …When the trier of facts observes
the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her age, he is
not taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is conducting
an examination of the evidence, the evidence being the
appearance of the person. Such a process militates against the
very concept of judicial notice, the object of which is to do
away with the presentation of evidence.
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· This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the
Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A person’s appearance,
where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same
being addressed to the senses of the court. [§1, R130]
· A person’s appearance, as evidence of age (for example,
of infancy, or of being under the age of consent to intercourse),
is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so, the tribunal may
properly observe the person brought before it. Experience
teaches that corporal appearances are approximately an index of
the age of their bearer, particularly for the marked extremes of
old age and youth. In every case such evidence should be
accepted and weighed for what it may be in each case worth. In
particular, the outward physical appearance of an alleged minor
may be considered in judging his age; a contrary rule would for
such an inference be pedantically over-cautious. Consequently,
the jury or the court trying an issue of fact may be allowed to
judge the age of persons in court by observation of such
persons. The formal offer of the person as evidence is not
necessary. The examination and cross-examination of a party
before the jury are equivalent to exhibiting him before the jury
and an offer of such person as an exhibit is properly refused.
· There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility
of a person’s appearance in determining his or her age. As to
the weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape cases,
Pruna laid down guideline no. 3.
· Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with
respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof
beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a),
(b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity between the
allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court
can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the
veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the
relative’s testimony.
· As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved,
the person’s appearance, as object evidence of her age, loses
probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and,
following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved in favor
of the accused.
· This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth,
the victim’s mere physical appearance is not enough to gauge
her exact age. For the extreme penalty of death to be upheld,
nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime must be substantiated. Verily,
the minority of the victim should be not only alleged but
likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime
itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victim’s age in the
present case spells the difference between life and death.
LANDBANK V. BANAL (2004)
The RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents'
property is P703.14K, merely took judicial notice of the
average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending
before it and applied the same to this case without conducting a
hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the
parties.
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when said cases have been tried or are pending in the
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
same court or before the same judge. They may only do so "in
the absence of objection" and "with the knowledge of the
opposing party," which are not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to
all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this
regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes
judicial notice of a certain matter.
PIGAO V. RABANILLO (2006)
We agree with respondent. We cannot take cognizance of this
document – the conditional contract to sell between Bernabe
and the PHHC alleged to be the pro-forma contract used by
PHHC with its applicants - which petitioners are presenting for
the first time. This document is not among the matters the law
mandatorily requires us to take judicial notice of. Neither can
we consider it of public knowledge nor capable of
unquestionable demonstration nor ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. We have held that:
Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and
not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within
the limits of jurisdiction of the court. The power of taking
judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution. Care
must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in
the negative.
Consequently, for this document to be properly considered by
us, it should have been presented during trial and formally
offered as evidence. Otherwise, we would be denying due
process of law to respondent:
It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that
which has been formally offered. xxx If [petitioners] neglected
to offer [any document] in evidence, however vital [it] may be,
[they] only have themselves to blame, not respondent who was
not even given a chance to object as the documents were never
offered in evidence.
B. Judicial admissions
1. §4, R129
Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or
written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in
the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)
Judicial admissions may be made in:
a) The pleadings filed by the parties;
b) In the course of the trial either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations; or
c) In other stages of the judicial proceeding, as in the pre-
trial of the case.
Admissions obtained through depositions, written
interrogatories, or requests for admission are also considered
judicial admissions.
To be considered as a JA, the same must be made in the same
case in which it is offered.
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Judicial admissions made in one case are admissible at the trial
of another case provided they are proved and are pertinent to
the issue involved in the latter, unless:
a) said admissions were made only for purposes of the first
case, as in the rule on implied admissions and their effects under
R26;
b) the same were withdrawn with the permission of the court
therein; or
c) the court deems it proper to relieve the party therefrom.
§4, R129, as amended, now includes superseded pleadings as
judicial admissions.
JAs cannot be contradicted by the admitted who is the party
himself, unless they were made through palpable mistake or no
such admission was made or, in the case of a pre-trial
admission in civil cases, to prevent manifest injustice.
Admissions made by the parties in their pleadings, or in the
course of the trial or other proceedings, do not require proof
and cannot be contradicted by them unless proved to have been
made through palpable mistake. (Sta. Ana. v. Maliwat)
Facts subject of a stipulation or agreement entered into by the
parties at the pre-trial of a case constitute judicial admissions by
them which, under this section, do not require proof and cannot
be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made
through palpable mistake. (Lim v. Jabalde)
When the parties in a case agree on what the foreign law
provides, these are admissions of fact which the other parties
and the court are made to rely and act upon, hence they are in
estoppel to subsequently take a contrary position. (PCIB v.
Escolin)
2. §8, R10
Sec 8. Effect of amended pleadings. — An amended pleading
supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions in
superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the
pleader, and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated
in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived.
3. §§1-4, R26
R24: Admission by Adverse Party Sec. 1. Request for
admission. — At any time after issues have been joined, a party
may file and serve upon any other party may file and serve upon
any other party a written request for the admission by the latter
of the genuineness of any material and relevant document
described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any
material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request.
Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request
unless copies have already been furnished. (1a)
Sec. 2. Implied admission. — Each of the matters of which an
admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within
a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than
fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further
time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the
request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the
matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in
detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny
those matters.
 evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to
the court by the party requested within the period for and prior
to the filing of his sworn statement as contemplated in the
preceding paragraph and his compliance therewith shall be
deferred until such objections are resolved, which resolution
shall be made as early as practicable. (2a)
Sec 3. Effect of admission. — Any admission made by a party
pursuant to such request is for the purpose of the pending
action only and shall not constitute an admission by him for
any other purpose nor may the same be used against him in any
other proceeding. (3)
Sec. 4. Withdrawal. — The court may allow the party making
an admission under the Rule, whether express or implied, to
withdraw or amend it upon such terms as may be just.
4. CC 12, 2035
Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the
rules of evidence.
Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall
be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
5. FC 48, 60
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence
is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no
judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment. (88a)
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. (101a)
Cases
ATILLO III V. CA (1997)
GEN RULE (R129.4): JA is conclusive upon the party making
it and does not require proof
EXCEPTIONS:
· When it’s shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake
· When it’s shown that no such admission was in fact made
o This exception allows one to contradict an admission
by denying that he made such an admission
A party’s testimony in open court may override admissions he
made in his answer.
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REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2003)
· A written statement is nonetheless competent as an
admission even if it’s contained in a document which is not
itself effective for the purpose for which it’s made, either by
reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party thereto, or by
reason of not being signed, executed or delivered.
· Admissions of a party in his testimony are receivable
against him.
· Imelda’s failure to specifically deny the existence, much
less the genuineness and due execution, of the instruments
bearing her signature, was tantamount to a judicial admission of
the genuineness and due execution of said instruments.
· An admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such admission and becomes
conclusive on him, and that all proofs submitted by him
contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored,
whether an objection is interposed by the adverse party or not.
PEOPLE V. LACSON , 413 SCRA 20 (2003)
Lacson is bound by the judicial admissions he made in the CA
and such admissions so hold him in the proceedings before the
SC. [Present case made by way of appeal under R45, as such,
present recourse a mere continuation of CA proceedings]
HERRERA-FELIX V. CA (2004)
Admissions made in a motion are judicial admissions which are
binding on the party who made them. Such party is precluded
from denying the same unless there is proof of palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.
HEIRS OF PEDRO CLEMENA V. HEIRS OF IRENE BIEN
(2006) A judicial admission conclusively binds the party
making it. He cannot thereafter contradict it. The exception is
found only in those rare instances when the trial court, in the
exercise of its discretion and because of strong reasons to
support its stand, may relieve a party from the consequences of
his admission.
LUCIANO TAN V. RODIL ENTERPRISES (2006)
An admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by
the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him,
and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is
interposed by a party or not.
III. RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY
A. Object (Real) Evidence
Sec. 1. Object as evidence. — Objects as evidence are those
addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant
to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed
by the court. (1a)
Where an object is relevant to a fact in issue, the court may
acquire knowledge thereof by actually viewing the object, in
which case such object becomes object (real) evidence, or by
receiving testimonial evidence thereon.
An ocular inspection conducted by the judge w/o notice to or
the presence of the parties is invalid, as an ocular inspection is
part of the trial. (In re Hon. Rafael C. Climaco)
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Instances when court may rely solely on testimonial evidence
(no need for object [real] evidence)
1. Showing/exhibiting object is against public policy, morals
or decency
2. Requiring viewing amounts to delay, inconvenience,
unnecessary expenses disproportionate to the object’s
evidentiary value
3. Such object (real) evidence would be confusing or
misleading
4. The testimonial or documentary evidence clearly portrays
the object in question to render viewing unnecessary
Court may exclude the public from the viewing of indecent
object, if such viewing is necessary in the interest of justice
Object (real) evidence includes any article or object which may
be known or perceived by the use of any of the senses.
When documents are object (real) evidence
If the purpose is to prove
· their existence or condition,
· the nature of the handwritings thereon,
· to determine the age of the paper used, or the
blemishes/alterations thereon, as where falsification is
alleged.
Otherwise, they are considered documentary evidence, i.e. if
the purpose is to establish the contents or tenor thereof.
The physical examination of a person may be conducted by the
court, or under its direction, to show
· the nature, extent or location of injuries,
· his physique,
· his facial features to determine his resemblance and
possible relationship to another,
· his racial origin,
· his probable age, or
· in the case of a woman, to establish the fact of pregnancy.
RIANO:
Object or real evidence is exactly what its name suggests – the
real thing itself like the knife used to slash the victim’s throat,
the mangled fender of a truck rear-ended by a bulldozer, etc.
Object evidence appeals directly to the senses of the court.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth,
and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence –
where the physical evidence runs counter to the testimonial
evidence, the physical evidence should prevail. (BPI v. Reyes,
2008)
Object evidence is not taken in isolation. It is weighed in
relation to the testimony of a witness. Also, in giving credence
to a testimony, the court takes into consideration the physical
evidence. If the testimony bears a striking similarity with the
physical evidence, the testimony becomes worthy of belief.
(People v. Larrañaga)
Requisites for admissibility of object evidence
1. Evidence must be relevant
2. Evidence must be authenticated
3. The authentication must be made by a competent witness
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· This is to comply with the element of competence as
an essential ingredient of admissibility.
· After its authentication, the object needs to be offered
in evidence at the appropriate time.
4. The object must be formally offered in evidence
· Formal offer of evidence is a vital act before the
admission of evidence because the court “shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered”
The right against self - incrimination cannot be invoked against
object evidence – no testimonial compulsion involved
Categories of object evidence
1. Unique objects: objects that have readily identifiable
marks
2. Objects made unique: objects that are made readily
identifiable
3. Non-unique objects: objects with no identifying marks and
cannot be marked
Chain of custody
The third category (non-unique objects) refers to those objects
which are not readily identifiable, were not made identifiable or
cannot be made identifiable (ex. Drops of blood or oil, drugs in
powder form, etc.). Under this situation, the proponent of the
evidence must establish a chain of custody.
· Purpose of establishing chain of custody: to guarantee the
integrity of the physical evidence and to prevent the
introduction of evidence which is not authentic (Lester v. State)
o BUT where the exhibit is positively identified the
chain of custody of physical evidence is irrelevant
(State v. Clifford)
· There must be links to the chain – the people who actually
handled or had custody of the object
o Each link must show:
 how he received the object;
 how he handled it to prevent substitution; and
 how it was transferred to another
o Each of the handlers of the evidence is a link in the
chain and must testify to make the foundation complete
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody
rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be. …the exhibit’s
level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering –
w/o regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not –
dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of
custody rule. (Lopez v. People, 2008)
Chain of custody in drug cases
· Par. 1, §21, Art. II, RA 9165: The apprehending team
having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
· A mere statement that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the evidence is not enough. It must be accompanied by
proof. (People v. Dela Cruz, 2008)
Demonstrative evidence
It represents or demonstrates the real thing. Consider: does the
evidence sufficiently and accurately represent the object it
seeks to demonstrate or represent? If it does, the evidence
would be admissible.
Photographs
Under the electronic evidence rules, photographic
evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible
in evidence provided:
a) It shall be presented, displayed and shown to the
court; and
b) It shall be identified, explained or authenticated by
either
i) The person who made the recording, or by
ii) Some other person competent to testify on the
accuracy thereof
In determining whether photographs should be admitted, a
trial judge must determine whether they are relevant, and
whether a proper foundation has been laid.
Motion pictures and recordings
Rules that apply to photographs generally apply to these.
In the case of tape recordings, the witness should identify
the speakers, state how he recognizes their voices and that
the recording was not taken in violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law (RA 4200).
Admissibility requirements for tape recordings:
1. The recording device was capable of taking
testimony;
2. The operator of the device was competent;
3. No changes, additions or deletions have been made;
4. The testimony was elicited and voluntarily made w/o
any kind of inducement;
5. Establishment of authenticity and correctness of the
recording;
6. Identity of the speakers; and
7. The manner of the preservation of the recording
Diagrams, models and maps
Aside from the requirement of relevance, a diagram,
model or map must be identified by a witness who is
familiar with what the evidence depicts, and that the same
is an accurate representation of the scene it portrays… The
question as to the sufficiency of the authentication is a
matter of judicial discretion.
X-ray pictures
Admissible when shown to have been made under
circumstances as to assure their accuracy and where
relevant to a material issue in the case
· X-rays properly authenticated by the x-ray technician
or the physician who testifies to the competence of the person
taking it, the procedure taken and that the x-ray picture shown
is that of the person, the anatomical part or the object involved
in the case.
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Scientific tests, demonstrations and experiments
Matter subject to judicial discretion. In-court reenactment
of material events by witnesses has been held permissible
to help illustrate the testimony of a witness.
Ephemeral electronic communications
These forms of communications refer to telephone
conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming
audio, and other forms of electronic communication, the
evidence of which is not recorded or retained. (§1[k], REE)
· Shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the same or by one who has personal knowledge
thereof. In the absence or unavailability of such witness, other
competent evidence may be admitted.
View of an object or scene
An inspection or view outside the courtroom should be made in
the presence of the parties or at least with previous notice to
them… Such is part of the trial since evidence is thereby being
received.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. BARDAJE (1980)
Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more
eloquently than any number of witnesses put together.
SISON V. PEOPLE (1995)
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented
in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its
production and testified as to the circumstances under which
they were produced.
· The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a
correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its
admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the
scene at the time of the crime.
· Photographs can be identified by the photographer or by
any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness
and accuracy.
The use of the photographs by some of the accused to show
their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of
the exactness and accuracy thereof.
PEOPLE V. RULLEPA (2003)
· When the trier of facts observes the appearance of a person
to ascertain his/her age, he is not taking judicial notice of such
fact; rather, he is conducting an examination of the evidence,
the evidence being the appearance of the person. Such a process
militates against the very concept of judicial notice, the object
of which is to de away with the presentation of evidence.
· A person’s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as
object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the
court.
PEOPLE V. YATAR (2004)
A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change
throughout a person’s lifetime.
· Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving there was
physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly
collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be
compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene
of the crime.
B. Documentary Evidence
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. — Documents as evidence
consist of writing or any material containing letters, words,
numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression
offered as proof of their contents. (n)
RIANO:
Categories of documents as evidence
1. Writings
Ex. Wills, written contracts
2. Any other material containing modes of written
expressions
Ex. Those which are not traditionally considered as
writings but are actually objects but which contain
modes of written expressions
NOTE: for such writings or materials to be deemed
documentary evidence, the same must be offered as proof of
their contents.
When a contract is presented in court to show that it exists or
simply to establish its condition, it is not offered to prove
its contents.
Depending upon the specific purpose for which the contents of
the document is offered, there are certain inevitable issues
which may arise in connection with the admissibility of the
document aside from the issue of relevance.
Whenever documentary evidence is involved, the best evidence
rule, parol evidence rule, and hearsay rule, or any one of these
rules may come into play.
Case:
YAP V. INOPIQUEZ, JR . (2003)
It is a basic rule of evidence that between documentary and oral
evidence, the former carries more weight.
1. Best Evidence Rule (R130.3-8)
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. —
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office. (2a)
Sec. 4. Original of document. —
(a) The original of the document is one the contents of which
are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or
about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are
equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of
business, one being copied from another at or near the
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time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally
regarded as originals. (3a)
Document: a deed, instrument, or other duly authorized paper
by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth.
Documentary evidence: that which is furnished by written
instruments, inscriptions and documents of all kinds.
Best evidence rule, applied to documentary evidence, operates
as a rule of exclusion – secondary (or substitutionary) evidence
cannot inceptively be introduced as the original writing must be
produced in court
EXCEPTIONS
1. Original lost/destroyed/cannot be produced in court w/o
bad faith on offeror’s part
2. Original in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice
3. Original consists of numerous accounts or documents
which can’t be examined in court without great loss of time and
the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole
4. Original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office
Non-production of original document = presumption of
suppression of evidence.
BER applies only when the contents of such document is the
subject of inquiry.
When a document is presented to prove its existence or
condition, it is offered as real, not documentary, evidence.
In criminal cases where the issue is not only WRT the
contents of the document but also as to whether such
document actually existed with the participation therein as
imputed to the accused, the original itself must be
presented.
Where the transactions have been recorded in writing but
the contents of such are not the subject of inquiry, BER
doesn’t apply.
WRT documents prepared in several copies through the use of
carbon sheets, the SC has held that each carbon copy is
considered an original provided that the writing of a contract
upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party
sought to be charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the
sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the
same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed
impression. (People v. Tan)
If the issue is the contents of the telegram as received by the
addressee, then the original dispatch received is the best
evidence. On the issue as to the telegram sent by the sender, the
original is the message delivered for transmission. If the issue is
the inaccuracy of transmission, both telegrams as sent and
received are originals.
RIANO:
BER a.k.a. “original document” or “primary evidence” rule
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
It comprehends a situation where the evidence offered is
substitutionary in nature when what should be offered is the
original evidence.
GEN RULE: the original of a writing must be produced.
No reason to apply the BER when the issue does not involve
the contents of a writing
· BER cannot be invoked unless the contents of a
writing is the subject of judicial inquiry
Purpose of BER: prevention of fraud or mistake in the proof
of the contents of a writing. Basic premise – the need to present
to the court the exact words of a writing where a slight
variation of words may mean a great difference in rights
When document is merely collateral in issue
A document is collateral in issue when the purpose of
introducing the document is not to establish its terms but to
show facts that have no reference to its contents like its
existence, condition, execution or delivery.
Waiver of BER
BER may be waived if not raised in the trial.
What to do to apply BER
1. Determine the matter inquired into.
· Procedural compliance: requires presentation of the
original document
· So long as the original is available, no other evidence
can be substituted for the original
2. What if the original cannot be presented in evidence?
a. Find an adequate legal excuse for the failure to
present the original
· Instances when the original does not have to be
produced even when the contents of the doc are the subjects of
inquiry (R130, §3):
(a) When the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
b. Present a secondary evidence sanctioned by RoC
Present the original, except when you can justify its
unavailability in the manner provided for by the RoC.
Sec. 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith
on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of
its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
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Requirements for secondary evidence to be admissible
There must be proof by satisfactory evidence of:
1. Due execution of the original
Proven through the testimony of either:
a. The person/s who executed it;
b. Person before whom its execution as acknowledged;
or
c. Any person who was present and saw it executed and
delivered or who thereafter saw it and recognized the
signatures, or one to whom the parties thereto had previously
confessed the execution thereof
2. Loss, destruction, or unavailability of all such originals
This may be proved by anyone who, in the judgment of the
court, had made a sufficient examination in the places where
the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by
the person in whose custody the document was and has been
unable to find it, or who has made any other investigation
sufficient to satisfy the court that the document is indeed lost.
Intentional destruction of the originals by a party who,
however, had acted in good faith doesn’t preclude his
introduction of secondary evidence of the contents thereof.
3. Reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or
attempt to produce the original
When the original is outside the court’s jurisdiction, secondary
evidence is admissible. (PNB v. Olila)
Where the law specifically provides for the class and quantum
of secondary evidence to establish the contents of a document,
or bars secondary evidence of a lost document, such
requirement is controlling.
Reconstitution of documents by the court through secondary
evidence is governed by Act No. 3110.
RIANO:
Under R130.5, secondary evidence may be admitted only by
laying the basis for its production. This requires compliance w/
the ff.:
1. Offeror must prove the execution and existence of the
original document
2. Offeror must show the cause of its unavailability
3. Offeror must show that the unavailability was not due to
his bad faith.
Burden of proof in establishing loss or destruction of the
original is on the proponent of the secondary evidence.
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or
control. — If the document is in the custody or under the
control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to
produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its
existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence
may be presented as in the case of its loss. (5a)
Sec. 8. Party who calls for document not bound to offer it. — A
party who calls for the production of a document and inspects
the same is not obliged to offer it as evidence. (6a)
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012 ysr
No particular form of notice is required, as long as it fairly Cases:
apprises the other party as to what papers are desired. Even an
oral demand in open court for such production at a reasonable VDA. DE CORPUS V. BRABANGCO (1963)
time thereafter will suffice. Such notice must, however, be It’s not necessary, in order to admit evidence of the contents of
given to the adverse party, or his attorney, even if the document lost instrument, that the witnesses should be able to testify with
is in the actual possession of a third person. verbal accuracy to its contents; it is sufficient if they are able to
state it in substance. It’s enough if intelligent witnesses have
Where receipt of the original of a letter is acknowledged on a read the paper and state substantially its contents and import
carbon copy thereof, there’s no need for a notice to the other with reasonable accuracy.
party to produce the original of the letter. (Phil Ready-Mix · To insist on complete verbal accuracy would be in effect
Concrete Co. v. Villacorta) Note that the duplicate copy, if to prohibit entirely the proof of lost documents by recollection.
complete, is itself an original copy and the only point in issue is
the receipt of the basic original copy thereof. VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC. V. FERRER (1968)
Requisites for admissibility of secondary evidence when the
The adverse party’s justified refusal or failure to produce the original is in the custody of the adverse party:
document doesn’t give rise to the presumption of suppression
of evidence, or create an unfavorable inference, against him. It 1. Opponent’s possession of the original
only authorizes the introduction of secondary evidence. · It is enough that the circumstances are such as to
indicate that the writing is in his possession or under
Where such document is produced, that document is not his control
necessarily admissible in evidence, UNLESS the requisites for 2. Reasonable notice to opponent to produce the original
admissibility are present. · It’s not required that the party entitled to custody of
the instrument should, on being notified to produce
Rule of production of Rule of production of
documents under R130 documents under R27 it, admit having it in his possession.
· Secondary evidence is admissible where he denies
having it in his possession. The party calling for such
Procured by mere notice to Situation: document is either evidence may introduce a copy thereof as in the
the adverse party – req’ts for assumed to be favorable to case of loss.
such notice must be the party in possession 3. Satisfactory proof of its existence
complied w/ as condition thereof or that the party 4. Failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original in
precedent for subsequent seeking its production is not court
introduction of secondary sufficiently informed of the
evidence by the proponent contents of the same COMPANIA MARITIMA V. AFWU (1977)
- Presupposes that the - Production of such Original writings must be produced EXCEPT when original
doc to be produced is intended doc is in the nature of a mode consists of numerous accounts or documents which cannot be
as evidence for the proponent of discovery and can be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought
who is presumed to have sought only by proper motion to be established from them is only the general result of the
knowledge of its contents, in TC, but is permitted only whole. Voluminous character of the records should be
secondary evidence thereof upon good cause shown established. The records should also be made accessible to
being available in case of its
adverse party so that the correctness of the summary may be
non-production
tested on cross-examination.

DE VERA V. AGUILAR (1993)

Requisites for BER exception 3 (numerous accounts/docs) to
apply
1. Voluminous character of the records must be established
2. Such records must be made accessible to the adverse party
so that their correctness may be tested on cross-examination
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record. — When the original of document is in the custody of
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof. (2a)
This section complements exception 4 to BER. By specific
provision of R132, such document may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record (§24), and in the case of
an authorized public record of a private writing, the same may
also be proved by a copy thereof attested by the legal keeper of
the record (§27).
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents
were actually lost or destroyed. Prior to introduction of such
secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former
existence of the instrument.
· Correct order of proof: existence, execution, loss, contents.
· The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any
person knowing the facts.
All originals (duplicates or counterparts) must be accounted for
before using copies.
· No excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be
regarded as established until appears that all of its parts are
unavailable.
CITIBANK N .A. MASTERCARD V. TEODORO (2003)
· Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to
prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the ff:
1. existence or due execution of the original;
2. loss and destruction of the original or the reason for
its non-production in court; and

19
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
3. on the offeror’s part, the absence of bad faith to
which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.
· Correct order of proof: existence, execution, loss,
contents. At the sound discretion of the court, this order may be
changed if necessary.
· When more than one original copy exists, it must appear
that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of
any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for
the other originals.
TENEBRO V. CA (2004)
There is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage
contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a
condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere
fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the
marriage, provided all the requisites for its validity are present.
Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite
different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a
marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the
invalidity of a marriage.
BPI V. CASA MONTESSORI INTERNATIONALE (2004)
Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be established by clear,
positive and convincing evidence. Under the BER as applied to
documentary evidence like the checks in question, no
secondary or substitutionary evidence may inceptively be
introduced, as the original writing itself must be produced in
court. But when, w/o bad faith on the offeror’s part, the original
checks have already been destroyed or cannot be produced in
court, secondary evidence may be produced. Even WRT
documentary evidence, the BER applies only when the contents
of a document – such as the drawer’s signature on a check – is
the subject of inquiry.
LEE V. PEOPLE (2004)
The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of
legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable
evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or
incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the BER.
The rule does not apply to proof of facts collateral to the issues
CONSOLIDATED BANK V. DEL MONTE MOTOR
WORKS
The only actual rule the ‘best evidence’ phrase denotes today is
the rule requiring the production of the original writing.
(McCormick) In light of the dangers of mistransmission,
accompanying the use of written copies or of recollection,
largely avoided through proving the terms by presenting the
writing itself, the preference for the original writing is justified.
2. Parol Evidence Rule (R130.9)
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or
add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the
written agreement;
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(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or
their successors in interest after the execution of the written
agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. (7a)
PER is based upon the consideration that when the parties have
reduced their agreement on a particular matter into writing, all
their previous and contemporaneous agreements on the matter
are merged therein. (De Guzman v. Calma)
Parol evidence: any evidence aliunde, whether oral or written,
which is intended or tends to vary or contradict a complete and
enforceable agreement embodied in a document
PER doesn’t apply, and may not properly be invoked by either
party to the litigation against the other, where at least one party
to the suit is not a party or privy of a party to the written
instrument in question and doesn’t base a claim or assert a right
originating in the instrument of the relation established thereby.
Thus, if one of the parties to the case is a complete stranger to
the contract involved therein, he’s not bound by this rule and
can introduce extrinsic evidence against the efficacy of the
writing. (Lechugas v. CA)
Parol evidence rule Best evidence rule
Prohibits the varying of the Prohibits introduction of
terms of a written agreement substitutionary evidence in lieu
of the original doc, regardless
of W/N it varies the contents of
the original Applies to all kinds
Applies only to documents of writings
contractual in nature
Exception: wills
Invoked only when the Invoked by any part to an
controversy is between the action regardless of W/N such
parties to the written party has participated in the
agreement, their privies, or any writing involved
party directly affected thereby
(e.g. cestui que trust)
For the parol evidence to be admissible, the mistake or
imperfection of the document, or its failure to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the
agreement must be put in issue by the pleadings.
An intrinsic ambiguity in the written agreement is now
required to be put in issue in the pleading in order that
parol evidence therein may be admitted.
Mistake under the first exception refers to a mistake of fact
which is mutual to the parties, or where the innocent party was
imposed upon by unfair dealing of the other. Imperfection
includes an inaccurate statement in the agreement, or
incompleteness in the writing, or the presence of inconsistent
provisions therein.
There is latent ambiguity when the writing on its face
appears clear and unambiguous but there are collateral
matters or circumstances which make the meaning
uncertain, or where a writing admits of 2 constructions
both of which are in harmony w/ the language used.
(Ignacio v. Rementeria)
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Patent or extrinsic ambiguity is such ambiguity which is
apparent on the face of the writing itself and requires
something to be added in order to ascertain the meaning of
the words used.
Purpose of second exception: to enable the court to ascertain
the true intention of the parties or the true nature of the
transaction between the parties. Under the third exception
which in effect authorizes an inquiry into the validity of the
agreement, PE may be admitted to show the true consideration
of a contract (CC 1354), or the want or illegality thereof, or the
incapacity of the parties, or the fact that the contract was
fictitious or absolutely simulated, or that there was fraud in the
inducement.
No express trust concerning an immovable or any interest
therein may be proved by parol evidence. (CC 1443)
Reformation of a contract, as a relief, is regulated by CC 1359-
1368.
Related provisions
a. Express trusts on immovables (CC 1443)
Art. 1443. No express trusts concerning an immovable or any
interest therein may be proved by parol evidence.
b. Statute of Frauds (CC 1403, 1405)
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless
they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one
who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who
has acted beyond his powers;
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set
forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement
hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the
same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence,
therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the
writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed
within a year from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage,
other than a mutual promise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things
in action, at a price not less than five hundred pesos, unless the
buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the
evidences, or some of them, of such things in action or pay at
the time some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is
made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his
sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of
property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers and
person on whose account the sale is made, it is a sufficient
memorandum;
(e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than
one year, or for the sale of real property or of
an interest therein;
(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.
(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent
to a contract.
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Art. 1405. Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds, referred
to in No. 2 of Article 1403, are ratified by the failure to object
to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the same, or by the
acceptance of benefit under them.
Cases
MAULINI V. SERRANO (1914)
The prohibition against the introduction of parol evidence…
was designed to prevent alteration, change, modification,
variation or contraction of the terms of a written instrument
admittedly existing EXCEPT in cases specifically named
therein.
The prohibition does not apply where the purpose of the parol
evidence is to show:
· That no written contract ever existed,
· That the minds of the parties never met on the terms of
such a contract,
· That they never mutually agreed to enter into such a
contract, and
· That there never existed any consideration upon which
such an agreement could be founded.
PALANCA V. FRED WILSON & CO . (1918)
The introduction of evidence to explain circumstances under
which an agreement was made is permitted when it is necessary
to explain intrinsic ambiguity.
· Written agreement presumed to contain all the terms,
nevertheless does not exclude other evidence of the
circumstances under which the agreement was made, or to
which it relates, or to explain an intrinsic ambiguity.
ROBLES V. LIZARRAGA HERMANOS (1927)
The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a
writing does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of
extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral
parol agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be
received, regardless of W/N the written agreement contains
reference to such collateral agreement.
WOODHOUSE V. HALILI (1953)
Plaintiff’s act or statement was sought to be introduced to prove
the representations or inducements, or fraud, w/ which or by
which he secured the other party’s consent thereto. These are
expressly excluded from the PER.
· Where parties prohibited from proving said representations
or inducements, on the ground that the agreement had already
been entered into, it would be impossible to prove
misrepresentation or fraud.
· The PER expressly allows the evidence to be introduced
when the validity of an instrument is put in issue by the
pleadings.
LAND SETTLEMENT DEVT. V. GARCIA PLANTATION
CO ., INC . When the operation of the contract is made to
depend upon the occurrence of an event, which, for that reason
is a condition precedent, such may be established by parol
evidence.
PNR V. CFI OF ALBAY (1978)
Where there is no allegation in the complaint that there was any
mistake or imperfection in the written agreement or that it
failed to express the true intent of the parties, parol evidence is
inadmissible to vary the terms of the agreement.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
· However, if the defendant set up the affirmative defense
that the contract mentioned in the complaint does not express
the true agreement of the parties, then parol evidence is
admissible to prove the true agreement of the parties.
LECHUGAS V. CA (1986)
The PER does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by
either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one
of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the
written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the
relation established thereby.
· PER not applicable where the controversy is between one
of the parties to the document and third persons
· Thus, if one of the parties to the case is a complete
stranger to the contract involved therein, he’s not bound by this
rule and can introduce extrinsic evidence against the efficacy of
the writing.
INCIONG, JR. V. CA (1996)
The PER does not specify that the written agreement be a
public document.
LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. V. CA (2004)
While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of
written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating
into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which
are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud
or mistake. No such allegation had been made by petitioners in
this case.
BALUYOT V. POBLETE (2007)
When the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, it is
deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of
such terms can be admitted other than the contents of the
agreement itself.
Interpretation of Documents <not in outline>
Sec. 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal
meaning. — The language of a writing is to be interpreted
according to the legal meaning it bears in the place of its
execution, unless the parties intended otherwise. (8)
Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all
provisions. — In the construction of an instrument, where there
are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all. (9)
Sec. 12. Interpretation according to intention; general and
particular provisions. — In the construction of an instrument,
the intention of the parties is to be pursued; and when a general
and a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is
paramount to the former. So a particular intent will control a
general one that is inconsistent with it. (10)
Sec. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. — For the
proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under
which it was made, including the situation of the subject
thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge
may be placed in the position of those who language he is to
interpret. (11)
Sec. 14. Peculiar signification of terms. — The terms of a
writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and
general acceptation, but evidence is admissible to show that
they have a local, technical, or otherwise peculiar
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signification, and were so used and understood in the particular
instance, in which case the agreement must be construed
accordingly. (12)
Sec. 15. Written words control printed. — When an instrument
consists partly of written words and partly of a printed form,
and the two are inconsistent, the former controls the latter. (13)
Sec. 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining
certain writings. — When the characters in which an
instrument is written are difficult to be deciphered, or the
language is not understood by the court, the evidence of
persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or who
understand the language, is admissible to declare the characters
or the meaning of the language. (14)
Sec. 17. Of Two constructions, which preferred. — When the
terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense
by the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against
either party in which he supposed the other understood it, and
when different constructions of a provision are otherwise
equally proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable
to the party in whose favor the provision was made. (15)
Sec. 18. Construction in favor of natural right. — When an
instrument is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in
favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to be
adopted. (16)
Sec. 19. Interpretation according to usage. — An instrument
may be construed according to usage, in order to determine its
true character. (17)
Rules for interpretation of contracts are provided by CC 1370-
1379. For the rules on interpretation or construction of wills,
see CC 788-794.
C. Testimonial Evidence
1. Qualification of Witnesses (R130.20)
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. — Except as provided
in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive,
and perceiving, can make their known perception to others,
may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case,
or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall
not be ground for disqualification. (18a)
GEN RULE: all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses
RIANO:
Testimonial or oral evidence: Evidence elicited from the mouth
of the witness as distinguished from real and documentary
evidence
Competence of a witness refers to his personal qualifications to
testify. It also includes the absence of any factor that would
disqualify him from being a witness.
The admission of any evidence requires its identification.
· Identification precedes authentication. Without a witness,
no evidence can ever be authenticated.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Presumption in favor of competence of witness
GEN RULE: a person who takes the stand as a witness is
presumed to be able to testify.
· A party who desires to question the competence of a
witness must do so by making an objection as soon as the facts
tending to show incompetency are apparent.
Basic qualifications of a witness
1. He can perceive; and in perceiving
· The witness must have personal knowledge of the
facts surrounding the subject matter of his testimony
2. He can make known his perception to others.
· Involves 2 factors:
a. The ability to remember what has been
perceived; and
b. The ability to communicate the remembered
perception
· When deaf-mutes are competent as witnesses:
a. Can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an
oath;
b. Can comprehend facts they are going to testify
to; and
c. Can communicate their ideas through a qualified
interpreter
Add the following:
1. He must take either an oath or an affirmation
· R132, §1 requires that the examination of a witness
in a trial or hearing shall be done xxx under oath or affirmation
2. He must not possess the disqualifications imposed by law
or the rules
Credibility of a witness refers to the weight and the
trustworthiness or reliability of the testimony.
· A prevaricating witness or one who has given
contradicting testimony is still a competent witness. He may be
competent, but his testimony may not be given much weight by
the court or no weight at all if the court deems him not worthy
of belief.
· Drug abuse will not render a person incompetent to testify.
It becomes relevant only if the witness was under the influence
of drugs at the time he is testifying or at the time the events in
question were observed. This may serve as ground for attacking
the credibility of the witness.
· Questions concerning the credibility of a witness are best
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Related provisions
a. CC 821
Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses
to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines;
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a
document, perjury or false testimony. (n)
b. §17, R119, RoC
Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. — When two or
more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any
offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the
court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with
their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after
requiring the prosecution
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to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court
is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) The is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of
said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.
Case:
RECTO V. REPUBLIC (2004)
Requirements of a child’s competence as a witness:
a. Capacity of observation
b. Capacity of recollection
c. Capacity of communication
There is no showing that as a child, claimant did not possess
the foregoing qualifications. It’s not necessary that a witness’
knowledge of the fact to which he testifies was obtained in
adulthood.
2. Mental capacity or immaturity (§21, R130)
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. — The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are incapable of
intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and of relating them truthfully. (19a)
(Dis)qualifications of witnesses are determined as of the time
said witnesses are produced for examination in court or at the
taking of their depositions.
WRT children of tender years, it’s submitted that their
competence at the time of the occurrence to be testified to
should also be taken into account, especially if such event
took place long before their production as witnesses.
The phrase “unsound mind” includes any mental aberration,
whether organic or functional, or induced by drugs or hypnosis.
Mental unsoundness of the witness at the time the fact to be
testified to occurred affects only his credibility. Nevertheless,
as long as the witness can convey ideas by words or signs and
give sufficiently intelligent answers to questions propounded,
s/he is a competent witness even if s/he is feeble-minded, a
mental retardate, or a schizophrenic.
Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses when they can understand
and appreciate the sanctity of an oath, can comprehend facts
they’re going to testify to and can communicate their ideas
through a qualified interpreter. (People v. Hayag)
Considerations of court in determining competency of child
witness – his/her capacity
1. At the time the fact to be testified to occurred such that he
could receive correct impressions thereof;
2. To comprehend the obligation of an oath; and
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
3. To relate those facts truly at the time he is offered as a
witness
NOTE: the court should take into account his capacity for
observation, recollection, and communication. (Republic v.
CA)
Unless a child’s testimony is punctured w/ serious
inconsistencies as to lead one to believe that he was coached, if
he can perceive and make known his perception, he is
considered a competent witness. (People v. Cidro)
RIANO:
The mental incapacity of the witness at the time of his
perception of the events subject of the testimony does not affect
his competency as long as he is competent at the time he is
produced for examination to make known his perception to
others.
· His incapacity at the time of perception, although without
legal effect on his competency to testify, would concededly
have an adverse effect on his credibility.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. DEAUNA (2002)
GEN RULE: lunatics or persons affected w/ insanity are
admissible as witnesses, if they have sufficient understanding
to apprehend the obligation of an oath and are capable of
giving correct accounts of the matters that they have seen or
heard WRT the questions at issue.
PEOPLE V. MACAPAL, JR . (2005)
Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally
retarded person may be a credible witness. The acceptance of
his/her testimony depends on the quality of his/her perceptions
and the manner s/he can make them known to the court.
PEOPLE V. SANTOS (2006)
Trend in procedural law – give wide latitude to courts in
exercising control over questioning of a child witness
· Child witnesses may testify in narrative form and leading
questions may be allowed by TC in all stages of the
examination if the same will further the interest of justice.
3. Marital disqualification (R130.22)
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. — During
their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for
or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a)
In order that the marital disqualification rule will apply, it’s
necessary that: 1) the marriage is valid and existing as of the
time of the offer of testimony (Arroyo v. Azur), and 2) that the
other spouse is a party to the action.
Objections to the competency of the spouse presented to
testify against the other may be waived as in the case of
other witnesses generally.
Under R130.22, the marital DQ in criminal cases is limited to
crimes committed against the other or the latter’s direct
descendant/ascendant.
RIANO:
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This rule is based on society’s intent to preserve the marriage
relations and promote domestic peace. Prohibiting a testimony
in favor of the spouse is intended to discourage the commission
of perjury.
Marital DQ rule under R130.22 forbids the husband or wife to
testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse except in those cases authorized by the rule.
The rule does not prohibit a testimony for or against the other
after the marriage is dissolved.
If testimony for or against the other spouse is offered during
the existence of the marriage, it does not matter if the facts
subject of the testimony occurred or came to the knowledge of
the witness-spouse before the marriage. The affected spouse
may still invoke the rule by objecting to the testimony as long
as the testimony is offered during the marriage. Nothing in the
tenor of the rule allows a contrary view.
The benefit of the rule may be waived and it may be waived
impliedly or expressly.
The testimony covered by the marital DQ rule not only consists
of utterances but also the production of documents. (State v.
Bramlet)
EXCEPTIONS to the Marital DQ Rule
A spouse may testify for or against the other even without the
consent of the latter in the ff. instances:
1. In a civil case by one against the other; or
2. In a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other, or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.
The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon
the person is too narrow xxx. The better rule is that, when an
offense directly attacks or directly and vitally impairs the
conjugal relations, it comes within the exception to the statute.
(Ordoño v. Daquigan, quoting Cargill v. State)
Where the civil case is between a spouse and the direct
descendants or ascendants of the other, the marital DQ rule still
applies.
Cases:
LEZAMA V. RODRIGUEZ (1968)
Where the wife is a co-defendant in a suit charging her and her
husband with collusive fraud, she cannot be called as an
adverse party witness, as this will violate the marital DQ rule.
ALVAREZ V. RAMIREZ (2005)
Specific reasons for the Marital DQ Rule (spousal immunity):
1. Identity of interests between husband and wife
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is a
consequent danger of perjury
3. Policy of the law = to guard the security and confidences
of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of
justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger
of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the
other
NOTE: where the marital and domestic relations are so
strained, these considerations no longer apply.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
4. Dead Man’s Statute (R130.23)
Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of
adverse party. — Parties or assignor of parties to a case, or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such deceased person or against
such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of
fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound mind. (20a)
Survivorship DQ Rule, a.k.a. Dead Man’s Statute
Constitutes only a partial DQ as the witness is only prohibited
from testifying on the matters therein specified, unlike the
marital DQ rule which is a complete and absolute DQ
Requisites for DMS to apply
1. Witness offered for examination is a party plaintiff, or the
assignor of said party, or a person in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted
Such plaintiff must be the real party in interest. As such,
the rule has no application to mere witnesses
2. The case is against the executor or administrator or other
representative of a person deceased or of unsound mind
It’s necessary that the defendant is being sued and defends
in such representative capacity, and not in his individual
capacity. However, even if the property involved has
already been judicially adjudicated to the heirs, they are
still protected under this rule against such prohibited
testimony as they are considered as the representatives of
the deceased (Goñi v. CA)
The rule applies regardless of whether the deceased
died before or after the suit against him is filed,
provided he’s already dead at the time the testimony
is sought to be given (Babao v. Perez)
The protection of the rule would include the heirs of
the deceased defendant who are substituted for the
latter under R3.16, and the guardians of persons of
unsound mind who are sued in such representative
capacity under R96.3.
3. The case is upon a claim or demand against the estate of
such person who is deceased or of unsound mind
The rule doesn’t apply where it’s the administrator who
brings an action to recover property allegedly belonging to
the estate (Tongco v. Vianzon), or the action is by the
heirs of a deceased plaintiff who were substituted for the
latter (Ardina v. Alejandro)
4. Testimony to be given is on a matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind
Includes any matter of fact w/c bears upon a transaction or
communication between the witness and the decedent
even though without the presence or participation of the
latter (Stuart v. Lord)
Purpose of DMS: discourage perjury and protect the estate
from fictitious claims.
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The prohibition does not apply where the testimony is
offered to prove a claim less than what is established under
a written document (Icard v. Marasigan), or is intended to
prove a fraudulent transaction of the deceased (Ong Chua
v. Carr), provided such fraud is first established by
evidence aliunde
When DMS disqualification is waived
If the defendant doesn’t timely object to the admission of such
evidence or testifies on the prohibited matters (Asturias v. CA)
or cross-examines thereon (Tongco v. Vianzon)
RIANO:
The object of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give
false testimony in regard to the transaction on the part of the
surviving party and thereby put the parties upon equal terms.
(Tan v. CA)
The rule will not apply:
· Where the plaintiff is the executor or administrator as
representative of the deceased or if the plaintiff is the person of
unsound mind
· When the action brought is not “against” the estate, or not
upon a claim or demand “against” the estate – the claim, from
the tenor of the rule, is by its nature civil because the estate
itself cannot be criminally liable
The rule does not prohibit testimony by a mere witness to the
transaction between the plaintiff and the deceased and who has
no interest in such transaction. Thus, offering the testimony of a
so-called “disinterested witness” is not a transgression of the
rule since the prohibition extends only to the party or his
assignor or the person in whose behalf the case is prosecuted.
The rule does not altogether intend to keep the witness out of
the stand altogether. The witness is merely precluded from
testifying on particular topics.
The survivorship DQ rule is intended to benefit the estate of the
deceased or insane person. Hence, this protection may be
waived by:
a. Failing to object to the testimony; or
b. Cross-examining the witness on the prohibited testimony;
or
c. Offering evidence to rebut the testimony. Cases:
TONGCO V. VIANZON (1927)
The object and purpose of [DMS] is to guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction
in question on the part of the surviving party. The law was
designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to
suppress the truth.
· The law does not apply and a witness is competent to
testify when the actions were not brought ‘against’ the estate, or
upon claims ‘against’ the estate.
MENDEZONA V. VDA. DE GOITIA (1930)
The law prohibits a witness directly interested in a claim
against the decedent’s estate from testifying upon a matter of
fact w/c took place before the death of the deceased.
· Underlying principle of prohibition: to protect the intestate
estate from fictitious claims
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
· This protection should not be treated as an absolute bar or
prohibition from the filing of just claims against the decedent’s
estate.
ICARD V. MASIGAN (1941)
FROM RIANO: The witness is merely precluded from
testifying on particular topics. A testimony favorable to the
estate or to the insane person is not barred since the rule is
designed to protect the interest of the estate of the deceased or
insane person.
· FROM CASE: Where the purpose of the oral testimony is
to prove a lesser claim than what might be warranted by clear
written evidence, to avoid prejudice to the estate of the
deceased, the law has no reason for its application.
LICHAUCO V. AG &P (1949)
Inasmuch as [DMS] disqualifies only parties or assignors of
parties, the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not
disqualified from testifying for or against the corporation which
is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the
estate of a deceased person as to any matter of fact occurring
before the death of such deceased person.
GO CHI GUN V. CO CHO (1955)
An exception to [DMS] is where the decedent had been guilty
of fraud. The rule has been adopted to promote justice and not
to shield fraud. In the case of Ong Chua v. Carr, before the
testimonies of witnesses were allowed to be introduced the
fraud perpetrated by the deceased had been established beyond
all doubt, not by mere preponderance of the evidence alone.
· Aside from the fact that fraud must be proved as a fact by
a clear preponderance of evidence because fraud is a criminal
charge, there is an added ground in the case at bar for requiring
a high quantum of proof of the fraud.
ASTURIAS V. CA (1963)
[DMS] waived where no timely objected has been made
against the admission of such evidence and one of the
petitioners was made to testify on such prohibited matters
covered by the exclusion rule.
GUERRERO V. ST. CLAIRE’S REALTY & CO. (1983)
DMS does not apply:
· To a witness who is not a party or assignor of a party or a
person in whose behalf a case is prosecuted
· Where the case is not a claim or demand against the estate
of a deceased person
GOÑ I V. CA (1986)
Waiver [of DMS] occurs where:
· Representative of estate takes plaintiff’s deposition, OR
counsel for rep cross-examines plaintiff as to matters occurring
during deceased’s lifetime; AND
· Rep files a counterclaim against plaintiff
DMS can’t be invoked where party testifies as to
communications made or contracts entered into w/ the agent of
the decedent while the latter was alive.
RAZON V. IAC (1992)
DMS may not be invoked when the case was not filed against
the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims
against the estate. Granting that petitioner’s testimony [as
regards the true nature of transaction w/ the deceased] is
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within the prohibition of DMS, private respondent is deemed to
have waived the rule.
SUNGA - CHAN V. CHUA (2001)
DMS provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained
account of the transaction.
5. Privileged communication (R130.24)
Objections under the DQ rules can be invoked only by the
persons protected thereunder and may be waived by said
persons in the same manner, either expressly or impliedly.
a. Marital communications [R130.24(a)]
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage,
cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other or the latter's direct
descendants or ascendants;
xxx
Requisites for DQ by reason of marital privilege to apply
1. Valid marital relation
2. Privilege is invoked WRT a confidential communication
between the spouses during said marriage
3. The spouse against whom such evidence is being offered
has not given his/her consent to such testimony
RIANO:
Since the application of the rule requires a confidential
information received by one spouse from the other during the
marriage, information acquired by a spouse before the marriage
even if received confidentially will not fall squarely with R130,
§24(a) but divulging the same may be objected to under R130,
§22 upon proper objection as long as the information is sought
to be revealed during the marriage through a testimony for or
against the affected spouse.
Confidential information received from a third person is not
covered by the privilege.
Communications in private between H & W are presumed to be
confidential.
· BUT if a third person (other than a child of the family) is
present with the knowledge of the communicating spouse, this
stretches the web of confidence beyond the marital pair, and the
communication is unprivileged.
· If children of the family are present this likewise deprives
the conversation of protection unless the children are too young
to understand what is said.
Marital DQ Rule (R130.22) Marital Privileged
Communication Rule
[R130.24(a)]
Does not refer to Refers to confidential
confidential communications received by
communications between one spouse from the other
the spouses. during the marriage
Includes facts, occurrences Applies only to testimonies of a
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
or information even prior to
the marriage – in this sense,
it is broader because it
prevents testimony for or
against the spouse on any
fact and not merely a
disclosure of confidential
information
Can no longer be invoked
once the marriage is
dissolved
The prohibition is a
testimony for or against the
other
Cases:
confidential nature received by
one spouse from the other
during the marriage – does not
include acts merely observed by
the spouse UNLESS such acts
are intended as a means of
conveying confidential
communication by one to the
other
The privilege does not cease
just because the marriage has
ended
What is prohibited is the
examination of a spouse as to
matters received in confidence
by one from the other during
the marriage
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presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as
implied consent.
b. Attorney-client privilege [R130. 24(b)]
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or
his advice given thereon in the course of, or
with a view to, professional employment, nor can an
attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his employer,
concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been
acquired in such capacity;
xxx
Preliminary communications made for the purpose of creating
the attorney-client relationship are within the privilege

US V. ANTIPOLO (1916) The communications covered by the privilege include verbal

For the information to be confidential, it must be made during
and by reason of the marital relations and is intended not to be
shared with others. Without such intention, common reason
suggests that the information is not confidential.
· Instant case: in a prosecution for murder, the wife was
allowed to testify as to her husband’s dying declaration
regarding the identity of the assailant because there was no
intent of confidentiality in the information. The declaration is
intended to be communicated after the husband’s death because
it was made in the furtherance of justice.
PEOPLE V. CARLOS (1925)
Where a privileged communication from one spouse to another
comes into the hands of a third party, w/o collusion and
voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the
privilege is extinguished and the communication, if otherwise
competent, becomes admissible.
PEOPLE V. FRANCISCO (1947)
Reasons for prohibition:
a. Identity of interests
b. Consequent danger of perjury
c. Policy of law w/c deems it necessary to guard the security
and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional
failure of justice, and w/c rejects such evidence because its
admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness
d. Where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is
danger of punishing one spouse through the other’s hostile
testimony
EXCEPTIONS:
· In civil actions between the spouses
· In criminal cases for offenses committed by one against
the other
REASON FOR EXCEPTIONS: Where marital and domestic
relations are so strained that there’s no more harmony to be
preserved or peace and tranquility w/c may be disturbed
LACUROM V. JACOBA (2006)
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be
waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its
statements and documents or papers entrusted to the attorney,
and of facts learned by the attorney through the act or agency
of his client.
Atty-client privilege DOES NOT APPLY to communications:
1. intended to be made public;
2. intended to be communicated to others;
3. intended for an unlawful purpose;
4. received from third persons not acting in behalf of or as
agents of the client; or
5. made in the presence of third parties who are strangers to
the attorney-client relationship
Period to be considered for application of the privilege = that
date when the privileged communication was made by the
client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in
the past or WRT a crime intended to be committed in the
future.
RIANO:
Requisites:
1. A communication made by the client to the attorney or an
advice given by the attorney to his client
2. The communication or advice must have been given in
confidence
3. The communication or advice must’ve been given either:
a. In the course of the professional employment; or
b. With a view to professional employment
Perfected attorney-client relationship not required for the
privilege to exist – enough that the communication or advice be
“with a view to” professional employment
· Hence, the privilege is extended to communications made
for the purpose of securing the services of counsel even if the
counsel later refuses the professional relationship.
· Insertion of the clause “with a view to” includes
preliminary negotiations within the privilege
The privilege of a client to keep communications to his attorney
confidential is predicated upon the client’s belief that he is
consulting a lawyer in that capacity and has manifested his
intention to seek professional legal advice.

27
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
· It is enough if he reasonably believes that the person
consulted is a lawyer, although in fact he is not as in the case of
a detective pretending to be a lawyer. (People v. Barker) For
the privilege to exist, payment of a fee is not essential. (US v.
Landorf)
The privilege is not confined to communications regarding
actual pending cases. The communications may refer to
anticipated litigations or may not refer to any litigation at all.
The privilege does not extend to communications where the
client’s purpose is the furtherance of a future intended crime or
fraud, or for the purpose of committing a crime or a tort or
those made in furtherance of illicit activity.
Under the last link doctrine, non-privileged information, such
as the identity of the client, is protected if the revelation of such
information would necessarily reveal privileged information.
The statements of the client need not have been made to the
attorney in person.
· Those made to the attorney’s secretary, clerk or
stenographer for transmission to the attorney for the purpose of
the professional relationship or with a view to such relationship
or such knowledge acquired by such employees in such
capacity are covered by the privilege.
Before the statements of the client and the advice of the
attorney can be deemed as privileged, the same should have
been intended to be confidential. There can be no attorney-
client privilege where the information is given with the
expectation that it will be revealed to others.
In relation to the attorney, the privilege is owned by the client.
If the client waives the privilege, no one else including the
attorney can invoke it.
The protection of the privilege will generally survive the
client’s death.
Cases:
BARTON V. LEYTE ASPHALT (1924)
When a document, containing admissions of the client, comes
to the hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is
admissible in evidence. Where the authenticity of such a
document is admitted, the court will take no notice of the
manner in which it was obtained.
ORIENT INSURANCE V. REVILLA (1930)
The introduction in evidence by one party of part of a writing
[privileged matter] makes the whole document admissible –
privilege is waived as to other parts of the same writing.
UPJOHN COMPANY V. US (1981)
The attorney-client privilege applies when the client is a
corporation.
· If the employee making the communication, of whatever
rank he may be, is in a position to control or even to take a
substantial part in a decision about any action which the
corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, …in
effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he make his
disclosure to the lawyer, and the privilege would apply.
REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN (1996)
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· Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate that client
in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
· Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability,
his identity is privileged.
· The content of any client communication to a lawyer lies
within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the
legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance.
· The lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer’s
loyalty to his client extends even after the termination of the
relationship.
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN (1997)
The rule on attorney-client privilege has always referred to
“any communication,” without distinction or qualification.
There is no particular mode by which a confidential
communication shall be made by a client to his attorney.
· The privilege is not confined to verbal or written
communications made by the client to his attorney, but extends
as well to information communicated by the client to the attorney
by other means.
For the application of the privilege, the period to be considered
is the date when the privileged communication was made by
the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed
in the past or WRT a crime intended to be committed in the
future.
· If the client seeks lawyer’s advice WRT a crime the
former has committed, he is given the protection of the privilege
which cannot be broken by the attorney w/o the client’s consent.
· The same privilege does not attach with regard to a
crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the
future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer’s
advice.
For lawyer-client communication to be privileged, it must be
for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The
existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from
attaching.
MERCADO V. VITRIOLO
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential. The communication made by
a client to his attorney must have been transmitted for the
purpose of seeking legal advice.
c. Physician-patient privilege [R130. 24(c)]
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him
or any information which he may have acquired in attending
such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in capacity, and which would
blacken the
reputation of the patient;
xxx
Requisites:
1. The physician is authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics;
 evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
2. The information was acquired or the advice or treatment
was given by him in his professional capacity for the purpose of
treating and curing the patient;
3. The information, advice or treatment, if revealed, would
blacken the patient’s reputation; and
4. The privilege is invoked in a civil case, whether the
patient is a party thereto or not
The privilege DOES NOT APPLY where:
1. the communication was not given in confidence;
2. Communication is irrelevant to professional employment;
3. the communication was made for an unlawful purpose; as
when it’s intended for the commission or concealment of a
crime;
4. the information was intended to be made public; or
5. there was a waiver of the privilege either by provisions of
contract or law
RIANO:
The privilege applies to a civil case, whether the patient is a
party or not.
Rationale: to encourage the patient to freely disclose all the
matters which may aid in the diagnosis in the treatment of a
disease or an injury
The information which cannot be disclosed refers to:
1. any advice given to the client;
2. any treatment given to the client;
3. any information acquired in attending such patient
provided that the advice, treatment or information was made or
acquired in a professional capacity and was necessary to enable
him to act in that capacity; and
4. that the information sought to be disclosed would tend to
blacken the reputation of the patient
The rule doesn’t require that the physician-patient relationship
be a result of a contractual relationship.
It’s necessary for the operation of the privilege that the
physician is acting in his “professional capacity” and that the
advice or treatment is given or acquired in such capacity.
The privilege does not apply to shield the commission of a
crime or when the purpose is an unlawful one.
The privilege survives the death of the patient.
The privilege may be waived by the patient. There could also
be a waiver by operation of law or of the rules.
Rule 28: Physical and Mental Examination of
Persons xxx
Sec. 4. Waiver of privilege. — By requesting and obtaining a
report of the examination so ordered or by taking the deposition
of the examiner, the party examined waives any privilege he
may have in that action or any other involving the same
controversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who
has examined or may thereafter examine him in respect of the
same mental or physical examination. (4)
Under R28, the results of the physical and mental examination
of a person, when ordered by the court, are intended to be made
public, hence they can be divulged in that proceeding and
cannot be objected to on the ground of privilege. Also, results
of autopsies or postmortem examinations are generally
intended to be divulged in court,
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aside from the fact that the doctor’s services were not for
purposes of medical treatment.
Cases:
LIM V. CA (1992)
The privilege is not violated by permitting a physician to give
expert opinion testimony. Such opinion must exclude from his
consideration his personal knowledge of the patient acquired
through the physician-patient relationship.
KROHN V. CA (1994)
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery, or obstetrics. He is simply the patient’s husband who
wishes to testify on a document executed by medical
practitioners. Clearly, this does not fall within the claimed
prohibition.
d. Priest/minister-penitent privilege [§24(d),
R130]
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the
person making the confession, be examined as to any confession
made to or any advice given by him in his professional character
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the
minister or priest
belongs;
xxx
The privilege requires that the communications were made
pursuant to a religious duty enjoined in the course of the
discipline of the sect or denomination to which they belong and
must be confidential and penitential in character, e.g., under the
seal of the confessional.
RIANO:
The person making the confession holds the privilege.
· The priest or minister hearing the confession in his
professional capacity is prohibited from making a disclosure of
the confession without the consent of the person confessing.
o Note: the priest or minister must be duly ordained or
consecrated by his sect.
The privilege also extends to any advice given by the minister
or priest. NOTE: the communication must be made pursuant to
confessions of sins.
· Where the penitent discussed business arrangements with
the priest, the privilege does not apply.
e. State secrets [§24(e), R130]
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases: xxx
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of
office or afterwards, as to communications made to him in
official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest
would suffer by the disclosure. (21a)
Requisites:
1. The communication was made to the public officer in
official confidence; and
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
2. That public interest would suffer by the disclosure of such
communication, as in the case of State secrets.
Where no public interest would be prejudiced, this rule does
not apply.
RIANO:
National security matters and State secrets are confidential. A
court will most likely uphold the privilege.
Cases:
BANCO FILIPINO V. MONETARY BOARD (1986)
Tapes and transcripts of Monetary Board deliberations on the
closure of BF may be confidential, but they are not necessarily
absolute and privileged. There’s no specific provision in the
Central Bank Act w/c prohibits absolutely the courts from
conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are
relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit pending before
it.
RA 7653 (New Central Bank Act), §16. Responsibility. -
Members of the Monetary Board, officials, examiners, and
employees of the Bangko Sentral who willfully violate this Act
or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance
or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the
performance of his duties shall be held liable for any loss or
injury suffered by the Bangko Sentral or other banking
institutions as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse,
malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary
diligence.
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enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused
were exempted from the right to information. (Chavez v.
PCGG)
Presidential communications fall under the protection of
executive privilege.
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE
f. Parental and filial privilege
Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. — No person may be
compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants,
children or other direct descendants. (20a)
Both parental and filial privileges are granted to any person,
which privileges against compulsory testimony he can invoke
in any case against any of his parents, direct ascendants,
children, or direct descendants.
Related provision: CC 215
Art. 215. Each spouse shall proportionately bear the family
expenses.
Case:
PEOPLE V. INVENCION (2003)
The rule on filial privilege refers to a privilege not to testify,
which can be invoked or waived like other privileges.
g. Newsman’s Privilege (RA No. 53, as amended
by RA 1477)

Similar responsibility shall apply to members, officers, and
employees of the Bangko Sentral for: (1) the disclosure of any
information of a confidential nature, or any information on the
discussions or resolutions of the Monetary Board, or about the
confidential operations of the Bangko Sentral, unless the
disclosure is in connection with the performance of official
functions with the Bangko Sentral, or is with prior
authorization of the Monetary Board or the Governor; or (2) the
use of such information for personal gain or to the detriment of
the Government, the Bangko Sentral or third parties: Provided,
however, That any data or information required to be submitted
to the President and/or the Congress, or to be published under
the provisions of this Act shall not be considered confidential.
Under RA 53, the publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter
of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation
cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news report or
information appearing in said publication which was related in
confidence to him, unless the court or a House or committee of
Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security
of the State.
Case:
IN THE MATTER OF FARBER (1978)

Neri v. Senate: for the claim of executive privilege to be

invoked, there must be a formal claim of the privilege, lodged
by the head of the department which has control of the matter,
and that a formal and proper claim of the privilege requires a
precise and certain reason for preserving confidentiality, but
Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for
the claim with such particularity as to compel the disclosure of
the information which the privilege is meant to protect.

SENATE V. ERMITA (2006)

Executive privilege: the power of the government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress

There are certain types of information which the government

may withhold from the public like military, diplomatic and
national security secrets.

Secrets involving military, diplomatic and national security

matters and information on investigations of crimes by law

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evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012 ysr
PART TWO
Section 32. Admission by silence. — An act or declaration
I. ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a
party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is
A. Admissions against Interest such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and
when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in
1. §§ 26 & 32, R130 evidence against him.
Section 26. Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in Requisites to be admissible against a party as an admission by
evidence against him. (22) silence:
1. He must have heard or observed the act or declaration of
ADMISSION: any statement of fact made by a party against the other person
his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he 2. He must’ve had the opportunity to deny it
contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. 3. He must’ve understood the statement
4. He must’ve had an interest to object, such that he would
Requisites for admission to be admissible: naturally have done so if the statement was not true
1. Involves matters of fact, not of law 5. The facts were within his knowledge
2. Categorical and definite 6. The fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his
3. Knowingly and voluntarily made silence is material to the issue
4. Adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be
self-serving and inadmissible The rule on admission by silence applies where a person was
surprised in the act (US v. Bay) or even if he is already in the
Self-serving declaration: one which has been made custody of the police (People v. Ancheta)
extrajudicially by the party to favor his interests. It is not · Voluntary participation in a reenactment of the crime
admissible in evidence. conducted by the police is considered a tacit admission of
complicity. (People v. Tia Fong)
Self-serving testimony: the extrajudicial statement of a party o However, for a reenactment to be given any
which is being urged for admission in court. It does not include evidentiary weight, the validity and efficacy of the
his testimony as a witness in court. It has no application to a confession must first be shown. (People v. Navoa)
court declaration.
· Where the statement was not made in anticipation of a The rule applies to adverse statements in writing if the party
future litigation, the same cannot be considered self-serving. was carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant.
However, if there was no such mutual correspondence, the rule
Flight from justice is an admission by conduct and is relaxed on the theory that while the party would’ve
circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt. Also, immediately reacted by a denial if the statements were orally
evidence of attempts to suppress evidence, as by destruction of made in his presence, such prompt response can generally not
documentary evidence or eloignment of witnesses, are be expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply.
admissible under the same rationale.
· Eloignment: causing the disappearance or non-availability
of witnesses The rule does not apply if the statements adverse to the party
were made in the course of an official investigation (US v. de
la Cruz)
Admission Confession
A statement of fact which A statement of fact which 2. §13, R132
does not involve an involves an acknowledgment of Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of
acknowledgment of guilt or guilt or liability inconsistent statements. — Before a witness can be impeached
liability by evidence that he has made at other times statements
May be express or tacit May Must be express inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be
be made by third persons Made only by the party related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places
and, in certain cases, are himself and, in some and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made
admissible against a party instances, are admissible such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the
against his co-accused statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness
before any question is put to him concerning them. (16)
Admission Declaration against
Need not be made against interest Made against the Leading question: one w/c suggests to the witness the answer
the party’s proprietary or proprietary or pecuniary desired.
pecuniary interest, although interest of the party
it will greatly enhance its Misleading question: one w/c assumes facts not in evidence or
probative weight if it be so w/o sufficient basis or w/c assumes testimony or proof w/c has
made not been given.
Made by the party himself Made by a person who is
and is a primary evidence A leading question propounded to a witness may, by reacting to
either deceased or unable to
and competent though he an inference in his mind, cause him to testify in accordance w/
testify
be present in court and the suggestion by the question; his answer
ready to testify
Made any time Made ante lite motam
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evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
may be ‘an echo of the question’ than a genuine recollection of
events. (Escoto v. Pineda)
Leading questions may be permitted in the examination of a
witness who is immature; aged & infirm; in bad physical
condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or unaccustomed to, court
proceedings; inexperienced; unsophisticated; feeble-minded;
confused & agitated; terrified; timid or embarrassed while on
the stand; lacking in comprehension of questions or slow to
understand; deaf & dumb; or unable to speak or understand the
English language or only imperfectly familiar therewith.
(People v. Dela Cruz)
Gen rule: a party who voluntarily offers the testimony of a
witness in the case is bound by the testimony of said witness.
Exceptions:
1. Hostile witness;
2. Where the witness is the adverse party or the
representative of a juridical person w/c is the adverse party; and
3. When the witness is not voluntarily offered but is required
by law to be presented by the proponent, as in the case of
subscribing witnesses to a will. (Fernandez v. Tantoco)
A party can impeach the adverse party’s witness by:
1. Contradictory evidence
2. Evidence of prior inconsistent statements
3. Evidence of bad character
4. Evidence of bias, interest, prejudice, or incompetence
A party can peach his own witness only by:
1. Evidence contradictory to his testimony
2. Evidence of prior inconsistent statements
In the case of hostile witnesses, adverse party witnesses or
involuntary witnesses, they can also be impeached by other
modes of impeachment, aside from contradictory statements
and prior inconsistent statements made by them.
Contradictory evidence: other testimony of the same witness,
or other evidence presented by him in the same case, but not
the testimony of another witness
Prior inconsistent statements: oral or documentary statements
made by the witness sought to be impeached on occasions other
than the trial in which he is testifying.
How to impeach a witness by prior inconsistent
statements: by laying the predicate
1. Confront him w/ such statements, w/ the
circumstances under w/c they were made;
2. Ask him whether he made such statements; and
3. Give him a chance to explain the inconsistency.
o Unless the witness is given the opportunity to
explain the discrepancies, the impeachment is
incomplete. (US v. Baluyot) However, such
defect in the impeachment of the witness is
deemed waived if no objection on that ground is
raised when the document involved is offered
for admission. (People v. Molo)
It is believed that if the prior inconsistent statement appears in
a deposition of the adverse party, and not a mere witness, that
adverse party who testifies may be impeached w/o laying the
predicate, as such prior statements are in the
32
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nature of admissions of said adverse party. Thus, under
R23.4(b), the deposition of an adverse party may be used by
any party for any purpose, i.e. as evidence for the latter or to
impeach or contradict said party deponent through inconsistent
statements therein.
Where a witness’ previous statements are offered as evidence
of an admission, and not merely to impeach him, the rule on
laying a predicate does not apply (Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v.
Hashim) and the same would apply to like statements of a party
to the case
Cases:
PHILIPPINE TRUST CO. V. ANTIGUA BOTICA RAMIREZ
(1932) Admission made in testimony was adverse to his interest
– considered judicial admission
PEOPLE V. PARAGSA (1978) [Sir: BAD DECISION]
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied
admission of the truth of statements uttered in his presence is
applicable in criminal cases.
· Requisites:
a. Must appear that party heard and understood the
statement
b. He was at liberty to interpose a denial
c. Statement was in respect to some matter affecting his
rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally,
for an answer
d. The facts were within his knowledge
e. The fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from
his silence would be material to the issue
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO (2001)
An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or
action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the
party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied
by the other person.
· Jones explains that the “basis for admissibility of
admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification
or adoption by the party of the statements which the other
person had made.”
· In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to
dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him
as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Exec. Sec. Angara
had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to
consider the option of “dignified exit or resignation.” Petitioner
did not object to the suggested option but simply said he could
never leave the country. Petitioner’s silence on this and other
related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him
RUFINA PATIS FACTORY V. ALUSITAIN (2004)
· Being an admission against interest, the documents are the
best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in
dispute. Rationale for rule – presumption that no man would
declare anything against himself unless such declaration was
true
· It does not matter that the admission was self-serving
when it was made, so long as it is against the party’s present
claim.
ESTATE OF JESUS S. YUJUICO V. REPUBLIC (2007)
A hydrographic map is not the best evidence to show the nature
and location of the lot subject of a land registration application;
it is derived from a hydrographic survey which is
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
mainly used for navigation purposes. [Ocular inspections trump
map]
B. Compromises
1. §1(f), R116
2. §§ 1 & 2, R118
The amendment regarding the inadmissibility of a plea of
guilty later withdrawn or an unaccepted offer to plead guilty to
a lesser offense is a consequence of the present provisions in
criminal procedure on plea bargaining. [§1(f), R116; §§ 1&2,
R118]
3. §27, R130
Section 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. — In civil
cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any
liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses
(criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromised by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a
plea of guilty to lesser offense, is not admissible in evidence
against the accused who made the plea or offer.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other
expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence
as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury.
CIVIL CASES
As a rule, an offer of compromise in a civil case is not a tacit
admission of liability and cannot be proved over the objection
of the offeror, unless such offer is clearly not only to “buy
peace” but amounts to an admission of liability, the offered
compromise being directed only to the amount to be paid. (El
Varadero de Manila vs. Insular Lumber)
CRIMINAL CASES
An offer of compromise is an implied admission of guilt,
although the accused may be permitted to prove that such offer
was not made under consciousness of guilt but merely to avoid
the risks of criminal action against him.
While rape cases can in effect be compromised by actual
marriage of the parties since criminal liability is extinguished,
an offer to compromise for a monetary consideration, and not
to marry the victim, is an implied admission of guilt.
An offer of marriage by the accused, during the investigation of
the rape case, is also an admission of guilt. (People v. Valdez)
People v. Manzano: the attempt of the parents of the accused to
settle the case with the complainant was considered an implied
admission of guilt – ?! Note: attempt to settle made during
trial. May fall under §29, R130
Criminal cases involving criminal negligence, or the quasi-
offenses contemplated in RPC 365, are allowed to be
compromised under the amendment to this section, hence an
offer of settlement is not an implied admission of guilt.
Good Samaritan doctrine
33
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An offer to pay or the actual payment of the medical, hospital
or other expenses by reason of the victim’s injuries is not
admissible to prove civil or criminal liability therefor.
4. §204, RA 8424, Tax Reform Act of 1997
In prosecutions for violation of the internal revenue laws, such
offers of compromise are not admissible in evidence as the law
provides that the payment of any internal revenue tax may be
compromised, and all criminal violations may likewise be
compromised, except those already filed in court and those
involving fraud.
5. §§ 2, 4, 6, & 10, PD No. 1508 Amicable settlement at
barangay level
Cases:
VARADERO V. INSULAR LUMBER (1924)
GEN RULE: offer of compromise is inadmissible
EXCEPTION: where amount named in the offer to accept a
certain sum in settlement appears to have been arrived at as a
fair estimate of value, it is relevant (thus admissible)
PEOPLE V. GODOY (1995)
Generally, an offer of compromise in a criminal case is
admissible as evidence against the party making it.
· However, the accused may show that the offer was made
merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or some
other reason justifying a claim that the offer was not an
admission of guilt
PEOPLE V. LAMBID (2003)
Plea for forgiveness is analogous to an attempt to compromise,
and an offer of compromise by accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt
BATULANON V. PEOPLE (2006)
Offer of compromise by accused may be received in evidence
as an implied admission of guilt in criminal cases EXCEPT in
cases involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those
allowed by law to be compromised.
C. Res Inter Alios Acta (§§ 28 & 34, R130)
Section 28. Admission by third party. — The rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, except as hereinafter provided. (25a)
First branch of the rule of “res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet”
Exceptions:
1. §29: Where the third person is a partner, agent, joint
owner, joint debtor or has a joint interest with the party
2. §30: Third person is a co-conspirator
3. §31: Third person is a privy of the party
Section 34. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one did
or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to
prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge; identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like. (48a)
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Second branch of res inter alios acta (first branch is R130 §
28: the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another)
· Applies to both civil and criminal cases
· Strictly enforced in all cases where applicable
GEN RULE: Evidence that one did or did not do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did
not do the same or similar thing at another time.
EXCEPTIONS: Where evidence of similar acts may
prove
a. a specific intent or knowledge
b. identity
c. a plan/system/scheme
d. a specific habit
e. established customs, usages, and the like
Evidence of another crime is admissible in a prosecution for
robbery where it has the tendency to identify the accused or
show his presence at the scene of the crime (People v. Irang,
People v. Liera)
Evidence of another crime is inadmissible where the
evidence is to prove that the accused committed another
crime wholly independent of that for which he is on trial.
(People v. Asinas)
RIANO:
The rule prohibits the admission of “propensity evidence,”
evidence that tends to show that what a person has done at one
time is probative of the contention that he has done a similar
act at another time. Evidence of similar acts or occurrences
compels the defendant to meet allegations not mentioned in the
complaint, confuses him in his defense, raises a variety of
relevant issues, and diverts the attention of the court from the
issues immediately before it. Hence, the evidentiary rule guards
against the practical inconvenience of trying collateral issues
and protracting the trial and prevents surprise or other mischief
prejudicial to litigants. (Cruz v. CA)
The admissibility of similar acts or previous conduct would
depend on the purposes for which such conduct or acts are
offered.
Cases:
ALVIZO V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2003)
Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. The existence
of the assent of minds involved in a conspiracy may be, and
from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the
court from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some
complete whole. Proof of conspiracy most frequently made by
evidence of a chain of circumstances only
PEOPLE V. GAUDIA (2004)
Alleged offer of compromise by defendant’s parents cannot
prejudice defendant per res inter alios acta
· their actions can’t affect him as he was not a party to said
conversation
· it was not shown that he was privy to the offer they made
to the victim’s mother
D. Exceptions to the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule 1.
Admission by a co-partner or agent
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a. §29, R130
Section 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. — The act or
declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of
his authority and during the existence of the partnership or
agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of
a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested
with the party.
Requisites for application:
1. That the partnership, agency, or joint interest is established
by evidence other than the act or declaration;
2. The act or declaration is within the scope of the
partnership, agency, or joint interest; and
3. Such act or declaration must have been made during the
existence of the partnership, agency, or joint interest
Refer to CC 1803 (on partners), 1910 (agents), 487 (co-
owners), and 1222 (solidary debtors).
As a rule, statements made after a partnership has been
dissolved do not fall within this exception.
· Where the admissions are made in connection w/ the
winding up of the partnership affairs, said admissions are still
admissible as the partner is acting as an agent of his co-partners
in said winding-up.
The phrase “joint debtor” should be understood according to its
meaning in the common law system from which the provision
was taken, that is, in solidum, and not mancomunada. (Jaucian
v. Querol)
b. §23, R138
Admissions by counsel are admissible against the client as the
former acts in representation and as an agent of the client,
subject to the limitation that the same should not amount to a
compromise (§23, R138) or confession of judgment. (Acenas v.
Sison)
Cases:
ACENAS V. SISON (1963)
Attorney for defendants agreed to judgment on confession
against his clients: records do not show that he had authority to
confess judgment – such must be clear. R127.21 of the old RoC
states that special authority is needed to compromise their
client’s litigation
PHIL. JOURNALISTS, INC. V. NLRC (2006)
A judgment approving a compromise agreement cannot have
the effect of res judicata upon non-signatories since the
requirement of identity of parties is not satisfied – the union has
no authority to compromise the individual claims of members
who didn’t consent to the settlement
2. Admission by conspirators (§30, R130)
Section 30. Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration
of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of
declaration. (27)
This rule applies only to extrajudicial acts or statements and not
to testimony given on the witness stand at the trial where
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
the party adversely affected thereby has the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. (People v. Serrano)
· The requirement that the conspiracy must preliminarily be
proved by evidence other than the conspirator’s admission
applies on to extrajudicial admissions. (People v. Nierra)
An admission by a conspirator is admissible against his co-
conspirator if:
1. Such conspiracy is shown by evidence aliunde;
2. The admission was made during the existence of the
conspiracy; and
3. The admission relates to the conspiracy itself.
Note: These are not required in admissions during the trial as
the co-accused can cross-examine the declarant (People v.
Serrano) and, besides, these are admissions after the conspiracy
has ended. (People v. Vizcarra)
Existence of conspiracy may be inferred from:
· The acts of the accused
· The confessions of the accused
· Prima facie proof thereof
Where there is no independent evidence of the alleged
conspiracy, the extrajudicial confession of an accused cannot
be used against his co-accused as the res inter alios acta rule
applies to both extrajudicial confessions and admissions.
(People v. Alegre)
Extrajudicial admissions made by a conspirator after the
conspiracy had terminated and even before trial are not
admissible against the co-conspirator, EXCEPT:
1. if made in the presence of the latter who expressly or
impliedly agreed therein as, in the latter case, it would be a tacit
admission under §32;
2. where the facts in said admission are confirmed in the
individual extrajudicial confessions made by the co-
conspirators after their apprehension;
3. as a circumstance to determine a witness’ credibility; or
4. as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of the
latter’s participation in the offense.
In order that the extrajudicial statements of a co-accused may
be taken into consideration in judging the testimony of a
witness, it is necessary that the statements are made by several
accused, the same are all in material respects identical, and
there could have been no collusion among said co-accused in
making such statements. (People v. Badilla)
Cases:
PEOPLE V. CABRERA (1974)
Statement not made during the existence of the alleged
conspiracy, but after said alleged conspiracy had already
ceased – rule on admission by conspirator can’t be availed of
PREAGIDO V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2005)
R130.27 applies only to extrajudicial acts or declarations, not to
testimony given on the witness stand at the trial where the
defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant
3. Admission by privies (§31, R130)
Section 31. Admission by privies. — Where one derives title to
property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the
latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former. (28)
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Requirements to be admissible:
1. Relation of privity between the party and the declarant
2. Admission was made by the declarant, as predecessor-in-
interest, while holding the title to the property
3. Admission is in relation to said property
Privity in estate may have arisen by succession by acts mortis
causa or by acts inter vivos.
RIANO:
“Privies”: persons who are partakers or have an interest in any
action or thing, or any relation to another
Cases:
CITY OF MANILA V. DEL ROSARIO (1905)
Where one derives title to real property from another, the
declaration/act/omission of the latter in relation to the property
is evidence against the former only when made while the latter
holds the title
REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN (2003)
The individual and separate admissions of each respondent
bind all of them pursuant to §§29 and 31, R130 of the Rules of
Court. The declarations of a person are admissible against a
party whenever a “privity of estate” exists between the
declarant and the party, the term “privity of estate” generally
denoting a succession in rights. Consequently, an admission of
one in privity with a party to the record is competent.
E. Confessions
1. §33, R130
Section 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any
offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence
against him. (29a)
Confession: a categorical acknowledgment of guilt made by an
accused in a criminal case, without any exculpatory statement
or explanation.
May be oral or in writing
· If in writing, it need not be under oath
The fact that the extrajudicial confession was made while the
accused was under arrest does not render it inadmissible where
the same was made and admitted prior to the 1973 Constitution.
May be judicial or extrajudicial
· Judicial confession: one made before a court in which the
case is pending and in the course of legal proceedings therein
and, by itself, can sustain a conviction even in capital offenses
· Extrajudicial confession: one made in any other place or
occasion and cannot sustain a conviction unless corroborated by
evidence of the corpus delicti (R133.3) o Any form of
coercion renders the extrajudicial
confession inadmissible
o The extrajudicial confession of an accused is binding
only upon himself and is not admissible against his
co-accused.
 EXCEPTIONS:
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
a. Co-accused impliedly acquiesced in or
adopted said confession by not questioning its truthfulness
b. Accused persons voluntarily and
independentlyexecutedidentical
confessions without conclusion (interlocking
confessions), corroborated by other evidence
and without contradiction by the co-accused
who was present
c. Accused admitted facts stated by
confessant after being apprised of such confession
d. They are charged as co-conspirators of the
crime confessed by one of the accused and said confession is
used only as corroborating evidence
e. Confession is used as circumstantial
evidence to show the probability of participation by the co-
conspirator
f. Confessant testified for his co-defendant
g. Co-conspirator’s extrajudicial confession is
corroborated by other evidence of record
Requirements for confession to be admissible:
1. Confession must involve an express and categorical
acknowledgment of guilt
2. Facts admitted must be constitutive of a criminal offense
3. Given voluntarily
· Confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The onus is
on the defense to prove that it was involuntary for having been
obtained by violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or
leniency
· Why involuntary confessions are inadmissible o
Unreliable
o Humanitarian considerations
o Legal considerations of their being violative of
the constitutional right against self-incrimination
4. Intelligently made
5. No violation of §12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution
· Waiver of right to counsel during custodial
investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel
· When the accused was merely told of his
constitutional rights and asked if he understood what he was
told, but he was never asked whether he wanted to exercise or
avail himself of such rights, his extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible.
· Where the verbal extrajudicial confession was made
without counsel, but spontaneously made by the accused
immediately after the assault, the same is admissible not under
the confession rule, but as part of the res gestae, aside from the
consideration that no custodial investigation was involved.
Inadmissible evidence termed as “fruit of the poisonous tree”
refers to object, not testimonial evidence; it also refers to an
object seized in the course of an illegal search and seizure. It
does not refer to testimony or a confession obtained through an
illegal arrest.
2. §3, R133
Section 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for
conviction. — An extrajudicial confession made by an accused,
shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (3)
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Refer to notes under previous part (R130.33).
Corpus delicti: the body or substance of the crime
The actual commission by someone of the particular crime
charged. It’s a common fact made up of 2 things: a) the
existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the
criminal charge, and b) the existence of a criminal agency as
the cause of the act or the result.
Proved when the evidence on record shows that the crime
prosecuted had been committed
A mere voluntary extrajudicial confession uncorroborated by
independent proof of the corpus delicti is insufficient to sustain
a judgment of conviction. There must be independent proof of
the corpus delicti. The evidence may be circumstantial but, just
the same, there should be some evidence substantiating the
confession. (US v. de la Cruz)
3. §§ 12 & 17, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
Art. III, Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. COMPIL (1995)
Right to counsel attaches upon the start of investigation (when
investigating officer asks questions to get info etc.). At such
point, the person being interrogated must be assisted by
counsel. The belated arrival of the lawyer, even if prior to the
signing of the uncounseled [extrajudicial] confession does not
cure the defect.
PEOPLE V. WANG CHUEN MING (1996)
Signatures of the accused on the boxes [they were made to sign
while at NAIA and again on bags when already taken in
custody], which are tantamount to uncounseled extrajudicial
confessions, are inadmissible as evidence for being
unconstitutional.
PEOPLE V. SUAREZ (1997)
Doctrine of interlocking confessions (EXCEPTION to RIAA
and hearsay rule
· Although an extrajudicial confession is admissible only
against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to
establish the guilt of his co-accused.
· Where confession is used as circumstantial evidence to
show the probability of participation by an accused co-
conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against
him.
PEOPLE V. BASE (2000)
Requirements for extrajudicial confession to be admissible:
a. Voluntary
b. Made with assistance of competent and independent
counsel
c. Express
d. In writing
PEOPLE V. ULIT (2004)
Statement made to barangay chairman is admissible in
evidence – defendant was not under arrest or under custodial
investigation when he gave his statement
· Barangay chair not a law enforcement officer for purposes
of applying §12(1 & 3), Art. III of Constitution
PEOPLE V. TOMAQUIN (2004)
A barangay captain who is also a lawyer cannot be considered
independent and competent counsel within §12(1 & 3), Art. III
of Constitution, as RPC152 deems a barangay captain as a
person in authority (therefore he can’t be independent in such
instance)
PEOPLE V. RAPEZA (2007)
A confession is admissible in evidence if it is satisfactorily
shown to ave been obtained w/in the limits imposed by the
Constitution. The extrajudicial confession must also be tested
for voluntariness (that is, if it was given freely by the
confessant w/o any form of coercion or inducement).
II. CONDUCT AS EVIDENCE
A. Similar acts/unaccepted offer
1. §§ 34 & 35, R130
Section 34. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one did
or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to
prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent
or knowledge; identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like. (48a)
Section 35. Unaccepted offer. — An offer in writing to pay a
particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument or
specific personal property is, if rejected without valid cause,
equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money,
instrument, or property. (49a)
This section is merely an evidentiary complement to the rule on
tender of payment.
2. CC 1256
CC 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been
made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be
released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or
sum due.
Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the
following cases:
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1) When the creditor is absent or unknown, or does not
appear at the place of payment;
2) When he is incapacitated to receive the payment at the
time it is due;
3) When, without just cause, he refuses to give a receipt;
4) When two or more persons claim the same right to collect;
5) When the title of the obligation has been lost. (1176a)
Such tender of payment must, however, be followed by
consignation of the amount in court in order to produce the
effects of valid payment. (McLaughlin v. CA)
Cases:
US V. PINEDA (1918)
GEN RULE: evidence of other offenses committed by a
defendant is inadmissible.
· AN EXCEPTION: it’s permissible to ascertain defendant’s
knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence.
o If defendant has on more than one occasion performed
similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly
excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent
intent may even be established. There’s no better
evidence of negligence than the frequency of
accidents.
PEOPLE V. ASINAS (1929)
GEN RULE: evidence is not admissible which shows or tends
to show that the accused in a criminal case has committed a
crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on
trial.
· One crime does not (tend to) prove another, UNLESS
there’s such a relation between them that proof of one tends to
prove the other.
PEOPLE V. IRANG (1937)
GEN RULE: evidence of another crime by a defendant is
inadmissible in a prosecution for robbery
EXCEPTION: when it’s otherwise relevant, as where it tends to
identify defendant as perpetrator of robbery charged, or tends to
show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at
the time charged, or when it’s evidence of a circumstance
connected with the crime
NICOLAS V. ENRIQUEZ (1955)
Where the previous sexual relations sought to be proved were
far removed in point of time from the illicit act [of
concubinage] now complained of, and took place when there
was as yet no legal impediment to the same, they give no
rational basis for the inference that they would be continued
after complainant’s marriage had created such impediment and
made continuance of sexual relations between defendants a
crime.
BOSTON BANK V. MANALO (2006)
The fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance
of the purchase price of lots purchased by them in 120 or 180
monthly installments does not constitute evidence that XEI also
agreed to give respondents the same mode and timeline of
payment.
III. HEARSAY RULE
A. Testimonial knowledge (§§ 36-47, R130)
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal
knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise
provided in these rules. (30a)
HEARSAY EVIDENCE RULE (R130.36)
Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the
witness stand.
Why hearsay evidence is excluded
The party against whom it is presented is deprived of his right
and opportunity to cross-examine the persons to whom the
statements or writings are attributed. Consequently, if a party
does not object to the hearsay evidence, the same is
admissible, as a party can waive his right to cross-examine.
(People v. Ola)
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a
fact in issue but when no objection is interposed thereto, it
is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the
importance it deserves. (Manliclic v. Calaunan) However,
it has also been held that hearsay evidence not objected to
may be admissible but, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value and, as opposed to direct primary
evidence, the latter always prevails. (People v. Valero,
People v. Williams)
Where the statements or writings attributed to a person not on
the witness stand are being offered not to prove the truth of the
facts stated therein but only to prove that those statements were
actually made or those writings were executed, such evidence
is not covered by the hearsay evidence rule. The witness who
testifies thereto is competent because he heard the same or saw
the execution of the document, as these are matters of fact
derived from his own perception and the purpose is only to
prove either that the statement was made or the tenor thereof.
(People v. Cusi Jr., Cornejo Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, Sebastian
Sr. v. Garchitorena)
Thus, a witness may testify to the statements made by a
person if, for instance, the fact that such statements were
made by the latter would indicate the latter’s mental state
or physical condition – doctrine of independently relevant
statements, that is, independent of whether the facts stated
are true or not, they are relevant since they are the facts in
issue or are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue.
Examples: those made by a person
- showing his state of mind (mental condition,
knowledge, belief, intention, ill will, and other emotion)
- which show his physical condition, as illness and the like
- from which an inference may be made as to the state of
mind of another (knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith,
etc. of the latter)
- which may identify the date, place, and person in
question
- showing the lack of credibility of a witness
(Estrada v. Desierto, Resolution on MR)
Newspaper clippings or facts published in the newspapers are
hearsay and have no evidentiary value unless substantiated by
persons with personal knowledge of said facts. (People v.
Aguel)
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RIANO:
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in
whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce
it (Estrada v. Desierto).
Although hearsay evidence presupposes lack of personal
knowledge of the truth of the fact asserted by a witness, the
purpose for which the evidence is offered is a vital element of
hearsay evidence. It is the purpose for which the evidence is
offered which would determine whether the same is hearsay
or not.
Hearsay, as defined by R801[c] of the Federal Rules of
Evidence: a statement (oral or written assertion or nonverbal
conduct intended by the person as an assertion), other than the
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
Elements of hearsay evidence
1. Out-of-court statement
· Implied from an out-of-court statement is the fact that
the witness has no personal knowledge of the matter testified
to.
2. Repeated and offered by the witness in court to prove the
truth of the matters asserted by the statement
· Where a statement is not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted but is offered for an evidentiary purpose not
dependent on the truth of the matters asserted, the statement is
non-hearsay.
Hearsay evidence Opinion evidence
One that is not based on Based on the personal
one’s personal perception knowledge or personal
but based on the knowledge conclusions of the witness
of others to prove the truth based on his skill, training, or
of the matter asserted in an experience (R130 §49)
out-of-court declaration
(R130 §36)
Where a statement is not offered for the truth of the contents of
the conversation, but only to show that it was made, then the
statement is not hearsay.
As long as an out-of-court statement is offered for a non-
hearsay purpose (a purpose other than to prove the truth of
the matter asserted), the statement is admissible if it has
relevance to the matter in issue.
Cases:
RICHMOND V. ANCHUELO (1905)
Defense witness told by defendant, “Plaintiff agreed to cure me
for PhP 200, no charge if successful” – this is hearsay (and as
such inadmissible), as the witness didn’t know that plaintiff
made such statements. All he knows is that defendant told him
that’s what plaintiff said.
LEA MER INDUSTRIES, INC. V. MALAYAN INSURANCE
CO., INC. (2005)
Unless the affiant is presented as a witness, an affidavit is
considered hearsay.
· EXCEPTION: independently relevant statements
 evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012 ysr
A report made by a person is admissible if it’s intended to 1. The proponent shall make known to the adverse party the
prove the tenor, not the truth, of the statements. intention to offer such statement and its particulars to
Independent of the truth or falsity of the statement given provide him a fair opportunity to object
in the report, the fact that it has been made is relevant. 2. If the child is available, the court shall, upon motion of the
adverse party, require the child to be present at the
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO presentation of the hearsay statement for cross-
The ban on hearsay does not include statements which are examination by the adverse party
relevant independently of whether they are true or not, like 3. When the child is unavailable (deceased, suffers from
statements of a person to show, among others, his state of physical infirmity, mental illness, loss of memory, or
mind, mental condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will, because the child will be exposed to severe psychological
and other emotions. injury), the fact of such circumstance must be proved by
the proponent and the hearsay testimony shall be admitted
Kinds of independently relevant statements: only if corroborated by other admissible evidence
a. Those statements which are the very facts in issue
b. Those statements which are circumstantial evidence of In this connection, the court is allowed to admit videotape and
the fact in issue audiotape in-depth or disclosure interviews as evidence,
i. Statements of a person showing provided it is shown that a) the child witness is unable to testify
his state of mind (mental condition, knowledge, per §28(c) of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness; and
belief, intention, ill will, and other emotions) b) the interview was conducted by duly trained members of a
ii. Statements of a person which multidisciplinary team or representatives of law enforcement or
show his physical condition, as illness and the like child protective services, in situations where child abuse is
iii. Statements of a person from suspected, so as to determine whether child abuse occurred.
which an inference may be made as to the state of
mind of another (knowledge, belief, motive, Aside from the above requirements, the ff. foundational matters
good/bad faith etc. of the latter) must be established:
iv. Statements which may identify a) the party offering the videotape or audiotape, must
the date, place and person in question disclose the identity of all individuals present and at all times
v. Statements showing the lack of includes their images and voices;
credibility of a witness b) that the statement was not made in response to questioning
calculated to lead the child to make a particular statement or is
B. Specific Exceptions clearly shown to be the statement of the child and not the
product of improper suggestion;
11 Exceptions to Hearsay Rule (R130.37-47) c) that the videotape and audiotape machine or device was
a. Dying declarations capable of recording testimony;
d) that the person operating the device was competent to
b. Declaration against interest operate it;
c. Act or declaration against pedigree e) that the videotape or audiotape is authentic and correct;
d. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree and
f) that the recording has been duly preserved. (§29. Rule on
e. Common reputation Examination of a Child Witness)
f. Part of the res gestae
g. Entries in the course of business 1. Dying declaration (R130.37)
Section 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying
h. Entries in official records
person, made under the consciousness of an impending death,
i. Commercial lists and the like may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of
j. Learned treatises inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
k. Testimony or deposition at a former trial (Regalado: circumstances of such death. (31a)
logically, this is not an exception to the hearsay rule, for it
requires for its admissibility that the party had either cross- 1) DYING DECLARATIONS
examined or had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at
said former trial) a.k.a. ante mortem statement or statement in articulo mortis

These exceptions are warranted by the necessity for such Requisites

evidence and/or the assumption that, in the ordinary course of 1. That death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of
events, the same are trustworthy. the fact

NOTE: §28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness A declaration will be deemed as having been made under
(AM No. 00-4-07-SC) – special exception to the hearsay the consciousness of imminent death, in consideration of:
rule in child abuse cases a) The words or statements of the declarant on the same
Hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted occasion;
act of sexual abuse may now be admitted in any criminal b) His conduct at the time the declaration was made (US v.
proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of Virrey); or
cross-examination by the adverse party. The admissibility of
such hearsay statements shall be determined by the court in
light of specified subjective and objective considerations which
provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child witness.

RIANO:
Requisites
39
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
c) The serious nature of his wounds as would necessarily
engender a belief on his part that he would not survive
therefrom (People v. Avila, People v. Sarabia), especially
where he died an hour thereafter (People v. Brioso, People v.
Garcia, People v. Araja).
The intervening time from the making of the declaration
up to the actual death of the declarant is immaterial, as
long as the declaration was made under the consciousness
of impending death (US v. Mallari) which is a question of
fact for the trial court to determine (People v. Extra), and
as long as no retraction was made by the declarant until
his demise. Where the gravity of the wound did not
diminish, the admissibility of the dying declaration is not
affected by the fact that the declarant died hours or days
later (People v. Devaras) or even 14 days later (People v.
Jacinto). It is the belief in impending death at the time the
statement was made, and not the rapid succession of
death, that renders the dying declaration admissible.
(People v. Sabio)
However, the time interval between the declaration and
the death of the declarant may be taken into account
where the declaration is ambiguous as to whether the
declarant believed that his death was imminent when
he made such declaration. Thus, where the declarant
stated that he would not die if treated, such statement
indicates an awareness of death and the nature of his
wound and his death an hour later qualifies such statement
into a dying declaration, or, at least, as part of the res
gestae (People v. Antonio).
Where, shortly after he was wounded, the victim was
asked as to whether he believed he would die and to
which he replied “I cannot ascertain” and he died the
following day, his statement is admissible both as
part of the res gestae and as a dying declaration.
(People v. Gueron)
Where the viction, when asked as to whether he
thought he would die, replied:
- “I don’t know,” his declaration was not made under
the consciousness of his imminent death and does not qualify
as an ante mortem statement, although the same was admitted
as part of the res gestae since it was made immediately after the
incident. (People v. Laquinon)
- “It all depends,” and his condition had
progressively improved, his statements thereafter cannot be
considered as a dying declaration. (People v. Lanza)
2. That the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death
Statements referring to the antecedents of the fateful
encounter (People v. Bustos) or opinions, impressions or
conclusions of the declarant (State v. Horn) are not
admissible; but all facts relating to the cause of such death
are admissible whether the same are in favor or against the
accused (US v. Clemente, US v. Antipolo, People v.
Martinez).
3. That the declaration relates to facts which the victim is
competent to testify to
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4. That the declaration is offered in a case wherein the
declarant’s death is the subject of inquiry
After a dying declaration is proved and admitted as such, its
credibility and weight should be determined by the courts
under the same rules used in testing the weight and credibility
of any other testimonial evidence. (People v. Aniel, People v.
Ola)
Such factors as where the facts narrated by the declarant
have occurred under circumstances of surprise, rapidity,
and confusion, should not be lost by oversight, because the
accuracy of his observation of the occurrences before him
could be blurred by such disorder and rapidity of events
and, therefore, he could be mistaken in his identification of
his assailant. Taking into consideration, too, that the
source, accuracy and completeness of the declarant’s
knowledge as to the facts by him asserted could not be
tested by cross-examination, a dying declaration has to be
accepted with utmost care and should be considered in
light of all the facts proved in the case. (People v. Mallare)
A dying declaration may be oral or written or made by
signs which could be interpreted and testified to by a
witness thereto. The [spouse] of the declarant may testify to
the same, either for the prosecution or as a defense witness, and
this does not violate the marital privilege as a dying declaration
is not considered a confidential communication between the
spouses (US v. Antipolo). If the ante mortem statement was
made orally, the witness who heard it may testify thereto,
without necessarily reproducing the exact words as long as he
can give the substance thereof, and if the deceased had an
unsigned dying declaration, the same may be used as a
memorandum by the witness who took it down (People v.
Odencio).
A dying declaration may be attacked on the ground that any of
the requisites for its admissibility are not present, and the same
may be impeached in the same manner as the testimony of any
other witness on the stand (US v. Castellon, People v. Malacon,
People v. Aniel). American jurisprudence is to the effect that
dying declarations are on the same footing as testimony of a
witness on the stand and whatever would disqualify such
witness would also make such declarations incompetent
evidence (People v. Sanchez, Donnelly v. State)
RIANO:
As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying
declaration is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to
utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death
would make a careless and false accusation. It is thus
admissible, to provide the identity of the accused and the
deceased, to show the cause of death of the deceased, and the
circumstances under which the assault was made upon him. The
reason for its admissibility is necessity and trustworthiness
(People v. Cerilla).
As presently worder, R130 §37 no longer places any limitation
on the type of action in which a dying declaration may be
introduced. As long as the relevance is clear, a dying
declaration may now be introduced in a criminal or a civil
action and the relevance is satisfied where the subject of inquiry
is the death of the declarant himself.
A mere consciousness of death is not enough… the declarant
must be conscious that the death is near and certain, and
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
what is said must have been spoken in the hush of its
impending presence.
Apart from the statements of the declarant, consciousness of an
impending death may be established by other circumstances
such as the nature of the injury and the conduct of the
declarant... the declarant’s belief that he is going to die soon
may be shown circumstantially by the obvious fatal quality of
the wound, by the statements made to the victim by the
physician that his condition is hopeless, or by some other
circumstances (People v. Silang Cruz, People v. Chan Lin
Watt)
A dying declaration may be attacked in the same manner as one
would do to a testimony in open court.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. SABIO (1981)
It is the belief in impending death at the time the statement was
made, and not the rapid succession of death, that renders the
dying declaration admissible.
PEOPLE V. LAQUINON (1985)
· When the deceased was in doubt as to W/N he would die,
his dying declaration is not admissible as an ante-mortem
declaration.
· A dying declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae
when the declarant’s statement was made immediately after the
incident and he had no sufficient time to concoct a charge
against the accused.
PEOPLE V. DE JOYA (1991)
To be admissible, a dying declaration must be complete in
itself – the statement of any given fact should be a full
expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his
meaning in respect of such fact.
PEOPLE V. COMILING (2004)
An ante-mortem statement is evidence of the highest order. It is
doctrinal that when a person is at the point of death, every
motive of falsehood is silenced.
MARTURILLAS V. PEOPLE (2006)
The fact that the victim’s statement constituted a dying
declaration does not preclude it from being admitted as part of
the res gestae, if the elements of both are present.
2. Declaration against interest (R130.38)
Section 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration
made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the
interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the declaration
was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be
received in evidence against himself or his successors in
interest and against third persons. (32a)
2) DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST
Requisites
1. Declarant is dead or unable to testify
2. The statement relates to a fact against the interest of the
declarant
3. At the time he made said declaration the declarant was
aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest
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4. Declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such
declaration to be true
Declarations against Admissions against
interest Those made by a interest Those made by a
person who is neither a party party to a litigation or by one
nor in privity with a party to in privity with or identified in
the suit. They are secondary legal interest with such party
evidence but constitute an
exception to the hearsay rule
Admissible only when the Admissible W/N the declarant
declarant is unavailable as a is available as a witness
witness
A declaration against interest is the opposite of a self-serving
declaration (a statement favorable to or intended to advance the
interests of the declarant). Consequently, a self-serving
declaration is inadmissible as being hearsay if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness.
A declaration admitting that he was the one who killed the
victim, made by a declarant who died shortly thereafter, is
admissible where another person was subsequently charged as
the killer of the same victim, under the theory that said
declaration was one against the penal interest of the declarant
(People v. Toledo and Holgado). This would be a justifiable
theory since under our penal laws a person criminally liable is
also civilly liable, and is sustained under the present amended
rule which does not delimit or distinguish as to the interest
against which the declaration is made.
RIANO:
As a rule, the interest against which the declaration may have
been made should be either a pecuniary or moral interest, but in
our jurisdiction, the declaration could be against one’s penal
interest because if one admits to a crime, he is also civilly
liable, a liability that is pecuniary (People v. Toledo).
Cases:
VIACRUCIS V. CA
Previous recognition by a party in physical possession of the
property in dispute of the ownership in another constitutes a
declaration against the interest of the former and may be
received in evidence not only against such party who made the
declaration or his successors in interest but also against third
persons.
FUENTES, JR. V. CA
Requisites of declaration against interest:
a. Declarant must not be available to testify
b. Declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the
declarant
c. Circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to
falsify existed
PAREL V. PRUDENCIO
The theory under which declarations against interest are
received in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that
the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such
evidence advisable and, further that the reliability of such
declaration asserts facts against his own pecuniary or moral
interest.
3. Pedigree (R130.39)
Section 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or
declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth
or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred
before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the
places where these fast occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree. (33a)
3) ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE
The pedigree of a person may be proved by the act or
declaration of a relative
Requisites
1. The actor or declarant is dead or unable to testify
2. The act or declaration is made by a person related to the
subject by birth or marriage
3. The relationship between the declarant or actor and the
subject is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration
Relationship must be preliminarily proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence. The rules do not require any
specific degree of relationship, but the weight to which
such act or declaration is entitled may be affected by the
degree of relationship.
4. The act or declaration was made ante litem motam, or
prior to the controversy
RIANO:
The declaration about pedigree may be received in evidence if
the relationship is shown by evidence other than the
declaration.
Cases:
GRAVADOR V. MAMIGO
· Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the
date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he had learned
it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case
in an assertion of a family tradition.
· Made ante lite motam by a deceased relative, [declaration
in verified pleading as to petitioner’s age] is at once a
declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and
meaning of [R130.39]
TISON V. CA
GEN RULE: where the party claiming seeks recovery against a
relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from
the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate, the relationship
of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by
the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of
this fact.
EXCEPTION: requirement of other proof than declarant’s
statements as to relationship does not apply where it is sought
to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to
establish a right through his declarations to the property of
some other family member.
4. Family tradition (R130.40)
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.
— The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to
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the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity
or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or
charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may
be received as evidence of pedigree. (34a)
4) FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING
PEDIGREE
Requisites
1. The witness testifying thereto must be a member, by
consanguinity or affinity, of the same family as the subject
2. Such reputation or tradition must have existed in that
family ante litem motam
A person’s statement as to his date of birth and age, as he
learned of these from his parents or relatives, is an ante
litem motam declaration of a family tradition (Gravador v.
Mamigo). Such statement prevails over the mere opinion
of the trial judge (US v. Agadas) but cannot generally
prevail over the secondary statement of the father (US v.
Evangelista).
Cases:
FERRER V. DE I NCHAUSTI
The law does not require that the entries in [deceased’s
daybook] be made at the same time as the occurrence of those
events; hence, the written memorandum in the same is not
subject to the defect attributed to it.
PEO PLE V. ALEGADO
The word “pedigree” under R130.39 includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and
the places where these facts occurred and the names of the
relatives.
Requisites before evidence on pedigree will be admissible:
a. Controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the
members of a family
b. That the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the
person concerned existed previous to the controversy
c. The witness testifying to the reputation or tradition
regarding the pedigree of the person must be a member of the
family of said person
5. Common reputation (R130.41)
Section 41. Common reputation. — Common reputation
existing previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public
or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting
marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence.
Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received
as evidence of common reputation. (35)
5) COMMON REPUTATION
General reputation; the definite opinion of the community in
which the fact to be proved is known or exists; the general or
substantially undivided reputation, as distinguished from a
partial or qualified one, although it need not be unanimous.
Character Reputation
The inherent qualities of a The opinion of him by others
person
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Under R130 §41, the character of a person is permitted to be
established by his common reputation.
Admissible to prove the ff. cases (NOTE: In any of the three
cases, it is necessary that the common reputation existed
ante litem motam.):
1. Facts of public or general interest more than 30 years old
Matters of public interest Matters of general interest
Those of national interest Those affecting inhabitants of
a particular region or
community
The common reputation of such matters, which is required to
have existed ante litem motam, must likewise be >30 years old
and, therefore, can be established only by persons who have
had knowledge of that fact for such length of time, or by
monuments and inscriptions existing for that length of time.
2. Marriage
3. Moral character
Common reputation may be established either by the
testimonial evidence of competent witnesses, by monuments
and inscriptions in public places, or by documents containing
statements of reputation.
While, as a rule, the reputation of a person should be that
existing in the place of his residence, it may also be that
existing in the place where he is best known. Also, the
character of a place as an opium joint may be proved by its
common reputation in the community. (US v. Choa Chiok)
Common reputation is hearsay like any other exception to the
hearsay rule, but is admissible because of trustworthiness (Reg.
v. Bedfordshire)
While common reputation in the community may establish a
matter of public or general interest, marriage or moral
character, it cannot establish pedigree. This is established by
reputation in the family and not in the community.
Case:
CITY OF MANILA V. DEL ROSARIO
[V’s testimony, w/c consisted of what he had learned from
some of the oldest residents in that section of the city] was
introduced by the City of Manila apparently for the purpose of
proving that the city was generally considered the owner of the
land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual
ownership. Such testimony, however, does not constitute the
“common reputation” referred to. Common reputation is
equivalent to universal reputation.
6. Res gestae (R130.42)
Section 42. Part of res gestae. — Statements made by a person
while a starting occurrence is taking place or immediately prior
or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part
of the res gestae. (36a)
6) PART OF RES GESTAE
Res gestae: literally means “things done”
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Refers to
a) Spontaneous statements in connection with a startling
occurrence relating to that fact and in effect forming part
thereof
Requisites
1. The principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence
2. The statements forming part thereof were made
before the declarant had the opportunity to contrive
3. The statements refer to the occurrence in question and
its attending circumstances (People v. Siscar).
Further, only such statements as appear to have been
involuntarily and simultaneously wrung from the witness by
the impact of the occurrence are admissible. (People v.
Tulagan)
Res gestae in connection Dying declarations
with a homicidal act
May be that of the killer Can be made only by the
himself after or during the victim
killing (People v. Reyes)
or that of a third person
The statement may precede, Made only after the
accompany, or be made after homicidal attack has been
the homicidal act was committed
committed
Justification in the spontaneity Trustworthiness of
of the statement declaration based upon its
being given under an
awareness of impending
death
While the victim’s statements may not qualify as a dying
declaration because it was not made under the consciousness of
impending death (People v. Palamos), it may still be admissible
as part of the res gestae if it was made immediately after the
incident (People v. Reyes, People v. Abboc, People v. Pascual,
People v. Araja) or a few hours thereafter (People v. Tumalip,
People v. Lanza, cf. People v. Balbas). However, where the
elements of both are present, the statement may be admitted
both as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae (People
v. Balbas, People v. Cortezano).
The interval of time between the startling occurrence and the
statement depends upon the circumstances; but such statement
must have been made while the declarant was under the
immediate influence of the startling occurrence, hence it is
generally required to have been made immediately prior or
subsequent to the event. However, if the declarant was rendered
unconscious after the startling occurrence, his statements
relative thereto upon regaining consciousness are still part of
the res gestae regardless of the time that intervened in between.
If the statement was made under the influence of a startling
event and the declarant did not have the opportunity to concoct
or contrive a story, even if made 9 hours after the killing, the
statement is admissible as part of the res gestae (People v.
Berame).
Statements or outcries as part of the res gestae have been
admitted to establish the identity of the assailant (People v.
Alban, People v. Diva), to prove the complicity of another
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
person in the crime (US v. David), and to establish an
admission of liability on the part of the accused (People v.
Reyes, People v. Gondayao).
RIANO:
The admissibily of a spontaneous statement is anchored on the
theory that the statement was uttered under circumstances
where the opportunity to fabricate is absent. The statement is a
reflex action rather than a deliberate act, instinctive rather than
deliberate.
b) Statements accompanying an equivocal act, otherwise
known as verbal acts, on the theory that they are the verbal
parts of the act to be explained.
Requisites
1. The res gestae or principal act to be characterized must be
equivocal
2. Such act must be material to the issue
3. The statements must accompany the equivocal act
4. The statements give a legal significance to the equivocal
act
Such verbal acts must have been made at the time, and not
after, the equivocal act was being performed unlike
spontaneous exclamations which may have been made before,
during or immediately subsequent to the startling occurrence.
Term “verbal act” is used to denote that such statements
are the verbal parts of the equivocal act of which such
statements are explanatory, hence they constitute part of
this form of res gestae.
Notes taken regarding a transaction by a person who is not a
party thereto and who has not been requested to take down
such notes are not part of the res gestae. (Borromeo v. CA)
RIANO:
Objections to the admissibility of verbal acts depend upon W/N
the proponent has established the foundations for admissibility.
The objector has to consider the ff:
1. Is there an act that is equivocal or ambiguous?
2. Will the statement accompanying the ambiguous or
equivocal act explain the act or give legal significance to it?
3. Is the equivocal act material to the issue?
4. Does the statement accompany the equivocal act?
Cases:
PEOPLE V. LUNGAYA N
Complainant’s revelation cannot be considered as part of the
res gestae – her statement must be spontaneous and made at a
time when there was no opportunity for her to concoct her own
story.
PEOPLE V. LATAYADA
The utterances separately made by the victim to each of the
witnesses were correctly appreciated as part of the res gestae,
since they had been made immediately after a startling
occurrence and had complied w/ the ff. requirements:
a. Statements were spontaneous;
b. Made immediately before, during, and after the startling
occurrence; and
c. They related the circumstances thereof.
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DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED COMPANIES V. RMN
The rule in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did
not testify and provided that the testimony of the witness who
heard the declarant complies w/ the ff. requisites:
a. The principal act (res gestae) is a startling occurrence;
b. Statements were made before the declarant had the time to
contrive or devise a falsehood; and
c. The statements must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediate attending circumstances.
7. Entries in the course of business (R130.43)
Section 43. Entries in the course of business. — Entries made
at, or near the time of transactions to which they refer, by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to
know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty. (37a)
7) ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS
Requisites
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, out of the
country or unable to testify
2. Entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer (Figueras v. Serrano)
3. Entrant was in a position to know the fact stated in the
entries
4. Entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral,
or religious (US v. de Vera)
5. Entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty (FM Yap Tico & Co., Ltd. v. Lopez Vito,
Chapman v. Garcia)
If the entrant is available as a witness, the said entries will not
be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, but they may
nevertheless be availed of by said entrant as a memorandum to
refresh his memory while testifying on the transactions
reflected therein. (R132 §16; Cang Yui v. Gardner)
In the presentation and admission as evidence of entries made
in the regular course of business, there is no overriding
necessity to bring into court all the clerks or employees who
individually made the entries in a long account. It is sufficient
that the person who supervises the work of the clerks or other
employees making the entries testify that the account was
prepared under his supervision and that the entries were
regularly entered in the ordinary course of business (Yek Tong
Fire & Marine Insurance v. Gutierrez)
RIANO:
The exception is commonly encountered in breach of contract
suits and suits for collection of a sum of money.
Rules on Electronic Evidence also expressly exempt business
records from the hearsay rule (R8 §1).
Entries in the payroll, being entries in the ordinary course of
business, enjoy the presumption of regularity under R130 §43
(Sapio v. Undaloc Construction)
Cases:
CANQUE V. CA
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Requisites for corporate books to be admitted in evidence <see
notes above>
SADAGNOT V. REINIER PACIFIC INT ’L SHIPPING
The ship’s logbook is the official record of a ship’s voyage w/c
its captain is obligated by law to keep. The entries made in the
ship’s logbook by a person performing a duty required by law
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the logbook.
8. Official records (R130.44)
Section 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official
records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer
of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. (38)
8) ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS
Requisites
1. The entries were made by a public officer in the
performance of his duties or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law (Africa v.
Caltex)
2. Entrant had personal knowledge of the facts stated by him
or such facts were acquired by him from reports made by
persons under a legal duty to submit the same (Salmon,
Dexter & Co. v Wijangco)
3. Such entries were duly entered in a regular manner in the
official records
An official record may be a register (US v. Que Ping), a cash
book (US v. Asensi), or an official return or certificate (Manalo
v. Robles Trans)
Entries in official records Entries in the course of
business
The entrant, if a private It is sufficient that the entrant
individual, must have acted made the entries pursuant to a
pursuant to a specific legal duty, either legal,
duty (“specially enjoined by contractual, moral, or
law”) religious
No such requirement for the To be admissible, the person
admissibility of entries in who made such entries must
official records be dead or unable to testify
Baptismal certificates or parochial records of baptism are not
public or official records and are not proof of relationship or
filiation of the child baptized (Fortus v. Novero, Arde v.
Anicoche).
The entrant must have been competent with respect to the
facts stated in his entries. Consequently, while the priest
who officiates at a baptism acts pursuant to a legal duty in
recording the facts of such baptism in a register, such
entries in the register are not admissible to prove the date
of birth of the child or its relation to particular persons
(Remigio v. Ortiga), as the entrant priest was not
competent to testify with respect to the truth of these latter
facts.
After the promulgation of GO No. 58 and the passage of Act No.
190, church registries are no longer public writings. However, they
are admissible as evidence of the facts stated therein WRT
marriages solemnized by the priest without the necessity of calling
him. CC 68 requires the solemnizing officer to keep a record of
such marriages. It is necessary, however,
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that such records or certificates should be authenticated as
private writings (US v. de Vera). At any rate, the copy of the
certificate transmitted to the public officer as required by law
becomes a public document and a certified copy thereof is
admissible in evidence without prior authentication (US v.
Evangelista).
Cases:
US V. QUE PING
Exhibits in the nature of entries in public records, made in the
performance of their duty by public officers, are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. Such documents, however,
are not conclusive evidence. Their probative value may either
be substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence.
PEOPLE V. SAN GABRIEL
Entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are
only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. They are
not conclusive.
ESCOBAR V. LUNA
Certifications issued by government offices (and certified to by
authorized personnel who were clothed with authority and duty
to issue such certifications), without testimony of the person
giving the certification, is sufficient and competent evidence
w/c is an exception to the hearsay rule per R130.44. This
section should be read in conjunction w/ R132.28 which allows
the admission of said document.
9. Commercial lists (R130.45)
Section 45. Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of
statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other
published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the
truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them therein. (39)
9) COMMERCIAL LISTS AND THE LIKE
Examples: mortality tables, accepted actuarial and annuity
tables
Case:
PNOC SHIPPING V. CA
Requisites for commercial lists:
a. It’s a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in
an occupation;
b. Such statement is contained in a list, registet, periodical or
other published compilation;
c. Said compilation is published for the use of persons
engaged in that occupation; and
d. It’s generally used and relied upon by persons in the same
occupation.
10. Learned treatises (R130.46)
Section 46. Learned treatises. — A published treatise,
periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or
art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated
therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in
the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the
treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession
or calling as expert in the subject. (40a)
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
10) LEARNED TREATISES
Requisites
1. Court takes judicial notice thereof; OR
2. The same are testified to by an expert witness
Legal treatises are now properly included in this exception to
the hearsay rule.
RIANO:
History books, published findings of scientists fall within this
exception if an expert on the subject testifies to the expertise of
the writer or if the court takes judicial notice of such fact.
Case:
ESTRADA V. NOBLE
The Ballantine Scale of Values, w/c was embodied in a bill the
President sent to Congress for enactment in 1945, has been
repeatedly applied by Philippine courts in numerous cases. It is,
therefore, an official document whose publication constituted a
leading event of general interest and whose provisions are
widely known and have played an important part in the
contemporary political history of the country, of which courts
could take judicial cognizance.
11. Prior testimony (R130.47)
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.
— The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable
to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter,
may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him. (41a)
11) TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER
PROCEEDING
Requisites
1. Witness is dead or unable to testify (Guevara v. Almario)
2. His testimony or deposition was given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same
parties or those representing the same interests
3. The former case involved the same subject as that in the
present case, although on different causes of action
4. The issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is
the same issue involved in the present case
5. The adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness in the former case
Subsequent failure or refusal to appear at the second trial, or
hostility since testifying at the first trial, does not amount to
inability to testify. Such inability should proceed from a grave
cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old
and has lost the power of speech. Where the witnesses in
question are available, but they refused to testify, they do not
come within the legal purview of those “unable to testify”
contemplated in R130 §47 (Tan v. CA, Toledo Jr. v. People)
The admissibility of a prior judgment, and not the previous
testimony, in a criminal action is governed by different rules. A
judgment in a criminal proceeding …cannot be read in
evidence in a civil action against a person not a party thereto to
establish any fact therein determined. The matter is res inter
alios and cannot be invoked as res judicata (Almeida
Chantangco v. Abaroa). Such judgment may only be admitted
in evidence in a civil case by way of inducement, or to show a
collateral fact relevant to the issue in the civil action
46
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(Ed. A. Keller & Co. [Ltd.] v. Ellerman & Bucknall, City of
Manila v. Manila Electric)
Said judgment cannot, in a civil action arising from the
commission of a crime, or in which the commission of said
crime is collateral, be admitted to prove plaintiff’s cause of
action, or defendant’s defense, and whatever findings of fact
are made by the TC in the decision are not binding upon the
parties to the civil action. The judgment can only prove that a
certain defendant has been convicted of a crime and sentenced
to the penalty therein imposed (Arambulo v. Manila Electric).
Whatever informal expressions of views were made by the
court therein have no probative value. They amount to nothing
more than an order for judgment, which is not part of the
judgment (Rebullida v. Estrella)
Judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence
in the civil action to establish any fact therein determined even
though both actions involve the same act or omission. The
reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and
different rules of evidence are applicable to each case
(Manantan v. CA, citing Almeida Chantangco v. Abaroa)
However, it was subsequently held that a judgment of
conviction, in the absence of collusion between the
accused and the offended party, is binding and conclusive
upon the person subsidiarily liable not only with regard to
his subsidiary liability but also with regard to the amount
thereof (Miranda v. Malate Garage). Said judgment is
accordingly admissible in evidence in the civil action
brought to enforce said subsidiary liability (cf. Pajarito v.
Señeres)
Cases:
SALES V. SABINO
As a rule, the inadmissibility of testimony taken by deposition
is anchored on the ground that such testimony is hearsay, i.e.,
the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-
examine the deponent at the time his testimony is offered.
· But as jurisprudence teaches, it matters not that
opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the
taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for
cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time the
testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during
the trial or hearing.
· In fine, the act of cross-examining the deponent during the
taking of the deposition cannot, without more, be considered a
waiver of the right to object to its admissibility as evidence in
the trial proper. In participating, therefore, in the taking of the
deposition, but objecting to its admissibility in court as
evidence, petitioner did not assume inconsistent positions. He is
not, thus, estopped from challenging the admissibility of the
deposition just because he participated in the taking thereof.
MANLICLIC V. CALAUNAN
Though R130.47 speaks only of testimony and deposition, it
does not mean that documents from a former case or
proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be
admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that
have been admitted.
IV. OPINION RULE
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
A. R130.48-50
Section 48. General rule. — The opinion of witness is not
admissible, except as indicated in the following sections. (42)
Section 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a
witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he shown to posses, may be
received in evidence. (43a)
Section 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. — The opinion of a
witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in
evidence regarding —
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate
knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity;
and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion,
behavior, condition or appearance of a person.
GEN RULE (R130.48): witness’ opinion is inadmissible
EXCEPTIONS
1. Opinion of expert witnesses on matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he possesses
(R130.49)
2. Opinion of ordinary witnesses (R130.50) re:
a. Identity of person about whom he has adequate
knowledge
b. Handwriting he is sufficiently familiar w/
c. Mental sanity of person he’s sufficiently acquainted
w/
d. Emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a
person he has observed
e. Ordinary matters known to all men of common
perception, such as the value of ordinary household articles
(Galian v. State Assurance Co., Ltd.)
Expert witness
One who belongs to the profession or calling to which the
subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special
knowledge on questions on w/c he proposes to express an
opinion.
· There’s no definite standard of determining the degree of
skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to
testify as an expert.
· Following factors must be present:
a. Training and education
b. Particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the
case
c. Presentation of authorities or standards upon which
his opinion is based
When expert evidence is admissible
1. the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise,
and
2. the witness has been qualified as an expert.
GEN RULE: expert evidence regarded as purely advisory in
character
Hypothetical questions may be asked of an expert to elicit his
opinion. Courts, however, are not necessarily bound by the
expert’s findings.
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· W/N courts are bound by the testimony of an expert
depends greatly upon the nature of the subject of inquiry. It’s
only where the subject of inquiry is of such a technical nature
that a layman can possibly have no knowledge thereof that
courts must depend and rely upon expert evidence.
The value of expert testimony depends largely on the extent of
the experience or studies of the witness.
The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends upon
the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing
marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between
genuine and false specimens of writing w/c would ordinarily
escape detection by an untrained observer.
The results of blood grouping tests on the filiation of a child,
competently conducted by qualified persons, are admissible and
conclusive on the non-paternity of a person over the child.
The testimony of a witness skilled in the unwritten law of a
foreign country is not necessarily binding on our courts.
B. R132.22
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. — The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge. (23a)
This section merely enumerates the methods of proving
handwriting but does not give preference or priority to a
particular method.
C. Rule on DNA Evidence
People v. Vallejo adopted the ff. guidelines to be used by
courts in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence:
1. how samples were collected;
2. how they were handled;
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples;
4. procedure followed in analyzing the samples;
5. whether the proper standards and procedure were followed
in conducting the tests; and
6. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the test.
The present rule recognizes the validity of and gives official
recognition to DNA test results arising from properly conducted
standards and procedures in the collection, handling, and
analysis of the samples by a qualified analyst.
TCs should require at least 99.9% as the minimum numerical
estimate for the likelihood or probability of paternity.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. DURANAN
If the mother of an offended party in a rape case knows the
party’s physical and mental condition, how she was born, what
she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, she
 evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
is competent to testify on the matter even though she is not a
psychiatrist.
· A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the
(in)sanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings
he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any
fact bearing upon his mental condition, w/ the witness’ own
knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such
conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the
basis for his opinion.
ILAO - QUIANAY V. MAPILE
Courts are not bound by expert testimonies. The problem of the
evaluation of expert testimony is left to the discretion of the
trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the
absence of an abuse of that discretion.
PEOPLE V. UMANITO
· DNA print or identification technology is recognized as a
uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to
absolve one erroneously accused, where biological evidence is
available.
· The determination of whether Umanito is the father of
AAA’s child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing,
is material to the fair and correct adjudication of the instant
appeal. Under §4 of the New Rule on DNA Evidence, the courts
are authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order
a DNA testing.
V. CHARACTER AS EVIDENCE
A. R130.51
Sec. 51. Character evidence not generally
admissible; exceptions: —
(a) In Criminal Cases:
1) The accused may prove his good moral character
which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged.
2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his
bad moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved
in the offense charged.
3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party
may be proved if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability of
the offense charged.
(b) In Civil Cases: Evidence of the moral character of a party
in civil case is admissible only when pertinent to the issue
of character involved in the case.
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Section 14, (46a, 47a)
Rules on admissibility of character evidence
1. Criminal cases
· Prosecution may not at the outset prove the accused’s
bad moral character w/c is pertinent to the moral trait involved in
the offense charged. However, if the accused in his defense
attempts to prove his good moral character, prosecution can
introduce evidence of such bad moral character at the rebuttal
stage.
· The offended party’s good or bad moral character may
always be proved by either party as long as such evidence tends to
establish the (im)probability of the offense charged.
2. Civil cases
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Either party’s moral character cannot be proved UNLESS it’s
pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case
3. Both civil and criminal cases
A witness’ bad moral character may always be proved by
either party, but not evidence of his good character, unless
it has been impeached.
WRT the nature or substance of the character evidence w/c may
be admissible, the rules require that:
· As to the ACCUSED, such character evidence must be
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged (ex.
In estafa or perjury, where a person’s moral trait for honesty or
probity is involved)
· As to OFFENDED PERSON, it’s sufficient that such
character evidence may establish in any reasonable degree the
(im)probability of the offense charged
· As to WITNESSES, such character evidence must refer to
his general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity, that is, as
affecting his credibility
EXCEPTION: Proof of murder victim’s bad character is
inadmissible if the crime was committed through treachery or
premeditation, in the same manner that the rape victim’s bad
moral character is inadmissible if the crime was committed by
violence or intimidation.
RIANO:
Character: the aggregate of the moral qualities w/c belong to
and distinguish an individual person; the general results of
one’s distinguishing attributes.
B. R132.14
Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of witness. — Evidence of
the good character of a witness is not admissible until such
character has been impeached. (17)
C. §6, RA 8505
Section 6. Rape Shield. - In prosecutions for rape, evidence of
complainant's past sexual conduct, opinion thereof or of his/her
reputation shall not be admitted unless, and only to the extent
that the court finds, that such evidence is material and relevant
to the case.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. BABIERA
While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he
acted in self-defense, he may prove the deceased to have been
of a quarrelsome, provoking and irascible disposition, the proof
must be of his general reputation in the community and not of
isolated and specific acts.
PEOPLE V. SOLIMAN
While good or bad character may be availed of as an aid to
determine the probability or improbability of the commission of
an offense, such is not necessary in murder, where the killing is
committed through treachery of premeditation. The proof of
such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show
"that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in
the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a
prompt defensive action was necessary."
PEOPLE V. CHENG
Loose morals per se is not a ground to discredit a witness.
There must be clear indications militating against her
credibility other than her being a person of ill repute.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012 ysr
CSC V. BELAGAN
· Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in her own behalf, opened herself to character or reputation attack
pursuant to the principle that a party who becomes a witness in his own behalf places himself in the same position as any other witness,
and may be impeached by an attack on his character or reputation.
· Settled is the principle that evidence of one’s character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in
question.[24] In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto,
but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit.

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evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012 ysr
PART THREE The burden of proof is fixed by the pleadings. The plaintiff’s
claim w/c he must prove is spelled out in his complaint.
I. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS Defendant’s defenses which he must likewise prove are found
in his answer to the complaint. The burdens of proof of both
A. Burden of proof (R131.1) parties do not shift during the course of the trial.
Section 1. Burden of proof. — Burden of proof is the duty of a Ex. Burden of proof to establish that defendant owes plaintiff
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to remains w/ the latter; burden of proof to establish that the
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence loan has been paid remains w/ defendant throughout the
required by law. (1a, 2a) litigation

Burden of proof: onus probandi Equipoise rule

Obligation imposed upon a party who alleges the existence of Refers to a situation where the parties’ pieces of evidence are
facts necessary for the prosecution of his action or defense to evenly balanced or there’s doubt on which side the evidence
establish the same by the requisite quantum of evidence. preponderates. In such case, the decision should be against the
party w/ the burden of proof.
Where burden of proof is on the plaintiff and the evidence does
Quantum of evidence required:
not suggest that the scale of justice should weigh in his
· Civil cases: preponderance of evidence
favor court should render verdict for defendant.
· Criminal cases: evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt In a criminal case, the equipoise rule provides that where the
· administrative cases: substantial evidence (only such evidence is evenly balanced, the constitutional
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the
sufficient to support a conclusion) accused.
NOT APPLICABLE where the evidence presented is not
equally weighty, such as where prosecution evidence is
Burden of proof Burden of evidence overwhelming
Doesn’t shift – remains Shifts from party to party
throughout the trial w/ depending upon the Cases:
the party upon whom exigencies of the case in the
it’s imposed course of the trial Generally PEOPLE V. PAJENADO
Generally determined by determined by developments In criminal cases burden of proof as to offense charged lies w/
pleadings filed by a party at the trial, or by the prosecution, and a negative fact must be proved if it is an
provisions of the substantive essential ingredient of the crime – burden of proof w/
law or procedural rules w/c prosecution to prove that the firearm used by the accused in
may relieve the party from committing the offense charged was not properly licensed.
presenting evidence on the
fact alleged (i.e. SAMBAR V. LEVI STRAUSS & CO.
presumptions, judicial notice In civil cases, the burden of proof may be on either the plaintiff
& admissions) or the defendant. It is on the latter, if in his answer he alleges
an affirmative defense, which is not a denial of an
In both civil and criminal cases, the burden of evidence lies w/ essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but is one
the party asserting an affirmative allegation. Negative which, if established, will be a good defense – i.e., an
allegations don’t have to be proved except where such are “avoidance” of the claim, which prima facie, the plaintiff
essential parts of the COA or defense in a civil case, or are already has because of the defendant’s own admissions in the
essential ingredients of the offense in a criminal case or the pleadings.
defenses thereto. (Industrial Finance v. Tobias)
PEOPLE V. MACALABA
GEN RULE: prosecution has burden of proving the criminal GEN RULE: if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative
charge if it’s predicated on a negative allegation or that a allegation, or that a negative averment is an essential element
negative averment is an essential element of a crime of a crime, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
charge.
What need not be proved
1. Facts w/c are of judicial notice (R129) EXCEPTION: Where the negative of an issue does not permit
2. Facts w/c are judicially admitted (R129) of direct proof, or where the facts are more immediately within
3. Facts w/c are presumed (R131) the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon
· Presumption: an inference of the existence or non- him.
existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from the
proof of other facts PEOPLE V. FLORENDO
a. Presumptions of fact: derived wholly and The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an
directly from the circumstances of the particular case by means exempting circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and
of the common experience of mankind convincing evidence.
b. Presumptions of law: reduced to fixed rules and
form a part of the system of jurisprudence o RUDECON MGMT. CORP. V. CAMACHO
Conclusive/absolute presumptions In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against
o Disputable/rebuttable presumptions lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant
evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.
RIANO:

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 evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE V. TRANS - ASIA SHIPPING
In the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a
prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence
shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s prima facie case,
otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff.
B. Presumptions (R131.2-4)
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are
instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led to another to believe
a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in
any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be
permitted to falsify it:
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord
at the time of commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them. (3a)
Pars. a & b: estoppel in pais.
Under the doctrine of estoppel, the person making the
representation cannot claim benefit from the wrong he himself
committed.
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced;
No constitutional objection to a law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary
presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct,
and declaring what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome
such presumption. Legislature may provide for prima facie
evidence of guilt provided there be a rational connection
between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed.
(People v. Mingoa)
Requisites for application of presumption that evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced
1. The evidence is material
2. The party had the opportunity to produce the same
3. Said evidence is available only to said party
When this presumption doesn’t apply
· Evidence in question is equally available to both parties
· Evidence is merely corroborative, cumulative, or
unnecessary
· Suppression is not willful
· The suppression is an exercise of a privilege
(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the
latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt
for the later one is produced;
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CC 1176 also lays down presumption that interest has been paid
if the principal is received by the creditor without reservation
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possess, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the
payment of the money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the
money or delivered the thing accordingly;
(l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly
appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were
laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like
manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute
submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators
and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a
sufficient consideration;
(t) That an endorsement of negotiable instrument was made
before the instrument was overdue and at the place where
the instrument is dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the
regular course of the mail;
Facts needed proven before an inference of guilt from
possession of recently stolen goods can be made
1. The crime was actually committed
2. It was committed recently
3. Stolen property found in the possession of the accused
4. Accused is unable to satisfactorily explain his possession
thereof
Necessary to conclusively prove possession that:
1. Possession must be unexplained by any innocent
origin
2. Possession is fairly recent
3. Possession is exclusive
Similar rationale to par (j): if a person had in his possession a
falsified document and he made use of it, taken advantage of it
and profited thereby, the presumption is that he is the material
author of the falsification (People v. Sendaydiego)
For presumption in par (v) to arise, it must be proved that the
letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid and that it
was actually mailed (Nava v. CIR), and if said letter wasn’t
returned to the sender, it’s presumed that the addressee received
it (Sebastian v. WCC)
R13.10 states that service of pleadings by mail is complete
upon the expiration of 10 days after mailing, unless the court
provides otherwise, while service by registered mail is
complete upon actual receipt by the office w/in 5 days from
date of first notice, the service is complete at the expiration of
such time. However, there must be conclusive proof that a first
notice was sent to the addressee as the presumption that
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
official duty has been regularly performed does not apply to
this situation. (Barrameda v. Castillo) If, however, the
postmaster certifies that such notice was sent, such
presumption arises and overrides the addressee’s contrary
claim. (Ferraren v. Santos)
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, he is considered dead for
all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the
purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of
ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five
years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order
that his succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all
purposes including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or
an aircraft with is missing, who has not been heard of for four
years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in
armed hostilities, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and whose existence has not been known for
four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive
years, the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage if he
or she has well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
death. In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death
the circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent
marriage. However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the
Family Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the absent spouse.
Except for subpar 4, this paragraph is taken from CC 390 &
391. A view is held that WRT the ordinary but continued
absence of 7/10/5 years contemplated in the first 2
subparagraphs, the absentee is presumed to have died at the end
of said period, but that in the qualified absence where the
absentee was in danger of death under the contemplated
circumstances therein, the absentee is presumed to have died at
the time he was exposed to such danger or peril – at the start of
the 4-year period stated therein. The distinction assumes
significance in questions of successional rights to the
absentee’s estate arising from his presumptive death.
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing
acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact;
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and ordinary nature habits of life;
(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a
contract of copartneship;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the
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benefit of marriage or under void marriage, has been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who
are not capacitated to marry each other and who have acquire
properly through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding
shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit are equal.
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted
another marriage within three hundred days after such termination
of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of
proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the
solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have
been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred days after the termination of the
former marriage.
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following
the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have
been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred days after the termination of the
former marriage.
Par (dd) was taken from CC 259, which provided for
presumptions of paternity, except that the former now includes
termination of the prior marriage for causes other than the
death of the husband, in line with FC 168.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is
usual with things of the nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed
or published by public authority, was so printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting contain
reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the country where the
book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey
real property to a particular person has actually conveyed it to
him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of
such person or his successor in interest;
(jj)That except for purposes of succession, when two persons
perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or
conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are
no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the
survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from
the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following
rules:
1) If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is
deemed to have survived;
2) If both were above the age sixty, the younger is
deemed to have survived;
3) If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the
former is deemed to have survived;
4) If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be
different, the male is deemed to have survived, if the sex be the
same, the older;
5) If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other
between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Requirements for presumption of survivorship in par (jj) to
arise
1. The deaths occurred in a calamity
2. There are no particular circumstances from which it can
be inferred that one died ahead of the other.
Thus, regarding the third rule, if one is a one-day old child and
the other is 61 years old, it can’t be presumed that the child
survived, in view of the second requirement.
(kk)That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons
who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died
first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be
considered to have died at the same time. (5a)
The presumption is the same as the rule in CC 43 except that it
omits the last clause therein w/c states “and there shall be no
transmission of rights from one to the other,” since said clause
is a rule of substantive law as to the effect on the rights of the
parties.
Par (kk) Par (jj)
Not required that the parties Parties must’ve perished in a
perished in a calamity calamity
Only applies in questions of Applies only where the deaths
successional rights occurred during a calamity
and applies to cases not
involving successional rights
Provides for presumptions of
Provides a presumption of
survivorship
simultaneity in the deaths of
the persons called to succeed
each other
Sec. 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. — There
is no presumption of legitimacy of a child born after three
hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or the
separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of such child must prove his allegation. (6)
Exact copy of CC 261 – should properly apply when the
dissolution of the marriage is by reason of causes other than the
husband’s death. The separation may be a legal separation or a
separation de facto (Garcia v. Revilla). Said provision has been
substantially reproduced in FC 169.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. MAGBANUA
It is true that a government doctor’s post-mortem examination
is presumed by law to have been regularly performed. This
rebuttable presumption, however, cannot be successfully
invoked in the present case, it appearing that the examining
doctor was remiss in the performance of his duties as a medico-
legal officer.
MABUNGA V. PEOPLE
· Before an inference of guilt arising from possession of
recently stolen goods can be made, however, the following
basic facts need to be proven by the prosecution: 1) that the
crime was committed; 2) that the crime was committed
recently; 3) that the stolen property was found in the possession
of the defendant;
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and 4) that the defendant is unable to explain his
possession satisfactorily.
· For purposes moreover of conclusively proving
possession, the following considerations have to be
emphasized: 1) the possession must be unexplained by any
innocent origin; 2) the possession must be fairly recent; and 3)
the possession must be exclusive.
ONG V. SANDIGANBAYAN
The constitutional assurance of the right against self
incrimination likewise cannot be invoked by petitioners. The
right is a prohibition against the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused. It is
simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
accused’s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. In
this case, petitioners are not compelled to present themselves as
witnesses in rebutting the presumption established by law. They
may present documents evidencing the purported bank loans,
money market placements and other fund sources in their
defense.
PILIPINAS BANK V. GLEE CHEMICAL
LABORATORIES
The presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed is not conclusive. As provided under R131.3, such
presumption is rebuttable.
· In this case, the testimony of petitioner’s own witness
destroyed this presumption by admitting that when the
document was notarized, C.Y. and M.H. did not appear before
the notary public. Hence, the notary public did not witness C.Y.
affixing his signature on the document. Such notarization is
useless since there is no truth whatsoever to the notary public’s
statement or acknowledgment that the person who executed the
document personally appeared before him and the same was his
free and voluntary act.
SURTIDA V. RURAL BANK OF MALINAO
The effect of a legal presumption upon a burden of proof is to
create the necessity of presenting evidence to meet the legal
presumption or the prima facie case created thereby, and which
if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail.
The burden of proof remains where it is, but by the
presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the
time being from introducing evidence in support of the
averment, because the presumption stands in the place of
evidence unless rebutted.
II. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE A.
Examination of witnesses
1. R132.1-2
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. — The
examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be
done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the
witness is incapacitated to speak, or the questions calls for a
different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be
given orally. (1a)
Section 2. Proceedings to be recorded. — The entire
proceedings of a trial or hearing, including the questions
propounded to a witness and his answers thereto, the statements
made by the judge or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses
with reference to the case, shall be recorded by means of
shorthand or stenotype or by other means of recording found
suitable by the court.
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A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the
official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified as
correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement
of such proceedings. (2a)
GEN RULE: To be admissible, the testimony of the witness
must be given in open court.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. In civil cases, by depositions per R23 & 24
2. In criminal cases, by depositions or conditional
examinations per R119.12-15 & R123.1, or by the records of
the preliminary investigation, under R115.1(f)
Mere presentation of the affidavits of prosecution witnesses
subject to cross-examination is not allowed by RoC. (People v.
Estenzo)
Testimony of witness should be elicited by questions of
counsel. Nevertheless, court itself may propound questions
either on direct or cross-examination of the witness (People v.
Moreno), or may suggest questions that should be propounded
by counsel (E. Michael & Co., Inc. v. Enriquez)
Court should be given reasonable leeway to ascertain the
truth – extent to which such examination may be
conducted rests in its discretion and won’t be controlled in
the absence of abuse of discretion to the prejudice of
either party (People v. Manalo)
A witness’ testimony in court cannot be considered self-serving
since he can be subjected to cross-examination. (Co v. CA)
Self-serving evidence: one made out of court and is
excluded on the same ground as hearsay evidence, i.e.
deprivation of the right of cross-examination
2. §36, BP 129
Per BP 129, summary procedure may be authorized by the SC
in special cases like ejectment, traffic law violation, etc.
· SC may adopt simplified procedures which may provide
that affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of
oral testimony.
3. Revised Rule on Summary Procedure Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness
Examination of child witness
· Presented in a hearing or any proceeding
· Done in open court
· Answer of witness shall be given orally, unless witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different
mode of answer
· Court may exclude the public and persons who don’t have
a direct interest in the case (including press) when the child is
testifying.
· Court may appoint a facilitator (child psychologist,
psychiatrist, social worker, etc.) if it determines that the child is
unable to understand or respond to questions asked
· Testimony shall be recorded
4. Rule on the Conduct of Pre-Trial (AM No. 03-1-
09-SC)
Cases:
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PEOPLE V. GO
· The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to
appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse
party the opportunity o f cross-examination. It is only when the
witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his
countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or
detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical
condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate
observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy
will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed
by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. Indeed, the
great weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in the
appellate court is based upon his having had just that
opportunity and the assumption that he took advantage of it to
ascertain the credibility of the witnesses.
· Lapse of time is a matter that the trial court would
consider in weighing the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies.
PEOPLE V. BISDA
· An oath is defined as an outward pledge, given by the
person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an
immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The object of the
rule is to affect the conscience of the witness and thus compel
him to speak the truth, and also to lay him open to punishment
for perjury in case he willfully falsifies. A witness must be
sensible to the obligation of an oath before he can be permitted
to testify.
· It cannot be argued that simply because a child witness is
not examined on the nature of the oath and the need for her to
tell the whole truth, the competency of the witness and the truth
of her testimony are impaired…
· If a party against whom a witness is presented believes
that the witness is incompetent or is not aware of his obligation
and responsibility to tell the truth and the consequence of him
testifying falsely, such party may pray for leave to conduct a
voire dire examination on such witness to test his competency.
Any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made
at the time such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the
objection to its admissibility becomes apparent, otherwise the
objection will be considered waived and such evidence will
form part of the records of the case as competent and
admissible evidence.
B. Rights of a witness
1. R132.3
Section 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. — A witness
must answer questions, although his answer may tend to
establish a claim against him. However, it is the right of a
witness:
1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting
questions, and from harsh or insulting demeanor;
2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice
require;
3) Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to
the issue;
4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a
penalty for an offense unless otherwise provided by law; or
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his
reputation, unless it to be the very fact at issue or to a fact from
which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness must
answer to the fact of his previous final conviction for an
offense. (3a, 19a)
A witness cannot refuse to answer questions material to the
inquiry even if it may tend to establish a claim against him.
When he may validly refuse to answer:
1. Under the right against self - incrimination, if his
answer will tend to subject him to punishment for an offense;
or
2. Under the right against self - degradation, if his
answer will have a direct tendency to degrade his character
UNLESS
a. such question is directed to the very fact at issue
or to a fact from which the fact at issue would be presumed, or
b. it refers to his previous final conviction for an
offense
WRT accused in criminal cases, R115.1(e) provides for his
right against self-incrimination – he may refuse to take the
stand altogether, but in other cases or proceedings, a party may
be compelled to take the stand although he may object to
incriminating questions. (Suarez v. Tengco) The accused also
has the right against self-degradation.
The right against self-incrimination is available in criminal,
civil, or administrative cases. (Bermudez v. Castillo) It extends
to administrative proceedings with a criminal/penal aspect.
(Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners)
The right against self-incrimination is granted only in favor of
individuals – corporations cannot invoke that privilege as
questioned testimony can come only from a corporate officer or
EE who has a personality distinct from that of the corporation.
(Hale v. Henkel)
The right against self-incrimination, which may be invoked by
the accused, may be with reference to the offense involved in
the same case wherein he is charged or to an offense for which
he may be charged and tried in another case; WRT a witness,
the offense involved is one for w/c he may be tried in another
case. In either instance, the right should be seasonably invoked
and may be waived.
Seemingly conflicting decisions
Where, in a prosecution for falsification, the accused took the
stand and testified denying his authorship of the alleged
falsified signature, on cross-examination he can be compelled
to give a sample of his handwriting and it was not a denial of
his right against self-incrimination. (Beltran v. Samson)
Where, in a disbarment case, the complainant on cross-
examination denied authorship of certain handwritten letters,
she could not be compelled to give samples of her handwriting
as it would amount to a denial of her right against self-
incrimination in a possible charge for perjury. (Bermudez v.
Castillo)
Reconciliation of the two decisions
Beltran case: accused opened the issue on his direct
examination. As such, he waived his right against self-
incrimination on the issue, and could be cross-examined
thereon like any other witness.
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Bermudez case: testimony given by complainant who, unlike
an accused person, could not refuse to testify without an
unfavorable inference being drawn against her. She did
not open the issue in her direct examination as it was
raised during cross, thus she didn’t waive the privilege
against self-incrimination of her own volition or by acts
imputable to her.
GEN RULE: Witness granted the right against self-
incrimination.
EXCEPTION: immunity statutes wherein the witness is
granted immunity from criminal prosecution for offenses
admitted in his testimony
Classes of immunity states – see Galman v. Pamaran next page
2. §8, RA 1379
Sec. 8. Protection against self-incrimination. Neither the
respondent nor any other person shall be excused from
attending and testifying or from producing books, papers,
correspondence, memoranda and other records on the ground
that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise,
required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to
prosecution; but no individual shall be prosecuted criminally
for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning
which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise, except that such individual so
testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and conviction
for perjury or false testimony committed in so testifying or
from administrative proceedings.
3. PD 749
GRANTING IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION TO
GIVERS OF BRIBES AND OTHER GIFTS AND TO THEIR
ACCOMPLICES IN BRIBERY AND OTHER GRAFT
CASES AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS
Sec. 1. Any person who voluntarily gives information about
any violation of Articles 210, 211, and 212 of the RPC; RA
3019, as amended; Section 345 of the Internal Revenue Code
and Section 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and other
provisions of the said Codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on
the part of the public officials concerned; and other laws, rules
and regulations punishing acts of graft, corruption and other
forms of official abuse; and who willingly testifies against any
public official or employee for such violation shall be exempt
from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference
to which his information and testimony were given, and may
plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in
bar of such prosecution: Provided; that this immunity may be
enjoyed even in cases where the information and testimony are
given against a person who is not a public official but who is a
principal, or accomplice, or accessory in the commission of any
of the above-mentioned violations: Provided, further, that this
immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness
notwithstanding that he offered or gave the bribe or gift to the
public official or his accomplice for such gift or bribe-giving;
and Provided, finally, that the following conditions concur:
1. The information must refer to consummated violations of
any of the above-mentioned provisions of law, rules and
regulations;
2. The information and testimony are necessary for the
conviction of the accused public officer;
 evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
3. Such information and testimony are not yet in the
possession of the State;
4. Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its
material points; and
5. The informant or witness has not been previously convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Sec. 2. The immunity granted hereunder shall not attach should
it turn out subsequently that the information and/or testimony is
false and malicious or made only for the purpose of harassing,
molesting or in any way prejudicing the public officer
denounced. In such a case, the public officer so denounced
shall be entitled to any action, civil or criminal, against said
informant or witness.
xxx
Cases:
GALMAN V. PAMARAN
Classes of immunity statutes
a. Use immunity: prohibits use of witness’ compelled
testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection w/ the
criminal prosecution of the witness
· Merely testifying and/or producing evidence doesn’t
render the witness immune from prosecution despite his
invocation of the right against self-incrimination. He’s merely
saved from the use against him of such statements or evidence
w/c he had been compelled to produce notwithstanding his
having seasonably invoked said right against self-incrimination
b. Transactional immunity: grants immunity to witness from
prosecution for an offense to w/c his compelled testimony relates
PD 1886 grants only use immunity. Hence, dictates of fair play
demand that Generals Ver & Olivas should’ve been informed
of their rights to remain silent by the Agrava Board.
HERRERA V. ALBA
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or
from the respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of
respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-
incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is
“communicative” in essence taken under duress. The SC has
ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a
prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant,
not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may
be material.
ROSETE V. LIM
As a rule, only an accused in a criminal case can refuse to take
the witness stand. The right to refuse to take the stand does not
generally apply to parties in administrative cases or
proceedings. The parties thereto can only refuse to answer if
incriminating questions are propounded. But there is an
exception – a party who is not an accused in a criminal case is
allowed not to take the witness stand in administrative
cases/proceedings that partook of the nature of a criminal
proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. It is the
opinion of the Court that said exception applies to parties in
civil actions which are criminal in nature. As long as the suit is
criminal in nature, the party thereto can altogether decline to
take the witness stand. It is not the character of the suit
involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls.
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· Thus, for a party in a civil case to possess the right to
refuse to take the witness stand, the civil case must also partake
of the nature of a criminal proceeding
C. Order of examination
1. R132.4-10
Sec. 4. Order in the examination of an individual witness. —
The order in which the individual witness may be examined is
as follows:
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross-examination by the opponent.
Sec. 5. Direct examination. — Direct examination is the
examination-in-chief of a witness by the party presenting him
on the facts relevant to the issue.
Sec. 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. — Upon the
termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-
examined by the adverse party as to many matters stated in the
direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient
fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and
freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue.
Sec. 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. — After
the cross-examination of the witness has been concluded, he
may be re-examined by the party calling him, to explain or
supplement his answers given during the cross-examination. On
re-direct-examination, questions on matters not dealt with
during the cross-examination, may be allowed by the court in
its discretion.
Sec. 8. Re-cross-examination. — Upon the conclusion of the re-
direct examination, the adverse party may re-cross-examine the
witness on matters stated in his re-direct examination, and also
on such other matters as may be allowed by the court in its
discretion.
A witness may be cross-examined not only upon matters
testified to by him on his direct examination, but also on all
matters relevant to the issue. (Cupps v. State)
Where the witness is an unwilling or hostile witness so declared
by the court or is an adverse party, the cross-examination shall
only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief. This
is the same as the limitation of the cross-examination of an
accused who testifies as a witness in his own behalf.
When the question w/c assumes facts not on record is asked on
cross-examination, it’s objectionable for being misleading; if
on direct examination, it’s objectionable for lack of basis.
When cross-examination is not and cannot be done or
completed due to causes attributable to the party who offered
the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered
incompetent and should be stricken from the record. (Bachrach
Motor v. CIR)
Where, however, in a criminal case the prosecution
witness was extensively cross-examined on the essential
elements of the crime and what remained for further cross-
examination was the matter of price or reward w/c was
treated therein as merely an aggravating circumstance, his
failure to appear for further cross
 evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
thereon will not warrant the striking out of his direct
exam, especially since further cross could not be
conducted due to the witness’ subsequent death, a
circumstance not attributable to the prosecution. (People
v. Seneris) Same rule followed where prosecution witness
was extensively cross-examined on material points and
thereafter failed to appear and could not be produced
despite a warrant for his arrest. (People v. Gorospe)
RIANO:
Basic purposes of cross-examination:
1. Bring out facts favorable to counsel’s client not
established by the direct testimony
2. To enable counsel to impeach or to impair the witness’
credibility
If witness dies before his cross-examination is over, his
testimony on the direct may be stricken out only WRT the
testimony not covered by the cross-examination.
Sec. 9. Recalling witness. — After the examination of a witness
by both sides has been concluded, the witness cannot be
recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant or
withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may
require. (14)
Where all sides in the case have concluded witness
examination, his recall for further examination is discretionary
w/ the court as the interest of justice requires. However, where
such examination has not been concluded, or if the recall of the
witness was expressly reserved by a party w/ the approval of
the court, then his recall is a matter of right.
Sec. 10. Leading and misleading questions. — A question
which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining
party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
(a) On cross examination;
(b) On preliminary matters;
(c) When there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible
answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender
years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or
managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership
or association which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not
yet testified to by the witness, or contrary to that which he has
previously stated. It is not allowed.
Leading question: one w/c suggests to the witness the answer
desired.
· A leading question propounded to a witness may, by
reacting to an inference in his mind, cause him to testify in
accordance w/ the suggestion by the question; his answer may be
‘an echo of the question’ than a genuine recollection of events.
(Escoto v. Pineda)
· Leading questions may be permitted in the examination of
a witness who is immature; aged & infirm; in bad physical
condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or unaccustomed to, court
proceedings; inexperienced; unsophisticated; feeble-minded;
confused & agitated; terrified; timid or embarrassed while on the
stand; lacking in comprehension of questions or slow to
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understand; deaf & dumb; or unable to speak or
understand the English language or only imperfectly
familiar therewith. (People v. Dela Cruz)
Misleading question: one w/c assumes facts not in evidence or
w/o sufficient basis or w/c assumes testimony or proof w/c has
not been given.
RIANO:
Leading questions are not appropriate in direct and re-direct
examinations particularly when the witness is asked to testify
about a major element of the cause of action or defense.
As to a child witness, R132.10 should be deemed by §20 of the
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness. Under the latter rule,
the court may allow leading questions in ALL stages of
examination of a child under the condition that the same will
further the interests of justice.
2. R115.1(d)
Sec. 1. Rights of accused at trial. – In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be entitled to the following rights: xxx
d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-
examination on matters covered by direct examination. His
silence shall not in any manner prejudice him;
Cases:
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION V. PROV. OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL
A party may cross-examine a witness on matters not embraced
in his direct examination. But this does not mean that a party by
doing so is making the witness his own accordance with [law].
VERTUDES V. BUENAFLOR
Where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits
the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to
remain in the record.
PEOPLE V. SANTOS
A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may
propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the
witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend
to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party.
It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he
propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy
the theory of one party.
D. Impeachment of witnesses
1. R132.11-15
Sec. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. — A witness
may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by
contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation
for truth, honestly, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he
has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present, testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful
acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the
witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been
convicted of an offense. (15)
Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. — Except with
respect to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e)
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
of Section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to
impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so
declared by the court upon adequate showing of his adverse
interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled
the party into calling him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness
who is an adverse party, may be impeached by the party
presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the
adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character. He may
also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party,
but such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter
of his examination-in-chief. (6a, 7a)
Sec. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent
statements. — Before a witness can be impeached by evidence
that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with
the circumstances of the times and places and the persons
present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements
be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any
question is put to him concerning them. (16)
GEN RULE: a party who voluntarily offers the testimony of a
witness in the case is bound by the testimony of said witness.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. Hostile witness;
2. Where the witness is the adverse party or the
representative of a juridical person w/c is the adverse party; and
3. When the witness is not voluntarily offered but is required
by law to be presented by the proponent, as in the case of
subscribing witnesses to a will. (Fernandez v. Tantoco)
A party can impeach the adverse party’s witness by:
1. Contradictory evidence
2. Evidence of prior inconsistent statements
3. Evidence of bad character
4. Evidence of bias, interest, prejudice, or incompetence
A party can impeach his own witness only by:
1. Evidence contradictory to his testimony
2. Evidence of prior inconsistent statements
In the case of hostile witnesses, adverse party witnesses or
involuntary witnesses, they can also be impeached by other
modes of impeachment, aside from contradictory statements
and prior inconsistent statements made by them.
Contradictory evidence: other testimony of the same witness,
or other evidence presented by him in the same case, but not
the testimony of another witness
Fairness demands that the impeaching matter be raised in the
cross-examination of the witness sought to be impeached
by allowing him to admit or deny a matter to be used as
the basis of impeachment by contradictory evidence.
Prior inconsistent statements
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Oral or documentary statements made by the witness sought to
be impeached on occasions other than the trial in which he is
testifying.
· How to impeach a witness by prior inconsistent
statements: by laying the predicate
1. Confront him w/ such statements, w/ the
circumstances under w/c they were made;
2. Ask him whether he made such statements; and
3. Give him a chance to explain the inconsistency.
o Unless the witness is given the opportunity to
explain the discrepancies, the impeachment is
incomplete. (US v. Baluyot) However, such
defect in the impeachment of the witness is
deemed waived if no objection on that ground is
raised when the document involved is offered
for admission. (People v. Molo)
It is believed that if the prior inconsistent statement appears in a
deposition of the adverse party, and not a mere witness, that
adverse party who testifies may be impeached w/o laying the
predicate, as such prior statements are in the nature of
admissions of said adverse party. Thus, under R23.4(b), the
deposition of an adverse party may be used by any party for any
purpose, i.e. as evidence for the latter or to impeach or
contradict said party deponent through inconsistent statements
therein.
Where a witness’ previous statements are offered as evidence
of an admission, and not merely to impeach him, the rule on
laying a predicate does not apply (Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v.
Hashim) and the same would apply to like statements of a party
to the case
Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of witness. — Evidence of
the good character of a witness is not admissible until such
character has been impeached.
See R130.51
Sec. 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — On any trial
or hearing, the judge may exclude from the court any witness
not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the
testimony of other witnesses. The judge may also cause
witnesses to be kept separate and to be prevented from
conversing with one another until all shall have been examined.
(18)
The power of exclusion applies only to the witnesses and not to
the parties in a civil case. The same right against exclusion also
applies to the accused in a criminal case.
A party to an action has a right to be present in court while
his case is being tried, and the rule authorizing the
exclusion of witnesses during the trial cannot be
understood to extend to him. (Paez v. Berenguer)
If the witness violates the order of exclusion, the court may bar
him from testifying (People v. Sandal) or give little weight to
his testimony, aside from his liability for contempt. Contrarily,
it is within the power of the trial judge to refuse to order the
exclusion of the principal witness of the government during the
hearing of a criminal case and it may not, on that count alone,
be considered as an abuse of his discretion. (People v. Lua Chu)
2. R23.4
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Sec. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a
motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence,
may be used against any party who was present or represented
at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in
accordance with any one of the following provisions:
a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose
of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a
witness;
b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of
taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or
association which is a party may be used by an adverse party
for any purpose;
c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may
be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds:
(1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides
at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it
appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that
the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application
and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to
make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard
to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses
orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used; and
d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a
party, the adverse party may require him to introduce all of it
which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may
introduce any other parts.
Case:
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V.
MORANTE Under R132.13, a witness may be impeached by
showing that such two contradicting statements are under oath.
In order to impeach his testimony to be inconsistent with the
sworn statement, the sworn statement alleged to be inconsistent
with the subsequent one should have been shown and read to
him and, thereafter, he should have been asked to explain the
apparent inconsistency.
E. Reference to writing (R132.16-18)
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A witness
may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by
anything written or recorded by himself or under his direction
at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter,
or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and
knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in
such case the writing or record must be produced and may be
inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross
examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So,
also, a witness may testify from such writing or record, though
he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to
swear that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction
when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.
(10a)
First sentence = “revival of present memory.” Applies if the
witness remembers the facts regarding his entries and is
entitled to greater weight
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Second sentence = “revival of past recollection.” Applies
where the witness does not recall the facts involved, and is
entitled to lesser weight
This provision applies only when it is shown beforehand that
there is a need to refresh the memory of the witness. The
memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does
not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such,
because the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of
refreshed memory.
Where the witness has testified independently of or after
his memory has been refreshed by a memorandum of the
events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as
corroborative evidence, since a witness may not be
corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by
him. Exception = when the proper predicate of his failing
memory is priorly laid down. (Borromeo v. CA)
Sec. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in
evidence, the remainder, the remainder admissible. — When
part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is
given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject
may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act,
declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or
record necessary to its understanding may also be given in
evidence. (11a)
Similar rule provided for in use of depositions – see R23.4(d)
Sec. 18. Right to inspect writing shown to witness. —
Whenever a writing is shown to a witness, it may be inspected
by the adverse party. (9a)
Cases:
CANQUE V. CA
· Under R132.10, the memorandum used to refresh the
memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may
not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness
has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In
other words, where the witness has testified independently of or
after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the
events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as
corroborative evidence.
· As the entries in question were not made based on
personal knowledge, they could only corroborate her testimony
that she made the entries as she received the bills.
PEOPLE V. DELA CRUZ
The leading questions were neither conclusions of facts merely
put into the mouth of JONALYN nor prepared statements
which she merely confirmed as true. The questions were indeed
carefully phrased and sometimes based on her Sinumpaang
Salaysay to make JONALYN understand the import of the
questions. In the same vein, the prosecution’s referral to
JONALYN’s Sinumpaang Salaysay to refresh her memory was
also reasonable. The purpose of refreshing the recollection of a
witness is to enable both the witness and her present testimony
to be put fairly and in their proper light before the court.
III. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF
DOCUMENTS
 evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
A. Public documents
1. R132.19, 23-30
Sec. 19. Classes of Documents. — For the purpose of their
presentation evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of
the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except
last wills and testaments; and
c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to the entered therein.
All other writings are private. (20a)
Under the rules of evidence, official documents are “public
documents.” Those acknowledged before persons authorized to
administer oaths are public documents but are further governed
by Sec. 30, while commercial and private documents fall under
“private documents.”
Private documents required by law to be entered in public
records are considered as public documents and are
subject to Sec. 27.
GEN RULE: Public documents generally include notarial
documents and are admissible in evidence w/o the necessity of
preliminary proof as to its authenticity and due execution
(Antillon v. Barcelon)
EXCEPTION: where a special rule of law requires proof
thereof despite its being a document acknowledged in
accordance w/ Sec. 30, as in the case of probate of notarial
wills where the testimony of the attesting witnesses are still
required for its probate (R132.76 & 30)
Requisites for admissibility of copy of foreign official document
1. Attested by the officer having legal custody of the records
or by his deputy; and
2. Accompanied by a certificate of the Philippine diplomatic
or consular representative to the foreign country certifying that
such attesting officer has the custody of the document
· This requirement is intended to justify the giving of
full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a
foreign country (Valencia v. Lopez)
A document, to be public, must be an official written act of a
public officer.
If a private writing itself is inserted officially into a public
record, its record/recordation/incorporation into the public
record becomes a public document, but that does not make the
private writing itself a public document so as to make it
admissible w/o authentication. (Republic v. Worldwide
Insurance)
A claim for the enforcement of a foreign judgment can be
brought only before the regular courts and not in an
administrative agency. A foreign decision purporting to be the
written record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a
foreign country is a public writing under R132.19(a), and
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must be proved in accordance w/ Secs. 24 & 25 of the same
Rule.
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance
of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence,
even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter. (24a)
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office. (25a)
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a
copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy
is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. — Any public record,
an official copy of which is admissible in evidence, must not be
removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon order
of a court where the inspection of the record is essential to the
just determination of a pending case. (27a)
A public record cannot be removed from the office in w/c it is
kept w/o a court order, such as a subpoena duces tecum, and
even the court cannot order its removal therefrom.
EXCEPTION: when essential to the just determination of
a pending case
NOTE that this rule refers only to a public record an official
copy of w/c could be made available to the interested part and
is admissible in evidence.
§24: requirements for admissibility in evidence of a foreign
public document.
Absent the attestation of the officer having the legal
custody of the records and the certificate to that effect by a
Philippine foreign service officer, a mere copy of the
foreign document is not admissible as evidence to prove
the foreign law. (Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. CA)
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. — An authorized
public record of a private document may be proved by the
original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal
custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such
officer has the custody.
Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed
by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his
deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible
as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record
or entry. (29)
Sec. 29. How judicial record impeached. — Any judicial record
may be impeached by evidence of: (a) want of jurisdiction in
the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the parties,
or (c) fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the
proceedings. (30a)
RIANO:
Judicial record: the record of judicial proceedings. Includes
official entries or files, official acts of a judicial officer, and
judgment of the court
Sec. 30. Proof of notarial documents. — Every instrument duly
acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may
be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate
of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the
execution of the instrument or document involved. (31a)
Public documents may be proved by:
1. The original copy;
2. An official publication thereof; or
3. A certified true copy thereof
When a CTC is presented, § 24 & 25 provide what should
appear in the certification or attestation of said true copy and
w/c must have the documentary stamp affixed thereto in order
to be admissible (§201, RA 8424), UNLESS specifically
exempted therefrom, as in the case of baptismal/birth
certificates of contracting parties to a marriage (FC 13). It’s
presumed that the requisite stamps have been affixed to the
original copy of a document where only the carbon copies
thereof are available. (Mahilum v. CA)
Where the SPA is executed and acknowledged before a notary
public or other competent officer in a foreign country, it can’t
be admitted in evidence in Philippine courts UNLESS it’s
certified as such in accordance w/ R132.24 by a secretary of the
embassy or legation,
consul-general/consul/vice-consul/consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in w/c the record is kept of said public
document and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Lopez v.
CA)
The probative value of public instruments depends on the kind
of document that is presented in evidence. (Dupilas v.
Cabacungan)
Only baptismal certificates issued by the priests during the
Spanish regime are considered public documents. (Adriano v.
de Jesus) However, a baptismal certificate issued after the
Spanish regime is a private document and cannot even be
considered prima facie evidence of the fact that gave rise to its
execution – the fact of baptism and the date thereof – and is
therefore hearsay and inadmissible evidence even as to the date
of baptism unless the priest who performed the baptismal rites
and made the certificate is produced. (People v. Barcebal)
Baptismal certificates are not sufficient to prove paternity
(Arde v. Anicoche) or voluntary recognition of a child.
(Berciles v. GSIS)
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NOTE: While recognizing the primacy of a birth certificate as
proof of the victim’s age, SC held that in the absence of such
evidence, the victim’s minority may be proved by other
documentary evidence such as her baptismal certificate or other
authentic records. (People v. Llandelar)
A death certificate is not proof of the cause of death, its
probative value being confined only to the fact of death, and the
statement therein contained regarding the duration of illness
and the cause of death are mere hearsay. (Sison v. Sun Life
Assurance)
BUT it has been held that a death certificate is admissible
to prove the residence of the deceased at the time of his
death. (Garcia Fule v. Malvar)
2. CC408
CC403. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding
article, a daughter above twenty-one but below twenty-three
years of age cannot leave the parental home without the
consent of the father or mother in whose company she lives,
except to become a wife, or when she exercises a profession or
calling, or when the father or mother has contracted a
subsequent marriage. (321a)
Cf. CC 402. Majority commences upon the attainment of the
age of twenty-one years. The person who has reached majority
is qualified for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions
established by this Code in special cases.
3. §201, RA 8424
NIRC, Sec. 201. Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable Document.
- An instrument, document or paper which is required by law to
be stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted or
transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded,
nor shall it or any copy thereof or any record of transfer of the
same be admitted or used in evidence in any court until the
requisite stamp or stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.
Cases:
PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORP. V. NLRC
· The Dubai decision was not properly proved before the
POEA. The Dubai decision purports to be the written act or
record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country, and therefore a public writing under R132.20(a)
· Also, the Dubai decision is accompanied by a document
which purports to be an English translation of that decision, but
that translation is legally defective. R132.34 requires that
documents written in a non-official language (Arabic) shall not
be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a translation
into English or Spanish or Filipino.
PEOPLE V. LAZARO
Either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification
from, the PNP Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a
person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession of
illegal firearms. Moreover, the rule on hearsay evidence admits
of several exceptions. One such exception is that provided for
under R130.44 (Entries in official records). Relative to this
provision, R132.28 of the same Rules allows the admission of
the said document.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
MONTEVERDE V. PEOPLE
A private document acquires the character of a public
document when it becomes part of an official record and is
certified by a public officer duly authorized by law.
SORIANO V. GALIT
Public documents by themselves may be adequate to establish
the presumption of their validity. However, their probative
weight must be evaluated not in isolation but in conjunction
with other evidence adduced by the parties in the controversy,
much more so in this case where the contents of a copy thereof
subsequently registered for documentation purposes is being
contested.
DELFIN V. BILLONES
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. Nevertheless, this
presumption is disputable and is satisfactory only if
uncontradicted, and may be overcome by other evidence to the
contrary.
SEVILLA V. CARDENAS
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty.
B. Private documents (R132.20-22, 32-33)
Sec. 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:
a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that
which it is claimed to be. (21a)
Sec. 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not
necessary. — Where a private document is more than thirty
years old, is produced from the custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any
alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of
its authenticity need be given. (22a)
Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. — The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge. (23a)
R132.20-22: rules on authentication of private documents
Doctrine of self-authentication
Where the facts in the writing could only have been known by
the writer
Rule of authentication of the adverse party
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Where the reply of the adverse party refers to and affirms the
transmittal to him and his receipt of the letter in question, a
copy of which the proponent is offering as evidence
Instances when authentication of a document is NOT required
1. The writing is an ancient document, under the requisites of
§21
2. The writing is a public document or record per §19
3. It’s a notarial document acknowledged, proved, or
certified in accordance w/ §30
4. The authenticity and due execution of the document has
been expressly or impliedly admitted by a failure to deny the
same under oath, as in the case of actionable documents per
R8.8
The authenticity and due execution of a private document are
proved, inter alia, by evidence of the genuineness of the
handwriting of the maker
Genuineness of maker’s handwriting proved by:
1. A witness who actually saw the person writing the
instrument (§20[a])
2. A witness familiar w/ such handwriting (§22) and who
can give his opinion thereon, such opinion being an exception to
the opinion rule (R.130.50[b])
3. A comparison by the court of the questioned
handwriting and admitted genuine specimens thereof (§22)
4. Expert evidence (R.130.49)
§22 merely enumerates the methods of proving handwriting but
does not give preference or priority to a particular method
(Lopez v. CA)
Sec. 32. Seal. — There shall be no difference between sealed
and unsealed private documents insofar as their admissibility as
evidence is concerned. (33a)
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. —
Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be
admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation
into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings,
parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation
prepared before trial.
PD 155 (1973) provides that “the Spanish language shall
continue to be recognized as an official language in the
Philippines while important documents in government files are
in the Spanish language and not translated into either English or
Pilipino language.”
1987 Consti: the official languages are Filipino and, until
otherwise provided by law, English, w/ the regional
languages as auxiliary official languages in the region
Cases:
BARTOLOME V. IAC
Under R132.21, the due execution and authenticity of a private
writing must be proved either by anyone who saw the writing
executed, by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of
the maker, or by a subscribing witness.
CEQUEÑA V. BOLANTE
· An ancient document is one that is (1) more than 30 years
old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by
any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It must on
its face appear to be genuine.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
· Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on
authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become
a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat.
· By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
MALAYAN INSURANCE V. PNWC
Under R132.20, before a private document is admitted in
evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who
executed it, the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it
executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the
signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments
had previously confessed execution thereof.
JIMENEZ V. COMMISSION ON ECUMENICAL MISSION
R132.22 explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a
comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge."
PAN PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SALES V. CA
The presumption of regularity does not hold true with respect
to the [notarized] Marital Consent which is a private writing. It
is subject to the requirement of proof under R132.20 which
states the Marital Consent was merely a jurat, and thus a
private document whose execution and authenticity required
proof under R132.20.
C. Alteration in documents (R132.31)
Sec. 31. Alteration in document, how to explain. — The party
producing a document as genuine which has been altered and
appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part
material to the question in dispute, must account for the
alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by
another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent
of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or
innocent made, or that the alteration did not change the
meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the
document shall not be admissible in evidence.
Cases:
CABOTAJE V. PADUNAN
<Restated the provision>
CIRELOS V. HERNANDEZ
The party producing a document as genuine which has been
altered in a part material to the question in dispute must
account for the alteration.
D. Rule on Electronic Evidence
Rule 5. Authentication of Electronic Documents Sec. 1. The
person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal
proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity.
Sec. 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private
electronic document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the
following means:
a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person
purported to have signed the same;
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b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or
devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law
for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the
document; or
c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the
satisfaction of the judge.
Sec. 3. Proof of electronically notarized document. - A
document electronically notarized in accordance with the rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court shall be considered as a
public document and proved as a notarial document under the
Rules of Court.
Cases:
ASUNCION V. NLRC
Handwritten listing and unsigned computer printouts which are
unauthenticated are unreliable. The SC has consistently
required some proof of authenticity or reliability as condition
for the admission of documents.
VIDALLON - MAGTOLIS V. SALUD
· Text messages are covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the
REE, which provides: "Ephemeral electronic communication
refers to telephone conversations, text messages ' and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not
recorded or retained."
· Under Section 2, Rule 11 of REE, “Ephemeral electronic
communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person
who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge
thereof.”
IV. OFFER AND OBJECTION (R132.34-40)
Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified. (35)
Sec. 35. When to make offer. — As regards the testimony of a
witness, the offer must be made at the time the witness is called
to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the
presentation of a party's testimonial evidence. Such offer shall
be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in
writing. (n)
The literal import of §34 has been relaxed in the sense that
evidence not formally offered can be admitted by the TC
provided the ff. requirements are present:
1. The same must’ve been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded; and
2. The same must’ve been incorporated in the records of the
case
The formal offer of testimonial evidence at the time the witness
is called to testify is necessary to enable the court to
intelligently rule on any objection to the questions asked. As a
rule, the proponent must show its relevance, materiality, and
competence, and the adverse party must promptly raise any
objection thereto. (People v. Ancheta)
RIANO:
When formal offer of evidence is not required
1. In a summary proceeding, as it’s a proceeding where
there’s no full-blown trial
 evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
2. Documents judicially admitted or taken judicial notice of
3. Documents, affidavits, and depositions used in rendering a
summary judgment
4. Documents or affidavits used in deciding quasi-judicial or
administrative cases
5. Lost objects previously marked, identified, described in
the record, and testified to by witnesses who had been subjects
of cross-examination in respect to said objects
Sec. 36. Objection. — Objection to evidence offered orally
must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral
examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds
therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three
(3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is
allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Sec. 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. — When it
becomes reasonably apparent in the course of the examination
of a witness that the question being propounded are of the same
class as those to which objection has been made, whether such
objection was sustained or overruled, it shall not be necessary
to repeat the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse party
to record his continuing objection to such class of questions.
Sec. 38. Ruling. — The ruling of the court must be given
immediately after the objection is made, unless the court
desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the
question presented; but the ruling shall always be made during
the trial and at such time as will give the party against whom it
is made an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the
ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not
be stated. However, if the objection is based on two or more
grounds, a ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of
them must specify the ground or grounds relied upon. (38a)
Sec. 39. Striking out answer. — Should a witness answer the
question before the adverse party had the opportunity to voice
fully its objection to the same, and such objection is found to
be meritorious, the court shall sustain the objection and order
the answer given to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of
answers which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise
improper. (n)
Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. — If documents or things
offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may
have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the
evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record
the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and
the substance of the proposed testimony. (n)
Parties who offer objections to questions on whatever ground
are entitled to a ruling at the time the objection is made, unless
they present a question with regard to which the court desires
to inform itself before making its ruling. In that event, it’s
perfectly proper for the court to take a reasonable time to study
the questions raised by the
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objection, but a ruling should always be made during the trial.
The courts should consider the evidence only for the
purpose for which it was offered (People v. Abalos)
The trial courts should permit all exhibits presented by the
parties, although not admitted, to be attached to the records so
that, in case of appeal, the appellate court may be able to
examine the same and determine the propriety of their rejection.
(Oliveros v. Oliveros)
However, it has been held that where documentary
evidence was rejected by the TC and the offeror did not
move that the same be attached to the record, the same
cannot be considered by the appellate court (Banez v. CA),
as documents forming no part of proofs before the
appellate court cannot be considered in disposing of the
case (De Castro v. CA); otherwise, that would infringe
upon the adverse party’s constitutional right to due process
of law. (Tinsay v. Yusay)
Where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the
attorney offering the evidence, the court may, as a rule, safely
accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the
proof offered will be connected later. (Prats & Co. v. Phoenix
Insurance)
The purpose for w/c the evidence is offered must be specified
because such evidence may be admissible for several purposes
under the doctrine of multiple admissibility, or may be
admissible for one purpose and not for another, otherwise the
adverse party can’t interpose the proper objection. Evidence
submitted for one purpose may not be considered for any other
purpose. (People v. Diano)
A document or writing which is admitted merely as part of the
testimony of a witness (and not as an independent evidence)
does not constitute proof of the facts related therein. (Sheraton-
Palace Hotel v. Quijano)
Identification of Formal offer of documentary
documentary evidence evidence
Made in the course of the Only when the proponent
trial and marked as exhibits. rests his case and formally
Evidence identified at trial offers the evidence that an
and marked as exhibits may objection thereto may be
be withdrawn before formal made.
offer thereof or may not at all
be offered as evidence
Documents which may have been marked as exhibits during
the hearing but w/c were not formally offered in evidence
cannot be considered as evidence nor can they be given any
evidentiary value. (Vda. De Flores v. WCC)
However, it has been held in a criminal case for
kidnapping w/ murder that even if there was no formal
offer of the exhibits but the same have been duly identified
by testimony duly recorded and the exhibits have been
incorporated in the records of the case, said exhibits are
admissible against the accused. (People v. Mate)
§37 provides that the repetition of objections to the same class
of evidence is not required. The party may just enter a general
and continuing objection to the same class of evidence and the
ruling of the court shall be applicable to all such evidence of the
same class. It has been held that the court itself may motu
proprio treat the objection as a
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
continuing one. (Ed. A. Keller & Co., Ltd. v. Ellerman &
Bucknail)
An erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by the TC is
not a ground for a new trial or reversal of the decision if there
are other independent evidence to sustain the decision, or if the
rejected evidence, if it had been admitted, wouldn’t have
changed the decision (People v. Bande); otherwise a new trial
is warranted by reason of such erroneous ruling w/c goes into
the merits of the case and would’ve affected the decision (US
v. Villanueva).
If the TC erroneously ruled out the evidence and
discovered such error before the judgment had become
final or before and appeal therefrom had been perfected, it
may reopen the case. (Tinsay v. Yusay)
The TC rulings on procedural questions and on admissibility of
evidence during the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature
and may not be the subject of separate appeals or review on
certiorari. These are to be assigned as errors and reviewed in
the appeal taken from the TC on the merits of the case.
(Gatdula v. People)
RIANO:
An objection must point out the specific ground of the
objection, and if it does not do so, no error is committed in
overruling it.
An objector must be explicit as to the legal ground he invokes.
He cannot simply manifest that he is interposing an objection.
He has to precisely state the exclusionary rule that would
justify his opposition to the proffered evidence.
The rule is that a specific objection is always preferred over a
general one. However, it does not impose an absolute ban on
general objections. There is no compelling need to specify the
ground, “if the ground for exclusion should have been obvious
to the judge or to counsel.” (AmJur)
Objections may be formal or substantive.
· Formal objection: one directed against the alleged defect
in the formulation of the question (Examples of
defectively formulated questions: ambiguous,
argumentative, etc.)
· Substantive objection: objections made and directed
against the very nature of the evidence, i.e. it is inadmissible
either because it is irrelevant or incompetent or both
An objection must state the specific ground relied upon and be
timely (made at the earliest opportunity).
Cases:
HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN V. COMORPOSA
Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would
sanction the admission of evidence that has not been formally
offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable
only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on
summary procedure – cases in which no full-blown trial is held.
CABUGAO V. PEOPLE
Where a party fails to object to evidence when offered, he is
deemed to have waived his objection thereto. Consequently, the
evidence offered may be admitted.
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YU V. CA
It is apparent [from R132.40] that before tender of excluded
evidence is made, the evidence must have been formally
offered before the court. And before formal offer of evidence is
made, the evidence must have been identified and presented
before the court.
VALENCIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
· Admission of additional evidence is addressed to the
sound discretion of the TC.
· A motion to reopen presupposes that either or both parties
have formally offered and closed their evidence.
PAREL V. PRUDENCIO
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to
rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a
settled rule that the mere fact that a particular document is
identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has
thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.
RAMOS V. DIZON
In People v. Napat-a, we relaxed [R132.34] and allowed
evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by
the trial court provided the following requirements are present,
viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and, second, the same must have been
incorporated in the records of the case.
TAN V. PEOPLE
SC has ruled that objection to the admissibility of evidence, if
not made at the time such evidence is offered, shall be deemed
waived. However, in all cases where said rule had been applied,
the assailed testimonial or object evidence had been duly
presented during the course of the trial.
V. WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
A. Civil cases (R133.1)
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In
civil cases, the party having burden of proof must establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which there are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear
upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of
witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number. (1a)
§1 & 2 give the rules on the requisite quantum of evidence in
civil & criminal cases.
Evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a
credible source but must, in addition, be credible in itself. And
by this is meant that it shall be natural, reasonable and probable
as to make it easy to believe. (People v. Baquiran)
To be believed, evidence should be in accord with the common
knowledge and experience of mankind. (People v. Acusar)
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
GEN RULE re TC findings on credibility of witnesses: TC
findings won’t be disturbed on appeal, as it was in a better
position to decide the question, having heard and observed the
demeanor of each witness. (People v. Baao)
EXCEPTION: when the TC has plainly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value w/c, if considered, might affect the
result of the case. (People v. Realon)
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: where the issue
revolved around the identification of the accused or the
credibility of witness and one judge heard the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses but a different judge penned the
decision – the latter, not having heard the testimonial
presentation, wouldn’t be in a better position than the
appellate courts to make such determination (People v.
CA)
The matter of assigning values to declarations at the witness
stand is best and most completely performed by a trial judge
who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in
light of the defendant’s behavior, demeanor, conduct, and
attitude at the trial. (People v. Magallanes)
TC shouldn’t discredit a witness by the supposed
expression of lack of sincerity in his face. Facial
expressions are not necessarily indicative of one’s
feelings. TC should’ve made it appear in the record and
allowed the witness the opportunity to explain why he was
showing such an expression on his face. (People v.
Enriquez)
As a general rule, the number of witnesses should not in and by
itself determine the weight of evidence, but in case of
conflicting testimonies of witnesses, the numerical factor may
be given certain weight. (Caluna v. Vicente)
A party’s failure to present merely corroborative or cumulative
evidence doesn’t give rise to any adverse or unfavorable
presumption. (People v. Quilino)
Credibility of a witness: his integrity, disposition, and intention
to tell the truth in the testimony he has given as distinguished
from the credibility of his testimony. (People v. Rivera)
Competency of a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a
credible witness. Courts allow a person to testify as a witness
upon a given matter because he is competent but may thereafter
decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony.
(Arroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo)
The demeanor, the emphasis, gestures, and inflection of the
voice of a witness , while testifying , are potent aids in the
proper evaluation of his credibility. (US v. Macuti)
When a witness makes 2 sworn statements gravely
contradicting each other, the court cannot accept either
statement as proof. The witness by his own act of giving false
testimony impeaches his own testimony and the court should
exclude it from all consideration. (US v. Pala) This is different
from the situation wherein the testimonies of 2 witnesses
contradict each other, in w/c case the court shall adopt such
testimony w/c it believes to be true. (US v. Lasada)
The fact that a person has reached the “twilight of his life” is not
always a guarantee that he would tell the truth. It’s also quite
common that advanced age makes a person mentally dull and
completely hazy about things which have happened
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to him and, at times, it weakens his resistance to outside
influence. (People v. Juarez)
The record of a preliminary investigation constitutes no part of
the final proceedings in a cause, unless it’s presented in
evidence. The facts adduced therein are evidence only for the
purpose of testing the credibility of witnesses. (US v. Grant)
When a witness may be said to be biased
When his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he
has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his
statements, or to suppress or pervert the truth, or to state what’s
false.
Bias: that w/c excites the disposition to see and report matters
as they are wished for rather than as they are.
When the witnesses on both sides are equally interested or
otherwise biased, especially if there’s no numerical
preponderance on either side, bias ceases to be a consideration
in determining where the weight of evidence rests. Credit
should be given to the one whose demeanor and manner of
testifying convinces the court of his credibility. (People v.
Watin)
The testimonies of interested witnesses are not necessarily
biased, incredible or self-serving, although their interest may to
some extent affect their credibility. (People v. Lardizabal)
The testimony of a co-conspirator or accomplice, while
admissible, must be scrutinized with great caution because it
comes from a polluted source and is subject to grave suspicion.
(People v. Aquino)
The conviction of an accused may be based on the testimony of
one witness alone provided such testimony is clear and
convincing. (People v. Olais) The offended party’s testimony is
not essential to convict an accused if there are already other
evidence to prove the latter’s guilt. (People v. Juliada) The
prosecution is not obliged to present each and every person who
witnessed the occurrence but only a sufficient number to prove
the commission of the offense. (People v. Marasigan)
Inconsistencies or contradictions on mere details in the
testimony of a witness don’t materially impair the credibility of
such witness. (People v. Modelo) Inconsistencies in their
testimony on insignificant details don’t affect their credibility
as to the material points; rather, they indicate veracity (People
v. Viñas) and only tend to bolster the probative value of such
testimony.
The non-production of a corroborative witness without any
explanation given why he wasn’t produced weakens the
testimony of the witness who named that corroborating witness
in his testimony. (People v. Abonales)
Affirmative testimony is stronger than negative testimony.
Negative testimony of a witness cannot prevail over the
positive statements of persons who were eyewitnesses of the
fact w/c is the subject of investigation. (Vda de Ramos v. CA)
Delay of a witness in revealing to the authorities what he
knows about a crime does not render his testimony false, for
the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most
people and their abhorrence to get involved in a criminal case.
(People v. Untalasco Jr) More than this, there is always the
inherent fear of reprisal, which is quite understandable
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
especially if the accused is a man of power and influence in the
community. (People v. Catao)
The refusal of a person to submit to investigation to
explain the innocent role he professes is inconsistent with
the normal reaction of an innocent man. (People v.
Bunsol)
The mere relationship of the witness to the victim does not
impair his positive and clear testimony nor render the same less
worthy of credit (People v. Berganio), UNLESS there’s a
showing of improper motive on the part of said witnesses.
(People v. Jabeguero)
Affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open
court declarations because they are oftentimes executed when
the affiant is at a high pitch of excitement and when his mental
faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair
opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has just
transpired. An affidavit is only prima facie evidence of weak
probative force and should be received with caution.
(Rodriguez v. Red Line Transportation)
These rules don’t apply where the omission in the
affidavit refers to a very important detail such that the
affiant would not have failed to mention it (People v.
Anggot), or the self-contradictions and inconsistencies are
on very material and substantial matters. (People v.
Amon)
The infirmity of affidavits as a species of evidence is a matter
of judicial experience. Generally, an affidavit is not prepared
by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant’s statements. Omissions and
misunderstandings by the writer are frequent particularly under
circumstances of hurry or impatience. (People v. Mariquina)
To prove conspiracy, prosecution need not establish that all the
parties thereto agreed on every detail in the execution of the
crime or that they were actually together at all stages; it is
enough that, from the individual acts of each accused, it may
reasonably be deduced that they had a common plan to commit
the felony. (People v. Catao) However, the same degree of
proof required for establishing the crime is required to support
a finding of conspiracy. (People v. Tumalip)
The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act must be
proved in an evident and incontestable manner. They must be
proved as conclusively as the acts constituting the offense.
(People v. Tiongson)
The quantum of evidence necessary to prove self-defense or
defense of a relative is “clear and convincing” evidence. If the
evidence for the defense is of doubtful veracity, conviction of
the accused is imperative. (People v. Berio)
For alibi to be given credence, it must not only appear that the
accused interposing the same was at some other place, but also
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime
scene at the time of its commission. (People v. Gerones) Such
defense becomes weaker if uncorroborated; worse still if it
could’ve been corroborated by other persons mentioned by the
accused but such corroborative testimony has not been
presented. (People v. Brioso)
While, as a rule, the defense of alibi deserves scant
consideration, it may be duly entertained if predicated on
substantial and reliable evidence sufficient to
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engender reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
(People v. Gerones)
Where one accused withdraws his appeal after realizing the
futility of his defense, and the other escapes from confinement
thereby causing the dismissal of his appeal, said acts are
unmistakable signs of guilt. (People v. Aquiedo)
Tax declarations or the payment of real estate taxes on the land
are not conclusive evidence of ownership of the declarant or
payor. (De Guzman v. CA)
Tax receipts are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership but if accompanied by open, adverse, and
continued possession in the concept of owner of the
property, they constitute evidence of great weight in
support of a claim of ownership over said property by the
possessor thereof or his privies. (Tabuena v. CA)
Flight is evidence of guilt and of a guilty conscience. (US v.
Alegado) The converse, however, is not true.
As a rule, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is
immaterial and, not being an element of a crime, it does not
have to be proved. (People v. Tiengo)
Instances when evidence of motive is relevant or essential
1. Where the assailant’s identity is in question (US v.
McMann)
2. To determine the voluntariness of the criminal act
(People v. Taneo), or the sanity of the accused (People v.
Bascos)
3. To determine from which side the unlawful
aggression commenced, as where the accused invoked self-
defense wherein unlawful aggression on the part of his
opponent is an essential element (US v. Laurel)
4. To determine the specific nature of the crime
committed
5. To determine whether a shooting was intentional or
accidental, the fact that the accused had personal motives to
shoot the victim being a weighty consideration (People v.
Martinez Godinez)
6. Where the accused contends that he acted in defense
of a stranger, since it’s essential, for such defense to prosper,
that the accused wasn’t induced by revenge, resentment or other
evil motive
7. Where the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive
and there’s doubt whether a crime has been committed or
whether the accused has committed it (People v. Nicolas)
In some cases, motive is necessary not only for the procedural
requirement on the quantum of proof but as virtually an element of
the offense, such as to prove malice of the accused in libel or
slander (US v. Bustos). The true motive of the conduct of the
accused explains and supplies the element of malice and,
correspondingly, proves his criminal intent.
People v. Pineda: non-exhaustive list of danger signals that the
out-of-court identification of suspects may be erroneous even
though the method used is proper
1. The witness originally stated that he couldn’t identify
anyone
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
2. The witness knew the accused before the crime but made
no accusation against him when questioned by the police
3. A serious discrepancy exists between the witness’ original
description and his actual description of the accused
4. Before identifying the accused at trial, the witness
erroneously identified some other person
5. Other witnesses of the crime fail to identify the accused
6. Before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to
identify him
7. Before the commission of the crime, the witness had
limited opportunity to see the accused
8. The witness and the person identified are of different
racial groups
9. During his original observation of the offender, the
witness was unaware that a crime was involved
10. A considerable time elapsed between the witness’ view
and his identification of the accused
11. Several persons committed the crime
12. The witness failed to make a positive trial identification
Res ipsa loquitur: the thing speaks for itself
The fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima
facie case, and present a question of fact for the defendant to
meet w/ an explanation. The doctrine is simply a recognition of
the postulate that as a matter of common knowledge and
experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may
justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrumentality causing the injury, in the absence
of some explanation by him.
Note that this doctrine is considered as merely evidentiary
or in the nature of a procedural rule. Its application
doesn’t dispense with the requirement of proof of
negligence. It’s simply in the process of such proof,
permitting the plaintiff to present enough of the attending
circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference
or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the
defendant the burden of going forward with the proof to
the contrary. (Ramos v. CA)
Cases:
HABAGAT GRILL V. DMC - URBAN PROPERTY
DEVELOPER “Preponderance of evidence” means that the
evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. Where the evidence
presented by one side is insufficient to ascertain the claim,
there is no preponderance of evidence. In criminal cases in
which the quantum of evidence required is greater than in civil
cases, the testimony of only one witness – if credible,
straightforward, and worthy of belief – is sufficient to convict.
HUN HYUNG PARK V. EUNG WAN CHOI
In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the
accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies
the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two
aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary
value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the
case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to
the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as
to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not
insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then
the same evidence is likewise not
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insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of
evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is
insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not
follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a
preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer,
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds.
The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer
carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a
finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to
the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court,
the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect
of the case unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
B. Criminal cases (R133.2-4)
Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case,
the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. (2a)
See notes under R133.1
Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for
conviction. — An extrajudicial confession made by an accused,
shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (3)
Refer to notes under R130.33.
Corpus delicti: the body or substance of the crime
The actual commission by someone of the particular crime
charged. It’s a common fact made up of 2 things: a) the
existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the
criminal charge, and b) the existence of a criminal agency as
the cause of the act or the result.
Proved when the evidence on record shows that the crime
prosecuted had been committed
A mere voluntary extrajudicial confession uncorroborated by
independent proof of the corpus delicti is insufficient to sustain
a judgment of conviction. There must be independent proof of
the corpus delicti. The evidence may be circumstantial but, just
the same, there should be some evidence substantiating the
confession. (US v. de la Cruz)
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. —
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5)
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction even in
capital offenses, except when the law specifies the species and
quantum of evidence.
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
Not only the prior and coetaneous actuations of the accused in
relation to the crime but also his acts or conduct subsequent
thereto can be considered as circumstantial evidence of guilt.
While the motive of the accused is generally immaterial not
being an element of the crime, such motive becomes important
when the evidence of the crime is purely circumstantial.
RIANO:
A conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude
each and every hypothesis consistent w/ innocence. If the
totality of the circumstances eliminates beyond reasonable
doubt the possibility of innocence, conviction is proper.
Cases:
UNGSOD V. PEOPLE
· Circumstantial evidence: that w/c goes to prove a fact or
series of facts other than the facts in issue, which, if proved,
may tend by inference to establish a fact in issue.
· Standard that courts should observe in appreciating
circumstantial evidence, as discussed in People v. Modesto:
“No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity
of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice.
All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
It has been said, and we believe correctly, that the
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which
points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person. From all the circumstances, there should be
a combination of evidence which in the ordinary and
natural course of things leaves no room for reasonable
doubt as to his guilt.”
MARTURILLAS V. PEOPLE
Conviction in a criminal case does not require a degree of proof
that, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of
proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
PEOPLE V. VILLANUEVA
To sustain a conviction under a single prosecution witness,
such testimony needs only to establish sufficiently: 1) the
identity of the buyer, seller, object and consideration; and 2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.
PEOPLE V. DEL MUNDO
On the non-presentation of the informant, the rule is that his
presentation in an illegal drugs case is not essential for the
conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution
because his testimony would merely be corroborative and
cumulative. Informants are generally not presented in court
because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their
invaluable service to the police. Here, the agents directly
testified regarding the entrapment, and the testimony of the
informant would merely have been corroborative
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PEOPLE V. PADUA
Conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld,
provided the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that
points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person.
C. Administrative cases (R133.5)
Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. — In cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)
Substantial evidence doesn’t necessarily mean preponderant
proof as required in ordinary civil cases, but such kind of
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion (Biak-na-bato Mining Co. v.
Tanco), or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent
men in the conduct of their affairs. (EO 292)
Cases:
REYES V. MANGINO
· It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden
of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of
rests on the complainant.
· Even in administrative cases, the Rules of Court requires
that if a judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or
any graver offense, the evidence against him should be
competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary to
which the respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of
its members could be faulted, competent evidence should be
presented, since the charge is penal in character. Thus, the
ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the
charge on which removal is sought is misconduct in office,
willful neglect, corruption, or incompetence. The general rules
in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.
RAMOS VDA. DE BRIGINO V. RAMOS
Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction
is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only
respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Such findings deserve full respect and, without justifiable
reason, ought not to be altered, modified or reversed.
D. Credibility of witnesses
RIANO:
Credibility of the witness refers to the believability of the
witness and has nothing to do with the law or the rules. It refers
to the weight and trustworthiness or reliability of the testimony.
· Questions concerning the credibility of a witness are best
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court as it is in the
best position to observe his demeanor and bodily movements.
Cases:
PEOPLE V. DOMINGCIL
evidence | 1st sem, 2011-2012
The evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses
is entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case.
PEOPLE V. ALCANTARA
We have followed the rule in accord with human nature and
experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial
matters serve to strengthen, rather than destroy, the credibility
of a witness, especially of witnesses to crimes shocking to
conscience and numbing to senses.
ysr
PEOPLE V.
MONTEIRO
The trial court should have applied R133.7 on evidence on
motion. In Sapida v De Villanueva, the SC had ruled that
“while the court may rule upon motions solely on the basis of
affidavits and counter-affidavits, if the affidavits contradict
each other on matters of fact, the court can have no basis to
make its findings of facts and the prudent course is to subject
the affiants to cross-examination so that the court can decide
whom to believe.”

E. Termination of presentation of evidence (R133.6)

Sec. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. — The
court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon
any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so
full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be
reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this
power should be exercised with caution. (6)

The court has the power to stop the introduction of

testimony which will merely be cumulative. (Guinea v. Vda de
Pamonal)

Case:

PEOPLE V. SUBIDA
While justice must be administered with dispatch, the
essential ingredient is that the proceedings must be orderly
expeditious and not merely speedy. The judicial conscience
certainly cannot rest easy on a conviction based solely on
prosecution evidence just because the presentation of the
defense evidence had been barred by technicality.
· Records show that respondent was present during the trial and presumably was ready to continue with the presentation of his
evidence and the testimony of his witnesses. He had no inkling why his counsel did not appear for trial. That the absence of his counsel
could not have been deliberate is evidenced by the fact that it was only he who was absent.

F. Evidence on motion (R133.7)

Sec. 7. Evidence on motion. — When a motion is based on
facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter
on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective
parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard
wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. (7)

While the court may hear and rule upon motions solely on
the basis of affidavits or counter-affidavits, if the affidavits
contradict each other on matters of fact, the court can have
no basis to make its findings of fact and the prudent course is
to subject the affiants to cross-examination so that the court
can decide whom to believe. (Sapida v. De Villanueva)

Cases:

BRAVO, JR. V. BORJA

Evidence of petitioner's minority was already a part of the
record of the case [copy of birth cert attached in his
memorandum in support of the motion for bail]. It was
properly filed in support of a motion. It would be a needless
formality to offer it in evidence. Respondent Judge therefore
acted with grave abuse of discretion in disregarding it.

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