Labor Case Digest - Bana PDF

LABOR LAW CASE DIGEST
JOHN MARCUS BANA

G.R. No. 219238
1.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
MOISES DEJOLDE, JR. y SALINO, Accused-Appellant
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Appellant was charged for Illegal Recruitment Committed in Large Scale and 2 counts of
Estafa.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of private complainants Naty
Loman (Naty), Jessie Doculan (Jessie), and Roseliene Marcos. They testified that the
appellant recruited them to work as caregivers in the United Kingdom; that he charged
them ₱450,000.00 each for the processing of their visas and cost of plane fares; that Naty
paid appellant the amount of ₱400,000.00 while Jessie gave the amount of ₱450,000.00;
that they later discovered that the visas were fake and that appellant was not authorized
by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA); that they demanded
the return of their monies; and that appellant returned only the amounts of ₱50,000.00 to
Naty and ₱10,000.00 to Jessie.
Appellant, on the other hand, denied that he recruited private complainants to work as
caregivers in the United Kingdom.1awp++i1 He testified that he was engaged in the
business of processing student visa applications for those who want to study in the
United Kingdom; that the sums of money he received from private complainants were
for the payment of school tuition fees and the processing of the student visas; and that he
was not able to process their applications or refund their money because he was arrested.
ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.
RULING:
1|P age
The Court held in affirmative.
After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds that the prosecution,
through its witnesses, was able to prove that appellant recruited private complainants for
employment as caregivers in the United Kingdom and that he collected money from them
in the process. Appellant's defense of mere denial could not prevail over the positive
testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses as the Court often views with disfavor the
defense of denial, especially if it is not substantiated by any clear and convincing
evidence.11
2|P age
G.R. No. 215281
2.ROLANDO DE ROCA, Petitioner

vs.
EDUARDO C. DABUY AN, JENNIFER A. BRANZUELA, JENNYL YN A. RI CARTE,
and HERMINIGILDO F. SABANATE, Respondents
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Factual Antecedents
As found by the CA, the facts are as follows:
In 2012, private respondents filed a complaint6 for illegal dismissal against "RAF Mansion
Hotel Old Management and New Management and Victoriano Ewayan." Later, private
respondents amended the complaint and included petitioner Rolando De Roca as [co]-
respondent. Summons was sent through registered mail to petitioner but it was returned.
On 18 April 2012, private respondents submitted their position paper. On the same day,
petitioner filed his motion to dismiss7 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He alleged
that[,] while he [was] the owner of RA.F Mru1sion Hotel building, the same [was being]
leased by Victoriano Ewayan., the owner of Oceanics Travel and Tour Agency. Petitioner
claims that Ewayan was the employer of private respondents, Consequently, he asserted
that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and private respondents
and the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Can the procedure of NLRC be set aside?
RULING:
Yes. In this case, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result
from the strict application of the [r]ules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the
3|P age
interest of substantial justice. It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to
effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Thus, if the application of the rules
would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice. it is always within our power to
suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation. 26
Taking this to mind, the labor tribunals and the CA should have considered petitioner’s
repeated pleas to scrutinize the facts and particularly the lease agreement executed by
him and Oceanic, which would naturally exculpate him from liability as this would prove
the absence of an employment relation between him and respondents. The only claim
respondents have in resorting to implead petitioner as a corespondent in the labor case is
the fact that he is the owner of the entire building called "RAF Mansion Hotel" which
happens to be the very same name of the hotel which Ewayan and Oceanic continued to
adopt, for reasons not evident in the pleadings. It must be noted as well that when they
originally filed the labor case, respondents did not include petitioner as respondent
therein. And that when the private respondent, in this case, pleaded the petitioner it is
merely an afterthought.
4|P age
GR. 222219
3.GERALDO VS BILL SENDER CORPORATION,ET.AL.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
On June 20, 1997, respondent The Bill Sender Corporation, engaged in the business of
delivering bills and other mail matters for and in behalf of their customers, employed
petitioner Reynaldo S. Geraldo as a delivery/messenger man to deliver the bills of its
client, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). He was paid on a "per-
piece basis," the amount of his salary depending on the number of bills he delivered. On
February 6, 2012, Geraldo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal alleging that on August
7, 2011, the company's operations manager, Mr. Nicolas Constantino, suddenly informed
him that his employment was being terminated because he failed to deliver certain bills.
Company countered that Geraldo was not a full time employee but only a piece-rate
worker as he reported to work only as he pleased and that it was a usual practice for
messengers to transfer from one company to another to similarly deliver bills and mail
matters. Moreover, contrary to Geraldo's claims, the company asserts that he was not
illegally dismissed for he was the one who abandoned his job when he no longer reported
for work. Thus, the burden was on him to substantiate his claims for illegal dismissal. [4]
ISSUE: Whether Gerardo is a regular employee.
RULING: The Court held in affirmative.
5|P age
To determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable connection between
the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or
trade of the employer. If the employee has been performing the job for at least one year,
even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the
repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity,
if not indispensability, of that activity to the business.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the company was engaged in the business of
delivering bills and other mail matters for and in behalf of their customers, and that
Geraldo was engaged as a delivery/messenger man tasked to deliver bills of the
company's clients. Clearly, the company cannot deny the fact that Geraldo was
performing activities necessary or desirable in its usual business or trade for without his
services, its fundamental purpose of delivering bills cannot be accomplished. On this
basis alone, the law deems Geraldo as a regular employee of the company. But even
considering that he is not a full time employee as the company insists, the law still deems
his employment as regular due to the fact that he had been performing the activities for
more than one year.
We held that the payment on a piece-rate basis does not negate regular employment. The
term "wage" is broadly defined in Article 97 of the Labor Code as remuneration or
earnings, capable of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on
a time, task, piece or commission basis. Payment by the piece is just a method of
compensation and does not define the essence of the relations. Thus, the fact that Geraldo
is paid on the basis of his productivity does not render his employment as contractual.
The Court, however, finds that apart from this self-serving allegation, the company failed
to adduce proof of overt acts on the part of Geraldo showing his intention to abandon his
work. Time and again, the Court has held that to justify a finding of abandonment of
work, there must be proof of a deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of an
6|P age
employee to resume his employment. The records reveal that he (Gerardo) even sought
permission to return to work but was rejected by the company.
7|P age
G.R. No. 215111
4.ABOSTA SHIPMANAGEMENT CORPORATION, PANSTAR SHIPPING CO.,

LTD., AND/OR GAUDENCIO MORALES, Petitioners
vs.
RODEL D. DELOS REYES, Respondent
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Abosta Shipmanagement Corp. (Abosta) is a duly licensed manning agency

while petitioner Panstar Shipping, Co., Ltd. (Panstar) is a foreign principal agency based
in Korea.5 Petitioner Gaudencio Morales, on the other hand, is an officer of petitioner
Abosta.6
On March 30, 2010, petitioner employed respondent as a bosun on board the vessel MV
Stellar Daisy for a period of nine months.7 Before boarding the vessel, respondent
underwent a Pre-Employment Medical Examination and was declared fit to work. 8
Sometime in July 2010, respondent complained of pain in his groin while performing his
duties.9 He received treatment in Korea and was diagnosed with Inguinal Hernia. 10
On August 1, 2010, respondent was repatriated and medically examined by the company-
designated physician. 11On August 23, 2010, upon recommendation of the company-
designated physician, respondent underwent right inginual herniorrhaphy with mesh
imposition. 12On August 25, 2010, respondent was discharged from the hospital and was
paid two months sickness allowance. 13On September 2, 2010, 14 respondent was declared
fit to work by the company-designated physician.15
On July 19, 2011, respondent consulted Dr. Li-Ann Lara- Orencia (Dr. Orencia), who
found him to be permanently unfit to work and suffering from a Grade 1 disability. 16 In
the Medical Certificate, 17 she stated that:
8|P age
ISSUE: Whether the referral of a third doctor is mandatory.
Our Ruling
Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC provides that:
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may
be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall
be final and binding on both parties.
Based on the above-cited provision, the referral to a third doctor is mandatory when: (1)
there is a valid and timely assessment by the company-designated physician and (2) the
appointed doctor of the seafarer refuted such assessment
Similarly, in this case, respondent, after consulting with Dr. Orencia, who happened to
be the same doctor in Marlow, failed to refer the conflicting medical assessments to a third
doctor. The Court has consistently ruled that in case of conflicting medical assessments,
referral to a third doctor is mandatory; and that in the absence of a third doctor's opinion,
it is the medical assessment of the company-designated physician that should prevail.
9|P age
G.R. No. 222710
5.PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, CHAIRPERSON MICHAEL G. AGUINALDO,
DIRECTOR JOSEPH B. ANACAY AND SUPERVISING AUDITOR ELENA L.
AGUSTIN, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
GESMUNDO, J.:
Antecedents
On March 25, 1992, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7305, otherwise known as the Magna Carta
of Public Health Workers, was signed into law. Section 23 thereof granted longevity pay
to a health worker, to wit:
Pursuant to R.A. No. 7305, former Department of Health (DOH) Secretary Alberto G.
Romualdez, Jr., issued a Certification5 dated February 20, 2000, declaring PhilHealth
officers and employees as public health workers.
On August 1, 2011, former PhilHealth President and Chief Executive Officer Dr. Rey B.
Aquino issued Office Order No. 0053, Series of 2011,7 prescribing the guidelines on the
grant of longevity pay, incorporating it in the basic salary of qualified PhilHealth
employees for the year 2011 and every year thereafter.On January 31, 2012, the PhilHealth
Board passed and approved Resolution No. 1584, Series of 2012, which confirmed the
grant of longevity pay to its officers and employees for the period January to September
2011, in the total amount of P5,575,294.70.8
The COA stating that the grant of longevity pay to PhilHealth officers and employees
lacked legal basis, and thus, should be disallowed.
On May 18, 2012, PhilHealth asserted that its personnel were public health workers,
pursuant to the DOH Certification dated February 20, 2000, and OGCC Opinion No. 064,
10 | P a g e
Series of 2001 dated April 26, 2011, and hence, are entitled to longevity pay under R.A.
No. 7305.
In its July 24, 2018 Decision, the Court said that PhilHealth personnel's functions are not
principally related to health service because their service pertains to the effective
administration of the National Health Insurance Program, or facilitating the availability
of funds of health services to its covered employees.. Thus, as PhilHealth's employees are
not considered health workers, they are not entitled to longevity pay under R.A. No. 7305.
ISSUE:
WHETHER PHILHEALTH PERSONNEL ARE PUBLIC HEALTH WORKERS AS

DEFINED AND DETERMINED UNDER [R.A. No.] 7305 AND ITS IRR.
The Court's Ruling
The Court ruled in affirmative.
Notably, R.A. No. 11223 provides plainly, the law states that all personnel of the
PhilHealth are public health workers in accordance with R.A. No. 7305. This confirms
that PhilHealth personnel are covered by the definition of a public health worker. In other
words, R.A. No. 11223 is a curative statute that remedies the shortcomings of R.A. No.
7305 with respect to the classification of PhilHealth personnel as public health workers.
In this case, while the Court initially declared that PhilHealth personnel were not public
health workers in its July 24, 2018 Decision and that ND No. H.O. 12-005 (11) was final
and executory, the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 11223, which transpired after the
promulgation of its decision, convinces the Court to review its ruling. Thus, R.A. No.
11223 is a curative legislation that benefits PhilHealth personnel and has retrospective
application to pending proceedings
11 | P a g e
G.R. No. 236576
6. ARIEL P. HORLADOR, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS,

INC., MARINE* SHIPMANAGEMENT LTD., AND CAPTAIN MARLON L.
MALANAO, Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Facts
Respondents averred that petitioner is not entitled to permanent and total disability
benefits, contending that petitioner: (a) was not medically repatriated as his discharge
from the vessel was due to contract completion; (b) failed to comply with the mandatory
post-deployment medical examination; and (c) failed to prove his allegation that he had
contracted and was diagnosed with hernia.12
In a Decision13 dated September 27, 2013, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed petitioner's
complaint for lack of merit, essentially upholding respondents' contentions in this
case.14The NLRC reversed and set aside the LA's decision. The CA affirmed the NLRC
ruling, with modification deleting the award of attorney's fees
ISSUE: The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly deleted
the award of attorney's fees in petitioner's favor.
RULING:
No. The CA is not correct to delete the award of attorney’s fee.
There are two (2) commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees - the ordinary and
extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation
paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services the former renders; compensation is
12 | P a g e
paid for the cost and/or results of legal services per agreement or as may be assessed. In
its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by
the court to be paid by the losing party to the winning party. The instances when these
may be awarded are enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code and is payable not to
the lawyer but to the client, unless the client and his lawyer have agreed that the award
shall accrue to the lawyer as additional or part of compensation.
In this case, suffice it to say that the CA erred in deleting the award of attorney's fees,
considering that petitioner was found to be entitled to permanent and total disability
benefits and was forced to litigate to protect his valid claim.
13 | P a g e
G.R. No. 232275
7. SOLPIA MARINE AND SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioner, v. MICHAEL V.

POSTRANO, Respondent.
TIJAM, J.:
The Facts
Respondent Michael V. Postrano (Postrano) was engaged by petitioner Solpia Marine and
Ship Management, Inc. (Solpia) as an able seaman aboard MV Daebo IBT, for and in
behalf of its principal Daebo Ship Management Co. Postrano's work involved strenuous
manual work. On December 9, 2012, Postrano sustained a fracture on his right hand and
an open wound on his left hand when he was pinned while arranging a ladder
Upon his arrival, Postrano was referred to the YGEIA Medical Center, Inc. for x-ray. The
results of the same disclosed that his right forearm suffered incomplete fracture on the
middle third shaft of the right ulna. The company-designated physician then prescribed
medication for pain management.On February 5, 2013, Postrano was advised to undergo
physical therapy. However, he opted, with permission, to continue the same in
Compostela Valley as it is his place of residence. The permission secured was with the
condition that Postrano must return to the company-designated physician for follow-up.7
Issue
Is Postrano entitled to the award of permanent and total disability benefits?
Ruling of the Court
14 | P a g e
No. The respondent is not entitled for the award of permanent and total disability
benefits.
Respondent shall submit himself to a post employment medical examination by a

company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when
he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within
the same period is deemed as compliance. x x x Failure of the seafarer to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the
above benefits.
In this case, Postrano was repatriated on January 1, 2013. Upon his return, he was referred
to the company-designated physician for examination and the latter prescribed
medication for Postrano's condition. He was then advised to undergo physical therapy
sessions for the betterment of his condition. After completing ten sessions of physical
therapy or on March 14, 2013, he reported to the company-designated physician who
further advised him to continue with said therapy as his condition was notably
improving. He was also asked to report again for a follow-up. However, Postrano failed
to return to the company-designated physician after completing another series of
physical therapy sessions. It bears stressing that when Postrano reported on March 14,
2013, it had only been 72 days since he was first attended to by said doctor. During such
time, Postrano was only suffering from temporary total disability since the 120 day-
period had not yet lapsed. We cannot give credence to Postrano's position that the
company-designated physician's failure to give him a disability grading automatically
amounts to a declaration that he is indeed suffering from a total permanent disability.
Without the final assessment of the company-designated physician, Postrano is deemed

suffering from temporary total disability. More so, the 120 day-period provided by law
had not yet lapsed.
15 | P a g e
G.R. No. 229302
8. CONSOLIDATED DISTILLERS OF THE FAR EAST, INC., Petitioner, v. ROGEL N.

ZARAGOZA, Respondent.
CAGUIOA, J.:
Facts
The present case is an offshoot of the petition entitled Consolidated Distillers of the Far East,
Inc. v. Rogel N. Zaragoza
After the finality of the resolution of the Court in G.R. No. 196038 on March 30, 2012,
Rogel moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution against Condis for his
reinstatement, and the payment of full backwages, accrued salaries and allowances as of
December 3, 2012, less the P454,986.98 that was already released to him by the LA
pending appeal (Execution Proceedings).8 Condis opposed the motion and argued that
its execution of the Asset Purchase Agreement with Emperador Distillers, Inc. (EDI) was
a supervening event that made it impossible to reinstate Rogel to his former position.
Issues
Whether the petitioner was liable for backwages and separation pay.
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the CA that Condis is liable for backwages and separation pay
until the finality of the decision awarding separation pay
16 | P a g e
The Supreme Court held therein that when there is a supervening event that renders
reinstatement impossible, backwages is computed from the time of dismissal until the
finality of the decision ordering separation pay,20 thus:
x x x when separation pay is ordered after the finality of the decision ordering the
reinstatement by reason of a supervening event that makes the award of reinstatement
no longer possible (as in the case), backwages is computed from the time of dismissal
until the finality of the decision ordering separation pay.21
The reason for this, as the Court explained in Bani, is that "[w]hen there is an order of
separation pay (in lieu of reinstatement or when the reinstatement aspect is waived or
subsequently ordered in light of a supervening event making the award of reinstatement
no longer possible), the employment relationship is terminated only upon the finality
of the decision ordering the separation pay. The finality of the decision cuts-off the
employment relationship and represents the final settlement of the rights and
obligations of the parties against each other."22
Here, the award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, which Condis does not
question, was made subsequent to the finality of the Decision in the Illegal Dismissal Case
(G.R. No. 196038). Condis cannot therefore evade its liability to Rogel for backwages and
separation pay computed until the finality of this Decision which affirms the order
granting separation pay
17 | P a g e
GR No. 225125
9. MARLON L. ARCILLA, PETITIONER, VS. ZULISIBS, INC., PIANDRE SALON, AND
ROSALINDA FRANCISCO, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Facts
Respondent Zulisibs, Inc. (Zulisibs) is a corporation organized and existing under

Philippine lan establishment engaged in the operation of beauty salons.
Petitioner Marlon L. Arcilla (Marlon) was hired by Piandre on 8 February 2000 and was
assigned to the Alabang, Muntinlupa City branch. After several years Marlon were
promoted as senior hair stylists Zulisibs, through its officers, received information that
Marlon was establishing a beauty salon
On 6 September 2014, Marlon received a notice from Piandre and Francisco placing
Marlon under preventive suspension from 6 to 14 September 2014 and requiring him to
appear on 12 September 2014 at Francisco's office in Sta. Ana, Manila.
The Issues
1. Whether Marlon's dismissal to be valid and for just cause, and effected after due
notice and hearing.
The Ruling of this Court
18 | P a g e
The Court held in affirmative. Dismissals under the Labor Code have two facets: the
legality of the act of dismissal, which constitutes substantive due process; and the legality
of the manner of dismissal, which constitutes procedural due process.[14] The requirement
of procedural due process was met when Marlon was served with a first written notice
containing the specific causes or grounds for his termination, when Marlon was called to
attend an investigative hearing to explain his side, and when Marlon was served with a
second written notice containing the justification for his termination.
19 | P a g e
G.R. No. 195614
10. DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC./JOHN GOKONGWEI,

JR., Petitioner
vs.
NEILSON M. AYAPANA, Respondent
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
THE FACTS
Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (petitioner or company) hired respondent as

Key Accounts Manager for its telecommunication products and services in the areas of
Quezon. Respondent was tasked, among others, to offer and sell DIGITEL's foreign
exchange (FEX) line to prospective customers. On 6 September 2006, respondent
successfully offered two (2) FEX lines. He received from Lim the total amount of
₱7,000.00 (the subject amount) for the two lines, for which he issued two (2) official receipts.
Respondent, however, did not remit the subject amount to petitioner on the same date.On
7 September 2006, petitioner's sales team, which included respondent, held a meeting
during which respondent learned, from his immediate superior, that there was no
available FEX line in Atimonan, Quezon; and that it was not possible to have a FEX line
in the area due to technical constraints.
Issue: Was respondent validly dismissed?
RULING:
20 | P a g e
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or the
latter's duly authorized representative is a just cause for dismissal.1âwphi1 However, the
validity of a dismissal based on this ground is premised upon the concurrence of these
conditions: (1) the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and
confidence; and (2) there must be a willful act that would justify the loss of trust and
confidence. It is not disputed that respondent was tasked to solicit subscribers for
petitioner's FEX line and, in the course thereof, collect money for subscriptions and issue
official receipts therefor, as was the case in the transaction subject of this controversy.
Being involved in the handling of the company's funds, respondent undeniably occupies
a position of trust and confidence.It is uncontroverted that respondent took part in a
series of irregularities relative to his transaction with Lim, he offered an inexistent FEX
line to Lim, for which he received a subscription payment of ₱7,000.00. Even granting he
did not know that the Atimonan line was unavailable at the time he offered the same to
Lim, he was remiss in not ascertaining its availability before he concluded his transaction
with Lim and received from her the subscription payment.
21 | P a g e
G.R. No. 230030
11. PHILIPPINE PIZZA, INC., Petitioner, v. JENNY PORRAS* CAYETANO, RIZALDO

G. AVENIDO, PEE JAY T. GURION, RUMEL A. RECTO, ROGELIO T. SUMBANG,
JR., AND JIMMY J. DELOSO, RESPONDENTS, Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE J.:
The Facts
On various dates,7 respondents were hired by CBMI, a job contractor which provides
kitchen, delivery, sanitation, and allied services to PPI's 8 Pizza Hut chain of restaurants
(Pizza Hut),9 and were thereafter deployed to the various branches of the latter.
Respondents alleged that they rendered work for Pizza Hut, ranging from seven (7) to
eleven (11) years, hence, they were regular employees of PPI and not of CBMIFor its part,
PPI denied any employer-employee relationship with respondents, averring that it
entered into several Contracts of Services14 with CBMI to perform janitorial, bussing,
kitchen, table service, cashiering, warehousing, delivery, and allied services in PPI's
favor.
On the other hand, CBMI admitted that respondents were its employees, and that it paid
their wages and remitted their SSS,16 PhilHealth,17 and Pag-IBIG18 contributions. It
insisted that it is a legitimate job contractor, as it possesses substantial capital and a
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Certificate of Registration; 19 undertakes
a business separate and distinct from that of PPI based on its Articles of
Incorporation;20 and more importantly, retained and exercised the right of control over
respondents.
22 | P a g e
The Issues Before the Court
Whether or not that CBMI is engaged in a prohibited labor-only contracting arrangement

with PPI.
The Court's Ruling
No. The Court finds that CBMI operates their business legitimately.
The court found that CBMI is a legitimate job contractor, as it has sufficient capital and
investment to properly carry out its obligation with PPI, as well as adequate funds to
cover its operational expenses. It also observed that CBMI is presumed to have complied
with all the requirements of a legitimate job contractor in light of the Certificate of
Registration issued by the DOLE, thus it gives a presumption that its operation is
legitimate.30
The Court also held that there was no employer-employee relationship between PPI and
respondents, observing that the mere issuance of Pizza Hut's certifications was
insufficient to show the element of control. On the contrary, CBMI was the one which
ultimately exercised control and supervision over respondents, as it assigned at least one
(1) supervisor in respondents' respective workplaces to regularly control, supervise, and
monitor their attendance and performance.31
Furthermore, the existence of the element of control can also be inferred from CBMI's act
of subjecting respondents to disciplinary sanctions for violations of company rules and
regulations as evidenced by the various Offense Notices and Memoranda 52 issued to
them. Additionally, records show that CBMI employed measures to ensure the
observance of due process before subjecting respondents to disciplinary action.
Lastly, the NLRC correctly found that no employer-employee relationship exists between
PPI and respondents, and that the latter were employees of CBMI. Records reveal that
respondents applied for work with CBMI and were consequently selected and hired by
23 | P a g e
the latter. From all indications, the Court finds that CBMI is a legitimate job contractor,
and thus, the employer of respondents.
G.R. No. 181154
12. RAMCHRISEN H. HAVERIA, Petitioner, v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM,

CORAZON DE LA PAZ, AND LEONORA S. NUQUE, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Facts
Haveria was employed with the SSS from May 1958 to July 1984. 6 During his
employment, he became a member of, and was elected as an officer/treasurer of the SSS
Employees' Association (SSSEA). He was reported by the SSSEA as an employee for SSS
coverage and Haveria's membership was approved. Thereafter, the SSSEA remitted his
monthly contributions from May 1966 to December 1981. 7
In June 2002, Haveria received a letter 9 from the SSS which ordered the suspension of
Haveria's retirement benefits. The SSS held that they were not entitled to any benefits
under the Social Security Act of 1997 or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 828210 (SS Law) as there
was no employment relationship between the two and the SSSEA. 11
In a Resolution13 dated December 7, 2005, the SSC held that Haveria's coverage under the
SSS was erroneous. It pointed out that Haveria was not an employee of the SSSEA, but of
24 | P a g e
the SSS, a government agency. The SSC also said that Haveria cannot also claim coverage
under the expanded coverage scheme of the SSS which allowed the inclusion of self-
employed workers, precisely because he claimed coverage as an employee of the SSSEA.
The SSS contends that the SSSEA is not an employer but a mere labor association within
the SSS. It does not undertake any kind of business or service. It merely acts as
representative of the members of the association. Furthermore, Haveria's relationship
with the SSSEA did not pass the four-fold test.17 He was not hired by SSSEA but merely
elected by its members as an officer/treasurer. He was not receiving a salary but merely
an honorarium. Moreover, Haveria was employed with the SSS. He could not have been
an employee of the SSSEA at the same time as he was a full-time government employee.
Issue
Whether Haveria's inclusion as a compulsory member of the SSS was valid and
consequently, whether he is entitled to receive monthly pensions.
The Court's Ruling
No.
For compulsory members, both the employer and employee contribute to the employee's
monthly premium contributions.22 Voluntary members pay for their own monthly
premiums; as such, they are required to pay twice the amount of the employee's
contribution Haveria was reported by the SSSEA as an employee, and he claims coverage
as a compulsory member of the SSS. As correctly held by the SSC and CA, the SSSEA, a
labor organization, cannot be considered an employer under the law. The Labor Code
25 | P a g e
expressly excludes labor organizations from the definition of an employer, except when
they directly hire employees to render services for the union.
G.R. No. 207252
13. PHILIPPINE GEOTHERMAL, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION (PGIEU), Petitioner,

v. CHEVRON GEOTHERMAL PHILS. HOLDINGS, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
The Facts
Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization and the certified bargaining agent of the rank-
and-file employees of Chevron Geothermal Phils. Holdings, Inc. (respondent).5
On July 31, 2008, the petitioner and respondent formally executed a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) which was made effective for the period from November 1, 2007 until
October 31, 2012. Under Article VII, Section 1 thereof, there is a stipulation governing
salary increases of the respondent's rank-and-file employees.On October 6, 2009, a letter
dated September 20, 2009 was sent by the petitioner's President to respondent expressing,
on behalf of its members, the concern that the aforesaid CBA provision and implementing
rules were not being implemented properly pursuant to the guidelines and that, if not
addressed, might result to a salary distortion among union members. 7
Petitioner averred that respondent breached their CBA provision on worker's wage
increase because it granted salary increase even to probationary employees in
contravention of the express mandate of that particular CBA article and implementing
guidelines that salary increases were to be given only to regular employees. Respondent
26 | P a g e
asserted that the salary increase is a result of their being hired on different dates,
regularization at different occasion and difference in their hiring rates at the time of their
employment.
The Issues
Whether or not the grant of wage increase of the such employees is a valid exercise of
management prerogative.
Ruling of the Court
Yes.
Management prerogative gives an employer freedom to regulate according to their

discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment including work assignment,
working methods, the processes to be followed, working regulations, transfer of
employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall
of workers.26 This right is tempered only by these limitations: that it must be exercised
in good faith and with due regard to the rights of the employees.27
The alleged increase in their salaries was not a result of the erroneous application of
Article VII and Annex D of the CBA, rather, it was because when they were hired by
respondent in 2009, when the hiring rates were relatively higher as compared to those of
the previous years. Verily, the setting and implementation of such various engagement
rates were purely an exercise of the respondent's business prerogative in order to attract
or lure the best possible applicants in the market and which We will not interfere with,
absent any showing that it was exercised in bad faith.
27 | P a g e
G.R. No. 215504
14. SOCIETE INTERNATIONALE DE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

AERONAUTIQUES (SITA), SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING COMPUTING
B.V. (SITA, INC.), EQUANT SERVICES, INC. (EQUANT) and LEE CHEE
WEE, Petitioners
vs.
THEODORE L. HULIGANGA, Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Huliganga was hired by Societe International De Telecommunications

Aeronautiques (SITA) on April 16, 1980 as Technical Assistant to the Representative-
Manager. Eventually, he became the Country Operating Officer, the highest accountable
officer of SIT A in the Philippines and his current position at the time of his retirement on
December 31, 2008. He received his retirement benefits computed at 1.5 months of basic
pay for each year of service, or the total amount of ₱7,495,102.84 in retirement and other
benefits.
According to petitioners, the 2006 CBA unequivocally provides that managerial

employees, like Huliganga, are excluded from its coverage and application, thus, the
provisions of the CBA should not be extended to him as there is no basis to warrant the
same. Petitioners also argue that there is no credible evidence submitted by Huliganga
that it has been an established practice of SIT A to amend its employment regulations for
28 | P a g e
personnel recruited by SIT A Philippines by adopting the improved economic benefits in
the CBA.
ISSUE: Whether respondent has the right to assert his claim of unclaimed retirement
benefits.
RULING.
No. Respondent has no right to assert the claim of unclaimed retirement benefit.
According to petitioners, the 2006 CBA unequivocally provides that managerial

employees, like Huliganga, are excluded from its coverage and application, thus, the
provisions of the CBA should not be extended to him as there is no basis to warrant the
same.
It is an indisputable fact that Huliganga was a managerial employee of SITA and, as such,
he is not entitled to retirement benefits exclusively granted to the rank-and-file
employees under the CBA. It must be remembered that under Article 245 of the Labor
Code, managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization.14 [T]o be entitled to the benefits under the CBA, the employees must be
members of the bargaining unit, but not necessarily of the labor organization designated
as the bargaining agent.
29 | P a g e
G.R. 226002
15. LINO A. FERNANDEZ, JR., PETITIONER, VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
(MERALCO), RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Fernandez was an employee of respondent Manila Electric Company

(MERALCO) from October 3, 1978 until his termination on September 14, 2000 for
allegedly participating in an illegal strike.[5] As a result, he filed a case for illegal dismissal
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is entitled for the separation pay.
RULING:
Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled
to reinstatement as a matter of right.[30] The award of separation pay is a mere
exception to the rule.[31] It is made an alternative relief in lieu of reinstatement in certain
circumstances, and one of it is when strained relations between the employer and
employee.[32]
Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay is considered an
30 | P a g e
acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or
viable. The doctrine of strained relations should not be used recklessly or applied loosely
nor be based on impression alone.[34] It cannot be applied indiscriminately since every
labor dispute almost invariably results in "strained relations;" otherwise, reinstatement
can never be possible simply because some hostility is engendered between the parties
as a result of their disagreement.[35] Strained relations must be demonstrated as a fact.
31 | P a g e
G.R. No. 203185
16. SUPERIOR MAINTENANCE SERVICES, INC., AND MR. GUSTAVO
TAMBUNTING PETITIONERS, VS. CARLOS BERMEO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
A. REYES, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Superior Maintenance is a manpower agency engaged in the business of supplying

janitorial services to its clients. In 1991, it hired Bermeo as a janitor for its clients. Through
the years, Bermeo was assigned to several establishments. He was last stationed at
Trinoma Mall until the end of contract on March 30, 2008. [4]On August 28, 2008, Bermeo
was deployed to French Baker at SM Marikina, one of Superior Maintenance's clients;
however, French Baker asked for a replacement upon learning that Bermeo was already
54 years old.On September 5, 2008, Bermeo filed a Complaint [6] before the Labor Arbiter
(LA) against the petitioners for constructive dismissal with claim for separation pay.The
LA found that Bermeo was constructively dismissed because no work was offered to him
even during the pendency of the proceedings before it, such that the period of his floating
status had already expired. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the findings of the LA and
ruled that Bermeo was not constructively dismissed from work. The NLRC concluded
that the complaint was prematurely filed, as Bermeo's floating status was short of the six
months required for it to ripen to constructive dismissal
ISSUE: Whether Bermeo was constructively dismissed from work
32 | P a g e
Ruling of the Court
No. Bermeo was not constructively dismissed from work.
In Salvaloza v. NLRC,[17] temporary off-detail or floating status was defined as that "period
of time when when the employees are in between assignments or when they are made to
wait after being relieved from a previous post until they are transferred to a new one.
In all cases however, the temporary lay-off wherein the employees cease to work should
not exceed six months, in consonance with Article 301 of the Labor Code. After six
months, the employees should either be recalled to work or permanently retrenched
following the requirements of the law. Otherwise, the employees are considered as
constructively dismissed from work and the agency can be held liable for such
dismissal.[22]
In the present controversy, when Bermeo filed his complaint for constructive dismissal
on September 5, 2008, it was only a week after his unsuccessful assignment in French
Baker on August 28, 2008. Even if the reckoning date would be his last assignment at
Trinoma Mall, which ended on March 30, 2008, it is still less than the six-month period
allowed by Article 301 for employees to be placed on floating status. Thus, the filing of
his complaint for constructive dismissal is premature. Besides, it is unrebutted that the
petitioners contacted Bermeo for a new assignment even after the latter has filed a
complaint for constructive dismissal. [26] Clearly, the LA erred in concluding that the
petitioners did not at any time offer any work assignment to Bermeo. [27]
33 | P a g e
G.R. No. 214667
17. LINGNAM RESTAURANT, Petitioner, v. SKILLS & TALENT EMPLOYMENT

POOL, INC., AND JESSIE COLASTE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Skills & Talent Employment Pool, Inc. (STEP) is a domestic corporation
engaged in manpower management and technical services, and one of its clients is
petitioner Lingnam Restaurant, a business enterprise owned and operated by Liberty C.
Nacion. In a contract2 of employment, respondent Jessie Colaste is a project employee of
respondent STEP assigned to work with petitioner Lingnam Restaurant as assistant cook.
On March 5, 2008, at about 10:00 a.m., Colaste reported to the main office of STEP at
Ortigas Center, Pasig City. He was informed by one Katherine R. Barrun that his contract
with Lingnam Restaurant had expired. In its Position Paper 5 dated August 8, 2008,
Lingnam Restaurant denied that it is the employer of complainant Jessie Colaste and
alleged that STEP is Colaste's real employer. Hence, it is not liable for the claims and
causes of action of Colaste, and that the complaint should be dismissed insofar as it is
concerned. STEP it alleged that it is an independent contractor engaged in the business
of rendering management and technical services
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent STEP is engaged in labor-only contracting; hence,

petitioner Lingnam Restaurant is the employer of complainant-respondent Jessie Colaste
and it is liable for Colaste's illegal dismissal.
34 | P a g e
RULING:
Lingnam Restaurant is the employer of Colaste, thus liable for the latter’s illegal
dismissal.
Labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor or

subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or
service for a principal, and any of the following elements are present:
i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment(Used
actually and directly by the subcontractor and contract in the performance or
completion of the job, work or service contracted out) which relates to the job, work or
service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such
contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the
main business of the principal; or
ii)The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work
of the contractual employee.
The principal shall be deemed the employer of the contractual employee in any of the
following cases, as declared by a competent authority:
(a) where there is labor-only contracting; or
As stated by the Court in PCI Automation Center, Inc. v. NLRC,24 the legitimate job
contractor provides services, while the labor-only contractor provides only manpower.
Guided by the provisions of law above, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that
respondent STEP was engaged in labor-only contracting.
35 | P a g e
G.R. No. 229955, July 23, 2018
18. MELCHOR BARCENAS DEOCARIZA, Petitioner, v. FLEET MANAGEMENT

SERVICES PHILIPPINES, INC., MODERN ASIA SHIPPING CORPORATION,
A.B.F. GAVIOLA, JR., AND MA. CORAZON CRUZ, Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Facts
Petitioner was initially hired in 2010 as Chief Officer by Fleet Management Services
Philippines., Inc., for and in behalf of its principal, Modern Asia Shipping Corporation
(collectively, respondents) on board the vessel, M.V. Morning Carina, a car and motor
carrier ship.
In the course of his employment, or on December 3, 2011, petitioner complained of

bruises on both thighs, rashes on his neck, delayed healing of abrasion wound on his left
forearm, fever, sore throat, and loss of appetite. He was medically repatriated on
December 26, 2011 and was, consequently, referred to a company-designated physician
at the Metropolitan Medical Center (MMC) who diagnosed him to be suffering from
"Aplastic Anemia."18On September 10, 2012, the company-designated physician informed
respondents that after petitioner was seen on August 29, 2012, the latter no longer
appeared at his next scheduled follow-up session on September 3, 2012.21
Meanwhile, claiming that his illness rendered him incapacitated to resume work as a
seafarer for more than 240 days, petitioner filed a complaint 22 dated April 16, 2013 against
respondents, for the payment of total and permanent disability benefits in accordance
with the CBA.
The Issue Before the Court
36 | P a g e
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.
The Court's Ruling
Pursuant to Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, the employer is liable for disability
benefits when the seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term
of his contract. A seafarer who knowingly conceals a pre-existing illness or condition in
the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) shall be liable for misrepresentation
and shall be disqualified from any compensation and benefits.Complainant's condition
may have been brought about by his artificial heart which he failed to disclose to the
company doctor during the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME).
An employer is absolved from liability when a seafarer suffers a work-related injury or

illness on account of the latter's willful concealment or misrepresentation of a pre-existing
condition or illness. Thus, the burden is on the employer to prove such concealment of
a pre-existing illness or condition on the part of the seafarer to be discharged from any
liability. In this regard, an illness shall be considered as pre-existing if prior to the
processing of the POEA contract, any of the following conditions is present, namely: (a)
the advice of a medical doctor on treatment was given for such continuing illness or
condition; or (b) the seafarer had been diagnosed and has knowledge of such illness or
condition but failed to disclose the same during the PEME, and such cannot be
diagnosed during the PEME.59
On the contrary, the Court finds the following pieces of evidence as substantial to support
a conclusion that petitioner had no mechanical heart valves.
37 | P a g e
GR No. 177059
19. La Rosa vs Ambassador Hotel
FACTS: On April 17, 2002, employees of Ambassador Hotel including herein petitioners
filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) several complaints, for
illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, and illegal deductions against the hotel (respondent)
and its manager, Yolanda L. Chan. They alleged that, following their filing of complaints
with the Department of Labor and Employment-NCR which prompted an inspection of
the hotel’s premises by a labor inspector, respondent was found to have been violating
labor standards laws and was thus ordered to pay them some money claims. This
purportedly angered respondent’s management which retaliated by suspending and/or
constructively dismissing them by drastically reducing their work days through the
adoption of a work reduction/rotation scheme.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is justified in reducing the work days.
RULING: No. Respondent was not justified in reducing the work days. The Court held
that the records fail, however, to show any documentary proof that the work reduction
scheme was adopted due to respondent’s business reverses. Respondent’s
memorandum dated April 5, 2000 (sic, should be 2002) informing petitioners of the
adoption of a two-day work scheme effective April 5, 2002 made no mention why such
scheme was being adopted. Neither do the records show any documentary proof that
respondent suffered financial losses to justify its adoption of the said scheme to stabilize
its operations
38 | P a g e
GR No. 111474
20. Five J Taxi vs NLRC
FACTS: Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by
the petitioners as taxi drivers and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour
shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or
P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car
washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their
"boundary," for every actual working day.
ISSUE: Whether the deposit for car wash payment was covered under the general
prohibition against deposit for loss or damage.
RULING:
No. Deposit for car wash payment is not covered under the general prohibition against
deposit. The Court elucidate in the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as
a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the
driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out,
and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s)
(private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the
amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find
nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver
as illegal deduction in the context of the law. It will be noted that there was nothing to
prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to
save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour
of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
39 | P a g e
GR No. 185814
21. SHS Perforated Materials , Inc. vs Diaz
FACTS: Petitioner’s President expressed his dissatisfaction over respondent’s poor

performance. On November 29, 2005, Hartmannshenn instructed Taguiang not to release
respondent’s salary. Later that afternoon, respondent called and inquired about his
salary. Taguiang informed him that it was being withheld and that he had to immediately
communicate with Hartmannshenn. But the respondent didn’t communicate
Hartmannsheen but rather serves a demand letter for the withhold salary and a
resignation letter a. Hartmannshenn then accepted respondent’s resignation and
informed him that his salary would be released upon explanation of his failure to report
to work, and proof that he did, in fact, work for the period in question. Respondent
interposes that the withholding of his salary amounted to unjust dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is justified in withholding respondent’ s salary.
RULING: The petitioner is not justified in withholding respondent’s salary. The Court
finds petitioners’ evidence insufficient to prove that respondent did not work. It is
elementary in Labor Law that when there is doubt it should be resolved in favor of the
worker. Therefore, the petitioner is not justified in withholding respondent’s salary for
the reason that he fails to satisfy the burden of proof of just dismissal.
40 | P a g e
G.R. No. 102636
22. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-
TUCP and ANTONIO V. BALINANG vs. NLRC and METROPOLITAN BANK and
TRUST COMPANY
FACTS:
On 25 May 1989, the bank entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the
MBTCEU, granting a monthly P900 wage increase effective 01 January 1989, P600 wage
increase 01 January 1990, and P200 wage increase effective 01 January 1991.
Consequently, only regular employees as of 01 January 1989 were given the increase to
the exclusion of probationary employees. Barely a month later, or on 01 January 1989,
Republic Act 6727- the law provides that the statutory minimum wages of all workers in
the private sector shall be increased by 25 pesos oer day, provided that those already
receiving the above minimum wages UP TO 100 pesos shall also receive an increase of 25
pesos per day.
Pursuant to the above provisions, the bank gave the P25 increase per day, or P750 a
month, to its probationary employees and to those who had been promoted to regular or
permanent status before 01 July 1989 but whose daily rate was P100 and below. The bank
refused to give the same increase to its regular employees who were receiving more than
P100 per day and recipients of the P900 CBA increase.
ISSUE: Whether there is a wage distortion.
RULING:
Yes. Distortion can so exist when, as a result of an increase in the prescribed wage rate,
an "elimination or severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or
41 | P a g e
salary rates" would occur "between and among employee groups in an establishment as
to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills,
length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation." In mandating an adjustment,
the law did not require that there be an elimination or total abrogation of quantitative
wage or salary differences; a severe contraction thereof is enough. As has been aptly
observed by Presiding Commissioner Edna Bonto-Perez in her dissenting opinion, the
contraction between personnel groupings comes close to eighty-three (83%), which
cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be considered less than severe
42 | P a g e
G.R. No. 94951
23. APEX MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SINCLITICA
CANDIDO, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company,
Inc. on May 18, 1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara,
Maco, Davao del Norte. In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However,
on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a month which was
ultimately increased to P575.00 a month.
ISSUE: Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper
or a regular employee of the said firm?
RULING:
The househelper in the staff house of an industrial company shall be treated as a regular
employee of such firm instead of being a domestic helper.
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who
is employed in the employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort
and enjoyment of the employer's family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic
servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and other similar househelps.
The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in

staffhouses of a company, like petitioner who attends to the needs of the company's guest
and other persons availing of said facilities. The criteria is the personal comfort and
enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned
to certain aspects of the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic
servant may be considered as such as employee. The Court finds no merit in making any
such distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working
within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection
with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees,
warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant.
43 | P a g e
G.R. No. 168081
24. ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of

Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (5’8") with a large
body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147
to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew
Administration Manual1 of PAL.
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go
on an extended vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his
weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the company’s weight standards,
prompting another leave without pay from March 5, 1985 to November 1985. On April
26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with
company policy, he was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989.
He was formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight
checks on several dates. Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his
ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff was justifiably dismissed for the reason that he fails
to comply the weight standard of the company.
RULING:
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that
they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job.
44 | P a g e
Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his
ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as
flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code
that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is
nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically means that
the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force
influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under
Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and
habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the
element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”
The standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer; they were
the "prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and
keep his or her position in the company. In other words, they were standards that
establish continuing qualifications for an employee’s position.
By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and after an
employee is hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a
job applicant must initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an
employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his
job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which an employee
can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282; the employee can be
dismissed simply because he no longer "qualifies" for his job irrespective of whether or
not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional.
45 | P a g e
G.R. No. 86200
25. APEX MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SANDIGAN NG
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, represented by RANULFO PEDRERA,
President, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
Respondent allegedthat Apex had paid its employees in its Maco, Davao del Norte
operations, between 1 November 1954 until 28 March 1985, an aggregate cumulative
daily ECOLA of only P15.00 which was P2.00 below the cumulative minimum ECOLA
of P17.00 (for non-agricultural workers) established under Wage Order No. 6; and that
petitioner had belatedly granted the additional P2.00 starting on 29 March 1985 only.
Apex denied having failed to comply with Wage Order No. 6, contending that it had, by
previous agreement, incorporated the alleged P2.00 deficiency into the basic salary of its
employees. In turn, Sandigan denies that such an agreement had been made, but
conceded that a P2.00 increase in basic salary had been made by Apex, in compliance
with a provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") then in force between
Apex and Sandigan, and not in fulfillment of Apex's obligation under Wage Order No. 6.
Sandigan pointed out that Wage Order No. 6 had taken effect on 1 November 1984, several
months after the P2.00 had been integrated by Apex into the basic salary of its employees.
The P2.00 increase integrated in the basic salary of Apex's, employees, effective on and
after 1 February 1984, was concededly given under the provisions of the CBA. Section 4
of Article VI of the CBA provided as follows: It is understood that the grant of these
general increases shall be as part of any increase in basic pay and/or allowance that may
hereafter be decreed or imposed by law.
46 | P a g e
ISSUE: Whether or not the P2.00 per day increase in basic salary effective starting on 1
February 1984 granted by petitioner Apex pursuant to the CBA, was lawfully credited
towards compliance with increases in ECOLA required under Wage Orders Nos. 5 and
6.
RULING:
It is important to note that the creditability provisions in Wage Orders Nos. 5 and 6 (as
well as the parallel provisions in Wage Orders Nos. 2, 3 and 4) are grounded in an
important public policy. That public policy may be seen to be the encouragement of
employers to grant wage and allowance increases to their employees higher than the
minimum rates of increases prescribed by statute or administrative regulation. To obliterate the
creditability provisions in the Wage Orders through interpretation or otherwise, and to
compel employers simply to add on legislated increases in salaries or allowances without
regard to what is already being paid, would be to penalize employers who grant their
workers more than the statutorily prescribed minimum rates of increases. Clearly, this
would be counter-productive so far as securing the interests of labor is concerned. The
creditability provisions in the Wage Orders prevent the penalizing of employers who are
industry leaders and who do not wait for statutorily prescribed increases in salary or
allowances and pay their workers more than what the law or regulations require.
Statutory wage increases are to be considered separate from increases granted through
the medium of CBAs. We interpret the above section to mean that every grant of daily
increase in statutory minimum wage rates and living allowance must be considered as
independent, separate or apart from the wage increases in the collective bargaining agreement and
must be integrated into the salary scale of the employees to the end that the desired rates
decreed by the National Wages Council are attained Petitioner Apex having lawfully
credited the P2.00 increase in basic salary towards compliance of the increase in ECOLA
prescribed by Wage Orders Nos. 5 and 6, it follows that respondent Sandigan's ,claim to
a differ.
47 | P a g e
G.R. No. 77959
26. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR
OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT and UNITED RCPI COMMUNICATIONS LABOR ASSOCIATION
(URCPICLA)-FUR, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner, a domestic corporation engaged in the telecommunications business, filed

with the National Wages Council an application for exemption from the coverage of
Wage Order No. 1. The application was opposed by respondent URCPICLA-FUR, a labor
organization affiliated with the Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR). On May 22, 1981,
the National Wages Council, through its Chairman, rendered a letter-
decision 3 disapproving said application and ordering the petitioner to pay its covered
employees the mandatory living allowance of P2.00 daily effective March 22, 1981.
On October 24, 1985, without the knowledge and consent of respondent union, petitioner
entered into a compromise agreements 9 with BMRCPI-NFL as the new bargaining agent
of oppositors RCPI employees, the pertinent provisions whereof are hereunder
reproduced: Of and from the aforesaid total amount due every employee, 10% thereof
shall be considered as attorney's fee due Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan, the same to be
deducted from the remaining 70% and distributed to Atty. R. Capocyan at the time of the
distribution of the remaining 70
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is justified to deduct the attorney’s fee to the
worker’s wages.
RULING:
48 | P a g e
The petitioner is justified for deducting the attorney’ss fee to the worker’s wage.
'While the claim for union service fee was initially directed against the union members,
there is no dispute that the claim was basically for attorney's fee. As a matter of fact, RCPI
admitted that the union service fee is 'for Compensation for services rendered by the
union. ... 16
Petitioner cannot invoke the lack of an individual written authorization from the
employees as a shield for its fraudulent refusal to pay the service fee of private
respondent. Prior to the payment made to its employees, petitioner was ordered by the
Regional Director to deduct the 15% attorney's fee from the total amount due its
employees and to deposit the same with the Regional Labor Office.
We agree that Article 222 of the Labor Code requiring an individual written authorization
as a prerequisite to wage deductions seeks to protect the employee against unwarranted
practices that would diminish his compensation without his knowledge and
consent. 21 However, for all intents and purposes, the deductions required of the
petitioner and the employees do not run counter to the express mandate of the law since
the same are not unwarranted or without their knowledge and consent. Also, the
deductions for the union service fee in question are authorized by law and do not require
individual check-off authorizations.
49 | P a g e
G.R. No. 231096, August 15, 2018
27. LORNA B. DIONIO
vs.
ND SHIPPING AGENCY AND ALLIED SERVICES, INC.
FACTS: Gil, husband of petitioner, was hired to serve as a Second Engineer on board a
vessel. Upon the expiration of his employment contract, respondents and Gil mutually
consented to extend the latter's contract. While in the course of his extended employment,
Gil suffered from a UTI and prostate enlargement. He was declared unfit for work; it was
recommended that he be repatriated. On February 13, 2007, Gil was medically
repatriated. On February 14, 2007, Gil arrived in the Philippines and immediately went
to ND Shipping's office where he was issued a Referral Slip for medical examination. The
referral slip stated that the expenses shall be paid for by Gil. Also, Gil was never examined
by the company-designated physician.
His condition worsens, so he went to a doctor at his own expense. Afterwards, he

was diagnosed with Prostatic Cancer Stage IV with widespread metastasis. After one
year, Gil died.
ISSUE: Whether the death of Gil is compensable?
RULING: A seafarer claiming disability benefits is required to submit himself to a

postemployment medical examination by a company-designated physician within 3
working days from repatriation. Failure to comply with such a requirement results in the
forfeiture of the seafarer's claim for disability benefits. There are, however, exceptions to
the rule: (1) when the seafarer is incapacitated to report to the employer upon his
repatriation; and (2) when the employer inadvertently or deliberately refused to submit
the seafarer to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated
50 | P a g e
physician. Moreover, it is the burden of the employer to prove that the seafarer was
referred to a company designated doctor.
Accordingly, Gil immediately reported to the respondents within 3 working days

from repatriation but respondents failed to refer him to the company designated
physician. Moreover, respondents failed to overcome the disputable presumption that
Gil’s disease was worked-related.
51 | P a g e
G.R. No. 203587, August 13, 2018
28. DIWA ASIA PUBLISHING, INC. AND SATURNINO BELEN
vs.
MARY GRACE U. DE LEON
FACTS: X, Inc. which is a subsidiary of A, Inc., is part of a conglomeration of companies

which include Y, Inc. and Z, Inc. Belen is the Chairman of A, Inc.’s Board of Directors.
Mary was hired by X, Inc. as its HR Manager which included handling the HR
Department of the other companies in the conglomeration. After a series of
circumstances, she filed a Complaint for Constructive Dismissal against A, Inc. and Belen,
for acts of hostility towards her and for perceiving a demotion since she now submits all
her work and decisions which were previously at her liberty to handle, to Asuncion, a
superior officer for review and evaluation.
ISSUE: WON Mary constructively dismissed?
RULING: YES. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the
employee’s position would have felt compelled to give his position under the
circumstances. Asuncion’s emails, both as to language and tone, indicate a pattern of
faultfinding and nitpicking, an attitude of disdain and purposely leaving Mary out on
HR matters (which also constitutes demotion herein). Asuncion also insisted on
numerous occasions that Mary failed to perform tasks despite the latter’s insistence and
even evidence of compliance. The e-mails alone clearly depict an atmosphere of open
disdain and hostility towards Mary which is further established by the Affidavit of
Mary’s co-worker who corroborated Mary’s assertions, as she cited specific instances of
mistreatment in front of her or others.
In constructive dismissal cases, the employer is charged with the burden of proving that
its conduct and actions were for valid and legitimate grounds, and must not rely on the
respondent’s weakness of evidence. The unjustly dismissed employee shall be entitled to
52 | P a g e
reinstatement without loss of seniority or other privileges, or an award of separation pay
of one-month’s salary for every year of service as a just alternative for reinstatement. Both
separation pay and backwages shall be computed up to the finality of the decision as it is
at that point that the employment relationship is effectively ended.
53 | P a g e
G.R. No. 224127, August 15, 2018
29. BENEDICTO O. BUENAVENTURA, JR.
vs.
CAREER PHILIPPINES SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC.
FACTS: Buenaventura entered into a ninemonth contract as a laundryman with

respondent Columbia, through its local agent, Career. After he was declared fit for duty
following a pre-employment medical examination, he went on board MV Columbus 2.
On December 25, 2012, Buenaventura allegedly slipped and hit his left shoulder on the
door of a washing machine. He alleged that he immediately reported his condition to the
ship doctor. To address the pain on his left shoulder, Buenaventura underwent a surgical
operation called Arthroscopic Superior Labral Repair. He was placed on therapy for 2
months thereafter. During this period, he was paid his sickness allowance.
Buenaventura filed a complaint for disability benefits and insisted that his condition was
caused by an accident suffered while on board MV Columbus 2. Respondents denied
liability under the CBA because Buenaventura's condition did not arise from an accident.
ISSUE: Is Buenaventura entitled to total and permanent disability benefits?
RULING: YES. Under the terms of the CBA and the POEA-SEC, a seafarer is entitled
compensation if he suffers injury as a result of accident or any other cause while in the
employ of the company. There are 2 elements for disability to be compensable: (1) Injury
or illness must be work-related; and (2) The work-related injury or illness must have
existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.
54 | P a g e
In this case, Buenaventura suffered a "Superior Labral Tear" on his left shoulder,
while in the course of his employment. The injury took place within the period of his
employment or 5 months and 14 days into the contract, at the laundry area while fulfilling
his duty. Thus, his injury is work-related and it occurred during the term of the contract.
55 | P a g e
G.R. No. 219324
30. DEBRA ANN P. GAITE
vs.
FILIPINO SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS, INC.
FACTS: Gaite is a general manager of FILSCAP. Several issues of misconduct pertaining

to Gaite were brought to the attention of FILSCAP such as unauthorized
misappropriation or reallocation of money and utilized the same for personal use.
Investigation was conducted and was given a Show Cause Notice to explain. In her
Position Paper, Gaite alleged that her termination was premeditated.
ISSUE: WON Gaite's dismissal was legal.
RULING: Yes. On the ground of serious misconduct: Due to the amount involved
(P17,720,455.77), the reallocation violated an express provision of the company's rules
and was accomplished without authority from the Board. Gaite committed said transfer
in the performance of her duties as General Manager.
On the ground of loss of trust and confidence: There is no doubt that she held a
position of trust and confidence. As General Manager of the company, Gaite clearly falls
under the first class of employees. They are those who are vested with the power to lay
down management policies, hire, suspend, layoff, transfer employees or recommend
such managerial actions. She was responsible for the overall operations thereof. The act
of transferring the staggering amount from the Special Accounts to cover the company's
Operating Expenses, without the knowledge and consent of the Board, and in direct
56 | P a g e
contravention of FILSCAP's Rules is sufficient reason for the loss of trust and confidence
in Gaite.
It bears stressing that as managerial employee, Gaite could be terminated on the

ground of loss of confidence by mere existence of a basis for believing that she had
breached the trust of her employer. This distinguishes a managerial employee from a
fiduciary rank-and-file where loss of trust and confidence, as ground for valid dismissal,
requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere
uncorroborated assertion and accusation by the employer will not be sufficient. Damage
and fraud are not necessary elements.
57 | P a g e
G.R. No. 219435,
31. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, now merged with PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK v. REYNOLD CALUMPANG
FACTS:
Petitioner Allied Banking Corporation and Race Cleaners, Inc. entered into a
Service Agreement whereby RCI will provide Allied with messengerial, janitorial,
communication, and maintenance services. As such, respondent Reynold Calumpang
was hired as a janitor and was assigned at the bank’s Tanjay City Branch.
During the course of his work, petitioner discovered that respondent was also
plying his pedicab and ferrying passengers. The Bank Manager also found out that
respondent has been borrowing money from several clients of the branch. He was then
told by the Bank Manager that his services was no longer needed. Thereafter, respondent
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages against petitioner
before the NLRC.
In his position paper, respondent asserted that the four-fold test of employer-
employee relationship is present between him and the bank. Petitioner denied the
existence of any employer-employee relationship between itself and respondent. It
asserted that respondent was clearly an employee of RCI by virtue of the Service
Agreement which clearly indicated in Article XI thereof that there would be no employer-
employee relationship between RCI’s employees and the Bank. It further averred that
RCI is a qualified job contractor because of its capitalization and the fact that it exercised
control and supervision over its employees deployed at the branches of the petitioner in
accordance with Rule VIII-A, Sec. 4, pars. (d) & (e) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not RCI is a labor-only contractor.
b) Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between
the Bank and the respondent.
58 | P a g e
RULING:
As a general rule, a contractor is presumed to be a labor-only contractor, unless
such contractor overcomes the burden of proving that it has the substantial capital,
investment, tools and the like.
In the present case, petitioner failed to establish that RCI is a legitimate labor
contractor as contemplated under the Labor Code. Except for the bare allegation of
petitioner that RCI had substantial capitalization, it presented no supporting evidence to
show the same. Aside from this, petitioner’s claim that RCI exercised control and
supervision over respondent is belied by the fact that petitioner admitted that its own
Branch Manager had informed respondent that his services would no longer be required
at the Branch. Moreover, respondent’s work is related to petitioner’s business and is
characterized as part of or in pursuit of its banking operations.
A finding that a contractor is a labor-only contractor, as opposed to permissible
job contracting, is equivalent to declaring that there is an employer-employee
relationship between the principal and the employees of the supposed contractor, and
the labor-only contractor is considered as a mere agent of the principal, the real employer.
In this case, petitioner bank is the principal employer and RCI is the labor-only
contractor. Accordingly, petitioner and RCI are solidarily liable for the rightful claims of
respondent.
59 | P a g e
G.R. No. 209582
32. TEEKAY SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. v. ROBERTO M. RAMOGA, JR.
FACTS:
Respondent entered into a contract of overseas employment with Teekay Shipping
Ltd. to work on board the vessel M/T "SEBAROK SPIRIT" with terms and conditions
approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). After the
mandatory pre-employment medical examination (PEME), respondent was declared fit
for sea duty. As such, he joined the vessel.
Barely six (6) months after, he slipped and twisted his left ankle while climbing
the stairs on board the said vessel. He underwent an x-ray examination at the Bangkok
Hospital, Thailand and was diagnosed to be suffering from a non-displaced fracture. A
surgery was recommended.
Respondent was repatriated to the Philippines and underwent a rehabilitation
program. He was advised to continue using crutches to aid ambulation and was given
medications. On April 8, 2011, Dr. Chuasuan, Jr. issued a certification stating that
[respondent] was fit to return to work. Unsatisfied with the company doctor's
assessment, respondent sought the help of his own doctor, Dr. Rogelio P. Catapang who
declared that respondent still continues to have pain and discomfort on his left foot and
ankle even after his continuous physiotherapy. Thus, he was declared to be permanently
unfit in any capacity to resume his sea duties.
Consequently, respondent lodged a complaint for permanent total disability
benefits, sickness allowance, medical expenses, damages and attorney's fees in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the Revised Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-going Vessels.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to Permanent Disability benefits.
60 | P a g e
RULING:
No, as laid down by this Court in Elburg Shipmanagement Phils. Inc., et. al., and
in Jebsens Maritime, Inc., Sea Chefs Ltd., and Enrique M Aboitiz v. Florvin G. Rapiz, the
following guidelines shall govern the seafarer's claims for permanent total disability
benefits: 1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on
the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer
reported to him; 2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment
within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability
becomes permanent and total; 3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his
assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g. seafarer
required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of
diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to
prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the
period; and 4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment
within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent
and total, regardless of any justification. In this case, there is a sufficient justification for
extending the period.
In a Report, the company designated physician advised respondent to continue
his rehabilitation and medications and to come back for his repeat x-ray of the left foot
and for re-evaluation. The company-designated physician has determined that
respondent's condition needed further medical treatment and evaluation. Neither is the
declaration of respondent's own doctor that respondent is unfit to return to sea duties
conclusive as to respondent's condition. It is well-settled that the assessment of the
company designated physician prevails over that of the seafarer's own doctor. "The
assessment of the company-designated physician is more credible for having been
arrived at after months of medical attendance and diagnosis, compared with the
assessment of a private physician done in one day on the basis of an examination or
existing medical records." With the declaration of the company-designated physician that
respondent is already fit to return to work, the latter is not entitled to his permanent total
disability benefits.
61 | P a g e
G.R. No. 201792
33. WILFREDO P. ASAYAS v. SEA POWER SHIPPING ENTERPRISES, INC.
FACTS:
Respondent Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. employed petitioner as Third
Officer on board the M/TSamaria, a vessel owned by Avin International SA. Prior to the
expiration of his employment contract, the shipowner sold the M/T Samaria to the Swiss
Singapore Overseas Enterprise, Pte. Ltd. As a consequence, he was discharged and
repatriated to the Philippines under the promise to transfer him to the M/T Platinum,
another vessel of the respondents.
After he was not ultimately deployed on the M/T Platinum, he was engaged to
work as a Second Mate on board the M/T Kriti Akti. Before his deployment on board the
M/T Kriti Akti, however, the shipowner also sold the vessel to the Mideast Shipping and
Trading Limited. Thereafter, he was no longer deployed to another vessel to complete his
contract.
On April 23, 2010, the petitioner complained against the respondents in the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) demanding the full payment
of his employment contract which was then settled pursuant to which he received
separation pay after deducting his cash advances. Two months thereafter, the petitioner
filed another complaint against the respondents for alleged illegal dismissal and non-
payment of the unexpired portion of his contract which was granted by the Labor Arbiter
and NLRC. Upon appeal, the CA granted the respondents' petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed.
RULING:
No, the instant case is sanctioned by the Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers onboard Ocean Going Vessels,
specifically Section 23 to wit: “Section 23. Termination due to Vessel Sale, Lay-Up or
62 | P a g e
Discontinuance of Voyage-Where the vessel is sold, laid up, or the voyage is discontinued
necessitating the termination of employment before the date indicated in the Contract,
the seafarer shall be entitled to earned wages, repatriation at employer's cost and one (1)
month basic wage as termination pay, unless arrangements have been made for the
seafarer to join another vessel belonging to the same principal to complete his contract
which case the seafarer shall be entitled to basic wages until the date of joining the other
vessel.”
It is worthy to note that private respondent's non-inclusion of employment
contract in the case at bar was due to the sale of M/T SAMARIA to Swiss Singapore
Overseas Enterprise, Pte. Ltd. The Court find that the requirements under the said
provision were met, to wit: (a) Seafarer's entitlement to earned wages; (b) Seafarer's
repatriation at employer's cost; and (c) one (1) month basic wage as termination pay.
63 | P a g e
G.R. No. 195878
34. MAGSAYSAY MITSUI OSK MARINE, INC v. OLIVER G. BUENAVENTURA
FACTS:
Petitioner Magsaysay Mitsui OSK Marine, Inc. hired respondent Oliver G.
Buenaventura (Buenaventura) as an ordinary seaman on board the vessel Meridian. The
contract was for nine months, with a basic monthly salary of $403.00 and subject to the
JSU collective bargaining agreement.
On 25 January 2007, Buenaventura met an accident wherein a mooring winch
crushed his right hand which required emergency surgical procedures done in Japan. On
21 February 2007, Buenaventura was medically repatriated. He was referred to the
Maritime Medical Service, the company designated clinic, and was attended to by Dr.
Stephen Hebron (Dr. Hebron) who referred Buenaventura to Dr. Celso Fernandez (Dr.
Fernandez), an orthopedic surgeon.
On 3 August 2007, Dr. Hebron declared Beunaventura fit to work after undergoing
conservative management, continuous rehabilitation physiotheraphy, and occupational
therapy. Nevertheless, Buenaventura still felt pain in his hand especially during cold
weather. In a medical certificate Dr. Hebron stated that according to Dr. Fernandez, the
MC plates in Buenaventura's right hand might be contributing to the pain. According to
him, the removal of the MC plates would cost around ₱70,000.00, which would not be
shouldered by Magsaysay. This prompted Buenaventura to consult Dr. Rodolfo Rosales
(Dr. Rosales) who found him unfit to work and recommended a ten-week physical
therapy. He also consulted Dr. Venancio Garduce, Jr., an orthopedic surgeon, who
diagnosed him with: (a) inability to extend the right hand; (b) weak grip, grasp and pinch;
(c) healed flap, dorsum of hand; (d) deformity of the thumb right hand atrophy; and (e)
traumatic arthritis, carpo-metacarpal joints in his right hand. Dr. Garduce opined that it
would be difficult for Buenaventura to continue to work as a seaman. Based on the
differing opinions of his physicians of choice, Buenaventura filed a complaint for
disability compensation under the CBA, recovery of medical expenses; moral, exemplary,
and nominal damages; and attorney's fees.
64 | P a g e
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Buenaventura is entitled to Permanent Disability
Benefit.
RULING:
No, the mere lapse of the 120-day period does not automatically render the
disability of the seafarer permanent and total. The period may be extended to 240 days
should the circumstances justify the same.
In this case, the extension of the initial 120-day period to issue an assessment was
justified considering that during the interim, Buenaventura underwent therapy and
rehabilitation and was continuously observed. The company-designated physicians did
not sit idly by and wait for the lapse of the said period. Buenaventura’s further need of
treatment necessitated the extension for the issuance of the medical assessment. It is
noteworthy that the seafarer was declared fit to work after six months from the time he
was medically repatriated or within the allowable extended period of 240 days.
In summary, if there is a claim for total and permanent disability benefits by a
seafarer, the following rules (rules) shall govern: 1. The company-designated physician
must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period
of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him; 2. If the company-designated
physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any
justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total; 3. If the
company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days
with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer
was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240
days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has
sufficient justification to extend the period; and 4. If the company-designated physician
still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's
disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.
65 | P a g e
G.R. No. 205813
35. ALFREDO F. LAYA, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo F. Laya, Jr. was hired by respondent Philippine Veterans Bank
(PVB) as its Chief Legal Counsel with a rank of Vice President. On June 14, 2007, he was
informed thru letter by the private respondent of his retirement effective on July 1, 2007,
but petitioner requested for the extension of his tenure for another 2 years. On June 26,
2008, private respondent issued a memorandum directing the petitioner to continue to
discharge his official duties and functions as chief legal counsel pending his request.
However, his request for an extension of tenure was denied.
As such, he filed his complaint for illegal dismissal against PVB and Balbido, Jr. in
the NLRC to protest his unexpected retirement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Alfredo Laya, Jr. was validly retired by PVB at age 60.
RULING:
No, Art. 287 of the Labor Code provides that any employee may be retired upon
reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other
applicable employment contract. In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement
providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon
reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is
hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in
the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay.
Obviously, the mere mention of the retirement plan in the letter of appointment
did not sufficiently inform the petitioner of the contents or details of the retirement
program. To construe from the petitioner's acceptance of his appointment that he had
acquiesced to be retired earlier than the compulsory age of 65 years would, therefore, not
be warranted. This is because retirement should be the result of the bilateral act of both
66 | P a g e
the employer and the employee based on their voluntary agreement that the employee
agrees to sever his employment upon reaching a certain age. Acceptance by the
employees of an early retirement age option must be explicit, voluntary, free, and
uncompelled. While an employer may unilaterally retire an employee earlier than the
legally permissible ages under the Labor Code, this prerogative must be exercised
pursuant to a mutually instituted early retirement plan.
To stress, company retirement plans must not only comply with the standards set
by the prevailing labor laws but must also be accepted by the employees as
commensurate to their faithful services to the employer within the requisite period.
Although the employer could be free to impose a retirement age lower than 65 years for
as long its employees consented, the retirement of the employee whose intent to retire
was not clearly established, or whose retirement was involuntary is to be treated as a
discharge. With the petitioner having been thus dismissed pursuant to the retirement
provision that he had not knowingly and voluntarily agreed to, PVB was guilty of illegal
dismissal.
67 | P a g e
G.R. No. 207354
36. CHARLIE HUBILLA v. HSY MARKETING LTD.
FACTS:
Respondents are engaged in manufacturing and selling goods under the brand
Novo Jeans & Shirt & General Merchandise (Novo Jeans). Several Novo Jeans employees
went to Raffy Tulfo's radio program to air their grievances against their employers for
alleged labor violations. They were referred to the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) Camanava Regional Office. These employees claimed that they were not allowed
to enter the Novo Jeans branches they were employed in because they were already
dismissed.
On the other hand, Novo Jeans claimed that these employees voluntarily severed
their employment. They alleged that the employees' notice of withdrawal was not
actually granted by DOLE but that the employees nonetheless filed their complaints
before the Labor Arbiter who dismissed the same. He found they did not present any
other evidence showing that their employment was terminated or that they were
prevented from reporting for work. The Labor Arbiter likewise ruled that the employees
voluntarily severed their employment since the airing of their grievances on Raffy Tulfo's
radio program was enough reason for them not to report for work, simply because of a
possible disciplinary action by Novo Jeans
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed by respondents.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners were not dismissed under any of the causes mentioned in Article
282 of the Labor Code. Thus, their dismissal was illegal. They were not validly informed
of the causes of their dismissal. When the evidence of the employer and the employee are
68 | P a g e
in equipoise, doubts are resolved in favor of labor. This is in line with the policy of the
State to afford greater protection to labor.
In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer to prove that the
employee was dismissed for a valid cause and that the employee was afforded due
process prior to the dismissal. Respondents allege that there was no dismissal since they
sent petitioners a First Notice of Termination of Employment, asking them to show cause
why they should not be dismissed for their continued absence from work. However, no
evidence has been presented proving that each and every petitioner received a copy of
the First Notice of Termination of Employment. There is likewise no proof that petitioners
abandoned their employment. To constitute abandonment, the employer must prove that
"first, the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without
valid or justifiable reason; and second, [that] there must have been a clear intention on
the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by
some overt act." An employee who is found to have been illegally dismissed is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. If reinstatement
proves to be impossible due to the strained relations between the parties, the illegally
dismissed employee is entitled instead to separation pay.
69 | P a g e
G.R. No. 214291
37. AMERICAN POWER CONVERSION CORPORATION v. JAYSON YU LIM
FACTS:
On July 1, 1998, respondent Jason Yu Lim was hired to serve as the Country
Manager of American Power Conversion Philippine Sales Office. In 2002, American
Power Conversion (Phils.) B. V. (APCP BV) was established in the country and it acquired
APCPI and continued the latter's business here. In November, 2004, respondent was
promoted as Regional Manager for APC North ASEAN, a division of APC ASEAN.
In 2005, Truong was replaced by petitioner George Kong (Kong). During their stint
with Kong, respondent and Shao supposedly discovered irregularities committed by
Kong. Upon being apprised of the issues against him, Kong on September 8, 2005 sent
three e-mail messages to respondent and the other six members of the sales and
marketing team indicating his displeasure and that he took the matter quite personally.
On September 30, 2005, Kong and Hendy met with Shao, where the latter was asked to
resign; when he refused, he was right then and there terminated from employment with
immediate effect. The Letter of Termination handed to him did not specify any reason
why he was being fired from work, and was written on the official stationery of American
Power Conversion Singapore Pte, Ltd. (APCS) and signed by its Human Resource
Manager, Samantha Phang (Phang).
Thereafter, Kong arrived in the country and met with respondent on October 17,
2005, where he informed the latter of a supposed company restructuring which rendered
his position as Regional Manager for North ASEAN redundant. On December 8, 2005,
respondent's counsel proceeded to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to
verify if petitioners gave the requisite notice of termination due to redundancy. In a
Certification, the DOLE confirmed that there was no record on file - from September l,
2005 up to November 30, 2005 - of a notice of termination filed by any of the petitioners.
Respondent was paid severance pay, but in a written demand, he sought reinstatement,
70 | P a g e
the payment of backwages and allowances/benefits, and damages for his claimed
malicious and illegal termination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner on the ground of redundancy is
tenable.
RULING:
No. In the present case, it appeared from the records that the redundancy program
was not in existence. Circumstances obtaining therein never point to the fact of a
restructuring being carried out by the company. The respondents dismally failed to
convince this Court that the organizational chart and self-serving affidavits presented are
sufficient proof of the existence of redundancy. The pieces of evidence presented did not
justify the reorganization that led to redundant positions as claimed by the respondent.
Moreover, records also show that the written notice to the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), as required by Article 283 of the Labor Code.
To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, four elements
generally need to be considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to
control the employee's conduct. These elements or indicators comprise the so-called 'four-
fold' test of employment relationship. Therefore, SC declared the subject redundancy
scheme a sham, the same being an integral part of petitioners' illegitimate scheme to
defraud the public - including respondent - and the State. It is null and void for being
contrary to law and public policy as it is in furtherance of an illegal scheme perpetrated
by APCC with the aid of its co-petitioners. Things that are invalid from the beginning are
not made valid by a subsequent act.
71 | P a g e
G.R. No. 217036
38. SKIPPERS UNITED PACIFIC, INC.
vs.
ESTELITO S. LAGNE
FACTS:
Lagne was a seafarer hired by Skippers United Pacific as Oiler on board the vessel
"Nicolaos M". On his pre-employment medical examination, he was declared “fit for
duty”. Lagne started to feel pain in his anus whenever he carries heavy weights or
performs laborious tasks. He was diagnosed with rectal mass and was repatriated. He
then filed a complaint with the NLRC for permanent total disability benefits.
In his claim for disability compensation, Lagne asserted that his illness, rectosigmoid
adenocarcinoma, was directly caused by his employment with petitioners.
ISSUE: WON Lagne’s diagnosis is work related.
RULING:
YES. For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) (4) of the POEA-SEC, two
elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work
related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment
contract.
Considering the manual and laborious job that Lagne does, we surmised that he was able
to reasonably prove that his working conditions exposed him to factors that could have
aggravated his medical condition. For what matters is that his work had contributed,
even to a small degree, to the development of the disease. Neither is it necessary, in order
to recover compensation, that the employee must have been in perfect health at the time
he contracted the disease.
72 | P a g e
In determining the compensability of an illness, we do not require that the
employment be the sole factor in the growth, development, or acceleration of a claimants'
illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment
contributed, even if only in a small degree, to the development of the disease.
73 | P a g e
G.R. No. 232905
39. OSCAR D. GAMBOA
vs.
MAUNLAD TRANS, INC.
FACTS: In 2014, Gamboa was employed by MTI to work in its cargo vessel transporting
logs from Canada to Asian countries. Gamboa was declared fit for duty in the
preemployment medical examination. However, during his employment, he experienced
asthma attacks and back pain, prompting the foreign port doctor to declare him unfit for
duty leading to his medical repatriation. 88 days thereafter, the company physician
reported that his illness was not related to his cause of his repatriation and only gave an
interim assessment of the condition, while the orthopedic specialist declared his
condition was pre-existing. Due to such, MTI refused to shoulder the medical procedures
advised to be done.
ISSUE: Gamboa then filed a complaint seeking permanent total disability benefits. Is he
entitled to such?
RULING: Yes, he is entitled to permanent total disability benefits by operation of law for
failure of the company physician to arrive at a definitive assessment within the 120-day
period from repatriation, or indicate the need for further medical treatment which would
address the temporary total disability, hence would justify an extension of the period to
240 days. Without a valid final and definitive assessment from the company physician
within the 120/240-day period, the law operates to consider the disability as total and
permanent.
74 | P a g e
G.R. No. 221250
40. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION
vs.
MANUEL R. VERGA
FACTS: Verga was deployed with petitioner for a nine-month stint as a “technical rating”
aboard the vessel Azura-D/E. While on board the vessel, Verga slipped and fell on his
back. He was found to be suffering from Stable Anterior Wedge Fracture T10. Because of
this, Verga was repatriated to the Philippines.
Upon his return, the company designated physician examined Verga. Over the course of
several months and after reevaluation, the company physician issued Verga a
certification that he was fit to work. Verga also signed a pro forma Certificate of Fitness
to Work. He then waited to be called back for re-deployment. Verga had still not been re-
deployed, so he consulted with another doctor about the pain in his back. Verga’s doctors
had contrary findings to those of the company-designated physician and concluded that
Verga was "not fit for further sea duty permanently in whatever capacity.” As a result,
Verga filed a complaint for total disability benefits and damages.
ISSUE: Whether the Court will uphold the findings of the company designated physician
and the subsequent issuance of a Certificate of Fitness to Work in favor of Vega?
RULING: Yes. There is no doubt that the company-designated physician's certification

was issued within the extended 240-day period allowed for the seafarer's medical
treatment. In fact, Verga did not challenge the certification when it was issued and for
four months after that. That he signed the Certificate of Fitness to Work on the same day
is proof of his concurrence with the company designated physician's findings.
75 | P a g e
Moreover, said certification was not a hastily issued missive but the product of months
of consultations, examinations, treatments, and assessment.
76 | P a g e
G.R. No. 221548
41. RENERIO M. VILLAS
Vs.
C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC.
FACTS: Villas was engaged by C.F. Sharp for Blue Ocean Ship Management. He was
employed as a Second Engineer for six months on board the vessel Rebekka N. On
February 10, 2013, While Villas was on sea duty, his right hand was crushed and he
sustained severe injuries on his 3rd and 4th digits. He was repatriated immediately
thereafter.
During his checkup on June 6, 2013, Dr. Marzan, a company designated physician wrote
to Dr. Chan to ask about Villas’ condition. Dr. Chan declared that Villas was already fit
to work. However, Villas wrote C.F. Sharp requesting for further examination and
treatment. He consulted with Dr. Magtira who concluded that he had become partially
and permanently disabled. He claimed payment of disability benefits which C.F. denied.
ISSUE: WON Villas’ injury amounted to permanent total disability.
RULING: YES. The rules methodically took into consideration the applicability of both
the 120-day period under the Labor Code and the 240-day period under the IRR. The
medical assessment of the company-designated physician is not the alpha and the omega
of the seafarer's claim for permanent and total disability. Hence, as it stands, the current
rule provides: (1) that mere inability to work for a period of 120 days does not entitle a
seafarer to permanent and total disability benefits; (2) that the determination of the fitness
of a seafarer for sea duty is within the province of the company-designated physician,
77 | P a g e
subject to the periods prescribed by law; (3) that the company-designated physician has
an initial 120 days to determine the fitness or disability of the seafarer; and (4) that the
period of treatment may only be extended to 240 days if a sufficient justification exists
such as when further medical treatment is required or when the seafarer is uncooperative.
The court found that the first fit to work certificate was issued 115 days from the
time of Villa’s repatriation. However, there was no basis for the issuance of the fit to work
certificate. The final Medical Report was issued 141 days from the time of repatriation.
The company designated physician failed to give the final medical assessment within 120
days and failed to justify that Villas still needed further medical treatment to extend the
medical assessment to 240 days. As such, the court ruled that Villas’ disability was total
and permanent.
78 | P a g e
G.R. No. 200258
42. PHILIPPINE HAMMONIA SHIP AGENCY, ET. AL
vs.
FERDINAND Z. ISRAEL
FACTS: Petitioner is the local manning agent, on behalf of petitioner DML, the foreign
principal, which hired respondent as a Bosun on board the vessel NASR. Respondent,
while in the performance of his duties suffered an injury after he slipped and fell while
conducting an inspection of the crew's maintenance work. Respondent claimed for full
disability benefits since his medical treatment exceeded 120 days to which the petitioner
opposed.
ISSUE: WON there is permanent total disability.
RULING: YES. In Crystal Shipping, the Court ruled that mere inability of a worker to
perform his job for more than 120 days entitles him to full disability benefits while in
Elburg Shipmanagement case (current rule), it ruled that a seafarer's disability should
not be simply determined by the number of days that he could not work but instead the
determination should be subjected to the periods prescribed by law. Moreover, if a
maritime compensation complaint was filed prior to October 6, 2008, the 120- day rule
applies; if, on the other hand, the complaint was filed from October 6, 2008 onwards,
the 240-day rule applies.
Respondent filed his Complaint before the NLRC on June 7, 2007, prior to
October 6, 2008; therefore the 120-day rule applies. Pursuant to Crystal Shipping, the
worker must be unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which
constitutes permanent total, disability. Dr. Cruz-Balbon certified that respondent is
79 | P a g e
already fit to work on January 31, 2006, 142 days had passed since respondent's
repatriation on September 11, 2005. Pursuant to Crystal Shipping, respondent is already
deemed to be suffering from permanent total disability entitling him to full disability
benefits.
80 | P a g e
G.R. No. 238933
43. JOEY RONTOS CLEMENTE
vs.
STATUS MARITIME CORP.
FACTS Clemente filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter against his employer, Status
Maritime, for rejecting his claim for disability benefits. This claim allegedly arose from a
shoulder dislocation Clemente suffered while lifting a heavy object during work. Status
Maritime denied his claim, asserting that Clemente had fraudulently concealed his
history of previous shoulder dislocations. Status Maritime presented affidavits made by
Clemente’s crewmates that Clemente had disclosed to them that he suffered two shoulder
dislocations before his employment.
In Clemente’s arguments, he questions Status Maritime’s reliance on the findings of the

foreign physician. Clemente argues that this falls short of the obligation in the POEA
Standard Employment Contract to administer a post-employment medical examination
conducted by a company-designated physician. Further, Clemente asserted that
assuming that he had the injury before, it was Status Maritime’s responsibility to detect
the injury during the pre-employment medical examination. Lastly, Clemente contends
that his crewmates’ affidavits cannot be given credence for being unverified.
ISSUE: Was Clemente disqualified from claiming disability benefits due to fraudulent
concealment?
81 | P a g e
RULING: Yes. A Seafarer’s failure to disclose any illness that they have knowledge of
disqualifies them from claiming disability benefits. Clemente cannot capitalize on his
clearance in the pre-employment medical examination because this is not exploratory in
nature. Employers are not burdened to discover any and all pre-existing medical
conditions of the seafarer.
82 | P a g e
G.R. No. 231748
44. RICHARD LAWRENCE DAZ TOLIONGCO

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ANGLO-
EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC.
FACTS: Petitioner (Toliongco) was employed as messman on board a vessel. On the night
of June 27, 2014, when he served dinner to a coworker, the latter demanded that he
masturbate and perform oral sex on him. He resisted and left the room. He was called
again by the co-worker and was sexually harassed but he again resisted and escaped.
Next day, filed a complaint for physical abuse and sexual abuse. Two coworkers
corroborated the complaint through written testimonies. The assailant threatened to kill
him when he learned of the complaint. On July 12, 2014, he was voluntarily requested to
repatriated. Upon arrival, he was examined by the company physician who found that
he was sexually harassed and physically abused. In November 2014, he was diagnosed
with PTSD by a clinical psychologist.
He filed a labor complaint but the Labor Arbiter and both LA and the NLRC on appeal
concluded that he cannot claim disability benefits because he failed to report within three
days from his arrival and the medical evidence he submitted was not enough to
guarantee his disability claim.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the 3-day rule on postemployment medical examination is mandatory
(2) WON he is entitled to disability damages.
83 | P a g e
RULING:
(1) YES but it must be viewed on a case-tocase basis. The 3-day mandatory reporting
requirement must be observed to identify whether the disease was contracted
during the term of his employment or that his working conditions increased the
risk of contracting the ailment. BUT, some illnesses may take more than three (3)
days before its symptoms manifest depending on the type of illness or disease.
There is no doubt that sexual harassment occurred on board the M/V Mineral
Water, and that petitioner was a victim of it.
(2) NOT ENTITLED. It is established that petitioner suffered some form of injury but
the evidence submitted are not sufficient to support that he has been rendered
permanently and totally disabled. He is precluded from the award of disability
benefits not because of his noncompliance with the 3-day reportorial requirement
but because there is barely any evidence to support the claim for disability
benefits.
84 | P a g e
G.R. No. 235315
45. HENRY T. PARAGELE

vs.
GMA NETWORK, INC.
FACTS: In this case petitioners’ argued that they were regular employees having
performed functions that were necessary and desirable to GMA’s usual business as a
television and broadcasting company.
The Court noted that there was no showing that at all that the employees, who were paid
a meager salary ranging from P750 to P1500 per taping, were hired because of their
unique skills, talent and celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees. It stressed
that in ordered to be considered independent contractors and not employees, as claimed
by the media network, it must be shown that the petitioners were hired because of their
unique skills and talents and that GMA did not exercise control over the means and
methods of their work. In this case, GMA provided the equipment used during tapings
and assigned supervisors to monitor the petitioners’ performance and guarantee their
compliance with company protocols and standards.
ISSUE: WON there was employer-employee relationship between the petitioners and
GMA network?
RULING: Yes. The Court held that only casual employees performing work that is
neither necessary nor desirable to the usual business and trade of the employer are
required to render at least one year of service to attain regular status. However,
85 | P a g e
employees who perform functions which are necessary and desirable to the usual
business and trade of the employer attain regular status from the time of engagement.
Thus, there existed an employer-employee relationship between the GMA and the
petitioners hired as camera operators. The Court’s Third Division declared petitioners as
regular employees of GMA. The Court further ordered the media network to pay each of
the petitioners’ attorney’s fee equivalent to 10 percent of total monetary award accruing
to each of them. The amounts due to each petitioner shall bear legal interest at the rate of
six percent per annum, to be computed from finality of Court’s decision until full
payment. SC remanded this case to the LA.
86 | P a g e
G.R. No. 200774
46. GERMAN MARINE AGENCIES, INC., ET AL
vs.
TEODOLAH R. CARO
FACTS: German Marine hired Eduardo Caro from May 1996, until January 2006 when
he finished his contract and was repatriated. A year later, Caro died of acute respiratory
failure. His wife, Teodolah, filed a complaint for death benefits from German Marine
contending that Caro acquired the bronchial asthma while working for petitioner.
ISSUE: Is the death of Caro compensable?
RULING:
YES. Under the given definition of the 2000 POEA-SEC, a work-related illness is "any
sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under
Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." The 2000 POEA-
SEC creates a disputable presumption that illnesses not mentioned therein are work-
related.
In this case, Teodolah proved the causal connection between Caro's work as a
seafarer and his cause of death. The evidence included an enumeration of Eduardo's
exposure to chemicals, excessive heat from burners and steam pipes, and ultraviolet
radiation during welding operations while on board and in the exercise of his duties as a
Second Officer for petitioners. Under settled jurisprudence, reasonable correlation is all
that is required to prove a rightful claim for death benefits.
87 | P a g e
The application of the liberal construction in favor of labor in our jurisdiction and
settled jurisprudence requires only that a reasonable connection between the nature of
the occupation and the cause of death be established to entitle claimants to accountability.
In the present case, Caro's causes of death included acute respiratory failure which was
diagnosed as secondary to pulmonary thromboembolism. It does not demand a stretch
of the imagination to reasonably presume that the conditions to which Eduardo was
exposed to during the fulfillment of his duties as Second Officer aboard petitioners' vessel
at the very least contributed to either the contracting of said respiratory illness or the
aggravation thereof.
88 | P a g e
G.R. No. 221117
47. JEBSENS MARITIME, INC.

vs.
JESSIE D. ALCIBAR
FACTS: Petitioners hired Alcibar as an ordinary seaman. While on board, Alcibar felt
pain in his anal region and noticed blood in his stool. According to him, he was ignored
by his senior officers when he told them and that no medicine was given.
Alcibar was repatriated to the Philippines. His request for a POME from the petitioner
was not heeded. He later on had himself physically examined in a Cebu hospital and was
diagnosed to have suffered colon cancer. Filing for permanent disability compensation,
sickness allowance, damages and attorney’s fees, he claimed that the dietary provisions
on board the vessel increased his risk in contacting colon cancer.
Petitioners claimed that Alcibar was repatriated because his contract expired. Petitioners
contend that colon cancer is not work-related and is not compensable because it did not
result from an accident on board the vessel.
ISSUE: Is Alcibar’s illness compensable?
RULING: Yes. Alcibar willingly submitted himself to POME by petitioner’s designated

physician, but the latter deemed waived its right to examine when it did not schedule
Alcibar for POME.
89 | P a g e
POEA Standard Employment Contract requires POME, conducted within three working
days upon return, to prove a seafarer’s claim to disability benefits. Illnesses like colon
cancer, acquired or aggravated while on duty and caused by conditions on board the
vessel, are also considered work-related if proven by the seaman through substantial
evidence. Dietary provisions, high in fat and cholesterol given to the seaman while on
duty, aggravated the seaman’s risk of colon cancer.
90 | P a g e
G.R. No. 217949
48. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)

vs.
REYNALDO P. PALMIERY
FACTS: Reynaldo Palmiery served in the government since 1961. He retired as an

employee of SSS in 1994 but re-entered government service in GSIS in 1998. In 2001,
Reynaldo refunded GSIS the amount covering the benefits he received from his previous
retirement. In 2005, Reynaldo applied again for retirement benefits for his full
government service since 1961. GSIS denied it for failure to meet the service requirement.
Upon appeal to CA, the court reversed the decision of GSIS.
ISSUE: Should Santiago’s previous years in government be included in his retirement

benefits?
RULING: YES. The law provides that employees who already received their retirement
benefits cannot credit their years of service prior to their re-entry in the government.
Conversely, employees who have not received their retirement benefits are entitled to full
credit of their service. Here, while Reynaldo previously received his retirement benefits
in SSS, he refunded the same to GSIS in 2001. Hence, technically Reynaldo has not
received any retirement benefits. Also, in accepting the refund, GSIS cannot adopt a new
policy that is prejudicial to the retiree. Granting full credit to Reynaldo's years of service
is neither unjust enrichment nor violative of the principle against double compensation.
Ultimately, the inflexible rule is that social legislation must be liberally construed in favor
of the beneficiaries. This includes retirement laws. In light of the humanitarian purpose
91 | P a g e
of retirement laws, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the retiree as the person
primarily intended to be benefited by this legislation.
92 | P a g e
G.R. NO. 236020
49. PAPERTECH, INC. VS. KATANDO
FACTS:
Petitioner hired Katando as a machine operator in 1996. In 2007, Katando and

other employees of petitioner filed a Petition for Certification Election and picketed in the
company. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal strike against the participants and
prayed that the respondents be declared to have lost their employment. The LA ruled in
favor of petitioners but the NLRC reversed said ruling and ordered the reinstatement of
the workers. The NLRC ruling was affirmed by the CA and the SC. Upon motion, the LA
issued a writ of execution on April 17, 2013 and ordered the workers’ reinstatement.
However, in May 2013, petitioner sent notice to Katando and other workers ordering
them to report to various posts in CDO, Cebu City, Iloilo City, and Pangasinan, under
pain of removal in case of non-compliance. The workers filed a Manifestation with Urgent
Motion to Cite Papertech in Contempt and to Order Payment of their Salaries which the
LA denied. Thus, the workers filed a verified petition for extraordinary remedies before
the NLRC. The NLRC ordered the LA to resolve the issues on salaries and to proceed
with the execution. Papertech appealed this ruling to the CA. On December 14, 2013,
petitioner received a memorandum from petitioner stating that she will be transferred to
Makati office under the same employment terms. Three days later, she received a show
cause memorandum for her refusal to heed the earlier memorandum. Then petitioner
sent Katando a memorandum imposing on her a seven-day suspension for disrespectful
behaviour. Katando served her suspension but she was suspended yet again for one week
for her disobedience and refusal to transfer as directed. Then, she filed a complaint for
illegal suspension. The LA ruled that there was illegal dismissal and ordered petitioners
backwages and separation pay. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s ruling.
Meanwhile, on November 2015, the CA, in the certification case, directed Katando
and her co-respondents to report back to work in the place designated by Papertech per
notice of job assignments dated May 4, 2013, or if they obstinately refuse such assignment,
93 | P a g e
ordered Papertech to pay them separation pay. This was affirmed by the SC and became
final and executory. Thus, Katando appealed the NLRC ruling for payment of separation
pay. The CA granted Katando's petition and ordered Papertech to immediately reinstate
her to her previous position without loss of seniority rights in addition to the award of
backwages. Thus, Papertech appealed to SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ordering Katando’s reinstatement instead of

granting her separation pay.
HELD:
No, the order of reinstatement instead of granting the separation pay has no leg to stand
on. Although Katando does not occupy a position of trust and confidence as a machine
operator, the circumstances of this case nonetheless calls for the application of the
doctrine of strained relations. It is true that litigation between the parties per se should
not bar the reinstatement of an employee. However, as observed by the NLRC, this is not
the only case involving Papertech and Katando. They have been in conflict since 2008, or
for 11 years now. The SC reiterated that the length of time from the occurrence of the
incident to its resolution and the demonstrated litigiousness of the parties showed that
their relationship is strained. Similarly, the protracted litigation between the parties here
sufficiently demonstrate that their relationship is strained. It is notable that Papertech has
not even bothered to appeal the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, and even stated that "in order
not to prolong the proceedings, and for both parties to peacefully move on from this
unwanted situation, Papertech is willing to pay the judgment award of separation pay.
"Clearly, Papertech does not want Katando back as its employee.
94 | P a g e
G.R. No. 217101
50. LBC Express-Vis, Inc. vs. Monica C. Palco
FACTS:
Respondent Monica C. Palco filed a complaint for sexual harassment before the
Danao City Prosecutor’s Office, alleging that she was harassed by her supervisor, Arturo
Batucan; and that her employer, petitioner LBC Express-Visayas, failed to take immediate
action on the matter. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Palco. The National Labor
Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals likewise ruled in favor of the
respondent. In view thereof, LBC filed this petition, arguing that they should not be liable
for constructive dismissal, and that it cannot be held liable for the sexual acts of Batucan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sexual harassment done to Monica Palco constitutes to her
constructive dismissal.
HELD:
Yes, the sexual harassment done to Palco can be a compelling reason for her to
complain against constructive dismissal. Constructive dismissal occurs when an
employer makes and employee’s continued employment impossible, unreasonably or
unlikely, or has made an employee’s working conditions or environment harsh, hostile,
and unfavorable, such that the employee feels obliged to resign from his or her
employment. One of the ways by which hostile or offensive work environment is created
is through the sexual harassment of an employee. Palco posited in this case that her
resignation was not voluntary but was borne out of the hostile work environment
brought about by Batucan’s sexual harassment. Thus, this petition was denied by the
Supreme Court.
95 | P a g e

Labor Case Digest - Bana PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Labor Case Digest - Bana PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

LABOR LAW CASE DIGEST

JOHN MARCUS BANA

1.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.

2.ROLANDO DE ROCA, Petitioner

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

As found by the CA, the facts are as follows:

ISSUE: Can the procedure of NLRC be set aside?

3.GERALDO VS BILL SENDER CORPORATION,ET.AL.

ISSUE: Whether Gerardo is a regular employee.

RULING: The Court held in affirmative.

4.ABOSTA SHIPMANAGEMENT CORPORATION, PANSTAR SHIPPING CO.,

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Petitioner Abosta Shipmanagement Corp. (Abosta) is a duly licensed manning agency

The Court held in affirmative.

Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC provides that:

5.PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS.

WHETHER PHILHEALTH PERSONNEL ARE PUBLIC HEALTH WORKERS AS

The Court's Ruling

The Court ruled in affirmative.

6. ARIEL P. HORLADOR, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS,

No. The CA is not correct to delete the award of attorney’s fee.

7. SOLPIA MARINE AND SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioner, v. MICHAEL V.

Is Postrano entitled to the award of permanent and total disability benefits?

Ruling of the Court

Respondent shall submit himself to a post employment medical examination by a

Without the final assessment of the company-designated physician, Postrano is deemed

8. CONSOLIDATED DISTILLERS OF THE FAR EAST, INC., Petitioner, v. ROGEL N.

The Court's Ruling

Respondent Zulisibs, Inc. (Zulisibs) is a corporation organized and existing under

The Ruling of this Court

10. DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC./JOHN GOKONGWEI,

Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (petitioner or company) hired respondent as

Issue: Was respondent validly dismissed?

11. PHILIPPINE PIZZA, INC., Petitioner, v. JENNY PORRAS* CAYETANO, RIZALDO

Whether or not that CBMI is engaged in a prohibited labor-only contracting arrangement

The Court's Ruling

G.R. No. 181154

12. RAMCHRISEN H. HAVERIA, Petitioner, v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM,

The Court's Ruling

G.R. No. 207252

13. PHILIPPINE GEOTHERMAL, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION (PGIEU), Petitioner,

REYES, JR., J.:

Ruling of the Court

Management prerogative gives an employer freedom to regulate according to their

14. SOCIETE INTERNATIONALE DE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Huliganga was hired by Societe International De Telecommunications

According to petitioners, the 2006 CBA unequivocally provides that managerial

According to petitioners, the 2006 CBA unequivocally provides that managerial

Petitioner Fernandez was an employee of respondent Manila Electric Company

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is entitled for the separation pay.

The Court held in affirmative.

Superior Maintenance is a manpower agency engaged in the business of supplying

ISSUE: Whether Bermeo was constructively dismissed from work

No. Bermeo was not constructively dismissed from work.

17. LINGNAM RESTAURANT, Petitioner, v. SKILLS & TALENT EMPLOYMENT

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent STEP is engaged in labor-only contracting; hence,

Labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor or

18. MELCHOR BARCENAS DEOCARIZA, Petitioner, v. FLEET MANAGEMENT

In the course of his employment, or on December 3, 2011, petitioner complained of

The Issue Before the Court