Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Jurisprudence On Liberality
Jurisprudence On Liberality
Jurisprudence On Liberality
Topic: Failure to attach a certification of non-forum shopping on the appeal before the
IPO Director General
This rule is in keeping with the general principle that administrative bodies are not
strictly bound by technical rules of procedure:
[A]dministrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Administrative
tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of
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certain procedural requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental
and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented
before them. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.
In conformity with this liberality, Section 5(b) of the Intellectual Property Office’s
Uniform Rules on Appeal expressly enables appellants, who failed to comply with
Section 4's formal requirements, to subsequently complete their compliance:
Given these premises, it was an error for the Director General of the Intellectual
Property Office to have been so rigid in applying a procedural rule and dismissing
respondent's appeal.
Topic: Failure to attach the original of the documentary evidence with the IPO.
It is well-settled that "the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the
attainment of justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of the
rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the
rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be
used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be
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afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause,
free from the constraints of technicalities." "Indeed, the primordial policy is a faithful
observance of [procedural rules], and their relaxation or suspension should only be for
persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed."31 This is especially true with quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies, such as the IPO, which are not bound by technical rules of procedure. x x x
Note: Although the Supreme Court did not apply the liberal approach in favor of
Taiwan Kolin, the Court had the occasion to discuss the doctrine of liberality over the
technical rules.
It is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the IPO’s BLA are not bound
by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. The BLA is not bound
by the strict technical rules of procedure and evidence but may adopt, in the absence of
any applicable rule in the Inter Partes Regulations, such mode of proceedings consistent
with the requirements of fair play and conducive to the just speedy and inexpensive
disposition of cases, and which will give the BLA the greatest possibility to focus on the
contentious issues before it.
However, it is equally true that the relaxation of procedural rules cannot be made
without any valid reasons proffered for or underpinning it. Procedural rules are
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases, and are not to be belittled or dismissed
simply because their non-observance may have resulted to a party’s substantive rights.
Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relive a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
To merit liberality, petitioners must show reasonable cause justifying their non-
compliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of
the petition would defeat the administration of substantive justice.
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4. Viva Shipping Lines vs Keppel Philippines Mining, Inc., et. al.
G.R. No. 177382, 17 February 2016.
Our courts are not only courts of law, but are also courts of equity. Equity is justice
outside legal provisions, and must be exercised in the absence of law, not against
it. In Reyes v. Lim:
Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to
adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of
its statutory or legal jurisdiction. Equity is the principle by which substantial justice
may be attained in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are
inadequate. (Citation omitted)
Liberality lies within the bounded discretion of a court to allow an equitable result
when the proven circumstances require it. Liberality acknowledges a lacuna in the text
of a provision of law. This may be because those who promulgated the rule may not
have foreseen the unique circumstances of a case at bar. Human foresight as laws and
rules are prepared is powerful, but not perfect.
Remarkably, in highly exceptional instances, we have allowed the relaxing of the rules
on the application of the reglementary periods of appeal. Thus:
In Ramos v. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395, we excused the delay of four days in the
filing of a notice of appeal because the questioned decision of the trial
court was served upon appellant Ramos at a time when her counsel of
record was already dead. Her new counsel could only file the appeal four
days after the prescribed reglementary period was over. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453, we allowed the perfection of an appeal by
the Republic despite the delay of six days to prevent a gross miscarriage of
justice since the Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land
already titled in its name and had since then been devoted for educational
purposes. In Olacao v. National Labor Relations Commission, 177 SCRA 38,
41, we accepted a tardy appeal considering that the subject matter in issue
had theretofore been judicially settled, with finality, in another case. The
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dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant being
ordered twice to make the same reparation to the appellee.
We pronounced in those cases that technicality should not be allowed to stand in the
way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.
In all these, the Court allowed liberal interpretation given the extraordinary
circumstances that justify a deviation from an otherwise stringent rule.