People v.

Perfecto

In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and little
importance is attached to them, because they are generally the result of political controversy and
are usually regarded as more or less colored or exaggerated. Attacks of this character upon a
legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although such publications are
reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to the application of the provision of law under
which this case was filed. Our Penal Code has come to us from the Spanish regime. Article
256 of that Code prescribes punishment for persons who use insulting language about
Ministers of the Crown or other "authority." The King of Spain doubtless left the need of
such protection to his ministers and others in authority in the Philippines as well as in Spain.
Hence, the article referred to was made applicable here. Notwithstanding the change of
sovereignty, our Supreme Court, in a majority decision, has held that this provision is still in
force, and that one who made an insulting remark about the President of the United States was
punishable under it. (U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case, it would appear to be
applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256 must be enforced, without fear or favor, until it
shall be repealed or superseded by other legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall otherwise
determine.

ISSUE:

whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the
nature of a municipal law or political law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States and the characteristics and institutions of the American Government.

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to
denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. Mr.
Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court stated the obvious when in the course of his
opinion in the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said:
"As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political
character, institutions and Constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus,
upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power — and the latter is involved in the
former — to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion or
abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like,
would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect." To
quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain
could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much
less can it be admitted that they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every
nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the Constitution
and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it."
(Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)

On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military

Commander dated May 28, 1898, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the
punishment of crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible
with the new order of things. But President McKinley, in his instructions to General Merritt,
was careful to say: "The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the
severance of the former political relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new
political power." From that day to this, the ordinarily it has been taken for granted that the
provisions under consideration were still effective. To paraphrase the language of the United
States Supreme Court in Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349, there was not and
could not be, except as precise questions were presented, a careful consideration of the codal
provisions and a determination of the extent to which they accorded with or were repugnant to
the "'great principles of liberty and law' which had been 'made the basis of our governmental
system.' " But when the question has been squarely raised, the appellate court has been forced on
occasion to hold certain portions of the Spanish codes repugnant to democratic institutions
and American constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18; U.S. vs. Balcorta
[1913], 25 Phil., 273; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533; Weems vs. U.S., supra.)

Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the
American character and system of government. The gulf which separates this article from the
spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which separates a
monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the United States. This article was crowded
out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands.
Penalties out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical
conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the
protection of the interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of
government in the Islands.

To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for
different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted
Political Law; Concept and Scope

 It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.

 "Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the
inhabitants to the sovereign. (people vs. perfecto)

 Political Law – That branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operations of the governmental organs of the state and defines the relations of the state
with the inhabitants of its territory.

 As opposed to private laws which regulate private affairs. They are based on the will of
the people or the formation of social contracts.

 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLITICAL LAW, DEFINED. — Political law has

been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operation of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the
state with the inhabitants of its territory (People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887). It must be
recalled that a political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations,
administrative law including the law on public officers and election. (macariola vs
Asuncion)

Effectivity of the Constitution

 whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date that the
plebiscite for its ratification was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987,
the date its ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the
Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino.

 The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by virtue
of the provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall
take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987,
the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date.

Rules on Interpreting Doubtful Provision of the Constitution

 A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of
a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the
different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words
is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance
with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract
violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by
the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for
private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.

 Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the
framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the different
departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and
inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as
those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Thus, a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

 Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing
view is, as it has always been, that -

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing

rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended,
the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the
will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by
simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
 The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a
right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in
harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make
it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the
subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
 Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art.
XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which
undoubtedly are not self-executing.[18] The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the
first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a
fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not
by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-
executing in another.
 People v. Perfecto [43 Phil 887]

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero,
discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil
companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the
newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article
against the Philippine Senate (basically calling them corrupt) alleged to have violated Article 256
of the Spanish Penal Code – a provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the
Crown. It is contended that said provision is no longer applicable due to the change in
sovereignty over the Philippine from Spain to the United States.

ISSUE: Is Article 256 of the SPC a political law, inasmuch as it would be abolished and
ineffective upon the cessation of sovereignty of Spain to the United States?

HELD: YES. The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was
enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains
that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to
protect.

With the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the
invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article
256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its
inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated.’ Citing American Jurisprudence, the Supreme Court stated that “all laws,
ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and
Constitution of the new government are at once displaced.” Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is
considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent
was acquitted.

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, Complainant, v. HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION,

Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent judge was charged, among others, for having violated Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte. Said Article prohibits judges from acquiring any commercial interest in any
business within the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties.

ISSUE:
Is Article 14 of the Code of Commerce a political law?

HELD:
Although the aforestated provision is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it however,
partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government
and certain public officers and employees and as such is deemed to have been automatically
abrogated.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization
and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with
the inhabitants of its territory (People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled
that political law embraces (1) constitutional law, (2) law of public corporations, (3)
administrative law including the (4) law on public officers and (5) elections. Specifically, Article
14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it
regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in
business; hence, political in essence.
Under the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States (US) and later on from the US
to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have
been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically
abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated
provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent.

*Excerpt inclusions ko lang:

Thus, We held in Roa v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:
"‘By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either
following a conquest or otherwise, . . . those laws which are political in their nature and
pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer
of sovereignty.’

"While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the laws of the new
sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the
political laws do not. (Halleck’s Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of
the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new
sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of
the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace.
 G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C.
TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M. RESURRECCION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of
Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of
Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z.
LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L.
TOLENTINO, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioners were the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Brgy. Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal, elected under BP Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982. A
memorandum was then received by petitioner De Leon signed by respondent OIC Governor
Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987, designating the other respondents in their public
positions and replacing them.
Petitioners thus came before the Supreme Court arguing that the subject Memoranda of February
8, 1987, be declared null and void since their term of office under BP Blg. 222 have not yet
expired, and that the ratification of the 1987 Constitution had the effect of abolishing the
respondent OIC Governor’s authority to replace them and to designate their successors under
the Provisional Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite for its
ratification was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was
proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino.

HELD:
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore,
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of the
provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the
plebiscite held on that same date.
 Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS [G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997]
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it
should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding
rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution.

FACTS:
GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government decided to sell 51% of
its shares in Manila Hotel Corporation through a public bidding. Two bidders participated,
namely, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, and Renong Berhad,
a Malaysian firm.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the
necessary contracts, Manila Prince matched the bid price of Renong Berhad at P44.00 per share.
Perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, petitioner thus
came to the Supreme Court on prohibition and mandamus, invoking Section 10, second par., Art.
XII, of the 1987 Constitution regarding the Filipino First Policy in the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, and that they should therefore be
given priority in the bidding.
However, respondents argue that said provision that petitioners are invoking is merely a
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislations for it to operate and be enforced.

ISSUE:
Is the Filipino First Policy enshrined in a self-executing provision or not? What is the
construction to be given in case of doubt whether a constitutional provision is self-executing or
non-self-executing?

RULING:
Section 10, 2nd paragraph of Article XII of the Constitution is a self-executing provision.

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional

mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always
been, that –
 x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated
to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.

The second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any
legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony.
 Francisco v. House of Representatives [G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003]

FACTS:
On June 2, 2003, an impeachment complaint was filed by former president Joseph Estrada,
endorsed by certain members of the House, against then Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust,
and other high crimes which was, however, denied by the House Committee on Justice for being
insufficient in substance.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint, or on
October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed by certain members of the House
against the Chief Justice.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the HoR, et. al, most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the Section 3,
Article XII of the Constitution that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
On the other hand, respondent HoR argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules do not violate said Constitutional provision, contending that the term
“initiate” does not mean “to file”, and that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice and Associate Justices had not been initiated as
the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.

ISSUE:
I. What is the construction to be given to the word “initiate” Section 3(1), Article XI of
the Constitution regarding the exclusive power of the House of Representatives to
initiate all cases of impeachment?

II. Was the second impeachment complaint filed in accordance with Section 3(5), Article
XI of the Constitution, not falling within the one-year bar as expressly provided?

HELD:
One of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. The Court
looked into the records of the deliberation of the framers regarding Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution where it can be evidently gleaned that the latter intended the meaning of
“initiate” as “to file”. It is not the body, or in this case, the House that initiates it. It only
approves or disapproves the resolution. It is thus clear that the framers intended “initiation” to
start with the filing of a verified complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement
of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least
one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the
House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one-year period.
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5)
of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a different meaning from filing and referral
(because the Rules additionally require that the complaint be sufficient in substance).
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.

PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do
not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the
words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to
be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law
to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as
much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
 A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that
purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame

Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental

principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic
law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also
be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus,
in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a

provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of

the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make
the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is
available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court
expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the

constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no
light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood
by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof. 46 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS

ARTICLE XVII

Amendments or Revisions

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

SECTION 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of
calling such a convention.

SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be
valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier
than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after
the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

 Source of Power to Propose Changes to the Constitution

Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not
included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI,
Constitution of the Philippines). It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the
repository sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours (Section 1, Art. 11, Constitution of
the Philippines) — to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress
may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such
power. (Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and members of the House of Representatives act, not as
members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting
as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike
the people, when performing the same function, (Of amending the Constitution) for
their authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very source of
all powers of government including the Constitution itself. (Tolentino v. COMELEC,
citing Mabanag v. Lopez Vito)

Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the

members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows,
necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or
beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught,
contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid
nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that the Constitution expressly
confers upon the Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to lower courts.) the power to declare a
treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution), despite the eminently
political character of treaty-making power.

 Amendment – Broadly refers to a change in the Constitution that adds, reduces, or

deletes, without altering the basic principles involved

 Means an isolated or piecemeal change only.

 A change effected in some parts of the constitution without considering the whole
document.

 Revision – Generally affects several provisions of the Constitution. While amendment

affects only specific provisions being amended.

 A revamp or rewriting of the whole instrument.

 Involves a rewriting or substantial changing in the Constitution viewed in its entirety.

 Constituent Assembly – A body or assembly of popularly elected representatives

composed for the purpose of drafting or adopting a constitutional type of document.
(Congress)

 Proposal – Made either directly by the Congress as a constituent assembly, or by a

constitutional convention.

 By congress, as a constituent assembly – requires a vote of at least 3/4 of all

members.

 By constitutional convention – requires a vote of at least 2/3 of all the

members of congress.

 Submission to the people/electorate whether to call such a convention –

majority vote of all its members.
  Ratification – Any amendment to or revision of the constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held not earlier than 60 days nor
later than 90 days after the approval of such change by the congress/constitutional
convention.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

I.—General Provisions

SECTION 1. Title.—This Act shall be known as “The Initiative and Referendum Act.”

SEC. 2. Statement of Policy.—The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution,
laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.—For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(a) “Initiative” is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;

a.2 Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

(b) “Indirect initiative” is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to
Congress or the local legislative body for action.

(c) “Referendum” is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an
election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:

c.1 Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part
thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2 Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or
ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.

(d) “Proposition” is the measure proposed by the voters.

(e) “Plebiscite” is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or
rejected by the people.

(f) “Petition” is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of
signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on
Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.

(g) “Local government units” refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.

(h) “Local legislative bodies” refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang

Panglungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.

(i) “Local executives” refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong
Barangay, as the case may be.

SEC. 4. Who May Exercise.—The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all
registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays.

SEC. 5. Requirements.—(a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per

centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition
for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;

c.2 the proposition;

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.

(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative
assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition
therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein: Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of
one (1) legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city
should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.

(e) A referendum or initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly

initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters
in the municipality, of which every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
the registered voters therein.

(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if

signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay.

SEC. 6. Special Registration.—The Commission on Elections shall set a special registration day
at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.

SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures.—The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the
basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits and voters’ identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election.

II.—National Initiative and Referendum

SEC. 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum.—The Commission shall call and
supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.

Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon
determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice
in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum
which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the
determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.

SEC. 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition.—(a) The proposition for the

enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and
approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines.

If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast,
the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen
(15) days following completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject
a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed
repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of
publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended
shall remain in full force and effect.

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast
in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election
called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and
proclamation by the Commission.

SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures.—The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or

referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and

(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in
Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its
effectivity.

SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative.—Any duly accredited people’s organization, as defined by law, may
file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative
bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that
the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.

The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any
legislative measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall
have precedence over other pending legislative measures on the committee.

SEC. 12. Appeal.—The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or

insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court
within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.

III.—Local Initiative and Referendum

SEC. 13. Procedure in Local Initiative.—(a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters
in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred
(100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the
Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment,
repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within thirty (30) days from
its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and registered representative may
invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned.

(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local
Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the
proposition.

(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.

(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety
(90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30)
days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required
number of signatures.

(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representatives, in
the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a representative of the regional assemblies
and local legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or local
government unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may be established in as many places as
may be warranted.

(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through its office
in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of
signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition.

(h) If the required number of signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for the
initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local
government unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days from the date of
certification by the Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous
regions, sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the
date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on
Elections.

SEC. 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions.—If the proposition is approved by a majority of the

votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if
affirmative action thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local executive
concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated.

SEC. 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives.—(a) The power of local initiative shall not be
exercised more than once a year.

(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the
local legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the
proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may,
if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.

SEC. 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies.—Any proposition or ordinance or

resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not
be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months
from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body
within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided,
however, That in case of barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the
first six (6) months.

SEC. 17. Local Referendum.—Notwithstanding the provision of Section 4 hereof, any local

legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly
enacted or approved.

Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty
(60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty
(30) days in case of barangays.

The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.

SEC. 18. Authority of Courts.—Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts
from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the
Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.

IV.—Final Provisions

SEC. 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code.—The Omnibus Election Code and other
election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and
referenda.

SEC. 20. Rules and Regulations.—The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such

rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

SEC. 21. Appropriations.—The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation
of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the
current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full implementation of this Act
shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

SEC. 22. Separability Clause.—If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.

SEC. 23. Effectivity.—This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.
 Doctrine of proper submission – a plebiscite may be held on the same day as a regular
election, provided the people are sufficiently informed of the amendments to be voted
upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon, and to express their will in a genuine manner.

 Requirements for ratification –

SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of
such amendment or revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later
than ninety days after the certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the
petition.
 G.R. No. L-28196 November 9, 1967
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR
GENERAL, respondents.

FACTS:
R. B. H. No. 1 — the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives,
from 120 to 180, and — under R. B. H. No. 3 — the authority given to the members of Congress
to run for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge the
duties of such delegates without forfeiting their seats in Congress.

ISSUE:
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?

HELD:
YES. There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a
"special," not a general, election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows
that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate
its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
 Imbong v. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-32432, September 11, 1970]

FACTS:
Petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and
interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their
rights as such candidates.
Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No.2, calling for a constitutional
convention proposing Constitutional amendments. After its adoption, Congress, acting as a
legislative body, enacted R.A. 4914 implementing said resolution, restating entirely the
provisions of said resolution.
Thereafter, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending
Resolution No. 2 by providing that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates
apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their
respective inhabitants, and that any other details relating to the specific apportionment of
delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of the Constitutional Convention shall be
embodied in an implementing legislation xxx.
Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and
4, and expressly repealing R.A. 4914.

ISSUE:
May Congress in acting as a legislative body enact R.A.6132 to implement the resolution passed
by it in its capacity as a Constituent Assembly?

HELD:
YES. The Court sustained the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by
Congress acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, and
not as a Constituent Assembly, because —

1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has
full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention
for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting
separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by
the required three-fourths vote.
2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a
constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all
other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the
power to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as
well as appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for the election of delegates and for the
operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other implementing details
indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody the above-
mentioned details, except the appropriation of funds.

3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution
solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the
implementing details, which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A.
No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such
implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its
comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by
necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative
action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the
constitution, they are valid.

4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for

such implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a
legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which
authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.
 Santiago v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997]

FACTS:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent COMELEC a "Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative"
wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC to assist them in fixing the time and date of the signature
gathering, the publications of the petition, and establishing signing stations.
Herein petitioners Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, et. al. argued that the people's initiative is
limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof, and that the Delfin petition
extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision which is outside the power of the
people's initiative. While R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely,
initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide
any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III.
On the other hand, private respondents contend that R.A. No. 6735 is sufficient in its guidelines
regarding the people’s initiative to amend the Constitution, and that the proposed initiative is a
mere amendment because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or
more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the
entire document.

ISSUE:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735 was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and if so, whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative;

2. Whether the lifting of the term limits of elective national and local officials would
constitute a revision or an amendment.

HELD:
NO.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word
"Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to
said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and
local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only
do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that
Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the
registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of
initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the
proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case
may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.

Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and
for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the
Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735
to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it
could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby
giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of
its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines
"initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of
initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an
initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the
constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e)
provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured
by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.

Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of
Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly
vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a
petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3%
of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the
required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures
and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather
signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly
initiated.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC,
sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of
such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; 63 (2) to issue through its Election
Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each
legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of
signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis
of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term
limits of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the
Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
 Occena v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 56350, April 2, 1981]

FACTS:
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales challenge on two prohibition proceedings
the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments.

ISSUE:
Can the Interim Batasang Pambansa propose amendments? More specifically the extent of the
changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and
the standard required for a proper submission.

HELD:
The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable
provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The
Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same
functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National
Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof." One of such powers is
precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions
vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call
by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with
the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of
the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by
virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose
the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed.

Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments proposed are so extensive in
character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang
Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was to
revise and not to amend. It suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for
the Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections to dispose of this contention. Thus: "3.
And whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new
Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment;
because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the
sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. xxx”
3) That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the
standard for proper submission. Again, petitioners have not made out a case that calls for a
judgment in their favor. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above
questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose
amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible
proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies
as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed.
That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a
requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent
power to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of
three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained.

As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the Constitution indicates the way the
matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: "Any amendment
to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of
such amendment or revision." The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang
Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang
Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-
day period provided by the Constitution.

JUSTICE TEEHANKEE, SEPARATE OPINION

2. As restated by me in the 1977 case of Hidalgo, under the controlling doctrine of Tolentino, the
October 1976 constitutional amendments which created the Interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu
of the Interim National Assembly were invalid since as ruled by the Court therein, constitutional
provisions on amendments "dealing with the procedure or manner of amending the fundamental
law are binding upon the Convention and the other departments of the government (and) are no
less binding upon the people" and "the very Idea of departing from the fundamental law is
anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and repugnant to the essence of the rule of law."
The proposed amendments at bar having been adopted by the Interim Batasang Pambansa
as the fruit of the invalid October, 1976 amendments must necessarily suffer from the same
Congenital infirmity.
3. Prescinding from the foregoing and assuming the validity of the proposed amendments, I
reiterate my stand in Sanidad that the doctrine of fair and proper submission first enunciated
by a simple majority of six Justices (of an eleven member Court prior to the 1973 Constitution
which increased the official composition of the Court to fifteen) in Gonzales vs. Comelec and
subsequently officially adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority vote of the
Court (of eight votes, then) in Tolentino is fully applicable in the case at bar. The three
resolutions proposing complex, complicated and radical amendments of our very structure of
government were considered and approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 27, 1981. It set the date of the plebiscite for thirty-nine
days later on April 7, 1981 which is totally inadequate and far short of the ninety-day period
fixed by the Constitution for submittal to the people to "sufficiently inform them of the
amendments to be voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon and to express their
will in a genuine manner."

4. "The minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission
to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment" as stated by retired Justice Conrado V.
Sanchez in his separate opinion in Gonzales bears repeating as follows: “ xxx We believe the
word 'submitted' can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities,
should strain every short to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the
proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. ... What the Constitution
in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for ratification, should put
every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people, educate
them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For, as we have earlier stated, one thing
is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or
rejection. If with all these safeguards the people still approve the amendments no matter how
prejudicial it is to them, then so be it. For the people decree their own fate."
 Tolentino v. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971]

FACTS:
A petition for prohibition was filed to restrain respondent COMELEC from undertaking to hold a
plebiscite on November 8, 1971 for the proposed constitutional amendment reducing the voting
age in the Philippines to eighteen (18) years.
Petitioners contend that the COMELEC’s resolution of holding a plebiscite are null and void on
the ground that the holding and calling of such plebiscite is a power lodged exclusively in
Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised by the convention.
Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other
implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and
effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the
elections of eight senators and all city, provincial and municipal officials to be held on
November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the
holding of the plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the
calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in
Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under
Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be
presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to
be drafted and proposed by the Convention.
On the other hand, respondents and intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix the date
and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment the Convention
may deem proper to propose is within the authority of the Convention as a necessary
consequence and part of its power to propose amendments and that this power includes that of
submitting such amendments either individually or jointly at such time and manner as the
Convention may direct in discretion. The Court's delicate task now is to decide which of these
two poses is really in accord with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the
holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years
the age for the exercise of suffrage proposed in the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the
manner and form provided for in said resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and
resolution of the Convention?

HELD:
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section
1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a
plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that
there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same
Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being
indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first
amendment the Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of
submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent
Comelec in that direction are null and void.
The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly
that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may
propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments
that Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides
that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections"
or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same
constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an
election" which means only one.

This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already from the fact
that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is
provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by
the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to
enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote
intelligently on the proposed amendment, although it may already be observed that under Section
3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen under conditions he feels are
needed under the circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in the ballot nor is there
any possible indication whether they will ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for
future action, what kind of judgment can he render on the proposal?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment
to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but
ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its
relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In
the context of the present state of things, where the Convention has hardly started considering the
merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present
to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. We are
of the opinion that the present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a
plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base
their judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame
of reference, for the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of
the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the
ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the proposed
plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the
Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".
 Sanidad v. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976]

FACTS:
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991
calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays")
to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the
powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, and the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of his present powers.

ISSUE:
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances
now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as
well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his
proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
therefor a sufficient and proper submission?

HELD:
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,
Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee
and Munoz Palma voted in the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his
concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents
from the proposition that there is concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of
crisis, thus raising serious doubts as to the power of the President to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the
proposed amendments for ratification by the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar
expressed the hope, however that the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices
Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore
beyond the competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his
concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA
774).Associate Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold that prescinding from the
President's lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to propose the amendments, etc.,
as above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with sufficient information and time to
assure intelligent consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in the controlling
cases of Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr.
and Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate
opinion, Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and
Munoz Palma voted to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This
decision is immediately executory.