TRANSORTATION LAW
Chapter 1 – Definition and Concept of Common Carriers
1. Article 1732, Civil Code; Broad Concept
De Guzman vs. CA
Cruz vs. Sun Holidays Inc.
First Phil Industrial Corp. vs. CA
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines “common carriers”
as persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in
the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods
or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering
their services to the public. This article makes no distinction
between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does
such carrying only as an ancillary activity or as a mere
“sideline”. It makes no distinction between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on
a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service
on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither it
distinguishes between a carrier offering its services to the
“general public,” i.e., the general community or population,
and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population.
Indeed, respondent is a common carrier. Its ferry services
are so intertwined with its main business as to be properly
considered ancillary thereto. The constancy of respondent’s
ferry services in its resort operations is underscored by its
having its own Coco Beach boats. And the tour packages it
offers, which include the ferry services, may be availed of
by anyone who can afford to pay the same. These services
are thus available to the public.
That respondent does not charge a separate fee or fare for its
ferry services is of no moment. It would be imprudent to
suppose that it provides said services at a loss. The Court is
aware of the practice of beach resort operators offering tour
packages to factor the transportation fee in arriving at the
tour package price. That guests who opt not to avail of
respondent’s ferry services pay the same amount is likewise
inconsequential. These guests may only be deemed to have
overpaid.
As De Guzman instructs, Article 1732 of the Civil Code
defining "common carriers" has deliberately refrained from
making distinctions on whether the carrying of persons or
goods is the carrier’s principal business, whether it is
offered on a regular basis, or whether it is offered to the
general public. The intent of the law is thus to not consider
such distinctions. Otherwise, there is no telling how many
other distinctions may be concocted by unscrupulous
businessmen engaged in the carrying of persons or goods in
order to avoid the legal obligations and liabilities of
common carriers.
Yes, petitioner is a common carrier. The test for
determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods

Calvo vs. UCPB General Insurance Co.
Asia Lighterage and Shipping Inc. vs. CA
is: 1. He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods
for others as a public employment, and must hold himself
out as ready to engage in the transportation of goods for
person generally as a business and not as a casual
occupation; 2. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind
to which his business is confined; 3. He must undertake to
carry by the method by which his business is conducted and
over his established roads; and 4. The transportation must
be for hire.
The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not
exclude it from the definition of a common carrier. Based
on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt
that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the
business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum
products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to
carry for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who
choose to employ its services, and transports the goods by
land and for compensation. The fact that petitioner has a
limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a
common carrier.
Pursuant to Article 1732, petitioner is a common carrier as
transportation of goods is an integral part of her business.
Article 1732 defines “common carriers” as persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business
of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services
to the public. This article makes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons
or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as
an ancillary activity . . . Article 1732 also carefully avoids
making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled
basis and one offering such service on
an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does
Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its
services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community
or population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general
population.
Common Carrier.  Petitioner is a common carrier whether
its carrying of goods is done on an irregular rather than
scheduled manner, and with an only limited clientele. A
common carrier need not have fixed and publicly known
routes. Neither does it have to maintain terminals or issue
tickets. To be sure, petitioner fits the test of a common
carrier as laid down in Bascos vs. Court of Appeals. The test
to determine a common carrier is "whether the given
undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the
carrier which he has held out to the general public as his
occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business
transacted." In the case at bar, the petitioner admitted that it
is engaged in the business of shipping and lighterage,

Asian Terminals, Inc. vs. Daehan Fire and Marine
Insurance Co.
Sps. Perena vs. Sps. Zarate
offering its barges to the public, despite its limited clientele
for carrying or transporting goods by water for
compensation.
The relationship, therefore, between the consignee and the
arrastre operator must be examined. This relationship is akin
to that existing between the consignee and/or the owner of
the shipped goods and the common carrier, or that between
a depositor and a warehouseman. In the performance of its
obligations, an arrastre operator should observe the same
degree of diligence as that required of a common carrier and
a warehouseman.
Being the custodian of the goods discharged from a vessel,
an arrastre operator’s duty is to take good care of the goods
and to turn them over to the party entitled to their
possession. In a claim for loss filed by the consignee or in
the insurer, the burden of proof to show compliance with the
obligation to deliver the goods to the appropriate party
devolves upon the arrastre operator. Since the safekeeping
of the goods is its responsibility, it must prove that the
losses were not due to its negligence or that of its
employees.
To prove the exercise of diligence in handling the subject
cargoes, ATI must do more than merely show the possibility
that some other party could be responsible for the loss or the
damage. It must prove that it exercised due care in the
handling thereof. ATI failed to do this.
YES. A school bus operator is a common carrier.
Perena’s defense of diligence of a good father in the
selection and supervision of their driver is unavailable for
breach of contract of carriage. Perenas operated as a
common carrier; and their standard of care was
extraordinary diligence, not only diligence of a good father.
A carrier is a person or corporation who undertakes to
transport or convey goods from one place to another,
gratuitously or for hire. They may be private or common
Private carrier is one who, without holding himself or
itself out to the public as ready to act for all who may desire
his or its services, undertakes, by special agreement in a
particular instance only, to transport goods or persons from
one place to another either gratutitously or for hire. The
diligence required of a private carrier is only ordinary
Common Carrier is a person, corporation, firm or
association engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or
air, for compensation, offering such services to the
public. Diligence required is to observe extraordinary
diligence, and is presumed to be at fault or to have acted
negligently in case of the loss of effects of passengers, or
death or injuries to passengers

The true test for a common carrier is not the quantity or

extent of business actually transacted, or the number of
conveyances, BUT WHETHER the undertaking is a part of
the activity that he has held out to the general public as his
business or occupation.

The Perenas held themselves out as a ready transportation

indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living
within or near where they operated the service and for a
fee. Perena, being a common carrier, was already presumed
to be negligent at the time of the accident because death
occurred to their passenger. The omissions of care on the
part of the driver constituted negligence.