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So Close Yet So Far: An Analysis on the Rise of Mexico’s Third Parties

Alejandro Urbina-Bernal

POS 301

April 22, 2020

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Introduction

Throughout the development of American national politics, we have seen a tendency to

ignore third party movements following the split into Democrats or Republicans in the 18th and

19th century. Across the border however, the United States’ southern neighbors in Latin America,

primarily Mexico, have witnessed substantial growth in external parties that successfully retain

seats in the executive and majorities in the legislative and judicial branches. For such a close

geographical proximity, there is a wildly different political landscape in both the acceptance and

successes of third parties that warrants an in-depth analysis, particularly at a time when the

American voter finds themselves increasingly dissatisfied with the current political dichotomy.

This paper will begin with a brief overview of Mexico’s political history, focusing on the

downfall of the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) hegemonic crumbling, along with an

explanation on how this research is justifiable in the answering of the proposed research

question. Thereafter, the paper will apply qualitative and quantitative analysis on the two critical

movements identified, the rise of the National Action Party (PAN) in 2000, and the rise of the

National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) in 2018, identifying what factors made these

power shifts possible. Finally, the paper will address the strengths and weaknesses of the

research conducted, analyzing the role to which the multifaceted research and the permanence of

the topics being research add or detract from the overall answer.

Brief Overview and Proposed Research Question

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The Beginning of the End for the PRI

For decades, Latin American political systems have worked in quite a stark contrast to

the binary two-party system practiced in the United States. Many Latin American countries have

employed a multiparty system with respective changes in the tide of political prowess. To that

end, it might seem nonsensical to explore Mexico, given that one might argue that the rise of

third parties is simply engrained into the political culture and is to be expected. However, this is

not the case. While Mexico is now enjoying the rise of external parties into important positions

of government, for a large period of the 20th century, Mexico was subject to a one-party

hegemony of pseudo-democracy. In his article for the Journal of Politics in Latin America,

Miguel Carreras wrote that “…the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) controlled the

different levers of governmental power for more than five decades, including the presidency,

governorships, and both houses of Congress. During this period, the PRI and the government

combined to commit electoral fraud with impunity,” (Carreras 143). The PRI’s consolidation of

power and hegemonic control over the republic was legitimized with the presence of minor

outlier parties who provided candidates that would almost certainly lose to PRI candidates,

providing the illusion of democratic processes that endorsed the PRI ideology. Among these

outlier parties was the National Action Party (PAN) established in 1939 by “…professionals,

intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and Catholics seeking an institutional alternative to the PRI, which

had emerged as the ruling party in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution. Although it has

been frequently portrayed as a reactionary party, the PAN’s advocacy of free and fair elections, a

competitive multiparty system, effective federalism (with due respect for state and local

autonomy), and the separation of powers (especially the development of a truly independent

legislature) closely matches the Revolution’s original goals,” (Shirk 25). For decades, PAN had
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served as a minor obstacle deliberately allowed to exist as a legitimizing factor for often corrupt

elections, but in the late 1980s, public opinion and support for PRI began to change. Following a

period of economic instability, President Miguel De la Madrid ushered in an era of considerable

publicized economic reform, and Mexicans “…began to take a more personally invested interest

in politics and the performance of their government during the previous administration, under

President De la Madrid, that undertook massive projects of restructuring their economy. The

dramatic changes that De la Madrid made inspired voters, through issue positioning and

strengthening ideologization, to increase their support for the opposition forces and almost topple

the PRI,” (Gegg 17- 18). For the first time, the minor interests of the economists and

businessmen who comprised the PAN ranks began to take center stage as voters increasingly

subscribed to neoliberal politics and agendas, and PRI’s carefully constructed hegemony began

to crumble. Paired alongside the growth of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and an

increased personal invested interest in national electoral politics, the 1988 election marked a

turning point for PRI control who found themselves losing seats across the republic in the

Senate, Chamber of Deputies, and in 2000, the Presidency. Where before, the PRI had been a

surefire victor of elections, including through illicit practices of corruption, for the first time in

almost half a century, the Mexican population had democratically ousted the hegemony and

ushered in a new era, begging the question, how was the population empowered by their

environment to do so, and what lessons can we take from this to apply to American politics?

Justification for Research

The Demand for Political Alternatives

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The question and desire for American voters to be able to have an alternative to the

current two-party system is not a recent development in the political landscape. In his article for

Forbes, Bruce Bartlett notes that “…83% of Americans said there are serious problems with our

two-party system. Many have repeatedly said the want more choices than just those offered by

the Republicans and Democrats,” and yet, while this number seems almost impossible to

continue forcing a two-party system to, third parties in the United States have continued to lack

considerable, if any, success. As mentioned previously, some might argue that Latin American

politics cannot be indicative of American politics, as they simply have historical attachment to

multiparty systems, but again, this has not been the case until very recently in Mexico. As Guy

Poitras notes, “…the PAN posed no serious challenge to its dominant adversary at the ballot box.

It was never able to garner many votes during the heyday of the PRI. By the 1960s PAN was

able to achieve double-digit support at the polls for the presidency, but its strengths remained

concentrated at local and regional levels. Its first state gubernatorial triumphs did not come until

the more open reform period in the late twentieth century. Until the PRI broke into two rival

factions in the late 1980s, PANista hopes for electoral victories mostly rested on a rather small

segment of the voting populace,” (Poitras 273). There was no armed uprising, there was no

historical precedence facilitating the progress of party lines, it had all been accomplished by

something else. It is this “something else” that justifies this research, as it can provide a critical

insight into what the United States might be lacking in the search for third party growth.

Qualitative and Quantitative Research on the Rise in Third Parties

Qualitative Analysis on the Rise of PAN in 2000

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As mentioned previously, while PAN employed a multitude of contrarian reactionary

policies to that of the PRI’s legislative measures during their time in power, there remained a

considerable connection to the ideologies practiced by the revolutionary heroes of 1910. This

connection of ideology would be argued under qualitative and interpretive research to contribute

to the legitimization of the party as a valid group of political engagement that merited votes,

establishing Pan “…as a legitimate member of Mexico’s revolutionary family, albeit only distant

cousin of the groups that came to dominate Mexican politics during the past century,” (Shirk 25-

26). This is important to note, as it would serve as a crucial factor in the rise of prominence for

PAN and its candidates in the late 20th century. PAN served initially as the side party that

legitimized the democratic farce of the PRI’s elections, but was protected likewise in the claimed

historical ties to revolutionary heroes, and at first, PAN was willing to accept their minimal role

of merely serving to shift the perspectives of PRI and not holding any power itself, but this began

to change in the 1980s, when PAN’s business leaders “…strongly repudiated the governmental

decision to expropriate the banks. This neopanismo chose a strategy of “electoral insurrection”

and mobilized resources to try to compete on equal footing with the PRI at the municipal level,

especially in the north,” (Carreras 144). Suddenly, PAN found themselves without decision-

making power afforded to them by the hegemony of the PRI and began to engage in active

measures to regain this influence. The strategy that PAN identified was to cater to the very group

that had been ignored for so long, the increasingly disgruntled voters who saw themselves not as

participants of the electoral system, but as subjects of the ruling party. Carreras argued that the

crucial actions of the parties were that “…political parties were not passive actors that indirectly

benefited from the democratization process. On the contrary, the PAN (Partido Acción Nacional

– National Action Party) and the PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática – Party of the
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Democratic Revolution) were instrumental in weakening the hegemonic party by mobilizing

disgruntled voters at the regional and local level,” (Carreras 144). Opposition leaders empowered

disillusioned communities with the intention to draw attention to the electoral process and limit

the reach of PRI’s electoral corruption, and as more voters were encouraged to participate, they

found within PAN a legitimate alternative to the immoveable nature of the PRI’s political

machine. Paired alongside the heavy economic blows of the 1980s, the opposition movements

capitalized on the frailty of PRI to secure votes and maneuvered themselves as the economic

experts and thereby saviors of future generations. What began as small movements in localized

municipal races quickly gained national traction and secured a Presidential victory for Vicente

Fox of PAN at the turn of the century in 2000. PAN arguably relied heavily on the interpretation

of itself as historically revolutionary, connecting itself to heroic figures of change and drawing

legitimacy from it, and when paired with their symbols of success as leaders of the industrial and

business industries in Mexico, gained considerable attention and support from a voter base who

at the very heart of it, wanted something new that could respond and adapt to the problems of

modern society.

Multifaceted Analysis on the Rise of MORENA in 2018

More critical to this research however was the electoral process behind Andres Manuel

Lopez Obrador’s election to the presidency in 2018. Following the 2000 election, PAN won the

Presidency and a legislative majority in 2006, although with a considerably smaller majority than

their 2000 victory. In this 2006 election, AMLO made a name for himself as the president and

candidate for the PRD movement after having helped establish it in 1989, declaring himself to be

the heir of the legacy of Ricardo Flores Magón (Schatzberg). Following a successful tenure as

Mayor of Mexico City in 2000, he publicly denounced the governance of Fox and his PAN
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comrades and ran as the PRD challenger against Felipe Calderon of the PAN. In a highly

contested election rampant with allegations of voter fraud, and even a self-declared victory along

with a private inauguration, AMLO lost by a mere fraction. In 2012, he ran again under the PRD

banner, and even with the qualifications and considerations ascribed to him as a legate of

Mexican leftist movements and leader of the considerably more progressive PRD at a time when

voters sought to remove the socially conservative PAN from power, the previously listed factors

studied under qualitative and interpretative methods would have concluded AMLO should have

won, and yet, both times, he lost. Even more crucially however, AMLO ran once more in 2018,

this time under the banner of his civic organization turned party, MORENA, and won.

So, what made his candidacy under the PRD different from his candidacy under

MORENA? In both situations, he had the qualitative factors of reliable connections to Mexican

revolutionary and progressive heroes, support of “…the strongest, most coherent forces on the

Mexican Marxist left…[and] significant presences in labor unions and social movements,”

(Schatzberg), and yet, something was crucially different between the AMLO of PRD and the

AMLO of MORENA, not necessarily reflecting a change in character, but instead revealing a

change in sociopolitical conditions. To explore this, quantitative methods of research is

necessary, particularly the research conducted by Madeline Gegg in her thesis for the University

of Mississippi. Gegg focuses her quantification on the behavior of voters, sorting them into

separate groups with their respective political behavior. LAPOP data was gathered from “…

individual survey responses from 100 different municipalities...specifically focusing on variables

indicating dissatisfaction with the three main parties, PAN, PRI, and PRD, and institutional

distrust,” (Gegg 25). Votes were sorted into those for AMLO or those against, coded with each

party retaining a specific identifying number. Gegg further included research on the satisfaction
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of the respondent with their political party, if they identify with one, coding this through

partisanship scores represented by attendance or abandonment. In her extensive coding, Gegg

found that “…one of the most significant groups to abandon the PRI during the 2018 election is

uneducated voters. Previously a vote largely monopolized by the PRI, uneducated voters took to

the poles in support of AMLO with him earning 42% of this vote while the PRI candidate Meade

only won 27% (Mattiace, 2019). This is one area where AMLO’s support improved significantly

since the 2012 election, speaking to how AMLO’s overwhelming popularity as the MORENA

candidate was considerably more farreaching than with the PRD,” (Gegg 23). Now, while

AMLO’s gain of the uneducated vote contributed to the electoral victory, it does not fully

explain the nature of the difference between his loss in 2006 and 2012 with his victory of 2018.

To explain this, Gegg draws attention to the codification of the association of respondents to

political parties and their satisfaction of said party, stating that “…the significance of confidence

in political parties to mean that low confidence, indicated by Table 4.1, means that the

respondents were likely to vote for the MORENA. The majority of AMLO’s votes came from

either independents or those abandoning their own parties, as demonstrated by the data in Tables

4.1 and 4.2,” (Gegg 33). Gegg’s codification indicated a significant correlation between an

increased vote for AMLO and MORENA candidates to voters shifting party lines, indicating that

AMLO’s movement had derived a sizable portion of votes not through the activation of a

dormant voter base, but through the convincing of already active voters to abandon party lines

and vote MORENA instead. It is important to thus ask why that was. Gegg proposes a quantified

correlation for this as well through her analysis of votes with respect to incumbent approval

ratings. Gegg points to the considerable drop of approval for the 2012 PRI President, Enrique

Pena Nieto, in comparison to Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderon’s approval ratings as an indicator
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to a change in voting patterns, arguing that PAN administrations left office “…without a

dramatic drop in approval, along with the PAN party still being a signifier of change from the

PRI, Felipe Calderón was well positioned going into the 2006 election. Peña Nieto’s poor

approval ratings, on the other hand, were extremely low by the end of his presidency which

would then in turn send voters away from the PRI in 2018. Alternatively, the 2012 election was

not affected by the approval ratings in the same way because the era of newness of democracy

and the PAN’s victory had ended and Calderón’s approval ratings had tapered off,” (Gegg 34).

Gegg’s codification of voting patterns paired alongside national approval ratings thus provides a

cohesive argument of quantified analysis that establishes an enlightened understanding of the

Mexican political landscape, arguing that not only was it necessary for a candidate to be tied to

the qualitative measures of revolutionary spirit and recognition as a driving force for change, but

that a power shift required with it a considerably empowered opposition to the incumbent not

purely from third parties, but even including from those within the incumbent party.

Conclusion on the Strengths and Weaknesses of Research

The Strength of Multifaceted Analysis

Throughout the scope of this research, there have been a multitude of different interacting

independent variables proposed that attempt to explain the reasoning behind not only the success

of third-party PAN in the 2000 Mexican election, but also the difference behind the failed

attempt of AMLO’s PRD candidacy in 2006 and 2012 as opposed to the success of his

MORENA candidacy in 2018. Quantitative and qualitative research was used to depict a wide

berth of factors that affect political success, with this multifaceted approach providing a solid
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foundation of comparison with which to draw arguments regarding American politics. In

qualitative analysis, research indicated a strong connection to historical figures of revolutionary

movements, notable in American politics in both the permanence of the current binary system

and the lack of third-party presence. Democrats and Republicans were instrumental in the

establishment of the country, and historically can trace themselves as the backbone to the current

political system, whilst third parties have institutionally never truly formed a considerable

portion of power, lacking both political figures and heritage to gain a truly legitimized platform.

Even more critically however, the argument of presidential approval to party shifts is

quantifiably reflected in American politics as well. From 1980 to the present day, there have

been three presidents who served a singular term before being replaced by a candidate of the

opposing party, and in each of these scenarios, the incumbent had a low approval and high

disapproval rating at the end of their term. Jimmy Carter had a 34% approval rating, George W.

Bush had 34%, and Donald Trump had 34%, with their disapproval ratings reported at 55%,

61%, and 62% respectively. Quantitative research thus details those voters will be ready for

change most eminently following a particularly poor approval of the incumbent, while

qualitative informs that this is then followed by a trusted member of change with considerable

historical ties of progress. The research of both quantitative and qualitative methods thus

provides a fully cohesive understanding of the environments that exist elsewhere that the United

States fails to maintain. Third parties critically lack the qualitative elements of historical

trustworthiness and connections to revolutionary ideologies, along with the quantitative element

of voter abandonment of a party. In the United States, given the historical domination of the

current binary system, voters reasonably conclude that their only alternative is one of two party

options, and thus contribute to a perpetual system wherein third parties consistently lose ground
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in the belief that they will not win elections. Quantitative and qualitative analysis adds to the

theory that Mexico had a considerable environment to allow for the development of external

party rise, evidenced by both MORENA and PAN, an environment that is lacking in the United

States in the legitimization of third parties. By approaching the research from quantitative and

qualitative research, this conclusion is bolstered further and provided sufficient evidence.

The Question of Permanence

However much evidence there might be in defense of the research conclusion, there is

still a critical element missing behind this analysis, particularly since most of the analysis is

derived from the performance of MORENA in 2018. While the study exists to show how they

got to power, there remains the question of how MORENA might fare in the future. While PAN

was able to sweep in 2000 and 2006, PRI made a comeback in 2012, retaking all branches of

government. The goal of this research was to answer not just how might a third party come to

power in the United States by studying Mexico, but also how might it stay in power. This is yet

to be explored with MORENA. As mentioned previously, there is difficulty in successfully

determining the permanence and relevance of MORENA as a political party given that it was

intended and established not as a party, but as a social movement, and social movements that

build into campaigns “…usually come out weakened. The kind of movement infrastructure

needed to build a successful electoral campaign does not look like the infrastructure of a

successful social movement. Although supporters such as John Ackerman may see Morena as a

‘movement party’ whose main goal ‘is not to win elections but to transform the country,’ as soon

as election campaigns begin, electoral considerations almost inevitably take precedence over

everything else,” (Schatzberg). Gegg similarly agrees with this statement, adding that “…the

2018 presidential election was so recent that there is little that discusses the MORENA’s
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newfound role. Their history is short, having only participated in one presidential election, yet

monumental when considering the current state of Mexican politics,” (Gegg 19). Research on

MORENA is ongoing, and the theoretical framework behind their performance in connection to

qualitative and quantitative research may be loosened as further research is conducted and

further interactive variables are discovered. It may eventually be discovered that there is an

external factor that is the root of approval ratings beyond a simple explanation of public

perception that could thus alter the conclusion of how this affects voter behaviors. Overall, while

the research provided currently is significant enough to arrive at a correlation, it is still far too

early to tell if this is a concrete correlation, and not merely a product of an independent variable

yet to be identified.

At the present moment however, research indicates that the factors behind the success of

PAN in the 2000 election and the success of MORENA in the 2018 election as opposed to the

failure of PRD in the 2006 and 2012 elections can be strongly attributed to the qualitative and

quantitative factors of historical and revolutionary relevance, connections to respected historical

figures and entities, and the mobilization of frustrated voters empowered by a poorly received

incumbent. If American third parties aim to emulate the success received in Mexico and Latin

America, then there should be a considerable focus on the redistribution of resources and

candidate platforms to match this strategy. On the backfoot of an incredibly tumultuous 2020

election, third party movements have the capability to establish themselves as a legitimate force

to be reckoned with at the national level.

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Works Cited

Carreras, Miguel. “Party Systems in Latin America after the Third Wave: A Critical Re-

Assessment.” Journal of Politics in Latin America, vol. 4, no. 1, 2012, pp. 135–153.,

doi:10.1177/1866802x1200400105.

“Final Presidential Job Approval Ratings.” Final Presidential Job Approval Ratings | The

American Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/data/final-presidential-

job-approval-ratings.

Gegg, Madeline, "The Mexican Voter Transformed: MORENA Success in the Wake of Party

System Failure" (2020). Honors Theses. 1401.

Poitras, Guy, “The Rise of the Pan”, 9 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 271 (2003)

Schatzberg, Simon, et al. “The Rise of Morena.” Jacobin,

www.jacobinmag.com/2016/07/morena-mexico-obrador-df-nieto-pri-oaxaca.

Shirk, David A. “Vicente Fox and the Rise of the PAN.” Journal of Democracy, vol. 11, no. 4,

2000, pp. 25–32., doi:10.1353/jod.2000.0086.

“Why Third Parties Can't Compete.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 11 July 2012,

www.forbes.com/2010/05/13/third-parties-fusion-voting-elections-opinions-columnists-

bruce-bartlett.html?sh=15ca26715f7a.