Case: Salaw vs NLRC

Topic: Right to Counsel, Right to Remain Silent

DOCTRINE: Section 12(1), Article III thereof specifically provides: "Any person under
investigation for the commssion of an offense shall have the right to ... have compete and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing in the
presence of counsel

PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS

ESPERO SANTOS SAIAW NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION, ASSOCIATED BANK AND/ OR
JOSE R. TENGCO, Chairman of the Board,
ROLLIE TUAZON, Manager,

ACTION SEQUENCE:

FACTS
 Espero Santos Salaw, was employed by the private respondents in September 1967 as a
credit investigator-appraiser. 
 On November 27, 1984, the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine
Constabulary, extracted from the petitioner — without the assistance of counsel — a
Sworn Statement  which made it appear that the petitioner, in cahoots with a co-employee,
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Reynaldo Madrigal, a supervisor in charge of the acquired assets of respondent

Associated Bank, sold 20 sewing machines and electric generators which had been
foreclosed by the respondent bank for P60,000 and divided the proceeds between them
 The petitioner was requested by private respondent Rollie Tuazon, the bank manager, to
appear before the bank's Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee (PDIC).
Further, Tuazon sent Salaw a letter stating that “[he is] requested to come on Thursday,
February 28, 1985 at 11:00 at the Board Room, 10th Floor of the Madrigal Building,
Ayala, without counsel or representative.”
 Thereafter, Salaw was terminated from employment for alleged serious misconduct or
willful disobedience and fraud or willful breach of the trust
 Salaw filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the Bank, and Tuazon before the
NLRC.
 LA – held that the dismissal is illegal and ordered his reinstatement
 NLRC – On appeal, NLRC reversed LA.

ISSUE/S
Whether Salaw was illegally dismissed

RULING
YES.

It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by the technical rules of
procedure in the adjudication cases. However, the right to counsel, a very basic requirement of
substantive due process, has to be observed. Indeed, rights to counsel and to due process of law
are two of fundamental rights guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution to person under investigation,
be the proceeding administrate civil, or criminal. Thus, Section 12(1), Article III thereof specifically
provides: "Any person under investigation for the commssion of an offense shall have the right
to ... have compete and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing in the presence of counsel."  To underscore the inviolability this provision, the third
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paragraph of the same section explicitly states that, "any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible evidence against him.

The investigation of petitioner Salaw by the respondent Bank' investigating committee violated his
constitutional right to due process, in as much as he was not given a chance to defend himself, as
provided in Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code
governing the dismissal of employees. Section 5 of the said Rule requires that "the employer shall
afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires."  Here petition was perfunctorily denied the assistance of counsel
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during investigation to be conducted by the PDIC.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the appealed
decision of the NLRC REINSTATING the decision of the labor arbiter.

NOTES
Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee by
his employer are two-fold: the substantive and the procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a
valid or authorized cause as provided by law (Articles 279, 281, 282-284, New Labor Code), but
the rudimentary requirements of due process — notice and hearing — must also be observed
before an employee may be dismissed. One does not suffice; without their concurrence, the
terminate would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.

The requirement of notice is intended inform the employee concerned of the employer's intent
dismiss him and the reason for the proposed dismissal; on other hand, the requirement of hearing
affords the employ the opportunity to answer his employer's charges against him and accordingly
to defend himself therefrom before dismissal effected. Neither one of these two requirements can
be dispensed with without running afoul of the due process requirement of the Constitution.