THARDY RIASSUNTO (2018)

What about: structural impediments to the materialization of European defense.

INTRODUCTION

With Maastricht was the ambition to develop an EU foreign policy backed by a parallel common defense
policy. The EU was to move away from its “normative”, “civilian” power status and exist as a foreign policy
actor.
Series of challenges: uncertain support from member states, inadequacy of the tool to the security needs
and institutional inertia. The original goal of security and defense has turned into an over-dominant security
track under-developed defense track.
Defense: aims to protect citizens and territories – including or primarily through the use of military force –
from attacks.
Security: characterized by a relative absence of threats, broader range of policy responses – political,
economic, social, police, etc. – to tackle threats.
CSDP more a “Common Security Policy” than a “common defense policy”: security characterizes the EU’s
policy. In last three years defense track is given new impetus. 1. EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016 2.the
invocation of the “defense clause” of the Lisbon Treaty in 2015. 3. the establishment of EU military
headquarter 4. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), 5. European Commission-proposed European
Defense Fund in 2017 revitalization of the defense debate. “Protecting the Union and its citizens” has
become one of the three strategic priorities of the EU and defense is presented as a central instrument. But
member states’ strategic cultures continue to diverge on the virtues of the EU as a defense institution, let
alone using force through it. Member states’ defense policies tend to remain either national or NATO-
focused. Advances in the defense field have been more about structures and capabilities than about
operations. What the Europeans want to collectively do and achieve through these operations, to defend
the interests defined in the EUGS. Article nature of CSDP balancing towards defense.

THE EU’S COMMON SECURITY POLICY

ESDP was anchored in the “progressive framing of a common defense policy”. 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal
military-focused “deploy rapidly and then sustain forces. This ambition was supposed to move the EU away
from its “civilian” and “normative” power status. Defense in an EU context is to draw on national
conceptions and imply the protection of citizens, territories interests through the use of military force.
Defense is about some sort of coercion. And EU successive treaties make an EU defense policy a primary
ambition. Why then has defense not been more conceptualized and developed?
The defense dimension of CSDP has remained largely under-developed and the EU still displays many of the
characteristics of a civilian power. Civilian missions have always outnumbered military operations, four sets
of reasons: 1. CSDP has developed in reaction to existing needs that were predominantly of a civilian
nature; 2. most member states were in reality not willing to give the EU the defense role assigned to it by
various treaties; 3. inter-institutional competition drove the EU towards a civilian crisis management
identity in comparison with the UN or NATO; 4. learning or “practice-based communities have been
pushing forward a new security thinking”, thus “changing the traditional – military – understanding of crisis
management”.

EU has invested in the fields of inter alia conflict prevention and mediation, security sector reform (SSR),
rule of law, civilian policing, border management, training and capacity-building, and peace- and resilience-
building. This was done through CSDP missions, but also through the European Commission’s instruments,
through the activities of Justice and Home Affairs agencies.
Operations have been more about peacekeeping in the UN way than about defense. Three issues are under
consideration here that pertain to the mandates of CSDP military operations, their degree of robustness,
and the extent to which they aim at “defending” Europe. 1. reluctance to identify any enemy, have made
those missions closer to police than to military activities. The main task of mission were security of people
and places, freedom of movement, support to the local armed and security forces,
2. Use of armed units in stabilization rather than openly coercive mandates.
The EU does not wage wars through CSDP operations, nor does it place high value on the use of force as an
instrument. And CSDP operations have in reality never been about sustained coercion. On the ground,
whenever the use of force is foreseen, it is supposed to remain tactical, that is, limited in time and space,
rather than strategic. By essence, CSDP operations are deployed with the consent of the host state; the
soldier acts more as a police officer or as a capacity-builder than as a combatant.
3. more about projecting security outside of the EU area than about “defending” EU member states or
citizens.

EU military operations have been more about the stability of third states than driven by a narrow
conception of European security or interests. The liberal institutionalist outward-looking feature of CSDP
then seems to have prevailed over the inward-looking Realist agenda, at least until recently.
Finally defense and industrial cooperation aspects of CSDP, too limited in scope to present this domain as
evidence of an emerging European defence. EU has remained more a security than a defence actor.

DEFENCE METTERS

CSDP operations are criticized for being either over ambitious, or under-delivering. Member states are
hesitant to fully support the operations they have created, and doubts are cast about the adequacy of CSDP
operations to the challenges. It is the defense dimension of CSDP that is challenged, as a result of diverging
views from member states as to what defense should entail and how far the EU should go in this field.
Events creating a sentiment of enthusiasm for European defense: 1. evolution of the security environment
and related threats to Europe: evolution in the environment – are the Arab Springs and the instability that
they created at the European periphery, the materialization of the terrorist and the ramification between
extra- European terrorist groups and Europe-based terrorist cells, and the flows of irregular
migrants/refugees.
2. Foreign policies of states that are key to European security: states’ foreign policies evolutions – are the
resurgence of an aggressive Russia, the election of Trump in the US and the British decision to pull out from
the EU.
France and Germany have been instrumental here. France has for long pushed for a more ambitious
defense role for the EU. Germany has been equally supportive. The two countries then released a series of
joint documents; about the urgency of strengthening European defense, and lead on most subsequent
defense-related projects. Three sets of processes have attested to a renewed interest for defense: the
invocation of the defense clause by France in November 2015; the release of the EUGS on Foreign and
Security policy in June 2016 and its follow-up work-strands, the European Defense Fund and the PESCO;
and work of the European Commission in the domain of defense research and capability development
funding.

THE DEFENCE CLAUSE

Provision of the Lisbon Treaty in the defense area is its “mutual defense clause”, by which a member state
that is the “victim of armed aggression on its territory” may call upon the other member states for “aid and
assistance by all the means in their power”. France invoked the EU defense clause for the first time with the
intention to embark its partners into a more robust defense posture; “the enemy is not France’s but
Europe’s enemy” (solicit coalition against Daesh), but only a few states committed military capabilities and
the majority stayed away from operations in Iraq and Syria. UK and Germany responded rapidly. The
invocation of the defense clause is one indication that the environment is evolving in a way that gives
European defense more prominence.

THE EUGS AND DEFENCE-RELATED WORK-STANDS

A second sign that EU defense agenda has been revitalized is a new strategy for the EU’s foreign and
security policy. The necessity comes as a result of a combination of a new security environment at the EU
periphery and the obsolescence of the previous European Security Strategy (2003). The EUGS defined four
categories of interests for the EU: peace and security; prosperity; resilience of EU democracies; and a
rules-based global order. “Defending Europe” is a top priority”. The Strategy has constituted the doctrinal
basis for a series of developments with a clear defense focus. EUGS led to the drafting of a Security and
Defense Implementation Plan (SDIP) member states agreed on three strategic priorities; responding to
external conflicts and crises; building the capacities of partners; and protecting the Union and its citizens.
SDIP laid the basis of three subsequent defense-focused work strands: the Coordinated Annual Review on
Defence (CARD); the permanent military planning capability and the PESCO.
CARD (2017) will “gradually synchronize” and “mutually adapt” member state’s “national defense planning
cycles and capability development practices”.
MPCC “military planning and conduct capability” (2017)  permanent strategic level headquarters for non-
executive military missions. The creation of the MPCC has come as the result of three parallel processes,
namely the identification of a specific need, the momentum generated by the release of the EUGS, and the
UK’s decision to leave the EU.
PESCO desire to move forward. It aims at bringing together those EU “member states whose military
capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this
area with a view to the most demanding missions”. In June 2017, the European Council agreed on “the
need to launch an inclusive and ambitious Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)”; only the UK, Malta
and Denmark not joining it. PESCO aimed at incentivizing cooperation among member states in the field of
defense capability development and operations. Two components: 1. Binding commitments in the field of
defense spending, capability development, and availability and deployability of forces. 2. developing a
European medical command, surveillance systems, cybersecurity response teams, military mobility.
Added value of PESCO are the combination of the nature of commitments, the accountability and the
permanence of the framework. These elements are supposed to shape national mindsets and practices,
and in the end, the form of cooperation, in a way never observed in the past.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S NEW ROLE

The European Commission was absent from CFSP and CSDP. Last couple of years push from the European
Commission to play a role in European defense through its funding capacity. The Commission released its
European Defense Action Plan (EDAP) that introduces the idea of a European Defense Fund. It is composed
of two “windows”: 1. Finance defense research and 2. Capability development. The European Commission’s
contribution is new and opens up opportunities both for the industrial sector and at the political level. This
attests to an evolution in the thinking about the role that defense should play in the European institutional
framework.

A LONG WAY FROM EUROPEAN DEFENCE

How member states, France and Germany most importantly, will take the lead and sustain the effort, will
be key to success. Equally important is the extent to which these developments will be perceived as being
compatible with NATO’s role. At least two sets of issues of a conceptual, operational, and cultural nature
need to be considered. One is the under-conceptualization of defense within the EU; the other one is
member states’ diverging strategic cultures and conceptions of the EU’s defense role.

DEFENCE UNDER-CONCEPTUALISATION
Major problem of the EU was the “lack of a clear conceptual framework and established military doctrine to
guide” European peace operation larger grey zone between peace and war. Calling for Europeans to “think
more creatively about what kind of defense capability they want” and “what sorts of missions they
envisage” alongside “traditional peacekeeping.” High Representatives “The EU is not a military alliance”.
And therefore “defense” is not about territorial or collective defense. For the 22 EU member states that are
also members of NATO, collective defense is NATO’s prerogative. Invocation of the EU defense clause by
France confirmed that the EU is not a collective defense organization. High Representative added, “The
Union cannot afford to ignore the ‘D’ in its CSDP.” Yet under-conceptualization persists. Military CSDP
operations are more of a security than of a defense nature.
2016 Foreign Affairs Council referred to a possible EU defense role in “the protection and resilience of [the
EU’s] networks and critical infrastructure”, “ensuring stable access to and use of the global commons,
“countering hybrid threats”, “countering terrorism”, “combatting people smuggling; some tasks have been
listed. EU defense activities can span from expeditionary to maritime operations that can be openly
coercive in nature, and may also include training or capacity-building. Examples: NATO led-operations
Yugoslavia 1999, Libya 2011or Afghanistan; Islamic State; French led operation Barkhane in the Sahel. What
distinguishes these operations from the current EU-led military operations is the combination of the
identification of an opponent or enemy and the centrality of the use of force.

An EU defense role would imply the capacity and will to conduct operations that 1. give the military a
central combatant role with the aim to deter or compel a political opponent; 2. are deployed to stabilize a
situation with the possibility of coercive action; or 3. support third states’ armed forces engaged in coercive
action against political opponents.
How far the EU is from to this defense role? EU is still a long way from such a defense capacity and role.

On two occasions in the last two years, opportunities to further define the meaning of defense were
missed:

1. invocation of art. 42(7) in November 2015 , example: showed that CSDP or even the EU were not an
important part of the implementation of the provision. The EU as such is not mentioned in article
42(7) – only member states are. In 2016 Joint Communication on Hybrid threats called for further
work on wide-ranging and serious hybrid attack occurs: but the debate needs to be broader than
just on the response to hybrid threats.
The invocation of the defense clause could have led to a debate on some sort of European
solidarity in the defense domain.

2. weak or partial conceptualization of defense also illustrated in the context of the EUGS. The debate
has focused far more on defense capabilities than on the kind of operations that the EU could
conduct with those capabilities.
The EUGS coined the term of “strategic autonomy” for the EU, necessary to “promote the common
interests of our citizens, as well as our principles and values”. Such autonomy contains a defense
dimension, but the Strategy does not define it further. Tellingly, terms such as “use of force”,
“robust operations”, “coercion” do not appear in the EUGS, and the term defense is never
mentioned in relation to possible military operations.
SDIP provided many opportunities to debate over the meaning of defense. Council Conclusions on
the implementation of the EUGS listed the type of operations that the EU should be able to
conduct. The first three items are 1. “Joint crisis management operations in situations of high
security risk in the regions surrounding the EU”, 2. “Joint stabilization operations, including air and
special operations”, 3. “Civilian and military rapid response, including military rapid response
operations inter alia using the EU Battlegroups as a whole or within a mission-tailored Force
package”. There is little in the way the various PESCO operational projects are defined or in the way
the PESCO framework has been built. PESCO would unlikely be the tool through which the EU goes
much beyond the traditional crisis management activities. Work done by the Commission focused
on defense integration and capability development not on when and how the EU would then fight.
 “Member states have been unwilling to seriously discuss the military level of ambition” and
conditions of the use of force under EU.

OPERATIONS, STRATEGIC CULTURES AND INSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCES

Two problems stem from this under-conceptualization of European defense.

1. is the issue of capability development in the absence of a clear idea of what the EU will do with
these capabilities.
2. Risk that the battle plan will not survive the first contact with the enemy. Is the EU better equipped
or keener to run complex military operations as a result of the momentum?

European defense integration rests on two pillars: operations and capability development. EU posture is
more of a security than of a defense nature and also implies that the future of European defense will be
measured against the ability of the EU to run operations that have a genuine defense role.
Propensity of member states to run military operations is uncertain. Example: binding commitments
underlying PESCO deals with the availability and deployability of forces, for which member states commit
to “provide substantial support within means and capabilities to CSDP operations. Some states think of
PESCO as an incentivizing mechanism. Real test will only come with the next military operation.
Yet, differences are deep and likely to continue to hinder the emergence of an EU defence role. Issue:
states do not have the same approach to the term “defense” nor to what is to be done in an EU framework
in the defense field. Opposition in the discussion on PESCO: France seeing PESCO as a restricted club of
states willing to mutualize capabilities, Germany more inclusive approach in which socialization of EU
member states risk that German conception would become more central.
Debate on member states’ perceptions of the merits and effectiveness of recent military operations. For
France operations are indications of what European defense should lead to; German more doubtful that
such operations are the logical expression of a defense ambition.
Emergence of an EU defense role is constrained by institutional preferences, EU may not be the preferred
option for defense in few EU member states. Recent evolutions offer ambivalent picture: uncertainties in
the US increased defense role and centrality of NATO as a defense guarantor still prevails in most of its
member states, in particular, the ones that identify Russia as a major threat. In the end, the EU appears as
one option among a few, arguably in contradiction with the Lisbon Treaty’s objective of the “progressive
framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense”.

CONCLUSION

Recent key developments attest to a possible rebalancing towards the EU’s defense role. Even the
European Commission has started to position itself on the defense market. Three issues are at stake in this
debate
1. “defense” as an activity is being revisited: the defense dimension of a given activity can be difficult
to define.
2. EU member states diverge on the merits of the use of force in international politics, hesitate to fully
embrace an EU defense agenda if such an agenda implies a hard conception of defense.
3. quite a few member states would agree that defense needs to be given more prominence within
the EU’s external action, divergences persist on both the finality of the project and the method.
There is still a gap between the need for Europe to defend itself and the fact that such task should
be the EU’s prerogative. In other words, the EU might not be the most appropriate instrument of
the defense of Europe.