A Study of offences against Unlawful Assembly

Offence committed by a member of Unlawful assembly, makes all member of unlawful assembly liable
Abstract:

Introduction:
The study deals about the offences that are against the Unlawful Assembly and the punishment given
for the people indulging in activities.
Statistical data about the offences against Unlawful assembly are discussed systematically.
Under IPC public offences are categorized into four, One of which is Unlawful Assembly.
The definition of Unlawful Assembly is given in section 141 of IPC.

Objectives:
 To study about the offences against Unlawful Assembly.
 To analyse the the punishment given for the offences relating to Unlawful Assembly.

Review of Literature:

Article 19(1) (B) of the Indian Constitution 1950 gives Fundamental Right to assemble peacefully
however IPC seeks to criminalize an unlawful assembly.

S 141: Unlawful Assembly:

An Assembly of five or more persons is Unlawful Assembly.

Essential ingredients of Unlawful Assembly:

1)There must be necessarily be five or more than five persons sharing the common object. When
there is only four individual shared common object or presence of fifth individual is not proved; it
cannot be considered an unlawful assembly.

2)There must be use of Criminal force and compel any person to do what he is not legally bound to
do.

3)There should be mischief or some Criminal trespass or some other offence.

4)There must be use of Criminal force against state or central government or any public servant.

Section 142 deals with a member of unlawful assembly. Whoever knows the fact that it is unlawful
Assembly and intentionally joins in that, or continues in it is said to be a member of Unlawful
Assembly.

Section 143 imposes punishment on the person who is the member of the unlawful assembly, which
may extend upto six years or fine or both.

Under section 149, Every member of unlawful assembly would be guilty of offence committed in
prosecution of common object and is vicariously liable.

This section imposes a constructive penal liability.

In order to fasten vicarious responsibility on any member of an unlawful assembly, there must be a
nexus between the common object and the offence committed and if it is, every member of the
assembly will become liable. The act must be the way it was done to achieve the common purpose
attributed to the members of the unlawful assembly.

The common object has to be inferred from the facts In Allaudin Mian vs. State of Bihar , Where the
common object of the unlawful assembly was to kill the father of the deceased girls and on frustration
of that object in consequence of the father who had gone inside the house to fetch a spear, having
been prevented from coming out of the house by his wife, two of the accused killed the two infant
girls, other accused could not be punished for the acts of killing two infant girls. It was not necessary
to kill the two girls who were not hindrance to accused in question from accomplishing their common
object.
It must be within the knowledge of other members as one likely to be committed in prosecution of the
common object. A thing is likely to occur only when it will probably occur or may very well
occur/happen. At the time of the commission of an offense, the word’ knew’ indicates a state of mind
and not the latter. Knowledge must be proved. The word’ likely’ means some strong proof that such
knowledge was available to the unlawful assembly. The prosecution must show that not only did the
accused know that the offense was likely to be committed, but also that it was likely to be committed
in prosecuting the assembly’s common object.

In Allaudin Mian vs. State of Bihar, Where two of the accused killed the two infant girls, other accused
could not be punished for the acts of killing two infant girls, as the object of Unlawful Assembly was
not to kill two Infant girls but father of the deceased girls. It was not necessary to kill the two girls who
were not hindrance to accused in question from accomplishing their common object.

The concept of Vicarious liable in criminal law means that a person may be held accountable for
another’s crime, even though the actus reus was done by another person. Individuals believe that a
person who only follows the instructions of another is not innocent and is thus held responsible for the
offense as well as the person who gave the instructions.

Example: The getaway driver is responsible for an armed robbery, even if the driver never got out of
the vehicle and the heist was carried out by someone else. When someone is held accountable for a
crime that is committed by someone else, they are referred to as the “principal offender,” even if the
crime was perpetrated by someone else. Because of this tie between the defendant and the alleged
physical perpetrator, certain laws place blame on the defendant for the conduct of the alleged
perpetrator because of his connection to the defendant. Prior to going any further, it is important to
point out that this kind of criminal culpability is the exception rather than the norm.

In Allaudin Mian vs. State of Bihar, two of the accused killed the two infant girls, other accused could
not be vicariously liable and punished for the acts of killing two infant girls.

John see, Darley, Al, Taking law, into, Twenty First Centuary
The Model Penal code (1962) holds that a person deserves punishment when the person has formed
a settled intent to commit a crime, a subjectivist std that focuses on the person’s criminal intent,

In Yunis vs. Madhya Pradesh State, the Supreme Court held that the presence of the accused as
part of an unlawful assembly was sufficient for the conviction to be held. The fact that the accused
was a participant of the unlawful assembly and his presence on the spot of the event is adequate to
hold him liable even if he is not accused of any overt act. However, mere presence in an unlawful
assembly cannot make an individual responsible unless he is acting by common object.

Here In Allaudin Mian vs. State of Bihar, other members were present when two infants were killed.
However common object of Unlawful Assembly was not performed, instead of father, two Infant girls
were killed and therefore other members could not be vicariously liable and punished for the acts of
killing two infant girls.

State of U.P VS Sughar Singh: Five accessed were lying in a bush on either side of a lane, with
armed guns. When the deceased came near, the accused 4 and 5 exhorted him, and accuses nos 1,
2 and 3 shot the deceased with their guns respectively. Accused 1, 2 and 3 threatened the witnesses.
The trial court held that all of these were sufficient to come to the conclusion that these five accused
had constituted an unlawful assembly and has members had common object to kill the deceased.
They had a prearranged plan. The trial court convicted the accused.

In Allaudin Mian vs. State of Bihar, Where the common object of the unlawful assembly was to kill the
father of the deceased girls and had a prearranged plan and on frustration of that object in
consequence of the father who had gone inside the house to fetch a spear, having been prevented
from coming out of the house by his wife, two of the accused killed the deceased.

If unlawful assembly has not prosecuted for the common object but prosected for other
offence, what would be the punishment. Is it valid to punish Death Sentence.
whether the imposition of death penalty on the two accused persons found guilty of murder is
justified.

It is necessary that the maximum sentence prescribed by law should be reserved for ‘the rarest of
rare’ cases which are of an exceptional nature. Unless the nature of the crime and the circumstances
of the offender reveal that the criminal is a menace to the society and the sentence of life
imprisonment would be altogether inadequate, the Court should ordinarily impose the lesser
punishment and not the extreme punishment of death which should be reserved for exceptional cases
only.

In Allaudin Mian vs. State of Bihar,Where in a case of murder the material for choice of sentence was
scanty and the motive for the crime was obscure and the killings were not for gain and the charge
showed that the target was the father of the deceased and not the two infant daughters who were
killed and the killing was not in the contemplation of any of the accused and the infants were the
victims of the offenders’ ire resulting from frustration at the escape of their target i.e. father, there was
nothing so uncommon about the crime as to make the case an exceptional one and the mere fact that
infants were killed, without more, was not sufficient to bring the case within the category of ‘the rarest
of rare’ cases.

The Trial Court has dealt with the question of sentence. The reason which weighed with the Trial
Court is: it is one of the gravest cases of extreme culpability in which two innocent and helpless
babies were butchered in a barbarous manner. After taking note of the mitigating circumstances that
both the offenders were married young men with children, the Trial Court found that since the murders
were committed without provocation and in cold blood there, was no room for leniency as the crime
was so abhorrent that it shocked the conscience of the court. The High Court while maintaining the
conviction of the said two accused persons proceeded to deal with the question of sentence.

However, in order that the sentences may be properly graded to fit the degree of gravity of each case,
it is necessary that the maximum sentence prescribed by law should,as observed in Bachan
Singh case , be reserved for ‘the rarest of rare’ cases which are of an exceptional nature. Sentences
of severity are imposed to reflect the seriousness of the crime, to promote respect for the law, to
provide just punishment for the offence, to afford adequate deterrent to criminal conduct and to
protect the community from further similar conduct. It serves a three-fold purpose (i) punitive (ii)
deterrent and (iii) protective.
That is why this Court in Bachan Singh’s case observed that when the question of choice of
sentence is under consideration the Court must not only look to the crime and the victim but also the
circumstances of the criminal and the impact of the crime on the community. Unless the nature of the
crime and the circumstances of the offender reveal that the criminal is a menace to the society and
the sentence of life imprisonment would be altogether inadequate, the Court should ordinarily impose
the lessor punishment and not the extreme punishment of death which should be reserved for
exceptional cases only.
In the subsequent decision of Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, the court observed that only in
those exceptional cases in which the crime is so brutal, diabolical and revolting as to shock the
collective conscience of the community, would it be permissible to award the death sentence.
In the present case, unfortunately the material for choice of sentence is scanty. The motive for the
crime is obscure, the one stated, namely, the quarrel between two infants of both sides, does not
seem to be correct. The killings were not for gain. Both the girls were the victims of the offenders’ ire
resulting from frustration at the escape of their target. There is nothing uncommon about the crime as
to make the case an exceptional one. The mere fact that infants are killed, without more, is not
sufficient to bring the case within the category of ‘the rarest of rare’ cases.

In Allauddin Mian and others v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court laid down certain broad guidelines
for determining choice of sentence by Courts. It will be useful to refer to them as under:

"In our justice delivery system several difficult decisions are left to the presiding officers, sometimes
without providing the scales or the weights for the same. In cases of murder, however, since the
choice is between capital punishment and life imprisonment the legislature has provided a guideline in
the form of sub-section (3) of Section 354 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("the Code") which
reads as under:

When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment
for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence
awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reason for such sentence.

This provision makes it obligatory in cases of conviction for an offence punishable with death or with
imprisonment for life or for a term of years to assign reasons in support of the sentence awarded to
the convict and further ordains that in case the judge awards the death penalty, "special reasons" for
such sentence shall be stated in the judgment.

When the law casts a duty on the judge to state reasons it follows that he is under a legal obligation to
explain his choice of the sentence. It may seem trite to say so, but the existence of the 'special
reasons clause' in the above provision implies that the court can in fit cases impose the extreme
penalty of death.

Where a sentence of severity is imposed, it is imperative that the judge should indicate the basis upon
which he considers a sentence of that magnitude justified. Unless there are special reasons, special
to the facts of the particular case, which can be catalogued as justifying a severe punishment the
judge would not award the death sentence. It may be stated that if a judge finds that he is unable to
explain with reasonable accuracy the basis for selecting the higher of the two sentences his choice
should fall on the lower sentence. In all such cases the law casts an obligation on the judge to make
his choice after carefully examining the pros and cons of each case.

Since the legislature in its wisdom though that in some rare cases it may still be necessary to impose
the extreme punishment of death to deter others and to protect the society and in a given case the
country, it left the choice of sentence to the judiciary with the rider that the judge may visit the convict
with the extreme punishment provided there exist special reasons for so doing.

There are only a few cases where a minimum punishment is prescribed. The question then is what
procedure does the judge follow for determining the punishment to be imposed in each case to fit the
crime? The choice has to be made after following the procedure set out in sub-section (2) of Section
235 of the Code. The subsection reads as under:

If the accused is convicted, the judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of
Section 360, hear the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according
to law.

The requirement of hearing the accused is intended to satisfy the rule of natural justice. It is a
fundamental requirement of fair play that the accused who was hitherto concentrating on the
prosecution evidence on the question of guilt should, on being found guilty, be asked if he has
anything to say or any evidence to tender on the question of sentence. This is all the more necessary
since the courts are generally required to make the choice from a wide range of discretion in the
matter of sentencing.

To assist the court in determining the correct sentence to be imposed the legislature introduced sub-
section (2) to Section 235.The said provision therefore satisfies a dual purpose; it satisfies the rule of
natural justice by according to the accused an opportunity of being heard on the question of sentence
and at the same time helps the court to choose the sentence to be awarded. Since the provision is
intended to give the accused an opportunity to place before the court all the relevant material having a
bearing on the question of sentence there can be no doubt that the provision is salutary and must be
strictly followed. It is clearly mandatory and should not be treated as a mere formality.

In the result both the appeals, he conviction of accused Nos. 1 and 2 under all the heads is confirmed
but their sentence of death for killing two infants, is converted to imprisonment for life. Accused Nos. 3
to 6, are not convicted and sentenced under section149. The appeals stand disposed of accordingly.
Hypothesis:
Null Hypothesis: No relation
Alternative Hypothesis: yes

1)What you know about unlawful assembly.

2)When one accused does murder with the help of other, is later would be liable for the murder with
same punishment with which murderer would liable? / 2)If offence is committed by member of
unlawful assembly, whether all Member would be held liable?

3)If its all depend upon case to case or on Judiciary to decide punishment, what you think Judiciary
can fairly decide. – Confidence in Judiciary

Result:
Confidence in Judiciary
Discussion:

Conclusion:

References:
Bachan Singh
Macchi singh
dullbonline

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