1.) G.R. No.

164891               June 6, 2011

VIRGINIA M. GUADINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
assailing the Decision1 promulgated on April 30, 2004 and Resolution2 dated August 20, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan
convicting petitioner of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

The factual antecedents:

On August 25, 1992, the Provincial Treasurer of Quezon directed the Municipal Treasurer of Polillo, Quezon, Naime
Ayuma, to conduct a public bidding for the materials to be used in the repair and construction of Navotas Bridge
along Polillo-Burdeos provincial road at Barangay Sibulan. As a result of the bidding held on September 8, 1992, the
contract was awarded to V.M. Guadines Construction Supply owned and managed by petitioner Virginia M.
Guadines. On October 19, 1992, Purchaser Order No. 2019 was issued by the Provincial Government of Quezon for
construction materials in the total price of ₱83,228.00. On November 13, 1992, the materials consisting of lumber
(Macaasim hardwood cut by chainsaw) were stockpiled along the road about five meters away from the Navotas
Bridge, and received by Bernie H. Azaula (Azaula).3 Azaula was then Barangay Chairman of Poblacion, Polillo and
Member of the Sangguniang Bayan being the President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Polillo.4

On November 20, 1992, a team of Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) officials/forest
rangers from the Community and Environment Resources (CENR) Polillo Station led by Officer-in-Charge Herminio
M. Salvosa confiscated seventy-three (73) pieces of Macaasim lumber (4,172 board feet valued at ₱41,172.00)
which were stockpiled alongside the Polillo-Burdeos road at Barangay Sibulan, approximately five meters away from
the Navotas Bridge. They measured the confiscated lumber using Marking Hatchet No. 1742 in which the number
1742 was 1/6 of an inch thick so that when you strike the lumber, the number 1742 will appear on the lumber. They
also marked the lumber with the words "DENR CONFISCATED" using white paint. These forest products were
confiscated in favor of the government pending submission of certain required documents. No person or entity was
apprehended as owner/possessor of the lumber. Since Azaula volunteered to take custody as a public official in the
locality, the CENR decided to turn over the seized lumber to him and required him to sign the Seizure Receipt.5

On December 14, 1992, the Sangguniang Bayan of Polillo acting upon the petition of some 460 individuals, and
after debating on whether to still wait for the DENR officials to ascertain the identity of the contractor involved in the
illegally cut timber or to proceed with the construction of the bridge using the confiscated lumber, resolved to
formally request the DENR Regional Director to donate the seized lumber so it can be used for the delayed repair
and construction of the Navotas Bridge. The logs remained stockpiled near the said bridge, apparently abandoned
by its owner.6 Later however, the Sanggunian passed a resolution (Kapasiyahan Blg. 24, t. 1993) requesting the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) through Provincial Engineer Abelardo Abrigo to send their
personnel to work on the repair and construction of the Navotas Bridge in the earliest possible time.7 Azaula was
among those members of the Sanggunian who had opposed the proposal to request the DENR Regional Director
for the donation of the confiscated lumber, insisting that the contractor (petitioner) be paid for said materials.8

In his letter dated January 25, 1993 addressed to Engr. Bert Nierva of the Provincial Engineer’s Office (PEO), Polillo
Mayor Rosendo H. Escara requested for assistance in the immediate construction of the Navotas Bridge, citing the
approval of Kapasiyahan Blg. 24, t. 1993 by the Sangguniang Bayan. On January 28, 1993, Polillo Municipal
Treasurer Naime Ayuma prepared the Inspection Report stating that the materials specified under Purchase
Order No. 2019 were delivered by the contractor (V.M. Guadines Construction Supply) and "[r]eceived in
good order and condition." The Inspection Report was signed by both Ayuma and Mayor Escara.9

Evidence II.
By February 5, 1993, the repair and construction of Navotas Bridge was finished. Upon the request of Azaula,
Disbursement Voucher 001-9302-957 was prepared, authorizing the Provincial Treasurer to pay V.M. Guadines
Construction Supply the total amount of ₱83,228.00. On February 18, 1993, petitioner received from the Provincial
Treasurer’s Office the amount of ₱83,228.00 as payment for the lumber and other materials she delivered for the
repair and construction of Navotas Bridge.10

In a Memorandum dated February 26, 1993, CENR Polillo Station OIC Salvosa reported to the CENRO of Real,
Quezon that despite warnings from forest rangers, workers headed by Engr. Nierva of the PEO utilized the
confiscated lumber in the construction of Navotas Bridge. Salvosa further informed the CENRO that while Engr.
Nierva claimed to be acting on official instructions from the Provincial Governor, they were not furnished any copy of
such directive or instruction.11 Accordingly, Juan dela Cruz, CENRO of Real, Quezon, prepared a memorandum-
report and forwarded the same to the DENR Region IV Executive Director with a request for a lawyer to be sent to
their office to assist in the preparation and filing of appropriate charges against the custodian who is the Barangay
Chairman of Poblacion, Polillo, Quezon. In a letter dated March 10, 1993, CENRO dela Cruz asked Azaula to
explain why he should not be charged with estafa and malversation for disposing the confiscated lumber without
legal authority or clearance from the DENR Secretary.12

On May 5, 1993, the Provincial Auditor of Quezon directed Edgardo A. Mendoza, State Auditor II, to conduct an
investigation regarding the payment made for confiscated lumber used in the repair and construction of Navotas
Bridge. After inspecting the site and inventory of the lumber in the newly constructed bridge together with the
Municipal Engineer, Mendoza confirmed that these materials were the same ones confiscated by the CENR
personnel, differing only in length of the logs used. Mendoza concluded that there was no justification for the
government to pay the purchase price of the lumber allegedly delivered by the contractor. Thus, in his final report
submitted to the Provincial Auditor, Mendoza recommended that V.M. Guadines Construction be ordered to refund
the amount paid by the provincial government and that administrative and criminal actions be filed against said
contractor, as well as the public officials who participated in defrauding the government in the amount of ₱83,228.00
and for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.13

On November 15, 1994, a Notice of Disallowance was issued by the Commission on Audit (COA), Lucena City for
the amount of ₱70,924.00. From the original amount of ₱83,228.00, they deducted the value of the common
materials used such as nails and "kawad." The difference represents the value of the confiscated lumber actually
used in the construction of the bridge.14

Subsequently, a complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman by Sangguniang Bayan member May
Verzo-Estuita against petitioner, Ayuma, Azaula and Escara for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (OMB 0-93-1388). On April 22, 1994, a Resolution15 was issued by the Ombudsman recommending the filing of
appropriate information against all the respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Ombudsman
found to be without merit respondents’ denial that the lumber used in the construction of Navotas Bridge were the
same lumber earlier confiscated by the CENR field personnel, noting that Azaula took cognizance of the said
materials during the deliberations in the Sangguniang Bayan. Respondents were thus held liable for causing undue
injury to the provincial government which was made to pay the amount of ₱83,228.00 for the confiscated lumber.

The Information charging petitioner, Azaula, Escara and Ayuma with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
(Criminal Case No. 20878) reads:

That in or about February of 1993, or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in Polillo, Quezon, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Bernie H. Azaula, Rosendo N. Escara, Namie V. Ayuma, being the
Barangay Captain, Municipal Mayor and Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of Polillo, Quezon, in the exercise of
their administrative and/or official functions, with evident bad faith, conspiring and confederating with accused
Virginia M. Guadinez, doing business under the V.M. Guadinez Construction Supply, did then and there wi[l]lfully
and unlawfully cause undue injury and/or damage to the province of Quezon, by using in the construction of the
Navotas Bridge in Sibulan, Polillo, Quezon, confiscated lumber consisting of 73 pieces with a volume of 4,172 board
feet, valued at P11,172.00, more or less, and make it appear in a Disbursement Voucher, Delivery Receipt No.
0063, and Inspection Report dated January 28, 1993, that the lumber used in the construction of the Navotas Bridge
were purchased from the V.M. Guadinez Construction Supply for P83,228.00, thus enabling accused Virginia
Guadinez to receive the said purchase price, to the damage and prejudice of the Province of Quezon, in the
aforementioned amount.
Evidence II.
CONTRARY TO LAW.16

The aforenamed respondents filed motions for reconsideration and re-investigation with the Ombudsman. In his
Order dated January 19, 1995, the Ombudsman recommended that the prosecution of petitioner, Azaula and
Escara be continued while the complaint against Ayuma be dropped for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently,
Ayuma was ordered excluded from the Information in Criminal Case No. 20878.17

After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision convicting petitioner, Escara and Azaula of the crime charged,
as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused BERNIE H. AZAULA, ROSENDO N. ESCARA
AND VIRGINIA M. GUADINES GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, and
hereby sentences each of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum. They are also ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the costs of
this suit.

Accused Guadines, having unlawfully received the amount of P70,924.00, representing payment for the confiscated
lumber, is hereby ordered to return the said amount to the Province of Quezon.

SO ORDERED.18

In their motion for reconsideration,19 petitioner and Azaula maintained that the lumber delivered by V.M. Guadines
Construction Supply were not the same lumber confiscated by the CENR. They argued that (1) the confiscated
lumber does not match the specified size, quality and quantity of the materials needed for the bridge
repair/construction project; (2) petitioner purchased the logs from third persons there being no sawmills in the
locality, and it is but proper that she be paid for the materials she delivered; and (3) since the municipalities of Polillo
and Burdeos have benefited from the repair and construction of the Navotas Bridge, the allegation that the Province
of Quezon suffered damage and prejudice is erroneous. As to the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the statements
she made during the Sangguniang Bayan proceedings on December 14, 1992, petitioner vehemently denied
making those statements and contended that to give them probative value would violate the rule on res
inter alios acta. Petitioner further asserted that she acted in good faith, as in fact no Sangguniang Bayan member
interposed an objection to the payment made in her favor.

In its August 20, 2004 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration filed by petitioner,
Azaula and Escara. The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner herself admitted in her direct testimony that the
lumber she delivered were the ones used in the repair and construction of the Navotas Bridge. Even if the
confiscated lumber were undersized, the pieces of lumber could have been bolted together to conform to the
required length of 22 feet long. Testimonial evidence also clearly showed that the confiscated lumber were used in
the construction of the bridge. As to petitioner’s contention that no damage or injury was caused to the provincial
government, the Sandiganbayan held that after confiscation by the DENR, the subject lumber became the property
of the National Government and consequently the Municipality of Polillo had no right to utilize the same without
authority from the DENR. And since the lumber had already been confiscated, petitioner had no right to receive
payment; hence, the payment made in her favor by the Province of Quezon did not produce any legal effect,
pursuant to Article 124020 of the Civil Code. Petitioner’s denial of the statements she made before
the Sanggunian was likewise found to be without merit. The certified copy of the minutes taken during the
December 14, 1992 session of the Sanggunian being a public document and an official record of the
proceedings, is considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The presumption of regularity and
authenticity of public official records had not been overcome and rebutted by the petitioner, there being no
competent evidence to support her denial. Further, there was no violation of the res inter alios acta rule
because the declarations and admissions made by the accused (petitioner) are being used against her and
not against any other individual or third persons. Finally, petitioner’s claim of good faith was rejected by the
Sandiganbayan stating that she clearly intentionally took advantage of the government when, despite her
knowledge that the lumber delivered to the Province of Quezon was confiscated, she still accepted and received the
purchase price paid by the provincial government.21

Evidence II.
Hence, this petition alleging that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in finding that she acted in
conspiracy with Azaula and Escara in defrauding the provincial government under their contract for purchase of
construction materials.

Petitioner reiterates her argument that the materials she delivered on November 13, 1992 were not the same lumber
confiscated by the DENR field personnel on November 20, 1992. The delivered lumber having been left unguarded
and unprotected along the national highway, some pieces thereof could have been stolen, which explains why there
was a smaller number (73) of confiscated lumber than the actual quantity (99) delivered. In any case, petitioner
asserts that the matter was not anymore her concern after she fulfilled her contractual obligation of delivering the
specified quantity and quality of lumber. The fact that Ayuma had certified in his Inspection Report that the delivered
lumber were received in good order and condition would only mean that there was no "CONFISCATED" marking
found thereon. Ayuma need not have foreknowledge of the DENR confiscation to confirm such marking in the
course of her physical inspection of the lumber delivered by petitioner.

On the allegation of conspiracy, petitioner contends that evidence is wanting to support the prosecution case
against her. A finding of guilt must not be based on speculation, such as the lumber she delivered were the ones
confiscated later by the DENR. Indeed, the lumber left along the highway exposed it to possibilities which include
substitution. Even if the materials used in the repair and construction of Navotas Bridge bore the DENR marking
"CONFISCATED", it cannot automatically mean that those were the same lumber delivered by petitioner,
considering that Ayuma had inspected these pieces of lumber and did not see those markings. Moreover, what
happened to the lumber after its delivery was no longer within the control of petitioner. Her only responsibility is to
deliver the goods stated in the contract she entered with the local government. After receipt of the lumber in good
order and condition by the provincial government through its officials which include Ayuma as the Municipal
Treasurer, petitioner had already fulfilled her contractual obligation. It was but natural and proper that petitioner be
compensated for the lumber she purchased from third persons. The provincial government suffered no damage or
injury since the repair and construction of the Navotas Bridge was completed. And assuming for the sake of
argument that her lumber were actually confiscated by the DENR, petitioner contends that what should have been
filed against her was a case for violation of the Forestry Code and not the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The petition has no merit.

Well-entrenched is the rule that factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court except where:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts
and the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.22 Petitioner failed to establish any of the foregoing exceptional circumstances.

On the contrary, the evidence on record clearly showed petitioner’s participation in the anomalous disbursement of
government funds in favor of a private contractor for lumber which have been validly seized by CENR forest
rangers. The inspection of deliveries and acceptance by the provincial government through Ayuma and Escara who
certified in the Inspection Report that lumber delivered by petitioner were found to be "in good order and condition"
relates only to the physical aspect and compliance with specifications as to quality, quantity and size of the
materials. Said certification did not state whether the lumber delivered by petitioner have been cut or gathered in
accordance with existing forestry laws, rules and regulations. Petitioner could have readily substantiated her
defense by producing documents, such as permits and Certificate of Timber/Lumber Origin, allegedly secured by
persons from whom she bought the lumber, or presenting as witnesses those workers who supposedly cut the trees
and hauled the logs. But none of these were presented at the trial. Hence, the prosecution evidence showing the
lumber delivered by petitioner to have been illegally cut and gathered, stands unrebutted.

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which provides:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. -- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxxx

Evidence II.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers
and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions. (Emphasis supplied.)

The essential elements of this crime are: (1) the accused are public officers or private persons charged in
conspiracy with them; (2) said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official
duties or in relation to their public position; (3) they caused undue injury to any party, whether the government or a
private party; (4) such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and
(5) the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.23

We explained the foregoing elements in Santos v. People24:

As may be noted, what contextually is punishable is the act of causing any undue injury to any party, or the giving to
any private party of unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of the public officer’s functions.
In Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, and again in Santiago vs. Garchitorena, the Court has made it abundantly clear that the
use of the disjunctive word "or" connotes that either act of (a) "causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government"; and (b) "giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference," qualifies as a
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. This is not to say, however, that each mode constitutes a
distinct offense but that an accused may be proceeded against under either or both modes.

xxxx

The term "undue injury" in the context of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act punishing the act
of "causing undue injury to any party," has a meaning akin to that civil law concept of "actual damage." The Court
said so in Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan, thus:

In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as "actual damage." Undue has been defined as "more
than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal;" and injury as "any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person,
rights, reputation or property [; that is, the] invasion of any legally protected interest of another." Actual damage, in
the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law. (Emphasis supplied.)

By accepting payment for delivery of lumber found to be without supporting documents as required by law, petitioner
caused undue injury or damage to the provincial government which had no obligation to pay for confiscated lumber
considered as government property. In fact, it is only the DENR Secretary or his representative who can dispose of
such confiscated lumber in accordance with forestry laws and regulations, pursuant to Section 68-A of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 705 (otherwise known as the Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended by Executive Order
No. 277, which provides:

SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order
Confiscation. - In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws[,] rules and regulations, the Department
Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water[,] or air in the commission of
the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter."

Petitioner’s contention that she should have been instead prosecuted for illegal cutting, gathering and
possession of timber or other forest products under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 ignores the fact that she
never came out to claim ownership of the seized lumber until her appearance before the Sangguniang
Bayan wherein she pleaded for consideration in the delayed bridge construction project after the DENR
confiscated the lumber she delivered. Except for her bare denial, petitioner failed to refute the correctness
of the statements she made as reflected in the official minutes of the Sanggunian session held on
December 14, 1992, duly certified by the Municipal Secretary and signed by the Sanggunian Members
present, to wit:

Evidence II.
Ang sumunod na binigyang pahintulot upang magbigay ng kanyang pahayag ay si Gng. Virginia Guadines, ang
nagtatapat na Contractor ng tulay ng Barangay Sibulan, o tulay Nabotas ayon sa pagkilala ng DPWH. Ayon sa
kanya siya bilang contractor ng nabanggit na proyekto ay nalulungkot sa pagkaabala nito dahilan nga sa nangyaring
paghuli ng mga tauhan ng Forestry sa mga kahoy na gagamitin sa tulay. Nalaman din niya na bunga nito ay
nagkakaroon ng parang pagpafaction-faction sa Sangguniang Bayan. Nais niyang ipagunita na ito ay isang public
knowledge na siya ang nanalong bidder sa ginanap na public bidding na nasabing proyekto at nalalaman ng lahat
na siya ay hindi makakapag-provide ng kahoy na gagamitin sa nasabing tulay. Nang mga panahong iyon nga ay
kailangang magtungo siya sa Lucban, Quezon para sa pagkoku[m]pleto ng mga kailangang papeles sa nasabing
kontrata, kaya’t siya ay nakisuyo ng taong mangangasiwa sa pagkuha ng kahoy. Ngayon na nangyari ang hindi
inaasahan ay hinihiling niya na tayo ay magtulungan na maipatapos ang tulay na ito alang-alang sa kapakanan ng
mga taong magdaraan sa nasabing tulay oras na ito ay matapos.

Nalalaman niya na siya ay mayroong pagkukulang, nguni’t hinihiling niya sa Sangguniang Bayan na bigyan na siya
ng konsiderasyon sa pangyayaring ito , total ay pinapayagan na pala ngayon ang pagputol ng kahoy kung
gagamitin sa mga government projects. Ang nabanggit na kautusan ay noon pa palang Nobyembre 1992
ipinalabas, kaya nga lamang ay hindi agad niya nalaman. Siya naman ay taos[-]puso ang pagtulong sa
pamahalaang bayan ng Polillo at basta at nakabalita siya ng proyektong maaaring ang makikinabang ay ang ating
bayan ay kanyang ginagawa kahi’t minsan nga ay nagdudukot bulsa siya para maiparating ito sa ating bayan.25

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it cited the pertinent portions of the
minutes of the Sangguniang Bayan session of December 14, 1992, as evidence of petitioner’s statements
concerning the lumber she delivered which were confiscated by the CENR for lack of requisite legal documents.
These statements revealed that petitioner was fully aware of the confiscation of her lumber stockpiled along the
Polillo-Burdeos provincial road, after she had delivered the same. We have previously underscored the importance
of the minutes of formal proceedings when the court is confronted with conflicting claims of parties as to the truth
and accuracy of the matters taken up therein. In De los Reyes v. Sandiganbayan, Third Division,26 this Court held:

Thus, the Court accords full recognition to the minutes as the official repository of what actually transpires in every
proceeding. It has happened that the minutes may be corrected to reflect the true account of a proceeding, thus
giving the Court more reason to accord them great weight for such subsequent corrections, if any, are made
precisely to preserve the accuracy of the records. In light of the conflicting claims of the parties in the case at bar,
the Court, without resorting to the minutes, will encounter difficulty in resolving the dispute at hand.27

Apart from petitioner’s own statements, the Sandiganbayan’s finding that it was petitioner’s lumber which were later
confiscated by CENR forest rangers and used in the bridge repair and construction, was satisfactorily established by
the prosecution’s documentary and testimonial evidence. As part of their official duties and following standard
procedure, they prepared the Confiscation Report and Seizure Receipt, and testified in court detailing the incident.
Two other witnesses corroborated their declaration that the confiscated lumber were actually used in the repair and
construction of the Navotas Bridge.

Johnny V. Abanica, a Construction Maintenance employee of the PEO, testified that sometime in February 1993, his
supervisor, Engr. Felixberto Nierva, informed him that they were going to construct the Navotas Bridge. Upon
arriving at the site, he noticed that the lumber they were going to use was marked "confiscated." He then reminded
Nierva that they might get into trouble because of it but Engr. Nierva told him that he already have an agreement
with Azaula. Thereafter, he and his companions started demolishing the old bridge. He executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay on September 25, 1993 in connection with the confiscated lumber.28

Salvosa who led the CENR team who seized the lumber, likewise testified that in February 1993, upon being
verbally informed by their field personnel, Forest Rangers Odelon Azul, Arnel F. Simon and Edwin Hernandez, he
went to the construction site. He saw for himself that the lumber used in the new bridge were marked with "DENR
CONFISCATED" and hatchet number 1742. Thereafter, he prepared a Memorandum-Report addressed to the
CENR of Real, Quezon informing the latter of utilization of confiscated lumber without prior approval of their office
and despite repeated warnings from their forest rangers, which report was endorsed to the DENR Regional
Director.29

Dela Cruz, the CENRO of Real, Quezon, also testified that after receiving the Memorandum-Report of Salvosa, he
informed the Regional Executive Director, DENR-Region IV about the matter with the recommendation that a legal
Evidence II.
officer be sent to Polillo to assist them in filing the proper complaint. He also wrote Azaula requiring him to explain
but since Azaula did not respond to his letter, the case was referred to their legal division.30

Lastly, COA Auditor Mendoza, who, along with the Municipal Engineer of Polillo, was tasked to investigate the
purchase of the materials used in the repair and construction of the Navotas Bridge after the completion of the
project, also confirmed that the lumber used bore the white paint marking "DENR" and contained hatchet numbers
when they inspected the same from under the new wooden bridge. He prepared three reports explaining his
findings. He then recommended to the Provincial Auditor that the money paid to the supplier be refunded to the
government and that administrative and criminal actions be instituted against the supplier and the concerned public
officials. Consequently, the COA disallowed the payment of the amount of ₱70,924.00, deducting from the original
amount of ₱83,228.00 the amount paid for common materials such as kawad and nails. The lumber used in the new
bridge consisted of 3,172 board feet while the volume of the confiscated lumber was around 4,000 board feet.31

In support of her claim that the lumber she delivered were not those confiscated by the CENR personnel, petitioner
presented as witness PO2 Reny I. Marasigan of the PNP Polillo Station. Marasigan testified that he issued a
certification dated June 9, 2000 stating that the lumber confiscated near the Navotas Bridge in 1993 were deposited
for safekeeping and are still intact at the back of their building. These rotting lumber on the ground were
photographed by petitioner.32 However, Marasigan failed to present proper documents evidencing the official transfer
of custody of the seized lumber by the CENRO to their headquarters. In fact, Marasigan signed the Confiscation
Report and Seizure Receipt as part of the apprehending team33 while it was Azaula who signed as the "Receiving
Officer."34 Moreover, prosecution witnesses Salvosa and his forest rangers, as well as Abanica and Mendoza, all
categorically declared that the lumber confiscated near the Navotas Bridge on November 20, 1992 were used in the
repair and construction of the bridge.

As to petitioner’s contention that the subsequent confiscation of the lumber she delivered, even if true, was no
longer her concern because she had already fulfilled her contractual undertaking to provide the lumber for the
bridge repair and construction, the same is untenable.

Basic is the rule that provisions of existing laws and regulations are read into and form an integral part of contracts,
moreso in the case of government contracts. Verily, all contracts, including Government contracts, are subject to the
police power of the State. Being an inherent attribute of sovereignty, such power is deemed incorporated into the
laws of the land, which are part of all contracts, thereby qualifying the obligations arising therefrom.35 Thus, it is an
implied condition in the subject contract for the procurement of materials needed in the repair and construction of
the Navotas Bridge that petitioner as private contractor would comply with pertinent forestry laws and regulations on
the cutting and gathering of the lumber she undertook to supply the provincial government.

Petitioner’s actual knowledge of the absence of supporting legal documents for the lumber she contracted to deliver
to the provincial government -- which resulted in its confiscation by the CENR personnel -- belies her claim of good
faith in receiving the payment for the said lumber.1âwphi1

When the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part, and the other performing
another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts though apparently
independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action
and concurrence of sentiments, the court will be justified in concluding that said defendants were engaged in a
conspiracy.36 In this case, the finding of conspiracy was well-supported by evidence.

Indeed, petitioner’s participation and cooperation was indispensable in defrauding the government of the amount
paid for the said confiscated lumber. Without doubt, her acts in making delivery to Azaula instead of the provincial
government or PEO, evading apprehension for the illegally cut logs and yet pursuing clearance for the release of the
said products by appealing to the local sanggunian, and later accepting payment with the assistance of Azaula and
Escara -- all clearly showed her complicity in the anomalous disbursement of provincial government funds allocated
for the bridge repair/construction project. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan did not err in finding her guilty of
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and ordering her to return the amount corresponding to the payment for
the confiscated lumber used in the construction of the Navotas Bridge, the same materials delivered by the
petitioner under her contract with the provincial government.

Evidence II.
The penalty for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No 3019 is "imprisonment for not less than six years and one month
nor more than fifteen years, and perpetual disqualification from public office."37 Under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, if the offense is punished by special law, as in the present case, an indeterminate penalty shall be imposed on
the accused, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the law, and the minimum not less
than the minimum prescribed therein.38 In view of the attendant circumstances, we hold that the penalty imposed by
the Sandiganbayan is in accord with law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated April 30, 2004 and Resolution
dated August 20, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 20878 are AFFIRMED

Evidence II.
2.) G.R. No. L-28237 August 31, 1982

BAY VIEW HOTEL., INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
KER & CO., LTD., and PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO., LTD., defendants-appellees.

Mariano V. Ampil, Jr. for plaintiff-appellant.

Alfonso Felix, Jr. for defendants-appellants.

&

TEEHANKEE, J.: 1äwphï1.ñët

This appeal was originally brought before the Court of Appeals but was certified to this Court pursuant to the
appellate court's resolution of October 13, 1967 since it involved purely questions of law.

Sometime in January, 1958, plaintiff-appellant Bay View Hotel, Inc., then the lessee arid operator of the Manila
Hotel, secured a fidelity guarantee bond from defendant-appellee Ker & Co., Ltd., for its accountable employees
against acts of fraud and dishonesty. Said defendant-appellee Ker & Co., Ltd., is the Philippine general agent of
Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. a foreign corporation duly licensed to do insurance business in the Philippines.

When one of the bonded employees, Tomas E. Ablaza, while acting in his capacity as cashier, was discovered by
plaintiff-appellant to have had a cash shortage and unremitted collections in the total amount of P42,490.95, it filed
claims for payments on the said fidelity guarantee bond but defendant-appellee Ker & Co. denied and refused
indemnification and payment. To enforce its claims, plaintiff-appellant instituted its complaint, dated August 30, 1965
docketed as Civil Case No. 63181 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

In its answer, defendant-appellee Ker & Co. justified its denial of the claims of plaintiff-appellant on various reasons,
such as non-compliance with the conditions stipulated in the insurance policy; non-presentation of evidence
regarding the various charges of dishonesty and misrepresentation against Tomas E. Ablaza and non-production of
the documents to prove the alleged loss. Ker & Co. likewise averred that it was merely an agent and- as such it
was not liable under the policy.

On June 22, 1966, counsel for Ker & Co. filed a request for admission, furnishing plaintiff-appellant's counsel with a
copy thereof requesting admission of the following facts:  1äwphï1.ñët

1. On February 14, 1967, the Bay View Hotel, Inc., applied to the Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd., for a
fidelity guarantee bond through a proposal form, a true copy of which is annexed to our answer as
Annex "A" thereof.

2. Such a policy was actually issued on January 22, 1958 by the Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd., in
favor of the Bay View Hotel, Inc., and was renewed from time to time with amendments. A true copy
of the policy as it finally stood at the time of the alleged defalcation is annexed to our answer as
Annex 'B ' thereof.

3. This claim filed by the Bay View Hotel, Inc., under this policy was denied on behalf of the Phoenix
Assurance Co., Ltd., by a letter dated 18th June, 1965 sent by registered mail to the Bay View Hotel,
Inc. on June 22, 1965. A true copy of this letter of denial is annexed to the present request as Annex
"C" hereof. "

When plaintiff-appellant failed to make any answer to the request for admission within the period prescribed by
the rules, defendant-appellee Ker & Co. filed a Motion to Dismiss on Affirmative Defense, dated July 6, 1966,
insisting that since under Sec. 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, plaintiff-appellant was deemed to have impliedly
admitted each of the matters enumerated in the request for admission, it followed that the proper party in
Evidence II.
interest against whom plaintiff-appellant might have a claim was the principal Phoenix Assurance Co.
(Phoenix) and not the agent Ker & Co.

Plaintiff-appellant filed an opposition, dated July 19, 1966 arguing that the proper remedy, under the circumstances
was not to dismiss the complaint but to amend it in order to bring the necessary or indispensable parties to the suit.
Defendant-appellee Ker & Co. filed a reply to the opposition reiterating its stand that since it merely acted as an
agent, the case should be dismissed and plaintiff-appellant should file the necessary action against the principal
Phoenix.

On August 1, 1966, plaintiff-appellant filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint, attaching copy of the
complaint, as amended, this time impleading Phoenix as party defendant. On August 16, 1966, defendants-
appellees filed their joint answer to the amended complaint. Again, Ker & Co., Ltd., argued that it was merely an
agent and therefore not liable under the policy. On the other hand, Phoenix, averred that under Condition 8 of the
insurance policy, plaintiff-appellant was deemed to have abandoned its claim in view of the fact that it did not ask for
an arbitration of its claim within twelve (12) months from June 22, 1965 the date of receipt of the denial of the claim.

On August 24, 1966, defendants-appellees filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted in its
decision of November 4, 1966, ordering the dismissal of the case. After denial of its motion for reconsideration,
plaintiff-appellant filed the present appeal, raising the following assignment of errors: 
1äwphï1.ñët

The lower court erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion in extending the legal effects, if any,
of the request for admission filed by Ker & Co., Ltd. to the Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd., which was
not a party-defendant at the time said request was filed and for whom no similar request was ever
filed.

II

The lower court erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion in giving legal effects to a request for
admission by the defendant-appellee under the original complaint after the said original complaint
was, with leave of court, amended.

III

The lower court erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that "Condition No. 8 of the
Policy No. FGC-5018-P requires that should there be a controversy in the payment of the claims, it
should be submitted to an arbitration" despite the admissions by the parties and the established fact
that Condition No. 8 of said Policy No. FGC-5018-P provides for Arbitration if any dispute shall arise
as to the amount of company's liability."

IV

The lower court erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion for Summary
Judgment and dismissing the complaint.

The first two errors assigned may be taken jointly. Plaintiff-appellant argues that since the implied admission
was made before the amendment of its complaint so as to include Phoenix, it follows that Phoenix has no
right to avail of these admissions, and that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
extending to Phoenix the legal effects of the request for admission filed solely by Ker & Co.

The argument is untenable, Admission is in the nature of evidence and its legal effects were already part of
the records of the case and therefore could be availed of by any party even by one subsequently impleaded.
The amendment of the complaint per se cannot set aside the legal effects of the request for admission since its
materiality has not been affected by the amendment. If a fact is admitted to be true at any stage of the
proceedings, it is not stricken out through the amendment of the complaint. To allow a party to alter the legal
Evidence II.
effects of the request for admission by the mere amendment of a pleading would constitute a dangerous and
undesirable precedent. The legal effects of plaintiff- appellant's failure to answer the request for admission could
and should have been corrected below by its filing a motion to be relieved of the consequences of the implied
admission with respect to respondent Phoenix.

Moreover, since an agent may do such acts as may be conducive to the accomplishment of the purpose of
the agency, admissions secured by the agent within the scope of the agency ought to favor the principal.
This has to be the rule, for the act or declarations of an agent of the party within the scope of the agency
and during its existence are considered and treated in turn as the declarations, acts and representations of
his principal 1 and may be given in evidence against such party.

Plaintiff-appellant insists that since the motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of defendant-appellee Ker
& Co. alone, there was no motion for summary judgment as far as Phoenix was concerned and the trial court's
decision dismissing the case should not have included the principal Phoenix.

But the motion for summary judgment was filed after the complaint had been amended and answer thereto had
been filed. The issues, therefore, with respect to Phoenix had already been likewise joined. Moreover, a reading of
the said motion for summary judgment, more particularly the prayer thereof, shows that Phoenix did join Ker & Co.
in moving for the dismissal of the case and prayed "that the present action be dismissed as against Ker & Co., Ltd.,
because being purely and simply the agent of the insurer, it is not liable under the policy and as against the Phoenix
Assurance Co., Ltd. because by failing to seek an arbitration within twelve months from the date of its receipt of the
denial of its claim on June 22, 1965, plaintiff Bay View Hotel, Inc., is deemed under condition 8 of ,, tie policy, to
have abandoned its claim against said defendant phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd."

The main issue raised by plaintiff-appellant is with respect to Condition No. 8 of the insurance policy, photostatic
copy of which was submitted to the trial court and reproduced as follows:  1äwphï1.ñët

If any dispute shall arise as to the amount of company's liability under this Policy the matter shall if
required by either party be to the decision of two neutral persons as arbitrators one of, whom shall
be named by each party or of an umpire who shall be appointed by the said arbitrators before
entering on the reference and in case either party or his representative shall neglect or refuse for the
space of two months after request in writing from the other party so to do to name an arbitrator the
arbitrator of the other party may proceed alone. And it is hereby expressly agreed and declared that
it shag be a condition precedent to any right of action or upon this Policy that the award by such
arbitrators, arbitrator or umpire of the amount of the loss shall first be obtained. The costs of and
connected with the arbitration shag be in the discretion of the arbitrators, arbitrator or umpire. 2

Plaintiff-appellant maintains that Condition No. 8 of the policy provides for arbitration only "if any dispute should
arise as to the amount of company's liability" consequently, the reference to arbitration is not a condition precedent
to the filing of the suit contrary to the insurer company's posture. Plaintiff-appellant points out that in the instant
case, there is a total and complete negation of liability. There is no dispute as to the amount of company's liability
because this presupposes an admission of responsibility although not to the extent of the cost thereof, while here
the insurer denies liability wholly and totally.

We find in favor of plaintiff-appellant. The provisions of Condition No. 8, more specifically the portion thereof which
reads, "if any dispute shall arise as to the amount of company's liability under this policy ...," do not appear to
require any extended interpretation. Condition No. 8 requires arbitration only as to disputes regarding the amount of
the insurer's liability but not as to any dispute as to the existence or non- existence of liability. Thus, Condition No. 8
comes into play only if the insurer admits liability but cannot agree with the insured as to the amount thereof and
cannot be invoked in cases like that at bar where the insurer completely denies any liability. Defendants-appellees'
contention that plaintiff-appellant's failure to request arbitration proceedings is a bar to its filing of the suit at bar
against the insurer company cannot be sustained, specially considering the established principle that contracts of
adhesion such as the insurance policy in question are to be strictly construed in case of doubt against the insurer.

As to appellee Ker & Co., Ltd., however, there appears to be no serious contradiction as to the fact that it merely
acted as the agent of its principal, Phoenix. Considering that there was full disclosure of such agency since the

Evidence II.
insurance policy was actually issued by Phoenix, We find no error in the dismissal of the case against said
defendant Ker & Co., Ltd.

Accordingly, the dismissal of the case against Ker & Co., Ltd., is hereby affirmed and maintained, while the
dismissal of the case against Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings and determination on the merits. No costs.

Evidence II.
3-4.)

Evidence II.
 5.) [G.R. No. L-19590. April 25, 1968.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAW YAW SHUN alias GEORGE

CHUA, VICTORIO ALVAREZ, DIONISIO CARASIG, and JOHN DOES, Accused, CHAW YA
SHUN alias GEORGE CHUA and VICTORIO ALVAREZ, Appellants.

Paredes & Associates and Jose L. Uy & Associates for appellant Chua.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and
Solicitor Federico V. Sian for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. EVIDENCE; FORMS OF TORTURE WHICH DO NOT SHOW EXTERNAL INJURIES. — The findings of
the doctors showed the existence of "reddish marks and scratch abrasions" on appellant’s body.
Although there is no sign of physical external injury which can be appreciated at the time of the
examination, and that the abdomen revealed no external manifestation of any injury, nor is there
any area of tenderness in the whole body of appellant, these circumstances do not detract from the
fact that some form of torture do not usually manifest external injury on the body of the person
maltreated. For instance, sitting on the stomach and the use of electric shock, among appellant’s
complaints, do not necessarily produce external physical injury.

2. ID.; ID.; USE OF ELECTRIC SHOCK. — Dr. Zarraga’s findings that there are no external
manifestation to indicate the application of electric current of such duration to almost cause death as
alleged does not negate the application of this form of torture. The use of electricity with wire on the
body of a person does not always leave any mark thereon. It is clear that the mere absence of
external injury in appellant’s body does not destroy or rule out appellant’s claim of maltreatment by
the use of other scientific modes or forms of torture. Appellant’s injuries certified by a private
physician and a constabulary doctor were telltales corroboration of the charge of torture and
maltreatment.

3. ID.; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OBTAINED BY TORTURE OR VIOLENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE IN

EVIDENCE. — It is now settled that a confession induced or extorted by torturing the accused or by
personal violence or abuse directed against the accused for the purpose of obtaining a confession, is
an involuntary one and is not admissible in evidence against him, unless found to be true. (Citing
People v. Tipay, 70 Phil., 615).

4. ID.; CONSPIRACY; HOW PROVED. — Conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other
than the confession. The admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in the same
case, must relate to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful
enterprise and in furtherance of its objects, and not to a confession, made, long after the conspiracy
had been brought to an end. Conspiracy must be real and not presumptive. It must be proved as the
crime itself, independent from the confession.

5. ID.; ALIBI, DEFENSE OF; WHEN ADMISSIBLE. — The defense of alibi when duly corroborated by
the findings of government agents is admissible in evidence.

DECISION

ANGELES, J.:

Evidence II.
At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of July 15, 1959, the lifeless body of Hector Crisostomo, then an
officer of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee charged with the apprehension of dollar smugglers,
was found in his Borgward sedan car at Lias Road, Marilao, Bulacan.

Upon the advice of the NBI medico-legal officer, the cadaver was brought to the Funeraria Quiogue,
Manila, for autopsy. Examination of the corpse revealed that the deceased suffered three gunshot
wounds on the head: One, at the right temple, at a point above the external auditory meatus right,
the entrance wound directed from right to left; another, at the pre-auricular region left, above the
external auditory meatus left, directed from left to right; and the last, at the temporal region, scalp,
left, at a point on the above left external auditory meatus, directed from left to right. The cause of
death was shock, severe, secondary to multiple gunshot wounds on the head.

In the course of the investigation to apprehend the perpetrators of the crime, Capt. Dionisio Carasig,
also a member of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee working with the deceased, intimated to
the PC authorities that the recent car deal of Crisostomo with Victorio Alvarez may possibly have
some connection with the killing. With that clue, an intensive investigation was pursued by the police
agencies, the Bulacan PC, the Marilao police, and the NBI agents joining hands together. Fingerprint
experts and photographers of the NBI examined the car where the body of the victim was found, but
no clear fingerprints could be detected. Upon an inspection of the car, some specimen evidence were
found, such as, one (1) cartridge case caliber .25; one (1) unfired bullet, caliber .25; one (1) slug,
caliber .25; two (2) metal jacketed bullets retrieved from the head of the victim, caliber .25; and a
bag.

Upon an examination of the bag, the investigators found a Philippine Trust Co.’s check in the amount
of P1,000,00, drawn by Victorio Alvarez in favor of Crisostomo, together with a receipt signed by the
deceased acknowledging payment by Alvarez in the amount stated in the check, with a further
statement of an unpaid balance of P24,500.00.

Suspecting that Alvarez may have something to do with the killing, the authorities picked him up for
questioning. Alvarez was taken to the Criminal Investigation Section of the PC for fingerprinting and
paraffin test for gun powder residue. The result of the test, as contained in the report of Crispin
Garcia, chief chemistry section of the PC, showed the presence of gun powder residue on both hands
of Alvarez.

On August 4, 1959, a complaint for murder was filed by Capt. Rafael Yapdiangco of the PC before the
Justice of the Peace Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Victorio Alvarez and two John Does. The
victim named in the complaint was Hector Crisostomo.

Victorio Alvarez was arrested on August 19, 1959. Immediately after his arrest, Alvarez was
investigated. He made a tape-recorded statement before Lt. Bautista and Major Santiago of the CIS
at Camp Crame, admitting that he alone shot and killed Crisostomo near Manga Avenue, Manila.
(Vide question 68, Exhibit L, statement of Alvarez, August 21, 1959.).

On August 20, 1959, Alvarez executed a handwritten statement in narrative form before the CIS in
the office of the PC Alabang headquarters (Exhibit G). In this statement, he affirmed that a certain
Johnny was the one who shot and killed Crisostomo in Marilao, Bulacan. On the same day, Alvarez
made another statement in the form of questions and answers repeating substantially the facts
contained in his handwritten statement. (Exhibit F.).

Still on the next day, August 21, 1959, Alvarez executed another statement before Capt. Rafael
Yapdiangco of the PC (Exhibit L), wherein Alvarez again admitted that he was the only one who shot
and killed Crisostomo at barrio Lias, Marilao, Bulacan. In this statement, Alvarez gave a detailed
narration of the participation of George Chua in the commission of the crime, as follows: "At around
Evidence II.
8:00 o’clock P.M. (July 14) the Borgward sedan car driven by Capt. Crisostomo was approaching our
car within a distance enough to call his attention. Johnny extended his arm and called Capt.
Crisostomo. Capt. Crisostomo’s attention was attracted and he cut in and parked his car in front of
the Oldsmobile where we were riding. When his car was properly parked, Capt. Carasig and George
Chua approached Capt. Crisostomo, and finally they got in; Capt. Carasig first then followed by
George Chua. After a few minutes conversation, the car driven by Capt. Crisostomo with Capt.
Carasig and George in it, left and we followed. They passed Taft Avenue towards Isaac Peral to Otis
turned left towards Nagtahan bridge, turned right to Santa Mesa Boulevard, turned left to Santol,
turned left to Pararle St., turned left to Benito St.,." . . and then we proceeded "towards Bulacan."
cralaw virtua1aw library

"Q Were you constantly following the car of Capt. Crisostomo?

A Yes, sir, . . .

Q Where in Bulacan did you go?

A Approximately one hundred meters before the road junction leading to Marilao poblacion where we
stopped.

Q What happened then?

A Upon arrival there at approximately 10:00 p.m., the Oldsmobile stopped at the back of the white
sedan. Then we all alighted from the Oldsmobile and transferred to the white sedan. Our position
inside the white sedan is that beside Capt. Crisostomo who was on the wheel was George Chua.
Behind George Chua, Capt. Carasig, behind the seat at the back extreme right, next to the left at
center is me and to my left is Johnny."cralaw virtua1aw library

Q What did you talked about?

A George Chua started the talking by telling Capt. Crisostomo to please turn over the documents to
them (documents consisting of names of persons connected with the dollar syndicate, the modus
operandi and activities) and then followed discussion, Chua telling Crisostomo to turn over to us the
papers and forget everything, then Capt. Crisostomo replied, I told you that I do not have time to
discuss that matter, and then Capt. Carasig said, Capt. we are business partners, and I am engaged
in this business too, for my sake, turn over the paper to them or to me, that will save the
government from exposing the whole activities, then Capt. Crisostomo replied it is too late already, I
have no time to discuss the matter; then George Chua drew his revolver. When we saw George Chua
drew his revolver, we did the same thing.

Q What happened next?

A When Capt. Crisostomo saw us drew our guns, he showed a sign of fighting back. George Chua
gave a signal and I fired a shot at Capt. Crisostomo on his right temple, then Capt. Crisostomo
showed a sign of fighting back so Johnny held the left shoulder of Capt. Crisostomo while Capt.
Carasig held his right shoulder, then I fired again, hitting him at the back of the head, George Chua
after the first shot, opened the door and went out and then I fired the third shot on his left temple
and Capt. Crisostomo snapped dead . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

Alvarez further declared that he was trusted by George Chua and was chosen to be the trigger-man;
that Chua promised to pay him P35,000.00 plus P400.00 a month for killing Crisostomo; that Chua
was engaged in the business of dollar smuggling.

On September 1, 1959, the complaint was amended by including Chaw Yaw Shun alias George Chua
and Lim Bun Ping alias Johnny Yao, together with Victorio Alvarez and two John Does.

Evidence II.
On the basis of Alvarez’ confessions, and with him as guide, the CIS agents proceeded to Chua’s
residence at 1834 M. H. del Pilar, Malate, Manila. Upon arrival at the house, they were received by
Chua’s wife. Inquiring for Chua, the CIS agents were told by the wife that her husband was not at
home. In the evening of August 24, 1959, George Chua, accompanied by his lawyer, Jose Uy,
surrendered to General Isagani Campo of the PC at the D & E restaurant in Quezon City, in the
presence of newspaper reporters and photographers. Immediately thereafter, George Chua was
taken to Camp Crame and was investigated by Capt. Yapdiangco and other CIS agents for three
hours, after which he was allowed to sleep. The next day, August 25, 1959, Chua was again
investigated by the CIS agents. The investigation was reduced to writing. Believing that Chua was
not telling the truth, because he would not admit participation in the crime, the investigator
destroyed the statements. To quote from Capt. Yapdiangco’s testimony: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Will you please tell the court from what time George Chua was interrogated on August 24, 1959?

A Well, as far as I remember, from that time when General Campo turned over to us Mr. Chua, he
was interviewed by us for about three hours. After that, we allowed him to sleep. We also slept. But
the following morning the 25th, naturally, we had to interview him again.

Q During those interviews that you have made as well as your companions on August 24 and 25, did
you attempt to make it in writing?

A Well, there was an attempt to put it in writing, but it was destroyed.

Q Will you tell us the reason why you have to discontinue the written interrogation?

A Because what he was telling us we believe it was not true." (tsn pp. 34-35, Vol. 22).

In spite of knowledge on the part of Capt. Yapdiangco that a complaint against George Chua had
already been filed in court, nevertheless, in view of the insistent denial by Chua of any participation
in the crime, at about midnight on August 26, 1959, Capt. Yapdiangco brought him to the PC
headquarters in Alabang, Rizal, where he was investigated in the presence of several CIS agents,
Chua made a written statement. (Exhibit R) In his confession, Chua stated the following: That he
ordered the killing of Capt. Crisostomo; that the plot to kill Crisostomo was hatched up in his house
at 1834 M.H. del Pilar, Malate, Manila on July 13, 1959, in the presence of Lim Bon Pin alias Johnny
Yao and Victorio Alvarez; that he (Chua) and Johnny hired Alvarez to kill Crisostomo for P35,000.00
because his partners in Hongkong, Yao Chiong and Tay Seng got angry at him, because the
$132,000.00 entrusted to a lady who was leaving for Hongkong, was confiscated by the local
authorities at the airport between June 15 and 25, 1959; that his partner, Yao Chung who was in
Hongkong, called him through overseas telephone on June 29, 1959, at eleven o’clock in the
morning, and told him to do something for him and to finish Capt. Crisostomo; that Capt. Crisostomo
was killed on July 14, 1959, at about ten o’clock at Marilao, Bulacan, and that Victorio Alvarez killed
him with a .25 caliber pistol by shooting him on the head two times; that when Capt. Crisostomo was
driving his car, Alvarez was seated at the rear, and a Filipino whose name he does not know, was
seated on the front seat beside Crisostomo when Alvarez shot Crisostomo; that after Capt.
Crisostomo was shot by Alvarez, the latter drove the small car to barrio Lias, Marilao, Bulacan,
turning right, while he (Chua) in another car, drove the Filipino further away and dropped him at a
bridge, and he (Chua) returned to pick up Alvarez, and both of them returned to Manila in the
Oldsmobile car; that upon reaching Manila, Alvarez was dropped at the Quezon Bridge where Alvarez
threw his pistol, caliber .25, and he (Chua) returned to his house; that he (Chua) actually gave the
amount of P35,000,00 to Johnny in his house, but does not know whether Johnny gave money to
Alvarez.

On August 28, 1959, while George Chua was detained in the provincial jail of Bulacan, he asked the
warden to summon the provincial fiscal of Bulacan, because he wanted to give a statement. The
assistant provincial fiscal, Pascual K. Kiliathko, interviewed George Chua in the provincial jail on
Evidence II.
August 29, 1959. The interview was reduced to writing in the form of questions and answers (Exhibit
VVV) the pertinent portions of which are the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q I understand from you that you sent for me?

A Yes, sir.

Q Are you ready to give the statement voluntarily and willingly?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, Mr. George Chua, will you please state your name and other personal circumstances?

A (Witness does so, and said) because I am accused of murder.

Q What is this murder charge that you have just stated?

A I was implicated by Alvarez to be one of those responsible for the killing of Crisostomo.

Q Now, Mr. Chua, what is it that you would like to state, you stated that you sent for me to give a
statement, what is that statement you would like to give?

A Because I want to report to you that I was maltreated by the CIS agents and forced to sign a
statement.

Q You stated that you were maltreated before, how were you maltreated?

A First I was taken to the 5th PC Co. at 12:00 o’clock midnight at Alabang, Rizal, on August 25,
1959, and there I was handcuffed, but before I was handcuffed, I was ordered to take off my clothes
and then I was handcuffed again and blindfolded me by wrapping a towel all around my face and my
head and some of the agents turned my head seven or eight times.

Q Now, is there something more that you still like to disclose before I ask you to sign this statement?

A Yes, sir, I want to inform you that they also applied electric shock to my body and while doing so,
they forced me to answer the way they designed, two hours later they forced me to lie down on the
ground, then a stout agent sat on my stomach and another agent sat on my legs, and then I almost
lost consciousness."cralaw virtua1aw library

On March 24, 1960, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for murder against Victorio
Alvarez, Dionisio Carasig, Chaw Yaw Shun alias George Chua and two John Does, alleging that said
accused, acting in conspiracy, with the attendant qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, use of motor vehicle, nocturnity and by
a band, killed Hector Crisostomo.

Upon arraignment, Victorio Alvarez, Chaw Yaw Shun alias George Chua and Dionisio Carasig entered
a plea of not guilty.

After a trial, Dionisio Carasig was acquitted on reasonable doubt; Victorio Alvarez and Chaw Yaw
Shun alias George Chua were found guilty of the offense as charged and sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Hector Crisostomo in the sum of P6,000.00, and
to pay the proportionate costs. Both appealed from the decision.

On September 6, 1962, Alvarez filed a motion to withdraw his appeal which he reiterated in another
motion on October 1, 1962. On October 24, 1962, Alvarez’ motion was granted.
Evidence II.
The case before Us concerns the appeal of George Chua.

The evidence relied upon by the Solicitor General in sustaining the conviction of the appellant, as
cited in the brief are:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The several confessions of Alvarez, which are self-contradicting and the confession of the appellant;
testimonial evidence that Capt. Yapdiangco and other CIS agents went to the house of Chua, and not
finding him there, they told the wife of Chua that they were looking for her husband; that on the next
day, Capt. Yapdiangco secured a warrant to search the house of Chua, and they found "a calling card
of Victorio Alvarez and a sort of a telephone directory index marked exhibits H and H-1" ; that
Alvarez made a re-enactment of the crime; that George Chua, accompanied by his lawyer,
surrendered to General Isagani Campo; that during the investigation of Chua, "Capt. Calderon asked
Chua why he was implicated by Victorio Alvarez. At first he denied any participation in the killing of
Capt. Crisostomo. But when Alvarez was brought before him, the former told him, ‘George I have
already confessed the truth. Do not tell a lie. Please tell the truth, George,’ At this instance, Chua
countered: ‘I did not kill him. You killed him.’ Alvarez told him again: ‘Now, tell the truth.’ Chua,
however, kept silent." (The foregoing incident testified to by CIS agents, does not appear in any
signed statement of Chua, although it is claimed that the confrontation had taken place during
Chua’s interrogation by the CIS agents, and neither does it appear in any of the several statements
of Alvarez); that "early in the morning on August 26, 1959, Capt. Rafael Yapdiangco brought George
Chua to Alabang PC headquarters for the purpose of taking down his statement. The reason of Capt.
Yapdiangco in investigating Chua in Alabang instead of at Camp Crame was explained by him thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Your Honor, the reason why the investigation of George Chua whose true name is Chaw Yaw
Shun was made at Alabang is that there were so many newspapermen in the CIS building and it
seems to confuse us in our manner of investigation, even now and then, they interfere, thus
obstructing our investigation, so we made it a point to bring Mr. Chua to Alabang so that more or
less, we will be in a position to investigate him thoroughly." ;

that "After their arrival at Alabang, Capt. Yapdiangco in the presence of Agent Ricardo Chavez and
some other agents, personally investigated George Chua. According to Capt. Yapdiangco, Chua
voluntarily submitted himself to the investigation and agreed that his confession be made in writing"
(Then follows the quoted confession of Chua.).

There is no evidence, oral or documentary, adduced by the prosecution, other than the several
confessions of Alvarez, the confession of Chua, and the testimony of Arturo Cayetano, that would
tend to prove any overt act of Chua indicating some connection between him and the other accused
establishing a common criminal design to commit the crime.

With regard to Arturo Cayetano, this witness declared that between 7:00 and 8:00 o’clock in the
evening of July 14, 1959, he saw an Oldsmobile car parked at the corner of Isaac Peral and Florida
streets, Manila, while he was at the opposite side of the street under a waiting shed; that after a
while, he was attracted by one of the occupants of the Oldsmobile car who was waving his hand in
the act of stopping another car coming from behind; that the latter car stopped and parked in front
of the former car; that later on, he saw two persons, whom he identified in court as Dionisio Carasig
and George Chua, approach the car that had just stopped, board it, and then the car left and moved
away towards Taft Avenue, Manila.

The weakness of the testimony is apparent from the failure of the witness to identify the driver or
occupant of the car into which Carasig and Chua entered. In the brief of the appellee, no reference
whatsoever is made to the testimony of Cayetano, for the obvious reason that it is irrelevant and
immaterial, as it would not in any way connect the appellant with the commission of the crime
committed in Marilao, Bulacan, about which fact there is not a scintilla of evidence showing that the
appellant was ever seen thereat on the night of July 14, 1959.
Evidence II.
At the trial, George Chua repudiated his confession and denied any participation in the commission of
the crime. With reference to his confession, he declared thus: "When he was investigated by the CIS
agents at Alabang PC headquarters on August 26, 1959, his eyes were ‘tied’ (blindfolded) with a wet
towel for about six (6) hours and the bandage was removed only at around 6:30 to 7:00 O’clock in
the morning of said date, but he cannot remember who tied his eyes; that some agents used electric
shock on his body for two (2) hours simultaneously on his left upper back, left ear and knees; that
the wire connected to his body is cranked; that he was forced to lie down after which an agent sat on
his stomach and another sat on his leg; that he was ordered to undress, and remove his shoes and
socks, then they applied the electric shock; that he signed his confession under threat, the agents
telling him that if he did not sign the statement, he will be killed and his body will be thrown away;
that nobody read to him the written statement; that he was not allowed to read his confession, and
to save his life, he just signed it.

Corroborating appellant’s claim of maltreatment, Dr. Jose Eustaquio, a private physician, declared
that when he examined Chua on August 26, 1959, at the instance of the latter’s lawyer, he noticed
some contusion on his left upper back, at the nape of the neck, and in the middle term called linear
abrasions also in the left upper back. His finding, however, was not put in writing. Dr. Eustaquio
examined Chua for the second time on August 27, 1959, and this time he put his findings in writing
(Exh. 19-Chua, Vol. 1). Being asked about the meaning of "multiple scratches likeline" mentioned in
his medical certificate, he said, it means linear abrasions" the cause of which he could not determine.
When he was pressed to explain the contents of his certificate, he said these scratches could have
been caused by wires, rough stones, pointed objects or similar instruments applied by other persons;
that the "reddish discoloration of the nape of the neck" which is a "contusion" may have been caused
by so called trauma or in common parlance, a blow that may cause injury either by fist or objects;
that the "reddish discoloration at the left upper back which is medial of shoulder blade is the same as
the injury on the neck which may have been caused by any kind of objects, such as fist or hand
blow; that the "pinhead spot on the left leg and multiple scratches likeline", could have been caused
by a pointed object applied to the skin, but he does not know whether electrical shocking apparatus
introduced in the body could have produced the same. (tsn pp. 149-195, Vol. 1).

In this appeal, the appellant assails the admission of his confession, contending that it is not
admissible, because it was obtained thru force, threat and intimidation.

In passing upon the weight and admissibility of a confession, the court may take into consideration
the circumstances and conditions under which it was obtained (People v. Lauas, 58 Phil. 742), and
may consider claims that a statement was taken in circumstances which violate the standard of
voluntariness — a standard grounded in the policies of privileged self-incrimination. (Davis v. State of
North Carolina, 16 L. ed. 86).

As narrated hereinabove, immediately upon Chua’s surrender on August 24, 1959, Capt. Yapdiangco
and several CIS agents interrogated him for three hours. The next morning, August 25, 1959, Chua
was again interrogated. The interrogation was reduced to writing. But, because Chua would not
admit his guilt, the investigators considered him a liar, and so they destroyed his written statement.
Persisting in their attempt to obtain a confession, at midnight on August 26, 1959, Chua was brought
to Alabang, Rizal, within the jurisdiction of the 3rd PC zone, for investigation, instead of taking him to
the 1st PC zone in Bulacan where the crime was committed. According to Capt. Yapdiangco, George
Chua voluntarily submitted himself to an investigation and agreed that his confession be made in
writing. To quote from appellee’s brief, p. 17:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"After their arrival at Alabang, Capt. Yapdiangco, in the presence of agents Ricardo Chavez and other
agents, . . . Chua voluntarily submitted himself to the investigation and agreed that his confession be
made in writing."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the light of the foregoing testimony of Capt. Yapdiangco, it is food for thought to ask: What made
Evidence II.
Chua become a "dove", when during all the time he was being investigated at Camp Crame, he had
demonstrated an attitude of belligerency by refusing to admit participation in the crime? Was the
sudden transformation the result of some spiritual persuasion that moved the conscience of the
suspect to admit his guilt, or was it due to an overbearing pressure which finally subdued his will
power? The observation made by his Honor, the late Manuel M. Mejia, the first trial judge in the case,
would seem to have answered the riddle, Thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Notwithstanding the fact that he surrendered or was surrendered to General Campo at the D &
E Restaurant in the evening of 24 August 1959, and was supposed to be confined at the CIS building
Camp Crame, Quezon City, and notwithstanding the prosecution’s claim that defendant Chua
executed his alleged confession, Exhibit M, voluntarily, the CIS agents had to take him to Alabang,
Rizal, approximately 20 kilometers away from Quezon City. Now, it may be asked, if defendant Chua
were really willing to execute a confession, why should the CIS agents have to take him to Alabang?
Could not such a confession be taken right in the CIS building in Quezon City, where they have all
the facilities? And if the confession, Exhibit N, had really been voluntarily given by defendant Chua,
as claimed by the prosecution, why would it take the CIS several hours in an isolated place in
Alabang, Rizal, to extract from him a 3-page confession? . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

Of course, Captain Yapdiangco explained that the reason why appellant was investigated in Alabang,
Rizal, was because of the presence of newspapermen in the CIS building at Camp Crame, Quezon
City, who interfered in their manner of investigation. His Honor, Judge Manuel M. Mejia, did not
accord credence to the explanation. Indeed, it is clear that it was only a pretext, considering that, as
admitted by the witness, the newspapermen are not always present in their office at Camp Crame.
(tsn. p. 62, Vol. 1).

The appellant claimed that he was maltreated and intimidated by the investigators at Alabang, hitting
his head, boxing him, applying electric shock to his body, sitting on his stomach and legs, and
required him to sign the confession under threat of death.

The claim merits serious consideration.

It appears that after Chua’s investigation on August 26, 1959, he was examined by Dr. Eustaquio
Bautista, a private medical practitioner, and by doctors Arsenio Anastacio and Miguel Zarraga of the
PC.

Dr. Eustaquio in his examination of Chua on August 27, 1959, as stated in his report, found "multiple
scratch likeline on the left upper back; reddish discoloration at nape of neck; reddish discoloration at
left upper back just medial of the shoulder blade; multiple pinhead reddish spots on left leg and
multiple scratches likeline; 3 scratches likeline on right leg" which according to the doctor could not
have been self-inflicted because of the location of the injuries.

On the other hand, upon an examination of Chua on August 27, 1959, by Dr. Anastacio, he found "7
linear reddish marks varying in length — 1/4 x 3/4 inch, 7 in number pinhead in size skin eruptions
reddish with some healed are noted on the outer half of the left shoulder, upper part of the left arm
and upper part of the left back. Similar eruptions appear on the upper part of the right back, both
legs and thighs. Linear reddish mark about 1 inch is noted on the antero-lateral aspect of the left
thighs. Three small reddish marks are noted on the junction of the upper and middle thirds lateral
aspect of the right leg. The abovementioned linear reddish marks represent scratch marks." (Exh. 3-
Chua, p. 135, Vol. 1).

Upon examination conducted by Dr. Miguel Zarraga, at about 10:00 a.m. on August 27, 1959, he
found that "over the left shoulder area, upper back, and upper arm are seen a number of superficial
abrasions of various sizes from 0.6 to 1.5 cm. long in various stage of healing, some reddish, some
covered with brownish scab; there are observed similar superficial marks over the right upper back,
and both legs and thighs. An abrasion measuring 2.2 cm. is seen on the antero-lateral portion of the
Evidence II.
left thigh. On the right leg at about the junction of the upper and middle thirds are three small
abrasions lateral to another one which subject claims had already been there for sometime now, the
exact number of days he does not remember." (Exh. 4-Chua, Vol. 1).

These findings of the three doctors, yielded one significant indication, the existence of "reddish marks
and scratch abrasions" on appellant’s body. True, that Dr. Arsenio Anastacio made a remark in his
medical certificate (Exh. 3-Chua) that there is "no sign of physical injury externally which can be
appreciated at the time of his examination", and Major Miguel Zarraga declared that "the abdomen
revealed no external manifestation of any injury, nor is there any area of tenderness in the whole
body" of the appellant, these remarks, however, do not detract from the fact, physically and
scientifically recognized, that some forms of torture do not usually manifest external injury, on the
body of the person maltreated. For instance, sitting on the stomach and the use of electric shock,
which incidentally are among appellant’s complaints, do not necessarily produce external physical
injury. Dr. Anastacio said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q You have long experience in medical practice, as a general rule, if blows are given in the
abdomen, do they leave external sign?

A Not all. (tsn p. 405, Exh. KKK, p. 390-415, Vol. 1).

On the same point, Dr. Zarraga said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q In your experience, did you Doctor have come across to a person given blows in the abdomen
without leaving any external mark?

A I have many cases, some of them leave signs and some of them do not leave any external injury.

Q Have you come across a person who died in traffic accident where the wheel passed over the
abdomen without leaving any mark of external injury?

A I remember very well a man in Camp Murphy whereby a young child was ran over by wheel and
she sustained serious internal injuries without any external injuries," (tsn pp. 424-425, Exh. LLL, Vol.
I, JP Marilao.)

And as regards the use of electric shock, Dr. Zarraga’s findings that "there are no external
manifestation to indicate the application of electric current of such duration to almost cause death as
alleged", does not negate the application of this form of torture for according to him, the use of
electricity with wire on the body of a person does not always leave any mark thereon. On cross-
examination, he said: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q You also admit Doctor that electricity from 6 volts battery applied with wire will not leave any
mark?

A I admit that." (tsn p. 525, Exh. LLL, Vol. I, JP Marilao.)

Testifying further on this point, and confronted with a quotation from a medical book, Dr. Zarraga
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q I will just read to you a certain portion of this book on page 201, and I quote: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘the autopsy of a person . . . dead and lying near an electric machine or wire may reveal a severe
cardiac, which could account for said death even without contact with the current. It may be very
difficult to define in such a case if the death was due to the disease or electric current if no electric
current marks are present.’You agree with that Doctor?

Evidence II.
A I agree with the condition that those who died of cardiac as a result of small shock may really die
without indication externally. (tsn pp. 426-427, Vol. I, JP Marilao).

Q And the abrasion you mentioned in Exh. R could that have been produced by minor or sharp
object?

A Yes, sir, in fact I mentioned that in my statement." cralaw virtua1aw library

From the foregoing facts and circumstances set forth, it is clear that the mere absence of external
injury in appellant’s body does not destroy or rule out appellant’s claim of maltreatment by the use of
other scientific modes or forms of torture. Appellant’s injuries, certified by a private physician and
constabulary doctors, were telltales corroboration of the charge of torture and maltreatment.

It is now settled that a confession which is induced or extorted by torturing the accused or by
personal violence or abuse directed against the accused for the purpose of obtaining a confession, is
an involuntary one and is not admissible in evidence against him, unless found to be true. (People v.
Tipay, 70 Phil. 615.)Appellee argues, however, conceding that the confession was involuntary, that it
is nevertheless admissible because the facts stated in the confession have been corroborated by
other evidence.

A review of the evidence, however, showed that other than the confession, there is no other evidence
which proves the truth of the facts stated in the confession. On the contrary, analyzing the
confession of Chua, it will be noticed that it is replete with improbabilities and falsities in its material
and substantial parts.

1. — While in Chua’s confession there appears a statement that the order to kill was given to him by
his partners in Hongkong, Yao Chung and Tay Seng, thru the overseas telephone on June 29, 1959,
at 11:00 a.m., the records of the Bureau of Telecommunications which in July 1959 was the only
agency operating an overseas telephone system between Hongkong and Manila, failed to disclose any
such telephone conversation between Yao Chung and appellant Chua. (Exhibit 17-Chua, and
testimony of radio technician, pp. 471-481, bail hearing before Judge Mejia).

2. — In Chua’s confession, it is said that the plot to kill Crisostomo was hatched up in Chua’s
residence at 1834 M. H. del Pilar, Malate Manila, on the night of July 13, 1959, with Alvarez and Lim
Bon Ping alias Johnny Yao, but the records of the Bureau of Immigration show that said Lim Bong
Ping had re-entered Manila in November 1958 and had left by Philippine Air Lines plane for Hongkong
on December 7, 1958 (Exhs. 13, 14 and 15). And there is no showing that he had re- entered the
Philippines after his departure for abroad on December 7, 1958. That Lim Bong Ping was not in
Manila in July 1959, is further shown by the sworn declarations of members of the staff of the
Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, that Lim Bong Ping alias Johnny Yao left
San Francisco, California on 30 April 1958, and returned thereto on 24 December 1958, where he
had been living constantly ever since. (Exhs. 5, 5-a and 6, 6-a.-) And this fact was corroborated by
the sworn statements of Mrs. Pilar R. Guerrero, Philippine Consulate employee in San Francisco, and
Enrique Herbosa, a Filipino student in California. (Exhs. 7 and 7-a.)

3. — In Chua’s confession, it is said that Alvarez killed Crisostomo in consideration of P35,000.00.

This is illogical and unbelievable. As his Honor, the late Judge Manuel M. Mejia, the first trial judge in
the case, said in his order granting bail to appellant, "If Alvarez had really killed Crisostomo in
consideration of a reward promised to him by Chua, it would seem to be unnatural and illogical for
Chua, to have gone along with Alvarez in the actual killing of Crisostomo on the night of July 14,
1959. On the other hand, it is said by Alvarez in his tape-recorded statement that his motive in
killing the deceased Crisostomo was to retrieve a rubber check which he had issued to Crisostomo in
connection with his purchase from the latter of a Ford Fairlane car for P20,500.00 (Exh. LL, pp. 13,
28, tsn. Oct. 31, 1959)." Indeed, the foregoing facts would show that it was Alvarez who had a
motive to kill Crisostomo. In fact, he withdrew his appeal.
Evidence II.
4. — It is also said in the confession that Crisostomo was shot on the head while driving the car. This
is incredible, because in that situation, the car would have gone out of control or would have been
involved in an accident which did not happen.

5. — And as a result of the incident discussed in the preceeding number, if it were true, evidently the
authorities would have found bloodstains in the car which is not present.

6. — The statement in the confession that Chua was with the group that killed Crisostomo at Lias
road, Marilao, is impeached by the testimony of Paulino Antonio, a witness for the prosecution, who
declared that it was only Alvarez whom he saw at the vicinity of the crime on the night of July 14,
1959.

The finding of the court that there was conspiracy among the accused, notwithstanding the fact that
on the same evidence, the court found one defendant not guilty, but sufficient to convict the two
others, on the court’s finding and conclusion "As regards the testimony of Arturo Cayetano, the court
is inclined to give a margin of error in his identifying Carasig on the night in question . . .," is indeed,
somewhat illogical —

"Since in the instant case, the widow appears also to be a star witness of the prosecution whose
testimony was given much weight in pinning liability on appellants, we wonder whether this could be
consistent and would be true to logic and fairness if it would hold that on the strength of the same
testimony which was discredited by the court, insofar as one of the appellants’ co-accused in the
same case is concerned would reach a verdict of conviction against said appellants. (People v.
Aquino, Et Al., L-13789, June 30, 1960, 67 Of. Gaz. No. 51, 9180).

Aside from the foregoing consideration, conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence
other than the confession. The admissibility of a confession by one accused against the
other in the same case, must relate to statements made by one conspirator during the
pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or during its existence) and in furtherance of its
objects, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been
brought to an end. (People v. Nakpil, 52 Phil., 985; People v. Yatco, Et Al., 51 Of. Gaz. No. 12,
6187) Conspiracy must be real and not presumptive. (U.S. v. Figueras, 2 Phil. 491) It must be
proved as the crime itself, independent from the confession. But in the case at bar, the trial court
admitted the conflicting confession of Alvarez which are not binding on the appellant for being
hearsay, aside from having been repudiated by Alvarez himself during the trial. There is, therefore,
no inter-locking confession so to say, for there being no independent evidence establishing an overt
act of appellant Chua connected to the crime, conspiracy must necessarily be discarded.

The appellant maintains that the trial court erred in not appreciating his defense of alibi.

The evidence shows that the appellant, even from the very beginning of his interrogation by the CIS
agents upon his surrender on August 24, 1959, has consistently claimed that on the night of July 14,
1959, when Crisostomo was killed at Marilao, Bulacan, he was at No. 2, Salud St., Pasay City, playing
mahjong. Capt. Yapdiangco corroborated this fact. Thus —

"Q What were the things which you fear he was not answering your interrogation which you consider
is not true?

A I remember he was declaring to us that on that day, on the evening of 14th of July 1959, he was in
the mahjong game: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

While Chua was being interrogated at the CIS, Camp Crame, Quezon City, on August 24, 1959, other
agents of the CIS particularly Agent Mariano Belen and Lt. Bautista, on the same date, were busy
checking up on Chua’s movements or whereabouts on July 14, 1959, and they were informed that on
Evidence II.
the night of July 14, 1959, Chua was indeed playing mahjong at No. 2, Salud St., Pasay City. To this
effect is the testimony of agent Belen:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Do you remember having gone with Lt. Bautista to a certain club house in Pasay on August 24,
1959?

A I remember, sir.

Q Do you remember where that club house is?

A No. 2, Salud St., Pasay City.

Q What was the purpose in going with Lt. Bautista to that club house at Salud St., Pasay City?

A To verify the allegation of Mr. Peter Lim that at said club house, George Chua was playing mahjong
on the night of July 14, 1959.

Q Because of that information imparted to you by Peter Lim, you went direct to Salud St.?

A Yes, sir, in the afternoon of the same date.

Q Whom did you interrogate upon your arrival in the clubhouse?

A We interrogated Ong Kong Pay.

Q What was the answer of Ong Kong Pay?

A That Mr. George Chua was there and practically playing mahjong one week from July 8 to 14,
1959." cralaw virtua1aw library

The foregoing facts were also corroborated by the testimonies of Ng Yu (tsn, p. 1024); Ong Kong Pay
(tsn, p. 1245) and Peter Lim (tsn p. 1295);

As further proof of the fact that Chua was playing mahjong at Salud St., on the night of July 14,
1959, the record shows that agent Belen of the CIS was given a notebook by Ong Kong Pay in-
charge of the clubhouse, on August 24, 1959, wherein accused George Chua was listed as one of the
players thereat on the date in question. However, it appears that the prosecution had lost the
notebook. Whether it was really lost by the CIS or deliberately suppressed, the presumption of its
truth has basis in law.

All the foregoing indubitably show that the defense of alibi of the appellant could not have been
merely a concoction, as the testimonies of the witnesses clearly showed that Chua was really playing
mahjong at Salud St., Pasay City, on the date in question. Upon the foregoing considerations, the
Court finds that the guilt of the appellant Chaw Yaw Shun alias George Chua has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt, and he is hereby acquitted of the offense charged with costs
de oficio. The bail bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled.

Evidence II.
6-11.)

Evidence II.
12.) G.R. No. L-12794             October 14, 1918

ELADIO ALPUERTO, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
JOSE PEREZ PASTOR and MANUEL ROA, provincial sheriff of Cebu, defendants-appellants.

Jose Martinez de San Agustin for appellants.

Gullas & Briones for appellee.

STREET, J.:

The three parcels of real property which constitutes the subject matter of the contention in this case formerly
belonged to Juan Llenos, and both the interested parties in this action claim titled under, the plaintiff as party in
possession under a contract of sale with pacto de retro, and the defendant as purchaser at a public sale under an
execution directed against Llenos. the plaintiff, Eladio Alpuerto, asks the court to make a declaration against the
defendant, Jose Perez Pastor, to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner thereof in full and absolute dominion. He
also prays that the sale of the property effected by the sheriff, Manuel Roa, to said defendant be declared null.

The defendant Pastor denies the right of the plaintiff to the relief sought, and asserts that the transaction by which
the plaintiff claims to have acquired titled was simulated or fictitious and that the supposed conveyance was effected
for the purpose of defrauding the defendant as creditor of Juan Llenos. This defendant therefore in turn prays the
court to declare that he himself is the true owner of the property and that a judgment be entered condemning the
plaintiff to surrender possession to him. From a judgment entered in the Court of First Instance of Cebu in favor of
the plaintiff , the defendants have appealed. It appears that, pending the proceedings, the defendant Pastor has
died and an administrator, Eustaquio Lopez, has been substituted in his stead. Throughout the opinion, however,
Pastor, the name of the original party defendant, will be used in referring to the interest now represented by the
administrator.

The plaintiff claims by virtue of the document (Exhibit A), which purports to be a contract of sale with the privilege of
repurchase. It recites a consideration of P2,500 the payment of which is acknowledged; and the stipulated period
within which is acknowledge; and the stipulated period within which the vendor may repurchase the property is fixed
at two years. This documents is signed by the two contracting parties (Juan Llenos and Eladio Alpuerto) and is
attested by two subscribing witnesses. It purports on its face to have been executed on July 3, 1912; just it was not
acknowledged before a notary until December 3, 1914. The property in question is assessed for the purposes of
taxation at P5,000 or P6,000; and is worth more than twice the amount which the plaintiff claims to have paid for it.

At the time of the supposed sale to Eladio Alpuerto there had been pending for nearly two years, in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, an action in which Jose Perez Pastor was plaintiff and Juan Llenos was defendant. In this action
the plaintiff sought to recover from Juan Llenos a considerable sum of money; and Eladio Alpuerto, as son-in-law of
Juan Llenos, was aware of this litigation from the beginning. On January 27, 1913, or about six months after the
alleged sale of the property in question to Eladio Alpuerto judgment was rendered in said action in favor of
the plaintiff Pastor for the sum of P3,789.13, with interest and costs. This judgment was affirmed upon appeal to
the Supreme Court on November 20, 1914. 1 An execution was thereafter issued on April 12, 1915, from the
Court of First Instance upon said judgment was levied upon the property in question as the property of Juan Llenos.
Before the sale was effected the plaintiff herein, Eladio Alpuerto, notified the sheriff that he claimed the property as
his own. Nevertheless, the sheriff proceeded under indemnification and sold the property at public sale to Jose
Perez Pastor for the sum of P1,100.

The case stated in the cross-complaint as a ground of relief to the defendant has its basis in the rule stated in
subsection 3 of article 1291 of the Civil Code, which declares generally that a contract executed in fraud of creditors
is subject of rescission; and upon this issue the burden of proof is of course upon Pastor, as the party assailing the

Evidence II.
transaction, to show that the transfer was fraudulent; though it should here be remembered that proof on this point
may be accomplished by the aid of presumptions, as in other cases.

The argument against the validity of the conveyance from Juan Llenos to Eladio Alpuerto is based on two
propositions, namely: (1) that said conveyance must, under the second paragraph of article 1297, in connection with
article 1227, of the Civil Code, be presumed to be fraudulent; and (2) that furthermore is shown by the evidence to
have been fraudulent in fact.

The second paragraph of article 1297 of the Civil Code says that a transfer of property made by one against whom
a condemnatory judgment has been pronounced in either instance is to be presumed fraudulent. The cardinal
question on this branch of the case is therefore this. Was the transfer in question made after a judgment had been
entered against Juan Llenos in either instance? This in turn depends upon the question whether the contract of sale
shall be considered effective as from the date upon which it purports to have been executed (July 3, 1912) or from
the date when it was acknowledge before a notary public (December 3, 1914) for in the interval between these two
dates final judgment had been rendered against Juan Llenos both in the Court of First Instance and in the Supreme
Court.

The solution of the problem thus presented requires us to consider the combined effect of articles 1225 and 1227 of
the Civil Code. Article 1225 declares that a private document legally recognized shall have, with regard to those who
sign it and their privies (causahabientes), the same force as a public instrument.

The expression "legally recognized" (reconocido legamente), as here used, must be taken to mean recognized, or
acknowledged by the person or persons, executing or emitting the document-in this case the vendor, Juan Llenos,
and the vendee-Eladio Alpuerto. The act of legal recognition occurred, we assume, when the document was signed
by parties and delivered in the presence of the attesting witnesses, who were called upon to bear witness to the
transaction.

Concerning the meaning of the expression "privies" (causabientes), in this article, the following passage is
found in the Commentary of Manresa:

The said word denotes the idea of succession, not only be right of heirship and testamentary legacy,
but also that of succession by singular title, derived form acts inter vivos, and for special purposes;
hence, an assignee of a credit, and one subrogated to it, etc., will be privies; in short, he, who by
succession is placed in the position of one of those who contracted the juridical relation and
executed the private document and appears to be substituting him in his personal rights and
obligations, is a privy. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, pp. 492 and 492.)

Under the interpretation thus placed upon the meaning of the term "privies", it is clear that Jose Perez
Pastor, the purchaser at the public sale under an execution directed against Juan Llenos, must be
considered a privy or successor in interest of the execution debtor. He is therefore undoubtedly bound by
the instrument which conveyed the property to Eladio Alpuerto — and this from the date of the execution of
that instrument as a private document-unless this result is prohibited by article 1227 of the Civil Code, which reads
as follows:

The date of a private instrument shall be considered, with regard to third persons, only from the date on
which it may have been filed or entered in a public registry, from the date on which it may have been
delivered to a public official by virtue of his office.

In considering this article it is important to bear in mind that it has reference merely to the probative value of the
document with respect to the date of its execution, and is not intended to lay down any rule concerning the efficacy
of the act or acts evidenced by the document. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 8, p. 501.) The importance of the rule
here declared is therefore most conspicuously revealed in the situation where the document itself contains the only
competent evidence before the court bearing upon the date upon which the instrument in question was executed as
a private document.

Evidence II.
This can be most conveniently exhibited by means of illustrations based on the language of the text itself. For
instance, let it be supposed that a document is produced bearing the signatures of the parties who participated in it
and purporting to have been executed upon a certain date, prior to the date upon which the document was filed or
inscribed in a public register. In such case the instrument can take effect, as against third persons, only from the
date when it was so filed or inscribed in a public register. It is, however, proved that one of the signatory parties has
died upon a certain date subsequent to that upon which case the instrument can take effect, as against third
persons, only from the date of the death of the deceased signatory party. Again, be it supposed, a document is
produced in court bearing the signatures of the parties and purporting to have been executed upon a certain date.
The instrument has at no time been elevated into a public document and it is not shown that either of the signatory
parties is dead. In this case the instrument can take effect, as against third persons, only from the date of the death
of the deceased signatory party. Again, be it supposed, a document is produced in court bearing the signatures of
the parties has died upon a certain dated subsequent to that upon which the instrument purports to have been
executed. In this case the instrument can take effect, as against third persons, only from the death of the deceased
signatory party. Again, be it supposed, a document is produced in court bearing the signatures of the parties and
purporting to have been executed upon a certain date. The instrument has at no time been elevated into a public
document and it is not shown that either of the signatory parties is dead. In this case the instrument can take effect,
as against third persons, only from the date when the document was filed in court, this being considered to be
delivery to a public official by virtue of his office.

All of these illustrations have reference to the situation where the document itself contains only evidence before the
court bearing upon the date of its original execution; and the execution of the instrument is supposed to be proved
by force of the act of notarial acknowledgment or by proof that the names of the parties signed to the document are
genuine. It must be borne in mind in this connection that article 1227 is not primarily or exclusively concerned with
instruments which after being executed originally as private documents are at a later date elevated to the status of
public documents. On the contrary, it deals primarily with private documents, and the instrument in question may at
all times remain a private document is not converted into a public document either by the death of one of the
signatory parties or by the fact that it is delivered to a public official by virtue of his office. The due execution of such
instruments must therefore be proved when they are introduced in court, if not made self-proving by notarial
acknowledgment, which operate to raise them to the status of public documents.

The commentator Manresa, discussing article 1227, observes with discernment that there may be other facts than
those mentioned in said article which be received as determinative of the date from which the instrument should be
considered to be effective against third person. Thus, if it should appear that, subsequent to the date upon which the
document purports to have been executed, one of the signatory parties had lost his penhand by amputation, this
should be accepted as being fully conclusive that the instrument was in fact executed before such occurrence.
(Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 8 p. 503.) In the same connection Manresa says that if a third person is affected with
notice of the existence of a private document or by any act of his own recognizes its existence, it will have effect, as
against him, from the date of such notice or recognition. (Opus citat., id.) These observations all go to show that
article 1227 states a presumption which may be rebutted.

The question then arises. Is there anything in article 1227, or elsewhere, which prohibits the introduction of the
testimony of attesting witnesses, or other persons who may be present when a private document is executed, to
prove that the act was accomplished upon the date stated therein to be date of its execution? We are of the opinion
that such testimony is admissible, even as against third parties.

This conclusion is fully supported by the opinion of the supreme court of Spain in the case of Alvarez vs. Yañez.
(177 Juris, Civil, 663, decided April 16, 1910). The facts in that case were that by private documents dated
respectively August 2 and August 3, 1908, Alvarez purchased four tracts of land. On August 17, of the same year
Carlos Vega sold, by public instrument, to Yañez several tracts were adjacent to part of the land purchased by
Alvarez who, upon learning of the sale, brought his action, under article 1523 of Civil Code, to be subrogated to the
buyer, exercising his right of retracto legal. The defendant answered that on August 17, 1908, plaintiff was not the
owner of any land adjacent to that acquired on that date by defendant the contention being that the private
documents upon which the complaint was based, in addition to the fact that they are not proof of ownership, were
not presented for the payment of the tax on real estate, which was fourteen days after defendant purchased the
properties in contest . . . .

Evidence II.
The trial court permitted plaintiff to produce witnesses for the purpose of proving that the private documents relied
upon by him were in fact executed and delivered upon the dates therein recited and that plaintiff went into
possession under them, and upon that evidence made finding in accordance with plaintiff's contentions, and held
that the right to take over the purchase retracto existed. The defendant appealed to the supreme court of Spain, and
argued that by its ruling the Audiencia had disregarded article 1227 of the Civil Code, the specific contention being
that as against persons who are not parties to them private documents must be treated as though their existence
commenced only from the date upon which they are made of public record. This contention was overruled, the Court
saying:

It cannot be denied that the appellant Constantino Vega is to be regarded as a third person, because he was
not a party to the two contracts of sale by virtue of which Vicente Alvarez acquired from Ildefonso Alvarez
the ownership of the three tracts of country real estate from which he derives his right to be subrogated as
purchaser of our other tracts adjacent thereto sold, with others, by Carlos Vega to the defendant by public
instrument dated August 17, 1908. Nevertheless, it is not to be inferred from this fact as appellant contends,
that the legal dates of the two first contracts, evidenced by private documents, are not those which are
recited therein, but that as regards third persons, in accordance with Art. 1227 of the Civil Code, they must
be regarded as dated on the day . . . on which they were noted in the tax office. That article established a
legal presumption which must yield to contrary evidence, and the trial court, basing its conclusion on the
testimony of the witnesses, has established the finding, which we cannot disturb, that the dates recited in
these documents are the true dates upon which the contracts were made.

Clearly articles 1225 and 1227 should be construed in such manner as to harmonize with each other and to give
effect, so far as possible, to the legislative intent expressed in each; and the only interpretation of article 1227 which
can be adopted consistently with the meaning of article 1225 is that the rule announced in article 1227 has
reference exclusively to the situation where there is no accredited evidence before the court, independent of the
recitals of the document itself, showing the date upon which it was in fact executed.

It has been settled in many decisions that a document which originates as private document and never arises above
that status will, under article 1225, be given full effect as such. (Samson vs. Salvilla and Sierra, 12 Phil. Rep., 497,
505; Tanguinot vs. Municipality of Tanay, 9 Phil. Rep., 369, 401; Guillermo vs. Mantiezo, 8 Phil. Rep., 368, 372;
Irureta, Goyena vs. Tambunting, 1 Phil. Rep., 490, 493.) It follows that article 1227 does not, as against the
signatory parties and their successors in interest, postpone the operation of an instrument, proved as private
document, if it is shown by competent evidence that it was in fact executed upon the date recited therein as the date
of its execution. If this were not true, the result would be that a person having rights under an instrument, probable
as a private document, might lose those rights by reason of the happening of some one of the occurrences
mentioned in article 1227. The contrary conclusion is evidently the proper one, that is, that if a party has rights under
an instrument, provable as a private document, and it is so proved, it will prevail from the true and proven date of its
execution with all the effect attributable to it under article 1225.

The expression "third parties" (terceros) as used in article 1227, evidently means persons who have not intervened
in the execution of the document. It has been so interpreted by the supreme court of Spain and by this court. (Lao
Simbieng vs. Palencia, 18 Phil. Rep., 325, 328; Easton vs. E. Diaz & Co. and Sheriff of Albay, 32 Phil. Rep., 181;
decision of the supreme court of Spain of April 16, 1910, already cited.) Manresa is therefore in error in supposing
that it has the more limited meaning of persons who have not intervened in the execution of the document and are
neither heirs nor successors in interest of those who signed the same. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 8, p. 501.)

In the case now before us the two witnesses examined with reference to the execution of the document in question
testify that it was originally executed and delivered on July 13, 1912, the date stated upon its face. For the purpose
of disposing of this branch of the case without further discussion, we provisionally accept this statement as true and
deduce the conclusion that he presumption stated in paragraph 2 of article 1297 of the Civil Code is not applicable.

This brings us to the question whether the transaction evidenced by Exhibit A should be pronounced fraudulent in
fact. Upon turning to the evidence for the purpose of determining this question, the following circumstances are
revealed, namely; (1) the grantee is the son-in-law of the grantor; (2) at the time conveyance is made an action is
pending against the grantor to recover several thousand pesos of money; and of the pendency of this action the
grantee has full knowledge; (3) the debtor has no other satisfied (4) the consideration for the transfer is less than
half of the value of the property in question. These circumstances are familiar badges of fraud, and their combined
Evidence II.
effect is such, we think, as to raise a presumption of fraud, even apart from the legal presumption expressed in
article 1297, and to impose upon the vendee the burden of proving the bona fides of the transaction by a
preponderance of evidence and to the satisfaction of the court. 1awph!l.net

We are of the opinion that the proof adduced not only fails to remove the imputation of fraud thus cast upon the
transaction but strongly tends to engender the suspicion that the transaction was wholly fictitious. It is true that both
the plaintiff himself and Simon Batuigas, one of the subscribing witnesses, declared in the clearest terms that the
transaction took place on July 3, 1912, as claimed; that two thousand pesos of the money charged hands in the act;
and that the balance of the consideration consisted in the satisfaction and released of the debt for five hundred
pesos owing from Juan Llenos to Eladio Alpuerto. It should not escape notice that neither Juan Llenos nor the other
attesting witness, Geronimo Godinez, were examined as to the circumstances attending the transaction; and no
explanation is given as to why these witnesses were not produced.

Where the law imposes the burden of proof upon the party to established the bona fides of such a transaction as
this, against the presumption of the fraud, it is his duty, if the experts to be believed, to lay before the court, so far as
is within his power, a complete and true revelation of all circumstances surrounding the affair; and where he
supresses evidence or negligently falls to call a witness supposed to know the facts, it may be presumed that the
testimony of the witness, if adduced, would be unfavorable.

The plaintiff did not try to show where or how he acquired the two thousand pesos of ready money with which the
purchased was made, and it does not appear that his resource are sufficient to enable him readily to command that
sum. The proof of the existence of the debt of five hundred pesos which Juan Llenos is supposed to have owed to
the plaintiff and which constituted the balance of the purchase price over and above the amount which was paid in
cash rests almost exclusively in the statement of the plaintiff himself. Upon these important points the testimony of
Juan Llenos, if adduced, might possibly have shed something about what become of the money. the effect of these
observations cannot be evaded by saying that the defendant might himself have summoned Juan Llenos and
examined him in court. The burden of the proof was on the plaintiff; and the defendant could not be expected to call
of the principles in the transaction which was impeached.

It is the course somewhat perplexing to a court to weight the uncontradicted testimony of a witness against mere
presumption of fraud stands as a witness, thought mute, pointing the finger of denunciation at the questioned
transaction, and the imputation thus cast upon it can only be removed by a full and honest revelation sufficient to
convince the court that the fraudulent intent did not exist.

It is not to be denied that the secretary of a transaction like that now under consideration, arising from the fact that
the conveyance was affected by a private document, is a circumstance tending to cast suspicion upon it. strong
consideration of public policy require that in such case the parties should held to strict proof of good faith; and this
court cannot give it approval to a doctrine which would permit the property of a failing and impleaded debtor to be
put beyond the reach of this creditors by a trick such as we believe was attempted in this case. When a legal
proceeding is ended and the sheriff goes to take property of the debtor in execution, he is not infrequently met with
the statutory that the property now belongs to some other persons; and a document is produced to prove it which
nobody, except the immediate parties, ever heard of before. The courts must be executed if they refused to listen
with childish credulity to mentions of this character.

We do not overlook the circumstances that the supposed sale in this case was effected by a contract with pacto de
retro; and where such a sale is made, as frequently occurs, to secure money intended as a mere loan, the
consideration is naturally less than the true value of the property. In such case, if the bona fides of the original
contract is not under suspicion, the fact that the consideration for the sale is less than the value of the property is not
indicative of fraud. But where the original sale is presumptively tained with fraud. But where the original sale is
presumptively tained with fraud, the entire transaction from the time of the making of the contract until the
consolidation of the title in the purchaser should be considered as a whole, and absolutely transferred at once.
otherwise the contract of sale with pacto de retro could be as an instrument to shield parties in their efforts to
defraud creditors. this cannot be permitted.

In the connection reliance is placed by the appellee upon the case of Chiong Veloso vs. Ro and Levering (37 Phil.
Rep., 63); and it is urged that this decision affords support for the view that the transaction in question, having been
accomplished by means of contract of sale with facto de retro, cannot be considered fraudulent. It must be
Evidence II.
remember, however, that the original sale to contract of pacto de retro was made in the case last cited to a
purchaser for value and in good faith; and the question was not so much whether the original transaction was
fraudulent as whether the failure of the debtor to redeem was fraudulent as whether, it being the theory of the
defendant that the plaintiff had colluded with the debtor (who as a sister) and had redeemed the property with her
money or for her benefit. Moreover, it was found in that case that at the time of the original conveyance the debtor
had other property more than sufficient to satisfy any judgment that might be recovered in the pending action.

The conclusion to which we come is that the questioned transaction, if actually any simulated, was made in fraud of
creditors and must be annulled. The judgment entered in this cause in the court below must accordingly be
reversed; and judgment will be here entered dismissing the complaint of Eladio Alpuerto and requiring in the
complaint to Eustaquio Lopez, as administrator to be a declared that the documents (Exhibit A), purporting to be a
contract of sale conveying the property in question from Juan Llenos to Eladio Alpuerto, acknowledged before a
notary public upon December 3, 1914, was executed in fraud of creditors and the same is hereby annulled. No
special adjudication as to costs will be made. So ordered.

Evidence II.
13-14.)

Evidence II.
 15.) G.R. No. 175085, June 01, 2016

TAN SIOK1 KUAN AND PUTE CHING, Petitioners, v. FELICISIMO "BOY" HO, RODOLFO C.

RETURTA,2 VICENTE M. SALAS, AND LOLITA MALONZO, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assailing the Decision4 dated June 29, 2006
and the Resolution5 dated October 17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 92107,
which rulings reversed the Consolidated Decision 6 dated May 6, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Civil Case Nos. Q-04-53505 to Q-04-53511 and the Joint Decision 7 dated July 8, 2004 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Civil Case Nos. 30272 to 30278 and, in effect, dismissed for lack
of merit the complaints for unlawful detainer filed by herein petitioners.

Antecedent Facts

The case at bar stems from seven (7) separate complaints for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners
Tan Siu Kuan and Pute Ching against defendants Avelino Bombita (Bombita), Felix Gagarin (Gagarin),
Bernardo Napolitano (Napolitano), Felicisimo "Boy" Ho (Ho), Rodolfo Returta (Returta), Vicente Salas
(Salas), and Lolita Malonzo (Malonzo).

In their Complaints,8 petitioners averred that they are the owners of a parcel of land, along with the
improvements therein, located at Apollo Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 279014 and 279015; that they have been leasing portions
of said property to the defendants since 1972; and that on February 7, 2003 they notified defendants
in writing of their failure to pay rentals, as follows:

- defendant AVELINO BOMBITA that his rentals from March 1997 to the present have not been paid in
the total sum of Php17,500.00 as of December, 2002;
- defendant FELIX GAGARIN that his rentals from September 1997 to the present have not been paid in
the total sum of Php16,000.00 as of December, 2002;
- defendant FELICISIMO "BOY" HO that his rentals from December 1996 to the present have not been
paid in the total sum of Php28,700.00 as of December, 2002;
- defendant LOLITA MALONZO that her rentals from January, 1997 to the present have not been paid in
the total sum of Php21,600.00 as of December, 2002;
- defendant BERNARDO NAPOLITANO that his rentals from September, 1997 to the present have not
been paid in the total sum of Php16,000.00 as of December, 2002;
- defendant RODOLFO RETURTA that his rentals from July, 1996 to the present have [not] been [paid in]
the total sum of Php23,700.00 as of December, 2002; and
- defendant VICENTE SALAS [that] his rentals from August, 1997 to the [present have] not been paid in
the total sum of Php22,750.00 as of December, 2002.9

Defendants were given ten (10) days to pay the rentals due or else to vacate the premises and turn
over the possession thereof to petitioners, but defendants allegedly ignored petitioners' demand,
warranting the filing of the complaints for unlawful detainer. 10
Evidence II.
For their part, Bombita, Gagarin, and Napolitano (defendants) argued that the lease
agreements they have executed with petitioners are void ab initio, petitioners being Chinese
nationals who are not entitled to own real property in the Philippines. Moreover, they claimed to have
been in possession of the subject premises since 1968 or some 35 years ago, thus plaintiffs action
cannot be one for ejectment or unlawful detainer, but accion publiciana which must be filed before
the RTC.11

On the other hand, Ho, Returta, Salas, and Malonzo, herein respondents, maintained that they
have been in possession of the subject premises for 37 years without any rentals being paid to any
landlord or his agents, and that there are no existing lease contracts between respondents and
petitioners. In fact, in separate letters to petitioners, in response to the latter's demand letters,
respondents categorically denied renting the subject premises.12 Respondents also asserted that they
have started possessing said property in 1966 by building residential houses, and that they have
been in continuous possession since then. Additionally, respondents claimed that petitioners
presented only photocopies of the subject TCTs and that when they presented such to the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City for verification as to how such were transferred from the mother titles TCT
Nos. 12505 and 12506, said office informed them that there is no single transaction recorded in the
aforesaid mother titles.13 Lastly, respondents argued that even assuming that petitioners' titles are
authentic, their cause of action should have been accion publiciana  considering that respondents are
in possession and that no lease contract exists between the parties.

After trial, the MeTC-Branch 40, Quezon City ruled in favor of petitioners. As regards
defendants, the MeTC held that they impliedly admitted the existence of lease contracts
between them and petitioners and, as such, they cannot deny the consequent lessor-lessee
relationship following the rule that a tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord. As
regards respondents, on the other hand, the MeTC ruled that since petitioners were able to show that
the property in question was registered under their name, and since respondents merely denied the
existence of a lessor-lessee relationship between them and petitioners, petitioners' averments must
prevail following the tenet that in weighing contradictory declarations and statements, greater weight
must generally be given to positive testimony.

Thus, the MeTC disposed of the case in this manner: 14

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the herein plaintiffs TAN
S1U KUAN & PUTE CHING as against all the above named defendants over that certain property
located at Apollo Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City covered by TRANSFER CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE NOS. 270014 and 279015, both of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, as follows:

IN CIVIL CASE NO. 30272:

a. ordering the defendant AVELINO BOMBITA and any and all persons' claiming rights
under him [to] vacate the premises in question, and to peacefully surrender and turn
over the possession of the same unto plaintiffs;

b. ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiff the sum of Php250.00 per month starting
from February 7, 2003 until they have completely vacated the premises;

c. ordering said [defendant to] pay unto plaintiff the sum of Php 10,000.00 pesos as and
by way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.

IN CIVIL CASE NO. 30273:

Evidence II.
 a. ordering the defendant FELIX GAGARIN and any and all persons claiming rights under
him to vacate the premises in question, and to peacefully surrender and turn over the
possession of the same unto plaintiffs;

b. ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiff the sum of Php250.00 per month starting
from February 7, 2003 until they have completely vacated the premises;

c. ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiff the sum of Php10,000.00 pesos as and by
way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.

IN CIVIL CASE NO. 30274:

a. ordering the defendant FELIC1SIMO "[BOY]" HO and any and all persons [claiming]
rights under him to vacate the premises in question, and to peacefully surrender and
turn over the possession of the same unto plaintiffs;

b. ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiff the sum of Php350.00 per month starting
from February 7, 2003 until they have completely vacated the premises;

c. ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiff the sum of Phpl0,000.00 pesos as and by
way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.

IN CIVIL CASE NO. 30275:

a. ordering the defendant LOLITA MALONZO and any and all persons claiming rights under
her to vacate the premises in question, and to peacefully surrender and turn over the
possession of the same unto plaintiffs;

b. ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of Php300.00 per month starting
from February 7, 2003 until they have completely vacated the premises;

c. ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of Php 10,000.00 pesos as and
by way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.

IN CIVIL CASE NO. 30276:

a. ordering the defendant BERNARDO NAPOLITANO and any [and all] persons claiming
rights under him to vacate the premises in question, and to peacefully surrender and
turn over the possession of the same unto plaintiffs;

b. ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of Php250.00 per month starting
from February 7, 2003 until they have completely vacated the premises;

c. ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of Phpl0,000.00 pesos as and by
way of attorney's fee[s], plus costs of suit.

IN CIVIL CASE NO, 30277:

a. ordering the defendant RODOLFO RETURTA and any and all persons claiming rights
under him to vacate the premises in question, and to peacefully surrender and turn
over the possession of the same unto plaintiffs;
Evidence II.
 b. ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of Php300.00 per month starting
from February 7, 2003 until they have completely vacated the premises;

c. ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of Phpl0,000.00 pesos as and by
way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.

-and-

IN CIVIL CASE NO. 30278:

a. ordering the defendant VICENTE SALAS and any and all persons claiming rights under
him to vacate the premises in question, and to peacefully surrender and turn over the
possession of the same unto plaintiffs;

b. ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of Php350.00 per month starting
from February 7, 2003 until they have completely vacated the premises; and

c. ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of Phpl 0,000.00 pesos as and by
way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Upon appeal, the RTC-Branch 87, Quezon City affirmed the MeTC. According to the RTC, the
"defendant's common defense is that the complaint states no cause of action against them on the
grounds that plaintiffs are [C]hinese nationals, hence, not entitled to own real properties in the
Philippines; occupancy since 1968, hence, the action should have been accion publiciana; and
absence of lessor/lessee relationship." 15 Said court then went on to address these issues, as follows:
"Relative to the first three assigned errors, the Court finds that the matters have been thoroughly
and judiciously passed upon by the court a quo in arriving at the subject decision, hence, this Court
finds no compelling reason to disturb the same." 16

Thus, the RTC ruled:17

In sum, the Court finds no reversible error in the decision of the court a quo  and hereby affirms the
same en toto.

Costs against the defendant. SO ORDERED.

On motion, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution dated January 16, 2006. 18 On February 24, 2006, the
subject premises were turned over to petitioners.19

In the meantime, on November 18, 2005, respondents timely filed their appeal before the CA,
questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC over the consolidated cases, the finding of a
lessor-lessee relationship between petitioners and respondents in. violation of the
principle of res inter alios acta, and the non-dismissal of the case despite the failure of petitioners
and their counsel to attend the pre-trial conference. 20

Petitioners, on the other hand, averred that the assailed decision has already become final and
executory for failure to file the Joint Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision within the
prescribed period and, in fact, a writ of execution has already been issued. Alternatively, they argued
that since respondents refused to pay their rentals from 1997 to present, and since non-payment of
rent is a valid ground for ejectment, then the lower courts were correct in ruling in their favor. 21

Evidence II.
After evaluating the merits of the case, the CA reversed the RTC. Although the CA upheld the
jurisdiction of the MeTC, saying that the allegations in the complaints make a case for unlawful
detainer and that the complaints were filed within one year from respondents' receipt of the demand
letters, it nevertheless agreed with respondents that petitioners have materially failed to prove their
right to eject respondents on the strength of being lessors. Moreover, the CA sustained respondents'
invocation of the principle of res inter alios acta.

Thus, the CA held:22

WHEREFORE, the Consolidated Decision dated May 6, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 87,
Quezon City is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its stead, a new one is entered dismissing
the actions for unlawful detainer for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.23 (Citation omitted.)

The Present Petition

Petitioners filed the present petition for review on  certiorari, raising the following issues:

I. THE CONSOLIDATED DECISION DATED 6 MAY 2005 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 87 IN CIVIL CASE NOS. 04-53507, 53508, 04-53510 and
04-53511, WHICH AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE EARLIER JOINT DECISION DATED 8 JULY
2004 OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE NOS. 30272
TO 30278 HAD BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY FOR FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO
FILE THEIR JOINT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY
PERIOD OF FIFTEEN (15) DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THE DECISION. 24

II. THE TENANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS WAS

PROPERLY ESTABLISHED.25

The Ruling of the Court

Petitioners' arguments do not persuade.

Anent the first issue of whether the Joint Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision was timely
filed, a close review of the records yields the finding that it was.

Indeed, as capitalized on by petitioners, respondents stated in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration
that they received the Decision dated May 6, 2005 on May 15, 2005, and that they filed the Joint
Motion for Reconsideration only on June 29, 2005.26 However, as explained by respondents, the
statement that they received the RTC Decision on May 15, 2005 was inadvertent and
erroneous.27 The records, particularly the certified true copies of the registry return slips from the
RTC,28 show that the RTC Decision was simultaneously mailed by the RTC to the parties only on June
7, 2005. Thus, as correctly maintained by respondents, they could not have received the RTC
Decision on May 15, 2005 or before the said decision was mailed to them.  Respondents then
clarified that they received the RTC Decision on June 15, 2005. 29 As such, the filing of the Joint
Motion for Reconsideration on June 29, 2005 was timely and the RTC Decision was not yet final and
executory.

As to the second issue of whether a lessor-lessee relationship between the parties was properly
established, the evidence on record generates a negative conclusion.

Evidence II.
Except for petitioners' bare claims, they have not shown any evidence of a lease between them and
respondents, be it express or implied. As keenly observed by the CA, there was no mention of how
and when the alleged contract of lease started, there was no proof of prior payment of rentals or any
prior demand for such payment considering petitioners' allegation that respondents failed to pay
rentals since 1997 and that the case was instituted only in 2003.

Moreover, there is merit in respondents' invocation of the principle of res inter alios acta or that
principle which states that "the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided, among which are: (1) admission by
third party, (2) admission by co-partner or agent, (3) admission by conspirator, and (4)
admission by privies."30

In the case of Tamargo v. Awingan,31 the Court expounded on the rationale behind the principle of
res inter alios acta. Citing People v. vda. De Ramos, the Court held that:

(O)n a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself,
and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought
their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

In the present case, petitioners failed to establish that the defendants' 32 alleged implied
admission of a lessor-lessee relationship falls under the exceptions to the principle of res
inter alios acta as to make such admission binding upon respondents. Although defendants
and respondents were all defendants in the complaints for unlawful detainer filed by
petitioners, it is very clear that defendants and respondents espoused different defenses.
Contrary to defendants' position, respondents, as early as the filing of their response to
petitioners' demand letter, firmly and consistently denied the existence of any lease
contract between them and petitioners over the subject land. chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed rulings, the Court resolves to DENY the
present petition. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 29, 2006 and the Resolution dated October 17,
2006 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the complaints for unlawful detainer filed by
petitioners Tan Siu Kuan and Pute Ching against respondents Felicisimo "Boy" Ho, Rodolfo Returta,
Vicente Salas, and Lolita Malonzo are DISMISSED.

Evidence II.
16.)

Evidence II.
17.) G.R. No. 180197               June 23, 2009

FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, Petitioner,
vs.
VIRGILIO P. BALAGUER and INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION CHANNEL-
13, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed is the August 10, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81657 which reversed the
October 29, 2003 Decision and February 2, 2004 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89
finding petitioner Francisco N. Villanueva entitled to damages. Also assailed is the October 16, 2007
Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration.

On March 31, 1992, petitioner Francisco N. Villanueva, then Assistant Manager for Operations of Intercontinental
Broadcasting Corporation-Channel 13 (IBC-13) was dismissed from employment on the ground of loss of
confidence for purportedly selling forged certificates of performance. Contesting his termination, petitioner filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission.

During the pendency of the labor case, news articles about irregularities in IBC-13 were published in the July 18,
1992 issue of the Manila Times and the Philippine Star, and in the July 19, 1992 issue of the Manila Bulletin.

In these news articles, respondent Virgilio P. Balaguer, then President of IBC-13, was quoted to have said that he
uncovered various anomalies in IBC-13 during his tenure which led to the dismissal of an operations executive for
selling forged certificates of performance.

In the Manila Times, on July 18, 1992:3

Anomalies at IBC-13 uncovered

INSIDER pilferage, malversation, overpricing and other irregularities have cost government-owned Intercontinental
Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) 13 more than P108 million in losses for the period 1986-1989.

Gil P. Balaguer, IBC president, uncovered the anomalies after a long and painstaking investigation when he took
over the company in 1990.

The investigation uncovered irregularities ranging from selling forged certificates of performance (CP’s) to non-
remittance of sales collections, illegal and unauthorized airing of movie trailer advertisements (MTA’s), illegal leasing
of electricity and machines to "friendly clients," millions worth of undocumented transactions to movie suppliers,
exorbitant fees against in-house productions, abused overtime charges by certain employees.

The anomalies did not escape Balaguer when he came to IBC-13 backed by hands-on experience in television
management work.

IBC has had four presidents since 1986 after the EDSA revolution. Balaguer is the fifth president.

A special investigative committee helped Balaguer uncover the anomalies in IBC. It led to the dismissal of an
operations executive who sold forged certificates of performance, a former supervisor who pocketed IBC’s sales
collections, and station managers who did not remit payments on radio advertisements.

Other anomalies committed against the government station include the loose issuance of technical facilities orders
(TFO’s) which practically leased the network’s broadcast facilities to a "friendly client" for free.

Evidence II.
Balaguer, sources said, succeeded in staying as president because of his technical expertise in media and
communications and his "managerial will" to cleanse the ranks of the firm. (Emphasis supplied)

In the Philippine Star, on July 18, 1992:4

IBC president uncovers anomalies at tv network

The government-owned International Broadcasting Corp.-Channel 13 lost more than P108 million due to insider
pilferage, malversation, overpricing and other irregularities from 1986 to 1989.

IBC president Gil P. Balaguer uncovered the anomalies after "a long and painstaking investigation" when he took
over the television station in 1990.

Balaguer, in a statement, said the irregularities uncovered included the sale of forged certificates of performance,
non-remittance of sales collections, illegal and unauthorized airing of movie advertisements, illegal lease of
equipment to "friendly" clients, exorbitant fees on in-house productions and abused overtime charges by some
employees.

Balaguer, the fifth IBC president since 1986, easily detected the anomalies as he has a vast experience in television
management work.

A special investigative committee helped Balaguer uncover the anomalies at IBC, which has resulted in the
dismissal of an operations executive who sold forged certificates of performance, a former supervisor who pocketed
sales collections and a station manager who did not remit payments on radio advertisements. (Emphasis supplied)

In the Manila Bulletin, on July 19, 1992:5

Sequestered firm’s losses bared

The Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp. (IBC) 13, a sequestered firm, lost more than P108 million for the period
1986-1989 due to pilferage, malversation, over-pricing, and other irregularities perpetrated by a syndicate,
according to Gil P. Balaguer, IBC president, who took over the company in 1990.

He said the irregularities ranged from selling forged certificates of performance to non-remittance of sales
collections, illegal and unauthorized airing of movie trailer advertisements, illegal leasing of electricity and machines
to "friendly clients," millions worth of undocumented transactions to movie suppliers, exorbitant fees against in-
house productions, and abused overtime charges by certain employees.

IBC has had four presidents since 1986, Balaguer being the fifth.

A special probe committee that helped Balaguer said one dismissed executive sold forged certificates of
performance, a former supervisor pocketed IBC sales collections, and some station managers did not remit
payments on radio advertisements.

The loose issuance of technical facilities orders practically leased the network’s broadcast facilities to a "friendly
client" for free.

Balaguer is credited with accelerating the network’s rank from number five in 1988 to number two or three under
current ratings, despite the efforts of some holdouts who tried to derail his administration. (Emphasis supplied)

In a letter dated July 20, 1992, petitioner urged respondents to confirm or deny if he was the person alluded
to in the news article as the operations executive of IBC-13 who was dismissed for selling forged
certificates of performance.6 None of the respondents replied to the letter.

Evidence II.
On September 25, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages
against Balaguer,7 which was later amended by impleading IBC-13 as additional defendant.8

Petitioner claimed that respondents caused the publication of the subject news articles which defamed him by
falsely and maliciously referring to him as the IBC-13 operations executive who sold forged certificates of
performance.9 He alleged that in causing these false and malicious publications, respondents violated Articles 19,
20, 21, and 26 of the Civil Code.10

Balaguer denied that he had anything to do with the publications.11 However, he argued that the publications are not
actionable because they are true and without malice;12 are of legitimate public concern and interest because IBC-13
is under sequestration; that petitioner is a newsworthy and public figure;13 and that they are privileged
communication.14 Balaguer filed a counterclaim against petitioner for alleged malicious filing of the civil case.15

IBC-13 also denied participation in the publications. It claimed that assuming press statements were issued during a
press conference, the same was done solely by Balaguer without its authority or sanction.16 IBC-13 also filed a
counterclaim against petitioner17 and a cross-claim against Balaguer.18

On August 31, 1993, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision19 finding petitioner’s dismissal as illegal, which was
affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission. The Commission, however, declared respondents to be
acting in good faith, hence, it deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages. On December 6, 1994, the
parties entered into a Compromise Agreement,20 with IBC-13 proposing a scheme of payment for petitioner’s
monetary claims, and with IBC-13 and petitioner waiving any and all claims against each other arising out of the
labor case.

On October 29, 2003, the Regional Trial Court21 of Quezon City held that petitioner is entitled to an award of
damages,22 thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff Francisco N. Villanueva and against
defendants Balaguer and Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13).

Accordingly, defendants are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally, as follows:

1) the sum of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos by way of moral damages;

2) the sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as and by way of exemplary damages;

3) the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos by way of nominal damages;

4) the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos by way of temperate or moderate damages; and

5) the sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as and by way of attorney’s fees.

With costs against defendants.

SO ORDERED.23

Respondents moved for reconsideration but it was denied.24 Hence, they appealed to the Court of Appeals which
rendered the herein assailed Decision on August 10, 2007, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The October 29, 2003 Decision and the
February 2, 2004 Resolution with Clarification issued by the Regional Trial Court, Br. 89, National Capital Judicial
Region, Quezon City, are hereby REVERSED. The Complaint, the Counterclaim, and the Cross-claim in Civil Case
No. Q-92-13680 are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.25

Evidence II.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:26

a) Does the failure of the addressee to respond to a letter containing statements attributing to him
commission of acts constituting actionable wrong, hence, adverse to his interest, and of such nature
as would call for his reaction, reply, or comment if untrue, constitute his admission of said
statements, consequently, may be used in evidence against him?

b) Is the admission by a principal admissible against its agent? Is the admission by a person jointly
interested with a party admissible against the latter?

c) Does the failure of an individual to disown the attribution to him by newspaper publications, as the source
of defamatory newspaper reports, when he is free and very able to do so, constitute admission that he,
indeed, was the source of the said defamatory news reports?

The petition lacks merit.

As early as 1905, this Court has declared that it is the duty of the party seeking to enforce a right to prove that their
right actually exists. In varying language, our Rules of Court, in speaking of burden of proof in civil cases, states that
each party must prove his own affirmative allegations and that the burden of proof lies on the party who would be
defeated if no evidence were given on either side.27 Thus, in civil cases, the burden of proof is generally on the
plaintiff, with respect to his complaint.28

In proving his claim, petitioner relied on the July 20, 1992 letter, the newspaper articles, and the alleged admission
of respondents. Based on the above pieces of evidence, the Court finds that petitioner was unable to discharge his
burden of proof. As such, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the complaint for damages.

The July 20, 1992 letter sent by petitioner to respondents reads as follows:29

20 July 1992

Mr. Virgilio Balaguer

Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation
Broadcast City, Capitol Hills
Diliman, Quezon City

Dear Mr. Balaguer:

We write on behalf of our client, Mr. Francisco N. Villanueva.

You have caused to be published in the 18 July 1992 issue of The Philippine Star and 19 July 1992 issue of Manila
Bulletin, a news item wherein you stated that you dismissed an Operations Executive because he "sold forged
Certificate of Performance". Our immediate impression is, you are referring to our client, Francisco N. Villanueva,
because he is the only Operations Executive in IBC, Channel 13 you have illegally and despotically dismissed.

We urge you, therefore, to inform us, within forty-eight (48) hours from your receipt of this letter that the Operations
Executive you referred to in your press statement is not our client, Francisco N. Villanueva. We shall construe your
failure/refusal to reply as your unequivocal admission that you are, in fact, actually referring to our client, Mr.
Francisco N. Villanueva, as the operations executive who "sold forged Certificate of Performance". Accordingly, we
shall immediately proceed to take appropriate criminal and civil court actions against you without further notice.

Very truly yours,

(signed)
REX G. RICO

Evidence II.
cc: Mr. Francisco N. Villanueva
Board of Administrators, IBC-13

Petitioner argues that by not responding to the above letter which expressly urged them to reply if the
statements therein contained are untrue, respondents in effect admitted the matters stated therein,
pursuant to the rule on admission by silence in Sec. 32, Rule 130, 30 and the disputable presumption that
acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact. 31

Petitioner’s argument lacks merit. One cannot prove his claim by placing the burden of proof on the other
party. Indeed, "(a) man cannot make evidence for himself by writing a letter containing the statements that
he wishes to prove. He does not make the letter evidence by sending it to the party against whom he wishes
to prove the facts [stated therein]. He no more can impose a duty to answer a charge than he can impose a
duty to pay by sending goods. Therefore a failure to answer such adverse assertions in the absence of
further circumstances making an answer requisite or natural has no effect as an admission."32

Moreover, the rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing if the party was carrying
on a mutual correspondence with the declarant. However, if there was no such mutual correspondence, the
rule is relaxed on the theory that while the party would have immediately reacted by a denial if the
statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt response can generally not be expected if the
party still has to resort to a written reply.33

In the same manner, we also cannot assume an admission by silence on the part of Balaguer by virtue of his failure
to protest or disclaim the attribution to him by the newspapers that he is the source of the articles. As explained
above, the rule on admission by silence is relaxed when the statement is not made orally in one’s presence or when
one still has to resort to a written reply, or when there is no mutual correspondence between the parties.

As for the publications themselves, newspaper articles purporting to state what the defendant said are inadmissible
against him, since he cannot be held responsible for the writings of third persons.34 As correctly observed by the
Court of Appeals, "while the subject news items indicated that Balaguer was the source of the columnists, proving
that he truly made such statements is another matter."35 Petitioner failed to prove that Balaguer did make such
statements.

Notably, petitioner did not implead the editorial staff and the publisher of the alleged defamatory articles.36 Contrary
to petitioner’s assertion, he should have at least presented the authors of the news articles as witnesses to prove his
case against respondents in the absence of an express admission by the latter that the subject news articles have
been caused by them.

Petitioner also claims that respondents have admitted that they held a press conference and caused the publication
of the news articles, based on the following testimony of Balaguer:37

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

Okay, Let me ask another question. Now Mr. Balaguer this publication referred to so called anomalies of
1986 to 1989 now how about the termination.

A: 1991.

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

Yes.

WITNESS:

I think the termination of Mr. Villanueva has nothing to do with that press statement release because the
period that covers that report is from specific date 1986 to 1989. (TSN, 07 November 2000, p. 19)

Evidence II.
Admissions, however, should be clear and unambiguous38 which can hardly be said of Balaguer’s above testimony.
If Balaguer intended to admit the allegation that he conducted a press conference and caused the publication of the
news articles, he could have done so. Instead, Balaguer specifically denied these allegations in paragraphs 4 and 5
of his Answer.39

Petitioner next argues that IBC-13’s Cross-Claim against Balaguer, in that:40

11. The acts complained of by the plaintiff were done solely by co-defendant Balaguer.

Balaguer resorted to these things in his attempt to stave off his impending removal from IBC.

is an admission by IBC-13, which is admissible against Balaguer pursuant to Sec. 29, Rule 13041 as an admission by
a co-partner or an agent.

Petitioner is mistaken. IBC-13’s cross-claim against Balaguer effectively created an adverse interest between them.
Hence, the admission of one defendant is not admissible against his co-defendant. Besides, as already discussed,
the alleged acts imputed to Balaguer were never proven to have been committed, much less maliciously, by
Balaguer. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity. Such must be substantiated by evidence.42

In sum, we find that petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proof. No satisfactory evidence was presented to
prove by preponderance of evidence that respondents committed the acts imputed against them. As such, there is
no more need to discuss whether the assailed statements are defamatory. 1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 10, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
81657 reversing the October 29, 2003 Decision and February 2, 2004 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 89, finding petitioner entitled to damages, as well as the October 16, 2007 Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

Evidence II.
 X.) G.R. No. 220977, June 19, 2017

PO1 CELSO TABOBO III Y EBID, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to nullify and
set aside the Decision2 dated January 23, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated October 12, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35948, affirming the Decision 4 dated May 15, 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, convicting Police Officer 1 Celso Tabobo III y Ebid
(petitioner) of the crime of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 06-248576.

Facts

On January 19, 2005, at around 7:00 a.m., Manuel Zachary Escudero y Araneta (Escudero) was
walking along P. Ocampo Street, Manila when two men riding on a motorcycle in tandem suddenly
approached him and grabbed his cellphone. The back rider then fired a shot at Escudero, resulting to
his death. The incident was reported to Police Station 9 (PS-9) of the Manila Police District. Station
Commander Police Superintendent Marcelino DL Pedrozo, Jr. (P/Supt. Pedrozo) dispatched a team of
police officers to the crime scene. After conducting a manhunt operation, the team arrested two
suspects who fit the description given by witnesses, namely, Victor Ramon Martin y Ong (Martin) and
Leopoldo Villanueva. They were directly brought to PS-9 for investigation and both were detained at
the detention cell of the PS-9 located at the rooftop. 5

On January 20, 2005, at around 4:00 a.m., Police Officer 2 Jesus De Leon (PO2 De Leon) was
interviewing Martin at the second floor of PS-9 when the latter requested to remove his handcuffs to
answer the call of nature. When PO2 De Leon removed the handcuffs, Martin suddenly grabbed his
service firearm. A scuffle ensued and the gun went off. The petitioner, who was then at the ground
floor, heard the gunshot and proceeded to the second floor. After seeing P02 De Leon almost
subdued by Martin, the petitioner fired his gun twice and hit Martin on the chest. Martin was rushed
to the Ospital ng Maynila but he was declared dead upon arrival.6

Consequently, the petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide for Martin's death before the
RTC of Manila.7

The prosecution presented Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot (Dr. Baluyot), the physician who conducted
the autopsy on Martin's body.8 He testified that Martin bore two gunshot wounds on the
chest.9 Considering that the exit wounds were higher than the entrance wounds, it was possible that
Martin was shot by someone who was positioned lower than him. 10 Dr. Baluyot also testified that
Martin had various injuries that could have been caused by forceful contact with hard, blunt objects. 11

On the other hand, the defense presented P/Supt. Pedrozo who testified that when he was informed
of a robbery incident, he dispatched a team of police officers to investigate. On the same day, he
learned that the suspects were arrested. However, he had no personal knowledge of the incident
surrounding Martin's death.12

PO2 De Leon initially took the witness stand for his direct examination. However, he was not able to
complete his testimony prompting the RTC to order his direct testimony to be stricken off the
records. Accordingly, the case was considered submitted for decision. 13

Ruling of the RTC

Evidence II.
On May 15, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision14 convicting the petitioner of the crime charged. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the [petitioner] guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion temporal, imposed in its medium period.

However, for lack of basis, no civil liability is adjudged.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.15

In so ruling, the RTC held that the petitioner failed to prove that all the elements of justifying
circumstance of defense of a stranger are present in this case. 16

On July 1, 2013, the petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion to allow accused to avail of the remedy of
appeal by accepting his justification and further allow him temporary liberty under his original bond.
He later filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial. The petitioner alleged
that his counsel's gross mistake and negligence deprived him of his right to due process. 17

The RTC issued an Order allowing the petitioner to post cash bail in the amount of P150,000.00.
However, the RTC deferred the resolution of the motion for new trial and informed the petitioner that
should he choose to avail of the remedy of appeal, the entire records would be forwarded to the CA.
Hence, the petitioner appealed to the CA.18

Ruling of the CA

The CA in its Decision19 dated January 23, 2015, affirmed the decision of the RTC, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated May 15, 2013 rendered by the RTC of
Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal Case No. 06-248576, is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
the [petitioner] is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,  as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim, [Martin],
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.20 (Citation omitted)

The CA reasoned that the prosecution need not prove the elements of homicide considering that the
burden of proof in this case has shifted to the petitioner for interposing the justifying circumstance of
defense of a stranger.21 However, it concurred with the findings of the RTC that the defense failed to
prove the existence of all the elements of defense of a stranger.22

The petitioner moved for reconsideration23 of the CA decision, but the motion was denied in a
Resolution24 dated October 12, 2015. Hence, the present petition.

The petitioner argues that he was denied due process in court due to the gross negligence
and incompetence of his counsel before the trial court. Moreover, he asserts that the CA
should have considered the stipulations made by the parties respecting the Crime Report
that Senior Police Officer 2 Edmundo C. Cabal (SPO2 Cabal) executed to the effect that the
petitioner acted in defense of PO2 De Leon when he shot the victim, which consequently

Evidence II.
relieves him of his duty to prove the elements of the justifying circumstance of defense of
a stranger.25

Issue

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the petitioner's conviction for the crime of homicide.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

"Let it be underscored that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review and it is
the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment
whether they are assigned or unassigned."26 This rule is strictly observed, particularly where the
liberty of the accused is at stake, as in the extant case. Thus, while the Court generally firmly
adheres to the principle that factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to
great weight and respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the
evidence on record,27 the same is not ironclad and applicable at all times.

In convicting the petitioner, the RTC and the CA primarily relied on the testimony of the prosecution
witness, SPO2 Cabal's Crime Report, and the petitioner's declarations in his Sworn Statement,
Counter-Affidavit, and Joint Rejoinder. The CA held that the petitioner admitted shooting
Martin as stated in his Sworn Statement dated January 26, 2006, Counter-Affidavit dated
March 21, 2006 and Joint Rejoinder dated April 25, 2006. It further noted that in his
Appellant's Brief, the petitioner relied on the "defense of a stranger" as justification for his
act. Thus, the CA concluded that the petitioner admitted that he killed the victim. 28

However, the fact that the petitioner may have admitted shooting Martin in the said
documents does not necessarily establish his guilt for the crime charged. An admission of
fact is starkly different from, and is not tantamount to, a confession of guilt. In People of the
Philippines v. Buntag,29 the Court elucidated that:

In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a statement of

facts by the accused, direct or implied, which do not directly involve an acknowledgment
of his guilt or of his criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is bound, against
his interests, of the evidence or truths charged. It is an acknowledgment of some facts or
circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends
only to establish the ultimate facts of guilt. A confession, on the other hand, is an
acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of the crime charged. 30 (Citations omitted)

In this case, the Court notes that while the Sworn Statement, Counter-Affidavit, and Joint Rejoinder
may be considered as the petitioner's admission as to the fact of the killing, the same were never
identified by the petitioner in court since he never took the witness stand, and is thus, hearsay as
regards to him. As elucidated in Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos-Manotoc, et al., 31 affidavits are
considered as hearsay evidence unless the affiants themselves testify thereon:

Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are
acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay evidence. The
reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the affiant, but by another one who
uses his or her own language in writing the affiant's statements, parts of which may thus be either
omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being

Evidence II.
hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. 32 (Citation
omitted)

The RTC, therefore, should not have readily relied on the said documents to establish the petitioner's
admission of the killing, more so when the admission was not corroborated by evidence, except for
the Crime Report.

The Court observes that the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the killing during arraignment and
invoked the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger under Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code. One who invokes self-defense admits responsibility for the killing. Accordingly, the burden of
proof shifts to the accused who must then prove the justifying circumstance. He must show by clear
and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a
stranger. With clear and convincing evidence, all the following elements of self-defense must be
established: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
claiming self-defense.33

In People v. Patrolman Belbes,34 the Court ruled:

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that once an accused had admitted that he inflicted the fatal
injuries on the deceased, it was incumbent upon him, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the
justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. He cannot
rely on the weakness of the prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence, "for even if the
evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had
admitted the killing."35 (Citations omitted)

Thus, the petitioner must establish with clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified,
and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. However, the petitioner was deprived of such
opportunity to effectively present his evidence and to defend himself due to the gross and palpable
negligence and incompetence of his counsel. Such deprivation amounts to a denial of the petitioner's
due process, vitiating the integrity of the proceedings before the trial court.

Evidently, the trial was marked by gross negligence and incompetence of the petitioner's counsel due
to numerous delays and postponements. The Court notes that the petitioner's counsel failed to
attend the hearings set on September 21, 2011, October 17, 2011, November 16, 2011, November
5, 2012, November 26, 2012, and March 18, 2013 despite notice, all of which were crucial for the
defense. As a result, the RTC ordered the initial testimony of PO2 De Leon, the sole witness to the
shooting, to be stricken off the records and to consider the presentation of the defense's evidence
waived.36

Moreover, the petitioner's counsel failed to ask for reconsideration of the RTC order, knowing fully
well that PO2 De Leon's testimony of what transpired in the police station is crucial to the petitioner's
defense. Likewise, no formal offer of exhibit was filed for the defense. Thus, the petitioner's counsel
can hardly be considered to have defended the petitioner at all.

It is, however, an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel bind the client. A
departure from this rule would bring about never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their
own fault or negligence to support the client's case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by
the operation of law.37 The only exception would be where the lawyer's gross negligence would result
in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law. 38 The Court finds that the
exception applies in this case.

The petitioner is, without doubt, entitled to competent legal representation from his counsel.
In Sanico v. People,39 the Court held that:

Evidence II.
If the incompetence of counsel was so great and the error committed as a result was so serious that
the client was prejudiced by a denial of his day in court, the litigation ought to be reopened to give to
the client another chance to present his case. The legitimate interests of the petitioner, particularly
the right to have his conviction reviewed by the RTC as the superior tribunal, should not be sacrificed
in the altar of technicalities.40

Furthermore, in Reyes v.  CA,41 the Court held that in cases where the counsel is grossly negligent as
to deprive the accused of his constitutional right to be heard, the conviction should not be based
solely on the evidence of the prosecution, thus:

It was Atty. Tenorio's absences, then, rather than petitioner's, which appear to be the cause for the
defense's failure to present its evidence. Atty. Tenorio's negligence did not consist in error of
procedure or even a lapse in strategy but something as basic as failing to appear in court despite
clear warning that such failure would amount to waiver of her client's right to present evidence in her
defense.

Keeping in mind that this case involves personal liberty, the negligence of counsel was certainly so
gross that it should not be allowed to prejudice petitioner's constitutional right to be heard. The
judicial conscience certainly cannot rest easy on a conviction based solely on the evidence of the
prosecution just because the presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by technicality.
Rigid application of rules must yield to the duty of courts to render justice where justice is due – to
secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime with which he or
she might be charged.42 (Citation omitted)

In the Reyes  case, the Court resolved to remand the case to the RTC for further reception of the
accused's evidence. Hence, in accordance with the Court's pronouncement in Reyes,  and in view of
the irregularities prejudicial to the rights of the petitioner that attended the trial, the case calls for a
new trial pursuant to Section 243 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. The case should be remanded to
the trial court to enable the petitioner to effectively defend himself and present evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 23, 2015 and
Resolution dated October 12, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35948 and the Decision
dated May 15, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 06-248576
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila for a new trial for the purpose of allowing Police Officer 1 Celso Tabobo III y Ebid to present
evidence in his defense with directive to the court thereafter to decide the case with all deliberate
speed.

Evidence II.
 X.2) [G.R. No. 106671. March 30, 2000.]

HARRY TANZO, Petitioner, v. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Secretary of

Justice, MANUEL J. SALAZAR and MARIO J. SALAZAR, Respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
and set aside the April 10, 1992 Resolution of public respondent Secretary of Justice, as well as the
latter’s August 6, 1992 Resolution denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The assailed
Resolutions upheld the Quezon City Prosecutor’s dismissal of the criminal complaint for estafa filed by
petitioner Harry Tanzo against private respondents Manuel and Mario Salazar. chanrobles.com : chanrobles.com.ph

The facts are: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Private respondents are brothers who were engaged in the business of forwarding and transporting
"balikbayan" boxes from California, U.S.A to Metro Manila, Philippines. Manuel J. Salazar (hereinafter
"Manuel") managed the Philippine side via MANSAL Forwarders, a business registered in his name
with principal office at No. 48 Scout Tobias Street, Quezon City. On the other hand, Mario J. Salazar
(hereinafter "Mario") handled the U.S. side of the forwarding business as General Manager of M.J.S.
International, Inc., a corporation with principal office at No. 3400 Fletcher Drive, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.

According to the petitioner, sometime in February of 1989, while he was in Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A., Mario tried to convince him to invest some money in the said business. Mario had allegedly
represented that petitioner’s money will be held in trust and administered by both him and his
brother for the exclusive use of their forwarding and transporting business. Petitioner further alleged
that Mario promised him a return on his investment equivalent to ten per centum (10%) for one
month, at the end of which his money plus interest earned shall be returned to him.

When petitioner returned to the Philippines, it was Manuel’s turn to persuade him to part with his
money under the said investment scheme. Eventually convinced by the private respondents’
representations and assurances, petitioner agreed to invest the total amount of US $34,000.00 which
he entrusted to his aunt, Liwayway Dee Tanzo, who was residing in the U.S.A. Thus, petitioner issued
several personal checks made out to Liwayway Dee Tanzo, 1 or to "Calfed" 2 , or payable to cash 3 ,
to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

California Federal

Savings and Loan Asso. Date of Check Amount

Check Numbers

319 August 04, 1989 US$5,000.00

320 August 09, 1989 9,000.00

321 August 09, 1989 9,000.00

322 August 08, 1989 2,000.00

323 August 10, 1989 4,000.00

Evidence II.
324 August 14, 1989 5,000.00

Total US $34,000.00 4

Except for California Federal Check No. 322 which was encashed by Mario himself, private
respondents received the proceeds of the above checks through Liwayway Dee Tanzo on several
occasions in August 1989.

Meanwhile, Mario encountered serious liquidity problems 5 that prompted him to petition the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for a release from his debts on September 27, 1990. He was ordered "released
from all dischargeable debts" by the said court on January 25, 1991. 6

Upon the expirations of the thirty (30) day investment period, petitioner demanded from Mario in the
States and Manuel in Quezon City proper accounting of his financial investment and/or the return of
his capital plus interest earned. At the outset, private respondents avoided their obligation to
petitioner by making various excuses but after persistent demands by the latter, Manuel finally
admitted that their shipments had encountered some problems with the Bureau of Customs. Thus, on
January 29, 1990, Manuel executed a letter authorizing the petitioner to withdraw documents to
assist in the release of their shipments from the Bureau of Customs. However, when petitioner
attempted to secure the release of the "balikbayan" boxes from the Bureau of Customs, he
discovered that the same had actually contained smuggled goods and were accordingly seized and
forfeited in favor of the government. chanrobles.com.ph : red

When private respondents continued to ignore petitioner’s demand for the return of his money, the
latter filed, on June 31, 1991, a complaint-affidavit for estafa against private respondents before the
Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor (hereinafter "prosecutor"). In a resolution dated September 4.
1991 the prosecutor dismissed the said complaint on the ground that" [t]he Quezon City Prosecutor’s
Office has no territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged as it was committed not in Quezon City,
Philippines." 7 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was denied by the
prosecutor on the same ground .8

Petitioner then filed a petition for review of the dismissal of his complaint for estafa against private
respondents with then Secretary of Justice, Franklin M. Drilon. On April 10, 1992, Acting Secretary of
Justice, Eduardo G. Montenegro dismissed the said petition for review in a resolution which reads: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x          x           x

An evaluation of the records of the case disclosed that the incident complained of took place in the
United States, and under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, our courts have no jurisdiction over
offenses committed outside the territory of the Philippines. While the rule allows certain exceptions,
the facts do not show that the case falls within any of said exceptions. Hence, we are convinced, and
hereby hold, that there is no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s
Office in the questioned resolution.

ACCORDINGLY, your petition is dismissed for lack of merit. 9

Dissatisfied, petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above resolution However, the Secretary of
Justice denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, and stated in a resolution dated August 6,
1992 that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x          x           x

Evidence II.
After a careful analysis of the issues raised in your motion and a re-evaluation of the evidence on
record, we find no valid reason, to justify a reversal of our previous resolution.

Aside from your bare allegations that there was a trust agreement between you and the respondents,
and that deceit and misappropriation which are the important elements of estafa were committed by
them in the Philippines, you did not present any concrete or convincing evidence support the same.
On the contrary, your own evidence shows that you transacted with Mario Salazar through your aunt.
Liwayway Dee Tanzo. This bolsters the claim of Manuel Salazar that the sums of money received by
Mario from Liwayway in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., were simple loans as shown by the loan
contracts executed by them in the said place.

WHEREFORE, your motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. 10

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the criminal case for estafa against the private respondents on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as
the crime charged was actually committed in the United States. 11

At the outset, we must point out that the Secretary of Justice dismissed the criminal
charges against the respondents not only for lack of jurisdiction but also, and more
importantly because it found petitioner’s evidence insufficient to support his charge of
estafa against the private respondents. Thus, the immediate issue for the determination of this
Court is whether prima facie evidence exists that the private respondents had committed the crime of
estafa and should be held for trial. After all, a finding that petitioners complaint for estafa is not
supported by that quantum of evidence necessary to justify the filing of a criminal case in court shall
render irrelevant the question of territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged.

A judicious scrutiny of the evidence on record leads us to agree with the Secretary of
Justice that the transactions between private respondents, particularly, Mario and the
petitioner, were simple loans, and did not constitute a trust agreement, the violation of
which would hold the private respondents liable for estafa.

Petitioner failed to present evidence other than his bare assertion that he had invested money in
private respondents’ business on the basis of a trust agreement. The photocopies of the checks
allegedly subject of the trust agreement did more damage than good to petitioner’s proposition. None
of these checks were issued to either Mario or Manuel and were in fact payable to "Liwayway Dee
Tanzo", "Calfed" or "Cash." Moreover, only one of these checks was actually encashed by Mario, the
rest by Liwayway Dee Tanzo. On the basis of the foregoing alone, private respondents could have
completely denied the existence of their liability to petitioner as neither proof in writing nor witnesses
exist to substantiate petitioner’s claim of a trust agreement between himself and the private
respondents. On the contrary, Manuel does not deny that Mario had indeed received money
from the petitioner, albeit claiming that the latter’s liability thereunder is purely civil in
nature for being rooted in a simple loan contract. Manuel offered in evidence copies of the
contracts of loan entered into between M.J.S. International and Liwayway Dee Tanzo. 12
We agree with the petitioner that these loan contracts do not by themselves prove that his
agreement with the private respondents was also a loan. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioner, he is not a party to these contracts that clearly stipulate "Liwayway Dee Tanzo" as creditor
and "M.J.S. International represented by its General Manager, Mario J. Salazar" as debtor.

These loan contracts may, however, be given evidentiary value in support of Manuel’s
claim that the agreement with petitioner was no different from the loan contracts with
Liwayway Dee Tanzo. Under the rule of res inter alios acta, evidence that one did or did
not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the
same or similar thing at another time, but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
Evidence II.
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. 13

Elaborating thus. we have held that: chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

[C]ollateral facts may be received as evidence under exceptional circumstances, as when

there is a rational similarity or resemblance between the conditions giving rise to the fact
offered and the circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be proved. Evidence of
similar acts may frequently become relevant, especially in actions based on fraud and
deceit, because it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a person, it provides
insight into such person’s motive or intent, it uncovers a scheme, design or plan, or it
reveals a mistake. 14 (Emphasis supplied).

The series of transactions between M.J.S. International and Liwayway Dee Tanzo were entered into
under similar circumstances as those surrounding the contract between petitioner and Mario. Just like
the alleged trust agreement between petitioner and Mario, the loan contracts between M.J.S.
International and Liwayway Dee Tanzo provide that the creditor shall lend to the debtor a specific
amount for use by the latter in its business operations. 15 Petitioner also admits that he entrusted
the checks to Liwayway Dee Tanzo for investment in private respondents’ business. This shows that
private respondents were transacting directly with Liwayway Dee Tanzo in the usual manner that
they conduct business, that is the loan of money for stipulated interest. Hence, private respondents’
modus operandi, if there ever was one, in raising additional capital for M.J.S. International was to
borrow money from willing investors. It is thus unlikely, considering the scheme of things, that
private respondents would all of a sudden deviate from an established business practice to enter into
a trust agreement with the petitioner.

In view of the foregoing and the unfortunate fact that petitioner has failed to present controverting
evidence, this Court is constrained to adopt private respondents’ position that the agreement
between Mario and the petitioner was in the nature of a simple loan agreement.

Therefore, petitioner’s contention that private respondents have committed the crime of estafa.

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x          x           x

b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other

personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such
obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond, or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property; 16

necessarily fails. This Court has ruled that when the relation is purely that of debtor and creditor, the
debtor cannot be held liable for the crime of estafa, under the above quoted provision, by merely
refusing to pay or by denying the indebtedness. 17 The reason behind this rule is simple. In order
that a person can be convicted of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, it
must be proven that he has the obligation to deliver or return the same money, goods or personal
property that he has received. The obligation to deliver exactly the same money, that is, bills or
coins, is non-existent in a simple loan of money because in the latter, the borrower acquires
ownership of the money borrowed. 18 Being the owner, the borrower can dispose of the thing
borrowed and his act will not be considered misappropriation thereof. 19

In the alternative, petitioner accuses private respondents of committing the crime of estafa under
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code which provides as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Evidence II.
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud

(a) By using, a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.

Specifically; petitioner contends that he was deceived by private respondents to part with
his money on their representation that the same would be held in trust for investment in
their legitimate freight business only to find out later on that private respondents used his
money for the illicit activity of smuggling prohibited goods into the Philippines. 20

This contention cannot be sustained for lack of evidence. Petitioner claims that private
respondents used his money for smuggling. The fact, however, that several shipments
from M.J.S. International Freight Services to Mansal Forwarders were seized and forfeited
by the Bureau of Customs for containing smuggled items does not prove that petitioner’s
money was indeed used by private respondents in the said illegal activity. Petitioner
himself admits that he and his relatives were regular clients of private respondents since
1988. 21 It cannot, thus, be doubted that the private respondents were likewise engaged
in a legitimate forwarding business in which business petitioner’s money could have
actually been invested. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The letter issued by Manuel authorizing petitioner to withdraw documents covering the containers
that were later seized by the Bureau of Customs bears little weight in view of the fact that the same
was not even presented before the prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice. Further, as correctly
pointed out by the private respondents, it is a mere blank form that does not even indicate
petitioner’s name as authorized bearer. 22

As we have explained earlier, the true nature of the contract between petitioner and private
respondents was that of a simple loan. In such a contract, the debtor promises to pay to the creditor
an equal amount of money plus interest if stipulated. 23 It is true that private respondents failed to
fulfill their promise to petitioner to return his money plus interest at the end of one month. However,
mere non-compliance of a promise to perform a thing does not constitute deceit 24 because it is hard
to determine and infer a priori the criminal intent to the person promising. 25 In other words, deceit
should be proved and established by acts distinct from and independent of, the non-compliance of
the promise, 26 and this, petitioner failed to do.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Evidence II.