Ponencias of J. Caguioa in CRIMINAL LAW 2022

Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Criminal Law

By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDDIE OLAZO, MIGUEL CORDIS, CHARITO

FERNANDEZ AND ROGELIO LASCONIA
G.R. No. 220761, October 03, 2016, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. In proving conspiracy, direct evidence is not
indispensable as its existence may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during,
and after the commission of the crime.
FACTS
Accused Rogelio Lasconia together with several others hatched a plan to rob the
spouses Erlinda and Nicanor Vallecera inside their home in Barangay Bito, Abuyog, Leyte.
Dionesia Lasconia, who was then employed as a stay-out house help of the spouses Vallecera
would assist them by helping them get access inside the house undetected.
On the day of the commission of the crime, Dionesia tended to her usual chores. She,
however, left the back gate open to allow her co-accused to enter the compound as agreed.
At around seven in the evening, Dionesia heard sounds near the back portion of the house.
She then immediately opened the kitchen door and allowed accused to enter the house.
When Erlinda Vallecera opened the master's bedroom door, she was immediately
accosted by the three intruders. Accused Eddie Fernandez then pointed a gun at Erlinda
Vallecera and grabbed her. The three then covered her face, and then dragged her into the
master's bedroom where they then hogtied Nicanor Vallecera.
The three then forced Erlinda to open the vault where they then took away at least
one hundred thousand pesos in cash and several pieces of jewelry. Afterwards, they brought
Erlinda into one of the comfort rooms where Rommel Escobio slashed her throat with the
use of a samurai.
An Information was filed with the RTC against Eddie Olazo, Miguel Corbis and Charito,
together with Rogelio Lasconia, Joseph Oronos, Dionesia Lasconia, Rommel Escobio, and
Eddie Fernandez, charging them with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Rommel Escobio
pleaded guilty, while Eddie Fernandez remained at large. During trial, Joseph was discharged
as state witness. On the other hand, Dionesia Lasconia was allowed to plead guilty to the
lesser offense of Homicide.
The RTC convicted Charito, together with Rogelio Lasconia, Eddie Olazo, and Miguel
Corbis, of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the RTC insofar as it convicted Charito of the
crime charged. Notably, however, the CA acquitted Eddie Olazo and Miguel Corbis on the
ground that there was a lack of evidence in the records to sustain their conviction.
Page 1 of 435
Case Digests
ISSUE
Whether or not Charito is guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
RULING
YES. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. In proving conspiracy, direct
evidence is not indispensable as its existence may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. In the instant case, the candid
testimony of state witness Joseph unmistakably produces a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. That Charito was present before, during, and after the commission of the crime and
that there was conspiracy between the malefactors are findings fully supported by the
evidence on record.
Joseph also testified that he saw Charito in the evening of the commission of the crime,
when he brought the accused near the house of the spouses Vallecera and again upon their
return to the drop-off area almost an hour later. It was also established that Charito paid
Joseph for the use of his motorcycle two (2) days after the commission of the crime and that
he was threatened by Charito should the former "squeal" on them. These facts clearly evince
unity of purpose and criminal design between Charito and his cohorts.
Finally, we take note of the fact that the RTC and the CA had concurring factual and
legal findings insofar as they found Charito guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Thus, in the absence of any showing that material facts or circumstances were overlooked
by the inferior courts, this Court affirms the questioned Decision.
With respect to the imposition of the appropriate penalty, Article 294(1) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
when by reason or on occasion of the crime of Robbery with violence against or intimidation
of persons, the crime of Homicide is committed. Considering that the imposable penalty for
Robbery with Homicide consists of two (2) indivisible penalties (i.e., death and reclusion
perpetua), Article 63 of the RPC finds application. In this regard, we note that both the RTC
and the CA failed to consider "evident premeditation" and "taking advantage of superior
strength" as ordinary, aggravating circumstances, despite having been sufficiently alleged in
the Information filed with the RTC.
Here, the evidence clearly established evident premeditation when Charito and his
co-conspirators hatched their malevolent plan to rob the spouses Vallecera and likewise "kill
[Dionesia Lasconia's] master". The first attempt of the malefactors to carry out their scheme
was foiled and it was only on their second attempt that they were able to consummate the
conspiracy. Hence, that there were persistent attempts made by the accused sufficiently
demonstrate how determined they were to adhere to their agreement despite the sufficient
lapse of time.
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Case Digests
Taking advantage of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance was also

present in this case. The records disclose that during the commission of the offense, Nicanor
Vallecera was hogtied by three (3) of the perpetrators, while Erlinda Vallecera, a woman,
was successively and fatally injured using a samurai sword and a long knife. Clearly, the
means employed by the culprits were patently excessive.
Proceeding from the foregoing, applying Article 63 of the RPC would mean that the
imposable penalty on the accused would be death given the presence of two (2) aggravating
circumstances. However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346, and as correctly ruled by the CA,
the imposition of the penalty of death has been prohibited and in lieu thereof, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is to be imposed.
Page 3 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANDITO LASTROLLO y DOE

G.R. No. 212631, November 7, 2016, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
AAA's deportment after the rape does not impair her credibility nor does it negate the
occurrence of the crime. There is no established singular reaction to rape by all victims of this
crime. It has likewise been judicially settled that delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an
indication of fabrication and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the
complainant. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her
defilement to the harsh glare of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or
unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant.
FACTS
AAA was only 17 years old when she testified in court. According to her mother, AAA
has abnormalities. When she was brought to a mental hospital, the doctor issued a medical
certification stating that AAA had Moderate Mental Retardation.
Sometime in November and December 2003, AAA went to the land of May Aida
Niebres which is located at the back of their own house in Brgy. CCC. As she was picking
banana blossoms, Dandito, carrying a bolo, suddenly pulled down her pants. AAA asked him
to let her go, but Dandito threatened to hack her with his bolo. Thereafter, he inserted his
penis inside AAA's vagina. AAA felt pain. Before leaving, Dandito told AAA not to tell her
mother about what happened, otherwise he would kill her.
Dandito raped AAA for the second time while the latter was at home cooking. He
suddenly entered the house and closed the door. He covered AAA's mouth with his hand,
pulled down AAA's pants and underwear, and let AAA lie down in their living room. Just like
the first incident, Dandito threatened to kill AAA if she tells her mother.
On March 15, 2004, BBB noticed that her daughter AAA was vomiting. When she
asked AAA, the latter was unable to answer and remained quiet. Suspicious, BBB brought
AAA to a clinic where it was found that AAA was about 4 months pregnant. When asked who
impregnated her, AAA answered Dandito.
According to Dandito, at the time of the alleged rape, he was working as a fish gatherer
in Bato Lake. Nestor, Dandito’s employer claimed that Dandito was the caretaker of his farm
and that during the period of November to December 2003, Dandito stayed in the farm and
worked with him.
ISSUE
Whether or not Dandito is guilty of one count of simple rape
RULING
Page 4 of 435
Case Digests
YES. Dandito was charged with one count of simple rape as defined under Article 266-
A of the RPC. For a charge of rape under the abovementioned provision to prosper, the
prosecution must prove that (1) Dandito had carnal knowledge of AAA;and (2) he
accompanied such act by force, threat or intimidation.
The Court agrees with the findings of both the RTC and CA that carnal knowledge
through threat or intimidation was established beyond reasonable doubt by the lone
testimony of the victim herself. In her testimony, AAA positively identified Dandito as the
man who pulled down her pants, let her lie down and inserted his penis to her vagina. AAA
also categorically stated that during the incident, Dandito, who was carrying a bolo,
threatened to kill her.
In an attempt to exculpate himself from liability, Dandito questioned AAA’s

credibility. However, the RTC found AAA’s testimony positive and categorical which was
confirmed by the CA. Dandito failed to point any significant fact or circumstance which would
justify the reversal of the findings on AAA’s credibility. Furthermore, Dandito also finds fault
in AAA’s behavior after the incident, claiming that it is unnatural for someone whose dignity
was supposedly ravaged to not show fear, remorse, hate or anxiety or to delay reporting the
rape to the authorities. It has been established that there is no singular reaction to rape. It
has likewise been settled that delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of
fabrication as the victim may have chosen only to keep quiet rather than to expose her to
public scrutiny.
Page 5 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO DACANAY Y TUMALABCAB

G.R. No. 216064, November 07, 2016, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
As ruled by the Court in the case of People v. Andan, confession made before news
reporters, absent any showing of undue influence from the police authorities, is sufficient to
sustain a conviction for the crime confessed to by the accused. “Verbal confessions to the
newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of
Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State.”
FACTS
Norma E. Dacanay (Norma), the wife of Antonio, was found lifeless with several
puncture wounds on the bathroom floor of their home by their son, Quinn, who was then
coming home from school. Quinn likewise observed that the rest of the house was in disarray,
with the clothes and things of Norma scattered on the floor, as if suggesting that a robbery
had just taken place.
Antonio was then interviewed by PO3 Jay Santos (PO3 Santos), during which
interview, Antonio informed PO3 Santos that One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
in cash and pieces of jewelry were missing. Antonio alluded to a certain "Miller" as an alleged
"lover" of Norma who may have perpetrated the crime. However, after further investigation,
the identity of "Miller" was never ascertained, as none of Norma's friends knew of any such
person.
After PO3 Santos's inspection of the crime scene, Antonio was invited to the precinct
to formalize his statement, to which the latter declined, as he still had to take care of the
funeral arrangements of Norma. Antonio failed to make good of his promise to go to the
police station the next day.
In a separate instance, Antonio was once again invited to the police station and he
acceded to the request after fetching Quinn from school. While at the precinct, Barangay
Kagawad Antonio I. Nastor, Jr. informed PO3 Santos that Antonio was already willing to
confess to killing Norma. In the meantime, PO3 Santos apprised Antonio of his constitutional
rights, including the right to remain silent. Antonio confessed to the crime before the media
representatives, who separately interviewed him without PO3 Santos.
Antonio interposed the twin defenses of alibi and denial, claiming coercion and
intimidation on the part of the police officers involved in the investigation of the crime.
ISSUE
Whether or not Antonio can be held guilty of the crime of Parricide on the basis of his
extrajudicial confession
Page 6 of 435
Case Digests
RULING
YES. At the outset, we note that Antonio had already admitted in his Appellant's Brief
that he was not under custodial investigation at the time he gave his extrajudicial confession.
Hence, Antonio's reliance on constitutional safeguards is misplaced as much as it is
unfounded.
During the separate occasions that Antonio was interviewed by the news reporters,
there was no indication of the presence of any police officers within the proximity who could
have possibly exerted undue pressure or influence. As recounted by two reporters during
their testimonies, Antonio voluntarily narrated how he perpetrated the crime in a candid
and straightforward manner, "with no trace of fear, intimidation or coercion in him". As
observed further by the Court of Appeals in its decision, while accused was physically
restrained by the cold bars of steel, he was at liberty to remain mute. Yet, he opted to respond
to inquiries from the media.
As ruled by the Court in the case of People v. Andan, confession made before news
reporters, absent any showing of undue influence from the police authorities, is sufficient to
sustain a conviction for the crime confessed to by the accused. “Verbal confessions to the
newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill
of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State.”
The fact that the extrajudicial confession was made by Antonio while inside a
detention cell does not by itself render such confession inadmissible, contrary to what
Antonio would like this Court to believe. All told, absent any independent evidence of
coercion or violence to corroborate Antonio's bare assertions, no other conclusion can be
drawn other than the fact that his statements were made freely and spontaneously,
unblemished by any coercion or intimidation.
Under Article 246 of the RPC, the crime of Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed;
(2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or
the legitimate spouse of the accused. Undoubtedly, all elements are present in this case.
Page 7 of 435
Case Digests
ZENAIDA P. MAAMO AND JULIET O. SILOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 201917, December 01, 2016, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
To be found guilty of Malversation, the Prosecution has the burden to prove the
following essential elements:
a. The offender is a public officer;
b. The offender has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office;
c. The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which the offender is
accountable; and
d. The offender has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or
through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or
property.
FACTS
Petitioners herein were accused of Malversation through Falsification of Public
Documents in a Letter-Complaint dated April 10, 2001 (Complaint) filed with the OMB
detailing a series of acts allegedly committed by them. Petitioner Maamo filed a Counter-
Affidavit dated July 9, 2001, denying the allegations contained in the Complaint for being
"false, imaginary, capricious, baseless, and politically motivated". Petitioner Maamo claimed
that based on the evidence presented, her alleged involvement in the disputed transactions
was not sufficiently proven. Petitioner Silor likewise denied the accusations in the Complaint
on the ground that the questioned disbursements were done regularly and that the payees
actually received their wages for services rendered.
In its Resolution dated September 26, 2001, the OMB found probable cause against
the Petitioners for Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents and
recommended the filing of the necessary informations against them with the SB.
SB convicted the Petitioners for the crime of Malversation through Falsification of

Public/Official Document. Notably, the SB also concluded that only one (1) crime was
technically committed by the Petitioners under the principle of delito continuado, there being
a plurality of acts performed during a period of time and unity of intent and penal provision
violated.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 29, 2011 arguing
that, inter alia, the absence of a name did not conclusively prove beyond reasonable doubt
that there was a ghost employee in the roll and that since the Time Books and Payrolls passed
audit, it followed that they were in order. The said Motion was denied by the SB in a
Resolution dated May 4, 2012.
ISSUE
Page 8 of 435
Case Digests
Whether or not the SB erred in finding Petitioners guilty of the crime of Malversation
through Falsification by feigning a signature.
RULING
YES. This Court has repeatedly adhered to the policy that when the guilt of the
accused is not proven with moral certainty, the presumption of innocence must be favored,
and exoneration must be granted as a matter of right. After judicious examination of the
records and the submissions of the parties, the Court ruled that the guilt of the petitioners
were not proven.
To be found guilty of Malversation, the Prosecution has the burden to prove the following
essential elements:
a. The offender is a public officer;
b. The offender has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of
his office;
c. The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which the offender is
accountable; and
d. The offender has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or
through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds
or property.
Notably, Article 217 of the RPC provides that the failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly
authorized officer gives rise to the presumption that he has put such missing funds to
personal use. As this Court clarified in Estino v. People, while demand is not an element of
Malversation, it is a requisite for the application of the presumption. Hence, absent such
presumption, the accused may still be proven guilty, albeit based on direct evidence of
Malversation.
Here, while the records support the presence of the first three (3) elements, we find
that the Prosecution was unable to satisfactorily prove the fourth element. In the cases
where the petitioners were found liable, the common denominator is the mere absence of
the name of a payee-laborer, as shown by the blanks in the Time Book and Payroll
corresponding to the signatures.
The evidence is severely insufficient and inconclusive to establish the guilt of the
Petitioners beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged. In the first place, as correctly
argued by the Petitioners, nowhere was the fact of demand shown in any of the documentary
exhibits or testimonies of the witnesses of the Prosecution. Considering that the Prosecution
never established such material fact, the burden of evidence was never shifted to the
Petitioners to prove their innocence, there being no prima facie presumption of
misappropriation under the facts obtaining.
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Case Digests
Moreover, the mere absence of a name in the Time Book and Payroll does not
automatically translate to the non existence of the alleged worker. Contrary to the
conclusions of the SB, there are other "logical explanation[s]" for such omission, one of which
is the explanation proffered by the Petitioners, i.e., that what was presented during trial were
the third original carbon copies on which the carbon paper did not work to copy those names
listed on the first page. Indeed, it is also entirely possible that the person responsible simply
forgot to write down the name of the payee-laborer even as he secured their signatures.
Certainly, the allegation that Petitioners hired "ghost employees" must be weighed against
the fact that Time Book and Payrolls were found to be in order.
In addition, the fact that the July 1-15, 1997 Time Book and Payroll was able to pass
audit and that no Notice of Suspension was issued by the Commission on Audit (COA) was
an indication that said documents were in order. Indeed, if it were true that there were
blanks next to the signatures of the unnamed employees, such glaring deficiency surely
would not have gone unnoticed by the COA.
All told, we cannot subscribe to the conclusion of the SB that the blanks next to the
signatures are, by themselves alone, enough to prove that Petitioners committed
Malversation through Falsification by feigning the said signatures. This Court is not prepared
to deprive Petitioners of their liberty with finality simply on the basis of a superficial
deficiency in Time Books and Payrolls.
Page 10 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROQUE DAYADAY y DAGOOC

G.R. No. 213224, January 16, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), murder is committed when: (1) a
person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of
the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 248; and (4) the killing neither constitutes
parricide nor infanticide.
FACTS
In an Information filed with the RTC, accused-appellant Roque Dayaday y Dagooc
(Roque) was charged with the crime of Murder. On the evening of October 27, 2005 at about
10 o'clock, Alex and his father, Basilio Gallenero (Basilio), were walking home along the road
in Barrio 3, Norala, South Cotabato after attending a wedding celebration at the house of
Rodolfo Dayaday, when suddenly, Roque shot the victim in the back four (4) times,
successively. Alex easily recognized Roque as the assailant because the place was well lit and
he was just about ten (10) meters away from Roque when the latter fired his gun. For fear of
his life, Alex an away from the place of incident. He reported the incident to his uncle Petring
Pinuela and to the police officers of Norala.
Roque, on the other hand, through the testimonies of Reynald Dayaday (Reynald) and
Dennis Blancada (Dennis), denied the accusation and interposed the defense of alibi.
Reynald, accused-appellant's brother, testified that on October 27, 2005, the night before the
wedding of his niece, he was at the house of his older Brother, Teodolfo Dayaday, at Barangay
Esperanza (Barrio 3), Norala, South Cotabato. He was with Roque and seven (7) other people,
who were tasked to prepare the food for the wedding celebration. They were all together in
the kitchen from 5 o'clock in the evening to 3 o'clock in the morning.
Dennis testified that he was at Barangay Esperanza, Norala, South Cotabato on

October 27, 2005 because he was invited to cook in the house of Teodolfo Dayaday. He
arrived there at 12 o'clock noon but his duty started at 5 o'clock in the evening and ended at
3 o'clock in the morning the following day. He recalled that during those times that he was
cooking, Roque never left the kitchen.
ISSUE
Whether or not Roque is guilty of the crime of murder
RULING
YES. In the instant appeal, Roque essentially questions the credibility of Alex and the
veracity of his accusations. Roque insists that Alex is a biased witness considering his
relationship with the victim.
Page 11 of 435
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The Court has held that when the issues involve matters of credibility of witnesses,
the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded
high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern
whether they are telling the truth. Hence, it is a settled rule that appellate courts will not
overturn the factual findings of the trial court unless there is a showing that the latter
overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the
case. The foregoing rule finds an even more stringent application where the findings of the
RTC are sustained by the CA. In the present case, both the RTC and CA found the testimony
of Alex straightforward and worthy of belief.
The imputation of bias to Alex because of his relationship with the victim must
necessarily fail. In People v. Montemayor, the Court ruled that relationship by itself does not
give rise to any presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it impair the credibility of
witnesses or tarnish their testimonies. The relationship of a witness to the victim would even
make his testimony more credible, as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested
in vindicating the crime to charge and prosecute another person other than the real culprit.
In this case, since there is no showing of any ill or improper motive on the part of Alex to
testify against the accused, his relationship with the victim even made his testimony more
credible and truthful.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), murder is committed when: (1) a
person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any
of the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 248; and (4) the killing neither
constitutes parricide nor infanticide. Through the testimony of Alex, the eyewitness to the
crime, it was established that Basilio was killed and it was Roque who had killed him. As to
the presence of qualifying circumstances, the Court sustains the CA's finding that treachery
attended the killing of Basilio. The evidence unequivocally shows that the attack against
Basilio, which came from behind, was sudden, deliberate and unexpected. The victim was
completely unaware of any threat to his life as he was merely walking home with his son.
Page 12 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LORENZO RAYTOS Y ESPINO

G.R. No. 225623, June 7, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
A plea of self-defense admits the commission of the act charged as a crime; accordingly,
the onus probandi falls on the accused to prove that such killing was justified - failure to
discharge which renders the act punishable.
Thus, to exonerate himself, the accused must establish: (i) that there was unlawful
aggression by the victim; (ii) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were
reasonable; and (iii) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part. Of the three,
unlawful aggression is the foremost requirement; absent such element, self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated.
FACTS
Version of the Defense

On February 1, 2010, Raytos was invited by Indo Sabio to partake on some leftovers
from the fiesta and to join them as a dance session was being held. At around 11:30 in the
evening, David Araza (victim), passed by and was approached by Edgar Papiona, and the two
danced. After dancing, the victim approached Raytos' table and asked who was brave enough
while drawing a knife tucked in the waistband of his pants. Raytos tried to escape by moving
backwards and, while doing so, he got hold of the victim's right hand. Raytos twisted the
victim's arm, got hold of the knife and then stabbed the victim several times on the chest. He
delivered three (3) successive stabbing blows in a quick and swift manner because he
panicked. He ran away immediately and surrendered himself to the barangay officials and
they proceeded to the police station.
Version of the Prosecution

According to Papiona, while he was dancing with the victim, Raytos approached them
and said that he wanted to dance with the victim. Papiona acceded and went to the side of
the road just an arm's length away from the dance area. From his position at the side of the
road, he saw Raytos stab the victim when the latter turned his back from Raytos while
dancing. Papiona recalled that he saw Raytos hold the right back shoulder of the victim and
stab the latter's back several times with the use of a knife measuring 8 inches in length.
The RTC found Raytos guilty of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. Upon
appeal, the CA affirmed Raytos' conviction.
ISSUE
Whether or not Raytos' guilt for the crime of Murder was sufficiently proven beyond
reasonable doubt
Page 13 of 435
Case Digests
RULING
YES. In this case, the opposing sides are incessant on the truthfulness of their version
of the story, which differ in material points of fact; the State, on one hand, has successfully
presented strong evidence of guilt for Murder, while Raytos, on the other hand, maintains
his innocence based on his plea of self-defense.
Raytos failed to establish the elements of self-defense. To exonerate himself, the

accused must establish: (i) that there was unlawful aggression by the victim; (ii) that the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable; and (iii) that there
was lack of sufficient provocation on his part. Of the three, unlawful aggression is the
foremost requirement; absent such element, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
cannot be appreciated.
After poring over the records of this case, the Court is convinced that Raytos failed to
establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, David Araza. In his version of the
incident, Raytos claimed that Araza drew a knife from his left waist following a brief
exchange of words between them. Raytos then moved back, allegedly intending to escape,
but instead ended up wresting possession of the knife from Araza. Here, it is difficult to
imagine how Raytos, while attempting to escape, was suddenly able to grab hold of Araza's
hand and after relieving the latter of the knife, proceeded to stab him multiple times in quick
succession. It has already been ruled by the Court that the mere drawing of a knife by the
victim does not constitute unlawful aggression, whether actual or imminent, as the peril
sought to be avoided by the accused was both premature and speculative.
Further on this point, even assuming arguendo that unlawful aggression was present
on the part of Araza, there was no longer any danger on Raytos' person from the moment he
disarmed the former by wresting possession of the knife. Time and again, this Court has held
that when an unlawful aggression that has begun has ceased to exist, the one who resorts to
self-defense has no right fo kill or even to wound the former aggressor.
On the contrary, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was sufficiently established

by evidence. To stress, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were unwavering
as to the manner of killing - that Raytos suddenly stabbed Araza from the back while holding
the latter's shoulder.
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Case Digests
CORAZON M. LACAP v. SANDIGANBAYAN [Fourth Division] and THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
In an application for a mayor's permit or license to do business in a municipality or city,
the procedure is fairly standard and uncomplicated. It requires the submission of the required
documents and the payment of the assessed business taxes and fees. In case of failure to comply
with the requirements, the application deserves to be disapproved. If the application is
compliant, then approval is the action to be taken. An inaction or refusal to act is a course of
action anathema to public service with utmost responsibility and efficiency. If the deliberate
refusal to act or intentional inaction on an application for mayor's permit is motivated by
personal conflicts and political considerations, it thus becomes discriminatory, and constitutes
a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
FACTS
Corazon was indicted for violation of Section 3(f) of RA 3019, for having allegedly
neglected or refused, after due demand, and without sufficient justification, to act within a
reasonable time, on the application of complainant Fermina Santos (Fermina) for a business
permit in Masantol, Pampanga for the years 1999 and 2000 for the purpose of discriminating
against Fermina.
Fermina owns the Fersan Variety Store located in Masantol, Pampanga and engaged
in the sale of school supplies, furniture and accessories since 1975. She usually applies for a
Mayor's Permit between February and March of every year and has been submitting to the
Office of the Mayor for the issuance of Mayor's Permit the required documents. For the year
1999, she filed an Application for Mayor's Permit and submitted the requirements to the
Mayor's Office. However, accused Mayor Corazon Lacap denied her application and she
(accused) was angry at her. She went back to accused Lacap twice to ask for reconsideration
but she (Lacap) was even more angry, and told them to leave the place.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision holding Corazon guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of violation of Section 3(f) of RA 3019.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of official inaction
under Section 3(f) of the Anti-Graft Law
RULING
YES. There is no merit in Corazon's petition. The Court completely agrees with the
findings and ruling of the Sandiganbayan. The elements of the offense penalized under
Section 3(f) of RA 3019 are:
Page 15 of 435
Case Digests
1. The offender is a public officer;

2. The said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient justification
after due demand or request has been made on him;
3. Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public
officer having acted on the matter pending before him; and
4. Such failure to so act is for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from
any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against another
In an application for a mayor's permit or license to do business in a municipality or

city, the procedure is fairly standard and uncomplicated. It requires the submission of the
required documents and the payment of the assessed business taxes and fees. In case of
failure to comply with the requirements, the application deserves to be disapproved. If the
application is compliant, then approval is the action to be taken. An inaction or refusal to act
is a course of action anathema to public service with utmost responsibility and efficiency. If
the deliberate refusal to act or intentional inaction on an application for mayor's permit is
motivated by personal conflicts and political considerations, it thus becomes discriminatory,
and constitutes a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The authority of the mayor to issue licenses and permits is not ministerial, it is
discretionary. While a discretionary power or authority of Corazon, as the then Municipal
Mayor of Masantol, Pampanga, is involved in this case, its exercise must be pursuant to law
and ordinance. The mayor must act on the application for a business permit, and as correctly
pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, the action expected of the mayor was either to approve
or disapprove the same.
Corazon argues that she did not refuse to act on Fermina's application for a mayor's
permit as contained in the transmittal letter of Atty. Calderon to Corazon. Corazon deemed
it wise to refer the said letter to her retained lawyer, Atty. Andres Pangilinan (Atty.
Pangilinan), because of "other pending cases lodged by Fermina against Corazon in the
Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Pampanga."
However, when Corazon referred to her lawyer, Atty. Pangilinan, Corazon did not act
according to law or ordinance. Indeed, she failed to cite any law or ordinance which required
her to do so.
Page 16 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FEDERICO GEROLA y AMAR alias "FIDEL"

G.R. No. 217973, July 19, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The Court has already held that the date or time of the commission of rape is not a
material ingredient of the crime and need not be stated with absolute accuracy; where the time
of commission is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof
of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the
precise time alleged.
FACTS
Sometime in 1998 at around 8:30 in the evening, AAA and her sisters were sleeping.
Her mother was in the hospital tending to her aunt who had just delivered a baby. At that
time, appellant crawled towards AAA. Accused-appellant told AAA to keep quiet, lie down
and remove her underwear. AAA tried to resist but appellant gestured to box her. AAA tried
to shout but he covered her mouth. After removing her underwear, accused also removed
his brief and laid on top of AAA. Appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA bled and
felt pain. AAA did not tell her mother about the incident because appellant threatened her of
maltreating them if she did so.
In July 1999 at around 9:30 in the evening, AAA was raped for the second time. While
she was sleeping in bed, appellant sat beside her and removed her underwear. He then
inserted his penis into her vagina. The victim felt pain and bled. At that time, AAA's mother
was in the Himamaylan hospital tending to her grandmother. Again, she did not tell her
mother due to appellant's threat to maltreat her mother.
In January of the year 2000, appellant did the same act of having carnal knowledge
with AAA for the third time. This was done at around 2:30 in the morning and lasted for
about thirty (30) minutes while everyone else in the house was sleeping. AAA's mother was
away from home to tend to the latter's younger sister who gave birth. Like the other
incidents, AAA did not tell her mother. Instead, AAA told her friend who advised her to tell
their teacher. AAA then narrated the incident to her teacher, Mrs. Rafil, who summoned her
mother and told her what happened.
Three (3) separate Informations for Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code were filed in the RTC against Federico. After trial, the RTC found accused-
appellant guilty of all charges filed against him and imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each charge, without eligibility of parole. The CA rendered the questioned
Decision, affirming the judgment of the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not Federico’s conviction for three (3) counts of Rape was proper
Page 17 of 435
Case Digests
RULING
YES. Federico's lone assignment of error rests on his claim that AAA "could not exactly
determine what year x x x the first rape incident occurred," which purportedly creates doubt
on the credibility of AAA. Federico draws the same conclusion from AAA's failure to promptly
disclose her repeated defilement to the proper authorities. The assessment of the credibility
of witnesses is a task most properly within the domain of trial courts. Consequently,
appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court in the absence of facts
or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.
The purported discrepancies consisted of statements relating to date of the

commission of the crime. The Court has already held that the date or time of the commission
of rape is not a material ingredient of the crime and need not be stated with absolute
accuracy; where the time of commission is not an essential element of the crime charged,
conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the
crime was not committed at the precise time alleged.
In the instant case, aside from harping on the alleged inconsistencies of AAA's
testimony, Federico relies on his bare and uncorroborated refutations and nothing more. No
other testimonial or documentary evidence was offered by Federico during the course of the
trial. Such counter evidence, when weighed against the positive identification and
straightforward testimony of AAA, do little to affect the issue of Federico's carnal knowledge
of AAA, the elements of which have been consistently narrated by the latter. Following
established jurisprudence, denials, being self-serving negative evidence, cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a credible witness.
Page 18 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUBEN "ROBIN" BONGBONGA Y NALOS

G.R. No. 214771, August 09, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
At the outset, it should be emphasized that the Court has consistently disfavored the
"sweetheart theory" defense for being self-serving in nature. Being an affirmative defense, the
allegation of a love affair must be substantiated by the accused with convincing proof.
FACTS
Three (3) separate Informations were filed in the RTC, charging Ruben with two (2)
counts of Rape and one (1) count of Acts of Lasciviousness. AAA, a minor of about 16 years
of age at the time she testified on February 4, 2003, declared that on April 26, 2000, while
she was seated in a chair reading a pocketbook in the yard of their house, appellant came
and he carried her inside the house up to the second floor where he laid her down the
bamboo floor. She wanted to shout, but the accused wielded a "balisong". The appellant then
went on top of AAA and forcibly had carnal knowledge with her and mashed her breast.
The second incident took place on May 29, 2000. While playing, appellant called AAA
and told her they were going to his mother Crising Bongbonga's house some 200 meters
away. Thereafter, appellant brought AAA inside one of the bedrooms and locked the door.
Armed with a "balisong", appellant again had carnal knowledge of AAA.
The third incident was on October 16, 2000, when AAA, BBB, CCC and their other
playmates, went to the river to go swimming. While the group was playing in the water,
appellant arrived. The group went home while AAA stayed behind because she was told by
the appellant "May gagawin tayo." Appellant carried AAA to the middle of the field,
undressed her and laid her down. Appellant undressed himself, went on top of AAA, kissed
her lips and for the third time, had carnal knowledge with the victim.
Pleading his innocence, Ruben denied the accusations against him on the claim that
he and AAA were live-in partners and that their sexual encounters were consensual. Ruben
further claimed that the charges against him were filed at the instance of AAA's Aunt,
possibly due to feelings of disapproval as Ruben was still married to another woman.
RTC rendered a Judgment finding Ruben guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged. The CA affirmed the same but modified the award of damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not CA erred in affirming the conviction of Ruben for two (2) counts of
Rape and one (1) count of Acts of Lasciviousness
RULING
Page 19 of 435
Case Digests
NO. It is settled that in assessing the credibility of a witness, the findings of the trial
court carry great weight and respect due to the unique opportunity afforded them to observe
the deportment of the witness while undergoing the rigors of examination. Hence, it is a
settled rule that appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court
unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case. Such rule finds an even more stringent
application where the findings of the RTC are sustained by the CA, as in the case at bench.
In this case, Ruben failed to show any misappreciation by the CA of the facts or
circumstances so as to warrant a reversal of the questioned Decision. In the same vein,
Ruben's arguments were already considered and thoroughly addressed by the courts below.
As correctly observed by the CA, Ruben's flimsy defense of consensual sexual

congress pales in comparison to the testimony of AAA, which was delivered in a clear and
straightforward manner. At the outset, it should be emphasized that the Court has
consistently disfavored the "sweetheart theory" defense for being self-serving in nature.
Being an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must be substantiated by the
accused with convincing proof. It bears noting that Ruben's defense was corroborated only
by his daughter, Ruby Ann, which effectively weakened the defense, being supported by a
mere relative of the accused. In People v. Nogpo, Jr., the Court held that where nothing
supports the sweetheart theory except the testimony of a relative, such defense deserves
scant consideration.
On this note, Ruben anchors his claim of consensual sexual congress on the fact of his
cohabitation with AAA. However, such claim was already addressed by the CA in the
questioned Decision, which affirmed the findings of the RTC, that such cohabitation occurred
only after the respective dates of the incidents. Here, such fact of cohabitation, by itself, had
no bearing on the prior forcible advances committed by Ruben upon AAA. In fact, contrary
to Ruben's assertions, any consent implied from the fact of cohabitation is dispelled by AAA's
express declarations that she was forced against her will to live with Ruben out of fear of her
father.
Moreover, in the landmark case of People v. Jumawan, the Court declared that even a
husband has no ownership over his wife's body by reason of marriage, for in assenting to
marital union, the wife does not divest herself of her right to exclusive autonomy over her
own body. Hence, a married woman can give or withhold her consent to sexual intercourse
with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case of her
refusal.
Page 20 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERATO PENTECOSTES y CRONICO

G.R. No. 226158, November 8, 2017, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Motive pertains to the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular
criminal activity. It is not an essential element of a crime and need not be proven by the State
in criminal prosecutions. Hence, proof of motive alone will not establish guilt in the same way
that the absence thereof cannot establish innocence. In previous occasions, the Court has held
that the question of motive only becomes material when there is doubt as to the identity of the
malefactor committing the offense charged.
FACTS
On March 24, 2005, Liberato was having a drinking spree at the house of Angel Vargas
(Angel), the father of the victim, Vivian Vargas (Vivian). Likewise present were Joel Basagre,
Mesio Caruito, Gerardo Rabal, and Daniel Briones. The drinking spree ended at around 2:00
in the aftemoon. At that time, Angel asked Vivian to go to the house of a certain Auring Rabal,
which was about two hundred (200) meters away, to return a chair that they borrowed.
Vivian would never return.
Meanwhile, Liberato went home at 3:00 in the afternoon. At around 3:30 to 4:30 p.m.,
Antonio Vargas (Antonio), the cousin of Vivian, together with his friend, Jason Basagre
(Jason), encountered Liberato at Antonio's com plantation. The plantation was around a
kilometer away from the house of Liberato. During the encounter, Liberato was seen
carrying Vivian on his back and appeared to be headed towards a nearby body of water. Jason
greeted Liberato, who then merely looked back at them angrily.
Later that day, with Vivian still missing, Angel began searching for Vivian with the
help of some relatives and barangay tanod, but to no avail. The following morning, however,
on March 25, 2005, Vivian's lifeless body was recovered near the house of Joel Basagre, the
father of Jason.
Immediately thereafter, the policemen summoned and investigated all those present
at the drinking spree in Angel's house. However, when Liberato's turn for questioning came,
he ran away. An autopsy later performed on Vivian's body revealed "asphyxia by
submersion" or drowning as the cause of death by Dr. Raoul Alcantara.
In the Decision dated December 28, 2012, the RTC found Liberato guilty of the crime
of Murder, qualified by treachery. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction with modification
only as to the damages awarded.
ISSUE
Whether or not Liberato was guilty beyond reasonable doubt despite the absence of
motive in the commission of the crime charged
Page 21 of 435
Case Digests
RULING
YES. Liberato makes the claim that the CA erred in convicting him despite the
prosecution's failure to establish a motive for the killing. Motive pertains to the reason which
prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. It is not an essential element
of a crime and need not be proven by the State in criminal prosecutions. Hence, proof of
motive alone will not establish guilt in the same way that the absence thereof cannot
establish innocence. In previous occasions, the Court has held that the question of motive
only becomes material when there is doubt as to the identity of the malefactor committing
the offense charged.
Here, the totality of circumstantial evidence on record sufficiently dispels any doubt
that Liberato was responsible for the ghastly death of Vivian. Liberato was positively
identified by two (2) eyewitnesses, coupled with the other pieces of circumstantial evidence
establishing Liberato's authorship of the crime.
First, Liberato was positively identified as the last person seen with Vivian before she
disappeared. While Liberato strongly disputes this fact, pointing instead to Joel Basagre as
the last person he saw with Vivian, no independent testimony was ever presented to
corroborate Liberato's version of the facts. Second, the records disclose that Vivian's cause
of death was "asphyxia by submersion (drowning). Significantly, both Antonio and Jason
testified to the fact that Liberato, while carrying Vivian on his back, was headed towards a
body of water within the vicinity of Antonio's com plantation. Third, during the investigation
of Vivian's death, which included four (4) other suspects who were present during the
drinking spree at Angel's house, Liberato fled the police station. In countless occasions, the
Court has held that the flight of an accused may be taken as evidence to establish his guilt.
Thus, after a thorough examination of the records of this case, the Court is fully
convinced that the evidence presented by the prosecution constitutes proof of Liberato's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While it is true that no direct evidence was adduced by the
prosecution, circumstantial evidence is by no means a "weaker" form of evidence vis-a-vis
direct evidence. Our prevailing jurisprudence has recognized that in its effect upon the
courts, circumstantial evidence may even surpass direct evidence in weight and probative
force. Accordingly, to the mind of the Court, the confluence of the established circumstances
leads to the fair and reasonable conclusion that Liberato was indeed responsible for the
death of Vivian.
Page 22 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PAUL DURAN, JR. y MIRABUENO

DOCTRINE
Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means and methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. To qualify an offense, the following
conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of
the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by
the assailant.
FACTS
Beverly C. Quilana testified that on January 9, 2009 at around 1:48 in the morning,
she was awakened by someone calling for her, uttering "Ninang". At that time she was inside
her house located in Ligtong 3, Rosario, Cavite. She recognized the voice of the person as her
godson named Gilbert Grimaldo. She then asked why. Grimaldo replied from outside saying
"Ninang tulungan mo ako yung taong ito ay kinukursunada ako," "kinukursunada ako ng
taong ito, me dala siyang baril". Then she opened the door for her godson. She then saw the
accused Paul Duran shot Grimaldo with a .38 caliber revolver from behind at a distance of 2
1/2 feet. Grimaldo was hit at the nape, and then fell to the ground lying with his face down.
Duran then left the place passing between their houses. Moments later accused returned and
shot Grimaldo three more times to make sure that the latter was dead. Witness then started
shouting and asking for help. At this point in time, witness saw the accused Duran ran away.
They then called the police. According to this witness, Grimaldo was hit on the nape, back
and head.
Duran invoked self-defense. According to him, on January 9, 2009 at around 2:15 to

2:45 a.m. while on his way to buy fish in Parañaque, he was blocked by two persons whose
identity he did not know. One of these men who turned out to be the victim Gilbert Grimaldo
poked a gun at him, and said that they only needed his money. That when Grimaldo
attempted to get the money from his belt bag, he was able to hold the victim's right hand
which was then holding the gun. Grimaldo then used his left hand to box his nape. Then they
wrestled for the possession of the gun for more or less thirty seconds. Then he (Duran) was
able to take the gun away from Grimaldo. When Grimaldo moved backward, he pulled the
trigger of the gun and hit Grimaldo. At that time he was worried that the other guy might
retaliate and that's the reason why he was able to pull the trigger of the .38 caliber revolver
gun.
The RTC found Duran guilty of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery. The CA
affirmed Duran's conviction in toto.
Page 23 of 435
Case Digests
ISSUE
Whether or not Duran's guilt for the crime of Murder was proven beyond reasonable
doubt
RULING
NO. However, the Court ruled that the accused is guilty of Homicide. Pleading self-
defense was not proper in this case because there was no unlawful aggression. The burden
of proving self-defense rests on the accused. He must prove by clear and convincing evidence
the concurrence of the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself or at least any provocation executed
by the accused claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the
victim's aggression. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense.
Without unlawful aggression, self-defense cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the
other elements are present.
Even if Duran's account of an attempted robbery against him is to be believed, his

testimony also shows that Grimaldo, albeit the initial aggressor, ceased to be the aggressor
as Duran had successfully wrested the weapon from him. Time and again, this Court has held
that when an unlawful aggression that has begun has ceased to exist, the one who resorts to
self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor. Aggression, if not
continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting defense of one's self. The condition
sine qua non of unlawful aggression being absent, self-defense cannot be appreciated in
favor of the accused.
With regard to the conviction for murder, the Court held that the prosecution failed
to prove treachery. Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the RPC, there is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and methods or forms
in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. To qualify an
offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or
forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.
It was error for the RTC to rule that treachery was present as said finding is not
supported by the evidence. Treachery must be unequivocally proven as the crime itself. The
prosecution did not prove that Duran intentionally sought the victim for the purpose of
killing him. The confrontation between Duran and Grimaldo appears to have been a chance
encounter. It was also not proven that Duran deliberately and consciously employed means,
methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act to ensure that Grimaldo could not
defend himself. In this case, Grimaldo was aware of the impending attack and was even able
to seek help from eyewitness Quilana.
Page 24 of 435
Case Digests
With the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime is Homicide
and not Murder.
Page 25 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OSCAR GIMPAYA AND ROEL GIMPAYA

G.R. No. 227395, January 10, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action
and purpose. Conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the crime —
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS
Roosevelt Agamosa (Roosevelt), the victim's neighbor, and Roselyn Clete (Roselyn),
the victim's wife, testified as to the commission of the crime.
The testimonies of both witnesses, as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
Witness ROOSEVELT AGAMOSA testified: that he witnessed the commotion between the
two (2) accused and victim, Genelito Clete; that he saw the victim Genelito Clete being
hugged by accused Oscar Gimpaya while the other accused Roel Gimpaya was stabbing
him; that when accused Roel Gimpaya saw the witness he uttered the words: "IKAW,
GUSTO MO?"; that the witness upon hearing said utterance, ran and met along the way
the wife of the victim Genelito Clete, Roselyn Clete; that Roselyn Clete likewise saw the
manner how her husband was stabbed to death; that the victim was brought to the
University of Perpetual Help System Hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
The witness [Roselyn B. Clete] testified: that on September 16, 2000 she was inside their
house while the commotion happened; that as she was about to check what the
commotion was all about, she was met by one Roosevelt Agamosa, who informed her
that her husband Genelito Clete was stabbed; that when she reached the place of the
incident, she saw the lifeless and bloodied body of her husband slumped on the ground;
that [s]he saw accused Oscar Gimpaya on top of her husband as the former was
strangling her husband; that the witness tried to help as she came to the assistance of
her husband, but accused Oscar Gimpaya shoved her away; that thereafter, the
Barangay authorities arrived; that her husband Genelito Clete was brought to [the]
University of Perpetual Help Hospital, and died thereat.
The RTC held Oscar and Roel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
qualified by treachery, and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the RTC
Decision with modification only as to the award of damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not Oscar's guilt for the crime of Murder was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
Page 26 of 435
Case Digests
RULING
NO. In the instant case, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the existence of conspiracy between accused appellant Oscar and his co-
accused Roel in the killing of Genelito.
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of
action and purpose. Conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the
crime — proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The RTC did not discuss its finding of conspiracy; it merely held that "both accused
acted in concert towards a common criminal goal." Conspiracy was not also discussed by the
CA. On the subject, the appellate court only said that "[the] [a]ccused-[a]ppellant [Oscar] and
[a]ccused Roel Gimpaya acted in concert in killing the victim." These pronouncements do not
sufficiently establish that there was a conspiracy between Oscar and Roel in the stabbing of
the victim.
Based on Roosevelt's testimony, it was the victim, Genelito, who went to the house of
Oscar where the quarrel and stabbing incident took place. When it was corroborated by Lea,
Oscar’s wife, it was also found that Oscar was just at his house on September 16, 2000 at
around 7:00 p.m. when he was called upon by Genelito. The house of Oscar and Genelito are
on separate sides of the Almarinez Compound while the house of Roel is beside the house of
Oscar.
Thereafter, Oscar and Genelito had a quarrel which escalated into a physical
altercation. Roel intervened and stabbed Genelito in the back. According to prosecution
witness Roosevelt, Oscar was hugging Genelito. Meanwhile, defense witness Lea testified
that Oscar had fallen down after being struck by Genelito. The common thread in their
testimony however, is that it was Roel who stabbed Genelito in the back and not Oscar.
As it was not Oscar who delivered the fatal blow (or any blows, at all) it was
incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the existence of conspiracy. It must be borne in
mind that the evidence required to prove conspiracy is of the same weight of evidence
needed to establish the crime itself—proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Even if the prosecution's version were to be believed, to the mind of the Court, the act
of Oscar in merely hugging the victim does not establish conspiracy in the intent to kill. It
was not proven that he acted in concert with Roel or that he even knew of Roel's intention
to stab Genelito.
Page 27 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AMADO "JAKE" P. MACASAET. ENRIQUE P.

ROMUALDEZ AND JOY P. DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 196094, March 5, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The rules on venue of criminal actions for libel were also restated in Agbayani v. Sayo:
Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published.
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the
time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance
of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the offense.
FACTS
These cases originated from complaints for nine counts of libel on account of nine
interrelated newspaper articles which appeared in the newspapers Malaya and Abante
where statements allegedly derogatory to then Governor Casimiro "Ito" M. Ynares, Jr and
Atty. Narciso "Jun" Y. Santiago, Jr. (Santiago) were written by Amado "Jake" Macasaet
(Macasaet).
Of the nine counts of libel, probable causes for libel were found in relation to the April
21, 1999 issue of Malaya with respect to the article entitled "Santiago's gambling habits" and
the March 1, 1999 issue of Malaya regarding the article entitled "NCA-UCAP FEUD: Walang
trabaho, personalan lang." Both articles were written by Macasaet. The libel complaint
involving the newspaper Abante was dismissed.
Thus, separate Informations for the two counts of libel were filed against Macasaet,
Malaya's Publisher, Chairman and writer, Enrique P. Romualdez (Romualdez), Malaya's
Executive Editor, and Joy P. Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), Malaya's Editor (collectively, the
accused). The present cases revolve around these two libel cases.
G.R. No. 196094 (second petition)
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The filing of the second petition on May 3, 2011 antedated that of the first petition.
However, the second petition arose from an incident before the RTC Manila, Br. 37 that
occurred after the incident that precipitated the first petition.
After the denial of the accused's motion to dismiss dated November 26, 2008 based
on the ground that the filing of the Information dated July 9, 2008 violated their
constitutionally guaranteed right to speedy disposition of their cases, the accused filed
before RTC Manila, Br. 37 another Motion to Dismiss dated September 24, 2009 on the
ground that the said court has no criminal jurisdiction over the case.
RTC Manila, Br. 37, in denying the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit, reasoned out
in its Order dated November 3, 2009 that:
x x x [T]he Information in the case at bar categorically stated the address of

Malaya at Port Area, Manila. While it is the position of [the] accused that this allegation
is insufficient, it must be stressed that this was followed by the phrase, "did then and
there x x x by writing, and publishing an article in the Malaya x x x." This shows that the
alleged libelous article was first published in Manila particularly at the address of
Malaya stated in the Information.
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied in the Order
dated January 29, 2010. The accused filed a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction before the
CA and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 113449. The CA rendered its October 2010 Decision
which granted the petition.
ISSUE
In the second petition (G.R. No. 196094), whether the Information is sufficient in form
and substance to charge Macasaet and Romualdez with the crime of libel
RULING
YES. The rules on venue of criminal actions for libel were also restated in Agbayani v.
Sayo:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
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4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at
the time of the commission of the offense.
In the present case, the venue is apparently the place where the alleged defamatory article
in Malaya was printed and first published.
The CA's ruling that the criminal action for libel was filed with the wrong venue was founded
on the fact that the Information does not specifically indicate that Port Area, Manila is the
editorial or business office of Malaya, following the formulation in Bonifacio. And, it cannot
be presumed as the CA further claims that the "address of Malaya is the same place where it
conducts its business of publication."
Paraphrasing the Information, the accused, as publisher/writer, executive editor and

editor defamed Santiago on April 21, 1999, in Manila City, by writing and publishing an
article in the Malaya with address at Port Area, Manila. To the Court, it is clear that Port Area,
Manila is where the defamatory article was written and published because that is the address
of Malaya, an unquestionably printed newspaper, wherein the article appeared. That the
Information did not expressly state "first published" is of no moment because the word
"published" does not exclude the first publication.
In turn, the accused do not deny that Port Area, Manila is the editorial and business
offices of Malaya and interestingly, they did not raise the ground of lack of jurisdiction to
dismiss Criminal Case No. 08-263272 despite the fact that the Information filed before RTC
Manila, Br. 36 is similarly worded as the Information in Criminal Case No. 08-263273 filed
before RTC Manila, Br. 37 as to the address of Malaya being at Port Area, Manila City and the
non-inclusion of the phrase "printed and first published."
According to Bonifacio, "the Information must allege with particularity where the
defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for
instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers." The
Information in question complies with the Bonifacio directive because it alleges with
particularity Port Area, Manila as the place where the alleged defamatory article was printed
and first published as evidenced or supported by the records of the case. The Information
need not parrot the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC and expressly use the phrase
"printed and first published."
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HESSON CALLAO Y MARCELINO AND JUNELLO AMAD

DOCTRINE
The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual.
The third element, inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime, was explained
more clearly by the Court in the case of Intod v. Court of Appeals: Legal impossibility occurs
where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. The impossibility of
killing a person already dead falls in this category.
FACTS
The prosecution presented its lone witness, Sario Joaquin (Sario), who testified that
on July 15, 2006, he was at the flea market of Guincalaban, Tayasan, Negros Oriental together
with his friends Hesson, Junello and one Remmy Casello (Remmy). While in the market,
Hesson and Junello discussed a plan to kill the victim, Fernando Adlawan (Fernando) as
ordered by one Enrile Yosores (Enrile).
Hesson, Junello, Remmy and Sario left the flea market and went to the house of
Fernando. Junello, upon seeing Fernando, asked for a cigarette lighter. After Fernando gave
Junello the lighter, the latter struck Fernando on the nape with a piece of firewood. Junello
then took a bolo and hacked Fernando's body on the side. Fernando lost consciousness and
as he laid motionless on the ground, Hesson stabbed him twice in the chest using a knife.
Hesson then sliced open Fernando's chest and took out the latter's heart using the same
knife. Junello followed and took out Fernando's liver using a bolo.
Sario was on the opposite side watching the incident. He and Remmy did not attempt
to stop the two (2) accused or run away for fear that the latter would kill them. Sario went
home from the crime scene and did not tell anyone about the incident because Hesson and
Junello threatened to kill him if he did so.
After the incident, Remmy was killed by Enrile during the town fiesta of Guincalaban.
The testimony of Florencio Adlawan, Fernando's father, was dispensed with after the
defense admitted the accused's civil liability and the funeral expenses incurred by the family.
Likewise, the testimony of Dr. Myrasol Zuniega, who examined the victim's body, was not
presented because the defense admitted the existence of the death certificate indicating that
the immediate cause of death is internal hemorrhage and the underlying cause is multiple
stab wounds.
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The trial court found Hesson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
qualified by treachery. The CA affirmed the trial court's conviction with modification only as
to the damages awarded.
ISSUE
Whether or not the crime committed was not murder but an impossible crime.
RULING
NO. Without admitting his guilt, Hesson argues that he should only be convicted of
committing an impossible crime. Allegedly, he cannot be held liable for Murder because it
was legally impossible for him to kill Fernando as the latter was already dead when Hesson
stabbed him.
However, the Court is not convinced. The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1)
that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was
done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the
means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
The third element, inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime, was explained
more clearly by the Court in the case of Intod v. Court of Appeals:
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not
amount to a crime. xxx
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
The victim's fact of death before he was stabbed by Hesson was not sufficiently
established by the defense. While Sario testified that he thought Fernando was already dead
after he was hacked by Junello because the former was already lying on the ground
motionless, this statement cannot sufficiently support the conclusion that, indeed, Fernando
was already dead when Hesson stabbed him. Sario's opinion of Femando's death was arrived
at by merely looking at the latter's body. No other act was done to ascertain this, such as
checking of Fernando's pulse, heartbeat or breathing.
Likewise, considering that Sario was in the middle of a surely stressful and frightful
event, he cannot be expected to have focused enough and be fit to determine if Fernando was
indeed dead when Sario thought he was. More importantly, even assuming that it was Junello
who killed Fernando and that the latter was already dead when he was stabbed by Hesson,
Hesson is still liable for murder because of the clear presence of conspiracy between Hesson
and Junello. As such, Junello's acts are likewise, legally, Hesson's acts.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEL DOMINGO
DOCTRINE
The Court has held that "self-contradictions and inconsistencies on a very material and
substantial matter seriously erodes the credibility of a witness." As the Court further held in
People v. Amon:
For evidence to be believed "must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness,
but must be credible in itself — such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. There is no test of the truth
of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and
experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of
judicial cognizance.
FACTS
The prosecution sought to prove that three men armed with M-14 and M-16 rifles
attacked and shot Roque Bareng, Virgilio Dalere, Glenn Rodriguez and Edwin Andres at the
Abadilla Farm in Brgy. Sta. Maria, Piddig, Ilocos Norte, around 11:30 PM on February 26,
2005. Virgilio Dalere and Glenn Rodriguez died from gunshot wounds. Roque Bareng, who
managed to escape unharmed, identified Joel Domingo as one of the assailants.
The prosecution's evidence showed that Roque Bareng was with Edwin Andres,
Glenn Rodriguez, and Virgilio Dalere at the bunkhouse of the Abadilla Farm at the time of the
shooting incident. While Roque Bareng and his companions were having coffee, three men
bearing M-14 and M-16 rifles appeared; one of them stayed outside the kitchen door, while
the other two entered.
The assailant with the M-16 rifle pointed his firearm towards Virgilio Dalere, and the
one with the M-14 rifle pointed it towards Glenn Rodriguez. Around two seconds after the
gunmen entered, each fired a single shot inside the kitchen.
Roque Bareng ran toward the fence. Upon reaching the fence, he looked back and saw
the assailant with the M-14 rifle pointing it at him. He then crouched toward the irrigation
and proceeded to the house of Edwin Andres where he stayed for the night.
The following morning, Piddig policemen fetched him at the house of Edwin Andres,
and they proceeded to the Abadilla Farm. There, they found the lifeless bodies of Glenn
Rodriguez and Virgilio Dalere outside the bunkhouse.
After taking Roque Bareng to a hospital in Piddig for treatment of the wounds, the
policemen brought him to the police station. In an answer to the query of the policemen,
Roque Bareng told them that he could recognize the assailants.
Page 33 of 435
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Three (3) days later, Roque Bareng was brought to the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial
Office in Camp Juan, Laoag City, where he gave his statement. Several days later, Roque
Bareng was again invited to the Piddig police station. During his stay, he saw two persons
being interviewed. He recognized them to be the assailants with the M-14 and M-16 rifles.
During the trial, he identified herein accused Joel Domingo as the gunman with an M-14 rifle.
The defense sought to prove that Accused Joel Domingo was attending a social dance
in Brgy. Dupitac, Piddig, Ilocos Norte when the victims were shot at Brgy. Sta. Maria of that
town.
ISSUE
Whether or not the guilt of accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt
RULING
NO. The Court has held that "self-contradictions and inconsistencies on a very
material and substantial matter seriously erodes the credibility of a witness. Here, the
testimony of Bareng, the prosecution's only witness, is inconsistent in material points
making it weak and incredible. Bareng testified in open court on December 11, 2007 that the
two assailants pointed their guns towards the two other victims, Virgilio Dalere and Glenn
Rodriguez. But during cross-examination, he changed his tune and testified that immediately
after the utterance of the two assailants, the assailant holding the M-14 rifle immediately
shot at him.
Bareng's identification of accused-appellant is also questionable given his

inconsistent statements and when weighed against the testimony of the defense witnesses.
In open court, when asked to describe the assailants, Bareng merely stated that they were
wearing brim buri hats. Edwin Andres (Andres), one of the defense witnesses and who was
also present during the attack by the assailants, however, testified that immediately after the
incident and while Bareng was in Andres's house, Bareng told Andres that all he saw were
small thin persons wearing hats and that he could not recognize the assailants.
Against the inconsistent statements of the lone eyewitness, accused-appellants’

evidence establishing his alibi gains significance and is, indeed, more credible. Accused-
appellant testified that he was in the barangay hall of Brgy. Dupitac, Piddig, Ilocos Norte from
10:00 P.M. of February 26, 2005 until 2:00 A.M. of the following day and that the crimes were
committed in Brgy. Sta. Maria, Piddig, Ilocos Norte.
The fact that accused-appellant was in another barangay attending social dance from
around 9:00 P.M. of February 26, 2005 until the early morning of the next day was
corroborated by the testimony of Norman Pablo. The foregoing testimonies convince the
Court that accused-appellant could not have committed the crime. Bareng's testimony, given
Page 34 of 435
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its material inconsistencies, cannot be given full faith and credit. Accused-appellant, on the
other hand, was able to prove his alibi.
Page 35 of 435
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICHAEL LUNA Y TORSILINO

DOCTRINE
The law puts in place requirements of time, witnesses and proof of inventory with
respect to the custody of seized dangerous drugs, to wit: (1) The initial custody requirements
must be done immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) The physical inventory and
photographing must be done in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel and
the required witnesses:
• a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official for offenses committed during the effectivity of RA 9165 and prior to its
amendment by RA 10640, as in this case;
• an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service of the
DOJ or the media for offenses committed during the effectivity of RA 10640.
As a rule, strict compliance with the foregoing requirements is mandatory.
FACTS
The prosecution alleged that on April 14, 2008, a buy-bust operation was organized
by the Marikina City Police Station. After coordinating with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), the buy-bust team, together with the CI, proceeded to accused-appellant
Luna's residence at Barangay Tumana, Marikina. Upon arrival thereat, SPO1 Soriano and the
CI walked toward the direction of accused-appellant Luna's house.
Accused-appellant Luna then approached both of them and told the CI, "pare, score
na kayo, mayroon pa ako dito." At that point, the CI introduced SPO1 Soriano to accused-
appellant Luna as an interested buyer. When asked how much worth of shabu he would like
to buy, SPO1 Soriano answered "tres lang brod," while handing accused-appellant Luna the
three (3) marked bills.
After the exchange, SPO1 Soriano checked the contents of the sachet using a flashlight,
which was then the pre-arranged signal to the buy-bust team. Immediately after, the other
members of the buy-bust team approached accused-appellant Luna and arrested him after
introducing themselves as police officers. Thereafter, SPO1 Soriano marked the two (2)
sachets and accomplished an Inventory of Confiscated Evidence in the presence of accused-
appellant Luna at the place of his arrest. The Inventory of Confiscated Evidence was
subsequently signed by Barangay Kagawad Oscar Frank Rabe at the Barangay Hall, while a
certain Danny Placides, a representative from the media, signed the same at the police
station. Likewise, at the police station, accused-appellant Luna was photographed holding
the plastic sachets supposedly recovered from his person.
On the same day, SPO1 Soriano requested for a laboratory examination of the items
with the Crime Laboratory of the Eastern Police District. The request was personally
received by PCI Cejes, who then conducted a qualitative examination of the contents of the
Page 36 of 435
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plastic sachets. The contents later tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellant Luna is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165
RULING
NO. The law puts in place requirements of time, witnesses and proof of inventory with
respect to the custody of seized dangerous drugs, to wit: (1) The initial custody requirements
must be done immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) The physical inventory and
photographing must be done in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel
and the required witnesses:
• a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official for offenses committed during the effectivity of RA 9165 and prior to
its amendment by RA 10640, as in this case;
• an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service of
the DOJ or the media for offenses committed during the effectivity of RA 10640.
After a judicious scrutiny of the records of this case, the Court finds that the police
officers reneged on their duty to comply with the requirements on the seizure, initial
custody, and handling of the seized items. Based on the narrative of the prosecution, none of
the witnesses required under Section 21 was present at the time the plastic sachets were
allegedly recovered from accused appellant Luna. Neither were they present during the
preparation of the inventory at the place of seizure. As categorically admitted by SPO1
Soriano, Barangay Kagawad Oscar Frank Rabe was only present at the Barangay Hall where
he was made to sign the Inventory of Confiscated Evidence. In the same manner, Danny
Placides, the purported media representative, only signed the inventory at the police station.
In the same vein, the police officers also failed to photograph the seized drugs
immediately after and at the place of seizure, as required under Section 21. Instead, it was
only at the police station that accused-appellant Luna was photographed while holding the
plastic sachets supposedly recovered from his person.
Significantly, in the Coordination Form dated April 14, 2008 prepared by the buy-bust
team ahead of the operation, a "camera" was among the listed "special equipment" that were
to be used in the operation. Hence, considering that the buy-bust team was able to
accomplish the Inventory of Confiscated Evidence at the place of seizure (albeit there was
belated participation of the required witnesses), there was no compelling reason for them to
defer the photographing requirement until their return to the police station.
All told, given the demonstrable failure of the police officers to faithfully observe the
mandatory requirements in Section 21, the question now is whether the saving clause under
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the IRR of RA 9165 was triggered. For this purpose, the prosecution must satisfy the two-
pronged requirement: first, present justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, and second,
show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were properly preserved.
Based on the circumstances of the present appeal, however, the saving clause was not
triggered because the first prong was not satisfied - the prosecution did not offer any
justifiable grounds for the noncompliance. No explanation was proffered as to why none of
the insulating witnesses was present at the place and time of the seizure, or as to the failure
to photograph the drugs immediately after seizure in the presence of such witnesses. There
was likewise no showing of any efforts exerted by the police officers to at least coordinate
with witnesses ahead of the buy-bust operation.
All things considered, the evidence, appreciated in its totality, unequivocally points to
an acquittal.
Page 38 of 435
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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, PLACIDO L. MAPA, JR., RECIO M. GARCIA, LEON O. TY, JOSE R. TENGCO,
JR., ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, VICENTE PATERNO, RUBEN ANCHETA, RAFAEL SISON,
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., CARMELINO G. ALVENDIA AND GENEROSO F. TENSECO
G.R. No. 195962, April 18, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The essential elements of violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019, as amended, are: 1. The
accused is a public officer discharging official, administrative or judicial functions or private
persons in conspiracy with them; 2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the
performance of his official duty or in relation to his public position; 3. The public officer acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, and 4. His action
caused injury to the Government or any private party, or gave unwarranted benefit, advantage
or preference.
On the other hand, to determine the culpability of private respondents under Section
3(g) of RA 3019, it must be established that: (1) they are public officers; (2) they entered into a
contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) such contract or transaction is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
FACTS
On 8 October 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No.
13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. On 9
November 1992, President Ramos further issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the
functions of the Committee to include in its investigation, inventory and study, all non-
performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.
Among the loan accounts investigated by the Committee was that of the Philippine
Pigment and Resin Corporation (PPRC). In its Seventeenth (17th) Fortnightly Report to
President Ramos, the Committee reported that the loans/accommodations obtained by
PPRC from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) possessed positive
characteristics of behest loans.
On the strength of the Committee's findings, the complaint a quo was filed before [the]
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), accusing herein private respondents of violation of
Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
On 29 April 2008, [OMB] issued its now assailed Resolution dismissing petitioner's
complaint for lack of probable cause to warrant [private] respondents indictment.
ISSUE
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Whether or not the OMB committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's complaint for alleged lack of probable
cause
RULING
NO. Private respondents are charged with violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of RA
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The essential elements
of violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019, as amended, are: 1. The accused is a public officer
discharging official, administrative or judicial functions or private persons in conspiracy
with them; 2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his
official duty or in relation to his public position; 3. The public officer acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, and 4. His action caused injury
to the Government or any private party, or gave unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference.
On the other hand, to determine the culpability of private respondents under Section
3(g) of RA 3019, it must be established that: (1) they are public officers; (2) they entered into
a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) such contract or transaction
is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
As found by the OMB, to which the Court fully agrees, the elements of evident bad
faith, manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence are lacking in the instant case;
and petitioner failed to prove that the questioned foreign currency loans granted by the DBP
to PPRC were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. While petitioner
alleged that the subject foreign currency loans were undercollateralized and PPRC was
undercapitalized, it failed to sufficiently establish that indeed the transactions were either
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government or that there was evident bad
faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence on the part of private respondents.
Petitioner took the position that since nearly 64% of the collaterals were yet to be
acquired, the loans of PPRC were undercollateralized. Even if the collaterals consisted mostly
of assets yet to be acquired, the inclusion of after-acquired properties in a mortgage contract
was held to be lawful.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BASHER TOMAWIS Y ALI

DOCTRINE
For a successful prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5 of RA
9165, the following must be proven: (a) the identities of the buyer, seller, object, and
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. In cases involving
dangerous drugs, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of
paramount importance that the prosecution prove that the identity and integrity of the seized
drugs are preserved. Each link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs must be established.
FACTS
Basher Tomawis y Ali (Tomawis) was charged with violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002." According to the Prosecution, a buy-bust operation was conducted in Metropolis
[Starmall], Alabang to meet with alias Salim. The confidential informant introduced
Alejandro to alias Salim and she told him that she wanted to buy shabu. Alias Salim, who was
later identified as Tomawis, said that he wanted to see the money first so she showed him
the money. He told her that he will get the shabu somewhere and will meet her in the food
court. After ten to fifteen minutes, Tomawis returned and they simultaneously exchanged
the money for the shabu. After getting the shabu, Alejandro removed her jacket which was
their pre-arranged signal.
A commotion occurred during the arrest because bystanders inside the food court
wanted to help Tomawis who shouted "Tulungan niyo ako papatayin nila ako." They were
not able to put markings on the evidence in the vicinity because of the commotion.
Upon reaching Brgy. Pinyahan, they immediately conducted the inventory which was
done before the barangay officials of the said barangay. Alejandro handed the seized item to
Alfonso Romano who was the inventory officer, but she was present during the inventory
process.
ISSUE
Whether or not Tomawis' guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven
beyond reasonable doubt
RULING
NO. The prosecution utterly failed to prove that the buy-bust team complied with the
mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 and for their failure to establish the chain
of custody of the seized drugs. For a successful prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of
drugs under Section 5 of RA 9165, the following must be proven: (a) the identities of the
buyer, seller, object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for it. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the drug itself constitutes the corpus
Page 41 of 435
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delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of paramount importance that the prosecution prove that the
identity and integrity of the seized drugs are preserved. Each link in the chain of custody of
the seized drugs must be established.
Sec. 21 imposes the following requirements in the manner of handling and inventory,
time, witnesses, and of place after the arrest of the accused and seizure of the dangerous
drugs:
1. The initial custody requirements must be done immediately after seizure or

confiscation;
2. The physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of:
a. the accused or his representative or counsel;
b. a representative from the media;
c. a representative from the DOJ; and
d. any elected public official.
3. The conduct of the physical inventory and photograph shall be done at the:
a. place where the search warrant is served; or
b. at the nearest police station; or
c. nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizure
All the above requirements must be complied with for a successful prosecution for
the crime of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5 of RA 9165. Any deviation in the mandatory
procedure must be satisfactorily justified by the buy-bust team provided that the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
team.
In this case, the buy-bust team in this case utterly failed to comply with these
requirements. To start, the conduct of the inventory in this case was not conducted
immediately at the place of arrest but at the barangay hall of Pinyahan, Quezon City. As
explained by the buy-bust team of the PDEA, IO1 Alejandro and IO1 Lacap, they could not
conduct the inventory at Starmall, Alabang, because a commotion ensued as bystanders in
the food court tried to assist Tomawis who shouted for help. Evidently, this happened
because the buy-bust operation was conducted in a shopping mall.
While the IRR allows alternative places for the conduct of the inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs, the requirement of having the three required witnesses
to be physically present at the time or near the place of apprehension, is not dispensed with.
There are police stations closer to Starmall, Alabang, in Muntinlupa City and the office
of the PDEA is also in Pinyahan, Quezon City. And yet, the inventory was conducted in the
barangay hall of Pinyahan, Quezon City - which is not one of the allowed alternative places
provided under Section 21 of the IRR.
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More importantly, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule. There were
no witnesses from the DOJ or the media. Only two witnesses who were elected barangay
officials were present. It thus becomes evident that the buy-bust team did not prepare or
bring with them any of the required witnesses at or near the place of the buy-bust operation
and the witnesses were a mere afterthought. The presence of the three witnesses must be
secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at the time of the warrantless
arrest.
Further, the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized drugs.
In the present case, there are gaps in the chain of custody of the seized drugs which creates
reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity thereof. There are glaring inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the buy-bust team. It is unclear as to who actually recovered the seized
drugs from Tomawis and who held custody of the drugs from the place of the arrest in transit
to Brgy. Pinyahan. There is also no testimony as to who held the drugs from the time of
inventory at Brgy. Pinyahan to the PDEA office; from the PDEA office until it was delivered
to the laboratory; and until its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
Page 43 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NARCISO SUPAT Y RADOC ALIAS "ISOY"

G.R. No. 217027, June 06, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
To sustain a conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs the following elements
must be established: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug. On the other hand, for a successful prosecution of the
offense of illegal sale of drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) the transaction or
sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) the
buyer and the seller were identified.
In both cases, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and
the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is essential, therefore, that
the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with moral certainty. The
prosecution must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the substance seized from the accused
is exactly the same substance offered in court as proof of the crime.
FACTS
Narciso was charged in two (2) separate Informations with the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. On 8 October 2005, a civilian informant and a Barangay Tanod of San
Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna arrived at the Municipal Police Station and reported the illegal
drug activities of Narciso. The team conducted a surveillance operation at Holiday Hills,
Narra Road, San Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna.
A buy-bust operation was conducted. The informant introduced PO3 Rivera to

Narciso as a customer. PO3 Rivera handed the P100.00 marked bill to Narciso, and the latter,
in turn, handed PO3 Rivera a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. After
receiving the sachet, PO3 Rivera gave SPO4 Dela Peña's phone a ring. The rest of the team
immediately entered Narciso's house and arrested Narciso.
The seized items were handed to SPO4 Dela Peña and were taken to the police station,
together with Narciso. The sachet bought by PO3 Rivera from Narciso was marked by SPO4
[Dela] Peña as "NS-B", while the two (2) other sachets confiscated by SPO1 Ame from
[Narciso's] possession were marked as "NS-P". An inventory of these seized items was
conducted. Afterwards, SPO4 [Dela] Peña transferred the custody of the seized sachets to the
crime laboratory for examination.
ISSUE
Whether or not Narciso's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, was
proven beyond reasonable doubt
RULING
Page 44 of 435
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NO. After a review of the records, the Court resolves to acquit Narciso as the
prosecution utterly failed to prove that the buy-bust team complied with the mandatory
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 and to establish the unbroken chain of custody of the
seized drugs.
In this case, Narciso was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. To
sustain a conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs the following elements must
be established: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug. On the other hand, for a successful prosecution of
the offense of illegal sale of drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) the transaction
or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3)
the buyer and the seller were identified.
In both cases, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense
and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is essential,
therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with moral
certainty.
Sec. 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR imposed the following requirements in the manner of
handling and inventory, time, witnesses, and of place after the arrest of the accused and
seizure of the dangerous drugs:
confiscation;
the accused or his representative or counsel;
a. a representative from the media;
b. a representative from the DOJ; and
c. any elected public official.
b. nearest police station; or
warrantless seizure.
The buy-bust team failed to comply with the mandatory requirements under Section
21. To start with, no photographs of the seized drugs were taken at the place of seizure or at
the police station where the inventory was conducted. More importantly, there was no
compliance with the three-witness rule. Based on the narrations of PO3 Rivera and SPO4
Dela Peña, not one of the witnesses required under Section 21 was present at the time the
plastic sachets were allegedly seized from Narciso or during the inventory of the recovered
drugs at the police station.
Page 45 of 435
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The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory
but, more importantly, at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the
presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure
and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the
seized drug.
Following the IRR of RA 9165, the courts may allow a deviation from the mandatory
requirements of Section 21 in exceptional cases, where the following requisites are present:
(1) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict compliance;
and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending team. However, the prosecution failed to prove justifiable ground for non-
compliance.
First, no explanation was offered as to the absence of the three (3) witnesses at the
place and time of seizure, or as to the failure to photograph the confiscated items
immediately after seizure or during inventory in the presence of the insulating witnesses.
Second, The prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized drugs.
Page 46 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JENNIFER GA-A Y CORONADO, AQUILA ADOBAR

DOCTRINE
Proof beyond reasonable doubt must be adduced in establishing the corpus delicti - the
body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. It is important that the State
establish with moral certainty the integrity and identity of the illicit drugs sold as the same as
those examined in the laboratory and subsequently presented in court as evidence. This
rigorous requirement, known under RA 9165 as the chain of custody, performs the function of
ensuring that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
FACTS
A buy-bust team was against Adobar and his live-in partner. The confidential
informant introduced IO1 Siglos to Adobar as a friend who was interested to buy shabu.
Adobar asked IO1 Siglos how much worth of shabu she wanted to buy and the latter
answered P500.00, while handing the buy-bust money to Adobar. Upon receipt of the money,
Adobar excused himself to get the "item" inside the house. In less than a minute, Adobar
came back and handed to IO1 Siglos one heat-sealed transparent sachet containing white
crystalline substance suspected to be shabu.
When Adobar was about to be arrested, he ran inside his house and locked the front
door behind him. The buy-bust team forced open the door, cleared the ground floor then
proceeded to the second floor where they found a small window through which they
suspected Adobar to have escaped. The buy-bust money was not recovered. IO3 Tablate
found Ga-a. Near her were seventeen (17) pieces of transparent sachets containing
suspected shabu together with other drug paraphernalia on top of a table. Upon inquiry, Ga-
a introduced herself as Mecaella, the live-in partner of Adobar, and claimed that the shabu
on the table were from Adobar.
After "clearing" Adobar's house, IO3 Tablate called for Camaman-an Punong
Barangay Acenas, media representative Rondie Cabrejas of Magnum Radyo (media
representative) and an unidentified representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Thereafter, the sachets of suspected shabu, including the subject drugs, were marked with
IO3 Tablate's initials, "AMT." After the marking, IO3 Tablate proceeded with the inventory of
the seized items (including the subject drugs) on the table where the seventeen (17) sachets
were found, and prepared the Inventory of Seized Items/Confiscated Non-Drugs (Inventory)
in the presence of Ga-a. Photographs of the seized drugs, the room where they were found
and the accomplishment of the Inventory were then taken. It appears from the prosecution's
submissions that among the three (3) witnesses summoned, only Punong Barangay Acenas
and the media representative arrived at Adobar's house and witnessed and signed the
Inventory.
ISSUE
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Whether or not accused-appellant Adobar is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sale

of illegal drugs as defined and punished under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165
RULING
NO. Adobar is charged with selling 0.03 gram of dangerous illegal drugs, in particular,
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride colloquially known as shabu. Section 3(ii), Article I of RA
9165 defines "selling" as any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical whether for money or any other consideration. In the
context of a buy-bust operation, its elements are 1) that the transaction or sale took place
between the accused and the poseur buyer; and 2) that the dangerous drugs subject of the
transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
Anent the latter element, proof beyond reasonable doubt must be adduced in
establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit
drug. It is important that the State establish with moral certainty the integrity and identity
of the illicit drugs sold as the same as those examined in the laboratory and subsequently
presented in court as evidence. This rigorous requirement, known under RA 9165 as the
chain of custody, performs the function of ensuring that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed.
The applicable law mandates the following to be observed as regards the time, witnesses
and proof of inventory in the custody of seized dangerous illegal drugs:
confiscation;
a. the accused or his representative or counsel;
b. a representative from the media;
c. a representative from the DOJ; and
d. any elected public official.
b. at the nearest police station; or
warrantless seizure
However, the buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21 of
RA 9165, particularly as to the presence of the three (3) witnesses immediately after seizure
and confiscation of the illegal drugs. In the present case, none of these three (3) witnesses
under Section 21 were present at the time the subject drugs were allegedly confiscated from
Adobar. Upon the other hand, only two (2) of the three (3) were summoned by the team and
were actually present during the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items.
Page 48 of 435
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The three (3) insulating witnesses must be present at the time of seizure of the drugs
such that they must be at or near the intended place of arrest so they can be ready to witness
the inventory and photographing of the seized items "immediately after seizure and
confiscation." These witnesses must sign the inventory and be given copies thereof. In the
present case, from the evidence of the prosecution itself, none of the witnesses were present
during the seizure and confiscation of the subject drugs. Moreover, only two (2) of them - the
punong barangay and the media representative - witnessed the photographing and signed
the inventory.
Page 49 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NORJANA SOOD Y AMATONDIN

DOCTRINE
The Court again takes this opportunity to emphasize that the presence of the three
witnesses required by Section 21 is precisely to protect and guard against the pernicious
practice of policemen in planting evidence. Without the insulating presence of the three
witnesses during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, "planting" or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of
RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity
and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the seized drugs that were evidence of the
corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of accused-
appellant.
FACTS
NORJANA SOOD y AMATONDIN was charged for Violation of Section 5, Art. II, R.A.
9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. On 28 January 2009, a certain
"Florence" was apprehended in a buy-bust operation conducted by police operatives
belonging to the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Task Group, Kamuning Police
Station (PS-10), Quezon City Police District. Upon their return to the police station, they were
informed by the confidential informant that the dealer of the alleged drugs, accused-
appellant, was due to arrive from Caloocan City that afternoon.
Police Senior Inspector Christopher N. Luyun, the Chief of SAID-SOTG, thereafter

allowed the continuous police operation for the arrest of accused-appellant. After a briefing
for accused-appellant's apprehension, the CI called the latter through a mobile phone on
loudspeaker. Pretending to be Florence, the CI asked accused-appellant, "Norjana, pwede
ako ulit magconsign ng isang bulto?" Accused-appellant replied: "Sige bigyan kita responde
pero ang remittance ay next week" to which the CI answered: "ok, text kana lang pag malapit
kana para pasundo kita." The CI and accused appellant agreed to meet later that day at the
place where they usually do their drug transactions.
The police operatives and the CI proceeded to the target area. When the CI saw
accused-appellant, she pointed the latter to SPO1 Regato. SPO1 Regato then approached
accused-appellant and asked her: "ikaw ba si Norjana, pinapasundo ka pala ni Florence."
Accused-appellant replied in the affirmative and added, "ah sige, kuya puwede kayo na
magbigay kay Ate Florence kasi nagmamadali ako." She then took from her right pocket two
(2) transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance believed to be
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu" and handed them to SPO1
Regato, who thereafter introduced himself as a police officer. Accused-appellant was then
arrested and apprised of her constitutional rights. Before leaving the target area, SPO1
Regato placed the markings "AR1-28 JAN09" and "AR2-28 JAN09" on the plastic sachets.
Page 50 of 435
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Accused appellant was then taken to the barangay hall. SPO1 Regato prepared the
Inventory of Seized Properties/Items and the inventory was conducted before Kgd. Manette
P. Salazar and Rey Argana, a media representative. Both Kgd. Salazar and Argana signed the
certificate of inventory for the two (2) transparent plastic sachets. Afterwards, accused
appellant was brought to the police station. SPO1 Regato turned over the confiscated items
to their investigator, PO3 Cortes, who prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination of the
subject specimens. Thereafter, SPO1 Regato submitted the evidence to the crime laboratory
for examination, which gave positive results to the tests for shabu.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused-appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt
for violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165
RULING
NO. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 states the procedure to be followed by a buy-
bust team in the seizure, initial custody, and handling of confiscated illegal drugs and/or
paraphernalia. Here, it is undisputed, as was found by both the RTC and the CA that the
prosecution failed to comply with Section 21 of RA 9165. To be sure, the findings of the CA
show an utter failure on the part of the police to conduct the inventory at the place of seizure
of the drugs.
In addition, SPO1 Regato admitted that, at the time of the arrest, there were no
witnesses, and that, according to him, this was the reason the inventory was conducted in
the barangay hall instead of at the place of arrest of accused-appellant. He likewise admitted
that the photographing was also conducted in the police station instead of the place of arrest,
specifically at the investigation room of the police station.
Unquestionably, the prosecution failed to prove that the three required witnesses
were present during the inventory and photographing of the seized drugs. As the RTC itself
found, only the barangay official and media representative were present during the
inventory, and they were called in only after the arrest and seizure had already happened —
which may have been at the barangay hall or at the police station.
The plain import of Section 21 of RA 9165 is that the buy-bust team is to conduct the
physical inventory and photographing of the seized items immediately after seizure and
confiscation in the presence of the accused, his counsel, or representative, a representative
of the DOJ, the media, and an elected public official, who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. And only if this is not practicable, can the
inventory and photographing be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest
police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.
Here, the buy-bust team admittedly failed to comply with the foregoing requirements.
The Court again takes this opportunity to emphasize that the presence of the three witnesses
Page 51 of 435
Case Digests
required by Section 21 is precisely to protect and guard against the pernicious practice of
policemen in planting evidence. Without the insulating presence of the three witnesses
during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, "planting" or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of
RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the
integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the seized drugs that were
evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the
incrimination of accused-appellant.
Page 52 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DELIA CALLEJO Y TADEJA AND SILVERA ANTOQUE Y

MOYA@ "INDAY"
DOCTRINE
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the
offense. Thus, it is of paramount importance that the prosecution prove that the identity and
integrity of the seized drugs are preserved. Each link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs
must be established.
FACTS
The Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (SAID-SOTG) conducted
a buy-bust operation against one "Delia Callejo" and "alias Bitoy" in Barangay Palanan,
Makati City. During the operation, appellants Delia Callejo and Silvera Antoque were arrested
and charged under two (2) separate Informations.
At the arraignment, both appellants pleaded not guilty. They denied the prosecution's
allegations and claimed that the charges filed against them were completely fabricated.
In a Decision, the RTC found both appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
rejected the appellants' defense of frame-up. Callejo and Antoque were guilty for violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165. Moreover, Callejo was guilty for violation
of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. The RTC ruled that sufficient evidence exists on record
to establish that the buy-bust operation conducted by the SAID-SOTG was valid, and the
prosecution successfully established the identity of the corpus delicti in the present case. The
CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the CA committed reversible error in sustaining: (i) Appellants’ conviction
for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165; and (ii) Callejo's conviction for violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165
RULING
YES. The prosecution utterly failed to prove that the SAID-SOTG complied with the
mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165, and establish the unbroken chain of
custody of the seized items.
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the
offense. Thus, it is of paramount importance that the prosecution prove that the identity and
integrity of the seized drugs are preserved. Each link in the chain of custody of the seized
drugs must be established.
Page 53 of 435
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However, in this case, the SAID-SOTG committed patent procedural lapses in the
seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug that create reasonable doubt as to
the identity and integrity of the drugs and consequently, reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the appellants. The SAID-SOTG also failed to comply with the three-witness rule as required
in Section 21. Said Section plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical
inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure
and confiscation. In addition, the inventory must be done in the presence of the accused, his
counsel, or representative, a representative of the DOJ, the media, and an elected public
official, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory
and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or
at the place of apprehension. By the same token, this also means that the three required
witnesses should already be physically present at the time of apprehension.
As confirmed by the testimonies presented by the prosecution, SAID-SOTG's lone

witness, Kagawad Bernal, was called to the place of arrest only after the apprehension of the
appellants and the alleged seizure of drugs from their possession. In fact, Kagawad Bernal
himself confirmed that he did not even have prior knowledge of the buy-bust operation and
that he was even taken by surprise when he was summoned to witness the physical
inventory and sign the Inventory Receipt thereafter. Further, no explanation was offered as
to the absence of the two other insulating witnesses from the DOJ and the media. The
submissions of the prosecution do not indicate that the SAID-SOTG exerted genuine effort in
order to secure their presence at the time of apprehension. The presence of the witnesses
from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office is necessary to protect against the
possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug.
The prosecution's failure to prove the corpus delicti of the offenses of sale and
possession of illegal drugs due to unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the
SAID-SOTG, as well as the material inconsistencies in the apprehending officers' testimonies
on the confidentiality of their informant's identity, taken together, cast reasonable doubt
over appellants' guilt. Verily, the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence ascribed to the appellants.
Page 54 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARVIN MADRONA OTICO

DOCTRINE
Basic is the rule that, for a conviction of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs to
stand, the prosecution should have proven the following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (1)
the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and its payment. The prosecution has the onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the
prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus delicti.
FACTS
Marvin Otico was indicted for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of RA
9165. He was arrested in an entrapment operation conducted by personnel of Oslob Police
Station in Brgy. Looc, Oslob, Cebu. He was allegedly caught selling, delivering and
distributing to a PNP agent acting as poseur buyer one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic
pack of white crystalline substance, weighing 0.02 gram, in consideration of P500.00 pesos,
which when subjected for laboratory examination gave positive result for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride. The RTC found Otico guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of the offense charged. The CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of Otico for the offense of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 5, RA 9165.
RULING
YES. The Court reversed and set aside the conviction due to the unexplained major
procedural lapses, the indefiniteness of the substantiation of the elements of illegal drug sale
under Section 5 of RA 9165, and the questionable identification of the sachet of shabu, which
is the purported object of the illegal sale.
Basic is the rule that, for a conviction of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs to
stand, the prosecution should have proven the following elements beyond reasonable doubt:
(1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and its payment. The prosecution has the onus to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court
of the prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus delicti.
In this case, the prosecution's proof that the "transaction actually took place" consists
of the "eyewitness" accounts of police officers PO1 Villasurda and PO3 Saquibal, neither of
whom was the poseur-buyer, and who were admittedly 10 meters away from where the
poseur-buyer allegedly transacted with Otico. Further, the civilian agent who was assigned
as the poseur-buyer was never presented as a witness. Informants are usually not presented
Page 55 of 435
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in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to
the police. Considering these, the evidence presented against Otico by the prosecution falls
terribly short of the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt. In addition, the identity of
the dangerous drug that Otico allegedly sold to the civilian agent is uncertain.
Concerned police officers also failed to comply with the standard rules to be followed
by PNP members and units engaged in the enforcement of RA 9165 in support of PDEA, part
of the handling of drug evidence is "the weighing of dangerous drugs, and if possible under
existing conditions, with the registered weight of the evidence on the scale focused by the
camera, in the presence of persons required, as provided under Section 21, Art II, RA 9165.
Given the failure to indicate the weight of the shabu in the documents required to prove the
regularity of the buy-bust operation and preserve the integrity of the recovered shabu, and
to comply with the requirement in the PNP Manual on the weighing thereof, the object of the
illegal sale has clearly not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. There is thus reasonable
doubt that the alleged shabu, which was recovered from the civilian agent and bought by the
latter from Otico, might not be the same one that was delivered to the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory Office 7 for examination.
Furthermore, there are serious lapses in the police officers' compliance with Section
21, Article II of RA 9165. These lapses include the following: (1) the inventory and
photograph taking were not done immediately after seizure and confiscation in the place of
operation; (2) Except for the elected official, the required witnesses were not present during
the inventory and photograph taking. Only one of the three third-party witnesses was
present; and (3) the police officers did not present justifiable grounds for their non-
compliance with the required procedure and proof that the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items were properly preserved by them. These lapses noted above are far
from being minor. They are major deviations from the statutorily mandated procedure and
there was no attempt whatsoever by the prosecution, through the testimonies of the police
officers, to explain why an honest-to-goodness compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 and
its IRR, as well as the PNP Manual, was unavailable under the circumstances obtaining during
the buy-bust operation.
Given these lapses and noncompliance of the police officers, the Court is compelled to
acquit Otico for the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The presumption of innocence in favor of Otico stands.
Page 56 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GERRY AGRAMON

DOCTRINE
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and
specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. To qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the
assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods
or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. On the other
hand, for evident premeditation to be appreciated, it is indispensable to show concrete evidence
on how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was
carried out.
FACTS
Accused-appellant Gerry Agramon (Gerry) was charged with Murder after attacking,
assaulting and stabbing the wife of his brother, Pelita Aboganda. Gerry first attacked and
stabbed Roger and then stabbed Pelita who tried to cover her husband in order not to be hit
again. Pelita died, while Roger was taken to the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center for
treatment. Gerry, on the other hand, interposed self-defense. He claimed that his brother was
the one who first attacked him while he was on his way to work.
In a Decision, the RTC gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution and
found Gerry guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. The RTC held that the
number and nature of the wounds inflicted upon the victim disproves Gerry's claim of self-
defense. The CA denied the appeal and affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. The
CA agreed with the RTC that Gerry failed to prove self-defense because the element of
unlawful aggression is explicitly wanting. However, as regards the qualifying circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation, the CA found that only evident premeditation was
clearly established. The CA held that treachery cannot be appreciated because the attack on
Pelita was not sudden and unexpected as Roger and Pelita were aware of the imminent
danger to their lives.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Gerry's conviction for Murder despite the fact that
the prosecution failed to establish his guilt for Murder beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
YES. Gerry can only be convicted of Homicide, not Murder as treachery and evident
premeditation were not established beyond reasonable doubt.
Page 57 of 435
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offended party might make. To qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1)
the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which
give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means,
methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.
The prosecution also did not prove that Gerry intentionally sought Pelita for the
purpose of killing her. In fact, Roger admitted that after Gerry delivered a stab thrust towards
him, Pelita used herself as a shield to protect him from being hit again. Indeed, jurisprudence
has established that treachery cannot be appreciated simply because the attack was sudden
and unexpected. There must be proof that the accused intentionally sought the victim for the
purpose of killing him or that the accused carefully and deliberately planned the killing in a
manner that would ensure his safety and success. Also, the fact that a bladed weapon was
used did not per se make the attack treacherous. And even if it was shown that the attack
was intended to kill another, as long as the victim's position was merely accidental, alevosia
will not qualify the offense.
However, with respect to the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, the

Court cannot agree with the CA. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, it is
indispensable to show concrete evidence on how and when the plan to kill was hatched or
how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. In this case, evident premeditation
was not established because the prosecution's evidence was limited to what transpired at
6:00 in the evening of December 24, 2005, when Gerry came to his brother's house yelling
and threatening to kill them all. The prosecution, however, did not present any proof
showing when and how Gerry planned and prepared to kill Pelita. Also, the mere fact that
the accused was armed at the beginning of the altercation does not unequivocally establish
that he earlier devised a deliberate plot to murder the victim. To qualify an offense, the
circumstance must not merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident premeditation."
Hence, absent a clear and positive proof of the overt act of planning the crime, mere
presumptions and inferences thereon, no matter how logical and probable, would not be
enough. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify the offense in this case.
Page 58 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEONARDO B. SIEGA

DOCTRINE
An accused, who pleads self-defense, has the burden of proving, with clear and
convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is most important and
indispensable. Unlawful aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to
inflict real imminent injury, upon a person." Without unlawful aggression, the justifying
circumstance of self-defense has no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated.
FACTS
Siega was charged with the crime of Murder, after attacking, assaulting, stabbing and
hacking Pacenciano Bitoy. Due to the severity of his wounds, Bitoy died instantly. Siega
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, and he claimed that it was self-defense.
The RTC ruled Siega guilty of the crime of Murder. It found that Siega failed to prove
the element of unlawful aggression. Siega's claim that Bitoy tried to draw a weapon from his
waist was belied by the fact that no such weapon was recovered from the victim or at the
scene of the incident; and Alingasa's credible testimony verified that Bitoy was not carrying
any weapon at the time of the incident. Moreover, it found that the killing of Bitoy was
attended by treachery because, as testified by Alingasa, Siega suddenly stabbed Bitoy, who
was unsuspecting and unarmed. However, the RTC did not appreciate the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation because there was no proof on how Siega planned
and prepared in the killing of Bitoy and on the lapse of time for Siega to reflect and cling to
his determination to execute the crime.
The CA affirmed, with modifications on the civil damages, the ruling of the RTC. The
CA held that the RTC did not err in convicting Siega for the crime of Murder as there was
failure of the defense to sufficiently prove self-defense and it was positively proven by the
prosecution that the killing of Bitoy was attended by treachery
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in upholding Siega's conviction for the crime of Murder
RULING
NO. The Court found Siega guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
An accused, who pleads self-defense, has the burden of proving, with clear and
convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1)
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unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person resorting to self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is most
important and indispensable. Unlawful aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at
least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person." Without unlawful aggression,
the justifying circumstance of self-defense has no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated.
In this case, records disclose that Siega failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim, Bitoy. Thus, his claim of self-defense must necessarily fail.
In his version, Siega claimed that Bitoy came rushing to his house armed with a bolo.
When Bitoy attempted to draw his weapon, Siega picked up a sharp pointed bolo and stabbed
Bitoy several times. However, as duly pointed out by the RTC and CA, Siega's account of
events is belied by the straightforward and credible testimony of Alingasa that Bitoy did not
carry any weapon at that time. This was corroborated by the fact that no weapon was
recovered from the victim.
Unlawful aggression is predicated on an actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent

danger — not merely a threatening or intimidating action. Bitoy's supposed act of holding a
weapon from his waist does not pose any actual, sudden or imminent danger to the life and
limb of Siega. The alleged assault did not come as a surprise, as it was preceded by a heated
exchange of words between the two parties who had a history of animosity. Further, the
alleged drawing of a knife by the victim could not have placed the life of appellant in
imminent danger. The former might have done it only to threaten or intimidate the latter.
Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger — not
merely threatening and intimidating action. There is aggression, only when the one attacked
faces real and immediate threat to one's life.
On the matter of treachery as a qualifying circumstance of Murder, the courts a quo

correctly ruled that treachery attended the killing of Bitoy. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack against an unarmed and unsuspecting victim, who has no
chance of defending himself. Here, a credible eyewitness testified that Siega, armed with a
bolo, stabbed Bitoy on the chest several times, while the latter was merely conversing with
Alingasa. That the attack was frontal does not rule out the existence of treachery; because it
was so sudden and unexpected that Bitoy, unarmed and had no chance to defend himself,
was felled down by Siega's repeated hacking blows. Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court
finds no reason to overturn the concurring findings of the RTC and the CA with respect to the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. XXX

G.R. No. 225059, July 23, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It is a long-standing rule that in rape cases, an accused may be convicted based on the
victim's sole testimony, provided that it is logical, credible, consistent, and convincing. The rule
becomes more binding where - as in the instant case - the victims are young and immature, not
only because of their relative vulnerability, but also because of the shame and embarrassment
which they stand to suffer during trial, if indeed the matters to be testified on were untrue.
FACTS
"BBB" is the daughter of the accused, [XXX]. She is the only girl in the brood of three.
Her mother is a manicurist while the accused is a pedicab driver. She recounted that on four
different occasions, her father ravished her, inside their residence. Four (4) separate
Informations for rape were filed in the RTC against XXX for four (4) counts of rape committed
against BBB.
During the arraignment, XXX pleaded "not guilty" to all charges. He claimed that there
is no truth in the charges against him stating that his daughter is "isip bata" and was
influenced by her friend with whom she is currently living with.
In the RTC Decision, XXX was found guilty on all four (4) counts of rape and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each charge. The RTC, in
considering the evidence on record, found BBB's testimony to be straightforward and
credible as against XXX's unsubstantiated defense of denial and alibi. Likewise, XXX's
imputation of ill motive to BBB was considered by the RTC as "too petty to merit belief. The
CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE
Whether XXX's guilt for the four counts of rape was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
YES. The Court found the appeal lacks merit as the evidence against XXX was
sufficient to prove that he is guilty.
It is a long-standing rule that in rape cases, an accused may be convicted based on the
victim's sole testimony, provided that it is logical, credible, consistent, and convincing. The
rule becomes more binding where - as in the instant case - the victims are young and
immature, not only because of their relative vulnerability, but also because of the shame and
embarrassment which they stand to suffer during trial, if indeed the matters to be testified
on were untrue.
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The testimony of BBB had established sufficient evidence that showed that the
appellant committed the offense charged in the four (4) information. BBB’s testimony was
able to prove that appellant was able to rape her using force and intimidation in the four (4)
separate occasions. Significantly, BBB's narration of events was corroborated by the physical
evidence, as contained in the medico-legal report which the findings was consistent with the
testimony given by the victim.
The Court has held on several occasions that when a rape victim's account is
straightforward and candid and is further corroborated by the medical findings of the
examining physician, such testimony is sufficient to support a conviction. As correctly
pointed out in the questioned Decision, BBB was able to describe in clear detail how each
incident of rape was committed by XXX. Moreover, the RTC, after observing BBB's manner
and demeanor firsthand during trial, was sufficiently convinced of her credibility and the
truthfulness of her testimony. Hence, the prosecution’s evidence prevail over the XXX's
defense of alibi and denial.
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JACINTO ANDES Y LORILLA

DOCTRINE
In rape cases, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone, uncorroborated
testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is clear, convincing, and otherwise
consistent with human nature. This is a matter best assigned to the trial court which had the
first-hand opportunity to hear the testimonies of the witnesses and observe their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude during cross-examination. Such matters cannot be gathered from a mere
reading of the transcripts of stenographic notes. Hence, the trial court's findings carry very
great weight and substance.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Andes for the rape of AAA. It was alleged that while
the private complainant, AAA, was sleeping with her 4 year old son in bed inside the room of
their house, she was awakened when suddenly somebody covered her mouth, and told her
not to shout and simultaneously poked a knife on her neck, saying, "don't shout, I will kill
you and your son.” While it was dark, she identified that person as the accused Andes through
his voice and the words he uttered. She did not resist in doing what was commanded of her
because she was thinking of the safety of her son as he could stab and kill him. The accused
had sexual intercourse with her twice.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted Andes of the crime charged. It found AAA's
identification of Andes sufficient. likewise held that Andes' defense of denial could not
prevail over the positive identification by AAA. Lastly, the RTC found AAA's testimony
spontaneous and credible after it had observed the demeanors of both AAA and Andes on
the witness stand.
In the appeal, Andes raised questions on the believability of AAA's testimony, and if
the element of coercion or intimidation was sufficiently proven. Still, the CA affirmed the
conviction of Andes.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Andes.
RULING
NO. The two elements of rape - viz.: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the
girl, and (2) that such act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation- are
both present as duly proven by the prosecution in this case. AAA was able to testify in detail
how Andes committed the rape. AAA's testimony, found to be clear, straightforward, and
believable, was given weight and credence not just by the RTC, but also by the CA upon
appeal.
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In rape cases, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone, uncorroborated
testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is clear, convincing, and otherwise
consistent with human nature. This is a matter best assigned to the trial court which had the
first-hand opportunity to hear the testimonies of the witnesses and observe their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude during cross-examination. Such matters cannot be gathered from a
mere reading of the transcripts of stenographic notes. Hence, the trial court's findings carry
very great weight and substance.
According to Andes, it was improbable that AAA was already able to grab the handle
of his supposed knife, and yet she failed to take advantage, and her supposed admission that
no weapon was used during the rapes. For Andes, it was an admission that force or
intimidation was absent during the time the rape was supposedly committed. Nonetheless,
the Court held that AAA sufficiently explained that despite the fact that no weapon was poked
at her body at the time the actual rapes were committed, she was of the belief that maybe
Andes was still holding the weapon and that she could not ascertain where the weapon was
because it was dark. It is established that the law does not impose on the rape victim the
burden of proving resistance. In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light
of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not
by any hard and fast rule
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HENRY DE VERA Y MEDINA

DOCTRINE
Strict compliance — not just substantial compliance — is required of the mandatory
provisions of Sec. 21. The Court cannot absolve the failure of the buy-bust team to comply fully
with Sec. 21 for its successful observance of only some of the law's provisions. Selective and
partial compliance is tantamount to non-compliance which, as have been repeatedly
emphasized, is fatal to establishing the corpus delicti. Then, unless excused by the saving clause,
the acquittal of the accused must follow. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties cannot apply where there is a clear violation of Sec. 21. In such cases, the
innocence of the accused, as presumed, must be upheld.
FACTS
According to the prosecution, a walk-in Confidential Informant (CI) went to the Office
of the City Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (CAIDSOTG) of the Baguio City
Police Office and reported that a certain Henry, who turned out to be De Vera, a drug pusher,
offered to sell shabu worth P5,000.00. Thereafter, a buy-bust team was formed and later on
proceeded to the meet-up place.
Upon arrival of De Vera, the CI introduced SPO2 Dolinta as the buyer. SPO2 Dolinta
brought out the buy-bust money worth P5,000 which he counted and handed to De Vera. De
Vera, in turn, brought out a purse from his front pocket, opened the same and took out one
(1) plastic sachet which contained white crystalline substance (drugs subject of sale). After
assessing the item as shabu, the buy-bust team arrested De Vera. Upon frisking, PO2
Charmino recovered from De Vera the purse containing three (3) more plastic sachets of
suspected shabu (drugs subject of the possession case) and 42 pieces of transparent empty
plastic sachets which PO2 Charmino marked by putting his initials, date and signature
thereon.
Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought De Vera to the CAIDSOTG office where the
inventory of the confiscated items was conducted in the presence of elected Barangay
Tibong, media representative from ABS-CBN, Meilen B. Pacio and DOJ representative,
Prosecutor Sudaypan. Thereafter, with a request for qualitative examination, all four (4)
seized drugs were brought to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office, Camp Bado Dangwa
(Crime Lab), for examination. The results yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
From the time of their seizure from De Vera to their submission to the Crime Lab,
SPO2 Dolinta held custody of the drugs subject of sale and the buy-bust money while PO2
Charmino held custody of the drugs subject of the possession case and the 42 pieces of
transparent plastic sachets.
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Case Digests
The RTC found De Vera is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the separate crimes of
sale and possession of illegal drugs. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
ISSUE
Whether accused-appellant De Vera is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the separate
crimes of sale and possession of illegal drugs as defined and punished under Sec. 5 and Sec.
11, respectively, both under Article II of RA 9165
RULING
NO. The buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Sec. 21 of RA 9165,
specifically, with the required inventory and photographing of the seized dangerous drugs
in the presence of the three (3) insulating witnesses and immediately after seizure and
confiscation.
Under Sec. 21 of, the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs must be at
the place of apprehension and/or seizure. Likewise, the three (3) mandatory witnesses —
the elected public official and the DOJ and media representatives — must already be
physically present at the time of and at or near the place of apprehension and seizure.
However, the records show no attempt by the buy-bust team to secure the presence
of the three (3) witnesses to be present at the time and place of the alleged confiscation of
the drugs. Instead, what is evident is that the witnesses' presence were only secured upon
return of the buy-bust team to CAIDSOTG office, and during the inventory of the seized items.
Further, the buy-bust team failed to conduct a physical inventory and photographing of the
seized drugs immediately after and at the place of confiscation as required. Significantly, no
photographs at all of the drugs and drug paraphernalia alleged to have been confiscated from
De Vera were presented.
Apart from the three (3) insulating witnesses, Sec. 21 requires that the physical
inventory and photographing be likewise made in the presence of the accused or his his/her
representative or counsel. In the present case, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence
concerning the presence of De Vera during the photographing, physical inventory and
marking of the seized items.
Strict compliance — not just substantial compliance — is required of the mandatory

provisions of Sec. 21. The Court cannot absolve the failure of the buy-bust team to comply
fully with Sec. 21 for its successful observance of only some of the law's provisions. Selective
and partial compliance is tantamount to non-compliance which, as have been repeatedly
emphasized, is fatal to establishing the corpus delicti. Then, unless excused by the saving
clause, the acquittal of the accused must follow.
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Courts must apply strictly the requirements of Sec. 21. The presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties cannot apply where there is a clear violation of Sec. 21.
In such cases, the innocence of the accused, as presumed, must be upheld.
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICKY GONZALES Y COS AND RENE GONZALES Y COS
G.R. No. 218946, September 05, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It does not always follow that if the attack was sudden and unexpected, it should
necessarily be deemed as an attack attended with treachery. In fact, the wounds of the victim
show that the attack was frontal, which indicates that the deceased was not totally without
opportunity to defend himself. Moreover, the stabbing, based on the evidence, appears to be the
result of a rash and impetuous impulse of the moment arising from the commotion between
Bobby and Rene which Ricky witnessed, rather than from a deliberated act of the will. As far as
the prosecution's evidence is concerned, it was only able to establish the following: (a) a
commotion was caused when Rene and Bobby were taunting each other; (b) Rene punched
Bobby and (c) Ricky went out of the plaza and stabbed Bobby. Considering the foregoing, it was
not proven that Ricky deliberately and consciously employed means, methods, or forms in the
execution of the criminal act to ensure that Bobby could not defend himself. Thus, it is not
possible to appreciate treachery against Ricky.
FACTS
Ricky and his brother and co-accused Rene Gonzales (Rene) were charged with the
crime of murder.
According to prosecution witness Leo, at around 1:00 am, he was awakened from
sleep by the cry of his child whose sleep was disturbed by the commotion outside their
house. Leo got up to investigate and, at the same time, to buy cigarettes. Leo then discovered
that the commotion came from the house of his neighbor, Bobby. Bobby and his nephew,
Rene, were outside Bobby's house and were taunting each other. This confrontation led to
Rene punching Bobby who failed to retaliate. Ricky then emerged from the plaza, which was
five meters away from Leo's house, and without warning stabbed Bobby three times with a
knife which was approximately nine inches long. Bobby was hit at his left forearm, middle of
his chest, and at his stomach. When people started arriving to help the victim, Rene and Ricky
escaped together.
Ricky admitted that he stabbed and killed the victim, but only because it was
necessary to defend himself. On that day, on his way home from a benefit dance in the plaza,
he passed by the house of Bobby and observed that Bobby was staring at him in a bad way.
Ricky claimed that he saw Bobby was about to strike him with a knife, but he was fortunate
enough to stab him first. When someone fired a warning shot to stop them, he ran away but
later voluntarily surrendered himself to their barangay captain upon knowing that Bobby
died.
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The RTC found Ricky guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. It held that since
there was treachery in Ricky's sudden and unexpected attack, the killing was qualified to
murder. The CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the prosecution failed to prove treachery
RULING
YES. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission without risk of himself.
In this case, the prosecution was unable to prove that Ricky intentionally sought the
victim for the purpose of killing him. Well settled is the rule that the circumstances which
would qualify a killing to murder must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself. There
must be a showing, first and foremost, that the offender consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended
directly to insure such execution, without risk to himself.
Indeed, it does not always follow that if the attack was sudden and unexpected, it
should necessarily be deemed as an attack attended with treachery. In fact, the wounds of
the victim show that the attack was frontal, which indicates that the deceased was not totally
without opportunity to defend himself. Moreover, the stabbing, based on the evidence,
appears to be the result of a rash and impetuous impulse of the moment arising from the
commotion between Bobby and Rene which Ricky witnessed, rather than from a deliberated
act of the will. As far as the prosecution's evidence is concerned, it was only able to establish
the following: (a) a commotion was caused when Rene and Bobby were taunting each other;
(b) Rene punched Bobby and (c) Ricky went out of the plaza and stabbed Bobby. Considering
the foregoing, it was not proven that Ricky deliberately and consciously employed means,
methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act to ensure that Bobby could not defend
himself. Thus, it is not possible to appreciate treachery against Ricky.
Therefore, with the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime is
homicide and not murder.
Page 69 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AQUIL PILPA Y DIPAZ

G.R. No. 225336, September 05, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It was error for both the RTC and the CA to conclude that the killing was attended by
the qualifying circumstance of treachery simply because the attack was "sudden,"
"unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation." It does not always follow that
because the attack is sudden and unexpected, it is tainted with treachery.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Pilpa for the murder of Dave Alde. Prosecution
eyewitness Barangay Tanon Leonila Abuel went to Quirino Highway, Pandacan to look for a
certain Reynan. When she arrived at the highway, she saw a group of five persons which
include Alde, Carol, Eva and two other people the names of which she failed to remember.
She approached the said group and asked if they knew the whereabouts of Reynan to which
Carol answered in the negative. While still talking to the group, another group of five men,
which included one named JR and appellant Pilpa arrived. At this point, JR stabbed Alde on
the chest with a big knife while appellant was positioned at the back of Leonila. After JR
stabbed Alde, Pilpa, who was a mere arms-length away from Leonila, poised to thrust Alde
as well. At this point, witness Leonila tried to intervene by announcing her position as
Barangay Tanod but appellant disregarded said intervention by uttering "wala kaming
pakialam kahit Barangay Tanod ka." Witness Leonila sustained injuries as she attempted to
parry the thrusts. Appellant's attempts to stab Alde ultimately failed because Choy, a
companion of Alde, was able to parry the thrusts. Leonila then ordered Alde to run away
which he was able to do despite his wounds, but appellant and his group gave chase.
Thereafter, appellant and his group scampered away.
Subsequently, Alde was brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be given timely medical
attention. However, after an operation, Alde went into cardiac arrest and succumbed to
death.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted Pilpa of the crime of Murder. The RTC
held that Pilpa was liable - although it was only the certain "JR" who was able to inflict stab
wounds on the victim - because there was conspiracy among the assailants of Alde. As
conspiracy was present, the RTC ruled that all of the assailants were liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the
commission of the crime perpetrated in furtherance of such conspiracy. The RTC also found
that treachery attended the killing of Alde, hence Pilpa was liable for Murder instead of
Homicide. The CA affirmed the RTC’s conviction of Pilpa.
ISSUES
1. Whether the CA erred in convicting Pilpa despite the prosecution's failure to
prove that conspiracy exists (NO)
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2. Whether the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery

(YES)
RULING
It is well-established that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is the
unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. There is conspiracy if at the
time of the commission of the offense, the acts of two or more accused show that they were
animated by the same criminal purpose and were united in their execution, or where the acts
of the malefactors indicate a concurrence of sentiments, a joint purpose and a concerted
action. In the present case, both the RTC and CA correctly inferred from the collective acts of
the assailants that conspiracy exists despite the absence of direct evidence to the effect.
To prove conspiracy, it is not needed that a meeting between the perpetrators be

proven. Such conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct before and immediately after the
act of the people involved. The conduct of appellant and "JR" in approaching the group of
Alde, stabbing him and running after him, indubitably shows that they had agreed to kill him.
After the incident, appellant was also found to be in "JR"s home. It is contrary to human
experience and logic to be present at the home of a friend who had just stabbed another
without being aware of such occurrence as appellant alleges.
On the other hand, It was error for both the RTC and the CA to conclude that the killing
was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery simply because the attack was
"sudden," "unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation." It does not always follow
that because the attack is sudden and unexpected, it is tainted with treachery.
In the case at bar, the testimonies reveal that the assailants attacked the victim while
the latter was having a seemingly random conversation with four friends in a public highway,
and even in the presence of a barangay tanod, who later joined the group. Under these
circumstances, the Court finds it difficult to agree that the assailants, including Pilpa,
deliberately chose a particular mode of attack that purportedly ensured the execution of the
criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim
might offer. In addition, the attack itself was frontal.
Page 71 of 435
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WILLIAM VILLAROS Y CARANTO

G.R. No. 228779, October 08, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or in
accordance with society's expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational
reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected to
act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human
mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard
reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with
different circumstances.
FACTS
Two (2) separate Informations were filed against the accused-appellant for the rape
of minor AAA. The incidents occurred inside the house of the victim. On November 29, 2009,
the victim went inside the bathroom beside the room of accused. She was still there when
accused Villaros peeped inside. When the said victim came out from the room, the accused
told her to buy cigarettes. The victim could not look at the accused when she gave the
cigarette to him as he was then only wearing shorts. Upon receiving the cigarette, the accused
pulled the victim inside his bedroom and closed the door. Accused Villaros who was then
already naked told the victim to remove her clothes while he was covering her mouth. At the
said time at around 6 o'clock in the afternoon there were no other persons inside the house
because the victim's mother and stepfather were at work. As the victim refuses to remove
her clothes, accused Villaros was the one who did so. The victim tried resisting but accused
Villaros covered her mouth with one hand while the other held her hands. Even when the
victim was petrified, she addressed the accused "Tito" as a sign of respect. After removing
the victim's clothes, accused Villaros made her lie down on foam which he used as a bed.
While crying, the accused touches the private part of the victim for about twenty (20)
minutes and then mounted on top of her inserting his sexual organ into her private part.
When done, the accused told the victim to dress up which she immediately did so and walked
out of the room.
During the incident that transpired on December 27, 2009 at 6 o'clock in the evening
the victim was alone in the house when the accused again sexually abused her. The victim
cried and felt hurt when accused inserted his sexual organ into her private part. One of the
accused's hands covered the victim's mouth while his other hand removes his shorts. The
accused remained on top of the victim for fifteen (15) minutes after the intercourse and then
hurriedly left. The accused warned the victim that he would hurt the victim's siblings if she
will not let him do what he wanted..
For the defense, Villaros testified that he knows the victim because she lives in the
house of his brother DDD, who is also the victim's stepfather. Their houses are adjacent to
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one another. The accused denies that he had sex with the victim. He claims that the victim is
just trying to ruin his reputation.
The RTC convicted Villaros of the crime charged. It held that Villaros took advantage
of his moral authority, as he was the brother of the stepfather of the victim, and likewise
employed force, threats, and intimidation to accomplish his lewd design. The RTC, however,
did not appreciate any of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances alleged. The CA
affirmed the RTC’s conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant
RULING
NO. The two elements of rape — (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the
girl, and (2) that such act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation — are
both present as duly proven by the prosecution in this case. AAA testified in detail how the
accused-appellant committed the sexual abuses, and this testimony was given weight and
credence by both the RTC and the CA. In rape cases, the accused may be convicted on the
basis of the lone, uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony
is clear, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature. This is a matter best
assigned to the trial court which had the first-hand opportunity to hear the testimonies of
the witnesses and observe their demeanor, conduct, and attitude during cross-examination.
Such matters cannot be gathered from a mere reading of the transcripts of stenographic
notes. Hence, the trial court's findings carry great weight and substance.
Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or in

accordance with society's expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational
reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected
to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human
mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard
reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with
different circumstances.
Additionally, the accused-appellant brazenly blames the victim for "exposing herself
to further abuse,” since she still went at their house after the first incident. The Court held
that such reasoning is outrageous, if not outright despicable. In his desperate attempt to
exculpate himself from criminal liability, the accused-appellant turned on his victim who, to
repeat, was a minor at the time the rape incidents were committed, and blamed her for
putting herself in a vulnerable position in her own home.
Further, the fact that the accused-appellant did not use any weapon is immaterial,
especially since the victim in this case was just 12 or 13 years old at the time of the incidents.
Moreover, this case involves a rape of a close kin. In rapes committed by a close kin, it is not
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necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy

takes the place of violence or intimidation. The fact that the accused-appellant was only a
"brother of her stepfather" does not diminish the fact that he exercised moral influence over
the minor, much more so in this case where they actually live together in the same house.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WELITO SERAD Y RAVILLES A.K.A. "WACKY"

DOCTRINE
While the Court emphasizes the importance of strictly following the procedure outlined
in Section 21, it likewise recognizes that there may be instances where a slight deviation from
the said procedure is justifiable and subsequent earnest efforts were made to comply with the
mandated procedure, much like in this case where the officers showed that they did their duties
bearing in mind the requirements of the law. In short, it would be error for the Court not to
reward such compliance.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Wacky for violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.
The prosecution averred that Office of Task Force Kasaligan in Negros Oriental was informed
by a confidential informant that Wacky was engaged in the illegal sale of drugs at his home.
As appellant was included in the Task Force's anti-narcotics operation target list, SA Miguel
Dungog, team leader of the Task Force, decided to carry out a buy-bust operation.
PO2 Ayunting and the confidential informant transacted with Wacky outside the
latter's house. After telling Wacky that Ayunting and the confidential informant intend to
purchase shabu worth four thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500.00), Wacky agreed to sell
and asked them to wait outside while he went to get the drugs inside the house. Upon his
return, appellant was in possession of one (1) plastic sachet which appeared to be containing
shabu. While Wacky handed the plastic sachet to the confidential informant, PO2 Ayunting
made the [pre]-arranged signal (drop call) to SPO2 Germodo. Upon receipt of the drop call,
the Task Force members proceeded to the area.
As Wacky demanded payment, PO2 Ayunting handed him the marked money and got
the plastic sachet from the confidential informant to confirm if it was shabu. At this moment,
Wacky noticed the arrival of the backup team, prompting him to flee.
PO2 Ayunting placed the plastic sachet inside his pocket and proceeded to run after
Wacky. The other members of the Task Force joined the pursuit. During the chase, Wacky
threw the marked money previously paid to him. He was caught by PO2 Ayunting with the
aid of SPO2 Germodo and the rest of the backup team, forty (40) or fifty (50) meters away
from where the sale took place. Speaking in the Visayan dialect, SPO2 Germodo informed
Wacky of their authority as police officers, and accordingly, arrested him. He was likewise
informed of the cause of his arrest and of his Constitutional rights. While PO2 Ayunting held
the accused, the rest of the members of the Task Force returned to the area to recover
marked money thrown away by Wacky. However, SPO2 Germodo was only able to get back
a single five hundred peso (P500) bill. PO2 Ayunting marked the transparent plastic sachet
with "WS-BB," which stood for "Wellito Serad[-]Buy Bust." After recovering the marked
money, SPO2 Germodo conducted an inventory of the item bought from Wacky.
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The inventory was held at the place where Wacky was arrested and in the presence
of the required witnesses, which included a local media practitioner, a DOJ representative
and PDEA representative. Another witness to the inventory, Dandan Teves Leon (Dumaguete
City Kagawad), was not present at the place of the arrest, but he was present at the NBI-
Dumaguete District Office. PO2 Ayunting took pictures of the marked money recovered by
members of the Task Force and the plastic sachet bought from Wacky.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted Wacky of the crime charged. The CA
affirmed the RTC’s conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in finding Wacky guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165
RULING
NO. Section 21 of the law plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same immediately after seizure
and confiscation in the presence of the accused, with (1) an elected public official, (2) a
representative of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and (3) a representative of the media, all
of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
While the police officers were not able to explain why only two of the three required
witnesses were at the place of arrest – and why no elected official was available – the police
officers nevertheless showed earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure. To
ensure that the integrity of the seized items were preserved, the police officers conducted a
preliminary inventory at the place of the arrest as preferred by law. Recognizing that what
was done was not strictly compliant with the law, the police officers conducted another
inventory, this time in the police station where all the three required witnesses were
available and were, in fact, present.
While the Court emphasizes the importance of strictly following the procedure
outlined in Section 21, it likewise recognizes that there may be instances where a slight
deviation from the said procedure is justifiable and subsequent earnest efforts were made
to comply with the mandated procedure, much like in this case where the officers showed
that they did their duties bearing in mind the requirements of the law. In short, it would be
error for the Court not to reward such compliance.
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ALBERTO GRANTON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
Settled is the rule that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since
when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been sexually violated, she says in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Furthermore, even granting that
appellant was correct in saying that the medical certificate did not establish his guilt with
reasonable certainty, it is noteworthy that expert testimony is merely corroborative in
character and not essential to conviction since an accused can still be convicted of rape on the
basis of the sole testimony of the private complainant.
FACTS
Housekeeper NNN was cleaning the house when she noticed blood in the
undergarments of CCC, the two (2)-year old daughter of MMM and FFF. The undergarments
had two blood stains - one was already brown but the other is still fresh and red. At first, she
thought CCC was suffering from a Urinary Tract Infection (UTI).
The following day, when NNN was about to do the laundry, once again, she saw one
of CCC's undergarments stained with blood. The day after, NNN noticed another of CCC's
undergarments with blood stains. It was then that she started having misgivings whether it
was really UTI that had been causing all these blood stains.
NNN asked CCC if she was "touched" by her "Tito Ambet" (referring to appellant). She
suspected appellant to have something to do with the blood stains found on the
undergarments because of his close familiarity with the child - appellant being a distant
relative of FFF and hired by the latter to feed his flock of fighting cocks on several occasions.
Appellant likewise resides in the house of spouses FFF-MMM and at times he was free to hug
and touch the child. CCC answered "yes", and demonstrated a push-and-pull movement of
her index finger. NNN likewise asked SSS, the elder sister of CCC, if she had seen appellant
touching the genitalia of her younger sister. SSS answered in the affirmative. NNN told the
spouses FFF-MMM about what appellant had done to their child. CCC was then brought to
the municipal hospital for physical examination.
Two (2) separate Informations for Rape through Sexual Assault were filed against
Alberto. The RTC found Alberto guilty of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of Alberto.
ISSUE
Whether the CA committed reversible error in finding Alberto guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of Rape through Sexual Assault.
RULING
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Settled is the rule that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit,
since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been sexually violated, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Furthermore, Even granting
that appellant was correct in saying that the medical certificate did not establish his guilt
with reasonable certainty, it is noteworthy that expert testimony is merely corroborative in
character and not essential to conviction since an accused can still be convicted of rape on
the basis of the sole testimony of the private complainant.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RENATO BACOLOT Y IDLISAN

DOCTRINE
For the defense of insanity to be successfully invoked as a circumstance to evade criminal
liability, it is necessary that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged. In short, in
order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must
successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence; and (2) such complete
deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission
of the offense. Having invoked the defense of insanity, accused-appellant is deemed to have
admitted the commission of the crime. Accordingly, he has the onus to establish with certainty
that he was completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental condition or illness.
FACTS
An Information was filed charging Renato of the crime of murder. Upon arraignment,
Renato's counsel manifested that Renato was suffering from mental disorder and requested
for his examination, which the RTC granted. The medical report submitted by Dr. Genotiva
of the EVRMC affirmed that Renato was mentally incompetent to stand for trial; hence, trial
was suspended and Renato was sent to the National Center for Mental Health for further
evaluation and treatment. Later on, the RTC received a letter from the Chief of the Forensic
Psychiatry Section of the National Center for Mental Health, attesting that Renato had
regained competency to stand trial and recommended his discharge. Subsequently, Renato
was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution witness Arnulfo, the brother of the victim Rodolfo, testified that on
May 14, 2008, while having a drinking spree with Renato and some other companions,
including Rodolfo who subsequently joined them, Renato suddenly took a scythe (matabia)
from Arnulfo's waist and hacked Rodolfo three times hitting the latter on the neck, back, and
fingers. The hacking happened while Rodolfo was singing with his face turned towards the
television. Renato then turned towards Arnulfo and hacked him too on the neck, head, and
left shoulder. Arnulfo survived, but Rodolfo died.
Renato pleaded insanity as defense. His lone witness, Dr. Genotiva, testified that she
had previously examined Renato in the year 2005 prior to his arrest. That was when Renato
tried to burn himself and had to be admitted for his suicidal tendencies. Dr. Genotiva
diagnosed Renato then as having "auditory hallucinations, depressed mood with appropriate
effect," and was "able to converse, but he was not oriented to time and place, he had poor
memory recall of the incidents, and he had blank stares." Dr. Genotiva again examined
Renato after his arrest. Recent psychological tests led her to recommend against Renato's
trial as he still had psychotic trends despite his calm behavior. According to Dr. Genotiva,
Renato had poor memory recall of the incidents relating to the commission of the crime and
that he did not know what he did at the time. Also, Renato showed not only psychotic trends,
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but a full-blown psychosis, and that his schizophrenia had no chance of being completely
healed.
The RTC convicted Renato of the crime of murder. The RTC emphasized that the
defense did not deny that Renato killed Rodolfo, but failed to present evidence to support
Renato's plea of insanity. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction.
ISSUES
1. Whether the CA gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged despite the fact that the defense was able to prove insanity (NO)
2. Whether the CA gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of murder
despite the prosecution's failure to establish the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation (YES)
RULING
Accused-appellant's defense of insanity was not proven. For this defense to be
successfully invoked to evade criminal liability, it is necessary that insanity must relate to
the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense. The
accused must successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence; and (2)
such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before
the commission of the offense. Having invoked the defense of insanity, accused-appellant is
deemed to have admitted the commission of the crime. Accordingly, he has the onus to
establish with certainty that he was completely deprived of intelligence because of his
mental condition or illness.
There was no finding whatsoever that accused-appellant exhibited any of the myriad
symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the
hacking of Rodolfo. Furthermore, the Court agrees with the CA that the defense of insanity is
belied by the following circumstances: First, his claim that he has absolutely no recollection
of the hacking incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. It
has been held that the professed inability of the accused to recall events before and after the
stabbing incident, as in the instant case, does not necessarily indicate an aberrant mind, but
is more indicative of a concocted excuse to exculpate himself. Second, accused-appellant's
voluntary surrender the following day belies his claim of insanity. This act tends to establish
that he was well aware of what he had just committed, and that he was capable of
discernment. Lastly, the testimony of Dr. Genotiva failed to show the mental condition of
accused-appellant between 2005 and 2008.
On the other hand, the prosecution failed to prove treachery. The following circumstances
negate the presence of treachery: First, the stabbing incident happened during a drinking
spree in which accused-appellant was a part. He did not deliberately seek the presence of the
victim as he was already in the same vicinity as the latter when he hacked the victim. Second,
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in killing the victim, accused-appellant did not even use his own weapon – he merely took a
scythe from Arnulfo. Therefore, the crime is homicide and not murder.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALGLEN REYES Y PAULINA

DOCTRINE
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged
in the Information. The test in determining whether the information validly charges an offense
is whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish the essential
elements of the offense charged as defined in the law.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Reyes in this case, the accusatory portion of which
reads as follows:
“That on or about 12:15 in the early dawn of July 5, 2011 in Brgy. Malindong,
Binmaley, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or "shabu", a dangerous drug, without any authority to sell the same.
Contrary to Section 5, Article II, of RA 9165”
The prosecution’s version of facts are as follows: A buy-bust operation was planned
against the accused. The buy-bust team proceeded to the target area and waited for the
accused to arrive. When he showed up, the posuer-buyer approached the accused, saying:
"This is the money, so give me the thing that I will buy." Accused handed one (1) small plastic
sachet containing shabu in exchange for the marked P500.00 bill. Thereafter, the accused
was arrested. The police frisked the accused and recovered from his right pocket three (3)
plastic sachets containing suspected shabu. Other items confiscated were bills, a key chain
with two keys, a lighter, a Nokia cellular phone, and a motorcycle. Vaquilar inscribed his
initials "JBV" on the four (4) sachets containing suspected shabu at the place of arrest and
immediately after he seized them from accused. He also prepared a Confiscation Receipt.
Thereafter, the officers brought the accused to the police station and turned him over,
together with the seized items, to the investigator on duty, SPO4 Guillermo Gutierrez.
Candelario prepared a request for laboratory examination of the seized specimens and drug
test on the person of the accused. The request and the specimens were delivered by Gutierrez
to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Urdaneta City on the same day.
The RTC convicted Reyes of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Reyes
RULING
YES. The Information filed against Reyes in this case was defective, for which reason
alone Reyes should be acquitted. The importance of sufficiency of the Information cannot be
more emphasized; it is an essential component of the right to due process in criminal
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proceedings as the accused possesses the right to be sufficiently informed of the cause of the
accusation against him.
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged
in the Information. The test in determining whether the information validly charges an
offense is whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish
the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law.
In the case at bar, the Information filed against Reyes failed to sufficiently identify
therein all the components of the first element of the crime of sale of dangerous drugs,
namely: the identity of the buyer, the object, and the consideration.
Even assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that the Information in this case
sufficiently informed Reyes of the charge against him, Reyes would still be acquitted on the
ground that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti has thus been compromised
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 requires that (1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and
photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or
counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In the present case, not one of the three required witnesses was present at the time
of seizure and apprehension and even during the conduct of the inventory. Furthermore,
there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the apprehending police officers to
look for the said representatives.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PATRICK JOHN MERCADO Y ANTICLA

DOCTRINE
Time and again, this Court has ruled that denial is the weakest of all defenses. It easily
crumbles in the face of positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. A
denial, like other defenses, remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence which is
independently assessed. When the evidence for the prosecution convincingly connects the crime
and the culprit, the probative value of the denial is negligible.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Mercado for the murders of his aunt Alicia and her
live-in partner, Evelyn. The victims are partners who lived together in a house located in
Bulacan. Appellant was the nephew of Alicia. He was enrolled at the nearby STI College in
Sta. Maria, Bulacan, and used to live in the same house.
It appears that around 11:00 PM of October 14, 2007, appellant was already inside
the house, having come home from school. Around 2:00 AM of October 15, 2007, the house
of Evelyn and Alicia was reported to be on fire. While the house was burning, Evelyn and
appellant were observed on the terrace supposedly trying to find a way to escape the blaze.
Eventually, through the help of neighbors, Evelyn and appellant were brought out of the
burning house. Evelyn looked weak and unable to walk as she was badly burnt. She also had
blood oozing out of the right side of her head.
Witnesses declared that as soon as Evelyn was carried out to safety, she promptly
accused and pointed to appellant as the person responsible for attacking her and Alicia as
well as for setting the house on fire. Specifically, Evelyn claimed that appellant hit her and
Alicia with a baseball bat then set them on fire. One witness heard Evelyn say: "ilayo ninyo
sa akin yang si Patrick dahil siya ang pumalo sa aking ulo at nagsunog ng bahay." Another
witness stated hearing the following utterances from Evelyn: "Kuya, wag mo akong iwan
papatayin ako ng pamangkin ko," referring to appellant, and "ilayo nyo sa akin si Patrick
dahil yan ang papatay sa amin." Still, another witness claimed to have heard Evelyn say:
"Ilayo nyo sa akin yan batang yan. Yan ang papatay sa akin. Yan ang sumunog sa amin. Yan
ang pumalo sa ulo namin." Further, while on board the ambulance on the way to the hospital,
Evelyn repeated the name of appellant as the culprit who caused their injuries and burned
the house. Thus, she uttered: "Te, si Patrick ang may gawa," "Si Patrick sinunog kami," and
"Si Patrick ang pumalo sa akin. Si Patrick ang sumunog sa amin, pati sa bahay." Despite
medical attention, Evelyn succumbed to her injuries and died.
Mercado, vehemently denied the charge against him. Dan Dacallos, a neighbor of
Patrick testified that, he was sleeping when he heard someone shouting "sunog". He checked
and saw a smoke coming out from the house of Patrick and also saw an unidentified bloodied
man coming out. He then saw Patrick throwing water on the burning house while at the
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terrace. He did not report having seen the bloodied man to the authorities because of his
minority and since his parents did not want him to get involved.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted Mercado of the crime of Double Murder.
The RTC held that although the evidence of the prosecution relied heavily on what appears
to be hearsay evidence, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were still admissible
because they were the dying declarations of Evelyn, and these were admissible under Section
37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The RTC further held that the crime committed was the
complex crime of Double Murder – instead of two counts of Murder – and sentenced him
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in convicting Mercado despite the prosecution's failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
RULING
NO. The testimony failed to overcome the credibility and probative value of the dying
declarations and/or part of the res gestae of Evelyn Santos which were recounted by several
witnesses. Time and again, this Court has ruled that denial is the weakest of all defenses. It
easily crumbles in the face of positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime. A denial, like other defenses, remains subject to the strength of the prosecution
evidence which is independently assessed. When the evidence for the prosecution
convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the probative value of the denial is
negligible.
As an exception to the hearsay rule, a dying declaration is admissible as evidence

because it is "evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person
aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.
In any event, even if the statements of Evelyn would not qualify as dying declarations,
they are nevertheless admissible in evidence because they are part of the res gestae. A
declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res
gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. Applying
the foregoing to the present case, the statements of Evelyn were clearly part of the res gestae.
The fire – which caused severe injuries on her body, destroyed her house, and killed her live-
in partner – was undeniably a startling occurrence. Evelyn's statements were made
immediately after she was rescued, and when she was clearly suffering from the pain caused
by her injuries, thereby negating any possibility of her contriving or manufacturing a lie. The
statements were also undoubtedly about the startling occurrence as Evelyn repeatedly
claimed that Mercado was the one who attacked them, and thereafter set the house on fire.
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Further, for voluntary surrender to mitigate the offense, the following elements must
be present: (a) the offender has not actually been arrested; (b) the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. In the present case,
Mercado did not actually surrender. Instead, he simply did not offer any resistance when so
arrested.
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DOCTRINE
For the guidance of public prosecutors and the courts, the Court took the opportunity to
prescribe the following guidelines in designating or charging the proper offense in case
lascivious conduct is committed under Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in determining the
imposable penalty: 1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or
charging the offense, and in determining the imposable penalty. 2. If the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610." Pursuant to the
second proviso in Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in
its medium period. 3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12)
but below eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old or older but is unable to fully
take care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, the crime should be
designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable
penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
FACTS
An Information was filed against XXX for the rape of AAA in 2003. The latter testified
that Sometime in July 2003, around 8:30 in the morning, while she was inside their house in
xxxx [CCC], appellant raped her by inserting his penis into her vagina. She was 10 years old
at that time. She was lying on the bed when appellant arrived and laid beside her. Appellant
embraced her while his hands touched her body. She was afraid and immobilized. Appellant
asked her to give him a massage on his chest, but she refused. As result, appellant pulled her
left hand and placed it on his chest as if massaging it, then pulled it down further to his penis.
Appellant only stopped when he heard her mother arrive from the market. He stood from
the bed and told her to fix her appearance. It took her a long time to report the incident
because appellant threatened her mother and older sister. In 2007, when she was already in
3rd year high school, she could no longer take appellant's abuses so she reported it to one of
her teachers.
XXX, on the other hand, admitted that something happened between him and his
daughter, he insisted that the same was consensual and it was even her daughter who
initiated their sexual congress by guiding his hand to her vagina. He assailed the date of
commission of the alleged crime claiming that the incident actually complained of happened
in 2007 and not 2003.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted XXX. It ruled that since XXX admitted that
he did have sexual intercourse with his daughter – although he claimed that it happened in
2007, instead of 2003 – sufficed to convict him of the crime charged since the precise time is
not an essential element of the crime. The CA affirmed the RTC’s conviction.
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ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting XXX
RULING
PARTIALLY ERRED. The Court modified the conviction of XXX from Statutory Rape
to Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. 7610), as
the prosecution was unable to prove that he committed the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
In rape cases in general, the prosecution has the burden to conclusively prove the two
elements of the crime – viz.: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the girl, and (2)
that such act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation. On the other hand,
to convict an accused for Statutory Rape, the prosecution has the burden of proving only the
following: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual
intercourse between the accused and the complainant.
Statutory Rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of

age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. What differentiates it with
other instances of rape is that, proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary,
considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is
below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that the victim does not possess
discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court observes the following guiding principles: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense.
In this case, records would reveal, that the evidence presented by the prosecution
failed to establish that he indeed had sexual intercourse with AAA in 2003, or at the time she
was still 10 years old. The testimony of AAA, establishes that what happened "sometime in
July 2003" was that XXX put her hand on his penis. She likewise testified that nothing else
happened as XXX was interrupted because BBB already arrived from the market. Thus, the
prosecution's evidence failed to establish the most crucial element of the crime of Rape –
that is, the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant.
Neither could XXX be convicted through his admission that he had sexual intercourse
with AAA in 2007. This is because the Information filed in this case accused XXX of having
sexual intercourse with AAA "sometime in July 2003." While it is true, as the RTC and the CA
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held, that the exact place and time of the commission of the crime is not an element of the
crime of Rape, XXX still could not be convicted of the crime for to do so would be to offend
the basic tenets of due process in criminal prosecutions.
For the guidance of public prosecutors and the courts, the Court took the opportunity
to prescribe the following guidelines in designating or charging the proper offense in case
lascivious conduct is committed under Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in determining the
imposable penalty: 1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or
charging the offense, and in determining the imposable penalty. 2. If the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Acts of Lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610."
Pursuant to the second proviso in Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the imposable penalty is
reclusion temporal in its medium period. 3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age,
or more than twelve (12) but below eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old
or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition, the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARMANDO BAGABAY Y MACARAEG

DOCTRINE
Although the attack was sudden and unexpected, the prosecution did not prove that
Armando deliberately chose a particular mode of attack that purportedly ensured the execution
of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim
might offer. As testified to by the witnesses, the incident happened in broad daylight outside a
public place where there were plenty of other people present who could have offered their help.
When aid was easily available to the victim, such as when the attendant circumstances showed
that there were several eyewitnesses, no treachery could be appreciated because if the accused
indeed consciously adopted means to insure the facilitation of the crime, he could have chosen
another place or time
FACTS
An information for Murder was filed against Armando. The prosecution witnesses
testified that in the morning of September 7, 2010, at around 7:00 o'clock, victim Guevarra
unloaded his passengers in front of Dr. Ramon De Santos National High School. While
Guevarra was giving his passengers their change, Armando alighted from his tricycle armed
with a kitchen knife. Without warning, Armando grabbed Guevarra's shoulder and stabbed
the latter twice in rapid successive motions near the heart. Guevarra got off his tricycle and
tried to run away, but Armando pursued him. When Guevarra collapsed on the road,
Armando took this as an opportunity to stab the former one more time. Armando left
thereafter. Gueverra was taken by bystanders to the Guimba District Hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival. Armando, on his part, asserted self-defense.
The RTC found Armando guilty of murder. It ruled that Armando failed to prove that
he acted in self-defense. It also declared that treachery attended the commission of the crime,
considering that Guevarra was stabbed from behind; and that the suddenness and
unexpectedness of the attack were deliberately employed so that the victim would be
deprived of any means to resist it. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Armando's conviction for Murder
RULING
PARTIALLY ERRED. The Court affirmed the conviction of Armando, but only for the
crime of homicide, instead of murder, as the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
proven.
Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the

killing itself. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to
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directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. To appreciate treachery as a qualifying circumstance,
the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in
the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately
or consciously adopted by the assailant.
In this case, although the attack was sudden and unexpected, the prosecution did not
prove that Armando deliberately chose a particular mode of attack that purportedly ensured
the execution of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the defense
that the victim might offer. As testified to by the witnesses, the incident happened in broad
daylight outside a public place where there were plenty of other people present who could
have offered their help. If Armando wanted to make certain that no risk would come to him,
he could have chosen another time and place to stab the victim. In a similar case, the Court
held that when aid was easily available to the victim, such as when the attendant
circumstances showed that there were several eyewitnesses, no treachery could be
appreciated because if the accused indeed consciously adopted means to insure the
facilitation of the crime, he could have chosen another place or time. Thus, the Court can
reasonably conclude that Armando acted impetuously in suddenly stabbing the victim.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SEGUNDO BRICERO Y FERNANDEZ

DOCTRINE
The defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because
of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their
official duties. Nonetheless, such a defense may be given credence when there is sufficient
evidence or proof making it very plausible or true
FACTS
A confidential informant came to the office of the District Anti-Illegal Drugs (DAID) in
Camp Karingal, Quezon City, and reported about the illegal drug activities of an alias Budoy.
Consequently, a buy-bust team was formed. At past 4:00 pm of that same day, the team
proceeded to the target area. The poseur-buyer was accompanied by the confidential
informant, who introduced her to appellant as a friend and a buyer of shabu. When appellant
asked them "kukuha ba kayo? ", the latter expressed their desire to buy shabu. Appellant
thereafter took out from his pocket and handed to a small plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance, which turned out to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu,
in exchange for three hundred pesos, earlier marked. Subsequently, appellants was arrested.
Inventory of the items were made at the place where they were confiscated and
appellant was later turned over to the investigator for further questioning. Immediately
thereafter, PO2 Ortiz personally brought the confiscated items (sic) to PNP Crime Laboratory
for examination.
Appellant denied possession and ownership of the sachet of shabu, contending that
he saw them for the first time at the police station. He alleged that he was inside his house
together with his wife and two children, sleeping. Suddenly, several persons from DAID,
about 15 of them, entered the house. He was handcuffed by a police officer and brought to
DAID office.
An information was filed against Bricero for violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
The RTC convicted him, and the CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE
Whether Bricero's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. The prosecution admittedly failed to prove that the buy-bust team complied with
the mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165.
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In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving
the elements of the crime, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime.
Compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution that follows such
operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. The rule is
imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the
suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said
drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding
of guilt.
In present case, the buy-bust team committed several patent procedural lapses in the
conduct of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug — which thus created
reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drug and, consequently, reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused. First, records show that the apprehending team did not
conduct an inventory nor did it photograph the confiscated item in the presence of the
accused-appellant or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
DOJ, and any elected public official. Second, the inventory was not prepared by the police
officer who recovered the prohibited item. It was prepared by PO1 Jimenez who was not
present at the time and place of apprehension. Third, no photographs of the seized drug were
taken at the place of seizure or at the police station where the inventory was conducted.
Lastly, the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for the failure of the
apprehending team to follow the prescribed procedures.
Further, the Court held that the buy-bust operation was merely fabricated by the
police officers. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught
in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized
but duty bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been
part of or used in the commission of the crime. However, where there really was no buy-bust
operation conducted, it cannot be denied that the elements for illegal sale of prohibited drugs
cannot be duly proved despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty and the seeming straightforward testimony in court by the arresting police officers.
After all, the indictment for illegal sale of prohibited drugs will not have a leg to stand on.
The defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence
because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular
performance of their official duties. Nonetheless, such a defense may be given credence when
there is sufficient evidence or proof making it very plausible or true. Taking into
consideration the defense of denial by Bricero, in light of the testimonies of PO1 Reyes and
PO2 Ortiz, the Court cannot conclude that there was a buy-bust operation conducted by the
arresting police officers as they attested to and testified on. The prosecution's story is like a
sieve full of holes.
Page 93 of 435
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALVIN FATALLO Y ALECARTE A.K.A. "ALVIN PATALLO

Y ALECARTE"
DOCTRINE
The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three
witnesses, when they could easily do so — and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to
witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has
already been finished — does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses
prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.
FACTS
On the strength of an information about the drug selling activity of Fatallo relayed by
the confidential informant to the concerned operatives, at around 9:00 pm, Police Inspector
Lawzaga conducted a buy-bust operation on Fatallo at Jean's Store located at T. Calo, Butuan
City.
As soon as the poseur-buyer arrived at the store, the Fatallo immediately came out
from the store and the two had a conversation. Not long after, Fatallo handed something to
the poseur-buyer and the latter, in return, got something from his pocket and handed the
same to Fatallo. SPO1 Delos Santos admitted that he saw clearly the transaction between
Fatallo and the poseur-buyer because the team was positioned in front of the store, across
the street and there was a street lighting near the store. After the exchange of items. The
team proceeded to arrest Fatallo, who ran to the upper portion of the house but was
eventually cornered.
The buy-bust team then immediately brought [Fatallo] to the team's office for
booking and documentation. From the crime scene to the office, SPO2 Joloyohoy got hold of
the two (2) sachets of shabu seized from [Fatallo]. In the office, SPO2 Joloyohoy marked the
two (2) sachets of shabu with identifying marks A-l and A-2. The team also prepared four
request for laboratory examinations. Afterwards, pictures were taken on [Fatallo] and on the
shabu recovered from him. From the office, SPO2 Joloyohoy, accompanied by PO1 Cultura,
brought the two (2) sachets of shabu and the written requests to the crime laboratory for
examination.
Fatallo was charged for violation of Sections 5 and 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 under
the Informations. The RTC found him guilty of the crimes charged. The CA affirmed his
conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting Fatallo of the crimes charged
RULING
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YES. The prosecution utterly failed to prove that the buy-bust team complied with the
mandatory requirements of Section 21 of R.A. 9165 and for its failure to establish the
unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs.
Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 lays down the procedure that police operatives must
strictly follow to preserve the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used
as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory and
In the present case, none of the three (3) required witnesses was present at the time
of seizure and confiscation and even during, the conduct of the inventory. Based on the
narrations of SPO1 Delos Santos and PO2 Coquilla not one of the required witnesses was
present at the time the plastic sachets were allegedly seized from Fatallo or during the
inventory of the recovered drugs at the police station.
The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the
three witnesses, when they could easily do so — and "calling them in" to the place of
inventory to witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust
operation has already been finished — does not achieve the purpose of the law in having
these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.
Under the saving clause, the courts may allow a deviation from the mandatory
the apprehending team. In this case, however, In the present case, prosecution neither
recognized, much less tried to justify or explain, the police officers' deviation from the
procedure contained in Section 21.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODEL MAGBUHOS Y DIOLA ALIAS "BODIL"

DOCTRINE
It is settled that findings of fact of the trial courts are generally accorded great weight,
except when it appears on the record that the trial court may have overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied some significant fact or circumstance which if considered,
would have altered the result. This is axiomatic in appeals in criminal cases where the whole
case is thrown open for review on issues of both fact and law, and the court may even consider
issues which were not raised by the parties as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court
full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
FACTS
Rodel was charged with the crime of Murder. The prosecution presented as witnesses
Angelito and Michael, the victim's nephew and son, respectively.
Angelito testified that he was at the billiard hall of his father and brother when he saw
Rodel approach his uncle, Enrique Castillo (Enrique), who was then sitting. Angelito noticed
that when Rodel arrived at the billiard hall, he was already under the influence of liquor as
his body was swaying while walking. Without saying a word, Rodel suddenly stabbed
Enrique on his left chest. Rodel then ran. Enrique was brought to a hospital in San Juan,
Batangas but died on the way to the Villa Hospital in Lipa City where he was about to be
transferred.
Michael testified that on the day of the crime, he was watching billiard games at the
billiard hall of his uncle. There were a lot of people inside the billiard hall. His father, Enrique,
was also inside the billiard hall, seated at the bamboo bench at the right side of the entrance,
when Rodel approached his father and using a fan knife, stabbed his father once at the left
chest. Michael immediately attended to his father and noticed that Rodel had run away. They
brought his father to the San Juan District Hospital and they decided later on to transfer him
to the Villa Hospital in Lipa City but he died on the way.
The RTC found Rodel guilty of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the Decision.
ISSUE
Whether the CA gravely erred in affirming Rodel's conviction for Murder
RULING
YES. Rodel can only be convicted of Homicide because treachery and evident
premeditation were not established beyond reasonable doubt.
Page 97 of 435
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In this case, the testimonies of Angelito and Michael reveal that Rodel attacked the
victim in the place familiar to the latter and in the presence of at least four other people, two
of whom are related to the victim. Under these circumstances, the Court finds it difficult to
agree with the CA that Rodel deliberately chose a particular mode of attack that purportedly
ensured the execution of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the
defense that the victim might offer. The Court further noted that the attack against Enrique
was frontal. While a frontal attack, by itself, does not negate the existence of treachery, when
the same is considered along with the other circumstances as previously discussed, it already
creates a reasonable doubt in the existence of the qualifying circumstance. As earlier stated,
treachery must be proven as fully and convincingly as the crime itself; and any doubt as to
existence must be resolved in favor of the accused.
There is also no basis for the Court to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the
crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3)
sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the circumstances of his act
In this case, evident premeditation was not established because the prosecution's
evidence was limited to what transpired between 12:00 o'clock noon to 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of October 6, 2002, when Rodel arrived in the billiard hall and stabbed Enrique.
The prosecution, however, did not present any proof showing when and how Rodel planned
and prepared to kill Enrique and the sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow Rodel to reflect upon the circumstance of his act. The fact that Rodel
approached and stabbed the victim does not unequivocally establish that Rodel earlier
devised a deliberate plot to murder Enrique. To qualify an offense, the circumstance must
not merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident premeditation." Hence, absent a clear
and positive proof of the overt act of planning, mere presumptions and inferences thereon,
no matter how logical and probable, would not be enough.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NADER MUSOR y ACMAD

DOCTRINE
In all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution
that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements
and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. The
rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the
suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug
is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
FACTS
A confidential informant (CI) went to PNP, San Fernando City, La Union and relayed
to PO2 Armand Bautista accused-appellant's illegal drug activities. The PNP then
coordinated with PDEA and RAIDSOTG for a buy-bust operation.
When they arrived near the area, the informant pointed to the person standing in
front of Wil-Jan as the accused Musor. When they approached the accused, the informant
introduced PO2 Bautista as the interested buyer of shabu. The accused then asked PO2
Bautista how much shabu he wanted to buy. The latter told him that he wanted to buy
P500.00 worth of shabu. The accused got something from his pocket and gave it to PO2
Bautista. When PO2 Bautista confirmed that it was a genuine shabu, he gave the marked
money to the accused. After he received the money, PO1 Bersola announced his arrest. PO2
Bautista frisked the accused and recovered another plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance, and put the same in his left pocket. Thereupon, their team leader
ordered them to return to the police station to avert any commotion, as their location was
dark and there were persons drinking in the area.
At the police station, the team asked for the presence of a barangay official and a
media representative to witness the marking and preparation of the inventory. PO2 Bautista
marked the plastic sachets and prepared the inventory. He also prepared a request for
laboratory examination which was submitted together with the sachets containing
crystalline substance to PO2 Baceloña at the crime laboratory. After receiving them, PO2
Bacelonia immediately turned over the same to the forensic chemist, P/Ins. Manuel. At the
crime laboratory, P/Ins. Manuel checked the markings of each specimen and conducted an
examination and found the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or a substance
known as "shabu".
The RTC found Musor guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 and was
convinced that the chain of custody of evidence was not broken and that the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items were duly preserved. Undeterred with the decision,
Musor asked for reconsideration but was denied.
Page 99 of 435
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Aggrieved, Musor appealed to the CA. The CA, however, affirmed Musor's conviction.
ISSUE
Whether or not Musor's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. In all drugs cases, therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial
in any prosecution that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug
confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as
exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude
as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
In this connection, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of
the commission of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must
follow to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision
requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after
seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in
the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public
official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department
of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.
Section 21 of RA 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical

and confiscation. The said inventory must be done in the presence of the aforementioned
required witness, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.
In the present case, the buy-bust team committed several and patent procedural
lapses in the conduct of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug — which
thus created reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drugs and, consequently,
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
None of the three required witnesses were present at the time of seizure and
apprehension as they were only called to the police station for the conduct of inventory.
Moreover, while the IRR allows alternative places for the conduct of the inventory and
to be physically present at the time or near the place of apprehension is not dispensed with.
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The reason is simple: it is at the time of arrest — or at the time of the drugs' "seizure and
confiscation" — that the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their
presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would insulate against the police
practice of planting evidence. Here, the buy-bust team utterly failed to comply with the
foregoing requirements.
To start with, no photographs of the seized drugs were taken at the place of seizure
or at the police station where the inventory was conducted. Neither were the inventory and
marking of the alleged seized items in this case done in the presence of accused Musor. More
importantly, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule. Based on the narrations
of PO2 Bautista, not one of the witnesses required under Section 21 was present at the time
the plastic sachets were allegedly seized from Musor. They were only present during the
conduct of inventory in the police station. There was also no explanation as to their absence
during the apprehension and their belated appearance at the police station.
Section 21 (a) of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that "noncompliance of these

requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." For this provision to be effective,
however, the prosecution must first (1) recognize any lapse on the part of the police officers
and (2) be able to justify the same.
Here, none of the requirements for the saving clause to be triggered is present as the
prosecution did not even concede that there were lapses in the conduct of the buy-bust
operation. Also, no explanation was offered as to the absence of the three witnesses at the
place and time of seizure, or as to the failure to photograph the confiscated items
immediately after seizure or during inventory in the presence of the insulating witnesses.
The prosecution also failed to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending
team's deviation from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. Their explanation — that
there might be a commotion since the place was very dark and there were plenty of persons
drinking at the place — is hollow and not worthy of belief.
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BOBBY PACNISEN y BUMACAS

DOCTRINE
It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving their compliance
with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-compliance.
In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to provide a sufficient
explanation for its deviation from the requirements of Section 21, RA 9165. While the Court
emphasizes the importance of strictly following the procedure outlined in Section 21, it likewise
recognizes that there may be instances where a slight deviation from the said procedure is
justifiable, much like in this case where the officers exerted earnest efforts to comply with the
law.
FACTS
A confidential informant arrived at the PDEA office, Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San
Fernando City, La Union and reported that a certain Bobby Pacnisen, who turned out to be
appellant, was selling marijuana at Santol and San Juan, La Union. Agent Asayco verified
appellant's name from their office's Intelligence Investigation Division. He learned that
appellant's name was included in the so-called "Summary of Information," a record of
complaints brought by the citizens against persons engaged in selling drugs. Based thereon,
Agent Asayco formed a buy-bust team.
The team proceeded to the agreed place of transaction. The confidential informant
and agent Esmin alighted from the team's vehicle and proceeded to the place on foot. Once
there, the confidential informant introduced Agent Esmin to the appellant as the person
interested to buy the P6,000.00 worth of marijuana. Agent Esmin asked appellant if he had
the "merchandise", to which the latter answered in the affirmative. Agent Esmin then asked
appellant if the price for the "merchandise" can be lowered. When the appellant did not
agree, Agent Esmin handed him the buy-bust money worth P6,000.00. Appellant, in turn,
gave him a plastic bag containing 2 packaged bricks. Agent Esmin asked appellant to show
him the "merchandise" which appellant did by cutting a portion of a packaged brick.
Thereafter, Agent Esmin wiped off his sweat with a handkerchief to signal the other team
members to arrest the appellant.
When the other team members arrived, they introduced themselves as PDEA agents.
Agent Mirindato informed appellant of his constitutional rights and placed handcuffs on him.
Agent Esmin then conducted a body search on appellant and made an inventory of the
confiscated items in the presence of the buy-bust team, Brgy. Captain of Urbiztondo Erickson
N. Valdriz, and DXNL anchor Dominador Dacanay. Photographs were also taken by team
leader Agent Asayco during the conduct of inventory.
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After the inventory, the team returned to their office where Agent Mirindato prepared
the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report. Agent Esmin, on the other hand, made the request for
laboratory examination which he, along with the seized items, personally delivered to
forensic chemist Lei-Yen Valdez. Per Chemistry Report, the contents of the 2 packaged bricks
were found positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
The appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi.
The RTC convicted the appellant for violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165.
In his appeal to the CA, the accused-appellant questioned his conviction by the RTC
because, according to him, the prosecution failed to prove (1) that a legitimate buy-bust
operation took place, and (2) that the proper chain of custody was complied with. The CA
affirmed the RTC's conviction of the accused-appellant, holding that the prosecution was
able to prove the elements of the crime charged. The CA upheld the finding that the
prosecution was able to establish (1) the identity of the buyer, as well as the seller, the object,
and the consideration of the sale; (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
As regards compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, the CA held that the prosecution
was able to establish the proper chain of custody. The CA ruled that since the prosecution
was able to establish an unbroken chain of custody from Agent Esmin to the forensic chemist
and then to the court, "the absence of a DOJ representative here would not destroy the
established identity and integrity of the seized drugs."
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged.
RULING
NO. In dangerous drugs cases, it is essential in establishing the corpus delicti that the
procedure provided in Section 21 of RA 9165 is followed.
Furthermore, Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of

RA No. 9165 filled in the details as to where the physical inventory and photographing of the
seized items that had to be done immediately after seizure could be done: i.e., at the place of
seizure, at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team.
Section 21 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of

the seized items and photograph the same immediately after seizure and confiscation in the
presence of the accused, with (1) an elected public official, (2) a representative of the DOJ,
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and (3) a representative of the media, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In the present case, however, only two of the three required witnesses — the elected
official and the representative from the media — were present at the time of seizure,
apprehension, and the conduct of the inventory. Nevertheless, the Court notes, based on the
evidence, that the absence of the DOJ representative could be explained by the urgency with
which the operation needed to be conducted. As the testimony of Agent Esmin reveals, there
was only a two-hour period from the time they received the information from their
confidential informant to the time that they needed to conduct the buy-bust operation. The
absence of the DOJ representative was likewise explained by Agent Esmin. According to
Agent Esmin, a colleague of his tried to contact a DOJ representative but there was no one
available.
It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving their compliance
with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-
compliance.
In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to provide a sufficient
explanation for its deviation from the requirements of Section 21, RA 9165. While the Court
emphasizes the importance of strictly following the procedure outlined in Section 21, it
likewise recognizes that there may be instances where a slight deviation from the said
procedure is justifiable, much like in this case where the officers exerted earnest efforts to
comply with the law.
The officers in this case thus showed earnest efforts to comply with the mandated
procedure; they showed that they did their duties bearing in mind the requirements of the
law. It would therefore be error for the Court not to reward their efforts towards
compliance.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JULIET RIVERA y OTOM and JAYSON LACDAN y

PARTO, JULIET RIVERA y OTOM
DOCTRINE
In all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution
that follows such operation. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug
confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit;
and that the identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that
requisite to make a finding of guilt.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Rivera for violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
The case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs against Rivera was later on consolidated with
Criminal Case wherein her common-law husband, accused Jayson Lacdan stood charged with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
The Intelligence Division of San Pedro Municipal Police Station received a report from
a confidential informant that accused Jayson Lacdan was selling drugs. To confirm the
information, PO2 Carandang, PO1 De Leon, PO1 Signap, and one other confidential informant
went to the house of accused Lacdan and conducted a surveillance operation They saw
several people, who looked like drug users, coming in and out of the house. The confidential
informant also identified appellant Rivera. They then planned for the conduct of the buy-bust
operation.
PO1 De Leon, together with the confidential informant who reported the illegal sale,
went to the house of accused Lacdan. Upon his arrival, PO1 De Leon was approached by
appellant Rivera. PO1 De Leon asked the appellant if accused Lacdan was around because
they wanted to buy shabu. Accused-appellant informed them that she would be the one to
get it from accused Lacdan. Thereafter, she went back inside the house and returned,
bringing with her a small plastic sachet containing the suspected shabu. After handing her
the money, PO1 De Leon made a missed call to signal his team leader that the transaction
had been consummated. They then proceeded to arrest the accused-appellant and Lacdan.
PO1 De Leon recovered the buy-bust money from accused-appellant while PO2 Carandang
recovered one plastic sachet from accused Lacdan.
Upon arrest, the two policemen read them their rights. PO1 De Leon subsequently
marked the plastic sachet he possessed and the recovered plastic sachet from accused
Lacdan. Afterward, the accused and the accused-appellant were taken to the police station
for investigation.
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Upon reaching the police station, the seized items were turned over to P/Insp.
Gutierrez to be photographed and inventoried. Mr. Nick Luares, a reporter from Laguna
Expose, acted as a witness.
The seized items were examined by Chief Rodrigo of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna. Results of the laboratory
examination show that the white crystalline substance inside the plastic sachets tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The RTC found Rivera guilty of the crime charged. However, the RTC acquitted Lacdan
based on reasonable doubt on the identity and evidentiary value of the drugs allegedly
confiscated from him. Aggrieved, Rivera appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed Rivera's
conviction
ISSUE
Whether or not Rivera's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. In all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any
prosecution that follows such operation. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the
prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance
offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
In this connection, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of
the commission of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must
follow to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision
requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after
seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in
official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ, all of
whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
As stated, Section 21 of RA 9165 requires the apprehending team to conduct a

physical inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after
seizure and confiscation and in the presence of the aforementioned required witness, all of
whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In the case at bar, the buy-bust team utterly failed to strictly comply with the
abovementioned procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165. First, no photograph of the
seized drug was taken at the place of seizure or at the police station where the inventory was
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conducted. Second, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule. Based on the
narrations of PO1 De Leon, not one of the witnesses required under Section 21 was present
at the time the plastic sachet was allegedly seized from Rivera. They only called a
representative from the media at the police station. They also did not give any justifiable
reason for the absence of the three required witnesses during or immediately after the buy-
bust operation for purposes of physical inventory and photograph of the seized item.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANGEL ANGELES y ARIMBUYUTAN

DOCTRINE
It is true, as pointed out by both the RTC and the CA, that there are cases where the Court
had ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid
out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
void and invalid. However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to
satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. The Court has
repeatedly emphasized that the prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses.
FACTS
Two (2) Informations were filed against the accused-appellant Angeles for violating
Sections 5 and 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
PO1 Engracia, per instruction of the Chief of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs- Special
Operation Task Group contacted through a mobile phone an informant at Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City to confirm the text message of a concerned citizen as regards the illegal-drug
selling activity of an alias "Panget." Immediately, said informant went to the office of the
SAID- SOTG, CCPS and confirmed to PO1 Engracia that alias "Panget" was indeed engaged in
selling illegal drugs. Thus, a buy-bust team was formed.
Upon arrival at the designated place, the informant and PO1 Engracia approached a
male person, who was later identified as appellant Angel Angeles. The informant said to
appellant, "Pare, kukuha itong kumpare ko." Appellant answered, "Ilan?" Thus, PO1 Engracia
answered, "Limang Daan lang brod," and handed to appellant the buy-bust money.
Afterwards, appellant said, "Sandali lang," left and entered an alley. After a while, appellant
returned and handed to PO1 Engracia two (2) plastic sachets, containing white crystalline
substance believed to be shabu, in exchange for the money that PO1 Engracia gave him.
PO1 Engracia then touched his nape as a pre-arranged signal that the sale was already
consummated. Upon seeing the other members of the buy-bust team approaching, PO1
Engracia held appellant and introduced himself as a police officer. Thereafter, PO1 Engracia
recovered the buy-bust money. PO1 Engracia marked the two (2) plastic sachets bought
from appellant. PO2 Gagarin informed appellant of his violation and Constitutional Rights.
Subsequently, appellant, the subject evidence and the buy-bust money were brought to the
Office of the SAID-SOTG, CCPS.
At the said office, PO1 Engracia turned over the appellant, the buy-bust money and
the subject evidence to the duty investigator, PO1 Pascual. An inventory of the confiscated
items was then conducted. In the course of the turn-over and inventory, PO1 Engracia was
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given an Evidence Acknowledgment Receipt and was made to sign the Chain of Custody Form
and Physical Inventory of Evidence Form. Photographs of the appellant and the subject
evidence were likewise taken.
Thereafter, PO1 Pascual brought appellant and the subject evidence to the NPD-CLO
for drug test and laboratory examination, respectively. Said examinations yielded positive
results for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu,"
a dangerous drug.
The RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC ruled that
the evidence on record was sufficient to pronounce a verdict of conviction against the
accused-appellant. The RTC also recognized that nothing in the records indicates that the
procedure for the conduct of the required physical inventory, outlined in Section 21, RA
9165, was complied with. Despite recognizing this, however, it stated that the non-
compliance, by itself, did not invalidate the seizure of the dangerous drugs.
Aggrieved, the accused-appellant appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of the accused-appellant. As regards compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, the
CA held that the defense's failure to question the police officers, on cross-examination,
regarding their alleged non-compliance with Section 21, amounts to a waiver and thus could
no longer be a ground for his acquittal
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the
crimes charged.
RULING
YES. It is true, as pointed out by both the RTC and the CA, that there are cases where
the Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items void and invalid. However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution
still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and
(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. The Court
has repeatedly emphasized that the prosecution should explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses.
In the present case, none of the three required witnesses was present at the time of
seizure and apprehension and even during the conduct of the inventory. It bears emphasis
that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the apprehension and inventory is
mandatory, and that the law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an
essential purpose.
The prosecution, in this case, neither recognized, much less tried to justify, its
deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21, RA 9165. Breaches of the procedure
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outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and

unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against
the accused- appellant as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised.
With the acquittal of the accused-appellant in relation to the charge of violation of

Section 5, RA 9165, it follows then that he should likewise be acquitted as to the charge of
violation of Section 15, RA 9165. The case for violation of Section 15, RA 9165 was filed
because the accused-appellant was found positive for use of methamphetamine
hydrochloride after he was subjected to a drug test following his arrest.
The accused-appellant was thus subjected to a drug test as a result of his

apprehension which, as already illustrated, was conducted in violation of Section 21, RA
9165 — a rule that is a matter of substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality. Section 21, RA 9165 is a statutory exclusionary rule of evidence,
bearing in mind that, under the Rules of Court, "evidence is admissible when it is relevant to
the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules."
The results of the drug test cannot thus be used against the accused- appellant for it
is considered, under the law, as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Applied in the present case, since the apprehension of the accused- appellant by the
police officers was illegal for non-compliance with the procedure provided by Section 21, RA
9165, it therefore follows that the drug test conducted on him was likewise illegal for it is an
indirect result of his arrest.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARLON CASCO y VILLAMER

DOCTRINE
Case law states that the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a
matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or
worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. For indeed, however
noble the purpose or necessary the exigencies of the campaign against illegal drugs may be, it
is still a governmental action that must always be executed within the boundaries of law.
FACTS
The District Anti-Illegal Drugs (DAID) Special Operations Task Force in Quezon City
received a tip from an informant that a certain "Marco" was selling illegal drugs along Loans
Street, Project 8, Barangay Sangandaan, Quezon City. A team was immediately formed and in
the afternoon of the same day, the team arrived at the place. PO1 Kalbi, acting as the poseur
buyer, and the informant went to a sari-sari store where Marco was standing. The informant
then talked to Marco and told him, "Ito yung sinasabi ko sa iyo na kasama ko, gustong
kumuha ng item, SHABU sa halagang limang piso, panggamit lang." Marco then asked "Atin
ba 'yan?" to which the informant replied that "Oo atin 'yan, hindi 'yan kalaban." Marco then
took from his pocket a sachet with white crystalline substance and handed it to PO1 Kalbi,
who, in exchange, gave a P500.00 bill which had been marked. After that, PO1 Kalbi removed
his cap as a pre-arranged signal of the completion of the buy-bust operation. The other
members of the team immediately descended on the place, arrested Marco and brought him
to the police station. The buy-bust money and the plastic sachet taken from Marco were
turned over to PO1 Gula.
For his defense, accused-appellant Casco denied the charge and claimed that armed
men, one of which is PO1 Kalbi, entered his house and pointed their guns at him. They
immediately handcuffed accused-appellant and boarded him in a red van. They also searched
the house but found nothing. Accused-appellant was then brought to Camp Karingal in
Quezon City. There, PO1 Gula demanded P200,000.00 in exchange for his freedom. When he
failed to produce the money, he was then brought to jail and the next thing he knew, he was
charged with selling illegal drugs.
The RTC found accused-appellant Casco guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 5 of RA 9165. On appeal, the CA, sustained accused- appellant Casco's conviction.
The CA held that the prosecution, through the testimony of PO1 Kalbi, together with the
stipulations with respect to the proposed testimony of PSI Bonifacio and PO1 Gula, was able
to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drug from the time it came into the
possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its
composition up to the time it was offered in evidence.
ISSUE
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Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining accused-appellant Casco's conviction for

violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
RULING
YES. In this case, the Court finds that the police officers committed unjustified
deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the
identity and evidentiary value of the item purportedly seized from accused-appellant Casco.
An examination of the records reveals that the buy-bust team failed to comply with
the mandatory witnesses' rule. Here, none of the three (3) required witnesses under Section
21 was present at the time the subject drug was allegedly seized from accused-appellant
Casco or during the conduct of the inventory at the police station. As admitted by PO1 Kalbi
himself, only the buy-bust team and their confidential asset were present at the place of
arrest. Moreover, the inventory of the seized drug was made not in the presence of accused-
appellant Casco or his representative or counsel, an elected public official, a representative
from media and a representative from the DOJ, as mandated by Section 21. To be sure, the
only witnesses who signed the Inventory Receipt were the police officers themselves/
Indeed, case law states that the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.
For indeed, however noble the purpose or necessary the exigencies of the campaign against
illegal drugs may be, it is still a governmental action that must always be executed within the
boundaries of law.
Following the IRR of RA 9165, the courts may allow a deviation from the mandatory
the apprehending team. If these elements are present, the seizure and custody of the
confiscated drug shall not be rendered void and invalid regardless of the non-compliance
with the mandatory requirements of Section 21. It has also been emphasized that the State
bears the burden of proving the justifiable cause. Thus, for the said saving clause to apply,
the prosecution must first recognize the lapse or lapses on the part of the buy-bust team and
justify or explain the same.
In the present case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify or
explain, the police officers' deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21.
Undeniably, the police officers did not exert even the slightest effort to secure the attendance
of the required witnesses considering that they had ample time to comply with the
requirements established by law from the time they were informed of an alleged peddling of
illegal drugs by accused-appellant Casco.
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Moreover, contrary to the findings of the CA, the prosecution failed to establish the
unbroken chain of custody of the seized drug. Records reveal that gaps exist in the chain of
custody of the seized item which create reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity
thereof.
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOVA DE LEON y WEVES

DOCTRINE
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must strictly follow to preserve
the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used as evidence. The provision
requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure
or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence
of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ),
all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
While it is true that there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid; the law requires
the prosecution to still satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.
FACTS
An informant went to the office at the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations
Task Force (SAIDSOTF) of the Parañaque City Policea and reported the illegal drug activities
of a certain "Nova De Leon." A buy bust team was then formed. was designated. SPO1
Lumabao, acting as poseur buyer, and the informant spotted the suspect standing in an alley
whom they approached. SPO1 Lumabao was introduced to the suspect as a bus driver in need
of shabu. The suspect replied that she had some with her. He handed the suspect the buy
bust money and in turn, the suspect handed him a sachet of suspected shabu. At this juncture,
SPO1 LUmabao then executed the pre-arranged signal of removing his cap to signal the rest
of the team that the transaction had materialized. SPO1 Macaraeg rushed to their location
and they effected the arrest of the accused. They brought the suspect to the Barangay Hall of
Tambo, Parañaque City and requested Tanod Melchor Alconaba to witness the preparation
of the inventory. There, SPO1 Lumabao marked the recovered evidence in his custody and
likewise prepared the inventory of recovered/seized evidence, signed by Tanod Alconaba as
witness.
On cross examination, SPO1 Lumabao testified that he placed markings on the

recovered specimen at the Barangay Hall and not at the scene of arrest as it was raining at
that time. There was no representative from the DOJ or media present during the inventory.
He personally placed markings on the buy bust money but he was not able to include the buy
bust money in the inventory at the time the pictures were taken.
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The RTC convicted accused- appellant De Leon of violating Section 5, Article II of RA

9165. Aggrieved, accused-appellant De Leon appealed to the CA. The CA sustained accused-
appellant De Leon's conviction and held that the prosecution sufficiently discharged its
burden of establishing the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and proving accused-
appellant De Leon's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It also ruled that there is a valid
justification for the arresting officers' non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21
of RA 9165; and at any rate, the prosecution was able to adequately show the continuous and
unbroken possession and subsequent transfer of the illegal drug from the time it was
confiscated up to the time the marked plastic sachet of shabu was offered in court.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellant De Leon's guilt for violating Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165 was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must strictly follow to
preserve the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used as evidence. The
provision requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately
after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be
done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected
public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the
Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof.
While it is true that there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid; the law
requires the prosecution to still satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for
non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the prosecution should explain the
reasons behind the procedural lapses; without any justifiable explanation, the evidence of
the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground
that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the police officers failed to comply with the foregoing
requirements. First, while the IRR provides alternative places for the physical inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs, whenever practicable, a barangay hall, is not one of them.
Also, the illegal drug was not marked immediately upon seizure and confiscation. Second,
the police officers failed to comply with the mandatory three (3)-witness rule. As SPO1
Lumabao, the poseur-buyer himself, testified, the marking, inventory and photographing of
the seized drug were witnessed only by a Barangay Tanod.
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Moreover, records do not show that the prosecution was able to establish a justifiable
ground as to why the police officers were not able to secure the presence of the DOJ and
media representatives. The Court finds SPO1 Lumabao's excuse that there were no available
DOJ and media representatives because of the weather condition insufficient and
uncorroborated by evidence.
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN CABEZUDO y RIEZA

DOCTRINE
Section 21, RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of
the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires: (1) that the seized items be
inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media,
and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Concededly, Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that "non- compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." For this provision to be effective,
however, the prosecution must (1) first recognize any lapse on the part of the police officers
and (2) then be able to justify the same.
FACTS
A confidential informant (CI) went to the Office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) Camarines Norte Unit and informed the officers therein that accused-
appellant Edwin Cabezudo is engaged in illegal drug trade. A verification from PDEA office
files revealed that accused-appellant is included in the watchlist. The buy-bust team decided
to conduct an entrapment operation against accused- appellant.
The team proceeded to Brgy. Palanas, Paracale, Camarines Norte to entrap accused-
appellant. The CI and SI2 Magpantay waited in a store near a cockpit while others
strategically positioned themselves waiting for the pre-arranged signal. At around 12:20 in
the afternoon, accused-appellant arrived and alighted from a tricycle. The CI approached the
latter and they talked. Then, the CI introduced accused-appellant to SI2 Magpantay. Accused-
appellant asked the latter to walk further in an attempt to conceal the sale. While walking,
he handed to SI2 Magpantay a sachet containing white crystalline substance. In exchange,
SI2 Magpantay gave the Php500.00 to him. After the sale was consummated, he raised his
bull cap as a pre-arranged signal to the other officers for them to arrest accused-appellant.
The officers rushed to the area and arrested him. The latter tried to resist but was subdued
by the team. The arrest resulted to the recovery of eleven (11) pieces of Php1,000.00 bills
and fourteen (14) pieces of Php500.00 bills, and one (1) plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance believed to be shabu.
At the scene of the crime, SI2 Magpantay marked the confiscated items. Other
members of the team photographed the accused and the seized items. Later on, they
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transferred to the barangay hall where the witnesses, the Barangay Chairman and the
representatives from the media and DOJ, signed the inventory report. SI2 Magpantay was in
possession of the seized drugs from Brgy. Palanan to the Office of PDEA until the same were
delivered to the laboratory for examination. PCI Grace Tugas conducted laboratory
examination of the seized white crystalline substance which yielded a positive result for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
For his part, the accused-appellant interposed the defense of denial and frame-up.
The RTC convicted Cabezudo of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Cabezudo, holding that the prosecution was
able to prove the elements of the crimes charged. The CA added that, contrary to Cabezudo's
contention, the integrity of the corpus delicti was preserved because "the chain of custody
was unbroken from the time of markings, inventory and laboratory examination up to the
presentation to the court of the sachet containing shabu."
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Cabezudo of the crime
charged.
RULING
YES. In this connection, Section 21, RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow
to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires:
(1) that the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or
confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the
presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public
a copy thereof.
Section 21, RA 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical
and confiscation in the presence of the aforementioned required witness, all of whom shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In the present case, while all three required witnesses signed the inventory receipt, a
thorough review of the records reveals that (a) none of them was present at the time of
seizure and apprehension, and (b) only one of them was present during the actual conduct
of the inventory.
It is worth emphasizing that Section 21, RA 9165 and its IRR requires the
apprehending team to conduct the physical inventory of the seized items and the
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photographing of the same in the presence of the required witness, all of whom shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
In this case, clear from the afore-quoted testimonies is the fact that while the
inventory was conducted at the place of the apprehension, it was conducted only in the
presence of the barangay official. To repeat, the representatives from the media and the DOJ
were only "called-in" to sign the inventory receipt at the barangay hall. Parenthetically, even
the place where the other witnesses were "called-in" was improper, for the rules require the
inventory to be conducted at the place of the arrest or, if impracticable, at the nearest police
station.
Concededly, Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that "non- compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." For this provision to be
effective, however, the prosecution must (1) first recognize any lapse on the part of the police
officers and (2) then be able to justify the same.
In this case, the prosecution failed to recognize and justify the police officers'
deviation from the procedure provided in Section 21, RA 9165.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIO BULUTANO y ALVAREZ

DOCTRINE
Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where
the mode adopted by the appellants does not positively tend to prove that they thereby
knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to
themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly
appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a
view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
In the same vein, jurisprudence provides that there cannot be treachery if the meeting
between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was impulsively done.
FACTS
On February 16, 1998 at around 11:30 in the evening, Reynaldo Astrolavio and his
friend Mark Gil Desono were at M. Aquino corner M.H. Del Pilar Streets, Barangay Rizal,
Makati City. Abeng Tabeng Jeremy provoked the two which resulted to a fist fight. Abeng’s
brother "Kulot" also arrived and boxed them. Reynaldo then saw the group of Mario
Bulutano and Jhun Serad rushing towards them. Sensing danger, Reynaldo ran away and hid.
From where he was hiding, he saw Serad hit Wilbert on his head. Afraid, Reynaldo went
home.
Around the same time, Allan Ramos Allan was at his house having a drinking spree
with some of his friends. He suddenly heard a commotion. Afraid that his friends were
involved, he immediately went outside the house and proceeded to M. Aquino corner M.H.
Del Pilar Streets. Upon reaching the place, Allan saw Bulutano, Serad, Dennis Cabangon
Pengpeng Estelera, and Vermel, also known as "Panot," rushing towards the same place. He
noticed that these people were drunk and carrying bladed weapons, stones, and pieces of
wood.
Allan tried to talk the group in order to settle the problem. Allan was then facing the
group while Wilbert, who was just passing by after making a phone call at a nearby site, stood
next to him. Suddenly, Serad surreptitiously went behind Wilbert and hit the latter with a
piece of wood. Wilbert fell on the ground, shaking. Allan was shocked and his immediate
reaction was to punch Serad. However, Serad was able to parry Allan's fist with the same
piece of wood he had used to hit Wilbert. Thereafter, a fight ensued. Allan was pulled away
by one of his companions while the others retreated upon seeing that their adversaries were
armed with weapons.
While Allan was retreating from the place, he looked back and there he saw Bulutano
hit Wilbert on the head even if the latter was already lying on the ground gasping for breath.
Pengpeng, Vermel and Dennis likewise kicked and mauled the hapless Wilbert.
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Meanwhile, Gerald Manaog also witnessed the brawl. Before the affray, Gerald saw
Wilbert just standing and doing nothing. But then, Serad suddenly hit Wilbert on the right
side of the latter's face. As a result, Wilbert fell on the ground. But despite Wilbert's state,
Bulutano still hit him with a piece of wood. Gerald shouted at Bulutano to stop hitting Wilbert
but Bulutano just replied "Bakit, papalag ka ba?["]. Gerald then could only warn them that if
something happened to Wilbert, they will all be held responsible.
At that point, operatives from Bantay Bayan arrived. Allan then rushed to the
bloodied Wilbert. With the assistance of concerned citizens, they carried Wilbert's body and
boarded him on a vehicle. Wilbert was brought to the hospital where he was subsequently
pronounced dead.
In his defense, accused-appellant Mario Bulutano denies participation in the crime

yet points at his co-accused, Jhun Serad, as the sole perpetrator thereof.
The RTC convicted Bulutano of the crime of murder. It found that treachery attended
the killing of Wilbert. Aggrieved, Bulutano appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of Bulutano, and held that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the
elements of the crime charged and the element of treachery were present in the killing of
Wilbert. The CA likewise ruled that treachery attended the killing as the victim was already
in a hapless state when Bulutano continued to strike him.
ISSUES
1. Whether the CA erred in convicting Bulutano despite the prosecution's failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
RULING
1. NO. It is well settled that in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not overturn
the factual findings of the trial court. Thus, when the case pivots on the issue of the
credibility of the witnesses, the findings of the trial courts necessarily carry great
weight and respect as they are afforded the unique opportunity to ascertain the
demeanor and sincerity of witnesses during trial. Here, after examining the records
of this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to vacate the RTC's appreciation of the
evidence, particularly on the credibility of the eyewitnesses, which was also affirmed
in toto by the CA.
Furthermore, the absence of evidence as to improper or ill motive on the part

of the prosecution witnesses — it being anchored merely on the allegation that their
testimonies were motivated by the supposed basketball rivalry between them and
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Bulutano — strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive
existed. Hence, their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.
2. YES. It was error for both the RTC and the CA to conclude that the killing was attended
by the qualifying circumstance of treachery simply because the victim was suddenly
attacked by Serad, and he was already defenseless at the time that Bulutano
continued attacking him. It does not always follow that because the attack is sudden
and unexpected, it is tainted with treachery.
As the Court held in People v. Santos, “[t]reachery, just like any other element
of the crime committed, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence — evidence
sufficient to establish its existence beyond reasonable doubt. It is not to be presumed
or taken for granted from a mere statement that 'the attack was sudden;' there must
be a clear showing from the narration of facts why the attack or assault is said to be
'sudden.'"
Stated differently, mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that
treachery is present, where the mode adopted by the appellants does not positively
tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of
their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that
the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly appear that the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to accomplishing the
act without risk to the aggressor.
In the same vein, jurisprudence provides that there cannot be treachery if the
meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was
impulsively done.
In the case at bar, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the
melee was only a chance encounter between the warring groups. More importantly,
the deceased Wilbert "was just passing by after making a phone call at a nearby site"
when he was hit in the head by Serad with a piece of wood and then later on
continually hit by Bulutano. The foregoing thus negates the existence of the second
requisite for treachery to be appreciated, namely, that the offenders deliberately and
consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.
The meeting between the parties — Bulutano, Serad, and the victim Wilbert — was
casual, and the attack was done impulsively. Therefore, the killing could not have
been attended by treachery.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHRISTOPHER ILAGAN y BAÑA alias "WENG"

G.R. No. 227021, December 5, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the
integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the seized
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the
physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the
media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be
It is true that there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. However, this is
with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the prosecution should
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses.
FACTS
A civilian asset went to the San Jose Municipal Police Station and reported to SPO1
Flores and PO2 Mitra that there is a certain "Weng," a helper of the Juennesse Flower Shop,
who is engaged in the selling marijuana. SPO1 Flores and PO2 Mitra informed their Chief, PCI
Eduard Padilla Mallo, who immediately instructed them to prepare for a buy-bust operation.
Thereafter, SPO1 Flores, PO2 Mitra and the civilian asset proceeded to Poblacion 3,
San Jose, Batangas and parked the car near the flower shop. PO2 Mitra and the civilian asset
alighted while SPO1 Flores was left inside the vehicle. When PO2 Mitra and the civilian asset
entered the flower shop, the only person inside was "Weng" who at that time was lying on a
chair. The asset told the latter that his companion will buy marijuana and upon hearing the
same, "Weng" immediately stood up. PO2 Mitra then gave the Two One Hundred Peso Bills
to the asset and at that moment, "Weng" brought out from his right pocket three (3) pieces
of heat sealed sachet containing suspected marijuana. PO2 Mitra gave the money to the
civilian asset who handed it to "Weng." After receiving the money, "Weng" gave to PO2 Mitra
the suspected marijuana. When SPO1 Flores saw the pre-arranged signal, he immediately
entered the shop and help PO2 Mitra in arresting the pusher. They informed the pusher, who
identified himself as herein accused Christopher Ilagan y Baña, of his constitutional rights.
When they frisked the accused, PO2 Mitra found the two pieces of One Hundred Peso bills.
Afterwards, the policemen brought the accused to the barangay hall of Brgy. 3, San
Jose, Batangas. In the presence of the Brgy. Captain Modesto Kalalo and media representative
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Mr. Lito Rendora, they conducted the inventory of the confiscated items. PO2 Mitra marked
the three (3) sachets containing suspected marijuana and the two (2) One Hundred Peso
bills. Photographs were taken during the inventory at the barangay hall. Thereafter, they
went back to the police station.
For his part, the accused interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up.
The RTC found Christopher guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165. Aggrieved, accused-appellant Christopher appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed
accused-appellant Christopher's conviction. It ruled, among others, that the integrity and
identity of the seized marijuana were not compromised because the buy-bust team was able
to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs seized.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellant Christopher's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA
9165 was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain
the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the
seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2)
that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the
accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice
(DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. However,
this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there
is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses.
In the present case, the buy-bust team committed several glaring procedural lapses
in the conduct of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug — which thus
created reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drugs and, consequently,
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant Christopher.
Clearly, the buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21 (1)
of RA 9165. First, no photographs of the seized drugs were taken at the place of seizure.
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Second, neither was the inventory and marking of the alleged seized items done at the place
of apprehension. Lastly, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule. Based on the
narrations of the buy-bust team, not one of the witnesses required under Section 21 was
present at the time the plastic sachets were allegedly seized from accused-appellant
Christopher. The media representative and barangay captain were only present during the
conduct of the inventory in the barangay hall. Moreover, there were only two witnesses
present — a barangay official and a media representative — when the law explicitly requires
three witnesses.
The prosecution has the burden of (1) proving its compliance with Section 21, RA
9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-compliance. In this case, none
of the abovementioned reasons is present.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NILA MALANA y SAMBOLLEDO

DOCTRINE
alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the
media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. However, this is
items are properly preserved. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the prosecution should
FACTS
An informer reported that a female individual, later identified to be Malana, was
engaged in rampant selling of shabu at Brgy. Dugo, Camalaniugan, Cagayan. A buy bust
operation was then planned. The informer, Rex Cortez, was designated as the civilian poseur
buyer.
Cortez ordered shabu worth P2,500.00 from Malana by sending a text message to
Malana. Unfortunately, Malana failed to appear at the designated place. Hence, P/C Insp.
Cablarda directed the team to execute another entrapment operation the following day, at
the same place and time.
The following day, Cortez ordered P500.00 worth of shabu from Malana to be
delivered at around 3 in the afternoon. Cortez informed the team that he will meet Malana
at a waiting shed in Brgy. Dugo, Camalaniugan, Cagayan. At around 4:14 in the afternoon, a
multicab from Aparri stopped near the designated waiting shed where Malana alighted.
Cortez and Malana had a brief conversation. Malana then handed something to Cortez, who
in turn, handed something to Malana. When Cortez gave the pre-arranged signal, which was
the removal of his hat, members of the team ran towards the waiting shed. SPO2 Alonzo
immediately frisked Malana and recovered the P500.00 marked money. P/C Insp. Cablarda
took possession of the plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance handed by
Malana to Cortez.
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For documentation, they sought the assistance of Brgy. Captain Philip Arce, and
kagawads Wilma Gonzaga and Perlita Arellano, who witnessed the inventory as evidenced
by the Confiscation Receipt and photographs on record. SPO1 Urian marked the seized
plastic sachet After, they proceeded to the Camalaniugan Police Station and prepared the
Request for Laboratory Examination.
For her part, the accused-appelant interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up.
The RTC found Christopher guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165. Aggrieved, accused-appellant Malana appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of accused-appellant Malana. The CA declared that the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs were properly established as "RA 9165 and its implementing rules do not
require strict compliance with the rule on chain of custody."
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting accused-appellant Malana of
the crime charged.
RULING
YES. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow
to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires
that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or
confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the
presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public
a copy thereof.
seizure and apprehension, and only one of them was present during the conduct of the
inventory.
this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there
is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses.
Verily, courts cannot, as the CA did in this case, make a blanket justification that "given
the nature of the operation, it is understandable that [the required witnesses'] immediate
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presence could not be immediately secured at the place of seizure or the nearest police
station." As the Court held in People v. De Guzman, "the justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist."
In this connection, it was error for both the RTC and the CA to convict accused-
appellant Malana by relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
supposedly extended in favor of the police officers. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused.
In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the buy-bust
team's blatant disregard of the established procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CESAR DELA CRUZ y LIBONAO ALIAS SESI of

ZONE 3, MACANAYA, APARRI, CAGAYAN
DOCTRINE
alleged crime, outlines the procedure which the police officers must strictly follow to preserve
the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used as evidence. The provision
requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure
or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of
(a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ),
all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same
and the seized drugs must be turned over to a forensic laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours
from confiscation for examination.
The Court, however, has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance
with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible; and, the failure of
the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165
this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is
items are properly preserved.
FACTS
The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Office received a phone call from a
confidential informant disclosing that a certain Cesar Dela Cruz alias Sesi is engaged in illegal
drug activities at Macanaya, Aparri, Cagayan. A buy bust team was then formed. IO2 Vivien
A. Molina was designated as the poseur buyer while IO1 Robert Baldoviso was assigned as
the immediate back-up.
At 8:30 in the evening, upon reaching Zone 3 of Brgy. Macanaya, Aparri, Cagayan, IO2
Molina and the confidential agent saw a man standing along the highway. The confidential
agent recognized the said man as Cesar Dela Cruz. The two approached the accused. The
poseur-buyer, confidential informant and the accused talked briefly. The accused asked IO2
Molina how much shabu she was buying and the latter replied that she needed shabu worth
one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos only. Upon hearing the amount, accused proceeded to an
alley at his residence and got something. When the accused returned, he handed IO2 Molina
a small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet while the latter in return handed to the accused
two pieces of five hundred (P500.00) peso bills. Upon confirming that the plastic sachet
contained shabu, IO2 Molina ignited her lighter prompting her immediate back-up and the
rest of the team to rush to the place. IO2. Baldoviso frisked the accused and recovered from
him the buy bust money.
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The PDEA agents brought the accused including the seized items to the Aparri Police
Station for marking and inventory of the confiscated items. The inventory was witnessed by
two Barangay officials namely, Barangay Kagawad Anthony Pipo and Barangay Captain Eder
Peneyra.
For his part, the accused-appellant interposed the defense of frame-up.
The RTC ruled that the prosecution's evidence sufficiently established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165. Aggrieved, Dela Cruz
appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed Dela Cruz's conviction. As to the contention of Dela Cruz
that the buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165, the
CA ruled that his argument is devoid of merit. It noted that non- compliance with Section 21
does not invalidate the seizure and custody of the seized drugs.
ISSUE
Whether or not Dela Cruz's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
of the alleged crime, outlines the procedure which the police officers must strictly follow to
after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in
a copy of the same and the seized drugs must be turned over to a forensic laboratory within
twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.
with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible; and, the failure
of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA
9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid.
However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that:
(a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved.
In the present case, the buy-bust team failed to strictly comply with the mandatory
requirements under Section 21, par. 1 of RA 9165. First, the arresting officers failed to mark
and photograph the seized illegal drug at the place of arrest. Moreover, none of the three
required witnesses was present at the time of seizure and apprehension. Second, even more
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revealing is the fact that Barangay Kagawad Anthony Pipo, whose signature was affixed on
the inventory, did not witness the actual preparation of the inventory and photographing of
the seized items. Lastly, the buy-bust team failed to offer any explanation for their failure to
strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21.
Breaches of the procedure outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti had been compromised. In the present case, the prosecution neither recognized, much
less tried to justify or explain, the police officers' deviation from the procedure contained in
Section 21.
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Case Digests
REYNALDO ARBAS RECTO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
Jurisprudence provides that treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not
make any preparation to kill the deceased in such manner as to insure the commission of the
killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend himself.
Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where the mode
adopted by the aggressor does not positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly
intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves
arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly appear that
the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to
accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
FACTS
An Information for Murder was filed against petitioner Reynaldo Arbas Recto for the
death of Margie Carlosita. Thereafter, Recto's former counsel filed a Petition for Bail with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). However, the RTC denied Recto's Petition for Bail as it gave
credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Joshua Emmanuel Rabillas, son of
Carlosita, that Recto was the one who killed his mother. The RTC, in denying the Petition for
Bail, noted that "without, however, prejudging in any way the result of the case, the Court is
of the impression that the evidence of guilt is strong, and it is incumbent on the part of the
accused to take the witness stand to show otherwise."
Trial on the merits then ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, Recto filed a
Demurrer to Evidence for insufficiency of evidence to hold him guilty of the crime of Murder.
The RTC, however, denied the Demurrer to Evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Fix Bail alleging that the prosecution was able to show
that the crime charged should be Homicide only and not Murder. He pointed out that
Rabillas, who was five years old at the time of the incident, testified that Carlosita was hit by
the bottle during a quarrel over money. Citing People v. Rivera, a case with substantially the
same facts wherein the common-law wife was killed by the common-law husband during a
heated argument, Recto argued that the case established by the prosecution was thus merely
Homicide due to the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
The RTC issued denied the Motion to Fix Bail. Aggrieved, Recto then filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA. The CA affirmed the denial of Recto's Motion to Fix Bail. The CA
reasoned that Recto failed to show that the RTC's issuance of the Order was attended by
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Recto then sought
reconsideration of the Decision, but the same was denied by the CA.
ISSUE
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Whether or not Recto is guilty of the crime of Murder.
RULING
NO. As correctly pointed out by Recto, the evidence of the prosecution could, at best,
only convict him of Homicide and not Murder. The testimony of the main prosecution
witness, Rabillas, was to the effect that his mother and Recto had an argument prior to her
death.
Jurisprudence provides that treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not
make any preparation to kill the deceased in such manner as to insure the commission of the
killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend
himself. Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present,
where the mode adopted by the aggressor does not positively tend to prove that they thereby
knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk
to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must
clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen
with a view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
Applying the same principles, the Court in People v. Rivera concluded that treachery
is not present when the killing was preceded by a heated argument.
The other qualifying circumstances alleged in the Information filed against Recto —
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength — are likewise negated by the
foregoing fact. For the circumstance of evident premeditation to be properly appreciated, it
must first be shown that there was a sufficient lapse of time between the decision to commit
the crime and the execution thereof to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of
his act. Similarly, for abuse of superior strength to be properly appreciated, there must be
evidence showing that the assailants "consciously sought the advantage " or that "there was
deliberate intent on the part of the malefactor to take advantage thereof."
Based on the foregoing, there is thus merit in Recto's claim that the evidence
presented by the prosecution could, at most, convict him only of Homicide and not Murder.
The RTC thus gravely abused its discretion when it denied Recto's Motion to Fix Bail.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BRYAN LABSAN y NALA and CLENIO DANTE y

PEREZ
G.R. No. 227184, February 6, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that:(a) there is
justifiable ground for non- compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
FACTS
While the police officers assigned at City Anti-Illegal Drugs Task Force (CAIDTF),
Cagayan de Oro City Police Office were having their tour of duty at the night cafe in Divisoria,
Cagayan de Oro City, a Confidential Informant (CI) arrived and informed PCI Cacdac that a
certain "Opaw" and "Bryan" were selling illicit drugs at Barangay Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro
City. A buy-bust operation was then planned by the team.
Before the team arrived at the target area, the CI disembarked first from the taxi and
approached the two (2) suspects at the side of the road. PO3 Baillo saw the actual transaction
of the CI and the suspects as there was a light coming from the lamp post. He saw the CI give
the ordinary marked money to "Opaw" while "Bryan" gave one (1) heat-sealed sachet plastic
cellophane to the CI. Immediately after the exchange, the CI removed his bull cap as the
agreed pre-arranged signal to show that the transaction was already consummated. Hence,
the buy-bust team rushed towards the suspects and arrested them. PO3 Vicente bodily
searched the suspects and he recovered from "Bryan" two (2) sachets of suspected shabu.
Likewise, PO3 Vicente recovered from "Opaw" one (1) sachet of suspected shabu, the two
(2) P100.00 bills used as buy-bust money, and an improvised hand gun. Also, the sachet of
suspected shabu subject of the buy-bust operation was turned over by the CI to PO3 Vicente.
Then, the buy-bust team took pictures of the items recovered from the suspects at the area.
The suspects were then brought to the CAIDTF office for proper documentation. Upon
their arrival thereat, PO3 Vicente turned over to SPO1 Tarre the seized items. SPO1 Tarre
then marked the seized items. The markings were done in the presence of PO3 Vicente, the
other members of the team, and also the accused-appellants. Thereafter, SPO1 Tarre turned
over the marked items together with the crime laboratory requests for the examination
thereof to the PNP Crime Laboratory, and the living body of the two (2) appellants to PO3
Vicente and PO3 Baillo for drug testing. The qualitative examination conducted on the
specimens and urine sample taken from appellants Labsan and Dante gave positive result to
the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
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For their part, Labsan and Dantes denied the charges against them.
The RTC found accused- appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the CA sustained accused- appellants'
conviction. The CA held that the failure of the police officers to strictly comply with the
provisions of Section 21 of RA 9165 is of no moment since the integrity and evidentiary value
of the drugs seized from accused-appellants were preserved.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining accused-appellants' conviction for violation
of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165.
RULING
YES. Section 21, 30 Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the
commission of the alleged crimes, outlines the procedure which the police officers must
strictly follow to preserve the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used
as evidence. Said provision requires that: (1) the seized items must be inventoried and
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same; and (3) the seized drugs must
be turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory within twenty-four
(24) hours from confiscation for examination.
However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove
that:(a) there is justifiable ground for non- compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved.
In this case, the Court finds that the police officers utterly failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements of Section 21, which put into question the identity and evidentiary
value of the items purportedly seized from accused-appellants.
To start with, the illegal drugs seized from accused-appellants were not marked
immediately upon seizure and confiscation. Records show that three (3) plastic sachets were
recovered from accused-appellants: one (1) sachet was bought by the confidential informant
and two (2) sachets were confiscated by PO3 Vicente; but the markings were made not in the
place of seizure and not by the police officer who recovered the seized drugs. More
importantly, there was no compliance with the three (3)-witness rule. None of the required
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witnesses was present at the place of apprehension and even at the police station where the
inventory and photography of the seized drugs were made.
Indeed, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be
brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to
the conviction of illegal drug suspects. For however noble the purpose or necessary the
exigencies of the campaign against illegal drugs may be, it is still a governmental action that
must always be executed within the boundaries of law.
Moreover, records do not show that the prosecution was able to establish a justifiable
ground as to why the police officers were not able to secure the presence of the witnesses.
In this case, PO3 Vicente admitted that despite knowledge of the mandatory requirements of
Section 21, the buy-bust team did not exert any effort to secure the presence of the required
witnesses.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DONDON GUERRERO y ELING

DOCTRINE
While there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto
render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid, this is with the caveat that the
prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
reasons behind the procedural lapses.
FACTS
On August 31, 2013, at about 4:30 p.m., a confidential informant (CI) came to the office
of Regional Anti- Illegal Drug Special Operations Task Group (RAIDSOTG) Region I and
reported to SPO1 Rosario that appellant and Marian Dagium were looking for buyers of
shabu. Using the Cl's cellphone, SPO1 Rosario contacted appellant and informed him that he
was interested in buying Php5,000.00 worth of shabu. They agreed to meet near the RITZ
Apartelle.
The CI then contacted appellant again to confirm the time of their meeting. Appellant
informed the CI that he's already on his way and so SPO1 Rosario, acting as poseur-buyer,
and the CI rode a tricycle to the apartelle at around 12:20 am of September 1, 2013 and
positioned themselves in front of RITZ Apartelle.
The CI informed appellant that they were already in front of the apartelle. Four
individuals came out from the building: appellant, Melchor Lorenzo, Jerry Salingbay and
Marian Dagium. Appellant approached SPO1 Rosario and the CI. Appellant then asked SPO1
Rosario if he has the money and SPO1 Rosario likewise asked if appellant has the "stuff with
him. Appellant answered in the affirmative and instructed Melchor Lorenzo to receive the
marked money. Melchor Lorenzo took the marked money while appellant handed over to
SPO1 Rosario a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. SPO1
Rosario confirmed that the contents of the sachet as shabu and then executed a pre-arranged
signal. This signal prompted arresting officer SPO1 Bitabit and the rest of the back-up team
to approach the group and arrest the four individuals, including appellant.
SPO1 Bitabit apprised them of their constitutional rights, after which, each person
under arrest was frisked, resulting in the seizure of another plastic sachet from the wallet of
Jerry Salingbay and another sachet from Marian Dagium. The marked money was recovered
from Melchor Lorenzo. The recovered items were marked by SPO1 Rosario in the place of
arrest, in the presence of other members of the team, Dominador Dacanay of DZNL and
barangay official Americo Flores of Canaoay. However, because it was dark in that place, the
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team leader ordered that they continue the inventory in their office at Camp Florendo Parian,
San Fernando City.
The team, together with appellant and his three other companions, went to Camp
Florendo, Parian, San Fernando City. In their office, the inventory of the seized items was
continued. Pictures were taken during the inventory. After the Certificate of Inventory was
signed, SPO1 Rosario prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination which was signed
by their Action Officer P/Supt. Bersola. SPO1 Rosario delivered the request and the three
plastic sachets of suspected shabu which were received by the Forensic Chemist of PDEA
Maximiano Valentin. The laboratory examination confirmed that the three sachets contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The RTC convicted Guerrero of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. Aggrieved,

Guerrero appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Guerrero, holding that
the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the crime charged. The CA also declared
that there was substantial compliance in ensuring the integrity of the drug seized from
Guerrero was preserved.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Guerrero of the crime charged.
RULING
YES. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR), the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, lays down the
procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the confiscated
drugs used as evidence. The provision requires: (1) that the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; and (3) that such conduct of the
physical inventory and photograph shall be done at the (a) place where the search warrant
is served; (b) nearest police station; or (c) nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizure.
While the IRR allows alternative places for the conduct of the inventory and
to be physically present at the time or near the place of apprehension is not dispensed
with. The reason is simple: it is at the time of arrest — or at the time of the drugs' "seizure
and confiscation" — that the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their
presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would insulate against the police
practice of planting evidence.
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In the present case, the records clearly show that the physical inventory and
photographing were not made before the three required witnesses. The Certificate of
Inventory dated September 1, 2013 was signed only by Americo Flores (Flores), the
barangay kagawad, and Dominador Dacanay (Dacanay), the representative from the media.
The two witnesses present — a barangay official and a media representative — do not suffice
in the face of the explicit requirement of the law that mandates the presence of three
witnesses. Neither did the police officers or the prosecution — during the trial — offer any
viable or acceptable explanation for their deviation from the law.
While there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso
facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid, this is with the caveat
that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for
reasons behind the procedural lapses.
In this case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify, its
deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21, RA 9165. The prosecution did not
offer any plausible explanation as to why they did not contact the representative from the
DOJ. Breaches of the procedure outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left
delicti had been compromised.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENJIE CARANTO y AUSTRIA

DOCTRINE
this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is
FACTS
SPO4 Romeo Abordo received an information from a Confidential Informant (CI) that
a certain Benjie was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. At that time, Benjie, who may be
found at Dr. Cariño Street, was looking for a prospective buyer of a certain amount of drugs
valued at One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos. Upon learning this, a buy-bust operation was
organized.
Upon reaching Dr. Cariño Street, the CI exchanged text messages with Benjie
informing the latter that he was already in the area. When Benjie showed up at the meeting
place, the CI pointed at him so that PO2 Boado may be able to identify him. After alighting
from the vehicle, the CI approached Benjie and introduced PO2 Boado to him as the
prospective buyer. Benjie asked for the money. PO2 Boado handed him two (2) Five Hundred
(P500.00)-Peso bills and Benjie gave him a plastic sachet containing shabu. PO2 Boado then
removed his bull- cap, the pre-arranged gesture for the back-up team to assist him in the
arrest of Benjie. The back-up team approached Benjie, introduced themselves as police
officers, and placed him under arrest. Benjie was frisked for deadly weapons but what was
recovered from him was a Nokia cellphone and two (2) Five Hundred (P500.00)-Peso bills.
PO2 Boado marked the items on the site. Benjie was then brought to Police Station 5 along
with the confiscated items including the plastic sachet of shabu in PO2 Boado's possession
which were brought for inventory. The following individuals were present during the
inventory: herein appellant Benjie; Prosecutor Ruth Bernabe, the representative of the DOJ;
Danilo Patacsil, an elected Barangay official; and Roi Molina of the BCBC, the media
representative. After the inventory, PO2 Boado turned over the items to SPO1 Takayen who
then requested PO2 Boado to bring the plastic sachet of shabu to Police Senior Inspector
Rowena Canlas of the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Bado, Dangwa.
For his part, the accused appellant interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up.
The RTC found the accused-appellant guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA

9165. he CA affirmed accused-appellant 's conviction. It ruled that the police officers' failure
to take photographs of the seized items while in the presence of the accused, a member of
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the media, a representative of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and an elected Barangay
official does not affect the admissibility of the seized drugs. It further held that although the
police officers did not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA
9165, their non-compliance did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drug seized from
Benjie as the chain of custody of evidence was shown to be unbroken under the
circumstances of the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not Benjie's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING
after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be
done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected
public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ, all
of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same
and the seized drugs must be turned over to a forensic laboratory within twenty-four (24)
hours from confiscation for examination.
requirements under Section 21, paragraph 1 of RA 9165.
First, the arresting officers failed to photograph the seized items at the place of arrest
and seizure and at the precinct where the mandatory witnesses were present. Neither did
they offer any explanation as to why they did not take photographs of the seized items.
Second, not one of the three required witnesses was present at the time of arrest of the
accused and marking of the seized items at the place of arrest. The three witnesses were only
"called-in" to the police station to witness the inventory of the seized items and sign the
inventory receipt.
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More so, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify or explain, the
police's deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21. The police officers did not
offer any justifiable reason for the absence of the required witnesses during the buy-bust
operation itself, especially where, as here, they had more than sufficient time to secure their
presence prior to the planned arrest. Hence, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti has thus been compromised, thus necessitating the acquittal of Benjie.
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JESUS CONCEPCION y TABOR a.k.a. "BAKLA/BONG" v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES,
DOCTRINE
It does not go unnoticed that strict compliance with the mandatory procedure under
R.A. No. 9165 was achieved by the apprehending officers; there was no record of any deviation
from the requirements under the law. Hence, absent contrary proof to the facts established,
Concepcion's conviction must follow. In criminal cases, "proof beyond reasonable doubt" does
not entail absolute certainty of the fact that the accused committed the crime, and neither does
it exclude the possibility of error. What is only required is that degree of proof which, after a
scrutiny of the facts, produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty of the culpability of the
accused.
FACTS
An Information was filed against petitioner Jesus Concepcion y Tabor for violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses,
namely: PCI Grace Tugas, IO2 Rodel Abina, SO2 Christopher Viaña, and Dennis Lladoc.
Witness PCI Tugas, the forensic chemist of the Camarines Norte Crime Laboratory,
testified she received a request from IO2 Abina for the laboratory examination of the subject
specimens. After the necessary examination of the content of the twelve (12) heat-sealed
sachets, it was found that the submitted specimens are positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrocholoride or shabu.
Witness IO2 Abina, narrated that on November 15, 2012, he participated in the
implementation of the search warrant dated November 14, 2012 issued against the
appellant. Agent Magpantay, their team leader, designated him to be the searcher. He
recounted that at around 4:30 a.m., after being given the go signal, he conducted the search
for illegal drugs and was able to recover twelve (12) pieces of small heat-sealed plastic
sachets containing crystalline substance that they suspected to be shabu. He affirmed that
during the conduct of the search, the barangay captain, DOJ representative Lladoc, Mr. Ricky
Pera from the media, and one barangay kagawad and the appellant were present. He further
testified that he put markings on each of the twelve (12) sachets. The inventory was then
prepared. After the necessary documentation, he proceeded to the crime laboratory and
submitted the request for laboratory examination together with the specimens.
SO2 Viana, in turn, testified that he was assigned as the arresting officer in the
enforcement of the search warrant against the appellant. He personally saw it when IO2
Abina found the subject items inside the Orocan cabinet. After seeing the seizure of the
suspected illicit drugs, he arrested the appellant, brought the latter to the Provincial Office,
and then submitted him for medical examination.
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On the other hand, the testimony of witness Lladoc, a representative of the

Department of Justice (DOJ), was stipulated upon by the public prosecutor and the defense.
Both parties admitted that: (a) the witness is one of the witnesses in the conduct of the
inventory seized from the appellant; and (b) said witness, as one of the witnesses in the
preparation of the inventory process, had affixed his signature in the Certificate of Inventory.
For his part, Concepcion categorically denied the charges against him
The RTC found Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
Aggrieved, Concepcion appealed his conviction to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's findings
but reduced the penalty imposed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in affirming Concepcion's conviction of Section
11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 notwithstanding the prosecution's failure to establish the chain
of custody and integrity of the seized drugs allegedly possessed by Concepcion.
RULING
NO. The movement of the confiscated contraband from the point of seizure until its
presentation in court was duly established by both testimonial and documentary evidence.
It does not go unnoticed that strict compliance with the mandatory procedure under
R.A. No. 9165 was achieved by the apprehending officers; there was no record of any
deviation from the requirements under the law. Hence, absent contrary proof to the facts
established, Concepcion's conviction must follow. In criminal cases, "proof beyond
reasonable doubt" does not entail absolute certainty of the fact that the accused committed
the crime, and neither does it exclude the possibility of error. What is only required is that
degree of proof which, after a scrutiny of the facts, produces in an unprejudiced mind moral
certainty of the culpability of the accused.
All told, the Court is convinced that Concepcion was indeed guilty of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, thereby violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
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MARLON DOMINGUEZ Y ARGANA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
In People v. Racho, the Court ruled that the determination of validity of the warrantless
arrest would also determine the validity of the warrantless search that was incident to the
arrest. A determination of whether there existed probable cause to effect an arrest should
therefore be determined first.
FACTS
While SPO1 Gerardo Parchaso was conducting monitoring and possible arrest of
violators of RA 9165 at Purok 3, Brgy. Poblacion, Muntinlupa City, he saw a man, who was
later identified as Dominguez, holding with his left hand a small transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. SPO1 Parchaso then grabbed
the hands of Dominguez and seized therefrom one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing the substance suspected to be shabu. He arrested Dominguez and informed him
of his violation and his rights under the law. However, seeing that there was already a crowd
gathering in the area, SPO1 Parchaso and PO2 Genova decided to leave the scene, and
brought Dominguez and the seized item to their office.
At the police station, SPO1 Parchaso marked the seized item With the help of Police
Inspector Diaz and another police officer, they prepared Dominguez's Booking and
Information Sheet, and took photographs of Dominguez and the marked seized item. They
also conducted the inventory which was witnessed by Orlando Rodriguez, a local
government employee of Muntinlupa City. SPO1 Parchaso explained that despite P/Insp.
Diaz's calls to the representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media to
witness the inventory, no one came. Nevertheless, they still proceeded with the inventory to
comply with the period within which to bring the evidence to the Philippine National Police-
Southern Police District (PNP-SPD) Crime Laboratory for examination.
The marked seized item was brought to the PNP-SPD Crime Laboratory for
examination. The request was received by PNP Non-Uniformed Personnel Bernardo
Bucayan, Jr. which he turned over to Police Chief Inspector Abraham Verde Tecson. Based on
Physical Science Report prepared by PCI Tecson, the specimen weighing 0.03 gram, yielded
a positive result for shabu.
For his part, Dominguez interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up.
The RTC convicted Dominguez of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.

Aggrieved, Dominguez appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of
Dominguez, holding that the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the crime
charged.
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ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Dominguez of the crime
charged.
RULING
YES. In People v. Racho, the Court ruled that the determination of validity of the
warrantless arrest would also determine the validity of the warrantless search that was
incident to the arrest. A determination of whether there existed probable cause to effect an
arrest should therefore be determined first.
The circumstances as stated above do not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that
Dominguez was in possession of shabu. From a meter away, even with perfect vision, SPO1
Parchaso would not have been able to identify with reasonable accuracy the contents of the
plastic sachet. Dominguez' acts of standing on the street and holding a plastic sachet in his
hands, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create
probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest.
The prosecution failed to establish the conditions set forth in Section 5 (a), Rule 113
of the Rules of Court that: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer
The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in
a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open
to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent.
In the case at hand, while it can be said that the presence of the police officers was
legitimate as they were patrolling the area and that discovery of the plastic sachet was
inadvertent, it should be emphasized that, as to the third requisite, it was clearly not
apparent that such plastic sachet is an evidence of a crime, a contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure. To recall, when SPO1 Parchaso saw Dominguez, he only saw that
Dominguez was holding a very small plastic sachet. To the Court's mind, a very small plastic
sachet is not readily apparent as evidence incriminating Dominguez, such that it can be
seized without a warrant. A very small plastic sachet can contain just about anything. It could
even be just that — a very small plastic sachet — and nothing more.
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Despite the fact that Dominguez can no longer question the validity of his arrest, it is
crystal clear that the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is
inadmissible in evidence against him. There being no warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest or seizure of evidence in plain view, the shabu purportedly seized from
Dominguez is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
Dominguez mu must be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALD ESPEJO y RIZALDO

DOCTRINE
reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti
have consequently been compromised.
FACTS
Operatives from the Philippine National Police stationed at the Provincial Intelligence
Branch of the Laguna Police Provincial Office in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, received a report from a
"concerned citizen" that the accused-appellant Reynald Espejo was engaged in illegal drug
trade in the area of Laguerta Street, Barangay San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna. Thereafter,
P/Supt. Protacio formed a buy-bust team.
The team proceeded to the target area and saw accused-appellant standing by the
doorstep of a house while conversing with another person. At a certain point, they saw
accused-appellant hand over to that person a plastic sachet of suspected shabu. Afterwards,
PO1 Ver and the informant, who are acting as poseur-buyer, alighted from the vehicle. They
walked towards accused-appellant who came out of the house. Accused- appellant uttered
"Ilan tol?" SPO1 Ver replied, "Lima tol," (meaning, P500 worth of shabu). SPO1 Ver gave the
buy-bust money to accused-appellant. Accused-appellant accepted the money, and then
pulled from underneath the ceiling a coin purse from which he retrieved several plastic
sachets of suspected shabu. Accused- appellant gave one (1) sachet to SPO1 Ver. At this
juncture, SPO1 Ver scratched his head to signal the consummation of the transaction. SPO1
Ver held accused-appellant and introduced himself as a police officer, while the back-up team
and the perimeter security rushed in. SPO1 Ver recovered the coin purse that contained four
(4) other plastic sachets with the P500.00 buy-bust money.
At the place of transaction, SPO1 Ver immediately marked all the sachets seized.
Thenceforth, they brought accused-appellant and the seized items to the police station, and
thereupon, prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination and a Certificate of Inventory.
Likewise, photographs of the accused-appellant and the seized items were taken in the
presence of a representative from the media. After documentation, SPO1 Ver and SPO4
Goyena personally delivered the request and the substances to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
After chemical examination, the substances were confirmed positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
For his part, the accused-appellant denied the charges against him.
The RTC found the accused-appellant guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165. The CA affirmed accused-appellant’s conviction. It ruled,
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among others, that the absence of a Department of Justice (DOJ) Representative and
Barangay Official during the inventory is of no consequence. In cases involving dangerous
drugs, the mandatory procedure of Section 21 of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) require only substantial compliance.
ISSUE
Whether or not Espejo's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 was proven
RULING
official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ, all of
whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same;
and (3) the seized drugs must be turned over to a forensic laboratory within twenty-four
(24) hours from confiscation for examination.
9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid.
requirements under Section 21, paragraph 1 of RA 9165. First, none of the three required
witnesses was present at the time of arrest of the accused and the seizure of the drugs.
Second, the buy-bust team failed to offer any explanation for its failure to strictly comply
with the requirements of Section 21.
delicti have consequently been compromised.
In the present case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify or
explain, the buy-bust team's deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21. The
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police officers did not offer any justifiable reason for the absence of the required witnesses
during the buy-bust operation itself, especially where, as here, they could have done so.
The integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised,
thus necessitating the acquittal of Espejo.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GARRY BRIONES y ESPINA

DOCTRINE
The Court has consistently held that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving their
compliance with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-
compliance.
FACTS
While PO1 Carandang was on duty at the office of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs
Special Operation Task Force of the Batangas City Police Station, his asset arrived at the
police station and reported that there was a person who was selling shabu on a consignment
basis. PO1 Carandang relayed the information to SPO1 de Chavez, SPO1 Yap and PO2
Ponciano Asilo. SPO1 de Chavez, acting as team leader, decided to conduct a buy-bust
operation against the drug pusher who the asset referred to as "Garry."
The team proceeded to the Fil Oil Gasoline Station in Brgy. Gulod Labac, Batangas
City. When they reached the gasoline station, PO1 Carandang and the asset alighted from the
car and waited at a vacant lot nearby. After five (5) minutes, a man referred to by the asset
as alias "Garry" arrived. The asset and Garry talked while PO1 Carandang stood just beside
both of them. Then, Garry handed the asset a plastic sachet and uttered, "point three yan,
two five yan." The asset immediately passed the plastic sachet to PO1 Carandang. Thereafter,
PO1 Carandang arrested Garry and the back-up team rushed in. SPO1 de Chavez frisked the
accused, who identified himself as Garry Briones y Espina, but did not recover any other
illegal item. Then, PO1 Carandang marked the plastic sachet.
From the place of arrest, the team brought the accused to the barangay hall of Brgy.
Gulod Labac, Batangas City. SPO1 de Chavez tried to call a media representative but no one
arrived. Upon arrival of SPO1 Adelantar and the DOJ representative, the inventory of
confiscated items was conducted. Pictures were also taken while the inventory was being
conducted. PO1 Carandang was in possession of the plastic sachet of shabu from the time it
was confiscated until it was turned over to SPO1 Adelantar after the inventory was
conducted. Thereafter, they proceeded back to the police station.
At the police station, SPO1 Adelantar prepared the request for laboratory
examination and for drug test. He then delivered the documents and the confiscated item to
the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory Office. As shown in the Chemistry Report No. BD
204-2013, the specimen tested positive for the presence of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The RTC convicted the Garry of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165. the CA affirmed in toto Garry's conviction. It held, among others, that the procedural
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lapses lapses alleged by Garry were minor and did not affect the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated drug.
ISSUE
Whether or not Garry's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING
a copy of the same; and (3) the seized drugs must be turned over to a forensic laboratory
within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.
In the instant case, the buy-bust team failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements under Section 21, which thus creates reasonable doubt as to the identity and
integrity of the seized drug from Garry. Based on the testimony of PO1 Ruther Carandang,
the police officers only tried to contact the three mandatory witnesses when they were
already at the barangay hall after the arrest of the accused and seizure of the drug at the
crime scene. Moreover, the buy-bust team did not offer any explanation for its failure to
strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21.
The Court has consistently held that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving
their compliance with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case
of non-compliance.
In the case at bar, the police officers gave no such explanation. They merely "called-
in" the mandatory witnesses after the buy-bust operation was already accomplished
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although it is obvious that they had no excuse to do so. The buy-bust team had enough time
to secure the presence of the required witnesses at the place of arrest and seizure.
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ROLANDO P. DIZON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

DOCTRINE
While as a rule, strict compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is
mandatory, a deviation may be allowed only if the following requisites concur: (1) the existence
of "justifiable grounds" allowing departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team. Thus, when there is a showing of lapses in procedure, the prosecution must
recognize such and accordingly justify the same in order to warrant the application of the
saving mechanism.
FACTS
SI Cruz together with team leader SI Arthur Oliveros, SI Sindatuk Ulama, SI Erum and
SI Otec implemented a search warrant issued by the RTC of Quezon City to make an
immediate search of the residence of accused-appellant Dizon and to seize and take
possession of the following articles and bring them to the court: 1) undetermined quantity
of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as "shabu"; 2) records and proceeds
of sale of shabu; 3) weighing scale, plastic sachets, sealers and other articles used or being
used in the same and distribution of shabu; 4) tooters, water pipes, burners and other
paraphernalia used or being used in the administration of "shabu."
SI Cruz, his team, accused-appellant, and the 2 barangay kagawad namely Kagawad
Alcantara and Kagawad Lim went inside the house. When the search began, SI Cruz
recovered plastic sachets containing crystalline substance at the nearest bedroom. The
plastic sachets were found inside the pocket of a white ladies jacket place on top of the bed.
Aware of the absence of accused-appellant's counsel, SI Cruz did not inquire about the owner
of the jacket. Thereafter, SI Cruz prepared an inventory and placed markings on the sachet
in the presence of accused-appellant, Kagawad Alcantara and Kagawad Lim. Based on the
inventory, the items seized from the premises of accused- appellant included a plastic sachet
containing seven (7) smaller heat- sealed transparent plastic sachets of white crystalline
substance and another plastic sachet containing two (2) smaller unsealed Ajinomoto packets
of white crystalline substance. SI Cruz also took photographs of the articles seized in the
premises. The search team brought accused-appellant and the confiscated articles to the NBI
main office in Taft Avenue and continued with the booking procedure.
Accused-appellant Dizon, for his part, vehemently denied the accusation against him.
The RTC convicted Dizon for violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(R.A. No. 9165). Unsatisfied, Dizon appealed his conviction to the CA. The CA affirmed the
RTC Decision in toto. The CA found that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
dangerous drugs were preserved due to the unbroken chain of custody established by the
prosecution.
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ISSUE
Whether or not Dizon is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
RULING
NO. Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 lays down following procedure must be
observed in the seizure, custody, and disposition of dangerous drugs. The Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 (IRR), on the other hand, supplied additional custody
requirements and added a "saving clause" in case of non-compliance with such requirements
under justifiable grounds.
Thus, while as a rule, strict compliance with the foregoing requirements is mandatory,
a deviation may be allowed only if the following requisites concur: (1) the existence of
"justifiable grounds" allowing departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team. Thus, when there is a showing of lapses in procedure, the prosecution
must recognize such and accordingly justify the same in order to warrant the application of
the saving mechanism.
In this case, the apprehending team plainly failed to comply with the witness
requirements under the law, i.e., that the photographing and inventory of the seized items
be witnessed by a representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official. The records are clear: only two (2) barangay officials were present to
witness the operation. Worse, there was no indication whatsoever that the apprehending
team attempted, at the very least, to secure the presence of the other required witnesses.
Thus, as a result of the foregoing irregularities committed by the government

authorities, the conviction of Dizon now hangs in the balance. In this respect, in order not to
render void the seizure and custody over the evidence obtained from the latter, the
prosecution is thus required, as a matter of law, to establish the following: (i) that such non-
compliance was based on justifiable grounds, and (ii) that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items were properly preserved.
After a judicious scrutiny of the records of this case, the Court finds that the
apprehending officers failed in this regard. At the outset, the Court finds it brazen of the
police officers to recognize their fatal error in procedure and yet at the same time offer no
explanation or justification for doing so, which, as stated above, is required by the law. What
further catches the attention of the Court is the fact that Dizon was apprehended pursuant
to a search warrant and therefore with more reason, the police officers could have secured
the presence of the other witnesses, i.e., the DOJ representative and media representative.
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However, despite the advantage of planning the operation ahead, the apprehending team
nonetheless inexplicably failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 21 of R.A
No. 9165.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DON VEGA Y RAMIL

DOCTRINE
“An accused who pleads self-defense admits to the commission of the crime charged. He
has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the
following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.
It is established that the qualifying circumstance of treachery must be proven by clear

and convincing evidence. To qualify as an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the
assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods
or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.”
FACTS
On 18 January 2009 at about 11:30 in the evening, the victim, Manuel Isip, was at
Arellano Street, Malate, Manila because his friend was celebrating his birthday. Among his
drinking buddies was Aldrin Fernandez, witness for the prosecution. While drinking,
chatting, and listening to music, they spotted accused Don Vega who was about 4 arms'
length away sniffing rugby from a bottle. After a few hours, Don Vega approached them and
caused a disturbance by smashing several items. Victim Manuel Isip tried to pacify the
accused saying, "pre, huwag naman dito, kasi may nagkakasiyahan dito" but accused harshly
replied, "huwag kang makialam dito, baka ikaw ang samain." Victim Isip did not comment
and merely turned his back to avert bigger trouble. While his back was turned on him,
accused suddenly grabbed him from behind, wrapped his left arm around the victim's neck
and using his right hand, plunged a knife to his chest. Victim Isip was rushed to the Ospital
ng Maynila but was declared "dead on arrival."
For its part, the defense presented accused himself. He claimed that on 18 January
2009, at about 11 in the evening, he was along Tuazon St., San Andres, Manila, drinking with
victim Isip and a certain "Fernandez," together with the birthday celebrator "Ogad." He
requested victim Isip to play his theme song. The victim asked him to wait because there
were many who made similar requests. He reiterated his request several times but was
ignored. He then approached the victim, but the latter punched him. Upset, he went back to
his table and picked up a bladed weapon. Victim Isip suddenly charged towards him, so he
stabbed him. He thought the people will pacify him (accused), but he was wrong.
RTC convicted Don of the crime of Murder, rulng that the defense was not able to
establish all the elements of self-defense. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, likewise
holding that the elements of self-defense are lacking.
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ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Don's conviction for Murder
RULING
YES. The Court affirmed Don’s conviction, but only for the crime of Homicide, as the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven.
The accused failed to prove self-defense. An accused who pleads self-defense admits
to the commission of the crime charged. He has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person resorting to self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is indispensable, which
refers to "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon
a person."
All the requisites of self-defense are wanting in this case: First, there is no unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. For unlawful aggression to be present, there must be
real danger to life or personal safety. Accordingly, the accused must establish the
concurrence of the 3 elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical
or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent;
and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful. None of the elements of unlawful aggression
was proven by the defense. Aside from Don's self-serving statement that it was Manuel who
punched and attacked him, not one of the persons present at the incident corroborated his
account. Neither did he present any medical record showing that he sustained any injuries
as the result of the attack by Manuel.
Second, in the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the second
requisite of self-defense could not have been present. Even assuming that there was unlawful
aggression, the means employed by Don in repelling the alleged attack by Manuel was not
reasonably necessary. Manuel was unarmed and had his back turned while Don used a
bladed weapon to "repel the attack" and stab Manuel repeatedly.
Lastly, the third requisite requires the person mounting a defense to be reasonably
blameless. It was Don who suddenly rushed to the victim and stabbed the latter several times
in the chest. In addition, there was no sufficient provocation on the part of Manuel. Based on
the account of the prosecution witnesses, Manuel merely implored Don to refrain from
breaking things and making unnecessary disturbance. In fact, when Don uttered harsh words
against Manuel, the latter did not make a comment and instead turned his back on the
former.
Further, treachery was not established by clear and convincing evidence. It is

established that the qualifying circumstance of treachery must be proven by clear and
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convincing evidence. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to
directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. To qualify as an offense, the following conditions must
exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal
act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the
assailant.
In this case, the following circumstances negate the presence of treachery: First, Don
was already a part of the drinking spree where the stabbing eventually happened; he did not
deliberately seek the presence of Manuel as they were already in the same vicinity. Second,
in killing Manuel, Don merely picked up a bladed weapon from his table - there was no
mention in the records as to who owned said weapon. The suddenness of an attack does not,
of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the
decision was made all of a sudden and the victim's helpless position was accidental. Based
on these circumstances, Don's decision to attack Manuel was more of a sudden impulse than
a planned decision. Lastly, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses, the incident happened
during a drinking spree where there were more or less 15 people, excluding Don and Manuel.
If Don wanted to make certain that no risk would come to him, he could have chosen another
time and place to stab Manuel.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LARRY LUMAHANG Y TALISAY
DOCTRINE
“Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where
the mode adopted by the aggressor does not positively tend to prove that he thereby knowingly
intended to insure the accomplishment of his criminal purpose without any risk to himself
arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly appear that the
method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to
accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.”
FACTS
On December 14, 2008, around 9 in the evening, Alberto Poraso, Rodel Velitario, and
Augusto Pornelos were attending a wake in Joan of Arc Street, Barangay Gulod, Novaliches,
QC when appellant appeared fuming mad. Suddenly, appellant approached Pornelos from
behind and stabbed him in a hook motion with knife in his left hand. Pornelos, who was hit
on the buttocks, quickly ran towards an alley. Without warning, appellant then turned his ire
on Velitario and stabbed him repeatedly on different parts of his body.
RTC convicted Lumahang of the crimes of Murder and Less Serious Physical Injuries
on the basis of the testimony of the prosecution eyewitness Poraso, who positively identified
him as the assailant of Velitario and Pornelos. The RTC held that the stabbing of Pornelos
and the killing of Velitario were attended by treachery as the attacks were sudden, the
victims were unarmed, and they were not able to defend themselves. However, as to
Pornelos, the RTC only convicted Lumahang of less serious physical injuries as it could not
be inferred from the attack, or the wound sustained by Pornelos, that Lumahang had the
intent to kill Pornelos.
CA affirmed the RTC conviction with modifications. It likewise upheld the RTC finding
that the attacks were attended with treachery. As to the attack against Pornelos, Lumahang
effected the attack from behind; as to Velitario, the attack, while made frontally, was made
in a sudden, unexpected, and swift manner. However, as to Pornelos, Lumahang’s conviction
was downgraded to only Slight Physical Injuries, as Pornelos only needed 7 days of hospital
confinement to recover.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of
treachery insofar as Velitario is concerned
RULING
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YES. The Court disagrees with the CA insofar as it holds that treachery attended the
attack on Velitario. Treachery undoubtedly exists on the attack against Pornelos because (1)
the parties were attending a wake, and were thus not expecting an attack from happening;
(2) the attack was made suddenly and from behind.
The CA held that the swiftness and unexpectedness of the attack caught Velitario off
guard, which rendered him unable to defend himself. This conclusion is erroneous. Mere
suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where the mode
adopted by the aggressor does not positively tend to prove that he thereby knowingly
intended to insure the accomplishment of his criminal purpose without any risk to himself
arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly appear that
the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to
accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
In this case, Lumahang had already made an attack against Pornelos who, after being
stabbed on the buttocks, was able to run away towards safety. Velitario was already apprised
that there was danger nearby as he saw the commotion between the two. Even if Velitario
was so surprised by the attack that he was unable to do anything, this does not automatically
make the attack treacherous. It is true that Velitario was unable to defend himself from
Lumahang's attacks not because he was not given an opportunity to do so, but simply
because he was not able to react in time from the initial attack on Pornelos.
The fact that the victim was unable to defend himself would not automatically mean
that the killing was attended by treachery if the prosecution, as in this case, failed to show
that the means used by Lumahang was consciously or deliberately adopted to ensure the
execution of the crime without any risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim
might offer.
In addition, the attack itself was frontal. While a frontal attack, by itself, does not
negate the existence of treachery, when it is considered along with the other circumstances,
like the attack not being unexpected, it already creates a reasonable doubt in the existence
of the qualifying circumstance. Hence, the Court must perforce rule in favor of the accused
and not appreciate the said circumstance. With the removal of the qualifying circumstance
of treachery, the crime committed by Lumahang against Velitario is therefore Homicide and
not Murder.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DAVE CLAUDEL y LUCAS
GR No. 219852, April 3, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
“In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It
is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drug be established with
moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on its identity, the prosecution
has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the chain
of custody from the moment the drug is seized up to its presentation in court as evidence of the
crime.”
FACTS
A buy-bust operation was conducted by the operatives of Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-
Special Operation Task Group Muntinlupa Police following a report that a certain Dave
Claudel is engaged in illegal drug activities. Prior to the buy-bust operation, Dave was
previously arrested for violation of RA 9165 involving illegal drugs. The buy-bust team
prepared the Pre-Operational Sheet and Coordination Sheet which they faxed to the PDEA.
In turn, the buy-bust team received a Certificate of Coordination from PDEA.
PO2 Hernaez was assigned as poseur-buyer while PO1 Yangson as the immediate
back up. PO2 Hernaez was handed a P500 Bill buy-bust money on which the latter wrote his
initials "RH" on the lower right portion. It was agreed that PO2 Hernaez will light a cigarette
as a pre-arranged signal that the sale was consummated.
As PO2 Hernaez was already familiar with Dave as he used to see him in court
hearings, PO2 Hernaez wore a disguise by wearing a gray polo shirt, maong pants, leather
shoes, and a cap to cover his face, in order to avoid being recognized.
At around 9:30pm, the team proceeded to the target place. PO2 Hernaez and the asset
walked towards Tuazon Street corner Rizal Street where it was dark and there was no light.
The asset pointed to Dave as the person selling illegal drugs and introduced PO2 Hernaez as
his kumpare who is interested in buying shabu. Dave asked how much they would buy and
PO2 Hernaez replied, "P500, pare." Dave reached into the secret pocket of his maong pants
and told PO2 Hernaez, "Tamang-tama pare huling kasa ko na lang 'to pauwi na rin ako." PO2
Hernaez handed Dave the buy-bust money while Dave handed him a transparent plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Hernaez lit his cigarette and PO1 Yangson
immediately rushed to the scene and arrested Dave.
After informing Dave of his rights, PO2 Hernaez and the rest of the buy-bust team
brought him to their office where they recovered the buy-bust money. The plastic sachet
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remained in PO2 Hernaez's custody until they reached their office. Upon arriving, PO2
Hernaez placed the marking "DC" on the seized plastic sachet. They conducted an Inventory
of the seized item in the presence of Dave and a DAPCO representative.
PO2 Hernaez explained that they contacted a representative from the media and the
barangay but received a negative reply as it was already around 10 or 11 in the evening.
Photographs of Dave, the buy-bust team, and the confiscated items were taken. They
prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination which was submitted to the Crime
Laboratory. PO2 Hernaez took custody of the seized item and submitted it to the Custodian
in the Crime Laboratory. The result of the Laboratory Examination yielded positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thereafter, they executed a Joint Affidavit, a Booking
Sheet, and Spot Report of the incident.
RTC held that the prosecution sufficiently established that Dave was caught in
flagrante delicto of selling drugs to a poseur-buyer during a buy-bust operation.
CA affirmed Dave's conviction, ruling that the elements of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs have been amply proven by the prosecution to affirm the conviction of Dave.
Moreover, the non-compliance with the strict requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 is not
necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case. What is of utmost importance is the preservation
of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. Further, it found that the police
officers exerted earnest efforts to obtain the presence and signatures of the required
witnesses, but the same proved futile as they received a negative reply since it was already
late at the time of the buy-bust operation.
ISSUE
Whether Dave's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt
RULING
NO. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very
corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of
conviction. It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drug be
established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on its
identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and
account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drug is seized up to its
presentation in court as evidence of the crime.
To preserve the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used as

evidence, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried
and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory
and photographing must be done in the presence of: (a) the accused or his/her
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and (d) a representative from the DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy of the same and the seized drugs must be turned over to the
PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for examination.
The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical
inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately
after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when it is not practicable that the IRR of RA
9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
reaches the nearest police station/office of the apprehending officer/team. This also means
that the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of the
conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again, must be immediately done at the
place of seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the
buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.
However, strict compliance may not always be possible; and such failure of the
apprehending team does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void
and invalid. However, the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. Without any justifiable explanation, which must be
proven as a fact, the evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and acquittal should follow
on the ground that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the buy-bust team failed to strictly comply with the mandatory
requirements. First, the arresting officers failed to mark and photograph the seized item at
the place of arrest and seizure. Neither did they offer any explanation as to why they failed
to do so. Moreover, none of the three required witnesses was present at the time of arrest
and the marking, photographing, and conduct of the inventory of the seized items.
Second, the buy-bust team failed to offer any explanation for its failure to comply. PO2
Hernaez merely said that they tried to contact the three required witnesses, but they never
came as it was already late, having been around 10-11pm. This is not sufficient to justify their
non-compliance. They had sufficient time prior to the buy-bust operation, as PO2 Hernaez
admitted that they were able to coordinate with PDEA and prepare the required documents
at about 7-8pm. Also, it was their second time arresting Dave, thus, they already knew what
to expect, and should have made the necessary preparations.
The prosecution has the burden of: (1) proving its compliance with Section 21, RA
9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-compliance. Breaches of the
procedure committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and unexplained by the
State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have been compromised.
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In this case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify, the police's
deviation from the procedure under Section 21. The integrity and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti have thus been compromised, necessitating the acquittal of Dave.
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MA. CARMEN ROSARIO ABILLA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
The confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its
existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is essential, therefore, that the identity
and integrity of the seized drugs must be established with moral certainty.
While the Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply
with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items void and invalid, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs
to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
FACTS
NBI Agent Dungog went to the PDEA Dumaguete City Office and informed SI Kintanar
about the illegal drug activity of Chicky. NBI Agent Dungog suggested that they meet his
confidential informant for a possible conduct of a buy-bust operation. NBI Agent Dungog and
SI Kintanar, together with SPO3 Germodo and IO1 Bataan Coliflores, proceeded to Brgy.
Piapi, Dumaguete City to meet said informant. The informant assured that he could transact
with Chicky for the purchase of shabu. Hence, NBI Agent Dungog contacted other members
of Task Force 24. When they arrived, SI Kintanar prepared the P500 bill buy-bust money
while the informant contacted Chicky, who instructed the informant to meet her at Villa
Fortunata. Hence, the team went to said place.
The informant introduced SI Kintanar to Chicky and told her that they were buying
P1000 worth of shabu. Chicky handed SI Kintanar a sachet of shabu and SI Kintanar handed
the P500 marked money. SI Kintanar pretended to get another P500 from his wallet and
executed the prearranged signal by making a miss call to NBI Agent Dungog. The rest of the
team assisted him in arresting Chicky. Her black leather bag was inspected, where the
marked money and another sachet of shabu were found. To preserve the integrity of the
evidence seized, SI Kintanar marked each sachet and signed them.
After marking, Brgy. Kagawad Baroy arrived, so SI Kintanar showed him the seized
items. The team was about to conduct the inventory but it decided to have it at the NBI Office
instead, as the place of the incident was not well-lighted and there was already a commotion
from the passing vehicles, and the people were already scared as they had guns. From there
up to the NBI Office, SI Kintanar had all the seized items in his custody.
At the NBI Office, when all the required witnesses were already present, SI Kintanar
inventoried the seized items and prepared the Certificate of Inventory while NBI Agent
Dungog prepared a request for laboratory examination. SPO3 Germodo took photographs of
the seized items, the Certificate of Inventory, and the required witnesses with Chicky. After
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inventory, all the confiscated items were left in the custody of SI Kintanar. As there was a
brown-out, IO1 Coliflores entered the incident in the PDEA blotter when the power was
restored.
On the next day, SI Kintanar personally submitted the seized sachets of shabu to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination. PCI Llena received the seized items and
conducted the qualitative examination on the specimens, which yielded positive results for
presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug under R.A. 9165.
She prepared a Chemistry Report to reflect her findings, re-sealed the sachets, and placed
her own markings. She kept them in the crime laboratory's evidence room, where only she
had access to, until they were submitted by her to the RTC.
RTC convicted Abilla for violation of Section 5 and 11 of RA No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) for having sold and possessed dangerous drugs without legal
authority. It further held that the chain of custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu has
never been broken. CA declared that there was substantial compliance in ensuring that the
integrity of the drugs seized from Abilla was preserved.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Abilla of the crimes charged.
RULING
YES. The Court acquits Abilla for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Abilla was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. In both cases, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense
and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a conviction. It is essential, therefore, that the
identity and integrity of the seized drugs must be established with moral certainty.
This resonates even more in buy-bust operations because "by their very nature, the
need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with
which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets or hands of
unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the
possibility of abuse is great." Thus, the law requires strict compliance with procedures laid
down by it to ensure that rights are safeguarded.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and
representative from the DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof; and (3) such conduct of the physical inventory and photograph
shall be done at the (a) place where the search warrant is served; (b) nearest police station;
or (c) nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizure.
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after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the IRR
of RA 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
that the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of
apprehension — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team
considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.
The buy-bust team failed to comply with the mandatory requirements under Section
21. The seized items were not inventoried immediately after seizure or confiscation. NBI
Agent Dungog admitted, during his cross-examination, that there was no inventory
conducted at the place of apprehension except for the markings made on the sachets by SI
Kintanar. The apprehending officers also testified that "although the place was lighted, it was
not considered sufficient for the proper conduct of inventory" and given the "presence of so
many people at that time." There were also no photographs of the seized drugs that were
taken at the place of seizure.; photographs were taken only at the NBI Office.
Moreover, none of the three required witnesses was present at the time of seizure
and apprehension. SI Kintanar testified that Brgy. Kagawad Baroy arrived after the arrest of
Abilla was executed. Further, there was no DOJ and media representatives present. The
presence of the other two witnesses at the NBI Office–Benlot as DOJ representative and Rio
as media representative, did not provide the necessary insulation contemplated by the law.
Based on Benlot's testimony, he arrived when the seized items were already arranged on the
table; while Rio's testimony revealed that he arrived only after the inventory and
photography of the seized items, and he was merely asked to sign the inventory sheet. As
they were unable to witness how the alleged sachets of dangerous drugs were seized, the
manner on how the buy-bust operation was conducted creates doubt as to the source,
identity, and integrity of the seized drugs.
The prosecution failed to prove any justifiable ground for non-compliance. While the
Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody
over the items void and invalid, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to
In this case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify, its
deviation from the procedure under Section 21, RA 9165. The reasons that (a) the place of
apprehension not being well-lighted; (b) existence of commotion from the passing vehicles,
and (c) people being scared because they had guns, do not persuade the Court to be
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justifiable explanations to dispense with the conduct of the physical inventory and the
photographing required by the law.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOVO TANES Y BELMONTE

DOCTRINE
In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti. Consequently,
compliance with the rule on chain of custody over the seized illegal drugs is crucial in any
prosecution that follows a buy-bust operation.
To maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs as evidence, Section 21, Article II of
R.A. 9165 requires: (1) the seized items must be inventoried and photographed immediately
after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the
presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official,
(c) a representative from media, and (d) a representative from DOJ, all required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
FACTS
An information was filed against Tanes for violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
Tanes pleaded not guilty, and eventually, filed a Petition for Bail. RTC issued an Order
granting Tanes' application for bail, finding that the evidence of his guilt was not strong
because there was doubt as to whether the chain of custody in the buy-bust operation was
preserved. The failure of prosecution to show that the 3 witnesses (media representative,
DOJ representative, elected official) were present in the actual buy-bust operation and not
only during the inventory negated the requirement of strong evidence of the accused's guilt
to justify a denial of bail.
Petitioner filed petition for certiorari before the CA, alleging that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting bail because:
(1) it did not state a summary of the prosecution's evidence in its Order, therefore, petitioner
was not accorded due process; and (2) it required the presence of the 3 witnesses during the
buy-bust operation and actual seizure of the drug, thereby extending the requirement laid
down in R.A. 9165.
CA dismissed the petition as petitioner failed to show that the RTC's exercise of
discretion in granting the application for bail was unsound and unguided by jurisprudence.
CA found that the evidence presented by the prosecution in establishing that Tanes' guilt was
strong was tarnished by a broken chain in custody. Further, petitioner was not denied due
process as 3 hearings were conducted for the bail application where petitioner was duly
represented by its prosecutors.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the Order of the RTC which granted Tanes'
application for bail.
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RULING
NO. Right to bail is recognized in the Bill of Rights, Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, xxx
Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, “No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.”
Thus, before conviction, bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua; it becomes a matter of discretion
if the offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment that
is, bail will be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. In this case, a violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. 9165 carries the penalty of life imprisonment. Hence, Tanes' bail becomes a
matter of judicial discretion if the evidence of his guilt is not strong.
To determine whether evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the conduct of bail
hearings is required. Non-compliance with the rules on chain of custody of illegal drugs
negates strong evidence of Tanes' guilt. As Tanes was charged with the crime of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the burden is on the State to prove
not only the elements of the crime but also the corpus delicti. In drug cases, the dangerous
drug itself is the very corpus delicti. Consequently, compliance with the rule on chain of
custody over the seized illegal drugs is crucial in any prosecution that follows a buy-bust
operation.
To maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs as evidence, Section 21, Article II of
R.A. 9165 requires: (1) the seized items must be inventoried and photographed immediately
official, (c) a representative from media, and (d) a representative from DOJ, all required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
of R.A. 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
that the required witnesses should be physically present at the time of the conduct of the
physical inventory of the seized items which must be immediately done at the place of
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seizure and confiscation - a requirement that can easily be complied with as the buy-bust
operation is a planned activity.
In this case, the buy-bust team committed several procedural lapses concerning the
chain of custody of the seized drug. The RTC and the CA found that: (1) there was no
representative from DOJ present during the buy-bust operation and inventory; (2) the two
other witnesses (media representative and elected public official) were not present during
the apprehension and seizure of the illegal drug but were merely called to sign the inventory
sheet; and (3) no photograph was presented showing the inventory of the seized shabu in
the presence of Tanes and the witnesses. These lapses in the chain of custody created doubt
as to the identity and integrity of the seized drug. Consequently, the evidence as to Tanes'
guilt cannot be characterized as strong. Accordingly, he is entitled to bail.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO ASENIERO
DOCTRINE
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring
its commission without risk to himself. There is no treachery if the attack was preceded by an
altercation between the accused and the victim. Each of them is forewarned of an impending
attack by either of them.
FACTS
On the part of the prosecution, Roel Pilo testified that he is a friend of the victim,
Dominador Reyes. At about 2am, he went to the dancing hall, 10 meters from the barangay
hall, where he saw Dominador Ranes, Mario Pelago, Analyn Gomez, and Mira Pagay. At about
5am, he left with the group of Dominador. They passed by a narrow road, so they did not
walk side by side. Mira trailed first, followed by Mario, then Roel, and behind him were
Dominador and Analyn. Suddenly, he heard Dominador say "Aray" (Ouch!); Dominador ran
past him followed by accused Romeo, who was carrying a long bolo. Around 4 meters from
where he was, Dominador stumbled with his back on the ground, and the accused caught up
with the victim and hacked him multiple times. Prior to this, Roel did not notice that accused
was around. He was so shocked by the incident that he just stood there and watched. He
asked the accused why he stabbed the victim, to which the accused replied that he was
jealous. At the trial, Roel identified the murder weapon (long bolo) used in the killing. Roel
admitted that since the victim was walking behind him, he did not know if it was the accused
who assaulted the victim first.
Analyn testified that the victim was her current boyfriend and that the suspect was
her former boyfriend, and that the reason why Romeo killed Dominador is jealousy. On their
way home from the dancing hall, they passed upon a narrow road. She was walking behind
Dominador when Romeo suddenly came from behind her and stabbed Dominador in the
back with a bolo. Dominador tried to run but stumbled down 25 feet. The accused was able
to catch up with the victim and continued to stab the latter several times. She shouted "No!"
but the accused continued hacking the victim and even chopped off his feet. The rest of the
group ran away while she hid behind a coffee tree. She admitted that before the accused
stabbed the victim, the former pushed her aside but she did not fall down the cliff as there
was a rock on the side of the trail.
On the part of the defense, Loreto Papa testified that he left the dance hall with his
cousins and accused Romeo. Analyn and her group were walking ahead of them about 10
arms-length away. Analyn and the accused have not broken up yet, but were quarreling.
When accused saw Analyn, he tried to go after her, but he was kicked by Dominador.
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Instantly, Dominador unsheathed his knife and Romeo, in turn, unsheathed his bolo. Further,
until accused and the victim unsheathed their weapons, no altercation occurred. Meanwhile,
Gregorio testified that Dominador kicked the accused and stabbed him in the chest with a
knife. The accused then leaned back, unsheathed his bolo and stabbed Dominador.
RTC found Romeo guilty of Murder, ruling that treachery attended the killing. The CA
upheld the RTC ruling that the accused's attack was treacherously carried out.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Romeo's conviction for Murder despite the fact
that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt for Murder beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
YES. The Court affirmed the conviction of Romeo, but only for the crime of Homicide,
as the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven in the killing of the victim.
There is treachery when offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
offended party might make. The following conditions must exist: (1) assailant employed
means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked
no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to himself.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the presence of the elements of treachery
in the killing of the victim. Based on the testimonies of the two defense witnesses the attack
was preceded by an altercation between Romeo and the victim. Both Loreto and Gregorio
testified that it was the victim who first assaulted the accused. This should prevail over the
testimony of the prosecution witness, Analyn, that Romeo immediately stabbed the victim,
considering that Analyn's testimony is uncorroborated by the other prosecution witness,
Roel, who testified that he did not see how the attack began as he was walking in front of the
victim.
There is no treachery if the attack was preceded by an altercation between the

accused and the victim. Each of them is forewarned of an impending attack by either of them.
Certainly, the attack made by the accused was not sudden or unexpected as it was the victim
who first attacked the former. Even assuming that the version of Analyn is to be considered,
she narrated that she was pushed by the accused prior to his attack on the victim. This event
should have made the victim aware that there was an impending attack on him. In addition,
the victim was able to defend himself from the initial stabbing as he had his own weapon and
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was able to run away. The only reason why he was not able to escape was because he
stumbled down.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SUSAN SAYO Y REYES AND ALFREDO ROXAS Y SAGON
DOCTRINE
Section 4 of RA 9208 refers to those acts which directly involve trafficking in persons,
such as recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring, receiving, buying, offering, selling, or
trading persons to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor,
slavery, involuntary servitude, or debt bondage. Meanwhile, Section 5 refers to those acts that
promote or facilitate any of the aforementioned predicate acts of Trafficking in Persons.
The offenses punished under Section 5 cannot be qualified by Section 6 as what the latter
seeks to qualify is the act of trafficking and not the promotion of trafficking.
FACTS
Combined testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC ("plaza girls") disclosed that they have
been under the control and supervision of Sayo as commercial sex workers. AAA testified
that she was only 15 years old when she began working for Sayo in December 2004. Her
Certificate of Live Birth showed that she was born on May 2, 1990. Likewise, BBB was born
on November 11, 1989, thus, a minor during their rescue on November 15, 2005.
As there were reported offerings of minor prostitutes at the Pasig Plaza by a pimp,
Susan Sayo, the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group-Women and Children Complaint
Division (CIDG-WCCD) conceptualized an entrapment operation called "Oplan Sagip Angel."
A team was organized for the rescue operation. PO3 Ong, PO2 So, and an agent from IJM were
tasked to act as poseur-customers. Bills amounting to P2,000 were sent to PNP-Crime
Laboratory for Ultra Violet Powder dusting, to be used as payments to the owner of the
apartment/room, for the pimp, and for the services of the "plaza girls".
The "Oplan Sagip Angel" operatives proceeded to the target area. As the three men
tasked to pretend as customers were in front of the church at the Pasig Plaza, they were
approached by Sayo who asked if they wanted women, further asking if they wanted 15 year-
old girls. The customers agreed for P300 each. Sayo then informed them about a room which
they could rent for P100 for each couple, to which they agreed.
Sayo then informed the "plaza girls" that they have customers that night. They met
Sayo at the Pasig Plaza, and were introduced to the three men. After negotiation, all of them
proceeded to the house of Alfredo Roxas. They were greeted by "Fred" who openly discussed
with Sayo regarding the transaction. Roxas said that the room rate for each couple is P100,
and the customers gave Roxas the P300.
The undercover agents, Sayo, and Roxas talked about the payment for the girls'
services, and when P900 was handed to Sayo for payment, the agents announced that it was
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a raid. PO3 Ong executed the pre-arranged signal and the back-up who were deployed in
different strategic locations rushed towards them and arrested Sayo and Roxas.
The marked money, P300 as payment for the use of the room, was recovered from
Alfredo Roxas; while the P900 for the sexual services was recovered from Sayo. They were
charged with a violation of RA 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003) – Sayo for
recruiting and transporting AAA and BBB (minors), and CCC (of legal age) for prostitution;
while Roxas for managing and operating a room to be used for prostitution.
The RTC found Sayo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons under Section 4(a,e) and Section 6(a) of RA 9208 insofar as minors AAA and BBB
are concerned. Roxas was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons under Section 5(a) and Section 6(a) of RA 9208 insofar as the minors are concerned.
As for CCC, who was no longer minor, Sayo was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of trafficking in Persons under Section 4(a,e) of RA 9208 while Roxas was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of trafficking in Persons under Section 5(a) of
RA 9208.
CA affirmed the RTC Decision. Accused-appellants filed a Notice of Appeal, which was
given due course by the CA. However, Sayo died due to multiple organ failure.
ISSUE
Whether the guilt of Roxas was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. The courts a quo committed serious error in convicting Roxas for Qualified
Trafficking of Persons and Trafficking in Persons as the offenses proscribed under Section 5
of RA 9208 are properly denominated as Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. Thus, the
Court affirms with modification Roxas' conviction and holds that he is guilty of one count of
violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9208 for Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons and not
Trafficking in Persons, qualified or otherwise.
There are four punishable acts under RA 9208: (1) Acts of Trafficking in Persons
under Section 4; (2) Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons under Section 5; (3) Violation
of the Confidentiality Rule under Section 7 in relation to Section 10(d); and (4) Use of
Trafficked Persons under Section 11.
The offense of Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 and Acts that Promote
Trafficking in Persons under Section 5 of RA 9208 are separate and distinct offenses with
their own corresponding penalties. Section 6 provides for qualifying circumstances of
Trafficking in Persons under Section 4, which when alleged and proved, will merit the
imposition of the maximum penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P2M but not more than
P5M under Section 10(c).
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SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be unlawful for any person,

natural or juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any
means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage;
xxxx
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;
xxxx
SEC. 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. — The following acts which
promote or facilitate trafficking in persons, shall be unlawful:
(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be used any house, building
or establishment for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
xxxx
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. — The following are considered as

qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child.
Thus, Section 4 of RA 9208 refers to those acts which directly involve trafficking in
persons, such as recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring, receiving, buying, offering,
selling, or trading persons to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude, or debt bondage. Meanwhile, Section 5 refers to those
acts that promote or facilitate any of the aforementioned predicate acts of Trafficking in
Persons.
It should be noted that the offenses punished under Section 5 cannot be qualified by
Section 6 as what the latter seeks to qualify is the act of trafficking and not the promotion of
trafficking. This was clarified in the amendatory law, RA 10364 (Expanded Anti-Trafficking
in Persons Act of 2012) where Section 6 was amended accordingly:
SEC. 9. Section 6 of RA No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. – Violations of Section 4 of
this Act shall be considered as qualified trafficking: x x x
Hence, only violations of Section 4 on Trafficking in Persons can be qualified. Section

5 on Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons, being separate and distinct offenses, cannot
be qualified as the law does not expressly provide therefor. The clarificatory amendment,
being beneficial to the accused, must be applied in his favor.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGAR GAYON Y FERRERAS
DOCTRINE
Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present. For
treachery to exist there must be a showing that the means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted by the accused with a view of accomplishing the act without risk to the
aggressor.
FACTS
According to the prosecution, on July 19, 2004 at around 9:40pm, Leyden Gayon was
in their house in Sulangan, Matnog, Sorsogon. Her husband is the first cousin of Rodolfo while
accused-appellant Edgar is the son of Rodolfo. Leyden testified that while she was having a
conversation with Leonora Givera, she saw Edgar enter. According to the People's witness,
Edgar sat on the lap of Leonora and suddenly stabbed her several times. She even saw
Edgar’s knife embedded on Leonora's right shoulder. Thereafter, Leyden dragged Leonora
inside the house. Leyden claimed that she heard Edgar tell his father Rodolfo "Papay we have
no more problem because I killed your sister.”
RTC convicted accused-appellant Edgar but acquitted Rodolfo, giving credence to the
testimony of the eyewitness. It held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was duly
proven due to the suddenness of the attack by Edgar without giving the victim a chance to
defend herself. The CA affirmed the RTC decision, finding that all the elements of Murder
were established. The prosecution managed to demonstrate that the attack on the
unsuspecting victim, who was merely inside the house, talking to Leyden, was very sudden.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Edgar's conviction for Murder
RULING
YES. The Court affirms the conviction of Edgar but for the crime of Homicide, as the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were not present in the
killing of the victim Leonora.
Qualifying circumstances must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the
crime itself (beyond reasonable doubt). Hence, for Edgar to be convicted of Murder,
prosecution must not only establish that he killed Leonora; it must also prove, beyond
reasonable doubt, that the killing was attended by treachery or evident premeditation.
Both the RTC and the CA found that the killing of Leonora was attended by treachery
only because of the suddenness of Edgar's attack against the victim. However, mere
suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present. For treachery to
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exist there must be a showing that the means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted by the accused with a view of accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
In this case, there is no showing that Edgar carefully and deliberately planned the
killing in the manner that would ensure his safety and success. Moreover, the testimony of
the eyewitness confirmed that Leonora was attacked at the place familiar to her and in the
presence of other people who are related to the victim. Under these circumstances, the Court
finds it difficult to agree with the courts a quo that Edgar deliberately chose a particular
mode of attack that purportedly ensured the execution of the criminal purpose without any
risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer. In addition, the attack
against Leonora was frontal. While a frontal attack, by itself, does not negate the existence of
treachery, when the same is considered along with the other circumstances as previously
discussed, it already creates a reasonable doubt in the existence of the qualifying
circumstance.
There is also no basis for the Court to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation. There is evident premeditation when the following elements concur:
(1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) the
lapse of a sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. In this case, evident premeditation was not
established because the prosecution's evidence was limited to what transpired in the house
of Leyden at 9:40pm of July 19, 2004, when Edgar stabbed Leonora, while the latter was
having a conversation with Leyden. The prosecution did not present any proof showing
when and how Edgar planned and prepared to kill Leonora.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANGEL GURO Y COMBO ALIAS "JASON,"
DOCTRINE
Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where
the mode adopted by the appellants does not positively tend to prove that they thereby
knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to
themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly
appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a
view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
FACTS
According to the prosecution, Jefferson, the first witness for the prosecution, is the
son of Jesus. He testified that while at home, in the early evening of February 12, 2007, his
father received a call from Venus, Jefferson's cousin. According to Jesus, a group of male
persons were waiting for his brother, Joemarie, in Marikina. Jefferson, by invitation of his
father, went to Marikina. They arrived at Joemarie's school at 9pm on board their respective
motorbikes. Joemarie rode with Jefferson.
While they were on their way home, at the intersection of CM. Recto and del Pilar
Streets, Joemarie saw the group composed of around 5 persons waiting for him at the
computer shop. Joemarie wanted to talk to them, so Joemari, Jefferson, and Jesus alighted
from their motorbikes and approached the group. Jefferson asked one Yayi what their
group's problem was with his uncle Joemarie. Yayi stood up and without saying any word,
pushed him in the chest. Jefferson fell to the gutter. When he was about to stand, he saw his
father kneeling and was about to stand when a group of persons lifted and threw a chair at
his father. As a result, he fell to the floor. He saw 3 persons continue to maul his father, as he
was about 15 meters away from his father who had fallen to his right side. While these
persons were mauling his father, the latter was just kneeling with his hands on the ground.
Suddenly, a male person arrived from the direction of the church and stabbed his father
twice in the back. The members of the group then fled together.
During the hearing, the person who stabbed his father was identified as Guro.
Jefferson admitted that at the time of the incident, he did not know his identity; he came to
know his name only from his uncle Joemarie.
Joemarie, the second witness for the prosecution, is the youngest brother of the
victim. He testified that there was this fraternity with whom he had a previous encounter, 3
days prior to the stabbing. He said that this group, composed of Yayi, Niki, and Lucky, had a
"trip" (nakursunadahan) on him wherein he was boxed on his right ear and mauled. He said
that this group was known at their school for being notorious in creating trouble. On
February 12, 2007, he was told by his classmate that the group was waiting for him. He texted
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Jefferson and asked him to fetch him because the group might have another "trip" on him. At
around 8:30pm, his brother Jesus and Jefferson arrived. He then rode the motorbike of
Jefferson, and his brother followed them on his own motorbike.
When they reached the corner of CM. Recto Street, he saw the group, then with Jerry
and Guro, playing at the arcade. Joemari, Jefferson, and Jesus approached them, and after a
little conversation with Yayi, the latter pushed Jefferson who fell to the ground. The other
members were standing side by side. When Joemarie was about to help his nephew, Yayi
boxed him. He was hit very slightly and Yayi ran away. He saw that Niki was about to hit his
brother with a long bench. His brother moved back and was able to evade the chair and fell
to the gutter. He was about 5 steps away from them. When his brother was about to stand,
Guro jumped on top his brother and stabbed him twice in the back and ran away.
The RTC found Guro guilty of Murder, holding that there being treachery in Guro's
sudden and unexpected attack, so the killing was qualified to Murder. The CA sustained the
conviction.
ISSUE
Whether Guro is guilty of Murder.
RULING
NO. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
offended party might make. To appreciate treachery as a qualifying offense, the following
conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution
of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted by the assailant. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to
defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to himself.
The RTC and CA erred when they ruled that treachery was present. The prosecution
was unable to prove that Guro intentionally sought the victim for the purpose of killing him.
Well settled is the rule that the circumstances which would qualify a killing to murder must
be proven as indubitably as the crime itself.
As far as the prosecution's evidence is concerned, only the following were

established: (a) a commotion was caused when Yayi pushed Jefferson; (b) Jesus was being
mauled by a group of persons; and (c) Guro stabbed Jesus twice in the back. It was not proven
that Guro deliberately and consciously employed means, methods, or forms in the execution
of the criminal act to ensure that Jesus could not defend himself. Indeed, it does not always
follow that if the attack was sudden and unexpected, it should necessarily be deemed as an
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attack attended with treachery. The stabbing, based on the evidence, appears to be the result
of a rash and impetuous impulse of the moment arising from the commotion between the
two groups, rather than from a deliberate act of the will. In fact, the target of Guro's group
was Joemarie and not Jesus. It was just unfortunate that it was Jesus whom the group ganged
up on.
Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present,
where the mode adopted by the appellants does not positively tend to prove that they
thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without
any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it
must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately
chosen with a view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.
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PERLY TUATES Y CHICO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat
the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. In this case, the presumption of
regularity cannot stand because of the police officers' blatant disregard of the established
procedures under BJMP-SOP 2010-05 and Section 21 of RA 9165 on the conduct of inventory.
FACTS
According to the prosecution, Katehlene Bundang, a Jail Guard at the Provincial Jail of
Zambales, was assigned to frisk women visitors. Tuates, a former detainee, went to visit her
boyfriend, Samuel Elamparo, who was charged with Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Bundang, while searching the lower part of Tuates’ body, found a plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance tucked on the left side of her waist. Bundang took it and went to
the Office of the Jail Warden to report it. Bundang wrote her initials "KAB" on the sachet in
the presence of another Jail Guard, Randy, and PO2 Fennolar. Bundang and Fennolar went to
the crime laboratory to have the seized specimen examined, which was later found positive
for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
On the part of the defense, Tuates asserted that she went to visit her live-in partner,
Elamparo, who was sick. She was let in by a male jail guard who told her to wait as the lady
jail guard, Bundang, was not yet around. After 30 minutes, Bundang arrived and brought her
to the search room. Bundang frisked her for more than 5 minutes. She was baffled as in her
previous visits, it lasted only for less than 2 minutes, with 2 to 4 guards in the search room.
Moreover, Bundang placed her hand on Tuates’ pocket and inside her pants. When Bundang
took out her hand from her pants, she was surprised when something fell out. Bundang then
shouted, "O meron ho. Hulihin na ito." Thereafter, the other jail guards came and brought her
to the office where they asked her name and purpose in visiting. Tuates was brought to the
crime laboratory for a urine examination which yielded a negative result.
RTC convicted Tuates of Violation of Section 11 of R.A. 9165, concluding that the
evidence sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged. It held that the
prosecution established an "unbroken link in the chain of custody of the plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance which when examined tested positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride." CA affirmed the RTC conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Tuates of the crime charged.
RULING
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YES. To convict a person of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11 of

RA 9165, the prosecution must prove the following: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
There is reasonable doubt, however, in the presence of the third element in this case — that
the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
The Court reverses the RTC and the CA rulings. As the Court said in Mallillin v. People,
"the blind reliance by the RTC and the CA on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of
police duty is misplaced. The presumption of regularity is a mere presumption disputable by
contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding
truth."
The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot arise in this case
because Bundang did not follow the prescribed procedure in searching or frisking Tuates.
Based on Bundang's own testimony, the search was conducted in contravention of the
established procedure. BJMP-SOP 2010-05 requires pat/frisk searches and rub searches to
be done over the jail visitor's clothing. Bundang admitted twice that what she instead did
was to raise Tuates' shirt. This she cannot do, for a strip search may be resorted to only "if
during the pat/frisk/rub search, the jail officer develops probable cause that contraband is
being hidden by the subject which is not likely to be discovered." Further, a strip search may
only be done after the visitor agrees in writing, which is a requirement to shield the jail
officer performing the search from harassment complaints.
In this case, there was no probable cause for a strip search, for Bundang's only basis
was that Tuates' boyfriend was a prisoner in that jail for a violation of RA 9165. Moreover,
Tuates never agreed in writing. It was thus highly irregular for Bundang to raise Tuates' shirt
in the conduct of her supposed search. Further, when Bundang realized that what she had
done was not allowed by the rules, she changed her testimony to the effect that she did not
raise Tuates' shirt but "just inserted her hand." This was also irregular as a pat/frisk/rub
search should be done only over the visitor's clothing.
Further, Bundang's testimony had material contradictions. Apart from the

inconsistency on whether she raised Tuates' shirt or inserted her hand inside Tuates'
undergarment, Bundang manifested in her Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-Aresto that she saw
the sachet tucked on the right side of Tuates' undergarment. Yet, in her direct testimony, she
testified that she found it on the left of Tuates' waist. Under different circumstances, it may
be dismissed as immaterial. However, as that the Court cannot afford Bundang the
presumption of regularity, the other inconsistencies in her testimony become material, and
adds further reasonable doubt on the existence of the third element.
Finally, it is doubtful that an inventory of the seized item was conducted. Prosecution
witnesses, Bundang and PO2 Fennolar, testified that after confiscation, they immediately
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submitted the seized item to the crime laboratory for examination. PO2 Fennolar testified
that "after turning it over, they delivered it to the police station for investigation and
preparation of documents such as sworn statements and receipts of the inventory.” Hence,
the police officers could not have conducted an inventory as they immediately turned it over
to the crime laboratory. Further, Bundang was a signatory to the Inventory Receipt as the
Seizing Officer; yet she testified that she did not know whether an inventory was conducted.
There is thus doubt on the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item — the corpus
delicti of the crime.
It bears emphasis that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty

cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise,
a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed
innocent. In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the police
officers' blatant disregard of the established procedures under BJMP-SOP 2010-05 and
Section 21 of RA 9165 on the conduct of inventory.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EVANGELINE GARCIA Y SUING
DOCTRINE
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these
elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the
dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. Therefore, compliance
with the chain of custody rule is crucial.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. In this case, the presumption of regularity
cannot stand because of the buy-bust team's blatant disregard of the established procedures
under Section 21 of RA 9165.
FACTS
On January 8, 2009, at about 8pm, a confidential informant (CI) reported to IO1
Ramos about the illegal drug activity of one Garcia in Ilocanos Norte, La Union. Garcia sells
drugs during midnight and that he could accompany their agents to Garcia’s house. Their
Regional Director was informed and upon verification that Garcia is listed in their Order of
Battle, organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation with IO1 Ancheta as the poseur
buyer, IO2 Gayuma as her back-up, and 5 other members as perimeter back-up. IO1 Ancheta
prepared the buy-bust money, a P500 bill marked with her initials 'LCA', photocopied it and
recorded it in their logbook.
At about 12:45 A.M. of January 9, 2009, the team, with the CI, proceeded to Ilocanos
Norte. IO1 Ancheta, IO2 Gayuma, and the CI proceeded to Garcia’s house, where Garcia was
standing outside. CI introduced IO1 Ancheta in Ilocano, which meant, “Manang Vangie, here
they are, the interested buyers of shabu.” Garcia asked IO1 Ancheta how much she would
buy, to which she answered P500 worth. Garcia asked for the money and after IO1 Ancheta
handed her the P500 buy bust money, Garcia gave IO1 Ancheta one transparent plastic
sachet containing shabu, and they arrested Garcia. IO1 Ancheta recovered the P500 bill from
her and marked the plastic sachet with, A-1LCA, and prepared the Certificate of Inventory
outside the house, in the presence of Valdez of DZNL and Nisperos, a Barangay Kagawad,
who affixed their signatures on the document. They took photographs of the evidence then
proceeded to their office, where IO1 Ancheta prepared the Booking Sheet, Arrest Report, and
a Request for Laboratory Examination which was signed by the higher ranking officer. After
preparing their Affidavit of Arrest, they brought the confiscated items to the PNP Crime
Laboratory where they were received by the duty officer as shown by his signature on the
request. The result yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
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RTC convicted Garcia of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 (The Comprehensive

Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended). CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting Garcia for violating Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165.
RULING
YES. In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution is required to prove the
following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
these elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases,
the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
To maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence, Section 21, Article
II of RA 9165 requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed
immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing
must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an
elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the
DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
"Immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and
photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the
place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the IRR of RA 9165
allows the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the
nearest police station/office of the apprehending officer/team. This also means that the
three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of apprehension
— a requirement that can easily be complied with considering that the buy-bust operation
is a planned activity, hence the team has enough time.
In this case, there is serious doubt that the physical inventory and photographing of
the seized illegal drugs were conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation at the
place of apprehension. According to the Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by IO1 Ancheta and
IO2 Gayuma, "inventory and photograph was made at the place of arrest." On cross
examination, IO1 Ancheta confirmed that the place of arrest was outside Garcia’s house and
the inventory immediately took place thereat. IO1 Ancheta further clarified that the
inventory, which was supposedly done outside the house, was specifically conducted in the
yard and that the items were placed on the cemented floor outside said house.
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Moreover, none of the prosecution witnesses offered any explanation as to why a

representative from the DOJ was not present. Further, the Certificate of Inventory, only
Valdez and Nisperos signed the same; it was not signed by Garcia or her counsel as required
by Section 21 of RA 9165.
Notably, the apprehending team had more than ample time to comply with the
requirements. As. IO1 Ancheta herself testified, Garcia had already been previously placed in
the PDEA's so-called "Order of Battle." Hence, PDEA had already known for some time that
Garcia was suspected of selling illegal drugs. Further, the CI made the report on January 8,
2009, about 8pm; the team proceeded to execute the buy-bust operation at about 12:45am
of January 9, 2009. Meaning, the team had almost 5 hours to contact and assemble the
required witnesses. Worse, the prosecution failed to offer any explanation for police officers'
deviation from the law during the trial.
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure does not ipso facto render the
seizure and custody over the items void. However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution
satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving the police
officers' compliance with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in
case of non-compliance. In this connection, it was an error for both the RTC and the CA to
convict Garcia by relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
supposedly extended in favor of the police officers. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused. In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the buy-bust
team's blatant disregard of the established procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165. As the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have been compromised, Garcia must be
acquitted.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIO URBANO TUBERA

DOCTRINE
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these
elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the
dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. Therefore, compliance
with the chain of custody rule is crucial.
The prosecution bears the burden of proving strict compliance with the chain of custody
because the accused has the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the
stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence
will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.
FACTS
Investigating Agent III Levi Ortiz of PDEA filed a report for the conduct of surveillance,
casing, and buy-bust operation against accused-appellant Mario Tubera. After several
surveillance and casing operations conducted in Barangay Mabini, Ormoc City, it was
confirmed by PDEA operatives that Tubera indeed was one of the individuals engaging in the
illicit drug trade in the area.
Sometime around 7:45pm on May 19, 2008, Ortiz, acting as team leader and poseur-
buyer, with the other members of his team, arrived at Barangay Mabini, where they were
met by their confidential informant who was to accompany Ortiz during the buy-bust
operation. After casing the area, the confidential agent spotted Tubera. Ortiz and the
confidential agent approached him and engaged him in a conversation. The confidential
agent informed him of their desire to purchase shabu.
Suspicious about Ortiz, Tubera asked from the confidential agent whether the former
could be trusted, to which he answered in the affirmative. Wary, however, of Ortiz, Tubera
beckoned the pair to follow him into the interior portion of the barangay. After walking 15
meters through a narrow footpath, Tubera pulled out from his pocket a plastic container. He
then positioned himself into one of the dimly lit comers of the pathway and demanded
money for the shabu. Ortiz then handed Tubera the P500 peso bill he had pre-marked and
blottered at the PDEA office. Upon receipt of the money, Tubera pocketed it and opened the
plastic container, which contained several packets containing white crystalline substance,
and handed one to Ortiz.
While the whole transaction was going on, an unidentified person hovered around
the group and acted as a lookout for Tubera. Several inhabitants of the area were also keenly
observing the transaction.
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After agent Ortiz received the plastic packet, he immediately announced his identity
and authority and arrested Tubera. While he was arresting Tubera, however, the latter was
able to toss the plastic container he was carrying to his lookout who immediately scampered
away into the maze of houses inside the interior portion of the barangay.
After Tubera was secured, and the marked money was retrieved from his possession,
the PDEA agents immediately left and proceeded to their office, with the packet and marked
money still in possession of Ortiz.
At the PDEA Regional Office 8, the packet was marked by Ortiz with the initial "MT".
Photographs and an inventory were made in the presence of an elected barangay official, a
member of the media, and Tubera. Subsequently, the packet, together with a letter request
for its laboratory examination, was delivered to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 8,
which later released a Chemistry Report finding the specimen to be positive for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
RTC convicted Tubera of having violated Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, holding that
although the marking, inventory, and photographing of the dangerous drugs were done at
the police station, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved as
Agent Ortiz had possession and control of the same from the time it was confiscated up to
the time it was submitted to the laboratory for examination. CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether RTC and CA erred in convicting Tubera of the crimes charged.
RULING
YES. In order to convict a person of the crime charged, the prosecution must prove:
1) the identity of the buyer, the seller, and the object of the consideration, and 2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State
bears not only the burden of proving these elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or
the body of the crime. In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the
violation of the law. Therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) xxx the physical inventory and
and be given a copy thereof.
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of RA 9165 allows the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
that the required witnesses should be physically present at the time of the conduct of the
physical inventory of the seized items which must be immediately done at the place of
seizure and confiscation, a requirement that can easily be complied with by the team
considering that the buy-bust operation is a planned activity.
It is true that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody
over the items void and invalid. However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still
needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b)
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
It bears emphasis that the prosecution bears the burden of proving strict compliance
with the chain of custody because the accused has the constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be
presumed innocent.
In this case, the buy-bust team committed several procedural lapses in the conduct of
the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drugs. First, the marking and inventory
were not done and the photographs were not taken at the place of apprehension and seizure,
and no explanation or justification was proffered as to why the same was impracticable.
Second, the required witnesses were not present at the time of the seizure and arrest, and no
explanation or justification was proffered as to why their presence could not be procured.
Ortiz stated that when he proceeded to the place where the buy-bust operation was to take
place, he was only accompanied by his fellow agent and confidential informant. Finally, no
representative from the DOJ was present during the time of the arrest or even during the
marking, inventory, and photographing of the seized drugs. Again, no explanation or
justification was proffered as to why the presence of a DOJ representative could not be
procured.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NELSON FLORES Y FONBUENA
DOCTRINE
The Court has consistently held that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving its
compliance with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-
compliance. Without any justifiable explanation, which must be proven as a fact, the evidence
of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground
that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS
IO2 Ramos of the PDEA received a tip from an informant that accused-appellant was
selling illegal drugs. IO2 Ramos relayed the information to the team leader, IO3 Bautista, who
coordinated with the Quick Reaction Force Team and with the Illegal Drug Special Operation
Task Group (PAIDSOTG) of the PNP and thereafter, formed a team to conduct an anti-illegal
drug operation, composed of IO2 Ramos who was designated as poseur-buyer, PO2 Bautista
as the immediate back-up, the confidential informant, and about 6 members of the PNP Quick
Reaction Force. They prepared the buy-bust money and the prearranged signal to indicate
the done deal (IO2 Ramos to remove his bull-cap).
The confidential informant contacted Nelson to arrange the sale of shabu worth
P1,000. IO2 Ramos and the confidential informant then proceeded to meet him at Purok 4,
Sevilla, San Fernando City, La Union. They found Nelson standing in front of his house and
the informant introduced IO2 Ramos to Nelson as the buyer. The confidential informant told
Nelson in Ilocano dialect, which meant, he is the one who will get one thousand. Nelson asked
for the money and took out 2 pieces of small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets from his
pocket and handed them to IO2 Ramos, who executed the prearranged signal, and the rest of
the team rushed to the scene. As IO2 Ramos informed Nelson that he was a police officer,
Nelson suddenly ran towards his house. The policemen chased him as he jumped into a canal,
and he was eventually arrested. Nelson was allowed to wash up and change clothing.
Thereafter, IO2 Ramos marked and took pictures of the items. Nelson and the drugs were
brought to the police office where IO2 Ramos made an inventory and prepared a request for
laboratory examination. He submitted the request and the subject plastic sachets with white
crystalline substance to the crime laboratory and were received by the Forensic Chemist.
After examination, she issued a Chemistry Report affirming that the substances were
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
RTC found Nelson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended), holding
that the prosecution clearly established the corpus delicti of the crime and that the police
officers complied with the chain of custody rule. There was substantial compliance with the
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requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165, thus the integrity of the drugs seized was preserved.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether Nelson's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 requires that: (I) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and
and be given a copy of the same and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for examination.
conduct of the inventory of the seized items which must be immediately done at the place of
seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust
team considering that the buy-bust operation is a planned activity.
However, the Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance
of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure under Section 21 does not
ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void. However, this is with the caveat
that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for
preserved. The Court has consistently held that the prosecution has the burden of (1)
proving its compliance with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation
in case of non-compliance. Without any justifiable explanation, which must be proven as a
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fact, the evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should
follow on the ground that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the buy-bust team failed to comply with the mandatory requirements
under Section 21, which thus creates reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the
seized drugs from Nelson. First, none of the three required witnesses was present during the
arrest and the marking, photography, and inventory of the seized drugs. The barangay
official and media representative only arrived at the police station to sign the Certificate of
Inventory, which was already prepared by the police officers. Neither did the police officers
offer any sufficient explanation as to the absence of the DOJ representative. The testimony of
IO2 Ramos established that the mandatory witnesses were "called-in" only when the police
and the accused were already at the police station. This law imposes the said requirement
because their presence serves to prevent against planting of drugs.
Second, the buy-bust team did not offer any explanation for their failure to strictly
comply with the requirements of Section 21. Notably, IO2 Ramos has been an intelligence
officer of PDEA since 2008; thus, he has conducted several buy-bust operations. Here, the
buy-bust operation happened in 2010. They already knew the standard procedure and the
mandatory requirements under Section 21. Hence, they should have had the foresight to do
all the necessary preparations for it.
As the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense of sale of illegal
drugs due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the buy-bust
team in the seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drug. In other words, the prosecution
was not able to overcome the presumption of innocence of Nelson.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OSCAR PEDRACIO GABRIEL, JR.

DOCTRINE
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus
is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with
crime.
FACTS
SPO1 Danilo Sumpay received information about illegal drug activities of appellant
Oscar Gabriel in his house at No. 6 Claire Street, Barangay Cupang, Antipolo City. Hence, the
Chief of Police formed a buy-bust team, composed of SPO1 Sumpay as team leader, PO1
Robert Gangan as poseur-buyer, and PO3 Edmund Gacute and P/A Cristito Magsino as
members. The team coordinated with the PDEA, prepared the buy-bust money, and recorded
their operation in their blotter book. The team proceeded to the target area.
Upon arriving at appellant's house, PO1 Gangan knocked. Somebody asked who he
was, to which PO1 Gangan replied, "pa iskor naman." PO1 Gangan was told to wait, and after
a while, appellant opened the door and PO1 Gangan immediately handed him the marked
money. In turn, appellant handed him a plastic sachet of shabu. PO1 Gangan made the pre-
arranged signal by scratching his head and the other members of the team proceeded to the
scene and introduced themselves as police officers.
PO3 Gacute was able to recover the P100 buy-bust money from appellant. When PO3
Gacute ordered appellant to empty his pocket, 7 more plastic sachets of shabu were
recovered. They arrested him and brought him to the Police Station, where the team
executed a joint affidavit and put marking on the plastic packs recovered. They prepared the
letter requesting for laboratory examination of the 8 plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance, which later yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 2 Informations were filed against Gabriel for violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
RTC convicted Gabriel of the crimes charged. CA affirmed, holding that the failure of
the arresting officers to mark the seized items at the place of arrest or to conduct the
required physical inventory and photographing of the evidence confiscated is not fatal, as
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team.
ISSUE
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Whether RTC and CA erred in convicting Gabriel of the crimes charged.
RULING
YES. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very
conviction. It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be

and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical inventory and
and be given a copy of the same and the seized drugs must be turned over to a forensic
laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for examination.
9165 allows the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
conduct of the inventory of the seized items which must be immediately done at the place of
seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust
team considering that the buy-bust operation is a planned activity.
may not always be possible; and, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with
the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items void and invalid. However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution
still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and
(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. It has been
repeatedly emphasized by the Court that the prosecution has the positive duty to explain the
reasons behind the procedural lapses. Without any justifiable explanation, which must be
proven as a fact, the evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of the
accused should follow on the ground that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable
doubt.
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In this case, the buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements under Section
21 of RA 9165. First, the arresting officers failed to mark and photograph the seized illegal
drug at the place of arrest. In fact, even at the police station, no inventory was prepared and
no photographs were taken of the illegal drugs. Second, none of the three required witnesses
was present at the time of seizure and apprehension. This is necessary to protect against the
possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug. Finally, the buy-bust team
proffered no explanation whatsoever to justify the non-compliance with the mandatory
rules.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the

stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional
guarantee of the accused being presumed innocent would be held subordinate to a mere rule
of evidence allocating the burden of evidence.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARLON CRISTOBAL Y AMBROSIO

DOCTRINE
It must be emphasized that these "stop and frisk" searches are exceptions to the general
rule that warrants are necessary for the State to conduct a search and, consequently, intrude
on a person's privacy. This doctrine of "stop and frisk" "should be balanced with the need to
protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution."
"Stop and frisk" searches should thus be allowed only in the limited instances
contemplated in Terry v. Ohio: (1) it should be allowed only on the basis of the police officer's
reasonable suspicion, in light of his or her experience, that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he/she is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous; (2) the
search must only be a carefully limited search of the outer clothing; and (3) conducted for the
purpose of discovering weapons which might be used to assault him/her or other persons in the
area.
FACTS
According to the prosecution, on November 22, 2013, PO2 Ramos and other police
officers were conducting "Oplan Sita" in a checkpoint. At around 6pm, PO2 Ramos flagged
down accused-appellant Cristobal who was driving a motorcycle without a helmet, and
ordered Cristobal to alight then asked for its original receipt and certificate of registration.
As Cristobal failed to show either, PO2 Ramos asked for his driver's license. While PO2
Ramos was preparing the traffic citation ticket for the traffic violation, the latter ran away
but other police officers were quick to apprehend him. He was brought back to the
checkpoint where he was searched for deadly weapons but nothing was found. As PO2
Ramos noticed that Cristobal's pocket was bulging, he ordered him to remove the object from
his pocket. Cristobal obliged by pulling-out a small plastic bag. PO2 Ramos opened it and
found 7 plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, which he suspected as shabu.
PO2 Ramos arrested Cristobal. In the presence of Cristobal, PO2 Ramos signed and marked
said plastic sachets.
Still in possession of the seized items, PO2 Ramos and his companions brought
Cristobal to their office, where PO2 Ramos summoned a barangay kagawad to witness the
inventory. Kagawad Bernabe arrived and an inventory of the seized items was done in his
and Cristobal’s presence. Then, PO2 Singuillo prepared the indorsement for the transfer of
Cristobal to their headquarters at Brgy. Caniogan, where PO2 Ramos prepared the Chain of
Custody Form. At around 8:40pm, he turned over the seized items to the Investigator of the
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (SAID-SOTG).
At around 12am of November 22, 2013, PO3 Torallo brought the confiscated items as
well as the Request for Laboratory Examination to the Crime Laboratory Office in
Mandaluyong for qualitative examination where they were received by PSI Santiago , a
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forensic chemist. The items tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a

dangerous drug. After the laboratory examination, PSI Santiago turned over the contraband
to SPO3 Rabino, Jr., the evidence custodian at the Eastern Police District, who released the
seized items on April 10, 2014 for their presentation in Court.
On the part of the Defense, Cristobal claims that he was riding his wife's motorcycle
on his way to SM Hypermart. However, he was flagged down by PO2 Ramos at a police
checkpoint. After giving his driver's license, he was asked to produce the OR/CR of the
motorcycle. As he was not able to produce the same, PO2 Ramos ordered him to empty his
pockets which he did; only P18,000 was found, money sent by his mother for his wedding.
PO2 Ramos went to the police car and returned to him and said "positive". PO2 Ramos frisked
him on his waist but found nothing. Cristobal told PO2 Ramos that he can prove that he is the
owner of the motorcycle if he will come with him to his house but PO2 Ramos ignored him
and ordered him to board the mobile car.
RTC convicted Cristobal for violating Section 11 of RA 9165, holding that the search
may be justified under the "stop and frisk" doctrine or the Terry search. While the police
officers were unable to strictly comply with the procedure in Section 21, RA 9165, the
evidentiary value of the seized items were nevertheless preserved. CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Cristobal.
RULING
YES. The CA manifestly overlooked the undisputed fact that the seized items were
confiscated from Cristobal as he was being issued a traffic violation ticket. His violations
consisted of 1) not wearing a helmet while driving a motorcycle, and 2) being unable to show
the OR and CR of said motorcycle. Cristobal's first violation is punishable by RA 10054
(Motorcycle Helmet Act of 2009), which is only punishable by fine. Meanwhile, Cristobal's
second violation is likewise punishable only by fine pursuant to LTO Department Order No.
2008-39 or the "Revised Schedule of LTO Fines and Penalties for Traffic and Administrative
Violations." Stated simply, the police officers conducted an illegal search when they frisked
Cristobal on the basis of the said violations. Hence, there was no valid "stop and frisk" search.
It was also not a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was no lawful arrest to speak of,
as Cristobal's violations were only punishable by fine.
Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. Corollary, neither can a warrantless
arrest be made for such an offense.
Even if the prosecution’s version of events were true, it did not justify the intensive
search. By the prosecution's own admission, after Cristobal was successfully apprehended
after he ran away, "PO2 Ramos searched him for any deadly weapon but he found none." This
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is corroborated by Cristobal's narration, that "he was unable to produce the OR/CR as the
key to the motorcycle compartment was lost. PO2 Ramos suddenly told him to stand up and
empty his pockets. He brought out the contents of his pockets, P18,000, which was sent by
his mother for his wedding. PO2 Ramos then went to his police mobile, returned, said
"positive", and frisked him on his waist. Nothing else was found in his possession."
Even if the Court accepts this version, the search that led to the supposed discovery
of the seized items had nevertheless become unlawful the moment they continued with the
search despite finding no weapon on Cristobal's body.
It must be emphasized that these "stop and frisk" searches are exceptions to the
general rule that warrants are necessary for the State to conduct a search and, consequently,
intrude on a person's privacy. This doctrine of "stop and frisk" "should be balanced with the
need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution."
"Stop and frisk" searches should thus be allowed only in the limited instances
contemplated in Terry v. Ohio: (1) it should be allowed only on the basis of the police officer's
reasonable suspicion, in light of his or her experience, that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he/she is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous; (2)
the search must only be a carefully limited search of the outer clothing; and (3) conducted for
the purpose of discovering weapons which might be used to assault him/her or other
persons in the area.
In this case, the police officers' act of proceeding to search Cristobal's body, despite
their own admission that they were unable to find any weapon on him, constitutes an invalid
and unconstitutional search.
In this connection, the Court, in Sindac v. People, reminds: “To protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. One of the recognized
exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search incidental to
a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.”
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALEX ESCARAN Y TARIMAN
DOCTRINE
is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drug be established with
crime.
FACTS
The confidential agent of the Drug Enforcement Unit of Mandaue made a phone call
to Police Chief Inspector Juanito Enguerra (PCI Enguerra,) informing the latter that Escaran
is selling shabu at Sitio Sapa-Sapa, Ibabao, Mandaue City. Hence, PCI Enguerra directed PO1
Montebon and PO1 Veraño, with their informant, to conduct a surveillance at around 8pm,
wherein they ascertained that the information was accurate.
Upon their return at the police station, PCI Enguerra conducted a briefing attended
by the confidential agent, PO1 Montebon, PO1 Veraño, and SPO4 Tumakay, wherein the
group hatched a plan to conduct a buy bust operation. PO1 Veraño was designated as the
poseur-buyer and he was given pre-marked two P100 peso bills furnished by
SPO1 Enriquez, who affixed his signature on the upper left portion thereof.
PO1 Montebon, PO1 Veraño and SPO1 Enriquez together with the confidential agent
went to the designated area. 20 minutes later, they were met by Escaran, who asked PO1
Veraño if he would be interested to buy shabu to which the latter answered in the affirmative.
PO1 Veraño then told Escaran that he would buy worth P200; thereafter the latter handed
him 2 packs of shabu. After that, PO1 Veraño and PO1 Montebon introduced themselves as
policemen, arrested Escaran, and apprised him of his constitutional rights. When Escaran
was frisked by PO1 Montebon, the policeman recovered additional 4 packs of shabu from the
right front pocket of Escaran's trousers. They brought Escaran to the police station, where
the 2 packets from the sale and the other 4 from the search were marked, and brought to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The
Chemistry Report prepared by PSI Salinas yielded positive results for shabu.
RTC found Escaran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11
of RA 9165. CA sustained Escaran's conviction.
ISSUE
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Whether the CA erred in sustaining Escaran's conviction for violation of Sections 5

and 11, Article II of RA 9165.
RULING

and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory
and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her
and (d) a representative from the DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy of the same and the seized drugs must be
turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for
examination.
9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.
This also means that the 3 required witnesses should already be physically present at the
time of apprehension — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-
bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is a planned activity.
may not always be possible; and, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with
the procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items void and invalid. However, this is with the caveat that the
prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for the non-
compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. It has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court that the prosecution
has the positive duty to explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses. Without any
justifiable explanation, which must be proven as a fact, the evidence of the corpus delicti is
unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground that his guilt has not
been shown beyond reasonable doubt.
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In this case, the police officers failed to comply with the prescribed chain of custody
rule, thereby putting into question the identity and evidentiary value of the items
purportedly seized from Escaran. First, while PO1 Montebon and PO1 Veraño narrated that
SPO1 Enriquez marked the items recovered from Escaran, there is no evidence as to when
and where they were marked and whether the marking was made in Escaran's presence.
Second, PO1 Veraño admitted that after the alleged sale of drugs was consummated
and Escaran was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights, he was immediately
brought to the police station for interrogation. The buy-bust team did not make any
inventory nor did it take photographs of the items seized from Escaran.
Third, none of the 3 required witnesses was

present at the place of seizure and apprehension and even at the police station. In
People v. Tomawis, the Court has held that the purpose of the law in mandating the presence
of said witnesses is to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the
seized drug.
Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish a justifiable ground as to why the police
officers failed to mark, photograph, and inventory the seized items and why they were not
able to secure the presence of the required witnesses. Notably,
they received the information that Escaran was peddling drugs at around 7pm and was
able to conduct a surveillance at the place before the buy-bust was operationalized at around
9pm. Thus, they had more than ample time to comply with the requirements; and yet they
did not exert even the slightest effort to secure the attendance of the required witnesses.
Further, gaps exist in the chain of custody of the seized items which create reasonable
doubt as to the identity and integrity thereof. To establish an unbroken chain of custody, "it
is necessary that every person who touched the seized item describe how and from whom
he or she received it; where and what happened to it while in the witness' possession; its
condition when received and at the time it was delivered to the next link in the chain." This
requirement was not complied in this case.
PO1 Veraño testified that the 6 plastic sachets confiscated from Escaran were turned
over to PCI Enguerra, who later delivered the same to SPO1 Enriquez to prepare the
request for laboratory examination. The Request for Laboratory examination showed that
the drugs were delivered to the crime laboratory by PO1 Veraño. However, the Court does
not see from the records the details on how the specimens were handled from the time they
were handed to PCI Enguerra to the time they were delivered to SPO1 Enriquez until they
were returned to PO1 Veraño and submitted to PSI Salinas for examination.
The testimonies of PO1 Veraño and PO1 Montebon were sorely lacking on these details.
Similarly, PSI Salinas did not testify on how she handled the seized items during examination
and before it was transferred to the court.
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The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the

stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of
evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. In this
case, the presumption of regularity does not arise because of the buy-bust team's blatant
disregard of the established procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165.
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ALFREDO PILI, JR. v. MARY ANN RESURRECCION

G.R. NO. 222798, June 19, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
"In criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest and the private offended party
is but a witness in the prosecution of offenses, the interest of the private offended party is
limited only to the aspect of civil liability." While a judgment of acquittal is immediately final
and executory, "either the offended party or the accused may appeal
the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The real parties-in-
interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused."
FACTS
Respondent entered into an agreement with Conpil Realty Corporation for the
purchase of a house and lot and issued 2 checks in favor of the latter. When Conpil deposited
the checks, they were dishonored and stamped as "Account Closed." A criminal complaint for
violation of B.P. 22 was filed before the MTC. Although the checks were issued in favor of
Conpil, the criminal complaint was signed by petitioner Alfredo Pili, Jr., President of Conpil,
as "Complainant."
The prosecution submitted: 1) a Secretary's Certificate, which stated that the Board
of Directors of Conpil resolved, at a special meeting on January 21, 2000, to
initiate all legal action against respondent and to authorize its President to represent the
Corporation in all civil and criminal cases against respondent and to sign the Complaint,
Affidavit of Complaint, and all necessary pleadings, and 2) an Affidavit of Complaint
subscribed before the Office of the Prosecutor on February 1, 2000, which stated that it was
filed because "Conpil Realty Corp. has extended its generosity and kind understanding to the
limit and cannot anymore extend its patience.” Both the Affidavit and the Secretary's
Certificate were formally offered as part of evidence to prove that petitioner was the
authorized representative of complainant corporation, and that he was authorized to file
the instant case, adduce evidence, and testify on behalf of Conpil.
The MTC rendered a Judgment acquitting respondent, but requiring respondent to

pay P500,000 by way of civil indemnity.
Respondent appealed her civil liability to the RTC, which was titled, "People of the
Philippines v. Mary Ann Resurreccion." The RTC, however, affirmed the Judgment of the
MTC. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
Respondent thus filed a petition for review with the CA, captioned by her as "Mary
Ann Resurreccion v. Alfredo Pili, Jr." Nevertheless, Paragraph 12 of petitioner's
Memorandum filed with the CA in the petition for review alleged that "Conpil authorized its
President to file cases for violation of BP 22" in order to enforce its right.
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In the CA, respondent claimed that petitioner "is not the real party in interest and
cannot file the criminal complaint in his personal capacity." On the other hand, petitioner
claimed that "he did not sue in his personal capacity but as a President of Conpil."
CA found respondent's petition for review meritorious and set aside the Decision and
Order of the RTC, holding that the criminal case was not prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest as Conpil was not included in the title of the case, even if it was the party: 1)
that signed the contract and 2) in whose favor the checks were issued.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in granting the appeal.
RULING
YES. "In criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest and the private
offended party is but a witness in the prosecution of offenses, the interest of the
private offended party is limited only to the aspect of civil liability." While a judgment of
acquittal is immediately final and executory, "either the offended party or the accused may
appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The real
parties-in-interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused."
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
In Goco v. CA, we explained that: This provision has two requirements: 1) to institute
an action, the plaintiff must be the real party in interest; and 2) the action must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest. Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court
means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. One having no
material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an
action.
Parties who are not the real parties in interest may be included in a suit in accordance
with the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted
or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the
beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real
party in interest xxx
There is no doubt that the People is the real party-in-interest in criminal

proceedings. As the criminal complaint for violation of B.P. 22 was filed in the MTC,
necessarily the criminal case before it was prosecuted "in the name of the People of the
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Philippines." This shows the egregious error by the CA in ruling that the Conpil should have
been "included in the title of the case."
Records show that the civil aspect of the criminal case was appealed by respondent
and that it was Conpil, being the victim of fraud, that was the private complainant. This is
clear from the following facts: 1) a Secretary's Certificate, which stated that the Board of
Directors of Conpil resolved, at a special meeting on January 21, 2000, to initiate all legal
action against respondent and to authorize its President to represent the Corporation in all
civil and criminal cases against Ms. Mary Ann Resurreccion and to sign the Complaint,
Affidavit of Complaint and all necessary pleadings, 2) the Affidavit of Complaint subscribed
before the Office of the Prosecutor on February of 2000 concludes that the complaint
affidavit was filed because "Conpil Realty Corp. has extended its generosity and kind
understanding to the limit and cannot anymore extend its patience," and 3) both the Affidavit
and the Secretary's Certificate were formally offered as evidence to prove that Alfredo Pili
was the authorized representative of complainant corporation, and that he was authorized
to file the instant case, adduce evidence, and testify on behalf of Conpil. This belies the CA's
claim that the criminal complaint was not filed or prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest.
More importantly, the CA grossly erred when it faulted petitioner for not having
included Conpil in the title of the petition for review, given that the criminal case was
correctly titled "People of the Philippines v. Mary Ann Resurreccion" and that the title was
changed by respondent when she filed her petition for review with the CA, to "Mary Ann
Resurreccion v. Alfredo Pili, Jr." The egregious error becomes more manifest considering that
in Paragraph 12 of the Memorandum filed by petitioner on behalf of Conpil, it expressly
stated that "Conpil authorized its President to file cases for violation of BP 22" in order to
enforce its right. That the CA closed its eyes to this constitutes not only gross manifest error
but grave abuse of discretion.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CESAR VILLAMOR CORPIN @ "BAY"
DOCTRINE
In order to appreciate treachery, both elements must be present. It is not enough that
the attack was "sudden", "unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation." There must
also be a showing that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly to insure such execution,
without risk to himself.
FACTS
Helen Raymundo testified that: at around 2:30pm of September 1, 2010, while she
was tending to her vegetable stall in Las Piñas Public Market, she saw Kuya Bay (accused-
appellant Corpin), kill Kuya Paulo; Corpin was a pork vendor while Paulo was a chicken
vendor; their stalls were at the back of each other and had the same entrance and exit; prior
to the hacking incident, Corpin and Paulo were always joking at each other; Paulo often said
"Ang baho" which made Corpin frown as he thought he was the one being alluded to; there
was no provocation on the part of Paulo at the time of the incident; Corpin and the victim
were not facing each other and the latter was in no position to defend himself; she was 1
meter away from them; after Corpin hacked Paulo, the victim was able to get a knife but the
former embraced him; at that juncture, one of the meat vendors, Kuya Kris, arrived and
pushed Corpin away from Paulo; and, Paulo ran away for about 3 meters and fell down in
front of the canteen, in front of Raymundo's stall.
Dr. Ethel Punzalan testified that: she was at home when the resident doctor at Las
Piñas Doctors' Hospital called her to attend to a patient named Paulo Pineda; she rushed
because she was told that the patient was continuously bleeding; they tried to give him blood
transfusion but before they could do so, the patient expired; their hospital issued a Medical
Certificate stating that the patient was admitted with a hacking wound.
RTC found Corpin guilty of Murder, ruling that treachery attended the commission of
the crime. CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Corpin's conviction for Murder.
RULING
YES. The Court affirms the conviction of Corpin, but only for the crime of Homicide,
as the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven in the killing of Paulo.
The fact that Corpin killed the victim is undisputed as it was admitted by Corpin.
However, the Court is not convinced that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
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The prosecution must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the killing of Paulo
was qualified by the aggravating circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and methods or forms
in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
To qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed
means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked
no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk of himself.
In order to appreciate treachery, both elements must be present. It is not enough that
the attack was "sudden", "unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation." There
must also be a showing that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly to insure such
execution, without risk to himself.
In this case, the following circumstances negate the presence of treachery: First,
although the attack was sudden and unexpected as he was hacked from behind, the
prosecution did not prove that Corpin deliberately chose the particular mode of attack he
used to ensure the execution of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself. As testified
by the prosecution witnesses, the incident happened in a public market where there were
numerous other people, including the witnesses, who could have offered their help. In a
similar case, the Court held that when aid is easily available to the victim, such as when the
attendant circumstances show that there were several eyewitnesses, no treachery could be
appreciated because if the accused indeed consciously adopted the particular means he used
to insure the facilitation of the crime, he could have chosen another place or time. Moreover,
after he was attacked by Corpin, Paulo was able to run away and escape, which shows that
the victim had the opportunity to defend himself.
Second, Corpin did not deliberately seek the presence of the victim. As testified by the
prosecution witnesses and Corpin himself, he and Paulo have been working as meat vendors
in the same public market for several years. The weapon he used to kill the victim was a
butcher's knife that he regularly used for his work. In this connection, the Court ruled in
another case that the fact that the victim and the accused were already within the same
vicinity when the attack happened and that the accused did not deliberately choose the
particular weapon he used to kill the victim as he merely picked it up from within his reach
is proof that there is no treachery involved.
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All told, Corpin's decision to attack the victim was more of a sudden impulse than a
planned decision. The prosecution failed to prove the elements of treachery. Thus, Corpin
can only be held guilty of the crime of Homicide.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GARRY PADILLA Y BASE AND FRANCISCO BERMAS Y

ASIS
DOCTRINE
The Court, in Cartuano and as subsequently clarified in People v. Dalandas, does not
require a comprehensive medical examination in each and every case where mental
retardation needed to be proved. However, it is well to emphasize that the conviction of an
accused of rape based on the mental retardation of the private complainant must be anchored
on proof beyond reasonable doubt of her mental retardation.
FACTS
According to BBB, her daughter, AAA, was mentally retarded since birth as
manifested by the latter's hardheadedness. AAA would utter senseless words which were
inappropriate for her age. At times, AAA would not be responsive to questions, and would
hit her nephews and nieces without any reason, while other times AAA would be out of
dimension and not within herself.
Barangay Captain CCC has been a neighbor of AAA for 10 years and has known AAA
to be mentally retarded for she was always smiling and laughing for no reason. He also knew
that AAA went to a special education school.
On 10 January 2008, AAA told her mother that she was to attend a birthday party near
their house. AAA testified that as she was watching those having videoke, she was told by
accused Bermas to go to Barangay Captain CCC's house. Bermas and one Garry Padilla were
already there. At the stairs, Bermas told her "AAA, wag kang magsumbong marami ako ritong
pera, sige na hubarin mo na ang panty mo." Both men then removed private complainants'
shorts and underwear. Bermas showed her his penis, inserted it into her vagina and moved
in a pumping motion. After a while, Bermas removed his penis and a liquid substance came
out. Thereafter, Garry inserted his penis into her vagina.
Meanwhile, Barangay Captain CCC testified that he was awakened by the sound of his
hogs and the barking of dogs. He peeped through his window and saw AAA raising her shorts
as she walked from his pig pen. AAA was also with a male companion who he identified as
Bermas. CCC then went next door to inform AAA's parents of what he saw.
When BBB saw her daughter, the latter was crying and trembling with fear. She asked
AAA who the man she was with. AAA replied that she was with Bermas. They then went to
the Women's and Children's Desk ng Himpilan ng Pulisya to report the incident.
Dr. Barasona testified that she examined AAA on 12 January 2008 and found that
there was clear evidence of penetration which happened within 72 hours from examination.
She referred AAA for psychiatric evaluation as she suspected her of having Down Syndrome
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for having features such as low-set and malformed ears as well as oblique palpebral fissures.
In addition, AAA had difficulty in understanding questions; she was not fully responsive to
questions and could not fully narrate incidents.
The RTC convicted Bermas of the crime of Rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC in
relation to RA 7610, finding that the testimony of the private complainant, as well as by the
barangay captain, who positively identified the accused, and the findings of the doctor gave
credence to the commission of the crime.
CA affirmed RTC's conviction, ruling that BBB's testimony that AAA was mentally
retarded since birth was sufficient to establish her retardation, and that medical evidence
was not a condition sine qua non to prove that AAA indeed was a mental retardate.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Bermas.
RULING
YES. The Court acquits Bermas for the failure of the prosecution to prove all the
elements of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. In rape cases, the prosecution has
the burden to conclusively prove the two elements of the crime: (1) that the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force or
intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she
was under 12 years of age or was demented.
Consequently, the Court holds that the evidence presented by the prosecution did not
sufficiently establish the second element of the crime charged, namely, that he had carnal
knowledge of AAA either (a) through force or intimidation, or (b) when she was deprived of
reason. Hence, Bermas' acquittal necessarily follows.
Records are bereft of any evidence conclusively establishing AAA's mental

retardation. The only evidence offered to prove the said fact were: (1) BBB's testimony that
AAA has had mental retardation since birth; (2) Barangay Captain CCC's testimony that he
has known AAA to have mental retardation and that she went to a special school; and (3) Dr.
Barasona's testimony that AAA "probably" has Down Syndrome.
BBB and CCC's testimonies are but mere conclusions that do not establish the fact of
AAA's mental retardation. Likewise, Dr. Barasona's testimony cannot be the basis for such as
said findings were inconclusive. Therefore, the finding that AAA is a mental retardate has no
leg to stand on.
The Court, in People v. Cartuano, Jr., explained that:

Mental retardation is a clinical diagnosis which requires demonstration of
significant subaverage intellectual performance (verified by standardized
psychometric measurements); evidence of an organic or clinical condition
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which affects an individual's intelligence; and proof of maladaptive

behavior.
In making a diagnosis of mental retardation, a thorough evaluation based

on history, physical and laboratory examination made by a clinician is
necessary.
The Court, in Cartuano and as subsequently clarified in People v. Dalandas, does not require
a comprehensive medical examination in each and every case where mental retardation
needed to be proved. However, it is well to emphasize that the conviction of an accused of
rape based on the mental retardation of the private complainant must be anchored on
proof beyond reasonable doubt of her mental retardation.
In this case, there is no such proof. Even if the Court were to appreciate BBB's
testimony, the same conclusion would be reached, for claims of "hardheadedness," "uttering
senseless words," and unresponsiveness to questions are all insufficient to conclude that
AAA is suffering from retardation such that she was unable to comprehend the consequences
of consenting to a sexual act. The Court needed to ascertain her level of understanding,
including that of sexual acts, for it is clear in the RTC decision, and in her testimony, that she
"consented" to the sexual act. The Court had to determine whether this consent was vitiated,
such that the act would amount to Rape under Article 266-A(l)(b) for having carnal
knowledge with a woman "deprived of reason." However, as discussed, the prosecution
failed to establish her mental retardation beyond reasonable doubt.
As, the second element of the crime charged — that the victim be "deprived of reason"
— was not established beyond reasonable doubt, the Court acquits Bermas of the crime
charged.
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Case Digests
RAMON PICARDAL Y BALUYOT v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
In Sindac v. People: Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search
and seizure must be carried out through a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable." To protect the
people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be
affected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there
first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.
FACTS
According to the prosecution, PO1 Mark Peniano is a regular member of the PNP. On
March 27, 2014, at around 8pm, together with his companion PO1 Cristobal and PO1 Co,
while they were on a beat patrol back to the station, they chanced upon a person urinating
against the wall. They approached said person who was later identified as accused-appellant
Ramon Picardal. The place is well-lighted since it is within the main road. PO1 Peniano told
Picardal that it is forbidden to urinate in public, hence, they invited him to go to the precinct.
When PO1 Peniano was about to handcuff him, Picardal attempted to run but failed since
PO1 Peniano was able to get hold of his hand. PO1 Peniano frisked him and was able to
recover a caliber .38 revolver from his waist. The rusty pistol with a handle made of wood
contained 5 live ammunitions.
Picardal was brought to the police station, where PO1 Peniano referred Picardal to
the officers in-charge for medical examination and the recovered items were surrendered to
P/Chief Insp. Santos for safekeeping. The following morning, the items were retrieved by
PO1 Peniano and were given to the assigned investigator, PO3 Navarro, for proper marking.
PO1 Peniano had the confiscated firearm checked with the Firearm and Explosive Division
(FED) of the PNP and it was discovered that it is a loose firearm. The FED issued a
certification stating that Picardal is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and
caliber.
The RTC convicted Picardal for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms under Section
28(a) in relation to Section 28(e-1) of RA 10591, finding that the prosecution was able to
prove all the elements of the crime charged, namely: (1) the existence of the subject firearm;
and (2) the fact that the accused, who owned or possessed it, does not have the license or
permit to possess the same. The CA affirmed RTC's conviction
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ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Picardal.
RULING
YES. The factual findings of the CA, affirming that of the trial court, are generally final
and conclusive on the Court. However, an exception to this rule is where the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.”
In this case, the CA manifestly overlooked the undisputed facts that: (1) the subject
firearm was seized from Picardal after he was frisked by the police officers for allegedly
urinating in a public place; and (2) the aforementioned case for "urinating in a public place"
filed against Picardal was subsequently dismissed by the MeTC of Manila. The act supposedly
committed by Picardal — urinating in a public place — is punished only by Section 2(a) of
MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, which provides that:
Sec. 2. Prohibited Acts
a) It is unlawful xxx to urinate, defecate and spit in public places.
The MMDA Regulation, however, provides that the penalty for said violation is only a
fine of P500 or community service of 1 day. Said regulation did not provide that the violator
may be imprisoned for violating it, precisely because it is, as its name implies, a mere
regulation, and not a law or an ordinance. Therefore, even if it were true that the Picardal
did urinate in a public place, the police officers still conducted an illegal search when they
frisked Picardal for allegedly violating the regulation. It was not a search incidental to a
lawful arrest as there could not have been any lawful arrest to speak of.
In this connection, the Court, in Sindac v. People:

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure
must be carried out through a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable."
To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.
One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may
be affected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the
process cannot be reversed.
Thus, as the firearm was discovered through an illegal search, it cannot be used in any
prosecution against him as mandated by Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. As
there is no longer any evidence against Picardal in this case, he must perforce be acquitted.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JIMMY FULINARA
DOCTRINE
The presence of the three insulating witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of
the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest and
inventory; such that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that
they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated
drugs immediately after seizure and confiscation. Compliance with Sec 21, Art II of RA 9165 is
integral to every conviction. Without any justifiable explanation, which must be proven as a
FACTS
Upon receiving information about the illegal drug activities of a certain alias “Boyet”,
who was later identified as Jimmy Fulinara, herein accused-appellant, the Anti-Illegal Drugs,
Special Operation Task Group (SAID-SOTG) of Valenzuela City Police Station planned and
executed a buy-bust operation.
After identifying Jimmy as the target, PO2 Julius A. Congson, the poseur-buyer, told
Jimmy that he would like to buy shabu worth P200.00. He gave the marked money consisting
of two (2) one hundred (100) peso bills to Jimmy who placed the said money in his left
pocket. Thereafter, Jimmy took out a black coin purse from his right side pocket and pulled
out one (1) plastic sachet containing shabu, which was handed over to PO2 Julius. Jimmy was
arrested and in his possession was found another plastic sachet of suspected shabu and two
(2) aluminum foil strips.
The buy-bust team was instructed by their lead operative to continue the inventory
of the confiscated items at the police station. Thereafter, the inventory was conducted in the
presence of Kagawad Rommel Mercado. The Department of Justice ("DOJ") Representative
and Media Representative were also called to witness the inventory, but their numbers were
busy. Jimmy was then charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs
under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended.
In his defense, Jimmy denied the allegations against him and testified that he was on
his way to a pharmacy when the police officers apprehended him. The police officers
questioned Jimmy about knowing a certain “Sugar” and demanded P10,000 if he could not
point her to them. Jimmy maintained that the sachets of shabu recovered from him were not
his and that he was just tending to his lugawan.
ISSUE
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Whether Jimmy's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 was proven
RULING
conviction. It is essential, that the identity and integrity of the seized drug be established
with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on its identity, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each
link in the chain of custody from the moment the drug is seized up to its presentation in court
as evidence of the crime.
Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640 requires that: (1) the seized items
be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from
the media or a representative from the National Prosecution Service (NPS) all of whom shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same and the seized
drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from
confiscation for examination.
The phrase immediately after seizure and confiscation means that the physical
of RA 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. In
this connection, this also means that the two required witnesses, whose presence at the time
of the warrantless arrest and inventory is mandatory, should already be physically present
at the time of the conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again, must be
immediately done at the place of seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily
be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its
nature, a planned activity.
The Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Sec 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible and the failure of the
seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. The prosecution still needs to
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team.
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requirements under Section 21(1) of RA 9165. First, none of the two required witnesses was
present at the time of arrest of the accused and the seizure of the drugs. The barangay
kagawad was merely "called-in" at the police station. The insulating presence of the
representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected public official during the seizure
and marking of the drugs would belie any doubt as to the source, identity and integrity of the
seized drug to avoid the evils of switching, planting or contamination of the evidence that
had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA 6425. If the buy-bust operation
is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the
usual defense of frame-up.
Second, the police officers offered the flimsy excuse that an alleged commotion
occurred as the reason why they decided to conduct the marking, inventory, and
photography of the seized items at the police station instead of the place of arrest. The
commotion only involved a group of 10 persons, who were five meters away from the buy-
bust team. Moreover, the Court also points out that PO2 Congson expressly admitted himself
that there was really no compelling reason for them to transfer to the police station and that
they did it merely because they were instructed by their team leader to do so, hence the
saving clause does not apply in this case.
All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crimes of sale and
possession of illegal drugs due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed
by the buy-bust team in the seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drugs. Compliance
with Section 21 is integral to every conviction. Without any justifiable explanation, which
must be proven as a fact, the evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of
the accused should follow on the ground that his guilt has not been shown beyond
reasonable doubt.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARNALDO ENRIQUEZ, JR.
DOCTRINE
In treachery, there must be clear and convincing evidence on how the aggression was
made, how it began, and how it developed. Where no particulars are known as to the manner
in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim
began and developed, it cannot be established from suppositions drawn only from
circumstances prior to the very moment of the aggression, that an accused perpetrated the
killing with treachery.
FACTS
At around 9:30PM on Dec 30, 2006, Luisa and her daughter, Jessica were in their
house watching the television when they saw a bloodied Florencio Dela Cruz coming out of
his house and upon reaching the door got stabbed in the back by Arnaldo Enriquez, herein
accused-appellant, with a bread knife. Dela Cruz managed to ask for help from his uncle's
house before collapsing. He was brought to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival
causes by multiple stab wounds. Enriquez was charged with murder.
Barangay Security Development Officer Obar arrived at the reported place and
arrested the person being mauled and whom he later involved as Enriquez and as the one
involved in the killing. Enriquez was charged with murder and found guilty of the crime
charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed Enriquez’ conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Enriquez's conviction for Murder
RULING
YES. In a catena of cases, the Court has consistently held that treachery cannot be
appreciated where the prosecution only proved the events after the attack happened, but
not the manner of how the attack commenced or how the act which resulted in the victim's
death unfolded. In treachery, there must be clear and convincing evidence on how the
aggression was made, how it began, and how it developed. Where no particulars are known
as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the
death of the victim began and developed, it cannot be established from suppositions drawn
only from circumstances prior to the very moment of the aggression, that an accused
perpetrated the killing with treachery. Accordingly, treachery cannot be considered where
the lone witness did not see the commencement of the assault.
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unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission without risk of himself. In order to appreciate treachery, both
elements must be present. It is not enough that the attack was "sudden," "unexpected," and
"without any warning or provocation.
In the instant case, treachery was not established by clear and convincing evidence.
The evidence presented by the prosecution only proved the events after the initial attack had
already happened. The prosecution witnesses, Luisa and Jessica, did not see the manner of
how the attack commenced or how the acts which resulted in the victim's death unfolded as
the attack started inside the house of the victim. They merely saw Enriquez stab the already
bloodied Dela Cruz from behind, as he was about to exit the house. It was not established
whether Enriquez deliberately or consciously employed the particular method he used so as
to deprive the victim any opportunity to defend himself. Even more telling is the fact that the
victim was able to escape from Enriquez and even ask for help from his uncle's house before
collapsing.
In view of the foregoing, Enriquez should only be liable for the crime of Homicide.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDWIN NIEVES Y ACUAVERA A.K.A. "ADING"
DOCTRINE
FACTS
The PNP Iba Municipality Station conducted a buy-bust operation for the arrest of
accused-appellant Edwin Nieves, who was infamous for being a drug pusher. PO1 Rudico
Angulo, the designated poseur-buyer along with the Confidential Informant and four
deployed personnel carried out the operation. Nieves was apprehended after pocketing the
marked money and handing to PO1 Angulo a small plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance. Upon reaching the police station, an inventory of the confiscated items
was done in the presence of PO2 Wilfredo F. Devera, one of the officers during the operation,
Department of Justice Representative Asst. State Prosecutor Olivia V. Non, and Elected
Barangay Official Bgy. Kagawad Victor Buenaventura. Nieves was then charged with illegal
use and sale of drugs under R.A. 9165 but was only found guilty for violation of Section 5 of
Article II of R.A. 9165, (selling of dangerous drugs) but acquitted him of the case for Use of
Dangerous Drugs.
Nieves on the other hand alleged that he was mistakenly taken as his brother Jun Jun
Nieves, the person that the police officers were looking for. He was surprised when they
removed his belt, tied both his hands, and dragged him towards their parked vehicle. He was
brought to Camp Conrado Yap where he was mauled. Nieves claimed that he saw the police
officers' asset, Armin Sarmiento who even questioned his arrest instead of his brother who
was the actual perpetrator of the crime charged. Upon realizing their mistake, the police
officers returned to Nieves’ house to look for Jun Jun, but failed to locate his whereabouts.
Nieves further claimed that he was subsequently brought to the Iba Police Station and was
forced to admit that he was his brother.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting Nieves
RULING
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YES. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of
proving these elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In
drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
While it is true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure,
sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the law nevertheless
also requires strict compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights are
safeguarded.
In all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any
prosecution that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded
as that required to make a finding of guilt.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of
the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain
seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation;
and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the
thereof.

The phrase ‘immediately after seizure and confiscation’ means that the physical
reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. In
this connection, this also means that the three required witnesses should already be
physically present at the time of apprehension — a requirement that can easily be complied
with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned
activity. Verily, a buy-bust team normally has enough time to gather and bring with them the
said witnesses.
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The Court had ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with
the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items void and invalid. However, this is with the caveat, as the CA itself
pointed out, that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the prosecution should
In the present case, a careful perusal of the records would reveal that the supposed
buy-bust operation was conducted without the presence of any of the three insulating
witnesses. In PO1 Angulo’s and PO2 Devera’s Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-
Aresto, the aforementioned apprehending officers claimed that they were only accompanied
by other operatives of PNP, Iba. Further, the inventory was subsequently conducted at the
police station without any explanation as to why it was impracticable to do the same at the
place of apprehension. More importantly, only two of the three required witnesses — the
DOJ representative and the elective official — were present in the conduct of inventory, as
evidenced by the signatures in the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized.
PO2 Devera then testified that the lack of media representative was due to the written
manifesto executed by them requesting that they be excluded from anti-drug operations. The
written manifesto, however, did not justify the police officers' deviation from the prescribed
procedure as it was undated, and was never even mentioned in any of the affidavits and
documents related to the case prior to PO2 Devera's testimony; only seven (7) media
practitioners signed the written manifesto and it was indicated therein that it binds only "all
mediamen whose name and signature appears thereon”; most importantly, the
requirements of the law cannot be set aside by the simple expedient of a written manifesto.
Thus, the Court finds that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the
apprehending police officers to look for the said representatives pursuant to Section 21(1)
of R.A. 9165. A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable — without so much
as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other
representatives, given the circumstances — is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse.
Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media and the DOJ,
and any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the
evils of switching, planting or contamination of the evidence would again rear their ugly
heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachet
of shabu that was evidence herein of the corpus delicti. Thus, this failure adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of
such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.
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In sum, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending
team's deviation from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti has thus been compromised. Furthermore, the
inconsistencies in the police officers' testimonies cast reasonable doubt on Nieves' guilt. In
light of these, Nieves must perforce be acquitted.
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERDINAND BUNIAG

DOCTRINE
FACTS
During a buy-bust operation conducted by PDEA agents in Olape, Cagayan de Oro,
appellant Ferdinand Buniag was apprehended after showing three bundles of marijuana
stalks and leaves contained in a black travelling bag to PDEA Agent IO1 Rubylyn S. Alfaro
who was the designated poseur-buyer. The team then brought Buniag to their station with
IO2 Neil Vincent Pimentel in possession of the traveling bag and the illegal narcotics in going
thereto. At the station, IO2 Pimentel did the markings and prepared the inventory of the
seized items. Buniag and the seized items were then brought to the Regional Crime
Laboratory Office. Buniag was charged with the crime of attempt to sell and/or delivery of a
dangerous drug under Sec 5, paragraph 1, in relation to Sec 26 of RA 9165.
Buniag countered that he went to Manila to check on his brother’s house and was
arrested as a suspect by the PDEA agents while he was out buying food. Buniag claimed that
the PDEA agents allegedly asked for P20,000 for his release, was made to point to a clack bag
while being photographed and was made to sign documents without knowing the contents
therein. Buniag denied owning the black travelling bag and the the three bundles of
marijuana inside it.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165
RULING
YES. The CA correctly ruled that the accused may only be held liable for attempted
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Under the rule on variance, while Buniag cannot be convicted
of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs because the sale was never consummated, he
may be convicted for the attempt to sell as it is necessarily included in the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. In the present case, Buniag attempted to sell shabu and commenced by
overt acts the commission of the intended crime however, the sale was aborted when IO1
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Alfaro, upon confirming that Buniag had with him the marijuana, made a "miss-call" to IO2
Pimentel, the pre-arranged signal, and the rest of the team rushed to the area and placed
Buniag under arrest.
The Court however held that Buniag may still not be convicted of attempted illegal
sale of dangerous drugs. For a successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under RA 9165, which necessarily includes attempted sale of illegal drugs,
the following elements must be proven: (1) the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) the buyer and the seller were
identified.
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction.
It is of prime importance that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt; and that it must be proven with exactitude that the substance bought
during the buy-bust operation is exactly the same substance offered in evidence before the
court.
The Court has repeatedly held that Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable
law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, strictly requires that (1) the seized
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2)
the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused
or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from
the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ.
Verily, the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time
of the conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again, must be immediately done
at the place of seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with by
the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned
activity.
In addition, while the Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. The
failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void; and this has always
been with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is
seized items are properly preserved.
requirements under Section 21(1) of RA 9165 without having a valid excuse. The agents’
mere allegation that they feared that the people started coming out of the house is nothing
but a frail excuse since there were seven (7) of them and they were even armed. The Court
also ruled that there was really no buy-bust operation conducted.
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First, the police officers did not conduct the marking, photography, and inventory of
the seized items at the place of arrest but at the police station, without having any valid
excuse for the deferment of the conduct of the required procedure under Section 21 of RA
9165. The total absence of any witness belies the claim that there was even a buy-bust
operation. Second, although there was a media representative who signed the inventory
report at the police office, such is not enough because the law requires that the mandatory
witnesses should already be present during the actual inventory and not merely after the
fact. Moreover, there was no representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ) or any
elected official at the time of arrest of the accused and seizure of the illegal drugs, and
inventory and photography of the seized items at the police station. The Court has repeatedly
held that the fact that a buy-bust is a planned operation, it strains credulity why the buy-bust
team could not have ensured the presence of the required witnesses pursuant to Section 21.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot overcome

the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. The right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty is a constitutionally protected right. Thus, it would be
a patent violation of the Constitution to uphold the importance of the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty over the presumption of innocence, especially
in this case where there are more than enough reasons to disregard the former.
All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged due to
the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the buy-bust team in the
seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drug. In other words, the prosecution was not
able to overcome the presumption of innocence of Buniag. The integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised and Buniag must accordingly be
acquitted.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY DAGDAG A.K.A. "TISOY"
G.R. No. No. 225503, June 26, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
FACTS
Acting upon the information that one Jerry Dagdag alias ‘Tisoy” was rampantly selling
illegal drugs in Brgy. Bambang in Pasig City, a buy bust operation was conducted. While the
poseur-buyer PO1 Christopher Millanes and the confidential Informant were walking along
the alley, they accidentally met Dagdag who sold to them a sachet of suspected shabu. Dagdag
was apprehended and found in his possession the marked money and two (2) plastic sachets
of suspected shabu. Thereafter, Dagdag was brought to the Pasig Police Station for proper
booking and documentation and his photograph was taken as well as the items seized from
the operation and was charged with the crime of illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of Article II of RA 9165.
Dagdag alleged that while at home two (2) men in civilian clothes and armed with
firearms entered the house, poked a gun at him and brought him to Pariancillo Police
Headquarters. He was allegedly told to settle the case by paying P50,000 and was later
reduced to P20,000. When Dagdag refused to give money, PO1 Millanes allegedly threatened
him with three small plastic sachets, lighter and a pair of scissors as evidence against him.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting Dagdag for violating Section Sections 5
and 11 of Article II of RA 9165
RULING
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other
hand, illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 has the
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following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified
to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of
the law. While it is true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure,
safeguarded.
The Court has repeatedly held that Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable
law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, strictly requires that (1) the seized
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2)
the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ all of whom shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

required witness. The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the
physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made
immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable
that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allows the inventory and
photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.
In this connection, this also means that the three required witnesses should already
be physically present at the time of apprehension — a requirement that can easily be
complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature,
a planned activity. Verily, a buy-bust team normally has enough time to gather and bring
with them the said witnesses.
Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that noncompliance of these requirements

under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said items. For this provision to be effective, however,
the prosecution must first (1) recognize any lapses on the part of the police officers and (2)
be able to justify the same. In this case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried
to justify, its deviations from the procedure contained in Section 21, RA 9165.
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In the present case, no inventory and photographing of the evidence were conducted
whatsoever in the presence of the required witnesses either at the scene of the purported
buy-bust operation or even when Dagdag was brought to the police station thereafter. There
was no evidence presented by the prosecution whatsoever showing that an inventory of the
allegedly seized drugs was even conducted by the police. The supposed buy-bust operation
in the instant case was conducted in complete and utter derogation of Section 21 of RA 9165.
The CA's assessment that the brazen and wholesale deviations of Section 21 of RA 9165
committed by the police in the instant case are mere "minor lapses" is unquestionably
incorrect. Such an assessment by the CA is irresponsible and reprehensible.
The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office is
necessary to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized
drug. Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the DOJ and
any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching,
"planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under
the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as
to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject sachet
that was evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of
the incrimination of the accused.
The Court is not unaware that, in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice
of planting evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians. The RTC and the CA
therefore seriously and erred in simply brushing aside Dagdag's defense of frame-up,
especially when the testimonies of Dagdag, Albert, his son-in-law, and Joanna, his daughter,
were consistent in that the police officers forcibly apprehended Dagdag and planted on
Dagdag the supposedly seized specimens of shabu. In this connection, the Court sternly
reminds the trial and appellate courts to exercise extra vigilance in trying and deciding drug
cases, and directs the Philippine National Police to conduct an investigation on this incident
and other similar cases, lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses.
In sum, the prosecution miserably failed to provide justifiable grounds for the
apprehending team's deviations from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised. In light of
this, Dagdag must perforce be acquitted.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO MENIL

DOCTRINE
Chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment or
that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of
opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack. For treachery
to be appreciated, both elements must be present. It is not enough that the attack was sudden,
unexpected, and without any warning or provocation. There must also be a showing that the
offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods and forms in the
execution of the crime which tended directly to insure such execution, without risk to himself.
FACTS
The victim, Edwin B. Bagaslao and Cynthia Rose Coloma, his common-law wife were
about to leave the Christmas party held at Tip-Topp Disco in Sing-Song Garden Restaurant
and organized by the Butuan Bet Takers Association, of which victim Bagaslao was a
member. On their way downstairs, accused-appellant Edgardo Menil pushed Coloma. A
heated argument ensued. When Coloma and Bagaslao were already on their path on the
sidewalk of the Sing-Sing Garden, Menil suddenly came from behind and shot the victim.
Ricardo Torralba was leaving the party and witnessed the appellant shoot Bagaslao and ran
away after. Bagaslao was brought to the hospital but died on the same day.
The appellant denied having killed Bagaslao, maintaining that he was at Sing-Sing
Garden with his friends. Bagaslao blocked his path and grabbed his revolver and that he had
no choice but to grapple with Bagaslao in order to regain possession of the revolver and
accidentally the shot was fired and killed Bagaslao.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming Menil's conviction for murder
RULING
YES. The accused should only be convicted of the crime of homicide and not murder.
The prosecution failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that treachery attended
the commission of the crime. Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of
attack must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself.
It has been consistently held by the Court that chance encounters, impulse killing or
crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations
are generally not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately
employ a treacherous mode of attack.
In this case, Menil and the victim had a heated altercation at the restaurant prior to
the killing of the victim by the accused. It is true that a certain Dodoy had pacified their fight.
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However, this does not necessarily mean that at the time the shooting incident happened,
they already had cool and level heads since only a short amount of time had lapsed between
the heated altercation and the shooting of the victim. Immediately after they were pacified
by Dodoy, the victim went down the stairs followed by Menil and upon reaching the sidewalk,
Menil immediately shot the victim. Verily, the victim should have still been aware that there
was a possibility of an impending attack as the armed accused was still in the same area.
Furthermore, to qualify the crime to murder, the following elements of treachery in a

given case must be proven: (a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate; and, (b) said means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted.
It has been repeatedly held that for treachery to be appreciated, both elements must
be present. It is not enough that the attack was sudden, unexpected, and without any warning
or provocation. There must also be a showing that the offender consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended
directly to insure such execution, without risk to himself.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the second requisite for treachery, i.e., that the
accused deliberately adopted the means of execution, was not proven by clear and
convincing evidence by the prosecution. The means of execution used by the accused cannot
be said to be deliberately or consciously adopted since it was more of a result of a sudden
impulse due to his previous heated altercation with the victim than a planned and deliberate
action. Similarly, in another case, the Court held, "there is no treachery when the assault is
preceded by a heated exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when the
victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former."
Thus, due to the absence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, Menil should
only be convicted of the crime of Homicide.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DAN DUMANJUG
DOCTRINE
The apprehending team should conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and the
photographing of the same immediately after seizure and confiscation. The said inventory must
be done in the presence of the required witnesses, all of whom shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The phrase "immediately after seizure and
confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended
by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the
same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allows
the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest
FACTS
Upon receiving information from a walk-in Confidential Informant that appellant Dan
Dumanjug was selling shabu, the PDEA conducted a buy-bust operation with Agent Robin
Beniga Tibayan as the designated poseur-buyer. Upon reaching the boarding house of
Dumanjug, Agent Tibayan bought 500 worth of illegal drugs and Dumanjug handed over (1)
small sachet of shabu. Dumanjug was arrested and thereafter Agent Tibayan marked the
small sachet of shabu that was bought from Dumanjug as "RT-1" at the scene. In Dumanjug's
room, which was 3 to 5 meters away from the crime scene, the team saw in plain sight a
weighing scale, eyeglass casing containing four (4) disposable lighters, empty sachets,
aluminum foil and a Nokia cellular phone. No markings were made on the said items after
Agent Subang assessed that the scene was quite dangerous.
Dumanjug was then taken to the PDEA Office where he was thoroughly searched. At
the same time, the pieces of evidence were photographed, marked and inventoried in the
presence of Dumanjug, the barangay kagawad of Fort Poyohon and representatives from the
media and the Department of Justice. Dumanjug was charged with violation of Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
Dumanjug denied the charges against him and alleged that while he was doing his
report in his boarding house, armed men with faces covered with bonnets forcibly entered
his place and pointed guns at him while they conducted a search inside the rooms in the
boarding house. Dumanjug was interrogated as to the location of shabu and searched his
ants for any illegal drugs but did not find any. He was brought to the PDEA office where a
marked money was allegedly placed inside his pocket.
ISSUE
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Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting Dumanjug for violating Section 5, Article
II of RA 9165
RULING
proving these elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In
drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
While it is true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure,
safeguarded.
thereof.
The Court has previously stressed that the presence of the three witnesses at the time
of seizure and confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the
warrantless arrest, they are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that
drugs immediately after seizure and confiscation.

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after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allows the inventory and
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. In this connection, this also means that
the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of the conduct
of the physical inventory of the seized items which, as aforementioned, must be immediately
done at the place of seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied
said witnesses.
seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. The prosecution still needs to
apprehending team.
The Court finds that there is no justifiable ground in the instant case that warrants
the non-observance of the mandatory requirements set by Section 21 of RA 9165. First, the
testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses, i.e., Agents Tibayan and Balbada, offer conflicting
reasons as to how the buy-bust team arrived at the decision to conduct the inventory and
photographing of the evidence in the PDEA Regional Office and not at the crime scene.
Second, from the testimony of Agent Balbada herself, it becomes apparent that the supposed
convergence of roughly two hundred (200) persons in the vicinity of the crime scene, aside
from being uncorroborated, is in itself an incredible and implausible tale. Third, even if Agent
Balbada's incredible testimony on the convergence of two hundred (200) persons in the
vicinity of the crime scene was to be believed, there is still no justifiable reason to conclude
that it was "quite dangerous" to hold the inventory and photographing of the evidence in the
presence of the required witnesses at the place of the alleged buy-bust operation as the buy-
bust operation was conducted outdoors and that there was no serious danger posed
whatsoever to the team and that the inventory and photographing of the evidence could have
also been conducted immediately after the confiscation of the drugs at the crime scene.
Regardless of the level of danger extant in the venue of the buy-bust operation, from the get-
go, the PDEA agents really had no intention whatsoever to conduct the buy-bust in
accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165.
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evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been seriously compromised. In light of this,
Dumanjug must perforce be acquitted.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CAROL ALCANTARA

DOCTRINE
FACTS
Acting on the information relayed by an informant about an ongoing sale of shabu by
alias Jonjon, later identified as the accused Jonathan Manuel, PO1 Richie Gaerlan, a member
of the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force of the Marikina City Police went to
the place and verified the information. They were told by Manuel to go to the house of a
certain alias "nanay" in San Mateo, Rizal as he already ran out of stock. The Anti-Illegal Drugs
Special Operations Task Force of the Marikina City Police then planned and executed a buy-
bust operation.
Upon reaching the house of alias nanay, they noticed that there were several persons
seated in front of a table who were repacking suspected shabu. Manuel was packing the
suspected shabu inside sachets, accused Jerry Robles was cutting plastic sachets, Aniceto
Decena was heat sealing the plastic sachets using an improvised burner, and they would then
pass all the packed suspected shabu to Carol Alcantara. The old woman, Resurreccion, then
gave the plastic sachets to PO1 Gaerlan. All the accused were then arrested.
PO1 Christopher Años, a member of PO1 Gaerlan's team, seized the following items
that were on top of the table: 1) money in different denominations amounting to ₱3,500.00;
2) 30 plastic sachets of suspected shabu; 3) three bundles of plastic sachets; 4) three pairs
of scissors; and 5) one improvised burner. PO1 Años put the necessary markings on the
seized items, and listed the serial numbers of the seized peso bills. The team brought the
suspects to the San Mateo Police Station to be blottered, while the specimens were brought
to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for examination. From the San Mateo Police
Station, all the accused were brought to the Marikina Police Station. They were charged of
violating Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of RA 9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The defense alleged that seven men suddenly barged in and conducted a search
thereat. The men allegedly took some of their belongings and Resureccion and Alcantara
were brought to the Marikina Station. Cruz, Decena and Robles alleged that they were in
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Resurreccion’s house to clean when the agents arrived looking for a certain alias Jonjon. Cruz
was then arrested and boarded in a vehicle with Alcantara, Ressurreccion, and Manuel. He
alleged that while the commotion was happening, there were no representatives from the
barangay or the media and the barangay official and police officer from San Mateo, Rizal,
arrived only after they were already inside the vehicle. While they were being questioned in
Marikina Police Station, there were still no members of the IBP or members of the media.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellants
RULING
YES. The accused-appellants were charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165. In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution must prove the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other
hand, to reach a conviction in a case involving the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the following must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the said drug.
the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. While it is true
that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the law nevertheless also requires strict
compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights are safeguarded.
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thereof.

said witnesses.
seizure and custody over the items void and invalid as provided under a saving mechanism.
To warrant the application of this saving mechanism, however, the prosecution still needs to
apprehending team.
In the present case, the apprehending team led by PO1 Gaerlan did not conduct the
buy-bust operation or the inventory post-operation in the presence of the required
witnesses. One of the prosecution’s witnesses testified that no person from the media or any
elected public official was present during the buy-bust operation or during the post-
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operation inventory. The apprehending team in this case had more than ample time to
comply with the requirements established by law. PO1 Gaerlan testified that before
executing the operation, they even coordinated with PDEA via phone call and with the San
Mateo Police through a letter of coordination. Hence, the police officers had all the time to
coordinate with the required witnesses so as to be compliant with the law. The records of
this case, however, indubitably reveal that neither the police officers nor the prosecution
offered any explanation for such deviation.
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been seriously compromised. In light of this,
the accused-appellants must perforce be acquitted.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LYNDON CAÑETE

DOCTRINE
be done in the presence of the aforementioned required witness, all of whom shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The phrase "immediately after
seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs
were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is
only when the same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9165 allows the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches
the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.
FACTS
Upon receiving a report from a confidential informant regarding Lyndon Canete‘s and
Peterlou Pimentel’s, herein appellants, drug activities, the PDEA Provincial Office in
Pagadian conducted a buy-bust operation. Agent Rolly Calangi, the designated poseur-buyer
was handed a sachet of suspected shabu wrapped in foil by Cañete. Thereafter, Cañete and
Pimentel were arrested. As people were starting to gather, Agent Pollisco decided to move
his team and appellants out of the vicinity. They proceeded to their service vehicle, where
Agent Calangi marked the confiscated evidence.
With Agent Calangi still in custody of the seized evidence, the buy-bust team
proceeded to the PDEA Office in Pagadian City. However, due to a power interruption, the
team had to go instead to the Provincial Intelligence Branch Office to conduct an inventory
of the evidence. Present during the inventory were appellants, media representative Vanessa
Cagas, elected official Ernesto Mondarte, and Department of Justice Representative
Prosecutor Mary Ann Tugbang-Torres. Thereafter, the investigator, Agent Decano, took a
photograph of the evidence. The appellants were charged with sale of illegal drugs under Sec
5, Art II of RA 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
The defense alleged that Cañete and Pimentel were at the billiard hall when the agents
arrived, searched and have them boarded in a vehicle. They were arrested thereafter and
brought to Camp Abelon where they were padlocked and forced to sign a document.
ISSUE
Whether accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged
RULING
NO. In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution must prove the following
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elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other hand, to reach a
conviction in a case involving the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
thereof.

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said witnesses.
apprehending team.
In the present case, the buy-bust team failed to justify their deviations from the
mandatory provisions of RA 9165. For this reason alone, accused-appellants must be
acquitted. Furthermore, at the time the drug was allegedly seized and confiscated from
accused-appellants, only the police officers were present. Likewise, at the time the item was
marked inside the service vehicle of the buy-bust team, there were yet no other witnesses to
observe the same. As detailed above, it was only at the time of the inventory and
photographing that the three (3) witnesses required under RA 9165 came into the picture.
The authorities also failed to follow the requirement that the inventory and photographs be
done at the place of apprehension which was the Philippine National Police (PNP) Station of
Labanga, or the PDEA Office in Dao, Pagadian City. Even assuming that the performance of
such procedure was impracticable at the billiard hall, the buy-bust team, without justifiable
reason or cause, still bypassed the nearest PNP and PDEA stations by still choosing to go to
Camp Abelon which was not the nearest police station or office from the crime scene. The
witnesses- representative from the media, Department of Justice, and local elected official-
were present only during the inventory and photographing at Camp Abelon.
In sum, the series of lapses committed by the apprehending team has created serious
doubt on whether the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged. With the very
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identity and integrity of the corpus delicti placed in serious doubt, the Court is duty-bound
to acquit accused-appellants.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARMIE NARVAS

DOCTRINE
be done in the presence of the aforementioned required witness, all of whom shall be required
FACTS
Acting on a concerned citizen’s tip to the desk officer of the Sta. Barbara Police Station
regarding drug-related activities in Villa Sta. Barbara, a buy-bust operation was conducted
with PO2 Christopher Idos as the poseur-buyer. After accused-appellant Armie Narvas
handed the two plastic sachets and took the marked money, he was arrested. PO1 Quibrantos
took the items and gave them to the investigator. SPO1 Raymundo Bauzon conducted an
inventory of the items seized. Thereafter, photographs were taken. PO2 Idos placed the
markings "CVI-1" and "CVI-2" on two (2) plastic sachets, while PO1 Quibrantos placed the
markings on the other two. At the police station, SPO1 Bauzon prepared the request for
laboratory examination and submitted the specimen to the crime laboratory. Narvas was
charged with sale and possession of illegal drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Art II of RA 9165
also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
The defense alleged that Narvas went to the house of his friend when suddenly, a
group of seven to eight men, later identified as police officers, barged into the house, dragged
and frisked them, but produced nothing. However, they were still handcuffed and brought
outside the house where they were photographed with six plastic sachets and two five
hundred bills. The appellant also alleged that he was blindfolded and tortured by the police
officers.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting accused-appellant Narvas for violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165
RULING
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thereof.

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said witnesses.
apprehending team.
In the present case, the buy-bust team failed to comply with and justify their
deviations from the mandatory provisions of RA 9165. There was no legitimate inventory of
the alleged seized drug specimens that was conducted, both in the scene of the crime and at
the police station. PO2 Idos revealed that the Inventory Receipt was prepared and
accomplished, not at the place of the alleged buy-bust operation, but only at the police
station. There also inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution’s
witnesses on the seized evidence and the conduct of the buy-bust operation. The marking of
the plastic sachets was highly irregular as they were merely marked with the initials of the
apprehending officers without indicating the date, time, and place the pieces of evidence
were supposedly confiscated. There was no photographing of the evidence conducted
immediately after, or at the place of apprehension as required under Section 21 of RA 9165.
It was not also explained by the prosecution why only elected public officials, i.e., local
barangay officials, were present during the supposed buy-bust operation. Further, there
were no photographs whatsoever showing that such witnesses were present during the
alleged buy-bust operation.
In sum, the prosecution miserably failed to provide justifiable grounds for the
apprehending team's deviation from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been seriously compromised.
In light of this, accused-appellant Narvas must perforce be acquitted.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDSON BARBAC RETADA

DOCTRINE
be done in the presence of the required witnesses, all of whom shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The phrase "immediately after seizure and
confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended
by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the
same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allows
the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest
FACTS
After confirming that one Edson Retada is engaged in illegal drug activities, a buy-
bust operation was conducted. After the accused Retada handed one plastic sachet of shabu
to PO2 Catubag and got the money, Retada was arrested. Upon arrival at the police station,
PO2 Catubag made a thorough body search on the accused and recovered on the latter one
plastic sachet of suspected shabu, buy-bust money, coins in different denominations and a
cellphone. Retada was charged with sale and possession of illegal drugs under Sections 5 and
11, Art II of RA 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
The defense alleged that Retada was at a store after attending a procession when
police suddenly arrived and he was immediately brought inside the Chief of Police Office and
bodily searched. The police then handcuffed him while his child was brought outside the
office. The police officers continued searching him until they showed him two sachets of
shabu and money amounting to Php 44.75 allegedly from his pocket. Thereafter, he was
placed inside the detention cell and the barangay officials arrived and signed the document.
ISSUE
Whether Retada's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 was proven
RULING
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thereof.

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of the physical inventory of the seized items which must be immediately done at the place of
seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with considering that
the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.
apprehending team.
It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical
inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such
as: (1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2)
their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an
immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf;
(3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative
and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being
charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug
operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape
deviations from the mandatory provisions of RA 9165. Although there were two elected
officials present during the inventory at the police station, the two other mandatory
witnesses were not present. The police officers admitted that they only tried to call-in the
mandatory witnesses when they were already at the police station. The buy-bust team did
not conduct the marking, inventory, and photography of the seized items at the place of
arrest. Instead, they delayed the proceedings and supposedly accomplished them only at the
police station with a flimsy excuse that there were several persons in the place where they
conducted the buy-bust operation. Moreover, considering that the warrantless arrest of the
accused was illegal, the subsequent warrantless search resulting in the recovery of one more
plastic sachet of shabu from Retada's possession is invalid and the seized shabu is
inadmissible in evidence being under the law, "fruit of the poisonous tree." Even more telling
is the fact that they only conducted the thorough body search of the accused at the police
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station when they could have immediately done it at the place of arrest. Thus, Retada must
perforce also be acquitted of the charge of violating Section 11 of RA 9165.
All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense of sale of
illegal drugs due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the buy-
bust team in the seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drug, thus the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drug have been compromised. Accordingly, Retada should be
acquitted of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HAVIB GALUKEN

DOCTRINE
be done in the presence of the aforementioned required witnesses, all of whom shall be required
FACTS
The PDEA South Cotabato conducted a buy-bust operation with I01 Falle as the
poseur-buyer. After accused-appellant Havib Galuken handed two transparent plastic bags
containing shabu and took the buy-bust money, he was apprehended. The team brought the
appellant and the confiscated items at the Tacurong City Police Station. I01 Falle marked the
two sachets with "RPF" and "RPF-1". The police officers likewise prepared an inventory
receipt signed by Barangay Poblacion Kagawad Pamplona and took photographs of the
seized items. On the evening of the same day, appellant was brought to the PDEA Regional
Office while the two sachets remained in the custody of I01 Falle which was later on
endorsed to another agent. Galuken was charged with sale of illegal drugs under Section 5,
Art II of RA 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
The defense alleged that Galuken was at the Tacurong City Public Market to take his
lunch and was on his way to the terminal when he was arrested by unknown persons.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in finding Galuken guilty of the crime of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs
RULING
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
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thereof.

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said witnesses.
apprehending team.
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape
deviations from the mandatory provisions of RA 9165. None of the required witnesses was
present at the place of arrest. The police officers merely called-in a Barangay Kagawad and
media representative when they were already at the police station to sign the inventory
receipt which they had already prepared prior to the arrival of said witnesses. The police
officers did not conduct the marking, inventory, and photography of the seized items at the
place of arrest and offered a hardly plausible explanation that the crowd became
uncontrollable considering that they conducted the buy-bust operation at a Caltex Station
and it is highly unbelievable that there would be a crowd in the said area that would pose a
danger to their lives. The conflicting testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team make
their credibility questionable. Thus, to the mind of the Court, there is doubt whether there
was even really a buy-bust operation. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged due to
the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the buy-bust team in the
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seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drug. In other words, the prosecution was not
able to overcome the presumption of innocence of Havib, thus he must be acquitted.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIO MANABAT

DOCTRINE
FACTS
Upon receiving information through a text message from a confidential informant
that a certain alias Mario is engaged in the selling of prohibited drugs in Estaka, Miputak and
other places in Dipolog City, the members of the City Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation
Task Force (CAIDSOTF) in Dipolog City conducted a buy-bust operation. After accused-
appellant Mario handed a sachet of shabu from inside a small container in his pocket and
took the buy-bust money, he was arrested.
The buy-bust team called for witnesses to the inventory of items recovered from
Mario. Representatives from DOJ, media and the barangay of Miputak came. PO2 Barral
conducted body search on Mario in the presence of the witnesses. After the search, Mario
revealed his full name. Confiscated from Mario's possession were nine (9) pieces small
transparent plastic sachets in triangular shape containing white crystalline granules, one (1)
piece P500 bill (marked money), P150 proceeds money, one (1) unit Nokia cellphone. PO2
Barral turned over one small piece of sachet from Mario. SPO2 Vertudes made markings on
the confiscated items. He also prepared the certificate of inventory which was signed by the
witnesses. The sachets of shabu were marked as MM-01 to MM-09 with date and initials and
the one piece buy-bust shabu was marked BB-01. Photographs were taken during the
conduct of inventory. Mario was then brought to the ZaNorte Medical Center for routine
medical checkup then to the police station. From the time of the inventory until Mario was
brought to the police station, SPO2 Vertudes kept custody of the drug specimens and other
recovered items. Mario was charged with sale and possession of illegal drugs under Sections
5 and 11, Art II of RA 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
The defense alleged that here was no buy bust operation conducted against Mario as
he was just grappled by persons near Casa Jose. Thereafter, he was brought to the boulevard
then to the Fish Port where he was frisked and his short pants removed while his wallet and
cellphone were taken. He was then brought to the ABC Printing Press, the alleged place of
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arrest, where pictures of him with nine cellophanes containing something were taken. There
was no lawyer during the search and inventory. He was then brought to the police station.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting accused-appellant Manabat of the crimes
charged
RULING
thereof.
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said witnesses.
apprehending team.
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obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
deviations from the mandatory provisions of RA 9165. The witnesses were not contacted at
all by the buy-bust team and were called and eventually arrived at the scene of the crime
only after the accused-appellant was already apprehended by PO2 Barral. The prosecution
even offered conflicting testimonies as regards the time of arrival of the witnesses and PO2
barral admitted that he photographs of the inventory do not show the presence of the
witnesses except for the Councilor. The Certificate of Inventory that was produced by the
prosecution was irregularly executed as the document was not signed by accused-appellant
Manabat or by his counsel or representative without the prosecution providing any
explanation. The marking of the plastic sachets allegedly recovered was irregularly done. As
incontrovertibly revealed by the photographs of the plastic sachets allegedly retrieved from
accused-appellant Manabat, only the date and initials of the seizing officers were inscribed
on the specimens. The time and place of the buy-bust operation were not indicated in the
markings, in clear contravention of the PNP's own set of procedures for the conduct of buy-
bust operations. There was an error for the RTC to convict accused-appellant Manabat by
relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties supposedly extended
in favor of the police officers. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised. In light of this, accused-
appellant Manabat must perforce be acquitted.
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EDWIN DEL ROSARIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
The distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery and theft is the use of violence
or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another; the element is present
in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft.
FACTS
Charlotte and Kim Evangelista Casiano was inside a jeepney with two male persons
later identified as Edwin and Roxan. When the jeepney stopped at a red light, Roxan snatched
the necklace of Charlotte then he and Edwin disembarked from the jeepney and ran away.
Roxan was apprehended and with the information that he gave regarding Edwin’s identity,
the police were also able to arrest Edwin. Edwin and Roxan were both charged with robbery.
In his defense, Edwin alleged that he was driving his jeepney and taking his usual
route on the day the incident happened. He also alleged that the in-court identification made
by Charlotte and Kim was heavily tainted because even before they were able to identify
Roxan's companion, the police already told them that the perpetrator has been arrested.
ISSUES
1. Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Edwin of the crime of robbery
2. Whether the snatching of the necklace is robbery or theft
RULING
1) NO. The Court adopts the CA's findings and conclusion as to Edwin's guilt. The
Court is convinced that the elements of taking of personal property which belongs to another
person without his consent have been established and such taking was with intent to gain.
The Court consistently held that intent to gain is a mental state whose existence is
demonstrated by a person's overt acts.
As to Edwin's allegation that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the required identification that he was one of the persons responsible for the crime charged,
the Court agrees with the CA when it ruled that the testimonies of both witnesses on direct
and cross-examinations would show that they were consistent on their narrative of the
incident and of the participation of appellant Edwin. Thus, there is no reason to depart from
the findings of the trial court especially since the direct appreciation of testimonial demeanor
during examination, veracity, sincerity and candor was foremost the trial court's domain, not
that of a reviewing court that had no similar access to the witnesses at the time they testified.
2) THEFT. The elements of robbery are: (1) there is a taking of personal property;
(2) the personal property belongs to another; (3) the taking is with animus lucrandi; and (4)
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the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things. Theft,
on the other hand, is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of
another without the latter's consent.
Thus, the distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery and theft is the use
of violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another; the
element is present in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft. The testimonies
of the witnesses reveal that the snatching of the necklace was without violence against or
intimidation of persons or with force upon things. The Court clarified that for the requisite
of violence to obtain in cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained less serious
physical injuries or slight physical injuries in the occasion of the robbery. The Court added
that the fact that the necklace was "grabbed" did not automatically mean that force attended
the taking.
The Court explained that the use of the word "grabbed", by itself, shows that violence
or physical force was employed by the offenders in taking Snyders' necklaces. The Court,
however, finds the argument to be a pure play of semantics. Grab means to take or seize by
or as if by a sudden motion or grasp; to take hastily. Clearly, the same does not suggest the
presence of violence or physical force in the act; the connotation is on the suddenness of the
act of taking or seizing which cannot be readily equated with the employment of violence or
physical force. Here, it was probably the suddenness of taking that shocked Snyder and not
the presence of violence or physical force since, as pointed out by petitioner, Snyder did not
at all allege that She was pushed or otherwise harmed by the persons who took her
necklaces.
The crime committed by Edwin is thus clearly only theft, instead of robbery. The
failure to specify the correct crime committed, however, will not bar Edwin's conviction for
the crime of theft. The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble
of the information, or by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated. The crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the complaint or information. In this case, the allegations in the Information
are sufficient to make out a charge of theft.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALLAN CANATOY
DOCTRINE
Direct evidence is not indispensable for conviction in criminal cases and that
circumstantial evidence may be enough to support a court's decision of guilt.
The essence of treachery is a swift and sudden attack on an unarmed victim without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. For this circumstance to be appreciated,
two elements must be alleged and proved, namely: (1) that the means of execution employed
gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or herself, or retaliate; and (2) that
the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The mode of attack must also
be consciously adopted.
FACTS
Omega Barbas, the victim, was inside her apartment when two men entered the gate
and proceeded to Barbas’ room and told her that they were delivering a package. Two other
tenants of Ziega Apartment, Tan and Soliman, saw the men enter the apartment gate, went
out of Barbas’ room and fleeing towards the gate. Upon hearing Barbas’ screams, they went
to her apartment and found Barbas lying face down and bathed in her own blood. The
examination report showed that she suffered incise wounds and one fatal stab wound.
Fabian Mabalato, Julio Cartuciano and Luz Sato were arrested in a follow-up
operation conducted by the police. Canatoy was apprehended by virtue of a warrant of
arrest. Mabalato and Cartuciano executed their extrajudicial confessions where Mabalato
admitted that they were hired by Cartuciano to kill Barbas for a consideration. Cartuciano,
in his sworn statement, implicated Sato as the one who hired them. Go, Barbas’ boyfriend,
testified that Sato was one of Barbas’ clients and that Sato owed her P100,000 and that Sato
got into an argument with Barbas. Canatoy, along with accused Mabalato and Cartuciano, as
well as Sato, were charged with Murder qualified by the attending circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength for killing Barbas.
In their defense, Mabalato and Canatoy were allegedly arrested and made to sign an
already prepared affidavit stating that they killed Barbas. Sato denied the accusations against
her and alleged that the police went to her workplace and invited her to the police station.
When she told the police that she knew Barbas, she was not allowed to leave the station and
was informed that she was the suspected mastermind in the killing. Canatoy denied knowing
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the three other accused and was allegedly brought to the Gorordo Police Station in Cebu from
Misamis Oriental.
Mabalato, Cartuciano and Canatoy were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder while Sato was acquitted. Mabalato died during the pendency of the appeal.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision but only Canatoy filed an appeal before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in convicting Canatoy of the crime charged despite the
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
RULING
NO. The prosecution's case rests mainly on: 1) the testimonies of witnesses Soliman
and Tan; and 2) the extrajudicial confessions of Cartuciano and the deceased Mabalato.
The Court rules that these pieces of evidence were sufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Canatoy, along with his other co-accused and in conspiracy with one
another, committed the crime charged. Although the records show that there was no
eyewitness to the actual killing of Barbas, the testimonies of Soliman and Tan on collateral
facts of the crime, were properly given ample weight by the trial court and the CA. It is settled,
that direct evidence is not indispensable for conviction in criminal cases and that
circumstantial evidence may be enough to support a court's decision of guilt.
Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive evidence, consists of

proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be
inferred according to reason and common experience. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules
of Court, circumstantial evidence will be sufficient to convict the offender if: 1) there is more
than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and 3)
the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. A conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person
Tan saw a grey t-shirt stained with blood near the leg of Barbas. It was the same shirt
color worn by one of the men whom Tan saw earlier enter the gate of the apartment, and
who was already wearing a white shirt when Tan saw him again, this time running away
from Barbas' room. Both Soliman and Tan identified in open court the two accused, Canatoy
and Mabalato, as the men running away from the crime scene. Well-established is the rule
that factual findings made by the trial court, which had the opportunity to directly observe
the witnesses and to determine the probative value of the testimonies, are entitled to great
weight and respect because the trial court is in a better position to assess the same.
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The extrajudicial confessions of Mabalato and Cartuciano were admissible in

evidence and were credible. For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible in evidence, it
must be satisfactorily shown that the same was obtained within the limits imposed by the
Constitution, specifically Sections 12 and 17, Article III thereof and reinforced in RA No.
7438. The Court, applying the foregoing standards, has settled that extra judicial confessions,
to be admissible in evidence, must be: 1) voluntary; 2) made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel; 3) express; and 4) in writing.
The confessions were voluntarily and freely executed. The confessants did not have
themselves examined by any physician nor did they institute any legal action against their
alleged abusers. Moreover, the confessants did not complain to their then counsel, Atty.
Truya, or Pros. Dinoy even when the latter inquired and ascertained from them the
voluntariness of the execution of their confessions. The rule is that where the defendant did
not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of
violence was presented, all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness. Mabalato
and Cartuciano, during the investigation, were duly assisted by Atty. Truya - a competent and
independent counsel, who informed them of their constitutional rights and the
consequences of their confessions. It has been held that a confession is presumed to be
voluntarily and validly made unless the contrary is proven and that the burden of proof is
upon the party who claims the contrary. Moreover, as the confessions of Mabalato and
Cartuciano meet the standards prescribed by the Constitution and the law, they constitute
evidence of a high order because it is presumed that no person of normal mind will
knowingly and deliberately confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.
Against the extrajudicial confessions and the testimonies of its witnesses as well as
the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, the alibi of Canatoy cannot
prevail. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have
been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.
However, the Court held that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime.
The essence of treachery is a swift and sudden attack on an unarmed victim without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim. As the evidence showed, the victim opened
the door expecting merely to acknowledge receipt of the letter or package brought by the
perpetrators, only to be held and stabbed with a knife by the accused. The victim was never
given a chance to defend herself. Soliman and Tan - the only witnesses on the actual
commission of the crime -did not testify that Barbas was "held" when she was stabbed by the
accused or that she was not given a chance to defend herself. Instead, they merely heard
Mabalato, Canatoy and Barbas' exchange of words after which they heard Barbas shout "Ay!"
three times.
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There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. For this circumstance to be appreciated, two elements must be
alleged and proved, namely: (1) that the means of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or herself, or retaliate; and (2) that the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The mode of attack must also be
consciously adopted. The accused must take some preparation to kill the deceased in a
manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person
attacked to defend himself or retaliate. The attack, then, must not spring from the unexpected
turn of events. No witness or proof was presented by the prosecution on the manner the
killing was executed, particularly if Barbas was attacked unexpectedly and suddenly or if she
had any opportunity to defend herself or if the means by which she was killed were
consciously adopted. None of these circumstances may be derived from the testimonies of
Soliman and Tan, both of whom testified on collateral facts which they merely, heard occur
immediately before and after Barbas was stabbed - but not during.
Notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove the aggravating circumstance

of treachery, the Court agrees with the findings of the trial court and CA that the killing of
Barbas was qualified by the circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength. Hence, the crime remains to be Murder under Article 24866 of the RPC, the
elements of which are: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him; (3) that
the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248; and
(4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In sum, the prosecution more than sufficiently established the guilt of accused-
appellant Canatoy of the crime of Murder. The Court affirms that the evidence proves beyond
reasonable doubt that Canatoy, Mabalato and Cartuciano, acting in conspiracy with one
another, perpetrated the killing of Barbas.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOREN DY
DOCTRINE
FACTS
After receiving information from a confidential informant that an "alias Bebeng", later
identified as Loren Dy, is engaged in selling illegal drugs, the PDEA conducted a buy-bust
operation. Accused-appellants Dy and William Cepeda were in the target area and transacted
with the agents. They arrested Dy and Cepeda who immediately went to the other room and
threw something. The agents searched Cepeda’s body and they discovered from his right
pocket the buy-bust money and in the left pocket another sachet of shabu. They also seized
one (1) lighter, improvised needle, some pieces of aluminum foil which they found on top of
a table in the sala. The said items were then gathered in one cellophane which was marked
by IO3 Aguilar "RLA". He also marked with her initials the sachet recovered from the pocket
of Cepeda. IO2 Orcales marked the sachet he bought "BB-VCO" and turned over the said
sachet to IO3 Aguilar. Dy and Cepeda were jointly charged with sale of illegal drugs while
Cepeda alone was charged with possession of illegal drugs under Sections 5 and 11
respectively, Art II of RA 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
The defense alleged that Dy and Cepeda who claimed to be husband and wife were in
their house when allegedly armed men who identified themselves as PDEA forcibly entered
their place, searched all the rooms and handcuffed Dy and Cepeda and bodily searched the
latter. The barangay kagawad and tanod arrived two hours after and was made to sign a
piece of paper, even though they refused to do so since they did not witness the search, after
which Cepeda and Dy were brought to the PDEA office. At the office, Cepeda pleaded that he
be submitted for a drug test, but his plea was ignored. Cepeda denied selling shabu and
having in his possession the buy-bust money and sachet of shabu.
ISSUE
Whether Dy is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged
RULING
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thereof.

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said witnesses.
apprehending team.
deviations from the mandatory provisions of RA 9165. There were gaping holes in the
records with respect to the presence and extent of participation of the witnesses in the buy-
bust operation. Not all the witnesses required under Section 21 were present at the time or
at least near the place of apprehension. Testimonies are completely silent with respect to the
presence of a representative of the Department of Justice, as required under the law, and
neither was there an attempt to explain why there was a failure to secure such witness. The
witnesses were summoned only after the fact; that it was only after the actual buy-bust and
subsequent seizure of the items that the witnesses were called which was two hours after.
Both witnesses never testified before the RTC despite several attempts to secure their
attendance. The Inventory of Seized Items/Confiscated Non-Drugs dated September 5, 2011,
forming part of the records, is more corroborative of the defense's version of events.
Nowhere does it indicate the name of the alleged media representative except for the name
"Norman Jabagat.” There is no designation whatsoever of who Norman Jabagat is or what
office or organization he represents, and neither was his name mentioned in the testimony
of the prosecution witnesses. Secondly, in one of the spaces where the witnesses are required
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to affix their signature over their printed name, there is written the phrase "REFUSED TO
SIGN," which unquestionably corroborates the uniform testimonies of herein accused.
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised. In light of this, accused-
appellant Dy must perforce be acquitted and likewise acquits Cepeda, notwithstanding his
failure to perfect an appeal herein.
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROLANDO SOLAR

G.R. No. 225595, August 6, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
An information alleging that treachery exists, to be sufficient, must therefore have
factual averments on how the person charged had deliberately employed means, methods or
forms in the execution of the act that tended directly and specially to insure its execution
without risk to the accused arising from the defense that the victim might make.
An information which lacks certain essential allegations may still sustain a conviction
when the accused fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured
by competent evidence presented therein.
FACTS
Ma. Theresa Capinig, the wife of Joseph, followed her husband who left the house to
get his cellphone from Rolando Solar, herein accused-appellant and along the way, saw
Rolando and Mark Kenneth hit Joseph Capinig, the victim, with a baseball bat on his nape.
Immediately, Joseph was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.
According to Dr. Nulud, the death resulted from traumatic injuries on the brain caused by a
blunt force applied on the head of the victim. Rolando and Mark Kenneth Solar were charged
with the murder of Joseph. Rolando pleaded not guilty while Mark Kenneth remained at
large.
Rolando denied the accusation and claimed that he was attending a wake the night of
the incident. Joseph was also there, approached him and offered to pawn a cellphone in
exchange of cash. On his way home, he met Joseph who, upon seeing him, drew out a kitchen
knife and tried to stab him thrice. He was not hit and he immediately ran away.
ISSUES
Whether the CA erred in convicting Rolando despite the prosecution's failure to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Whether the CA erred in convicting Rolando despite the prosecution's failure to prove
that conspiracy exists.
RULING
NO. It is well-settled that in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not overturn the
factual findings of the trial court. Thus, when the case pivots on the issue of the credibility of
the witnesses, the findings of the trial courts necessarily carry great weight and respect as
they are afforded the unique opportunity to ascertain the demeanor and sincerity of
witnesses during trial. Ma. Theresa was able to positively identify Rolando as one of the
perpetrators of the crime. She was only five meters away from the scene when it happened,
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and she knew Rolando since he was a childhood friend of her siblings. The supposed
inconsistencies pointed out by Rolando were sufficiently explained by the prosecution. For
one, Ma. Theresa already clarified that she did not recognize Mark Kenneth initially as she
did not know him, and she was only able to identify him through the help of the barangay
official who helped her.
The essence of Ma. Theresa's testimony never changed, in that she repeatedly claimed
that she saw her husband being attacked by assailants who only stopped when she shouted
for help. The supposed inconsistency does not change the essence of her testimony and, in
fact, even strengthens her credibility. The Court stresses that slight contradictions, in fact,
even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as these may be considered as
badges of truth rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend to prove that their testimonies have
not been rehearsed; nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for no
person has perfect faculties of senses or recall.
The Court follows the established doctrine that as between a positive and credible
testimony by an eyewitness, on the one hand, and a hollow denial, on the other, the former
generally prevails over the latter. The Court affirms the findings of both the RTC and the CA
that Rolando failed to prove any ill motive on the part of Ma. Theresa to implicate him. There
is no evidence on record, apart from the empty imputations of ill motive by Rolando, that
shows that Ma. Theresa was motivated by an improper motive to implicate Rolando for the
crime. In fact, relationship itself could even strengthen credibility in a particular case, for it
is highly unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual
culprit. The earnest desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not served should the witness
abandon his conscience and prudence to blame one who is innocent of the crime.
It is well-established that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is the
unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. There is conspiracy if at the
time of the commission of the offense, the acts of two or more accused show that they were
animated by the same criminal purpose and were united in their execution, or where the acts
of the malefactors indicate a concurrence of sentiments, a joint purpose and a concerted
action. The rule is well-settled that conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, where such conduct
reasonably shows community of criminal purpose or design. In the present case, implied
conspiracy between the accused can be deduced from the mode and manner in which they
perpetrated the killing. First, Rolando and Mark Kenneth were together at the crime scene.
Second, Rolando mauled the victim after Mark Kenneth hit him with a baseball bat. Third, as
soon as they achieved their common purpose, both accused fled together. All these acts point
to the conclusion that the accused conspired to commit the crime
In the assailed Decision, while the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that Rolando indeed
killed Joseph, it downgraded the offense from Murder to Homicide for failure of the
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Information to sufficiently state the particular facts establishing the existence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or
forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and
specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. The Court held that merely averring the killing of a
person by hitting his head with a baseball bat, without more, did not show how the execution
of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense
that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the baseball bat as an instrument to kill was
not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal
purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term,
standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the
particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in
murder were missing from the informations.
The Court holds that it is insufficient for prosecutors to indicate in an Information

that the act supposedly committed by the accused was done "with treachery" or "with abuse
of superior strength" or "with evident premeditation" without specifically describing the
acts done by the accused that made any or all of such circumstances present. An information
alleging that treachery exists, to be sufficient, must therefore have factual averments on how
the person charged had deliberately employed means, methods or forms in the execution of
the act that tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the accused
arising from the defense that the victim might make. To this end, prosecutors are instructed
to state with sufficient particularity not just the acts complained of or the acts constituting
the offense, but also the aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying or generic, as well as
any other attendant circumstances, that would impact the penalty to be imposed on the
accused should a verdict of conviction be reached.
The Court notes that the right to question the defects in an Information is not
absolute. In fact, defects in an Information with regard to its form may be waived by the
accused. While generally an accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly
charged in the complaint or information, this rule is not without exception. An information
which lacks certain essential allegations may still sustain a conviction when the accused fails
to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured by competent
evidence presented therein. Rolando did not question the supposed insufficiency of the
Information filed against him through either a motion to quash or motion for bill of
particulars. He voluntarily entered his plea during the arraignment and proceeded with the
trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any of the waivable defects in the Information,
including the supposed lack of particularity in the description of the attendant
circumstances.
There are currently two different views on how the qualifying circumstance of
treachery should be alleged. On the one hand is the view that it is sufficient that the
Information alleges that the act be committed "with treachery." The second view requires
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that the acts constituting treachery — or the acts which directly and specially insured the
execution of the crime, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which
the offended party might make — should be specifically alleged and described in the
Information.
The CA, in the assailed Decision in this case, took the second view and held that the
Information did not specifically allege the acts constituting treachery. As a result, it
downgraded the offense from Murder to Homicide. The Court, however, reverses the ruling
of the CA. The Court thus convicts Rolando for Murder instead of Homicide.
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EUTIQUIO BAER

DOCTRINE
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under
the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found.
FACTS
Agents of the Provincial Anti-Narcotics Unit (PANU) and barangay officials Cerilo
Gaviola and Marcelo Estoque, went to Brgy. Iniguihan, Bato, Leyte to serve a search warrant
against accused-appellant Eutiquio Baer and search his rented stall. In the presence of the
police officers and barangay officials, accused-appellant Baer admitted that there were
prohibited drugs in his place. He retrieved a locked steel box and gave it to the team. It was
found to contain seven big plastic sachets and 142 sealed decks of suspected shabu. The
police officers confiscated those articles and made an inventory of the seized items, signed
by Baer and the witnesses to the search. A certification of search was also prepared. After
the search, the team brought Baer and the seized items to the municipal building where the
confiscated items were marked - the seven big plastic sachets were marked "AD ET-1" to "AD
ET-7," the small plastic sachet was marked with "D-476-2002 AD ET 1" while the 142 decks
of shabu were marked "C-l" to "C-142.". Thereafter, the seized items were forwarded to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination. Baer was charged with sale and
possession of illegal drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Art II of RA 9165 also known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act but was only convicted by the RTC and CA for sale of
illegal drugs.
The defense alleged that Baer was in his stall watching a basketball game when
Notarte alias "Ondo" approached him and requested if Notarte could leave the steel box he
was carrying at Baer's stall. Baer refused but since Notarte left already, he brought the steel
box inside his stall. On his way out, several police officers approached him and asked about
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the steel box. The police officers did not present any document or search warrant to Baer,
nor inform him of the consequences of surrendering the steel box. Because the steel box was
locked, the police officers went to the municipal hall and obtained the key from Notarte.
When the steel box was opened, it was found to contain several items that looked like
"tawas." The police officers immediately listed the contents of the box, took a one-hundred-
peso bill from Baer and placed it on the table. After the incident, Baer was brought to the
municipal hall and placed inside a prison cell where Notarte was also detained.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting accused-appellant Baer for violating
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165
RULING
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
Jurisprudence holds that possession, under the law, includes not only actual
possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in
the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive
possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when
he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. The
transparent plastic bags and sealed decks allegedly containing shabu were not found on the
person of Baer. The prosecution does not refute or contest that the steel box which allegedly
contained the supposed confiscated drug specimen was owned by Notarte and not owned by
Baer, and that the latter was not capable of opening the same as the key that was used to
open the steel box did not come from accused-appellant Baer but from the authorities. Also,
when the search was conducted, Baer was not even inside the stall. The Court finds that the
supposed drug specimens were NOT constructively possessed by Baer.
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thereof.

said witnesses.
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apprehending team.
deviations from the mandatory provisions of RA 9165. The inventory and marking of the
evidence allegedly retrieved were not done immediately after the seizure of the drug
specimens. The CA found that there was "failure on the part of the police officers to
immediately mark the prohibited drugs after they were seized from accused-appellant's
rented stall. The inventory was not conducted at or near the place of the apprehension, as
required under Section 21 of RA 9165. The CA found that the "accused-appellant and the
seized drugs were brought to the municipal building, where the inventory was prepared. The
evidence on record readily reveals that the authorities did not photograph the evidence
allegedly seized. The testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses are completely silent as to
the photographing of the drug specimen. In fact, no photographs of the operation nor the
drug specimens were offered into evidence.
The operation was conducted only in the presence of the police officers and barangay
officials. It is not disputed that there were no representatives from the media and the DOJ to
witness the operation. The "Receipt of Confiscated Articles was also prepared, signed by the
police officers and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. Baer and his family
members were not given a copy of the inventory receipt which is a blatant and explicit
disregard of Section 21 of RA 9165, which requires that the certificate of inventory should
also be signed by the accused or his/her representative, and that the latter be given a copy
of the same. The markings were irregularly done by inscribing only the agent’s initials and
signature. The date, time, and place of the operation were not indicated on the markings, in
clear contravention of the PNP's own set of procedures.
Lastly, the Court finds that the third element of the crime of illegal possession under
Section 11 of RA 9165 is also wanting. The third element requires that the accused freely and
consciously possesses the illegal drug. The Court notes Baer’s testimony that the steel box
was only left with him by Notarte was duly corroborated by another witness of the defense,
Raul Solante, who testified that he saw Notarte, who brought with him the steel box and
asked permission from them to leave the said box with accused-appellant Baer. Considering
that criminal cases are heavily construed in favor of the accused, the RTC and CA committed
a serious error in simply brushing aside the corroborated testimony of accused-appellant
Baer. The Court is convinced that accused-appellant Baer did not freely and consciously
possess illegal drugs.
In sum, the Court acquits accused-appellant Baer of the offense of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs under Section 11 of RA 9165 because the prosecution seriously failed to
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establish the existence of the elements of the crime charged and failed to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence supposedly seized during the operation.
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Case Digests
CICL XXX v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
When a minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old is charged with a
crime, it cannot be presumed that he or she acted with discernment. The prosecution must
specifically prove as a separate circumstance that minor committed the alleged crime with
discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial.
Intent and discernment are two different concepts. Intent is a determination to do a

certain thing which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony,
freedom and intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, the discernment that
constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years
of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong.
FACTS
Private complainant Glenn Redoquerio was sent by his mother Lolita Redoquerio to
buy iced tea powder from a store and saw CICL XXX, a 17 yr old minor but acting with
discernment, Christopher Puyo and Jayjay Narag there. CICL XXX suddenly poked a gun at
the face of Redoquerio. CICL XXX pulled the trigger several times but the gun did not fire.
CICL XXX then hit (hinataw) the left temple and top of the head of Redoquerio with the gun.
Puyo and Narag held the arms of Redoquerio while CICL XXX punched him several times.
Puyo then hit the head of Redoquerio with a stone causing the latter to lose consciousness.
Redoquerio was in a coma for 7 days while he was confined at the East Avenue Medical
Center. CICL XXX was charged with frustrated homicide.
The defense alleged that CICL XXX was with his family having a celebration for the
New Year in their residence when they heard a commotion outside and they were told that
there was a mauling incident that was happening. CICL XXX saw Redoquerio and De los
Santos mauling Narag. Thereafter, De los Santos ran away while Narag boxed Redoquerio
who fell on his back. He surmised that the reason why he was implicated in this case is that
Redoquerio did not really know who mauled him.
ISSUES
Whether the CA erred in convicting CICL XXX despite the prosecution's failure to
show that he acted with discernment
Whether the CA erred in convicting CICL XXX for Frustrated Homicide without proof
of the extent of the injuries sustained by Redoquerio
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RULING
YES. The Court stated that when a minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18)
years old is charged with a crime, it cannot be presumed that he or she acted with
discernment. During the trial, the prosecution must specifically prove as a separate
circumstance that the CICL XXX committed the alleged crime with discernment by evidence
of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission
of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must
demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such
circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's cunning and
shrewdness.
Intent and discernment are two different concepts. Intent is a design; a determination
to do a certain thing; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is
essential to such intent; the design resolve, or determination with which a person acts. It is
this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony,
freedom and intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, the discernment that
constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen
years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong and such capacity may be known and
should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances accorded
by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment
and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also
after and even during the trial.
The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to

determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can
exist, and because the infant has no intelligence, the law exempts him from criminal liability.
In the present case, neither the RTC nor the CA discussed whether CICL XXX acted
with discernment. The CA, for instance, only noted CICL XXX's age in its discussion of the
penalty to be imposed on him. Both the RTC and the CA erred in convicting CICL XXX, as they
both equated "intent to kill" - which was admittedly established through the evidence
presented by the prosecution - with acting with discernment, which, on the contrary, was
not proved by the prosecution.
To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be

proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed
that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the intention to
kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said
to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and
could cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance.
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On the other hand, the essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows: (1) the
offender performs all the acts of execution; (2) all the acts performed would produce the
felony as a consequence; (3) but the felony is not produced; and (4) by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The extent of the injuries sustained by Redoquerio was not fully established. The
medical records of Redoquerio were admitted into evidence only through the testimony of
Luague, the Administrative Officer 1 of East Avenue Medical Center who had custody of the
medical records. However, as he was not a medical doctor, both parties stipulated that
Luague could not: (1) "testify as to the nature and gravity of the wound sustained by the
private complainant;" and (2) "testify whether or not the alleged wound sustained by the
private complainant is fatal in nature. There is no testimonial evidence on record explaining
to the Court the medical findings which would have established the nature and extent of the
injuries that Redoquerio sustained. Any medical doctor, however, who was competent to
interpret Dr. Zorilla's findings, as indicated in Redoquerio's medical records, could have
testified in his stead to establish the nature and extent of the injuries. As the nature and
extent of the injuries were not sufficiently established, it was error for the lower courts to
conclude that the injuries were fatal and that Redoquerio would have died if not for the
timely medical assistance he received. In the final analysis, it was therefore error for the
courts to conclude that the crime committed was Frustrated Homicide instead of Attempted
Homicide.
With the foregoing, the Court acquits CICL XXX for the crime of Frustrated Homicide.
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Case Digests
ROWENA SANTOS y COMPRADO AND RYAN SANTOS y COMPRADO

v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 242656. August 14, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
“The concept of possession of illegal drugs is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent
is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the
intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only
actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in
the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive
possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he
has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive
possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to
exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with
another.”
FACTS
Two separate informations were filed against Rowena and Ryan for violations of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. Pursuant to a search warrant that was issued against Ryan
and Rowena of Sagrada Familia, Peñafrancia, Naga City, PO1 Albao went to the house of Ryan
accompanied by P02 Altes.
PO1 Albao promptly informed Ryan of the search warrant. Ryan was handcuffed and
was transferred to the room of Rowena where both accused were informed of the contents
of the warrant. While converged at Rowena 's house, they waited around five minutes for the
arrival of the mandatory witnesses: Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Perry Boy
Solano, media representative Adiel Auxillo, and Barangay Kagawad Ma. Celina Breñ is.
In the presence of mandatory witnesses, PO1 Albao found among others, fourteen
(14) assorted cellphones, some cash in various denominations amounting to P8,275.00,five
pieces of empty plastic sachets, a plastic sachet with shabu contained in the black coin purse
on top of the refrigerator, some cash in various denominations amounting to P6,100.00, a
small blue box containing six sachets of shabu, and empty sachets separate from the six
sachets containing shabu. After bringing the specimens to the provincial crime laboratory
for examination. The laboratory examination yielded a positive result for the presence of
dangerous drugs.
From the foregoing, the RTC convicted Rowena and Ryan for violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165. It ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of the
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crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. On appeal, the CA affirmed Rowena’s and
Ryan’s conviction.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in convicting the petitioners for violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165.
RULING
NO. The prosecution was able to establish the integrity of the corpus delicti and an
unbroken chain of custody. The Court has explained in a catena of cases the four (4) links
that should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure
and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. In this
case, the prosecution was able to prove all the links that should be established in the chain
of custody.
In addition, the police officers were also able to strictly comply with the requirements
laid down in Section 21. They conducted the physical inventory and photography of the
seized items in the presence of petitioners, a representative from the media, a representative
of the DOJ and a barangay official at the place where the search was conducted.
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the CA erred in ruling that petitioners
were in constructive possession of the seized drugs since that the place where the seized
drugs were found were under the control and dominion of petitioners. They mainly argue
that since there are other family members who live in their houses, it is possible that the
seized drugs are not owned by them. This argument has no merit.
The concept of possession of illegal drugs is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal
intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had
the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not
only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the
drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand,
constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is
found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction
if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located,
is shared with another.
There is no question that the dangerous drugs were found in a coin purse on top of
the refrigerator in the first-floor living room of Rowena and in a plastic container box inside
a cabinet in the bedroom of Ryan. These findings were witnessed by a media representative,
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a DOJ representative and a barangay official who were present during the seizure and
confiscation of the dangerous drugs until the conduct of the inventory and taking of
photographs. They also did not offer any satisfactory explanation to overcome the
presumption that the seized items belong to them. Hence, the CA was correct in ruling that
petitioners had constructive possession of the illegal drugs since they were shown to enjoy
dominion and control over the premises they occupied. The fact that there were other people
living in their house is of no consequence.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODEL VELASCO y LUZON

DOCTRINE
“The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims
it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item
was picked up to the time it was offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the
item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.”
FACTS
Accused-appellant was charged by the prosecution with the crime of violation of P.D.
No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 9516.
In the course of “OPLAN SITA,” police officers noticed a Daewoo Racer car without
any plate number attached in front, which they signaled to stop. PO1 Bacani noticed in plain
view a gun tucked at the waistline of one of the passengers by the name of Roberto Alegre y
Apat. This prompted them to order the three passengers to alight therefrom. PO3 Taguba
then frisked the accused and found in his possession one (1) MK2 fragmentation grenade.
Hence, they arrested the accused and his companions and brought them to the police station
where they executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted accused-appellant Velasco of violating
Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 9516, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of accused-
appellant Velasco, holding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the elements of the crime charged.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting accused-appellant Velasco of
violating Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 9516.
RULING
YES. To convict an accused for illegal possession of an explosive devise under P.D. No.
1866, as amended, jurisprudence has held that two (2) essential elements must be
indubitably established: (a) the existence of the subject firearm or explosive which may be
proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of
witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that the
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accused had no license or permit to own or possess the firearm or explosive which fact may
be established by the testimony or certification of a representative of the Philippine National
Police Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit to possess the
subject firearm or explosive.
While it is beyond serious dispute that accused-appellant Velasco had no license or

permit to possess a fragmentation hand grenade, thus satisfying the second requisite stated
above, a close examination of the evidence on record reveals that the evidence presented by
the prosecution failed to establish that the MK-2 fragmentation hand grenade identified and
admitted into evidence during the trial was the same object allegedly retrieved from the
person of accused- appellant Velasco.
Simply stated, the prosecution was clearly unsuccessful in establishing an unbroken

chain of custody of the allegedly confiscated fragmentation hand grenade, creating serious
doubt as to the corpus delicti of the crime charged.
Jurisprudence explains that the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what the proponent claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it was offered in evidence, in such
a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not
in the chain to have possession of the same.
The prosecution's witness, PO1 Bacani testified that after the apprehension of
accused-appellant Velasco, the fragmentation hand grenade was turned over to the
investigator. However, the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses and the documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution are completely silent as to how the investigator
handled and stored the evidence, and the precautions taken to ensure that there had been
no change in the condition of the item.
In addition, accounts of the two witnesses as to how the authorities discovered that
accused-appellant Velasco possessed the grenade sharply differed from each other. With
these accounts being inconsistent with each other, the Court is left to wonder as to how
exactly the apprehending team acquired custody over the corpus delicti.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALLAN NIEVERA

DOCTRINE
“The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is
not tantamount to consent. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats
and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to her attackers of because of
fear. physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman voluntarily
succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer
strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all.”
FACTS
An Information was filed against Nievera for the rape of AAA.
AAA was 14 years old at the time of the alleged rape incidents. Her family lived in a
residential apartment building in Valenzuela City. AAA and her family lived on the second
floor. Nievera occupied the third floor with his second wife, Liza Alonzo.
On December 17, 2014 at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAA asked permission
from her mother to visit her classmate Rachel, as they were going to cook gelatin for their
school Christmas party. On her way down, she bumped into Nievera who persuaded her to
go inside his apartment on the pretext that he would just show her something. Once inside
the apartment, Nievera grabbed her and then hugged her, uttering, "Sandali lang to."
Forthwith, Nievera escorted AAA inside his room, made her lie down and removed all her
clothing. Frightened, she allowed him to mount her, kiss her and insert his penis into her
vagina. After succumbing to his bestial desires, Nievera removed his penis and AAA felt his
semen coming out. He then uttered, "Kahit anong mangyari wag kang magsusumbong," and
ordered AAA to clean up.
On December 29, 2014, AAA asked her mother for permission to go to the computer
shop. On her way out, she met Nievera. He made her wait for him at the corner because they
allegedly had somewhere to go. AAA was unaware that she would be brought to Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Arriving thereat, they went inside Peach Blossom Hotel. When AAA alighted from
the motorcycle, Nievera ordered her not to remove her helmet and just proceed inside their
room. As it happened, AAA was again raped by Nievera. Before leaving the hotel premises,
Nievera showed AAA his gun and she became afraid.
The RTC convicted Nievera of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed Nievera's
conviction albeit with modification as to the amount of damages.
ISSUE
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Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting Nievera.
RULING
NO. The two elements of rape — (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the
girl, and (2) that such act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation — are
both present as duly proven by the prosecution in this case. AAA was able to testify in detail
how Nievera committed the rape. AAA's testimony, found to be clear, straightforward, and
believable, was given due weight and credence not just by the RTC, but also by the CA upon
appeal.
Nievera, however, raises an issue out of the alleged improbability of AAA's testimony.
According to him, AAA testimony "fails to qualify as clear, positive, convincing, and otherwise
consistent." He argues that AAA clearly testified that she did not resist, and hence the
element of force or intimidation was not established.
While AAA admitted that she did not offer strong resistance against the advances of
Nievera, she communicated to him that she was not giving her consent to what was being
done to her. This absence of consent was shown by (1) her saying "ayoko po," and (2) using
one of her hands to shove Nievera's body away from her. The sexual acts were, therefore,
done to her against her will and without her consent.
It is important to stress that "the gravamen of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A (1)
is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent."
The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is
not tantamount to consent. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats
and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to her attackers of because of
fear. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman
voluntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction.
Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance
at all.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DENNIS SARABIA y REYES

DOCTRINE
With transmittal of the subject specimens from the latter to the evidence custodian
relying mainly on inadmissible evidence, the prosecution's version of events as to the
transmittal and examination of the drug specimens has no leg to stand on. With the transmittal
and examination of the subject specimens having no solid evidentiary basis, indubitably, there
is serious doubt cast, to say the least, on to the identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti.
Section 21 of RA 9165 provides that in the conduct of buy-bust operations: (1) the seized
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the
physical inventory, which includes the marking of the evidence, and photographing must be
done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b)an elected
public official, (c)a representative from the media, and (d)a representative from the
Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof. This procedure is mandatory in nature.”
FACTS
For allegedly selling a plastic sachet containing 0.0392 gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, commonly called shabu, and for allegedly possessing six plastic sachets
containing 3.219 grams of the same substance in a buy-bust operation conducted by the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) at Jose P. Rizal Street, Barangay 1, Laoag City,
accused-appellant Sarabia was charged in two separate Informations for violating Sections
5 and 11 of RA 9165.
The prosecution avers that at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of June 30, 2013, a
male confidential informant (CI) went to the temporary office of the PDEA-INSET located in
Brgy. 13, San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and reported the illegal activity of the accused, a resident
of Brgy. 12, Laoag City. After interviewing the CI who claimed that the accused had trust and
confidence in him and had asked him to look for buyers of shabu for a good commission, IO1
Mirindato informed their Team Leader SO2 Annabelle Cabarles who then told him to ask the
CI to call the accused and order from him shabu worth P1,000.00.
At around 10:20 o'clock that morning, when all was ready, the team proceeded to the
agreed place of transaction in their service vehicle and a private car. After the exchange
between the accused and IO1 Mirindato, the latter executed the pre-arranged signal and the
later stopped and informed his authority to the accused who was already astride the
motorcycle of his tricycle and was starting its engine. A few moments later as IO1 Mirindato
took hold of the hand of the accused who was unable to react as he appeared shocked, IO1
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Bahiyan arrived at the place approaching from the back of the accused. He ordered the
accused to alight and brought him to the waiting shed where IO1 Mirindato body searched
him and was able to recover from his possession the buy bust money, a cellphone and six
more plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. When barangay officials
including Barangay Chairman Darwin Domingo of Brgy. 1, Laoag City, and members of the
media arrived, the seized items were inventoried.
The RTC found accused - appellant Sarabia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of accused-appellant Sarabia.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting Sarabia.
RULING
consideration ; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other
hand, illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 has the
following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified
to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
the aforesaid elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug
cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
Therefore, considering that the very corpus delicti is the drug specimen itself, establishing
the integrity of the specimen is imperative. Hence, compliance with the chain of custody rule
is crucial in establishing accused-appellant Sarabia's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of
the allegedly seized drug specimens.
According to the prosecution's version of events, after the buy-bust was conducted,
on July 1, 2013, the allegedly seized drug specimens were transmitted by one SPO3 Diosdado
C. Mamotos to Police Inspector Amiely Ann L. Navarro (PI Navarro), a forensic chemist of the
PNP Crime Laboratory Office, Ilocos Norte. PI Navarro allegedly examined the specimens and
thereafter transmitted the same to the evidence custodian, PO3 John Edwin Padayao.
Instead of presenting the witness herself to testify on the transmittal and examination
of the allegedly seized drug specimens, the prosecution decided to submit before the RTC a
document entitled "Proffer Testimony (Police Inspector Amiely Ann L. Navarro)." The said
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document, containing the testimony of PI Navarro was executed, not by PI Navarro herself,
but by the Assistant City Prosecutor Daryl U. Fajardo.
The RTC gravely erred in admitting the "Proffer Testimony," considering that it is
hearsay evidence. Jurisprudence has held that documents such as affidavits are generally
classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statements, which may thus be
either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant themselves are placed on the witness
stand to testify thereon.
Therefore, with the prosecution's testimony on the transmittal of the allegedly seized
drug specimens to the forensic chemist, the examination undertaken by the said forensic
chemist, and the transmittal of the subject specimens from the latter to the evidence
custodian relying mainly on inadmissible evidence, the prosecution's version of events as to
the transmittal and examination of the drug specimens has no leg to stand on.
With the transmittal and examination of the subject specimens having no solid
evidentiary basis, indubitably, there is serious doubt cast, to say the least, on to the identity,
integrity, and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.
On the other hand, the treatment of the law as to dangerous drugs cases is special and
unique, owing to the peculiar nature of the corpus delicti of the crime, which makes the same
easily susceptible to manipulation in the hands of the State. Hence, as the innocence and
liberty of the accused are pitted unevenly against the powerful machinery of the State, the
law requires the strict observance of certain special rules that provide for procedural
safeguards which ensure moral certainty in the conviction of the accused.
Section 21 of RA 9165 provides that in the conduct of buy-bust operations: (1) the
and (2) the physical inventory, which includes the marking of the evidence, and
counsel, (b)an elected public official, (c)a representative from the media, and (d)a
The aforementioned procedural requirements laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165 and

the related administrative issuances are mandatory in nature, and can only be relaxed if the
prosecution (1) recognizes any lapses on the part of the police officers and (2) is able to
justify the same.
In the case at bar, the authorities failed to observe the mandatory requirements under
Section 21 of RA 9165. Worse, the prosecution failed to recognize these lapses and offer
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sufficient justification to warrant the non-observance of these mandatory rules. As testified

by IO1 Ray Bahiyan, a member of the buy- bust team and a key witness of the prosecution,
the buy-bust team coordinated only "with the barangay officials and then he called the
cameraman of ABS CBN to witness the inventory x x x." Hence, it is readily admitted by the
prosecution that there was no representative of the DOJ present during the inventory. But
more importantly, the marking of the evidence, which is a crucial element of the physical
inventory process, was conducted without the presence of any of the required witnesses.
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XXX v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 243151. September 2, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we
hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as
a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as

baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice
to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother
or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of

the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.”
FACTS
An Information was filed against XXX for doing lascivious acts against AAA.
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The prosecution presented AAA, her older sister BBB, and social welfare officer Nancy
de Castro as witnesses during the trial. Among others, private complainant testified that that
sometime in 2005, when she was eight (8) years old, she was at home sleeping when she
suddenly felt appellant touch her breasts and vagina. She was so afraid that all she could do
was tremble. Worse, the incident was witnessed by her mother, who instead of coming to
her aid, said "kayo na lang ang magsama." After the unfateful incident, private complainant
tried to distance herself from appellant. However, she was repeatedly molested by appellant
almost everyday. On the other hand, private complainant's sister BBB testified that private
complainant ran away from their house sometime in August 2010 because she was being
sexually abused by appellant by touching her breasts and vagina.
The RTC convicted XXX of the crime charged. The RTC found AAA's testimony to be
candid and straightforward, with "no tinge of revenge or rancor" and thus deserving of full
faith and credit. The RTC found the five-year delay in reporting the incident to be
insignificant, as the victim was only able to run away from her home five years after the
incident complained of. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of XXX. The CA held
that AAA's testimony sufficiently established all the elements of the crime. It ruled that the
RTC correctly accorded credence to the testimony of AAA after finding her answers to the
questions on direct and cross-examination to be intelligible, candid, and unwavering.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting XXX.
RULING
NO. To convict XXX of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC, the
prosecution, in turn, had to prove the following elements, to wit: (1) that the offender
commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force and
intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious,
or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is
another person of either sex. 22 The third element is immediately satisfied for the offended
party is, naturally, a person of either sex.
The first element — that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness
— on the other hand, was satisfied through the testimony of AAA, the offended party. AAA
testified that the accused repeatedly touched her private parts and that incident only
stopped when she ran away. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, noted that the testimony of AAA
"deserves total credibility. It was candid, straight-forward, with no tinge of revenge or
rancor." Thus, the first element of the crime charged has been proven by the prosecution
For the second element, the RTC and the CA concluded that it was present because
AAA was only eight years old at the time of the incident complained of. Coincidentally,
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because of this finding, the lower courts deemed R.A. 7610 to be applicable in light of recent
jurisprudence.
XXX, however, argues in this appeal that AAA's age was not properly established as
the Court's guidelines in People v. Pruna were not followed. The Pruna guidelines are as
follows:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we
hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or
as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as

baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would
suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended
party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of

the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be
taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
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The Court agrees with XXX's contention. In the present case, the prosecution did not
present AAA's birth certificate. Instead, they presented a photocopy of AAA's Baptismal
Certificate, and both AAA and BBB testified as regards AAA's age. As pointed out by XXX,
however, these pieces of evidence were not compliant with the Pruna guidelines and thus do
not suffice to establish AAA's age.
It must be clarified, however, that the Court still convicts XXX for Acts of
Lasciviousness despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the victim's age, because all
the elements of the crime are still present. To reiterate, the first element — that the offender
commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness — was sufficiently proved by the testimony
of AAA as regards the incident complained of. The third element was, in turn, immediately
satisfied as the offended party was a person of either sex.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HILARIO DE CASTRO y SANTOS alias "DACOY"

DOCTRINE
“While the Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible; and the failure of the
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void, this has always been with the
caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground
for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.”
FACTS
Two separate Informations were filed against De Castro for violation of Sections 5
and 11, Article II of RA 9165.
The prosecution avers, among others that on 4 August 2010, at around 2:00 a.m.,
PINSP Domingo J. Diaz instructed the police to conduct the buy-bust operation after
receiving a tip from the Informant that the appellant De Castro was selling shabu for P300.00.
PO3 Amodia and the Informant arrived at the target site at 3:00 a.m. PO3 Amodia then
handed the appellant De Castro the buy-bust money; after receiving the buy-bust money, the
appellant De Castro folded the bills, and inserted the bills in the right waist of the appellant
De Castro's shorts; the appellant De Castro then drew from his left waist the small, yellow,
plastic container, opened the container, took out one small transparent plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu, and handed the plastic
sachet to PO3 Amodia. PO3 Amodia accepted the plastic sachet and executed the pre-
arranged signal that the transaction had been consummated; PO3 Amodia introduced
himself to the appellant De Castro as a policeman, and grabbed the appellant De Castro's
right hand which was then holding the plastic container; PO2 Hernaez frisked the appellant
De Castro and recovered the buy-bust money; PO3 Amodia retrieved from the appellant De
Castro's plastic container, two more plastic sachets; PO3 Amodia arrested the appellant De
Castro, and informed the appellant De Castro of his constitutional rights, and the reason for
the appellant De Castro's arrest.
The RTC ruled that the prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the
elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal, he CA affirmed
De Castro's conviction. The CA ruled that all the elements of the crime of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs and illegal sale of dangerous drugs were proven.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting De Castro.
RULING
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conviction. It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs must
be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on their
account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to
their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.
In this connection, the Court has repeatedly held that Section 21,28 Article II of RA
9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, strictly requires
that (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or
confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence
of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
(DOJ).
While the Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible; and the failure of the
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void, this has always been
seized items are properly preserved.
In the case at bar, the police officers blatantly disregarded the requirements laid
down under Section 21 and they had no valid excuse for their deviation from the rules. As
testified by PO3 Amodia, none of the three required witnesses was present at the time of
arrest of the accused and the seizure of the drugs. Neither were they present during the
inventory of the seized drugs at the police office. The police officers merely tried to "call-in"
the three witnesses after the conduct of the buy-bust operation already. Indubitably, this is
the very practice that the law seeks to prevent. The practice of police operatives of not
bringing to the intended place of arrest the three witnesses, when they could easily do so —
and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to witness the inventory and photographing
of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already been finished — does not achieve
the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of
drugs.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE JAMILLO QUILATAN y DELA CRUZ

DOCTRINE
“The requirements outlined in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR are not mere
suggestions or recommendations. Undoubtedly, the buy-bust team is not at a liberty to select
only parts it wants to comply with and conveniently ignore the rest of the requirements.
Unjustified deviations from the prescribed procedure will result to the creation of reasonable
doubt as to the identity and integrity of the illegal drugs and, consequently, reasonable doubt
as to the guilt of the accused.”
FACTS
Two separate informations were filed against Quilatan for alleged violation of
Sections 5 6 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
According to the version of the prosecution, on June 15, 2009 at around 4:30 p.m., the
Parañ aque City Police Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Group received a
report from a female informant/asset about the illegal drug activities of Quilatan. Pursuant
to this, a buy-bust team was then formed. After coordinating with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, the buy-bust team, together with the informant, went to the target area
in Tramo St., Brgy. San Dionisio, Parañ aque City at around 9:15 p.m. that same day. After
seeing the informant, Quilatan asked "iiskor ka ba?" and the informant replied by saying
"itong kasama k[o]ng taxi driver tropa ko kukuha ng halagang limang daang piso." PO2
Ocampo then handed the marked money to Quilatan. After counting the same, Quilatan took
out from his right pocket a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance and
handed the same to PO2 Ocampo. After consummating the sale, PO2 Ocampo alerted his team
and gave the pre- arranged signal by removing his cap. Seeing that SPO1 Lumabao was
already rushing to the scene, PO2 Ocampo grabbed the hand of Quilatan and revealed his
identity as a police officer. PO2 Ocampo then checked Quilatan's right hand and recovered
another plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance.
The RTC ruled against Quilatan. The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and ruled that the prosecution was able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the offenses charged. On appeal, he CA ruled that the
prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt an unbroken link in the chain of
custody of the seized items and that their integrity and evidentiary value had been
preserved.
ISSUE
Whether or not prosecution proved Quilatan's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11
of RA 9165 beyond reasonable doubt.
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RULING
NO. Section 21 of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the alleged commission
of the crime, lays down the procedure to be followed by a buy- bust team in the seizure, initial
custody, and handling of confiscated illegal drugs and/or paraphernalia. Section 21
(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 (IRR), in turn, filled in
the details as to place of inventory and added a saving clause in case of non-compliance with
the requirements under justifiable grounds.
The requirements outlined in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR are not mere
suggestions or recommendations. Undoubtedly, the buy-bust team is not at a liberty to select
only parts it wants to comply with and conveniently ignore the rest of the requirements.
Unjustified deviations from the prescribed procedure will result to the creation of
reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the illegal drugs and, consequently,
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
Among the essential requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR are the
presence of the three required witnesses — namely, a media representative, a representative
from the DOJ, and any elected public official — and the immediate conduct of the physical
inventory and photographing of the seized items in the specified places allowed under the
law. Here, however, the buy-bust team miserably failed to comply with these requirements.
A perusal of the records and the evidence presented by the prosecution would show that,
even believing its version of a buy-bust operation, the buy- bust team made no effort at all to
secure the three required witnesses.
After allegedly receiving the tip from the confidential informant, the buy-bust team
was formed, a team briefing was conducted, and the team went to the target area with the
informant. Conspicuously absent in the narration of facts by the prosecution is the part
where the buy-bust team sought the attendance of the three required witnesses. From the
time they received the tip at 4:30 p.m. up to the time they went to the target area at around
9:15 p.m., there was a span of around five (5) hours where they could have easily contacted
the required witnesses, but there was no hint that they made any effort to do so.
Consequently, the requirement of the presence of all the witnesses at the time of the
operation, conduct of inventory, and photographing was not fulfilled.
While the IRR has a saving clause excusing deviation from the required procedure,
the application of such clause must be supported by the presence of the following elements:
the apprehending team.
The above grounds were not present in this case; thus, the buy-bust team's failure to
comply with the three-witness rule is inexcusable. Moreover, the buy-bust team likewise
failed to immediately conduct the inventory and photographing of the seized items in the
places allowed by law.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ORLANDO RAMOS ORDIZ

DOCTRINE
“The prosecution's case hinged mostly on the uncorroborated testimony of the supposed
poseur-buyer, whose testimony on direct examination was found by the RTC to be unclear and
lacking in details. To reiterate, sheer reliance on the sole testimony of an alleged poseur-buyer
fails to satisfy the quantum of evidence of proof beyond reasonable doubt.”
FACTS
For allegedly selling a plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of a white crystalline
substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly called shabu, in a buy-
bust operation conducted by members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) at about 1:00
p.m. at Sampaguita Street, Barangay Capitol Site, Cebu City, accused-appellant Ordiz was
charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
In the afternoon of October 3, 2004, a buy-bust operation was conducted by members

of the Philippine National Police (PNP) against accused Orlando Ordiz who was reported to
be selling shabu in the Capitol area. During the entrapment, SPO1 Cerna, as the designated
poseur-buyer, approached accused with the intention of purchasing P100.00 worth of shabu
from him while SPO1 Ursal, Jr. and PO2 Capangpangan placed themselves at strategic
positions while they waited for the pre-arranged signal of waving Cerna's hand that would
indicate the consummation of the transaction. SPO1 Cerna, accompanied with a confidential
asset, who knows the accused negotiated to buy P100.00 of shabu, which transaction was
done in front of accused house. After the transaction was consummated, accused was
arrested in the presence of his parents. He was informed of his constitutional rights and
brought to the police station, along with the suspected shabu and the recovered buy-bust
money. In the meantime, the crystallized substance that was bought from the accused was
marked and brought to PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The results revealed that the
substance was positive for the presence of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.
The RTC found accused- appellant Ordiz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of accused-
appellant Ordiz.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellant Ordiz is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime charged.
RULING
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In the instant case, the prosecution relied on the testimonies of its three witnesses,
i.e., SPO1 Ursal, Jr., PO2 Capangpangan, and SPO1 Cerna.A closer look at the testimonies of
SPO1 Ursal, Jr. and PO2 Capangpangan reveal that they did not actually see firsthand the
alleged sale of illegal drugs between accused-appellant Ordiz and the alleged poseur-buyer,
SPO1 Cerna, as they were positioned at some considerable distance away from the area
where SPO1 Cerna purportedly transacted with accused-appellant Ordiz.
In fact, the RTC itself made the observation that the testimonies of SPO1 Ursal, Jr., and
PO2 Capangpangan are unclear, holding in its Decision that "[t]he declaration of SPO1
Narciso Ursal, Jr. and PO2 Raniel Capangpangan are not clear whether they actually saw the
transaction or simply rushed up to arrest the accused after a pre- arranged signal was given."
The prosecution's case hinged mostly on the uncorroborated testimony of the

supposed poseur-buyer, whose testimony on direct examination was found by the RTC to be
unclear and lacking in details. To reiterate, sheer reliance on the sole testimony of an alleged
poseur-buyer fails to satisfy the quantum of evidence of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Aside from the foregoing, the acquittal of accused-appellant Ordiz is likewise

warranted due to the patent non-observance of the chain of custody rule. In particular, the
following links should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the
seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of
the allegedly seized drug specimen. As readily admitted by the RTC in its Decision, "[a]t the
outset, it is noted that neither the Forensic Chemical Officer, PSI Medardo Palapo, nor the
custodian was presented to identify the Chemistry Report x x x." Through the testimony of
SPO1 Ursal, Jr., the prosecution merely established that there was a request to examine the
allegedly seized specimen and that the specimen was transferred from the police station to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
Aside from the bare fact that the specimen was transferred to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, there was no evidence on the condition of the specimen and how the same was
exactly turned over to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination. There is likewise no
evidence on record as to the conduct of the supposed laboratory examination. No testimony
was provided showing the procedures undertaken by the forensic chemist in examining the
specimen, assuming in the first place that an examination was really undertaken.
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Moreover, there is no evidence providing details on how the specimen was returned
by the forensic chemist back to the evidence custodian. In fact, the identity of the evidence
custodian, assuming there was even a custodian, is unknown. In sum, there is absolutely no
evidence establishing how the specimen was stored and maintained while in the custody of
the PNP.
As if the prosecution's blatant failure to establish beyond reasonable doubt the

existence of the elements of the crime charged and the patent non-observance of the chain
of custody rule were not enough, the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation
of the prosecution's evidence are further put into serious doubt due to the indisputable and
wholesale failure of the authorities to observe the mandatory procedural requirements laid
down in Section 21 of RA 9165.
The Court ruled that the authorities failed to observe literally ALL the mandatory
requirements under Section 21 of RA 9165. Worse, the prosecution failed to recognize these
lapses and offer sufficient justification to warrant the non-observance of these mandatory
rules.
As borne by the evidence of the prosecution, no inventory and photographing were

conducted whatsoever. As testified by the prosecution's witnesses, after the alleged drug
transaction, accused- appellant Ordiz was immediately apprehended and brought to the
police station. In fact, the record is silent as to whether any inventory receipt or certificate
of inventory was executed. Surely, no such document was admitted and offered as evidence
for the prosecution.
To make matters worse, none of the required witnesses was present during the buy-
bust operation. The testimonies of the witnesses reveal that only the parents of accused-
appellant Ordiz witnessed the apprehension of the accused-appellant. Moreover, the
marking of the allegedly seized drug specimen was not made immediately after and at the
place of apprehension. No justification was made as to why the marking was done in the
police station and not in the place of apprehension. Worse, it was not even shown that the
police station where the marking was conducted was the nearest police station.
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Case Digests
DANILO DE VILLA y GUINTO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
“In this case, all the elements of the plain view doctrine were established. First, the police
officers were conducting a routine checkpoint when they flagged down the accused on board
his motorcycle. The police officers noticed that the accused, as abovementioned, was
committing several traffic infractions, thus the police officers had a prior justification for their
act of flagging down the accused and their subsequent intrusion. Second, upon asking the
accused for his registration papers, the accused opened his utility box, and the two (2) sachets
of shabu were plainly visible to the police officers. The discovery of the sachets was inadvertent
and the illicit items were immediately apparent. Lastly, PO2 Hamilton Salanguit (PO2
Salanguit) confiscated the sachets containing white crystalline substance since it appeared that
the same could be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.”
FACTS
An information was filed against Danilo for violation of Section 11 (3), Article II of RA
9165. On 04 May 2011, at around 3:10 o'clock p.m., PO2 Hamilton Salanguit and SPO1
Edward Plata and other police officers from Tuy (Batangas) Police Station were conducting
a checkpoint in Barangay Rizal when they flagged down a Green Honda Wave motorcycle
driven by accused-appellant with his wife Josefina Maria de Villa as backrider. Accused-
appellant was not wearing helmet and shoes, and was only clad in sando. PO2 Salanguit
approached accused-appellant and thereupon noticed that the motorcycle did not have a
license plate. He asked accused-appellant to show his driver's license, but the latter could
not present the same. PO2 Salanguit then requested accused-appellant to show the
registration papers. Accused-appellant opened the motorcycle's utility box and took out a
plastic containing the LTO — issued license plate (WG-7720) as well as the photocopies of
the motorcycle's expired registration papers under the name of Alex Dayandayan which he
handed to SPO1 Plata. At this instance, PO2 Sanlanguit saw two (2) plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance inside the utility box which he confiscated. Immediately, the
police officers bodily searched accused-appellant and ordered him to empty the contents of
his pocket. From accused- appellant's right pocket, two (2) more plastic sachets were
recovered.
From the foregoing, the RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove
the existence of all the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the CA
affirmed Danilo's conviction.
ISSUE
Whether or not Danilo's guilt for violation of Section 11 (3) of RA 9165 was proven
RULING
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YES. All the elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs were duly proven by
the prosecution. Moreover, there is no question that there was a valid warrantless arrest of
Danilo and seizure of the illegal drugs. It is undeniable that the seizure of the prohibited
items in this case was valid under the "plain view" doctrine.
In this case, all the elements of the plain view doctrine were established. First, the
police officers were conducting a routine checkpoint when they flagged down the accused
on board his motorcycle. The police officers noticed that the accused, as abovementioned,
was committing several traffic infractions, thus the police officers had a prior justification
for their act of flagging down the accused and their subsequent intrusion. Second, upon
asking the accused for his registration papers, the accused opened his utility box, and the
two (2) sachets of shabu were plainly visible to the police officers. The discovery of the
sachets was inadvertent and the illicit items were immediately apparent. Lastly, PO2
Hamilton Salanguit (PO2 Salanguit) confiscated the sachets containing white crystalline
substance since it appeared that the same could be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.
The seizure of these pieces of evidence in plain view is what justified the subsequent
searches and the arrest of Danilo. If not for the said plastic sachets, there would have been
no valid reason to search or frisk Danilo as his traffic violations were punishable only by fine.
His traffic violations per se did not justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was
as yet no lawful arrest to speak of. However, with the discovery of the two plastic sachets in
the utility box, there arose a valid reason to properly arrest Danilo and conduct a search
incidental to such lawful arrest. And true enough, they discovered two (2) more plastic
sachets of shabu in the right pocket of Danilo's pants.
The Court further ruled that with the CA that the police officers were able to strictly
comply with the requirements laid down in Section 21. The seized items were immediately
marked at the place of arrest by PO2 Salanguit. Since the arrest of the accused and seizure of
the dangerous drugs were merely a result of the routine checkpoint conducted by the police
officers and not because of a pre-planned buy-bust operation, they had a sufficient
justification to delay the conduct of the inventory and photography of the seized items at a
different venue. In addition, it is worthy to note that despite the fact that said arrest of the
accused and seizure of the illegal drugs was not planned, it is apparent that they exerted
enough reasonable efforts to ensure that the physical inventory and photography of the
seized items were conducted in the presence of the accused, a representative from the media,
a representative of the Department of Justice, and a barangay official immediately after the
arrest and seizure at the barangay hall — a requirement that many police officers normally
fail to comply with even in a planned buy-bust operation.
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL CARDENAS y HALILI

DOCTRINE
“If the arresting officers were unable to comply with the requirements under Section 21
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9156, they were under obligation to explain why the procedure was
not followed and prove that the reason provided a justifiable round. Otherwise, the requisites
under the law would merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by the
arresting officers at their own convenience.”
FACTS
An information was filed against Cardenas for alleged violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002," as amended.
On 12 September 2008, a male confidential informant reported to Police Inspector

Romeo Rabuya of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (SAID-SOTG)
of Police Station 11, Galas, Quezon City the illegal drug activities of a certain "Boom Tarat-
Tarat" (later identified as [accused-appellant Cardenas]) in the said area. In response, PI
Rabuya dispatched Police Officer 2 Jorge Santiago [(PO2 Santiago)] and Police Officer 2
Jayson Perez to conduct a surveillance and casing at Unang Hakbang St. in front of No. 78
Galas, Quezon City.
[PI] Rabuya recommended that a buy-bust operation be conducted against [accused-

appellant] Cardenas, designating [PO2] Santiago as the poseur- buyer who would use the
marked Php100.00 bill. The other members of the buy-bust operation team assembled by
[PI] Rabuya were Police Officer 1 Erwin Bautista [(PO1 Bautista)], Police Officer 1 Franklin
Gadia [(PO1 Gadia)], and [PI] Rabuya himself. The buy-bust operation team likewise
coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
[Accused-appellant] Cardenas then asked [PO2] Santiago whether he had money to

buy drugs. [PO2] Santiago replied in the affirmative by showing the marked Php100.00 bill.
Thereafter, [accused-appellant] Cardenas pulled from the right front pocket of his pants one
(1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing marijuana leaves with fruiting
tops. [PO2] Santiago handed the marked Php100.00 bill to [accused- appellant] Cardenas
while the latter handed to him the said one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing marijuana leaves with fruiting tops. At that juncture, [PO2] Santiago scratched his
head, as a signal to the rest of the buy-bust team that was on standby that the sale had already
been consummated.
[PO2] Santiago then held the hand of [accused- appellant] Cardenas to prevent him
from escaping. Subsequently, the rest of the buy-bust team led by [PO2] Perez arrived and
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Case Digests
approached [accused-appellant] Cardenas. [PO2] Perez informed [accused-appellant]

Cardenas of his constitutional rights.
The RTC found accused-appellant Cardenas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of accused-
appellant Cardenas.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellant Cardenas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime charged.
RULING
the aforesaid elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug
cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
Therefore, in all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in
establishing the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the alleged seized
drug specimen. According to the prosecution's version of events, after the buy-bust was
conducted, the team proceeded to the police station, wherein PO2 Santiago turned over the
seized item to PO3 Carranza. After PO3 Carranza prepared the Request for Laboratory
Examination, PO2 Santiago brought the seized item for physical and chemical examination
to the crime laboratory and turned over the same to Engr. Jabonillo, the Forensic Chemist of
the PNP Crime Laboratory.
However, on the witness stand, PO2 Santiago testified that he turned over the alleged
seized drug specimen to one SPO1 Ronaldo Corea (SPO1 Corea). According to PO2 Santiago's
testimony, it was SPO1 Corea who turned over the specimen to PO3 Carranza.
As SPO1 Corea was not presented by the prosecution, the evidence on record is silent
as to how SPO1 Corea handled the specimen, the condition of the specimen at the time the
specimen was handed over to SPO1 Corea, the precautions taken by SPO1 Corea to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item, and how SPO1 Corea transferred
possession of the specimen to PO3 Carranza. In short, the chain of custody of the specimen
from PO2 Santiago to SPO1 Corea and from SPO1 Corea to PO3 Carranza was not firmly
established.
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Case Digests
XXX v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
“Verily, no matter what she did subsequent to the events narrated above is immaterial
to the fact that the crime was already committed. In addition, it is worth emphasizing that
sexual abuse is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. Such an
offense is not analogous to a person's achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling
or reliving. Rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma
upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind
would opt to forget. Thus, a victim cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an
accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she had undergone.”
FACTS
An Information was filed against XXX for committing lascivious acts against AAA.
At around one o'clock in the afternoon of April 28, 2012, she was about to pick up
something from the floor in one of the rooms of their house when without any warning,
accused-appellant approached her from the back. When she turned to face him, the accused-
appellant grabbed the lower end of her t-shirt, inserted his hands inside and touched her
breast while he uttered the words "pahawak nga." She immediately parried accused-
appellant's hands to resist it. Accused-appellant then tried to pull down her shorts but she
held on to the sides of it to prevent him from stripping it off. Thereafter, she ran towards the
kitchen where her mother was. She was teary eyed and about to cry when her mother asked
her what was wrong. However, she did not say anything because she was afraid that the
accused-appellant might kill or hurt them as he had laid his hands on her mother before.
While she was crying and trembling from shock and fear, she went outside and called
her boyfriend CCC to tell him about her ordeal. She decided to go to the house of DDD, her
biological father, in Bulacan but the latter was not there at that time. She then texted her
mother saying "Yung asawa mo, hayup yan, yung ginawa niya sakin." Her mother called her
and she narrated what happened between her and the accused-appellant. Her mother cried
profusely upon knowing of the incident and advised her to go home so they could file a case
against the accused-appellant. Thus, she went home as per her mother's instruction and
together, they went to the Valenzuela City Police Station to file a complaint against the
accused- appellant.
The RTC convicted XXX of the crime charged. On appeal, the RTC convicted XXX of the
crime charged.
ISSUE
Whether or not RTC and the CA erred in convicting XXX.
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Case Digests
RULING
NO. Verily, no matter what she did subsequent to the events narrated above is
immaterial to the fact that the crime was already committed. In addition, it is worth
emphasizing that sexual abuse is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered
in detail. Such an offense is not analogous to a person's achievement or accomplishment as
to be worth recalling or reliving. Rather, it is something which causes deep psychological
wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her
conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a victim cannot be expected to
mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying
experience she had undergone.
Thus, the inconsistencies, if any, pointed out by XXX would not exculpate him from
the crime. XXX cannot likewise rely on the Affidavit of Desistance dated October 23, 2013
executed by AAA as the basis for his acquittal. It must be noted that, subsequent to the
execution of the Affidavit of Desistance, AAA still took the witness stand on July 26, 2016 to
testify against XXX.
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMALYN N. MORENO

DOCTRINE
“In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving the
elements of the crime charged, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime.
In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.
While it is true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned
by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the law nevertheless also requires
strict compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights are safeguarded.”
FACTS
An Information was filed against Moreno for alleged violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002," as amended.
On 11 July 2012, at around 9:00 p.m., Marleo B. Sumale (Agent Sumale), an agent of
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), was informed by a fellow PDEA agent that
a certain person named "Ara," a waitress at the WRJ Resto Bar in Barangay Salong, Calapan
City, Oriental Mindoro, was peddling dangerous drugs in said establishment. Acting on this
information, Agent Sumale — along with other PDEA agents — formed a team to conduct a
buy-bust operation against subject Ara. Agent Sumale was designated as the poseur-buyer,
while Rosemarie Catain (Agent Catain), was assigned to be the arresting officer. Before the
operation, Agent Sumale marked the money to be used with "SMB."
In accordance with the plan, Agent Sumale and the informant proceeded to the
establishment. At around 12:00 midnight, a woman approached them. The informant
identified the woman as the same "Ara" who was the alleged drug-seller. After having been
introduced to Agent Sumale, accused-appellant handed to him a plastic sachet containing
suspectedshabu. Upon receipt of the sachet, Agent Sumale handed to accused-appellant the
marked P500.00 bill. Thereafter, Agent Sumale removed his baseball cap, signifying the
completion of the transaction, upon which the other agents, originally positioned in strategic
spots around the area, converged on the scene and effected the arrest of accused-appellant.
Agent Catain frisked accused-appellant and found the marked bill. Agent Sumale then placed
the marking "SMB 12/07/12" on the sachet containing suspected shabu. The apprehending
team, along with the accused- appellant, then proceeded to the PDEA office where the
inventory of the confiscated arms was done.
The RTC convicted Moreno of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of Moreno, holding that the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the
crimes charged, namely: (1) the identity of the buyer, as well as the seller, the object, and the
consideration of the sale; (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
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Case Digests
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Moreno.
RULING
proving the elements of the crime charged, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body
of the crime. In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation
of the law. While it is true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven
procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the law
nevertheless also requires strict compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that
rights are safeguarded.

and confiscation . The said inventory must be done in the presence of the aforementioned
required witnesses, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
seizure and apprehension, and only two of them were present during the conduct of the
inventory. The records of this case are bereft of any explanation as to why no representative
from the DOJ was present in the inventory. The prosecution, despite its burden to prove the
officers' compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21, did not address the issue in
their pleadings, and the RTC and the CA instead had to rely on supposed substantial
compliance with the rules to justify Moreno's conviction.
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE RASOS, JR. y PADOLLO @ "JOSE"

DOCTRINE
“Given the very nature of the anti-illegal drugs campaign, the nature of entrapment and
buy-bust operations, the usual practice of utilizing unreliable characters as informants, and the
great ease by which drug specimen can be planted in the pockets or hands of unsuspecting
persons, most of whom come from the marginalized sectors of society, the propensity for police
abuse is great. This is precisely why the innocent is provided refuge under the protective mantle
of the law — through the mandatory requirements laid down in Republic Act No. 9165, as
amended. The instant case is yet another example of how the lowly, through the majesty of the
law, triumphs over the daunting and all-powerful prosecutorial power of the State.”
FACTS
In two (2) separate Informations filed before the RTC of Manila, Rasos, Jr. was charged
with violations of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
In the evening of September 11, 2015, a confidential asset reported to the Station
Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Task Unit (SAID-SOTU) of the Manila Police District-
Ermita Police Station (PS-5), the illegal drug trade activity of [Rasos, Jr.] along L. Guerrero
St., Ermita, Manila. Immediately thereafter, a buy-bust team was formed to entrap [Rasos,
Jr.], with SPO4 Rowell Robles as team leader and PO2 Garchitorena as poseur-buyer,
together with six (6) other police officers as back-up operatives. A Pre-Operation Report and
Authority to Operate were sent to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Upon
receipt of the documents, the PDEA faxed Control No. 10001-042015-0154 authorizing the
buy-bust team to proceed with the operation. During the briefing, poseur-buyer PO2
Garchitorena was given two (2) pieces of P100 bill bearing his initials "JC" to be used as buy-
bust money. It was agreed that PO2 Garchitorena will remove his cap after the sale
transaction.
At 3:00 o'clock in the morning of September 12, 2015, PO2 Garchitorena and the
confidential informant proceeded to the target area on board a motorcycle while the rest of
the team strategically positioned themselves nearby. PO2 Garchitorena and the confidential
informant alighted from the motorcycle then walked towards [Rasos, Jr.]. Upon seeing the
confidential informant, [Rasos, Jr.] approached them. After a short conversation, the
confidential informant introduced PO2 Garchitorena to [Rasos, Jr.] as a buyer of shabu.
Noticing the big physique of PO2 Garchitorena, [Rasos, Jr.] asked him, "Ano ito? Gagamitin
mo pampayat?" [Rasos, Jr.] answered, "Hindi bibili lang ako panggamit, dalawang tarya."
[Rasos, Jr.] then pulled out from his pocket two (2) plastic sachets ofshabu. PO2 Garchitorena
gave the two (2) pieces of P100 bill to [Rasos, Jr.]. [Rasos, Jr.] made PO2 Garchitorena choose
between the two (2) plastic sachets ofshabu. After PO2 Garchitorena picked one (1) plastic
sachet of shabu, [Rasos, Jr.] placed the money and the remaining plastic sachet in his pocket.
At the conclusion of the transaction, PO2 Garchitorena removed his cap which was the pre-
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Case Digests
arranged signal to his teammates that the sale has already been consummated. Seeing this,
the back-up operatives rushed to the crime scene, introduced themselves as police officers
and effected the arrest of [Rasos, Jr.]. PO2 Garchitorena directed [Rasos, Jr.] to empty his
pockets, to which he obliged. As a result thereof, the two (2) pieces P100 bill buy-bust money
and a plastic sachet of shabu was recovered from [Rasos, Jr.]. As the rain then started to pour,
the team decided to conduct the marking and inventory of the seized evidence at the police
station. PO2 Garchitorena held in his custody the two (2) plastic sachets of shabu until it was
brought to the police station.
The RTC rendered a Judgment convicting Rasos, Jr. for committing illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. With respect to illegal possession of
dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, the RTC acquitted Rasos, Jr. on the
ground of reasonable doubt. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Rasos, Jr.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting Rasos, Jr. for violating Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165.
RULING
YES. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, which was amended by RA 10640 in 2014, lays
down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the
confiscated drugs used as evidence.
The said provision requires that:(1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed at the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable; (2) the physical inventory and
counsel, (b) an elected public official, and (c) a representative of the National Prosecution
Service (NPS) or the media; and (3) the accused or his/her representative and all of the
aforesaid witnesses shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
The Court cannot stress enough that the presence of the required witnesses at the
time of the inventory and photographing of the seized evidence is mandatory, and that the
law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an essential purpose.
It is not disputed that the authorities failed to comply with Section 21 of RA 9165
when they conducted the subject buy-bust operation. As readily admitted by the CA in the
assailed Decision, "the arresting officers may not have strictly complied with requirements
of Section 21, Article II of RA No. 9165."
First, it is undisputed that there was no elected official who witnessed the inventory
of the alleged seized evidence and the photographing of the same. Second, the prosecution
likewise admits without hesitation that Rasos, Jr.'s signature on the Receipt/Inventory of
Page 314 of 435
Case Digests
Property/Seized Evidence/s dated September 12, 2015 is unavailing. Third, the

prosecution's main witness, PO2 Garchitorena, admitted on cross-examination that there
were no photographs taken during the inventory and markings of the alleged seized drug
specimens.
Page 315 of 435

Case Digests
CARLOS A. CATUBAO v. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 227371. October 2, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
“The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists
of the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly
or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise
has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a
crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime
or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.”
FACTS
Acting on a complaint filed by Cornelio Ragasa (Ragasa) and Atty. Fernando Perito
(Atty. Perito), an Information was filed by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)
against Catubao.
In 2007, estafa cases were filed against Cornelio Ragasa ("Ragasa"). He hired Atty.
Fernando Perito ("Atty. Perito") as his lawyer. The cases were pending before the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor in Bacoor, Cavite and accused Catubao was then the handling
prosecutor. For two years, the cases remained unresolved prompting Atty. Perito to
personally follow them up with the accused several times. Accused Catubao asked him for
"pang inom" whenever Atty. Perito makes a follow up. Before going on a Christmas vacation,
they again met and it was there that the accused said he need[ed] money for he was leaving
for Samar.
On December 19, 2008 and while in Guiuan, Samar, accused Catubao called Atty.
Perito asking any amount of money for a drinking session with his friends and mentioned
that five thousand pesos (Php5,000.00) will do. Atty. Perito immediately informed Ragasa
about it. Ragasa proceeded to Atty. Perito's office and handed him said amount. Atty. Perito
then ordered his secretary, Susan Remoquillo, to send only four thousand pesos
(Php4,000.00) to the accused through LBC Padre Faura.
The Sandiganbayan convicted Catubao of the crime charged. The Sandiganbayan

ruled that all the elements of the crime had been sufficiently proved by the prosecution. The
Sandiganbayan held that, based on the evidence, Catubao solicited and received a gift from
Atty. Perito to expedite the resolution of the estafa cases of Ragasa pending before him. Thus,
Catubao received a gift in consideration for doing an act, though not constituting a crime in
itself, but was related to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Catubao of the crime of Direct
Bribery.
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RULING
YES. The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
consists of the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received
directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present
or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not
constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and
(4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
In the case at bar, the third element, was not duly proven. The third element of the
crime requires that the gift be given in consideration of the accused's commission of some
crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is his
official duty to do.
In the present case, the prosecution claimed, and the Sandiganbayan believed, that
the P3,000.00 was solicited by Catubao in exchange for finally acting on the estafa cases filed
against Ragasa that were then pending before Catubao. Catubao, on the other hand, claims
that it was only (1) a "return of favor" because he previously lent Atty. Perito P1,000.00, and
(2) a "balato" because Atty. Perito told him that Atty. Perito just won another case.
Apart from the testimonial evidence of Atty. Perito and Ragasa, the prosecution
presented no other evidence that the money was solicited by Catubao and that it was given
in consideration of the latter finally acting on the case. The existence of the third element,
therefore, boils down to the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The Court holds that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the third element. This is so because the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses were so marred by inconsistencies that they are no longer believable.
Page 317 of 435

Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JEFFREY FAYO y RUBIO A.K.A. "JEFF"

DOCTRINE
“Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, which was amended by RA 10640 in 2014, lays down
the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the confiscated
drugs used as evidence.
The said provision requires that: (1)the seized items be inventoried and photographed
at the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable; (2) the physical inventory and
thereof.”
FACTS
In Crim. Case No. 20349-D, Fayo was charged with illegal sale of shabu. In addition,
he was charged with illegal possession of shabu in Crim. Case No. 20350-D.
On May 27, 2015, at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Police Chief Inspector (PCI)
Renato B. Castillo, Chief of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Group
(SAIDSOTG), Pasig City Police Station, conducted a meeting and informed the operatives that
a confidential informant can accompany any one of them to buy illegal drugs from [Fayo]
who is a known pusher at Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City. A buy-bust operation was
planned against [Fayo] where PO1 Jonathan P. Bueno (PO1 Bueno) was tasked as the poseur-
buyer, who will buy illegal drugs from [Fayo] using a one thousand-peso bill with Serial No.
FA131613 bearing the markings "JPB" on its lower left corner. The agreed pre-arranged
signal will be the act of PO1 Bueno in scratching his head which will signify that the buy-bust
transaction is already consummated. The other operatives were tasked as perimeter back-
ups, while PO1 Randy S. Sanoy (PO1 Sanoy) was designated as the immediate back-up of the
poseur-buyer.
[Fayo] then asked the confidential informant and PO1 Bueno how much they were
buying, to which PO1 Bueno responded One Thousand Pesos (Php1,000.00) worth and
immediately handed to [Fayo] the marked money. [Fayo] took the marked bill and kept it in
his left pocket. He then took several sachets from his right pocket, choosing one and handing
it to PO1 Bueno.
PO1 Bueno received the sachet from [Fayo] and executed the pre-arranged signal to
alert his fellow operatives. PO1 Bueno then introduced himself as a police officer. While
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Case Digests
being apprehended [Fayo] tried to reach for something from his waistline, but was stopped
by PO1 Sanoy. Upon frisking [Fayo], PO1 Sanoy discovered that [Fayo] was reaching for a
calibre .45 gun, also, [Fayo] had a grenade in his backpack.
PO1 Bueno confiscated from [Fayo] an additional four (4) transparent plastic sachets
all containing the same white crystalline substance believed to be shabu, as well as the
marked One Thousand Peso (Php1,000.00) bill.
The RTC rendered a Judgment convicting Fayo for committing illegal sale and
possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Fayo.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting Fayo for violating Sections 5 and
11, Article II of RA 9165.
RULING
YES. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, which was amended by RA 10640 in 2014, lays
down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the
confiscated drugs used as evidence.
The said provision requires that: (1)the seized items be inventoried and
photographed at the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable; (2) the physical inventory and
thereof.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the authorities failed to comply with
Section 21 of RA 9165 when they conducted the subject buy- bust operation.
First, it is beyond dispute that there was no representative from the NPS or media
who witnessed the inventory of the alleged seized evidence and the photographing of the
same. As readily acknowledged by the RTC, "[n]o representative from the National
Prosecution Service and/or media came."
Second, it is also an admitted fact that the inventory and photographing of the
allegedly seized drug specimen were undertaken at the Barangay Hall of Manggahan and not
at the place of the seizure or the nearest police station/office of the apprehending team.
Considering the foregoing premises, with the noncompliance of the requirements

mandated under Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended, not being justified, the seizures and
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Case Digests
custody of the alleged drug specimens are rendered void. Therefore, the conviction of Fayo
for violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 does not have a leg to stand on.
Page 320 of 435

Case Digests
GIL "BOYING" R. CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
“It has been consistently ruled that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To be held guilty
as a co-conspirator, the prosecution must be able to show, at the very least, with the same
degree of proof required to establish the crime — proof beyond reasonable doubt, that all
participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a
common purpose or design to commit the felony. The participation in the transaction must be
intentional. Otherwise, none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only be
held responsible for the results of his own action.”
FACTS
In Bocaue Bulacan, accused Serafin dela Cruz, then Mayor; Gil Cruz, then Acting
Administrator; Dennis Carpio then Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan and Private
Secretary to the mayor; and Isidoro Mauricio, then Municipal Assessor, all public officials of
the Bocaue, while in the performance of their official functions, and as such taking advantage
of the same, obstruct and stop the execution of the Court’s valid writs of execution and
demolition of the structure illegally constructed on the lot owned by the wife of the
complainant, thereby causing undue injury to the complainant and giving unwarranted
benefits to certain Alex Halili.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in its decision.
RULING
YES. In the assailed Decision, the SB held that petitioners Cruz and Carpio are guilty
of violating Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by reason of conspiracy. However, in finding Cruz and
Carpio liable through conspiracy, the SB simply ruled that it “lends credence to the claim of
the Prosecution that there had been conspiracy among accused in giving Alexander Halili
unwarranted benefits by interfering and obstructing in the enforcement of a legal process
enjoined by interfering and obstructing in the enforcement of a legal process enjoined by the
court accused exhibited evident bad faith.
These pronouncements are insufficient to establish that petitioners acted in

conspiracy to commit the crime charged. The be certain the SB failed to point to a specific act
performed by each petitioner that would indicate a unity of purpose or common design to
give Halili unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of their functions.
Page 321 of 435

Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMELO DORIA y PEREZ

DOCTRINE
“Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the
alleged crimes, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the
items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation ; and (2) the
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official , (c) a representative from the
media, and (d)a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.”
FACTS
Doria was charged in two (2) sets of Information both dated January 16, 2008 for
violation of Sections 5 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs), and 11 (Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs) of Article II of Republic Act No. 91655.
On January 15, 2008, members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Dagupan City
conducted a conference meeting about having a buy-bust operation against a certain
Marcelina Doris ("Marcelina" for brevity) who was a known drug peddler, and was
reportedly residing in the house of Spouses Samuel and Melody Erguiza ("Sps. Erguiza" for
brevity) in Pantal District, Dagupan City. The team leader, Police Inspector Leo Llamas ("PI
Llamas" for brevity), instructed the police officers to form a buy-bust team. The team was
composed of PI Llamas, PI George Sali-em, PO1 Romulo Lavarias [(PO1 Lavarias)], and PO2
De Vera. PO2 De Vera was designated as the poseur-buyer, who was to use five (5) pieces of
One Hundred peso bills, which bore the markings, "MCV." PO1 Lavarias was tasked as PO2
De Vera's immediate back-up. The buy-bust operation and the serial numbers of the marked
money were then recorded in the Police Blotter Book of the Dagupan City Police Station. The
team then proceeded to the area of operation. At about fifty (50) meters away from the target
place, PO2 De Vera alighted from the vehicle and walked towards the house of Sps. Erguiza.
According to PO2 De Vera, he saw a male person, who would later be identified as [Doria],
standing in front of Sps. Erguiza's house. PO2 De Vera approached [Doria] and looked for
Marcelina who was also known as Mamang. [Doria] replied that Marcelina was not around
and suddenly told PO2 De Vera in Pangasinan dialect, "Siak lay pangaliwan mo," which means
"Just buy it from me." Surprised, PO2 De Vera brought out the marked money, and said that
he wanted to buy shabu worth Five Hundred pesos. [Doria] then introduced himself as
Romelo Doria. After PO2 De Vera handed to [Doria] the marked money, the latter brought
out two (2) plastic sachets of suspected shabu. As a result, PO2 De Vera signaled to PO1
Lavarias in order to arrest [Doria]. [Doria], however, resisted the arrest and ran inside the
house of Sps. Erguiza. PO2 De Vera and PO1 Lavarias chased [Doria] inside the house. They
were able to arrest [Doria]. Afterwards, PO2 De Vera and PO1 Lavarias conducted a bodily
search on [Doria]. They were able to recover another three (3) plastic sachets of suspected
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Case Digests
shabu, two (2) empty plastic sachets, one (1) small scissor, one (1) disposable lighter, and
the marked money.
The RTC rendered its Decision convicting Doria on both charges. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC's conviction of Doria.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting Doria for violating Sections 5 and
11, Article II of RA 9165.
RULING
YES. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission
of the alleged crimes, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain
seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation ;
representative from the media, and (d)a representative from the Department of Justice
thereof.
In the instant case, it is beyond serious dispute that all of the mandatory procedures
required under Section 21 of RA 9165 have been violated by the buy-bust team.
First and foremost, not even one of the required witnesses witnessed the buy-bust
operation and the inventory and photographing of the alleged drug specimen supposedly
retrieved from Doria.
Second, the inventory receipt produced by the prosecution, i.e., the handwritten
Confiscation Receipt dated January 15, 2008, contains the lone signature of PO2 De Vera.
Third, while testifying that the Confiscation Receipt was prepared at the place of the
incident, in the same breath, the prosecution's main witness, PO2 De Vera, testified that the
recording, disposition, and inventory of the supposedly confiscated drug specimen were
conducted at the Dagupan City Police Station (DCPS) and not at the place of apprehension.
Fourth, in further engendering serious doubt as to the integrity of the specimen

allegedly retrieved from the person of Doria, PO2 De Vera himself acknowledges that with
respect to some of the plastic containers allegedly confiscated from Doria's left pocket, he
"did not place any marking, however we took pictures on the said recovered items, sir."
Page 323 of 435

Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CESARIA BASIO VERTUDES

and HENRY BASIO VERTUDES
DOCTRINE
“It is thus obvious that the police failed to comply with the three- witnesses requirement
under Section 21. Although there were two Barangay Tanods that were present at the
Barangay Hall for the inventory and photography of the seized items, they are not the required
witnesses contemplated by the law. It should be emphasized that the law requires the presence
of an elected public official. A Barangay Tanod is not an elected official; they are merely
appointed by the Sangguniang Barangay.”
FACTS
Accused-appellants Cesaria and her son, Henry, were indicted for violation of Section
5 of RA 9165 in an Information. Cesaria was likewise charged for violating Section 11 of RA
9165.
On April 16, 2010 at around 10:00 p.m., PO2 Ocampo was on duty at the Station Anti-
Illegal Drugs-Special Operations Task Group (SAIDSOTG) of Parañ aque Police Station, when
one of their regular assets came to their office to give information about the illegal selling of
drugs in the area of Barangay Baclaran, Parañ aque City by herein appellants Cesaria and
Henry. A buy-bust team was then organized composed of PO2 Ocampo, who was to act as
poseur-buyer, SPO1 Macaraeg, PSI Marlou Besona, PO3 Fernan Acbang, and PO2 Domingo
Julaton (PO2 Julaton). Two Php1,000.00 bills were given to PO2 Ocampo to purchase
Php2,000[.]00 worth of shabu from the suspects which he marked with "x." After
coordinating with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and conducting a short
briefing, the team, together with their informant, then proceeded to Barangay Baclaran.
Upon arrival at a small wet market along Quirino Avenue, Baclaran, PO2 Ocampo and the
informant went toward Bagong Ilog Street, while the rest of the team discre[e]tly followed.
There they spotted an elderly woman sitting outside of a house and a male person standing
along the street who were later identified respectively as herein appellants Cesaria and her
son[,] Henry.
At about 12:10 a.m. of April 17, 2010, PO2 Ocampo and the informant proceeded to
approach Henry to buy shabu. The informant greeted Henry and introduced PO2 Ocampo as
a businessman in need of shabu. PO2 Ocampo then asked Henry if he has Php2,000.00 worth
of shabu to which the latter replied that he does not have any and asked them to wait as he
will first ask his mother, Cesaria, if she has some left. Henry then shouted to the latter, "Nay,
meron ka pa ba diyan, meron akong scorer dito," to which the latter replied, "meron pa ako
at marami pa akong hawak dito." Cesaria then stood up to approach them. PO2 Ocampo
handed Henry the marked money which the latter in turn handed to his mother. In return,
Cesaria handed to Henry two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
Page 324 of 435

Case Digests
which he in turn handed to PO2 Ocampo. Upon receiving the sachets, PO2 Ocampo executed
the pre-arranged signal by turning his cap backwards to alert the rest of the team that the
transaction has been completed. SPO1 Macaraeg then rushed to the scene and was able to
arrest Henry. Cesaria, on the other hand, was apprehended by PO2 Ocampo.
The RTC found accused guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
conviction of Cesaria and Henry.
ISSUE
Whether or not the guilt of Henry for violation of Section 5 and of Cesaria for violation
of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. The prosecution admittedly failed to prove that the buy-bust team complied with
the mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165, which thus results in their failure to
prove the guilt of Cesaria and Henry beyond reasonable doubt.
Verily, the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time
of the conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again, must be immediately done
at the place of seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with by
the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned
activity.
In the case at bar, it is evident that the police officers, assuming that their story of a
buy-bust operation is even true, blatantly disregarded the requirements laid down under
Section 21. The buy-bust team committed several and patent procedural lapses in the
conduct of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug, which thus
compromised the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs. More importantly,
they had no valid excuse for their deviation from the rules.
The Court points out that, as testified by PO2 Ocampo none of the three required
witnesses was present at the time of arrest of the accused- appellants and the seizure of the
drugs. It is thus obvious that the police failed to comply with the three- witnesses
requirement under Section 21. Although there were two Barangay Tanods that were present
at the Barangay Hall for the inventory and photography of the seized items, they are not the
required witnesses contemplated by the law. It should be emphasized that the law requires
the presence of an elected public official. A Barangay Tanod is not an elected official; they are
merely appointed by the Sangguniang Barangay.
Page 325 of 435

Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL DOLANDOLAN

G.R. No. 232157. January 8, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
“While seemingly immaterial, the contradictory statements that: (1) accused-appellant
and AAA took a tricycle to the scene of the crime; (2) accused-appellant and AAA walked for
about an hour while talking; and, (3) accused-appellant and AAA walked for a period of time
that AAA could no longer recall, all the while under threat of violence — taken with all other
evident discrepancies undoubtedly calls AAA's credibility into question.”
FACTS
An Information was filed against accused-appellant for the rape of AAA.
On February 10, 1995, when [AAA] was 15 years old, she went with two of her friends
to a peryahan in [Brgy. RTD, XYZ,] Zambales. When her friends went home, she was left alone
in the peryahan playing games with bets and promenading when [accused- appellant], an
employee of the peryahan and who she has not met before, introduced himself to her. During
her direct examination, she narrated that [accused-appellant] invited her to his place, and
that he talked to her in a pleasant manner and she thought that the intention of [accused-
appellant] was just to befriend her. [Accused-appellant] forced her to walk with him for more
than an hour to his place at [Brgy. NBL, BLT, Zambales] then brought her to a sapaan, or a
creek. [Accused-appellant] was holding something which looked like a knife which he
pointed at her. [Accused-appellant] then raped her by inserting his private part to her private
part. She cried because of too much pain. After that, her parents saw her in the place where
it happened and they took her to the police. Thereafter, her mother accompanied her to the
hospital because she was traumatized by the incident. She presented a Medico-legal
Certificate dated February 13, 1995.
During her cross-examination, she averred that [accused- appellant] was just strolling
around the peryahan when, without talking to her, he kissed her and forced her to go with
him by threatening her with bodily harm. [Accused-appellant] used a weapon which looked
like a stick or a ballpen. Although there were many people at the peryahan, she did not
scream, shout nor do anything to alarm other people around her because she was already
afraid. She could no longer recall at what time they left [RTD] or arrived in [NBL], or for how
long and for how far they walked. She likewise did not resist [accused-appellant] while
walking to [NBL] because she was taken by fear. She [could not] say if she was taken to a
house in [NBL], but they met a few people. She denied being brought to a sapa or a creek. She
also [could not] say that the alleged attack happened in a house; in fact she [could not] recall
in what area she was raped, but it was a vacant lot and it was dark. [Accused-appellant]
forced her, kissed her while holding the stick, and then inserted his penis in her private part.
It was at the place of [accused-appellant] where her mother found her.
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Case Digests
The RTC convicted accused-appellant of the crime of Rape. The CA affirmed the RTC's
Decision but increased the award of exemplary damages to P30,000.00. The CA held that
although there were glaring inconsistencies between AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay and her
open court testimony, AAA never wavered in her claim that accused-appellant inserted his
private part into her private part after pointing a ballpen-like knife at her.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of
Rape.
RULING
YES. The prosecution failed to prove the guilt of accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Court believes, and accordingly holds, that there are substantial discrepancies
between AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay 31 dated February 13, 1995 (Sinumpaang Salaysay)
and her testimony, both during her direct examination and her cross-examination, which
discrepancies were never reconciled, explained, corrected, or justified by the prosecution.
As a result, the Court doubts the credibility of AAA. Thus, the guilt of accused-appellant has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay, she stated that accused-appellant threatened her with
a ballpen knife while she was on her way to a sayawan and transported her via tricycle to
the purported scene of the crime. When AAA was presented for her direct testimony on
March 5, 2013, she narrated that she met accused-appellant at a peryahan and that he
introduced himself to her, spoke to her in a pleasant manner, and invited her to his place.
Thereafter, they walked together for about an hour. Unlike her statements in her
Sinumpaang Salaysay, there was no mention of a sayawan, of being threatened at knife-point
to accompany accused- appellant, or of a tricycle ride to the purported scene of the crime.
During her cross-examination on September 17, 2013, AAA's recollection again

changed, this time with her saying that while she was at the peryahan, accused-appellant
directly threatened her with a ballpen-like stick and forced her to accompany him to the
purported scene of the crime. In direct contrast to her direct testimony, AAA stated on cross-
examination that accused-appellant never spoke to her and never invited her to his house.
The Court notes that the claim that AAA was threatened at knife-point while on her
way to asayawan is starkly different and absolutely inconsistent with the claim that accused-
appellant befriended her in a peryahan and thereafter invited her to his house. While
seemingly immaterial, the contradictory statements that: (1) accused-appellant and AAA
took a tricycle to the scene of the crime; (2) accused-appellant and AAA walked for about an
hour while talking; and, (3) accused-appellant and AAA walked for a period of time that AAA
could no longer recall, all the while under threat of violence — taken with all other evident
discrepancies undoubtedly calls AAA's credibility into question.
Page 327 of 435
Case Digests
ROLANDO GEMENEZ Y PARAME v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 241518, March 04, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
For alibi to prosper, the accused must satisfactorily prove that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed and that he was so far away that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Rolando Gemenez y Parame (Gemenez, Petitioner)
for the attack on Jerry Bechachino (Jerry), that the Petitioner, by means of treachery and
abuse of superior strength and with deliberate intent to take life, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously shoot twice one Jerry Bechachino using a shotgun
while he was just walking along the street.
As a consequence, Jerry suffered gunshot wounds on his left chest, left arm and right
thumb, accused, having performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of MURDER but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
his will, that is, the able and timely medical assistance given to him.
Upon arraignment, Gemenez pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Pre-trial and
trial on the merits then ensued.
On cross-examination, Jerry testified that he was walking home when he accidentally

met along his way Axiel and Reneson as they were also living in the same subdivision.
Reneson had to go on a different way so it was only him and Axiel who were left together
when they were accosted by accused Gemenez and his companion. He averred that accused
was with two (2) companions whose identities he did not know. He narrated that when he
was shot by the accused, the latter's two (2) companions dragged them and tried to board
them on a tricycle.
Last presented to the witness stand was Reneson, he testified that he is friends with
Jerry, and he knew that the accused is a barangay tanod in their place in Barangay San
Antonio. He denied the contents of the affidavit he executed which pointed to the accused as
the one who shot Jerry Bechachino.
On the other hand, the accused denied the allegations against him. While he was at a
tricycle terminal, the driver of the tricycle he boarded told him that a person was shot early
that morning. When he first heard that Jerry pointed to him as the assailant, he went to the
barangay hall and entered it on the blotter, but he cannot really recall what was entered on
the blotter; he did not have a copy of the excerpt of the blotter, but committed to secure a
copy from the barangay which he never did. He further denied knowing Jerry and averred
that he met him for the first time during the preliminary investigation at the fiscal's office.
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After trial on the merits, in its judgment, the RTC convicted Gemenez of the crime of
Frustrated Homicide. The RTC ruled that it was only Homicide and not Murder because
neither of the qualifying circumstances of treachery or abuse of superior strength was
sufficiently proven by the prosecution. Treachery could not be appreciated because it was
unclear from the evidence that Gemenez specifically sought the mode of attack to facilitate
the perpetration of the crime without risk to himself. Similarly, abuse of superior strength
could not be appreciated because there was no clear proof of Gemenez's physical superiority
over Jerry, or that the former took advantage of any such superiority to consummate the
offense.
The CA affirmed the RTC's findings. It similarly did not believe the alibi and denial
interposed by Gemenez because he was not able to prove that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the vicinity of the place where the crime was committed.
ISSUES
1. Whether the CA erred in upholding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, while
disregarding the consistent and corroborated testimonies of the defense witnesses;
2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the findings of the RTC which were plainly based
on speculation and conjectures; and
3. Whether the CA erred in affirming his conviction despite the prosecution's failure to
prove the elements of frustrated homicide with evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
The appeal is partly meritorious. The evidence of the prosecution established only the
elements of Attempted Homicide, instead of Frustrated Homicide.
First and Second Issues: The CA did not err in affirming the RTC's factual findings.
In this case, the accused failed to show by convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the crime scene during its commission considering that
his residence was only a short 500 meters more or less away from the place where the
incident happened. Likewise, as repeatedly held, positive identification by the prosecution
witnesses of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight than his
alibi and denial. These guidelines find more compelling application when the lone witness is
the victim himself whose direct and positive identification of his assailant is almost always
regarded with indubitable credibility, owing to the natural tendency of the victim to seek
justice for himself, and thus strive to remember the face of his assailant and to recall the
manner in which the latter committed the crime.
The Court likewise reiterates its ruling in People v. Sanchez as regards appeal; that it
gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand;
that absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC's assessments
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and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court's findings; and
that the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the Court sees no substantial reason to
justify the reversal of the RTC's finding as regards the credibility of the prosecution's
witnesses, especially that such finding had been upheld by the CA. Thus, the Court is of the
view that it was indeed Gemenez who attacked Jerry, and that the said attack was made with
intent to kill.
Third Issue: The CA erred in affirming Gemenez's conviction for Frustrated Homicide,
instead of merely Attempted Homicide.
The RTC and the CA convicted Gemenez of Frustrated Homicide because of their
finding that Jerry would have died from the injuries he sustained if not for the timely medical
assistance extended to him. Both courts anchored this finding only on the pictures of Jerry
on the hospital bed showing that there were numerous tubes attached to him.
While the Medico-Legal Certificate — which shows the extent of Jerry's injuries —
was correctly admitted into evidence as it was authenticated by Dr. Angelo Leano (Dr.
Leano), the same was not sufficient to establish that Jerry would have died from the injuries
he sustained if not for the timely medical assistance. That there were pictures of Jerry on the
hospital bed showing that tubes were attached to him does not conclusively establish that
the injuries were so serious that he would have died without timely medical assistance.
Verily, the RTC and the CA were merely inferring, and this was error. At this juncture,
the Court deems it fit to emphasize that the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt each element of the crime as its case will rise or fall on the strength of its
own evidence. Any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the accused.
As there is doubt as to the existence of the second element of Frustrated Homicide —

that the victim sustained fatal or mortal wounds but did not die because of timely medical
assistance — Gemenez's conviction must thus be modified to Attempted Homicide. Thus,
Gemenez should suffer the penalty of prision correccional, instead of reclusion temporal.
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MICHAEL TAÑAMOR Y ACIBO, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
An unbroken chain of custody is necessary in order to establish before the court that
the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance
offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that required to make a finding of guilt.
FACTS
An Information was filed against MICHAEL TAÑAMOR y' ACIBO and JUNFIL PIÑERO
for not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell
and deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known "shabu",
a dangerous drug under R.A. No. 9165.
The RTC was able to acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner only, as his co-
accused, Piñero, managed to escape during the operation and has since remained at large.
During arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued
thereafter.
The prosecution sought to establish that petitioner was apprehended following a

legitimate buy-bust operation, and alleges that an informant came forward about a certain
Mike and Pilo who, conspiring with each other, were engaged in illegal drug trade. Acting on
said information, the Chief instructed PO2 Buenaflor and PO1 Briones to conduct a series of
surveillance operations on these two. Upon surveillance, said officers alleged that they were
able to find out that the real names of Mike and Pilo were Michael Tañamor and Junfil Piñero,
respectively, as well as confirm their involvement with the drug trade. Through an asset, a
test-buy was also conducted, where the asset was able to purchase two sachets of shabu from
petitioner and Piñero, which prompted the operatives to plan the buy-bust proper, beginning
with the negotiation of a drug deal by PO2 Buenaflor and PO1 Briones.
In his defense, petitioner denied ownership of the items that were allegedly seized
and submitted instead that no buy-bust operation took place before his arrest. He further
submitted that on board the vehicle, he was forcibly searched without the benefit of a search
warrant and that several personal items were recovered from him. Allegedly finding nothing
from his personal items which would point to any illegal activity, one police officer named
Gerald Manlan, whom he recognized as his neighbor, showed him three sachets containing
white substance, after which the persons in the vehicle threatened him with an allegation of
ownership of the same if he did not cooperate. He was thereafter brought to a house where
he was repeatedly interrogated about his knowledge of a certain "Edfox." Petitioner alleged
that the persons who detained him kept insisting that he knew "Edfox" despite petitioner's
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persistent denial. Petitioner further alleged that he was kept in that house for over eight
hours, after which he was brought to the police station.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted the petitioner of the crime.
The CA was unpersuaded by petitioner's contentions and affirmed his conviction. It

found that the elements of the crime of illegal sale of drugs were sufficiently established. It
also held that with respect to the inventory having been conducted in a place other than the
site of arrest, it was nevertheless proper, given that Section 21 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allows for the inventory to be done at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
cases of warrantless seizure.
ISSUE
Whether the lower courts erred in convicting petitioner for violating Section 5, Article
II of RA 9165.
RULING
YES. The Petition is meritorious. The unjustified, let alone admitted departures from
the chain of custody, particularly the undertaking of the inventory elsewhere than in the
place of arrest and the absence of the insulating witnesses at the time of seizure, lead the
Court to no sounder conclusion than petitioner's acquittal.
In drug cases, the State bears the burden not only of proving the elements of the
crime, but also its body or corpus delicti, which in these cases pertains to the dangerous drug
itself. In cases involving illegal drugs, buy-bust operation has been declared as a valid and
effective procedure for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors and a legally
sanctioned means of trapping lawbreakers in felonious acts. Nevertheless, precisely due to
the peculiar nature of a buy-bust operation, the law concomitantly requires strict compliance
with procedures laid down by it to ensure that all the rights of the accused are guaranteed
and the credibility of the corpus delicti safeguarded.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, provides for the procedure
that police operatives are required to observe in order to assure the integrity of the
confiscated drugs. The said provision requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after confiscation at the place of seizure or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable;
(2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of the accused
or his/her representative or counsel, an elected public official, and a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media; and (3) the accused or his/her representative
and all of the aforesaid witnesses shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
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Given the law, the decisive requirements that bear upon the present case are the
immediacy of the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items, and the
protective, insulating presence of the three required witnesses. This Court finds that the
arresting officers in this case failed to comply with these two requirements during the
conduct of the buy-bust operation and the prosecution neglected to justify, let alone
acknowledge these lapses, ultimately proving fatal to its case.
Undoubtedly, the requirement of the presence of the mandatory two insulating

witnesses in this case is inseparable from the requirement of physical inventory and
photographing at the place of seizure. Stated differently, since the physical inventory and
photographing of the seized items must, as a general rule, be done at the place of seizure, it
follows that the two insulating witnesses whose presence are required during the inventory
and photographing must also be in or within the area of the site of seizure.
The seizure of the confiscated items, including the three sachets of shabu is therefore
invalid and void. The prosecution has no more evidence on which to ground petitioner's
conviction, and petitioner must be acquitted.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO

G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
By constitutional design, the accused is afforded the presumption of innocence - it is for
the State to prove the guilt of the accused. Without the State discharging this burden, the Court
is given no alternative but to acquit the accused. Moreover, if the process of gathering evidence
against the accused is tainted by a violation of the accused's right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which is a most cherished and protected right under the Bill of Rights,
the evidence procured must be excluded, inevitably leading to the accused's acquittal.
FACTS
In an Information, the accused-appellant Sapla was charged with violation of Section
5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, for then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in
his possession, control and custody four bricks of marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug, and
transport in transit through a passenger jeepney without license, permit or authority from
any appropriate government entity or agency.
The next day the accused-appellant was committed to the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology (BJMP). Upon his arraignment, he pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged
against him.
The evidence for the Prosecution established that an officer on duty at the RPSB office
received a phone call from a concerned citizen, who informed the said office that a certain
male individual would be transpiring marijuana from Kalinga and into the Province of
Isabela. Subsequently, a joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the Talaca command
post. The passenger jeepney then arrived in the afternoon, wherein the police officers at the
Talaca checkpoint flagged down the said vehicle and told its driver to park on the side of the
road. Officers Labbutan and Mabiasan approached the jeepney and saw Sapla seated at the
rear side of the vehicle. The police officers asked him if he was the owner of the blue sack in
front of him, which the latter answered in the affirmative. The said officers then requested
him to open the blue sack, and the officers saw four bricks of suspected dried marijuana
leaves, wrapped in newspaper and an old calendar. PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested
him, informed him of the cause of his arrest and his constitutional rights in Ilocano dialect.
PO2 Mabiasan further searched accused-appellant. Thereafter, PO2 Mabiasan seized the
dried marijuana leaves and brought them to their office for proper markings.
At the RPSB's office, PO2 Mabiasan took photographs and conducted an inventory of
the seized items and placed his signature on the said items. The conduct of inventory was
witnessed by accused-appellant Sapla, and by the following: 1) Joan K. Balneg from the
Department of Justice; 2) Victor Fontanilla, an elected barangay official; and 3) Geraldine G.
Dumalig, as media representative. Thereafter, PO3 Labbutan brought the accused-appellant
at the KPPO-PAIDSOTG Provincial Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Juan M. Duyan for
further investigation.
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On the other hand, the Defense presented accused-appellant Sapla as its sole witness,
who denied the charges against him and instead, offered a different version of the incident.
He claimed that he boarded a jeepney, and left for Roxas, Isabela to visit his nephew. Upon
reaching Talaca checkpoint, police officers flagged down the said jeepney in order to check
its passengers' baggages and cargoes. The police officers then found marijuana inside a sack
and were looking for a person who wore fatigue pants at that time. From the three (3)
passengers who wore fatigue pants, the said police officers identified him as the owner of
the marijuana found inside the sack. He denied ownership of the marijuana, and asserted
that he had no baggage at that time. Thereafter, the police officers arrested and brought him
to the Talaca barracks, wherein the sack and marijuana bricks were shown to him.
The RTC rendered its Decision convicting accused-appellant Sapla for violating
Section 5 of R.A. 9165. The RTC found that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish
the corpus delicti of the crime. The CA affirmed the RTC 's Decision with modifications. The
CA found that the search and seizure was lawful as it was a valid warrantless search of a
moving vehicle. The CA held that the essential requisite of probable cause was present,
justifying the warrantless search and seizure
ISSUE
Whether there was a valid search and seizure conducted by the police officers.
RULING
NO. The Court finds for accused-appellant Sapla and immediately orders his release
from incarceration.
As a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the authorities is reasonable

only when a court issues a search warrant after it has determined the existence of probable
cause through the personal examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses presented before the court, with the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized particularly described. Because of the sacrosanct position occupied by
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures in the hierarchy of rights, any deviation
or exemption from the rule is not favored and is strictly construed against the government.
There are, however, instances wherein searches are reasonable even in the absence
of a search warrant, taking into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner
in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured. The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless
searches and seizures are: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5)
customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
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In upholding the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the authorities, the
RTC and CA considered the police operation as a valid warrantless search of a moving
vehicle.
According to jurisprudence, "warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are

allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances
as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where
the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection."
On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only when "the
officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains an
item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction."
The Court finds error in the CA's holding that the search conducted in the instant case
is a search of a moving vehicle. The situation presented in the instant case cannot be
considered as a search of a moving vehicle.
The Court now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine that exclusive reliance
on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that permits a warrantless
search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search - which include both long-
standing and the most recent jurisprudence - should be the prevailing and controlling line of
jurisprudence.
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MARIA AURORA G. MATHAY, ISMAEL G. MATHAY III, MARIA SONYA M. RODRIGUEZ,

AND RAMON G. MATHA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ANDREA L. GANDIONCO,
DOCTRINE
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court, but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime, but so intimately connected with
it that its ascertainment determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
FACTS
Petitioners Maria Sonya M. Rodriguez (Maria Sonya), Ismael G. Mathay III (Ismael III),
Ramon G. Mathay (Ramon), and Maria Aurora G. Mathay (Maria Aurora) are siblings, whose
parents are the late Quezon City Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. (Ismael) and Sonya Gandionco
Mathay (Sonya).
Sonya and her sons, Ismael III and Ramon, along with Sonya's youngest sister, Andrea
L. Gandionco (private respondent), organized Goldenrod, Inc. During her lifetime, Sonya
managed and operated Goldenrod, Inc
At the time of her death, Goldenrod, Inc.'s General Information Sheet (GIS) reflected
Sonya as having subscribed to 60% of its total shareholdings. This GIS was signed by its
corporate secretary, Aida Palarca (Aida), and filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). After Sonya's death, the amended GIS showed that private respondent
owned 52% of the shareholdings of Goldenrod, Inc.,
The amendment of the GIS was prompted by the presentation of a Declaration and
Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) by private respondent to Aida. The Declaration was
executed by Sonya, who acknowledged therein that private respondent is the real owner of
the 60% shares of stock in Goldenrod, Inc. Sonya, in said Declaration, returned 52% of said
shares of stock to private respondent through the SPA. The remaining 8% shares, upon the
wishes of private respondent, were donated to petitioners, but were placed under Sonya's
custodianship until their actual distribution to petitioners.
Petitioners successively filed two (2) GIS of Goldenrod, Inc. with the SEC. Both GISs
showed an increase of Sonya's shares to 60% from the 8% shares reflected in the amended
GIS. Private respondent's name as shareholder was likewise conspicuously absent. Hence,
Private respondent, then, filed a civil complaint for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and
Mandamus against petitioners. Private respondent claimed deprivation of her shares of
Goldenrod, Inc. belonging to her by virtue of the SPA she allegedly entered into with Sonya.
Thus, she prayed for the return of shares, to call a special stockholders' meeting to elect a
new set of directors, to restrain petitioners from managing and exercising the powers and
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duties as directors of Goldenrod, Inc., for accounting of proceeds and funds paid to, received,
and earned by Goldenrod, Inc.; and for inventory of assets of Goldenrod, Inc.
Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for Qualified Theft through
Falsification of Public Documents by a Private Individual. The RTC denied the motions of
petitioners and ordered the issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest against them.
Holding that a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction, the trial court found that the allegations in the
Information and the affidavit-complaint, together with the documents submitted by the
prosecution, prima facie show all the elements of qualified theft through falsification of
public documents. Furthermore, the RTC gave credence to the Declaration where Sonya
admitted that her sister, private respondent, is the real owner of the 60% shares of stocks of
Goldenrod, Inc.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for Issuance
of TRO/Preliminary Injunction before the CA. The CA held that in the crime of theft,
ownership of the stolen property is immaterial. The law merely requires that the stolen
property must not belong to the offender.
ISSUES
1. Whether there is probable cause to charge them with Qualified Theft through
Falsification of Public Documents;
2. Whether the Information is defective;
3. Whether there is a prejudicial question which warrants the suspension of the criminal
proceedings against petitioners.
RULING
YES. The Court rules in the affirmative.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provide when a
criminal action may be suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action, and what the elements of the prejudicial question are, respectively:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court, but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is
a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime, but so intimately connected
with it that its ascertainment determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also
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that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.
There are two pending civil cases, which bear issues that, to the mind of the Court,
are determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioners in the instant criminal case.
Hence, should private respondent be adjudged not entitled to the shares of stocks in
the pending civil cases, there could have been no crime of qualified theft to speak of as the
elements of: (1) the property belonging to another; (2) the taking done with intent to gain;
(3) the taking done without the owner's consent; and (4) the taking done with abuse of
confidence would be absent.
In the same vein, there would be no crime of falsification to speak of, as well, because
there would be no perversion of truth and the statements in the two GISs would neither be
"untruthful statements in a narration of facts," nor "absolutely false." The Petition is
GRANTED.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO

DOCTRINE
By constitutional design, the accused is afforded the presumption of innocence - it is for
the State to prove the guilt of the accused. Without the State discharging this burden, the Court
is given no alternative but to acquit the accused. Moreover, if the process of gathering evidence
against the accused is tainted by a violation of the accused's right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which is a most cherished and protected right under the Bill of Rights,
the evidence procured must be excluded, inevitably leading to the accused's acquittal.
FACTS
In an Information, the accused-appellant Sapla was charged with violation of Section
5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, for then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in
his possession, control and custody four bricks of marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug, and
transport in transit through a passenger jeepney without license, permit or authority from
any appropriate government entity or agency.
The next day accused-appellant was committed to the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP). Upon his arraignment, he pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged against
him.
The evidence for the Prosecution established that an officer on duty at the RPSB office
received a phone call from a concerned citizen, who informed the said office that a certain
male individual would be transpiring marijuana from Kalinga and into the Province of
Isabela. Subsequently, a joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the Talaca command
post. The passenger jeepney then arrived in the afternoon, wherein the police officers at the
Talaca checkpoint flagged down the said vehicle and told its driver to park on the side of the
road. Officers Labbutan and Mabiasan approached the jeepney and saw Sapla seated at the
rear side of the vehicle. The police officers asked him if he was the owner of the blue sack in
front of him, which the latter answered in the affirmative. The said officers then requested
him to open the blue sack, and the officers saw four bricks of suspected dried marijuana
leaves, wrapped in newspaper and an old calendar. PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested
him, informed him of the cause of his arrest and his constitutional rights in Ilocano dialect.
PO2 Mabiasan further searched accused-appellant. Thereafter, PO2 Mabiasan seized the
dried marijuana leaves and brought them to their office for proper markings.
At the RPSB's office, PO2 Mabiasan took photographs and conducted an inventory of
the seized items and placed his signature on the said items. The conduct of inventory was
witnessed by accused-appellant Sapla, and by the following: 1) Joan K. Balneg from the
Department of Justice; 2) Victor Fontanilla, an elected barangay official; and 3) Geraldine G.
Dumalig, as media representative. Thereafter, PO3 Labbutan brought the accused-appellant
at the KPPO-PAIDSOTG Provincial Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Juan M. Duyan for
further investigation.
Page 340 of 435

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On the other hand, the Defense presented accused-appellant Sapla as its sole witness,
who denied the charges against him and instead, offered a different version of the incident.
He claimed that he boarded a jeepney, and left for Roxas, Isabela to visit his nephew. Upon
reaching Talaca checkpoint, police officers flagged down the said jeepney in order to check
its passengers' baggages and cargoes. The police officers then found marijuana inside a sack
and were looking for a person who wore fatigue pants at that time. From the three (3)
passengers who wore fatigue pants, the said police officers identified him as the owner of
the marijuana found inside the sack. He denied ownership of the marijuana, and asserted
that he had no baggage at that time. Thereafter, the police officers arrested and brought him
to the Talaca barracks, wherein the sack and marijuana bricks were shown to him.
The RTC rendered its Decision convicting accused-appellant Sapla for violating
Section 5 of R.A. 9165. The RTC found that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish
the corpus delicti of the crime. The CA affirmed the RTC 's Decision with modifications. The
CA found that the search and seizure was lawful as it was a valid warrantless search of a
moving vehicle. The CA held that the essential requisite of probable cause was present,
justifying the warrantless search and seizure
ISSUE
Whether there was a valid search and seizure conducted by the police officers. (NO)
RULING
NO. The Court finds for accused-appellant Sapla and immediately orders his release
from incarceration.
As a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the authorities is reasonable

only when a court issues a search warrant after it has determined the existence of probable
cause through the personal examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses presented before the court, with the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized particularly described. Because of the sacrosanct position occupied by
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures in the hierarchy of rights, any deviation
or exemption from the rule is not favored and is strictly construed against the government.
There are, however, instances wherein searches are reasonable even in the absence
of a search warrant, taking into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner
in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured. The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless
searches and seizures are: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5)
customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
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Case Digests
In upholding the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the authorities, the
RTC and CA considered the police operation as a valid warrantless search of a moving
vehicle.
According to jurisprudence, "warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are

allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances
as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where
the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection."
On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only when "the
officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains an
item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction."
The Court finds error in the CA's holding that the search conducted in the instant case
is a search of a moving vehicle. The situation presented in the instant case cannot be
considered as a search of a moving vehicle.
The Court now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine that exclusive reliance
on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that permits a warrantless
search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search - which include both long-
standing and the most recent jurisprudence - should be the prevailing and controlling line of
jurisprudence.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PETER LOPEZ Y CANLAS

DOCTRINE
The absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the buy-
bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has
left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug
dealers. A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary, especially where the
police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment.
FACTS
Lopez was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs. When
arraigned, Lopez pleaded not guilty to both charges. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that the intelligence operatives of the Philippine

National Police (PNP) Iriga City held a briefing in preparation for a buy-bust operation
against Lopez whose identity was confirmed by a confidential asset. PO1 Jonard Buenaflor
was designated to act as a poseur-buyer. As they waited for Lopez, the back-up operatives
positioned themselves in the area. Lopez arrived on a motorcycle and proceeded to ask the
informant how much they would be buying. PO1 Buenaflor then handed P2,000.00 to Lopez.
In turn, the latter gave him a small heat-sealed transparent sachet containing crystalline
substance which the poseur-buyer suspected as shabu. PO1 Buenaflor then delivered the
seized plastic sachet and Lopez to the provincial crime laboratory for examination, which
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
On the other hand, the defense established that Lopez just came from a gas station
where he met a certain Rico Murillo who gave him P2,000.00. He was instructed by the latter
to give the same to a person who he knew went by the name Engineer Tubig. He then rode
his motorcycle and went on his way only to be flagged down by PO1 Buenaflor upon reaching
Tantiado Hardware. When he inquired what his violation was, the police officer told him to
hold the money, but ordered him to stay put. In addition to that, PO1 Buenaflor collected the
keys of his motorcycle. After some time, about five to six policemen arrived at the scene.
When Viñas and Bongais showed up, the police officers took photographs of Lopez. He was
also frisked, but the police officers found nothing in his person. However, he saw one police
officer in civilian clothes take a plastic sachet from his own pocket which he revealed to Viñas
and Bongais. After Lopez's arrest, he was taken to the police station where he was
photographed with the plastic sachet and the money. Later, he was brought to the crime
laboratory. He was provided with water to drink which tasted unpleasant. Nevertheless, he
still drank it since the police officers needed his urine sample.
The RTC found Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The RTC
gave full credence to the testimony of the apprehending officers considering that their
testimonies were corroborated on material matters by documentary proof. The CA affirmed
the RTC's Judgment and sustained the conviction of Lopez.
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ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's Judgment finding Lopez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violations of Sections 5 and 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
RULING
YES. After a careful review of the records, the Court partly grants the appeal.
Insofar as the charge for violation of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is concerned, the Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from
the lower courts' findings that, indeed, the guilt of Lopez was sufficiently proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
However, with respect to the charge for violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 on illegal use of dangerous drugs, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove
the conduct of a confirmatory test subsequent to the screening test as required by law.
Hence, to this charge, Lopez should be acquitted.
The criminal liability of the accused-appellant under both charges are discussed
separately. In Criminal Case No. IR-10559, Lopez was found guilty by the lower courts of the
crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. In the present case, the Court agrees with the lower
courts that the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were adequately and satisfactorily
established by the prosecution.
A perusal of the proceedings before the trial court shows that the police operatives of
PNP Iriga City held a briefing for the conduct of a buy-bust operation against Lopez. Settled
is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of
the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The
Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to
apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary,
especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the
entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. We have held that when time is of the
essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance. In the instant case,
having been accompanied by the informant to the person who was peddling the dangerous
drugs, the policemen need not have conducted any prior surveillance before they undertook
the buy-bust operation.
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore,
ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia. This is a singular and rigid standard. Anything less than strict adherence
would automatically be a deviation from the chain of custody rule that would only pass
judicial muster in the most exacting of standards following the twin-requirements of: (1)
existence of justifiable reasons, and (2) preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items. In these cases, the point of contention should not revolve around the
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amount of illegal drugs seized, but on whether the constitutional and statutory rights of an
accused are protected in the prosecution of the crime he or she stands accused.
The Court notes in this case the meticulousness of the apprehending officers in their
compliance with the chain of custody rule and in documenting their movements. Additional
safeguards employed by the police operatives in this case such as the taking of photographs
in every step of the operation, though not legally required, are commendable practices in law
enforcement. Equal note should also be made on the prosecution's efforts in drawing out the
details in establishing the crucial custodial links to secure the identity and integrity of the
dangerous drug seized from the accused. This shows that the requirements imposed by
Section 21, while exacting considering the liberties at stake, are logical and susceptible to
strict and full compliance.
Further, in drug cases, two distinct drug tests are required: a screening test and a
confirmatory test. A positive screening test must be confirmed for it to be valid in a court of
law. The evidence for the prosecution, however, shows the conduct of only one test.
When the urine sample recovered from Lopez yielded a positive result, the specimen
should have been subjected to a second test - the confirmatory test, which is an analytical
test using a device, tool or equipment with a different chemical or physical principle that is
more specific which will validate and confirm the result of the screening test. It is the second
or further analytical procedure to more accurately determine the presence of dangerous
drugs in the specimen.
Considering that the Chemistry Report merely contains the results of the screening
test conducted, the same cannot be valid before any court of law absent the required
confirmatory test report. Without the requisite confirmatory test, the accused-appellant
cannot be held criminally liable for illegal use of dangerous drugs under Section 15, R.A. No.
9165. An acquittal for this charge follows as a necessary consequence.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ELIZABETH NYAMBURA RUNANA

AND MA. GRACE LACSON Y NAVARRO
DOCTRINE
It should be stressed that compliance with the requirements of Section 21 is crucial in
the prosecution of drugs cases for if substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized
prohibited drugs are proven, this will cast serious doubts on the authenticity of the evidence
presented in court and entitle the accused to an acquittal.
FACTS
Lacson and Runana were charged with violating Section 5, in relation to Section 26,
Article II of R.A. 9165, or conspiracy to transport or deliver prohibited drugs.
When Runana and Lacson were arraigned, both pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
on the merits then ensued.
The prosecution established that Runana and Lacson were indicted following their
arrest during an entrapment operation undertaken by the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), which was undertaken following a tip from a regular confidential informant.
Said confidential informant came to the PDEA office to report that she had been recruited by
a certain "Gina" as a drug courier who would travel to Malaysia as a tourist to bring luggage
containing illegal drugs. She was also instructed by "Gina" to recruit another person to do
the same. IO2 Alarde relayed this information to his team leader, who instructed him to
report whatever would be discussed with "Gina”. Later on, IO2 Alarde found out that "Gina"
was in fact Lacson, the person who he had been communicating with two years ago as part
of his investigation on an African drug syndicate operating in Malaysia and Thailand. He did
not immediately recognize her because she looked different from her pictures on Facebook.
On the other hand, the defense established that Runana claimed that she was a Sales
Executive Manager back in Kenya. She came to the Philippines and met a Filipina, Gina
Lacson. They talked for a while and agreed to have a few drinks in Runana's room. While
drinking, Lacson excused herself to fetch her boyfriend. Fifteen minutes later, someone
knocked on the door. Two men suddenly entered the room, pointed guns at Runana and
ordered her to sit on one of the beds. The men allegedly took Runana's jewelry and cellular
phone, and ordered her to be quiet. Runana was taken to another room, about four doors
away. There, she saw Lacson and other persons. Runana was ordered to sit on the far end of
one of the beds. On the other bed were two bags with aluminum foils on top. One of the men
informed her that they were PDEA agents and that she was being arrested for drugs. Said
agent told her that he would help her cause if she would be silent about what happened in
her room earlier. The agents assured her that she would be able to catch her scheduled flight
back to Kenya that night. However, she was taken to the PDEA office and was detained there
for two days.
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During the trial, Runana presented her wedding invitation, receipt from the caterer,
and photos with her fiance. Her sister, Alice, also testified on the alleged reason for Runana's
trip and that it was her who recommended visiting the Philippines to Runana.
On the other hand, only Lacson testified for her defense. While waiting for her
boyfriend to arrive from Cebu, she booked a room at Hostel 1632. She met Runana in the
elevator. Runana invited Lacson for a drink in her room. As she was opening the door of her
room, three men suddenly grabbed her and pushed her inside the room. Inside, there were
four other men and three women. They asked Lacson where "the foreigner" was. She
remembered Runana whom she had just met. Thus, she led the men to Runana's room and
knocked on the door. When Runana opened the door, two of the men entered the room, while
one of them brought her back to her room. Inside her room, Lacson saw two pieces of luggage
on the bed and several persons observing the luggage and searching the room. The persons
inside the room took pictures of the items on the bed and later brought in Runana to take
pictures of them as well.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding both Runana and Lacson guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. It declared that all the elements of Section 5, Article
II of R.A. 9165 in relation to the attempt to deliver, distribute and transport any dangerous
drugs were duly proved by the prosecution. The RTC also held that conspiracy may be
inferred from the acts of the accused as they clearly had knowledge of the illegal drugs neatly
concealed in the two pieces of luggage. This was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in finding Lacson guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 5, in relation to Section 26, Article II of R.A. 9165.
RULING
No. In illegal transportation of prohibited drugs, the essential element is the
movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another.
In the present case, the prosecution's evidence clearly shows that Lacson intended to
transport the seized prohibited drugs. Based on the information gathered by IO2 Alarde,
Lacson planned to transport the seized prohibited drugs to Malaysia through the use of drug
couriers in the person of the confidential informant and IO2 Alarde. At that point, the crime
of transportation of prohibited drugs is already at its attempted stage. Again, under Section
26 of R.A. 9165, even an attempt to transport prohibited drugs is already penalized by the
same penalty prescribed for the commission thereof.
However, to sustain a conviction on illegal transportation of prohibited drugs, the

prosecution must also prove the identity of the corpus delicti of the crime. To maintain the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized prohibited drug, the apprehending officers must
ensure that the chain of custody in handling the same is not compromised. The procedure
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therefor is specifically outlined in Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 and the corresponding
provisions in its IRR.
Under Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165, the apprehending team shall, among others,
"x x x immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative each from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof." Thereafter, and "within twenty-
four (24) hours, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination." The forensic laboratory examiner shall then issue
a certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath,
within 24 hours after the receipt of the subject item/s.
As exemplified in this case, the apprehending officers were able to meet the
requirements mandated by law in spite of them having barely 24 hours to plan the
entrapment operation. This case is therefore an exemplar of how strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 can easily be done, so that law
transgressors will be properly penalized, on the one hand, and the rights of individuals be
safeguarded against undue abuses, on the other.
The Court thus enjoins law enforcement agencies, the prosecutorial services, as well
as the courts, to observe strict compliance with these mandatory requirements. Exceptions
therefrom should be limited and allowed only under justified and meritorious cases, and
when the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized prohibited drugs are preserved. It
should always be remembered that what is at stake here is no less than the Constitution
which secures the life and liberty of individuals by recognizing the accused's right to be
presumed innocent — a Constitutional right that should never be made subservient to
expediency and convenience of prosecution. The appeal is DENIED.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ESMERALDO "JAY" AMURAO Y TEJERO

DOCTRINE
Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense
charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such
ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation,
officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing
an offense which he or she would otherwise not commit and has no intention of committing.
But in entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in
the mind of the accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the
criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the accused cannot justify his or her conduct.
In instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will have to be acquitted.
But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been said, instigation is a "trap
for the unwary innocent" while entrapment is a "trap for the unwary criminal."
FACTS
Amurao and Valencia were charged with Trafficking in Persons under five separate
sets of Information. Both accused were also charged with violation of RA 7610 or the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act under four sets of
Information. Amurao and Valencia pleaded "not guilty" to all charges.
The prosecution established that the National Bureau of Investigation - Central Luzon
Regional Office (NBI CELRO) received a report from the International Justice Mission (IJM),
a non-governmental organization involved in anti-trafficking in person project, that
appellant Esmeraldo T. Amurao was involved in prostituting women in Pampanga, some of
whom are minors. The NBI agents returned to their office and informed their superior about
the result of their operation. Special Investigator (SI) III Henry C. Roxas, Jr. organized a team
for possible rescue and entrapment operations. The team also coordinated with the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) Region III and requested them to
form part of the support group. Since the NBI failed to secure an arrest warrant for appellant,
they decided to proceed with the entrapment operation and prepared the entrapment
money. When they arrived at the area, the appellant offered them some girls but they insisted
that they be given minor girls. Minutes later, appellant, together with co-accused Marlyn D.
Valencia, arrived with six minor girls in tow. Realizing that the girls brought by appellant and
accused Marlyn D. Valencia were indeed minors, the undercover NBI agents requested the
girls to go inside their van. Accused Valencia also boarded the van as she was acting as their
"mamasan" as she was chaperoning the girls. SI Henry Roxas then handed to the appellant
the marked money. Appellant gave the rest of the money to BBB, who was acting as the leader
of the girls. Once the girls were all inside the van, SI Henry Roxas signaled the rest of the team
through a missed call and proceeded with the rescue operation. Appellant was subsequently
arrested and the marked money was recovered from him and BBB.
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After the operation, the team brought the six girls to the DSWD Region III Office, while
appellant and accused Marlyn D. Valencia were brought to NBI-CELRO for fingerprinting and
photograph taking. At the DSWD, the girls executed sworn statements narrating the
circumstances that transpired prior to their rescue, particularly the fact that appellant and
accused Marlyn D. Valencia recruited and promised them money in exchange for sex with a
customer. They likewise declared that they were still minors at the time of their rescue.
Appellant and accused Marlyn D. Valencia were subjected to Inquest Proceedings to which
Prosecutor Modesto A. Cendana found probable cause and recommended the filing of several
Information for Violation of RA 9208 and RA 7610, respectively.
On the other hand, the defense established that the NBI agents gave him P500.00 to
look for girls, but, when he failed to provide the girls, the agents still gave him a tip of P500.00
since the said agents won in the casino. Accused-appellant then contacted his co-accused
Marlyn to look for girls. Later on, they were able to bring only four girls to the agents. While
in front of Natalia Hotel, two other girls passed by and were invited by one of the girls they
brought to the agents. When they introduced the girls to the agents, the girls and Marlyn
boarded the van of the agents. The agents handed the marked money. Thereafter, the agents
declared that they were NBI agents and immediately arrested accused-appellant
The RTC convicted accused-appellant Amurao. It held that the prosecution was able
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant committed the acts of recruitment
upon the persons of AAA, and minors BBB and CCC, for prostitution.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision, with modification only as to the award of damages.
The CA did not give any credence to Amurao's defenses. On the defense of instigation, the CA
held that there was no indication that Amurao was merely induced to commit the crime. On
the contrary, the testimonies of the witnesses proved that Amurao was already engaged in
the illicit business of recruiting women into prostitution. The NBI agents merely devised a
scheme to facilitate Amurao's apprehension through the entrapment operation.
ISSUE
Whether the guilt of Amurao was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
YES. The Court affirms the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. The Court
upholds the findings of the courts a quo that Amurao's guilt for the offense of Trafficking in
Persons against AAA and Qualified Trafficking in Persons against minors BBB and CCC for
the purpose of prostitution was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution was able
to establish all the elements of the offense of simple Trafficking in Persons and Qualified
Trafficking in Persons. The testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC were direct,
straightforward, and consistent. They all similarly testified that Amurao recruited them
for the purpose of prostitution.
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The testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC also corroborated the testimony of the
arresting officer from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Special Investigator III (SI)
Henry Roxas, who detailed the conduct of the entrapment operation which led to the arrest
of Amurao and Valencia. Even Amurao himself corroborated the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses. He admitted that he was at the Natalia Hotel where he met two NBI
agents acting as poseur-buyers who inquired about minor girls. Amurao likewise did not
deny that he brought the female victims to Natalia Hotel for the purpose of prostituting them.
Amurao merely interposed the defense of instigation, alleging that he was forced by the NBI
agents to commit the crime.
Moreover, there is no indication that Amurao was merely forced or induced to commit
the crime. His defense is belied by his own actions in readily agreeing to procure girls for the
NBI agents/poseur-buyers and in his active recruitment of the victims. Thus, Amurao's
defense of instigation has no merit. Acting on the report from the International Justice
Mission, the NBI agents conducted a valid entrapment. They merely devised a scheme to
facilitate Amurao's illegal activities in order to arrest him. Given the foregoing, the Court
affirms Amurao's conviction. The appeal is DISMISSED.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, V. SAGISAG ATLAS “PAUL” BAUTISTA, ARLETH

BUENCONSEJO AND ROSAMEL CARA DE GUZMAN, SAGISAG ATLAS “PAUL” BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 218582, September 03, 2020, First Division, (CAGUIOA, J.)
DOCTRINE
An illegal recruiter may be held liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment committed in
large scale and estafa without risk of being put in double jeopardy, for as long as the accused
has been so charged under separate Informations.
FACTS
In 11 separate Informations, accused-appellant Bautista, together with co-accused
Buenconsejo and De Guzman, was charged with 10 counts of estafa. The Informations were
consolidated and during arraignment, accused-appellant Bautista pleaded not guilty.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Rowena G. Panganiban

(Rowena), Randy Pajarillo (Randy), Rolando De Vera (Rolando) and Efren Dingle (Efren)
(collectively, private complainants). Randy testified that he met accused-appellant Bautista
when the latter recruited him to work as a factory worker in Korea. He paid accused-
appellant Bautista P50,000.00 for the processing fee. After his payment, Randy later learned
that accused-appellant Bautista was arrested following an entrapment operation. Randy,
along with other persons who were also recruited by accused-appellant Bautista, visited the
latter in Camp Crame, but they failed to see accused-appellant Bautista in person. They were
instead told to go and see accused-appellant Bautista’s co-accused Buenconsejo, who
was supposedly the one who would speak to them about the money that they had given to
accused-appellant Bautista.
On cross-examination, Randy claimed that accused-appellant Bautista represented

that accused Buenconsejo was the owner of the recruitment agency, who later on denied
having any connections with the said agency. The prosecution also presented the testimony
of Rolando, who testified that similarly to Randy, Rolando was also introduced to accused-
appellant Bautista by Maribel, who told him that accused-appellant Bautista was looking for
workers to be sent to South Korea, as replacement for those applicants who backed out. On
the promise that he would be deployed to South Korea, Rolando gave accused-appellant
Bautista a total of P144,000.00 paid in seven installments, to supposedly cover the swapping
fee, the visa processing expenses, as well as airfare costs. Finally, the prosecution presented
Efren, who testified that he also met accused-appellant Bautista through Maribel, and that
accused-appellant Bautista also represented that he was recruiting applicants for work in
South Korea. Efren added that in order to be included among the list of recruits, he gave
accused-appellant Bautista a total of P159,000.00. Despite said payments, however, accused-
appellant Bautista failed to deploy Efren to South Korea as promised, and he later discovered
that the recruitment agency he paid fees to had already closed.
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Accused-appellant Bautista countered that he was merely an administrative assistant

of Baler Aurora Travel & Tours, Inc., which in turn is owned by his co-accused Buenconsejo
and De Guzman. He alleged that he met Randy, Rolando, and Efren when they purchased
plane tickets for Korea. He claimed that it was his co-accused De Guzman who received the
payments for the tickets, and that he was merely instructed to issue provisional receipts for
the payments. He further denied conspiring with his co-accused to misrepresent and
promise work in South Korea in exchange for money. He said that whenever he accepted
money from the complainants, he merely did so in behalf of his co-accused De Guzman, and
that in cases when he accepted money on his own behalf, he did so on the understanding that
the money was for the payment of the tuition fee for the Korean language classes he
conducted.
The RTC convicted accused-appellant Bautista of the crimes charged. It found that the
prosecution was able to establish the requisites for a finding of estafa as committed against
Randy, Rolando, and Efren. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE
Whether the lower courts erred in convicting accused-appellant Bautista of three
counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, and violation of Section 6 of
R.A. 8042.
RULING
NO. The appeal is bereft of merit. Accused-appellant Bautista counters that in all
instances, what were involved were only unfulfilled promises, absent deceit or
misrepresentation. He proffers that there was no fraud, but merely a non-compliance of the
supposed promise of job placements abroad.
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the RPC is committed by any person who
defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of
similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. In this
situational context, the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act
or fraudulent means used by accused-appellant Bautista and sustained damages as a result
thereof
Here, it is not disputed that private complainants Randy, Rolando and Efren all relied
on accused-appellant Bautista’s promise that he would be able to arrange for their
placements in jobs in South Korea, but that despite payments of varying amounts of fees and
the processing of the supposedly required documents, they were unable to leave the country
to work abroad as they were assured, and as a consequence, all three suffered damages.
These facts squarely fall within the definition of estafa, and belies accused-appellant
Bautista’s insistence that these were merely cases of benign unfulfilled promises. Instead,
and as found by the lower courts, these consisted of a series of deceitful acts that are
precisely within the contemplation of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the RPC.
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Illegal recruitment, on the other hand, is committed by a person who: (a) undertakes
any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated
under Articles 34 and 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a license or authority to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. It is committed on a large scale
when it is committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.
To prove illegal recruitment, two elements must be shown, namely: (1) the person
charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities, or any of the activities
enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended; and (2) said person does not have
a license or authority to do so. Contrary to accused-appellant Bautista’s mistaken notion,
therefore, it is not the issuance or signing of receipts for the placement fees that makes a case
for illegal recruitment, but rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the
necessary license or authority.
Further, to establish that the offense of illegal recruitment was conducted in a large
scale, it must be proven that: (1) the accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement
of workers defined under Article 13(b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the
Labor Code; (2) the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority
to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) the accused commits the
unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. All three elements
have been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Clearly, as testified to by the private complainants, the accused nevertheless engaged

in recruitment and placement activities without the
requisite authority, and were therefore properly charged with illegal recruitment.
Accused-appellant Bautista's reliance on the Equipoise Rule is likewise misplaced.

The Equipoise Rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced,
the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused. This Rule
cannot find application in accused-appellant Bautista's case because, contrary to his
submission, the evidence submitted and evaluated by both lower courts mount high against
accused-appellant Bautista's denial and ineffective and uncorroborated feigning of
innocence. The total evidence presented by both parties is asymmetrical, with the
prosecution's submissions indubitably demonstrating accused-appellant Bautista's guilt.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WODIE FRUELDA Y ANULAO

G.R. No. 242690, September 03, 2020, First Division, (CAGUIOA, J.)
DOCTRINE
When the case pivots on the issue of the credibility of the victim, the findings of the trial
court necessarily carry great weight and respect. This is because the trial court's determination
proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their
conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique
position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and
candor.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Fruelda for the crime of rape. Upon arraignment,
Fruelda pleaded not guilty. After pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits ensued.
The private complainant testified that she is a member and a full-time worker of Jesus
the Anointed One Church. She is in charge of the storeroom where bars of soaps, coffee and
other items used to generate funds for the congregation were stored. On the other hand, the
accused was the driver of the church's Bishop. When the accused arrived on the morning of
28 April 2014, the accused asked her where the storeroom was, and asked to retrieve bar
soaps for him to which she obliged. Private complainant entered the storeroom through its
main door while the Accused trailed behind her. While she was explaining that an inventory
is required before the items can be disposed of, the Accused suddenly grabbed her breasts.
Out of shock, private complainant shouted. Although the Accused released her breasts, he,
however, immediately grabbed the front of private complainant's pants directly over her
private part. She was shouting in pain as the Accused dragged her further inside the bodega.
The last thing she saw was the accused pulling out his penis and she heard him saying
"tumuwad ka".
When she regained composure, private complainant realized that she was already
seated on the floor. She saw that her pants as well as her underwear were pulled down to
her knees but the Accused was no longer to be found. She also does not know how much time
has already lapsed after the accused told her "tumuwad ka". Although it was already dark
and she could not see anything, private complainant gathered her senses, pulled up her
clothes and went out of the bodega. She was bursting in tears when her fellow church
member Conchita Pandi saw her. She retrieved her cellphone and called Edna Rabano Ilagan,
her fellow member at "Samahang Magdalo", to come to her aid. Edna Rabano Ilagan testified
that she received a call from the private complainant who was crying on the line. Private
complainant was begging to be fetched as she was allegedly raped. When she arrived at Jesus
the Anointed One Church, she saw private complainant crying and shaking near the
storeroom. She also noticed that private complainant had bruises on her body. She then
accompanied private complainant to the women's desk at Camp Miguel Malvar where they
were interviewed by P/Insp. Julieta Magpantay.
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For the defense, the following witnesses took the witness stand: the Accused Wodie
Fruelda himself, Conchita Pandi and Romel Elida.
The Accused denied the imputations against him and anchored his defense on the
sweetheart theory. The Accused testified he was acquainted with private complainant when
she joined the church in 1996. When he got married in 1999, private complainant would
usually ask him about his marital life. As time went by, they became closer with one another
until private complainant became his mistress. As such, it was just natural for the both of
them to engage in sexual activities as they did in the morning of 28 April 2014 inside the
storeroom.
When he and the Bishop returned to the church, the Accused was informed that there
was a complaint against him for rape filed by private complainant. The Bishop then told him
that they needed to go to CIDG at the PNP Headquarters wherein a certain SPO3 Mendoza
talked to him. He was then told to remain at the police station because of the complaint
lodged against him. He stayed at the police station for two (2) weeks before he was brought
to court and later to the city jail. He was saddened because the reason why he went to the
camp was to explain to his side that he did not commit the charges hurled against him.
The RTC found Fruelda guilty of the crime of rape: The CA affirmed the conviction of
Fruelda. However, the Accused-Appellant maintains that his sexual encounter with the
private complainant was consensual as they were sweethearts. By taking this stance,
Accused-Appellant inevitably admitted his carnal knowledge with private complainant. The
burden of evidence to prove their relationship as sweethearts is therefore shifted upon him.
ISSUES
1. Whether the CA erred in finding Fruelda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape by carnal knowledge.
2. Whether the CA erred in finding that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender cannot be appreciated in favor of Fruelda
RULING
1. The appeal is partly meritorious. In the case at bar, as in most rape cases, the issue
boils down to the credibility of the victim. In this regard, the Court pored over the
testimony of AAA and find that there is no reason to overturn the trial court's
assessment of AAA's credibility.
The "sweetheart theory" is an affirmative defense often raised to prove the non-
attendance of force or intimidation. When an accused in a rape case claims, as in the
case at bar, that he is in a relationship with the complainant, the burden of proof shifts
to him to prove the existence of the relationship and that the victim consented to the
sexual act.
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No such proof was presented by the defense in this case. Thus, the Court is left with
the admission of Fruelda that he inserted his finger inside AAA's private part and that
AAA fellated him — against her will. Fruelda's acts of inserting his finger inside AAA's
private part against her will and forcing AAA to fellate him constitute two different
acts of sexual assault under 266-A (2). However, since the Information is silent as to
the second act admitted by Fruelda, that of forcing AAA to fellate him, he cannot be
convicted for it.
2. YES. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in

favor of Fruelda.
Contrary to the conclusion of the CA, the Court holds that the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of Fruelda. When Fruelda
found out that AAA had lodged a complaint against him, he immediately went to the
Batangas Criminal Investigation and Detention Group to surrender. Acknowledgment
of guilt is not a condition sine qua non of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. It is sufficient that the accused spontaneously submits himself to the
authorities because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessary for
his search and capture.
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PO2 BERNARDINO CRUZ Y BASCO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 216642, September 08, 2020, First Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
As we already held in People v. Herrera citing People v. Hilario, "the fact that accused
killed a person other than their intended victim is of no moment." Evidently, Adriano's original
intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the commission of the crime of murder, a stray
bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of his act of shooting
Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS
Cruz was charged with homicide and pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
According to the Prosecution, private complainant Archibald Bernardo y David

(Bernardo) was manning his LPG business when he received a call from a customer
complaining that the LPG gas tank delivered earlier was leaking. Bernardo decided to attend
to it personally and, using his own motorcycle, proceeded to the customer. While cruising
along Paulino Street and before reaching the intersection of Nepa and Alfonso Streets,
Bernardo chanced upon Cruz who was also on a motorcycle in front of Balut Bakery.
Bernardo overtook Cruz but the latter tried to flag him down. When Bernardo looked back
and their eyes met, Cruz placed his right hand on the gun tucked in his waist and then, in a
challenging voice, shouted "Ano?" at Bernardo. Bernardo responded with "Ano rin."
Immediately, Cruz drew his gun from his waist and fired successive shots at Bernardo, who
sped off with his motorcycle to flee. In the meantime, Gerwin F. Torralba (Torralba) was
flying a kite in the area at that time. Torralba fell to the ground upon being hit by one of the
bullets fired by Cruz. Upon seeing Torralba sprawled on the ground, Cruz stopped, left his
motorcycle, and ran towards Nepa Street.
As per the Version of the Defense, Cruz, a regular member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), was on a day shift duty. Using his own motorcycle, he conducted a roving patrol
along Paulino Street up to the vicinity of San Rafael Street. While traversing Paulino Street
between the corners of Nepa and Batasan Streets, Bernardo, who was also on a motorcycle,
suddenly overtook him, blocked his path and nearly collided with his motorcycle. Cruz then
asked Bernardo, "Ano ba?" It was then that he recognized that the person who overtook him
was Bernardo, son of a former Barangay Chairman who was defeated by his mother in the
recent election. Bernardo shouted back, "Ano rin!" At the same time, Bernardo drew his gun
from his waist and pointed it at Cruz, while also moving away slowly on board his
motorcycle. Faced with imminent danger to his own life, Cruz, a policeman, acted swiftly to
prevent the aggression by drawing his service firearm and firing at the arms of Bernardo.
Thereafter, Cruz surrendered to his superior and turned-over his service firearms,
and subsequently submitted himself for investigation. It was only then that he learned that
during the incident, Torralba, a child who was playing, was accidentally hit and had died.
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The CA promulgated the assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.
The CA upheld the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
ISSUES
1. Whether the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of duty
should be appreciated in his favor;
2. Whether Cruz is guilty only of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide instead of
homicide; and
3. Whether his criminal liability should be mitigated given the sufficient provocation on
the part of Bernardo, and by his voluntary surrender.
RULING
1. NO. Cruz was not acting in self-defense or fulfillment of duty.
On the matter of self-defense, the Court concurs with the findings of both the RTC and
the CA that Cruz's act of shooting was not precipitated by any unlawful aggression on the
part of Bernardo. In self-defense, the accused bears the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence the concurrence of the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Of these
three elements, the existence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the most
important.
As found by the RTC and the CA, Cruz failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that it was Bernardo who first drew a gun. Thus, in the absence of unlawful aggression on
the part of Bernardo, the plea of self-defense must necessarily fail.
There is also no merit in Cruz's claim that he was acting in the fulfillment of his duties
as a police officer at the time of the shooting incident. To successfully invoke this justifying
circumstance, an accused must prove that: (1) he acted in the performance of a duty; and (2)
the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance or lawful exercise of such duty. It has already been established-by the
consistent factual findings of the RTC and CA, which gave more credence to the facts as
narrated by the prosecution-that Cruz's act of shooting Bernardo was without any justifiable
cause. Consequently, there is no basis to conclude that Cruz's actions were committed in
furtherance of his police duties.
Further, having pleaded self-defense, Cruz essentially admitted to the felonious act of
shooting Bernardo and inflicting fatal injuries upon the latter. On this score, the Court
concurs with the findings of the RTC and CA that Cruz is guilty of frustrated homicide.
2. NO. The death of Torralba amounts to homicide.
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Considering that the death of Torralba was caused by the same felonious act of
shooting at Bernardo, the OSG is correct when it argues that Cruz should be held guilty of
homicide as originally charged.
It has already been established that Cruz committed an intentional felony when he
fired multiple shots at Bernardo. The death of Torralba, who was hit by one of those bullets
intended for Bernardo, is a direct, natural, and logical consequence of said intentional felony.
The death of Torralba is an example of aberratio ictus.
3. NO. Cruz is only entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
While Cruz is guilty of frustrated homicide and homicide, he is entitled to the

mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender under Article 13, paragraph 7, of the RPC
which requires that the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in
authority or his agents.” For this mitigating circumstance to be appreciated, the following
elements must be present: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and 3) the surrender was
voluntary.64 All three elements are present in this case. As shown by the records, Cruz
surrendered his person and service firearm to his superior immediately after the shooting
incident.
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ALMA CAMORO PAHKIAT, MAHALITO BUNAYOG LAPINID AND FE MANAYAGA LOPEZ,

v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO AND COMMISSION ON AUDIT - XII
G.R. No. 223972, November 03, 2020, En Banc, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The general rule is that the Court defers to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman. The
Court's consistent policy has been to maintain noninterference in the determination by the
Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause.
The foregoing general rule, however, is subject to an exception - where there is an

allegation of grave abuse of discretion. In such case, the Ombudsman's act cannot escape
judicial scrutiny under the Court's own constitutional power and duty to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
FACTS
Kidapawan City State Auditor IV and Audit Team Leader, Marlene B. Aspilla issued
CAO Office Order No. 2006-07 to constitute a team to conduct a 10-day audit on the cash,
accounts and financial transactions of Barangay Poblacion after receiving information on the
alleged falsification of disbursement vouchers (DV), missing DVs, unrecorded check
issuances and other irregularities in the financial transactions of Barangay Poblacion. The
team proceeded to the Office of the Barangay Treasurer, but Joguilon failed to appear and
was later reported missing to the police. Nevertheless, the team proceeded with the audit
and submitted its 14-page Special Audit Report. A month after, Special Investigator IV
(Officer-In-Charge) Efren R. Rapacon of COA-XII indorsed the Special Audit Report to the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, recommending that criminal and administrative
proceedings be instituted against the persons named therein. Thus, the said Special Audit
Report was adopted as the complaint of COA-XII for the Complex Crime of Malversation of
Public Funds through Falsification of Public or Commercial Documents and Violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The criminal complaint was instituted together with the
administrative complaint for Dishonesty, Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service.
In a Joint Order, the Office of the Ombudsman Mindanao ordered the respondents to
submit their counter-affidavits. Tamayo, Sambuang, and petitioners submitted their Joint
Counter-Affidavit, wherein they alleged that the complaint against them should be dismissed
outright for failure to specifically allege the acts or omissions constituting the crime charged.
They cited Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that no person shall
be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law and that the accused
shall be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him or her. They posited that
the complaint failed to specifically establish their participation and that it merely concluded
that they conspired with barangay officials. They pointed out that COA-XII failed to establish
the elements of conspiracy against them.
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Thereafter, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued the assailed Resolution

dated February 28, 2011 for the criminal charges. On the same date, it also issued a Decision
for the administrative charges. The assailed Resolution and Decision are almost identical in
their narration of facts and ratiocination, extensively citing the Special Audit Report. In the
said Decision for the administrative case, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found
substantial evidence establishing the charges of Dishonesty, Misconduct, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and ordered CAO-Kidapawan personnel,
including petitioners, dismissed from the service.
Ruling on the separate motions for reconsideration of petitioners, however, the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao reversed its earlier Decision insofar as petitioners were
concerned and absolved them from liability. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found
that petitioners had no direct participation in the anomalies.
With regard to respondents Fe Manayaga Lopez, Alma Camoro Pahkiat, Mahalito

Bunayog Lapinid, their Motions for Reconsideration are hereby GRANTED and they are
hereby reinstated to their respective former positions and are entitled to full back wages as
the case against them is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
ISSUE
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding probable cause to charge herein petitioners with 107 counts of
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public and Commercial Documents
under Articles 217 and 171 of the RPC, and one (1) count of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended.
RULING
YES. The Petition is meritorious.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "an act too patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in
contemplation of law" or that the tribunal, board or officer with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers "exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility." Petitioners here have convincingly shown the presence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in this case.
Firstly, the Court finds the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao to have hastily and
arbitrarily denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. While procedural rules are
important since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice, such rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. What should guide judicial action is that party-
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litigants should be given the opportunity to establish the merits of their complaint or defense
rather than for them to lose life, liberty, honor, or property on technicalities.
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, when they result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Thus, if
only the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao had entertained the motion for reconsideration
instead of denying it cursorily and only on the basis of it being late, it would have realized
that there was a compelling reason to overturn its earlier Resolution finding probable cause
against petitioners.
The rule that the three kinds of remedies, which flow from the threefold liability of a
public officer, may proceed independently, is hinged on the differences in the quantum of
evidence required in each case. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed,
whereas a mere preponderance of evidence will suffice in civil cases. In administrative cases,
only substantial evidence is required. As such, defeat of any of the three remedies will not
necessarily preclude resort to other remedies or affect decisions reached thereat.
Although the instant case involves a criminal charge whereas Constantino involved
an administrative charge, still the findings in the latter case are binding herein because the
same set of facts are (sic) the subject of both cases. What is decisive is that the issues already
litigated in a final and executory judgment preclude-by the principle of bar by prior
judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of
the case,"—the re-litigation of the same issue in another action. It is well established that
when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them.
The ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, therefore, is much more than a
finding that there was "insufficient evidence" to hold petitioners administratively liable, but
rather, that petitioners did not commit anything at all which can potentially incriminate
them administratively or criminally.
A person acquitted of a criminal charge is not necessarily civilly free because the
quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is
greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be
completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal must be based on the fact that he did
not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused
may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained
of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged.
While the Court has in the past been wary about quashing an Information or
overturning a finding of the Ombudsman on the sole basis that the administrative case
against the accused has been dismissed, it has also balanced this respect with the right of an
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individual not to be subjected to the expense and rigors of a trial that has, by all accounts, no
leg to stand on. Certainly, the rights of the people from what could sometimes be an
"oppressive" exercise of government prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when
circumstances so require.
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CECILIA Q. REJAS v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND DIOSDADO N. DITONA, REPRESENTED BY EDWIN N.
DITONA
G.R. Nos. 241576 & 241623, November 03, 2020, First Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of
a rule of law or standard of behavior. It is considered grave where the elements of corruption
are present including a clear intent to violate the law, or a flagrant disregard of established
rules. To constitute misconduct, however, it is likewise imperative that the act or omission
complained of must have a direct relation to the public officer's duties and affect not only his
character as a private individual, but also, and more importantly, the performance of his official
duties as a public servant. The misfeasance or malfeasance must amount to either
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the
office.
FACTS
In his Affidavit Complaint filed before the Ombudsman, Diosdado Ditona (Ditona)
alleged that Rogelio N. Quiño (Rogelio), the former Municipal Mayor of Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon, approved several appointments of his brother, Antonio N. Quiño, Jr. (Antonio), as
Mechanical Shop Foreman. Ditona alleged that these appointments violated the rule on
nepotism. He further averred that petitioner, Rogelio's and Antonio's sister, certified the
appointments in her capacity as the former Municipal Budget Officer of the Municipality of
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon.8 The siblings purportedly conspired to make it appear that the
position of Mechanical Shop Foreman is of a higher salary grade (SG 15) when in truth, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, through Ordinance Nos. 2000-1519 and
2001-157,10 fixed a lower Salary grade of 11 to the position. Consequently, Antonio received
a salary higher than what was provided by law, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.11 Ditona finally alleged that Antonio falsified his personal data sheet (PDS) by
making it appear that he was not related to the appointing or recommending authority.
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, the siblings denied that there was an intention to hide
their relationship with Antonio, and that on the contrary, the fact was disclosed right from
the beginning. The position of Mechanical Shop Foreman was likewise contractual and of
non-career service, and was thusly excluded from the scope of the prohibition on nepotism
under Section 79 of the Local Government Code.
Petitioner and her brothers maintained that the hiring of Antonio did not cause undue
injury to the government, but had even proved beneficial and advantageous to the
government considering the 1,544% increase in the annual gross receipts of the heavy
equipment operations from the calendar years 2006 to 2011.
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In its Decision, the Ombudsman found the charge of nepotism against Rogelio
unmeritorious and also dismissed the charge of falsification against Antonio. However, the
Ombudsman found Rogelio and petitioner liable for grave misconduct.
In holding petitioner and Rogelio liable for grave misconduct, the Ombudsman found
their act of signing and approving the Plantilla of Casual Appointments which upgraded
Antonio's position as Mechanical Shop Foreman from salary grade 15 to 18, and of certifying
the appointments and the existence of an appropriation legally made for the purpose,
respectively, to have "transgressed some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer."
The CA ruled that petitioner and Rogelio were guilty of grave misconduct for granting
unto themselves the determination of the salary increase of Antonio, in contravention of
Sections 81 and 325 of the LGC and Sangguniang Bayan Ordinance Nos. 2000-151 and 2001-
157. Petitioner cannot likewise evade liability as she, being the local budget officer, ought to
know the budget that can only be allocated for Antonio's position
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in upholding the finding of the Ombudsman of grave
misconduct against petitioner.
RULING
The Petition is meritorious.
Local government units are endowed with power to fix the compensation of their
officials and employees. Under the LGC, the function of salary determination, which includes
any increase or adjustment, is lodged in the sanggunian concerned. This is clear from
Sections 81 and 447 of the LGC, to wit:
SEC. 81. Compensation of Local Officials and Employees. - The compensation of local
officials and personnel shall be determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided,
That the increase in compensation of elective local officials shall take effect only after
the terms of office of those approving such increase shall have expired: Provided,
further, That the increase in compensation of the appointive officials and employees
shall take effect as provided in the ordinance authorizing such increase: Provided,
however, That said increases shall not exceed the limitations on budgetary allocations
for personal services provided under Title Five, Book II of this Code: Provided, finally,
That such compensation may be based upon the pertinent provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-Seven Fifty-Eight (R.A. No. 6758), otherwise known as the
"Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."
xxxx
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SEC. 447. Powers. Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The sangguniang bayan,
as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers
of the municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(1)
Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective
municipal government, and in this connection shall:
xxxx
(viii)
Determine the positions and salaries, wages, allowances and other emoluments and
benefits of officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from municipal funds and
provide for expenditures necessary for the proper conduct of programs, projects,
services, and activities of the municipal government;
xxxx
Verily, in this case, the Sangguniang Bayan enacted Ordinance Nos. 2000-151 and
2001-157 which fixed the salary grade of Mechanical Shop Foreman to 11. Parenthetically,
this salary determination is compliant with DBM Local Budget Circular (LBC) No. 61, which
provides that a Mechanical Shop Foreman is a salary grade 11 position. DBM LBC No. 61 was,
in turn, prepared pursuant to Section 6 of RA No. 6758 which states that:
SECTION 6. Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades of the
Compensation and Position Classification System. - All positions in the government
covered under Section 4 hereof shall be allocated to their proper position titles and
salary grades in accordance with the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles
and Salary Grades of the Compensation and Position Classification System which shall
be prepared by the DBM.
It is undisputed that when Antonio was re-appointed as a Mechanical Shop Foreman

in a casual status beginning January 2009, his salary grade was 15. From the period of July
12, 2012 to October 11, 2012, his salary grade went up to 18. These salary adjustments, as
correctly held by the Ombudsman and the CA, contravened Ordinance Nos. 2000-151 and
2001-157 and DBM LBC No. 61. No countervailing evidence was presented to show that the
ordinances were revoked or superseded by a later ordinance. Neither was there any proof
that DBM LBC No. 61 had been revised during the relevant periods.
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The foregoing discussion, notwithstanding, the Court finds that petitioner had no
participation in the questionable act of increasing the salary grade of Antonio. Consequently,
the CA erred in affirming the finding of the Ombudsman that petitioner is guilty of grave
misconduct.
Hence, to hold petitioner liable for misconduct, the acts or omissions for which she
was charged must be of direct relation to and be connected with the performance of her
official duties as the Municipal Budget Officer and the same must be willful or intentional.
It bears emphasis at this point that the case against petitioner revolved around her
certifications appearing in the Plantilla of Casual Appointments of Antonio. It was alleged
that in certifying the same, petitioner effectively "had a hand" in irregularly upgrading the
salary of Antonio. However, a simple reading of the Plantilla of Casual Appointments plainly
shows the extent of petitioner's acts to be only with respect to certifying that appropriations
did exist for the position.
In order to establish administrative liability for misconduct, there must be a nexus

between the public official's acts and the functions of his or her office.58 Misconduct being
an intentional act, as well, the holding of the Court in PNP-CIDG v. Villafuerte,59 although
involving different charges, is illuminating. The Court in said case noted of a nexus that
should also be established between the functions of the official and a scheme to defraud the
Government. The Court cautioned that the Ombudsman cannot satisfy the threshold of
substantial evidence using only conjectures and suppositions.
Indeed, while the quantum of evidence in administrative cases does not require that
it be overwhelming or preponderant in order to be considered substantial, this does not
sanction drawing a nexus that is tenuous or rests on shaky grounds. The Court has always
lauded the Ombudsman in fulfilling its all too important role as "protector of the people," but
the Court has, at the same time, drawn the line when it becomes overzealous at the expense
of public officers. The Court once again puts its foot down in the shot-gun approach employed
by the Ombudsman in this case.
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CARLOS PEREZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE OMBUDSMAN,

G.R. No. 245862, November 03, 2020, First Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The constitutional guarantee on due process requires the State not only to observe the
substantive requirements on preliminary investigation, but to conform with the prescribed
periods under the applicable rules.
The correlation of the due process rights of the accused and the right to speedy
disposition of cases was explained in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan (Tatad) as follows: "[s]ubstantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation,
including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the
resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law.
FACTS
A complaint for Malversation of Public Funds or Property, for violation of Sections
3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,5 and for violation of Sections 37 and 48 of R.A.
No. 90036 was filed against Perez, in his capacity as the Mayor of Biñan, Laguna. The
complaint also impleaded Victor G. Rojo (Rojo), a private individual connected with Etsaw
Consultancy and Construction of Environmental Technologies International Corporation of
the Philippines.
The complaint stemmed from a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed on

November 12, 2001 between the Municipality of Biñan, as represented by Perez, and ECCE,
as represented by Rojo, wherein the Municipality of Biñan agreed to use ECCE's Hydromex
Technology for its solid waste management program, and to obtain its services for project
management, documentation, as-built drawings, installation, testing, supervision, and
training. The MOA further stated that the Municipality of Biñan was satisfied and convinced
of ECCE's capability to carry out the solid waste management program after it had observed
ECCE's Hydromex Technology in the Quezon City Hall compound. Perez's authority to enter
into the MOA was earlier granted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Biñan.
An amended MOA was supposedly executed on March 25, 2002, having the same
terms and conditions as the original MOA, except for the price and terms of payment. From
P75,000,000.00, the price was reduced to P71,000,000.00, and the terms of payment were
accelerated.10
The complaint, filed 14 years after the execution of the MOA, alleged that there was
no competitive bidding undertaken to procure ECCE's solid waste management program and
other services.
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After more than four months from the filing of the complaint, the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) Graft Investigation & Prosecution Officer issued a report on September
6, 2016, recommending the assignment of the case to a member of the Environmental
Ombudsman Team.
In a Resolution dated February 22, 2018, the OMB Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer found probable cause to charge Perez with the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019..
On October 31, 2018, Perez moved to quash the Information on the ground of
prescription of the offense. Perez pointed out that the alleged violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 occurred on November 12, 2001 up to March 25, 2002. Under Section 11 of R.A. No.
3019, all offenses punishable under this law prescribe after 15 years. Since the Information
was filed with the Sandiganbayan only on October 5, 2018, or more than 16 years from the
commission of the offense, the criminal charges should be dismissed on the ground of
prescription. In addition, Perez invoked his constitutional right to the speedy disposition of
cases.
On the issue of prescription of the offense, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the 15-year
period is applicable because R.A. No. 10910, the amendatory law of R.A. No. 3019, took effect
only on July 21, 2016. The Sandiganbayan likewise ruled that the prescriptive period
commenced to run only from the discovery of the commission of the offense, pursuant to the
"blameless ignorance" doctrine in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. For this reason, it was only when
the problems with the MOA became evident that the offense was discovered. In any case, the
Sandiganbayan held that even if it were to reckon the prescriptive period on the Sangguniang
Bayan's passage of its resolution on October 1, 2001, which approved the execution of the
subject MOA, the filing of the complaint with the OMB interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period.
Further, the Sandiganbayan held that there was no violation of Perez's right to speedy
disposition of cases.
ISSUES
(a) Whether the offense charged against Perez has prescribed; and
(b) Whether Perez's right to the speedy disposition of cases was violated.
RULING
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
a. The prescription of offenses defined in special penal laws generally begins to

run upon the commission of the offense.
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In resolving issues concerning the prescription of offenses, the Court must determine
the following: (a) the prescriptive period of the offense; (b) when the period commenced to
run; and (c) when the period was interrupted.
Since Perez was charged with the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the
prescriptive period of the offense is found in Section 1152 of the same law, which provides
that all offenses punishable under R.A. No. 3019 prescribes in 15 years. This provision was
later amended by R.A. No. 10910, increasing the prescriptive period from 15 to 20 years. The
amendatory law took effect on July 21, 2016. As such, this longer period of prescription may
not be retroactively applied to crimes committed prior to the passage of R.A. No. 10910.53
The applicable prescriptive period of the offense charged against Perez is therefore 15 years.
R.A. No. 3019 does not explicitly provide when the period begins to run. For this
purpose, reference should be made to Act No. 3326, which governs the prescription of
offenses punished by special penal laws.
As a general rule, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 prescribes that prescription is triggered
by the commission of the crime:
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
If the commission of the offense is not known at that time, prescription begins to run
from its discovery. This is otherwise referred to as the "blameless ignorance" principle which
the Sandiganbayan relied upon to hold that the offense charged against Perez has not
prescribed.
This "blameless ignorance" principle was mostly applied in cases involving behest
loans executed during the Martial Law regime, as an exception to the general rule that
prescription runs from the commission of the crime. Behest loans, by their very nature, are
not easily discovered as they normally involved a large-scale conspiracy among the loan
beneficiaries and the concerned public officials. Furthermore, there were negative
repercussions entailing the prosecution of these offenses during the Martial Law regime.
Taking the unique circumstances of behest loans under consideration, the Court ruled that
the prescription of offenses arising from these contracts did not run until after the State
discovered the violations
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As an exception, the "blameless ignorance" principle applies when the plaintiff is

unable to know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action. It
cannot always be invoked to extend the prescriptive period of the offense.
Here, the Court does not agree with the Sandiganbayan's reliance on the "blameless
ignorance" principle to rule that the offense here has not prescribed.
In this regard, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it misapplied
the discovery rule. There was neither any allegation nor evidence that Perez deliberately
concealed the MOA with ECCE from the public, such that it would be impossible for the State
to discover the anomalies in the contract. For this reason, prescription began to run upon the
execution of the MOA between the Municipality of Biñan and ECCE on November 12, 2001,
or when the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 was allegedly committed.
The filing of the complaint with the OMB on April 27, 2016 against Perez effectively
commenced the preliminary investigation proceedings. After the filing of the complaint, the
OMB was duty-bound to determine whether probable cause existed to charge Perez with the
offenses stated in the complaint.66 It was at that point that the prescriptive period was
interrupted approximately 14 years and five months after the commission of the alleged
offense.
Having settled the issue on whether the prescriptive period for the prosecution of the
offense has set in, the Court proceeds to determine whether there was a violation of Perez's
right to speedy disposition of cases.
b. There was inordinate delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation.
Accordingly, for purposes of assessing whether the right of Perez to the speedy
disposition of cases was violated, the Court must examine whether the OMB observed the
specified time periods in its conduct of the preliminary investigation. But aside from the
reglementary periods for the filing of the counter-affidavits and reply affidavits, the Rules of
Procedure of the OMB75 do not prescribe a period within which the preliminary
investigation should be concluded. That said, the Rules also provide, however, that
preliminary investigation shall be conducted in accordance with Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, subject to the specific provisions under the Rules of Procedure of the OMB
In Section 3(f), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the investigating officer must
determine whether there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial within 10 days
after the investigation. Furthermore, Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which also fills
the gap77 in the procedure lacking in the Rules of Procedure of the OMB.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but
his recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the
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latter may, by himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct another assistant
prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary
investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may
prescribe or motu propio, the Secretary of Justices reverses or modifies the resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor
concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or
information with notice to the parties. The same rule shall apply in preliminary
investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Clearly, upon the termination of the investigation or the submission of the case for
resolution, the investigating officer of the OMB has 10 days within which to determine the
presence of probable cause.
The records of this case show that the complaint against Perez was filed on April 27,
2016. He was directed to file his counter-affidavit on October 13, 2016. After about five
weeks, or on November 22, 2016, Perez requested for additional time to comply with this
directive. Perez eventually filed his counter-affidavit on December 20, 2016.
Thereafter, the resolution of the complaint against Perez remained stagnant for
nearly two years, that is, until the investigating officer issued the February 22, 2018
Resolution finding probable cause to charge him with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. Perez's motion for reconsideration was denied on June 7, 2018, and an Information
dated July 19, 2018 was prepared by the Assistant Special Prosecutor of the OMB. The
Information was then filed with the Sandiganbayan only on October 5, 2018, or more than
two months counted from the denial of Perez's motion for reconsideration.
From the filing of the last pleading on December 20, 2016, it took the OMB one year,
two months, and two days to resolve the complaint against Perez. The preliminary
investigation was therefore resolved beyond the 10-day period prescribed under the Rules.
Following Cagang, the burden of proof was then shifted to the prosecution, who was required
to establish that such delay was not inordinate. This involves proving the following: (a) the
prosecution followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation
and in the prosecution of the case; (b) the complexity of the issues and the volume of
evidence made the delay inevitable; and (c) no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a
result of the delay
Since the prosecution failed to provide ample justification for the delay in the
termination of preliminary investigation, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
denying Perez's motion to quash. In the same manner, the application for an injunctive relief
is meritorious. The Sandiganbayan is therefore permanently enjoined from proceeding with
the case.
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EDMUNDO JOSE T. BUENCAMINO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 216745-46, November 10, 2020, First Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
In all criminal cases, the prosecution is burdened with the duty of establishing with proof
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of an accused. The determination of whether the prosecution
has fulfilled such a heavy burden is left to the trial court, which, in turn, must be satisfied with
moral certainty that an accused has indeed committed the crime on the basis of facts and
circumstances to warrant a judgment of conviction. Otherwise, where there is reasonable
doubt, acquittal must then follow, for all accused are presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved
FACTS
In two separate Informations, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thus, trial on the merits ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented Engineer Constantino A. Pascual (Constantino),
Zenaida P. Pascual (Zenaida), Marciano T. Cruz (Marciano), and Clarissa Pascual Fernando
(Clarissa).
Constantino narrated that petitioner straightforwardly asked him to pay P1,000.00

as "pass way fee" per truckload. Constantino claimed that he tried to ask petitioner for any
legal document that could serve as basis for said collection, considering that RMDC was not
operating a quarry in San Miguel, Bulacan, but in Doña Remedios Trinidad, Bulacan, and only
passed through the territorial jurisdiction of San Miguel during hauling. Petitioner said that
temporary receipts would be issued by one Robert Tabemero12 (Tabernero), who was later
authorized by petitioner to receive said collections.
For her part, Zenaida she testified that the 30% royalty fee from quarrying operators
formed part of RMDC's revenue, and that the same was greatly prejudiced when its operator,
one Nora Tan (Nora), failed to remit the 30% royalty fee to RMDC due to the fact that Nora
already gave petitioner 20% thereof, allegedly per petitioner's order.24 She likewise
explained that the impounding of RMDC's delivery trucks disadvantaged RMDC because, as
a result, it failed to meet its daily quota of seven blocks per day of delivery.
The prosecution also presented Marciano, who testified that he has been the
Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Bulacan since 1998.27 His testimony centered on the
irregularity of the issuance of the official receipts which were issued to Constantino as proof
of payments of the pass way fees, more specifically the dates indicated thereon, and the
initials of the person who issued them.
The prosecution presented Clarissa as its final witness, who testified that she is the
Corporate Secretary of RMDC, as well as one of its mining operators.33 She testified that she
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herself paid pass way fees to Tabernero, as evidenced by an official receipt.34 She also
clarified that although she was the registered owner of the impounded trucks, it was her
father, Constantino, who bought them for RMDC.
After trial on the merits, the Sandiganbayan found evident bad faith attributable to
petitioner, and found such bad faith as the direct and proximate cause of RMDC and
Constantino's undue injury.
In finding petitioner guilty, the Sandiganbayan found that all the elements of unlawful
acts penalized under Section 3(e) were proven by the prosecution, and held that petitioner
did cause undue injury to Constantino, RMDC, and the government, through acts that were
attended by evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioner of two counts of violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
RULING
YES. Petitioner here is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which
provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
xxxx
In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must
concur, to wit:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or
judicial functions
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(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
The presence of the first and second elements are not disputed. Petitioner was the
Mayor of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense, and the acts complained of were done in the exercise of his official functions.
The dispute lies in whether the third element was proven, particularly whether his
act of collecting the pass way fees was done in evident bad faith and resulted in giving RMDC
or the government undue injury. The Court here finds that the prosecution failed to establish
beyond doubt the third element of evident bad faith as charged under the Informations
leveled against petitioner.
The case the prosecution built fails on two fatal points.
First, the Court agrees with petitioner's observation that a variance does exist
between the mode of commission petitioner was charged with (i.e., evident bad faith) vis-à-
vis the one he was convicted with (gross inexcusable negligence).
Second, and even granting in arguendo the prosecution's claim that the gross
inexcusable negligence was discussed by the Sandiganbayan merely to flesh out the element
of evident bad faith, and that no variance as to the mode of commission existed, the Court
finds, after a careful contemplation of the entire body of evidence, that the prosecution failed
to prove that petitioner's assailed acts were attended by evident bad faith. The Court here
agrees with petitioner's objection to the admissibility of several pieces of documentary
evidence offered by the prosecution on the ground of them being hearsay evidence. And still,
even if the Court admits the entire body of documentary evidence as submitted by the
prosecution, it is compelled to find that what it only managed to show is that petitioner's acts
stemmed not from ill will or evident bad faith, but from an honest albeit erroneous reliance
on a defunct legal authority.
It must first be considered that there are three modes by which the offense for
violation of Section 3(e) may be committed:
1.Through evident bad faith;
2. Through manifest partiality;
3. Through gross inexcusable negligence.
What is clear to the Court from the foregoing disquisition of the Sandiganbayan is that
it convicted petitioner on the modality of gross inexcusable negligence, which is separate
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and distinct from the modality of evident bad faith petitioner was charged with in the
Information. This stark variance, as correctly pleaded by petitioner, is violative of his
constitutional right to due process, specifically his right to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him.
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted
with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed
gross inexcusable negligence. The two modalities of violating Section 3(e) are distinct in
their nature of commission: "evident bad faith" entails the willfulness to do something
wrong, whereas "gross inexcusable negligence" entails failure to exercise the required
diligence that either results in a wrong or in the failure to prevent the occurrence of a
wrongdoing. Thus, "gross inexcusable negligence" and "evident bad faith" are separate and
distinct modalities, and a charge of one in an Information may not be considered extendible
to a conviction for the other.
Petitioner here, therefore, may not be convicted on the basis of gross inexcusable
negligence, since the said modality was not included in the charge leveled against him on
both counts.
In all, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to support a prayer of conviction.
Reasonable doubt has been cast on the culpability of petitioner for the crime charged. The
prosecution was unable to present sufficient evidence to prove that petitioner, in imposing
the pass way fees, was moved by a clear, notorious, evident bad faith to consciously inflict
injury on RMDC. Further, since there can be no presumption of bad faith, including cases
involving violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, failure to adequately impute
evident bad faith as required by its Section 3(e) must result in finding petitioner innocent as
he is constitutionally presumed.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 190728-29. November 18, 2020, Third Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Sequestration is the means to place or cause to be placed under the PCGG's possession
or control properties, building or office, including business enterprises and entities, for the
purpose of preventing the destruction, concealment or dissipation of, and otherwise conserving
and preserving the same until it can be determined through appropriate judicial proceedings,
whether the property was in fact "ill-gotten."
FACTS
This controversy stems from the 1986 sequestration by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) of the properties of Bataan Shipyard and Engineering
Company, Inc., and its subsidiaries Philippine Dockyard Corporation and BASECO Drydock
& Construction Co., Inc. (collectively, BASECO). Among the sequestered properties were nine
parcels of land with a total area of 3,005,104 square meters (subject properties) and
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Bataan (RD Bataan).
On February 12, 1988, the Province of Bataan sold the subject properties via a tax
delinquency sale through a public auction for the nonpayment of real property taxes on the
said properties. The Province of Bataan was the only bidder and the subject properties were
sold to it. After the lapse of the one-year redemption period with neither PCGG nor BASECO
redeeming the subject properties, the Province of Bataan filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Balanga, docketed as LRC No. 005-N'IL for the consolidation of its ownership
over the subject properties. With no opposition recorded, RTC Balanga, in its Order dated
June 22, 1989, granted the petition for consolidation and ordered the cancellation of the
pertinent Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) issued under BASECO's name, and directed the
RD Bataan to issue new certificates of title over the subject properties in the name of the
Province of Bataan.
The Province of Bataan thereafter leased the subject properties to RPort Services, and
the latter, in turn, ceded 10 hectares of the subject properties to Marina Port Services, which
entered into another lease contract for the said portion with the Province of Bataan.
Nearly four years after the RTC Balanga ordered the consolidation of ownership over
the subject properties to the Province of Bataan, or on May 14, 1993, the PCGG filed a
complaint for the annulment of the tax delinquency sale of the subject properties with the
RTC Balanga, alleging that said sale was invalid since there was no showing that the notice
of sale was published in accordance with law, or that said notice was otherwise sent to the
PCGG or BASECO. In this complaint, the PCGG further alleged that the subject properties sold
were included in the sequestered properties subject of the complaint for Reconveyance,
Reversion, Accounting, Restitution which was then pending with the Sandiganbayan, First
Division
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Four years after the PCGG filed its complaint for the annulment of the tax sale, it filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment. However, when the same also remained unacted upon, the
PCGG requested for a transfer of venue, and the same was granted, thereby transferring Civil
Case No. 212-ML to RTC Makati.
The RTC Makati granted the PCGG's Motion for Summary Judgment in its Decision and
declared the tax delinquency sale of the subject properties null and void. Consequently, the
RTC Makati ordered the RD Bataan to cancel the certificates of title issued to the Province of
Bataan, and reinstate the certificates of title in the name of BASECO. However, Enrique T.
Garcia, Jr. (private respondent Garcia), then in his capacity as Representative of the Second
District of Bataan, and the Province of Bataan, both filed motions for reconsideration of the
RTC Makati's Decision. The RTC Makati heeded these motions and through its Order dated
December 18, 2001 18 recalled and set aside its earlier Decision, and further ordered the
reception of evidence for the PCGG.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in finding no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against private respondents, and dismissing the Informations against the latter
RULING
NO. The petition lacks merit and the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan.
First, the Court agrees with private respondents' submission that petitioner availed
of the wrong remedy with the filing of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Considering that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which dismissed the
Information against private respondents was a final order that finally disposed of the case,
the proper remedy therefrom is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
Section 1
In the case at bar, it appears that petitioner resorted to the special civil action of
certiorari because petitioner failed to seasonably interpose an appeal. The Sandiganbayan
issued its Resolution on August 7, 2009. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration thereof
on August 28, 2009, but the same was denied via the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated
November 12, 2009, a copy of which was received by petitioner on November 16, 2009.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and the same may not be
entertained when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment or final order despite the
availability of that remedy. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or successive.
In this case, petitioner failed to demonstrate that the issue being raised in the present
petition, i.e., whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in
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dismissing the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. SB-08-CRM-0410 and SB-08-CRM-0411,

could not have been raised on appeal.
Finally on this point, although the Court has, in some instances, treated petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65 as having been filed under Rule 45 in the interest of justice," the
same may not be afforded petitioner in this case since the instant petition was filed after the
lapse of the period for the filing of a petition for review.
Second, even on the ground invoked by petitioner, i.e., that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Informations filed against private
respondents, the present petition must still be denied.
Private respondents here were charged before the Sandiganbayan with violations of Section
3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019 which provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited
or will profit thereby.
After a thoughtful and circumspect evaluation of the entire records of the case at bar,
the Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Informations against private respondents. In finding no grave abuse, the
Court finds: (1) that at the time private respondents entered into the Compromise
Agreement, the Province of Bataan did not enjoy any vested right over the subject properties,
and therefore, private respondents could not have injured a right or interest that did not
exist; and (2) that private respondents' decision to negotiate and enter into the Compromise
Agreement with the PCGG and BASECO is their collective judgment call pursuant to the
corporate powers of the local government unit, and may not be interfered with absent
competent proof showing any ill motive on the part of private respondents.
Province of Bataan without a vested right over the subject properties
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The case at bar, the Province of Bataan's ownership over the subject properties, apart
from it being disputed in Civil Case No. 212-ML, is likewise still subject to the resolution of
the sequestration case in Civil Case No. 0010.
More so, the Province of Bataan may not be considered to have enjoyed vested rights
so certain that a reduction of the same could support a criminal prosecution, as in this case.
Once more, since the Province of Bataan did not have a right in esse over the subject
properties, its interest could not be said to have been so permanent that the concessions
made by it in the Compromise Agreement were grossly disadvantageous to its interests as to
merit the criminal prosecution of private respondents for violation of Section 3( e) and (g)
of R.A. 3019.
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, ruled well within its jurisdiction when it determined
lack of probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest against private respondents, and
dismissed the Informations in the face of apparent absence of legal ground to stand on.
Lastly, the issue of propriety and good faith in private respondents' act of entering
into the Compromise Agreement was not an isolated incident that only took into
consideration the duties of their public office vis-a-vis the property interests of their
province. Contrarily, said question found itself within a farsighted and complex context of
other simultaneous legal disputes that included the validity of a tax sale and the more
penultimate dispute of sequestration and recovery of suspected ill-gotten wealth. Since the
propriety of the terms of the Compromise Agreement rise and fall on the nature of the right
that the Province of Bataan enjoyed over the subject properties, and since said right has been
adjudged as questionable or otherwise in dispute, the criminal prosecution of herein private
respondents stand on shifting factual grounds, and was therefore correctly dismissed.
Entering into the Compromise Agreement is within the corporate powers of the local
government unit represented by private respondents
In order to challenge and interfere with this corporate prerogative of the local
government unit, ill motive must be shown. To be sure, such ill motive was not shown, much
less alleged, in petitioner's submissions. more, the Court finds that the records of the case
at bar are bereft of any showing of ill motive that may have underpinned private
respondents' act of negotiating and entering into the Compromise Agreement. Absent a
showing of such, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's exercise of its discretion in authorizing
private respondent Garcia, as the local chief executive, to negotiate and enter into the
Compromise Agreement may not be made a basis for criminal prosecution.
Stated differently, local chief executives and local legislative bodies are necessarily
given enough elbow room to navigate and respond to the different community-based needs
and challenges that vary per constituency. The crucial flexibility of these offices, designed no
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less by R.A. 7160, is defeated when each decision that they make on behalf of their
constituency pursuant to their corporate powers are constantly threatened by prospects of
criminal backlash after the fact.
Absolutely, public office being a public trust, elected officials must be made to account
for any failure, irregularity or corruption in the discharge of the duties of their office.
However, absent clear proof of ill motive, these criminal prosecutions achieve no more than
paralyze locally elected officials into inaction, shortchange the people, and straitjacket public
service. This could not be farther from what R.A. 7160 intended. Absent proof of nefarious
motives, local elective officials must, as was intended, be given the space they need to capably
step into the shoes of the public offices they have been elected to, without the constant fear
of a Damocles sword hanging over their heads.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TEODORO ANSANO Y CALLEJA

G.R. No. 232455, December 02, 2020, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The Court has always been mindful that "the greatest care should be taken in
considering the identification of the accused, especially when this identification is made by a
sole witness and the judgment in the case totally depends on the reliability of the identification."
This stems from the recognition that testimonial evidence, unlike other forensic evidence such
as fingerprint and DNA testing which are real or object evidence, are subject to human errors
which may be intentional or unintentional. In
FACTS
An Information was filed against Ansano for the rape of minor AAA. Upon
arraignment, Ansano entered a plea of not guilty. Pre-trial and trial on the merits then
ensued.
The complaining witness is AAA, 15 years old, student and a resident of XXX. She
testified that she filed this case of rape against accused Teodoro Ansano, whom she pointed
to and identified in open court.
She stated that she did not know him at first, but when she went to the Municipal
Building, she came to know him because of his niece who is her friend. On April 6, 2005, at
about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, she was going to fetch her father at Narra, where he was
then selling goods at the river. This was at [GGG] near the river. Accused Ansano was then
carrying a bolo, wearing a long-sleeved shirt and long pants used in the farm; while she was
wearing red t-shirt and school uniform skirt. Ansano poked his bolo at her and told her to go
with him to the falls near the Narra tree. Because she was afraid and he threatened to kill her
if she does not go with him, she went along.
She came to know the name and identity of the accused on March 19, 2006 at 8:00
o'clock in the evening, when she saw him in their house having a drinking spree with her
father. She was able to recognize him ("namumukhaan"); he has a scar and "butil-butil" on
his face; he has a moustache and "medyo singkit". She came to know his name for the first
time when she went to the XXX Municipal Hall, where the accused was detained because of
the case filed by BBB. She was shown a picture of the accused, which she examined clearly,
and she was sure that he was the one who raped her.
Because she was raped, she went to [ZZZ] Provincial Hospital for a medical
examination. At the time of the incident on April 6, 2005, she was [just] thirteen (13) years
old. She presented her Certificate of Baptism issued by Santo Cristo of Bulacan, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, showing that she was born on September 14, 1991 and baptized on September
25, 1991. She does not have a Certificate of Live Birth, as her birth was not registered because
the midwife who attended to the delivery of her mother went abroad.
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The defense presented the accused himself, Teodoro Calleja Ansano, 45 years old,
single, slipper maker and residing at XXX. He stated that he does not personally know AAA.
The Court noted the manifestation of defense counsel that Ansano has no scar on his
face at the time he testified in court.
After trial on the merits, in its Decision dated November 16, 2015, the RTC convicted
Ansano of the crime.
In the questioned Decision dated February 20, 2017, the CA affirmed Ansano's
conviction, and held that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the elements of the
crime charged.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant.
RULING
YES. The appeal is meritorious. The Court acquits Ansano on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that "the Court, in the course of its review of criminal
cases elevated to it, still commences its analysis from the fundamental principle that the
accused before it is presumed innocent." This presumption continues although the accused
had been convicted in the trial court, as long as such conviction is still pending appeal.
First, the accused enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence until final
conviction; conviction requires no less than evidence sufficient to arrive at a moral certainty
of guilt, not only with respect to the existence of a crime, but, more importantly, of the
identity of the accused as the author of the crime.
Second, the prosecution's case must rise and fall on its own merits and cannot draw
its strength from the weakness of the defense.
Corollary to such principle, the Court has also laid down the following guidelines in
its review of rape cases:
(a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult
to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the
charge;
(b) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in
the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution;
and
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(c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.22
From these principles, and based on its own careful review of the records of the case,
the Court rules that a reasonable doubt exists as to Ansano's culpability. While the Court does
not doubt AAA's claim that she had been raped, the Court does not, however, have moral
certainty that it was Ansano who committed the dastardly act.
People v. Nuñez (Nuñez), the Court elucidated:
The frailty of human memory is a scientific fact. The danger of inordinate reliance on
human memory in criminal proceedings, where conviction results in the possible
deprivation of liberty, property, and even life, is equally established.
Thus, American jurisprudence has followed — and local jurisprudence later on

adopted — a "totality of circumstances test" in determining the reliability, or at times even
the admissibility, of a witness' out-of-court identification of the accused.
The jurisprudential test of "totality of circumstances"
The totality of circumstances test was first applied by the Court in People v.
Teehankee, wherein it applied the test as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Neil v. Biggers and Manson v. Brathwaite.
Application of the totality of circumstances test in the present case
To reiterate, the totality of circumstances test requires the Court to look at the
following factors in weighing the reliability of the out-of-court identification: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention
at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the length of
time between the crime and the identification; (5) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
The Court laments that neither the RTC nor the CA was able to discuss the doubt on
Ansano's identity as the perpetrator of the crime even though the issue was glaring in the
records of the case. Both the RTC and the CA focused on whether the crime indeed happened
and examined AAA's testimony only through that lens. The RTC simply said that "[t]he clear,
consistent and spontaneous testimony of [AAA] unrelentingly established how Ansano
sexually [assaulted] her on April 6, 2005 with the use of force, threat and intimidation."59
The CA was unfortunately as terse, as it held that: "AAA positively identified accused-
appellant as the perpetrator. The clear, consistent and spontaneous testimony of AAA
established that accused-appellant committed rape against the victim,"60 adding that
Ansano's defense of alibi and denial simply failed to stand in light of AAA's positive
identification.
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The Court thus takes this opportunity to remind courts that "[a] conviction for a crime
rests on two bases: (1) credible and convincing testimony establishing the identity of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime; and (2) the prosecution proving beyond reasonable
doubt that all elements of the crime are attributable to the accused."62 "Proving the identity
of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution's primary responsibility. Thus, in every
criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove
the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime
can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal
beyond reasonable doubt."
Given the foregoing findings, we are not concluding that complainant has not been a
victim of rape, or that appellant's defense of alibi and denial can be given full faith and
credence. We only stress that her testimony was unable to pass the exacting test of moral
certainty that the law demands and the rules require to satisfy the prosecution's burden of
overcoming appellant's presumption of innocence.
A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt

— moral certainty that the accused is guilty. The defense may be weak, but the prosecution
is even weaker. As a result of this finding, it will be unnecessary to discuss the other issues
raised.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ALBERTO "BERT" MARTINEZ

A.K.A. "ALBERTO BELINARIO", ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. No. 248016, December 02, 2020, First Division, (CAGUIOA, J.)
DOCTRINE
The Court has held time and again that the testimony of a child-victim is normally given
full weight and credit considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to
which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified was not true. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
FACTS
Three information were filed against the accused-appellant for rape.
During arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to each of the charges.
Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.
As culled from the evidence of the prosecution, it was shown that [AAA] was born on
January 8, 1998 to [BBB] and [CCC]. She has five other siblings, the birth order of which is:
[DDD], [EEE], [FFF], [GGG], [AAA] and [HHH]. The family is living in a one[-]story house with
six rooms, five of which are being rented out to boarders and the sixth room was occupied
by them. In one of these rooms, accused-appellant and his live-in partner were renting.
In January 2010, while they were celebrating the New Year, [accused-appellant,] who
was under the influence of liquor, again called [AAA) in his room. When they were inside, he
locked the door, grabbed her hand and laid her down. He undressed her, fondled her breast,
and licked her vagina. He then undressed his lower garment and inserted his penis inside
her vagina. After the act, he gave her [P]50.00 not to tell anyone.
At noon of October 2, 2010, the same incident happened inside his room when he
called her and he was able to suck her breast, lick her vagina and insert his penis into her
vagina. Finally, on October 3, 2010, at around 6:00 or 7:00 o'clock in the evening, accused-
appellant called [AAA] inside the comfort room because his live-in partner was in their room
and he put down her undergarments to her knees, licked her vagina and touched his penis
to her vagina. During all these incidents, she could not prevent him doing all these things to
her because he would create trouble in their residence and tell them that she was going out
with somebody. However, on October 4, 2010 when accused-appellant was again calling for
her to enter her [(sic)] room, [AAA] refused despite the trouble that he was creating by telling
stories about her. Alarmed why accused-appellant was acting this way towards [AAA], [BBB]
confronted her daughter as to the actuations of [accused appellant]. It was then that [AAA]
revealed to her what accused-appellant had been doing to her since she was in Grade 1. They
then filed a case against the accused-appellant.
When she was examined, it was found by Dr. Josefa Bentayen that there was an
absence of hymenal tissue on the labia of [AAA] and there were healed injuries at the 4:00
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o'clock position. Because of the condition of the injury, she stated that these injuries could
have occurred [(sic)] a year prior to her examination on November 24, 2010.
Further tests were conducted on [AAA] by the Municipal Social Welfare Officer of La
Trinidad, Benguet who prepared the Social Case Study report of [AAA] and by Psychologist
who diagnosed the cognitive functioning of [AAA] to be within a mild retardation level with
a mental age of seven years and one-month oId.
Accused appellant denied the actuations hurled against him. He proffered no

knowledge why AAA charged him of the crime of rape.
In affirming the RTC, the CA held that AAA was able to clearly, positively, and
convincingly narrate her miserable ordeal in the hands of accused-appellant. The CA quoted
the threshold principle that the testimonies of child-victims are generally given full weight
and credence as a young woman would not concoct a story of defloration, endure the
embarrassment and humiliation of a public disclosure that she had been ravished, allow an
examination of her private parts, and undergo the ordeal of a public trial if her story was not
true.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in finding accused-appellant guilty for three counts of Rape
under Article 266-A of the RPC.
RULING
NO. Article 266-A of the RPC reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve ( 12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and
without consent. If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force is not an element, as
the absence of a free consent is conclusively presumed as the law supposes that a woman
below this age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to
the sexual act. Conviction will therefore lie, regardless of proof of force or intimidation
provided sexual intercourse is proven. Force, threat, or intimidation are not elements of
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statutory rape, therefore proof thereof is unnecessary. But if the woman is 12 years of age or
over at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse must be proven and also that it was
done through force, violence, intimidation or threat.
The Court agrees with the conclusions of the lower courts' that the prosecution
sufficiently established, through the foregoing testimony, that accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of AAA on January 1, 2010, October 2, 2010, and October 3, 2010. The Court finds
no compelling reason to deviate from the lower courts' findings and their calibration of the
credibility of AAA, who related the details of her harrowing experiences in the hands of
accused-appellant in a simple yet convincing and consistent manner.
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EVELYN ABADINES CUICO, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 232293, December 09, 2020, First Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that every accused is
presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is "a basic
constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the
burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution's evidence and
not on the weakness of the defense."
FACTS
An Information was filed against Cuico for violating Section 12 of RA 9165, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 15th day of June, 2011, at about 1:05 o'clock A.M., in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent and without any lawful purpose did then and there
have in her possession and her control twenty four (24) disposable syringes and three
(3) empty ampoules of Nubain used for injecting NUBAIN which instruments and/or
equipments (sic) fit or intended for injecting Nubain, otherwise known as
NALBUPHINE HYDROCHLORIDE, now classified as dangerous drug per Dangerous
Drug Board Resolution No. 1, Series of 2010.
When arraigned, Cuico pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial
on the merits ensued.
The prosecution's version, as summarized by the CA, is as follows:
When they were in the interior part of Barangay Kamagayan, they saw a group of men
coming out from a small shanty made of light materials. At that point, PO3 Tiempo, who was
then standing near the open door of said shanty, saw accused-appellant inside the shanty
holding a disposable syringe used for "injecting Nubain." He knew said fact on account of his
experience, being in the police service for fifteen (15) years, and having previously made
more than ten (10) arrests involving illegal possession of drug paraphernalia in the same
area. Thus, they accosted accused-appellant and introduced themselves as police officers.
On the other hand, the evidence of the defense is based on the lone testimony of Cuico,
whose testimony was likewise summarized by the CA as follows:
Accused-appellant raised the defenses of denial and frame-up. According to her, on

June 15, 2011, at around 1:05 A.M. in Barangay Kamagayan, she was paid to attend to the
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video "karera" machine at her friend's house, which was situated at a distance of three (3)
houses from hers.
While inside her friend's house, three (3) persons, whom accused-appellant did not
know, came inside, introduced themselves as policemen, and asked if she was the video
karera attendant. After answering in the affirmative, the policemen directed her to call the
owner of the machine. However, she did not know the owner thereof. The police officers then
brought accused-appellant to the police station.
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted Cuico of the crime.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of Cuico.
RULING
YES. The petition is meritorious. The prosecution was unable to prove Cuico's guilt
In particular, in cases involving dangerous drugs, in order to hurdle the constitutional

presumption of innocence, the prosecution has the burden to prove compliance with the
chain of custody requirements under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, to wit: (1) the seized
items must be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2)
the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same; and (3) the
seized drugs or drug paraphernalia must be turned over to a forensic laboratory within
twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.
Strict compliance with the foregoing requirements is necessary in protecting the

integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, without which the crime of the illegal sale, or
illegal possession of dangerous drugs or drug paraphernalia cannot be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.21 In other words, non-compliance with Section 21 is tantamount to a
failure to establish an essential element of the crime, and will therefore engender the
acquittal of the accused.
The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other

paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12 of RA No. 9165 are: (1) possession or
control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended
for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous
drug into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law.
In the present case, there is no evidence showing that the aluminum foil, tube, and
lighters found in the petitioner's house were fit or intended for introducing any dangerous
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drug into the body. The prosecution did not bother to show that there were traces of shabu
on any of these alleged drug paraphernalia. In fact, it appears that the only evidence that the
prosecution offered to prove this charge is the existence of the seized items by themselves.
For the prosecution's failure to prove that the items seized were intended to be used
as drug paraphernalia, the petitioner must also be acquitted of the charge under Section 12
of RA No. 9165. Indeed, we cannot convict the petitioner for possession of drug
paraphernalia when it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that these items were used
or intended to be used as drug paraphernalia.
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RICHARD T. MARTEL, ALLAN C. PUTONG, ABEL A. GUIÑARES, VICTORIA G. MIER, and

EDGAR C. GAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 224720-23 & 224765-68, February 2, 2021, En Banc, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It is evident that there were irregularities in the procurement of the subject vehicles, in
violation of the applicable procurement laws. However, it must be noted that a violation of the
procurement laws does not ipso facto lead to a violation of R.A. 3019.
The demand for accountability should not be at the expense of well- meaning public
officials who may have erred in the performance of their duties but have done so without a
criminal mind. While the Constitution exacts a higher standard of accountability with respect
to public officers, as indeed public office is a public trust, the constitutional right of presumption
of innocence in criminal prosecutions is likewise enjoyed by public officers who stand accused.
Therefore, in order to justify conviction, their guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, as
with any other person who stands accused.
FACTS
The instant case revolves around the procurement of five motor vehicles for the use
of the Governor and Vice Governor of Davao del Sur (the Province). Through Purchase
Requests, all signed by Bautista as then Governor of the Province, the Office of the Governor
requested the acquisition of five specific vehicle brands and makes for the purpose of
providing service vehicles for the use of the Governor and Vice Governor, i.e., two units of
Toyota Hilux 4x4 SR5 (Toyota Hilux), one unit of Mitsubishi L300 Exceed DX2500 Diesel
(Mitsubishi L300 Exceed), and two units of Ford Ranger XLT 4x4 (Ford Ranger) (collectively,
the subject vehicles).
The procurement of the subject vehicles was not subjected to competitive public
bidding as it was effected through direct purchase.
Subsequently, a letter dated September 2, 2003 was filed by the Concerned Citizens
for Good Governance (CCGG) before the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao
(Ombudsman). The CCGG alleged that petitioners procured five motor vehicles for the use of
the Governor and Vice Governor of the Province in a manner violative of procurement laws.
The Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan four Informations charging

petitioners with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. After trial on the merits, the
Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. The Sandiganbayan found that the
procurement of the subject vehicles violated procurement laws and that all the elements of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 were present when the procurement of the subject vehicles was
undertaken by petitioners.
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ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019.
RULING
In order to convict the accused for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, the following
elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (2) he must have acted with
manifest partiality, or evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action
caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions
The first element is established in this case. As for the second element, the Surpeme
Court noted that there is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad
faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive
or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross
inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected.
To discuss the presence of the second element, the Supreme Court discussed the two
relevant laws.
As to the first subject procurement, i.e., the procurement of two units of Toyota Hilux
4x4 SR5, the Purchase Request was signed and issued by petitioner Bautista, Jr. on January
24, 2003, or two days prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9184. Hence, the procurement law
applicable to the first subject procurement is primarily the LGC. The second law, which is the
prevailing law on government procurement is R.A. 9184 or the Government Procurement
Reform Act. This law was signed by the President on January 10, 2003. Upon the effectivity
of R.A. 9184 on January 26, 2003, Title VI, Book II of the LGC was expanded. Hence, with
respect to the three subsequent procurements which involve Purchase Requests that were
signed and issued beyond January 26, 2013, R.A. 9184 should be considered together with
the pertinent provisions of the LGC.
Both laws provide that procurement shall be done through Competitive Bidding.
However, the general rule of competitive public bidding under both the LGC and R.A. 9184
admits of exceptions.
Petitioners justify the eschewing of competitive bidding in procuring the subject

vehicles on the reasoning that these were goods of foreign origin that may only be procured
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directly from the exclusive Philippine distributors or agents. It was established, however,
that the procurement of the subject vehicles was for the general need pf the Governor and
Vice Governer. Hence, the resort to direct contracting would have been legally permissible
only if there were no other vehicles that may have served the general need of the Governor
and Vice Governor for pick-up trucks aside from the specific vehicle brands and makes
purchased.
In asserting that there are no other suitable vehicles that satisfy the abovementioned
purpose, petitioners primarily relied on certifications issued by the three suppliers of the
subject vehicles, i.e., Toyota Davao, Kar Asia, and Ford Davao.
However, at most, these certifications merely state that the aforesaid car dealers are
the exclusive dealers of Toyota Hilux, Mitsubishi L300 Exceed, and Ford Davao. These
certifications do not purport to show whatsoever that there are no other suitable and more
affordable vehicle brands and makes that may serve as viable service vehicles of the
Governor and Vice Governor.
It must be noted that when the LGU undertakes the process of requisition of supplies
or properties, which the procurement law defines as the formal requesting of supplies or
property made through a written request or order, only the technical description of the
supplies or properties shall be indicated. The particular brand names of the goods cannot be
specified in the requisition. Here, in the requisition of the subject vehicles, the specific brands
and makes of the subject vehicles were indicated; but the technical descriptions of these
vehicles, such as the engine displacement, braking system, and other exact specifications,
were not identified in the Purchase Requests. In essence, the procurement laws were
violated.
Violation of procurement laws does not ipso facto give rise to violation of R.A. 3019.
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that there were irregularities in the
procurement of the subject vehicles, in violation of the applicable procurement laws. Be that
as it may, it should be emphasized that petitioners were charged and convicted for violating
Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019.
It must be noted that criminal liability does not depend solely upon the allegedly
scandalous irregularity of the bidding procedure for which prosecution may perhaps be
proper. For even if it were true and proved beyond reasonable doubt that the bidding had
been rigged, this pronouncement alone does not automatically result in finding the act of
petitioner similarly culpable. It is presumed that he acted in good faith in relying upon the
documents he signed and thereafter endorsed. To establish a prima facie case
against petitioner for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, the prosecution must show not
only the defects in the bidding procedure, a circumstance which we need not
presently determine, but also the alleged evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence or
manifest partiality of petitioner in affixing his signature on the purchase order and
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repeatedly endorsing the award earlier made by his subordinates despite his
knowledge that the winning bidder did not offer the lowest price. Absent a well- grounded
and reasonable belief that petitioner perpetrated these acts in the criminal manner he is
accused of, there is no basis for declaring the existence of probable cause
While these two cases involve the existence of probable cause for violation of Section
3 (e) of R.A. 3019, the pronouncements therein are still applicable in this case. Accordingly,
it is through the lens of the anti-graft and corruption law, and not the procurement laws, that
the guilt of the accused for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 must be determined. The
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: (1) the violation of procurement
laws caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, and (2) the accused acted with evident bad
faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence. This the prosecution failed to do.
Specifically, the prosecution miserably failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioners acted with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence
in relation to the subject procurements.
The prosecution failed to establish evident bad faith.

Because evident bad faith entails manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused
to do wrong or to cause damage, it must be shown that the accused was "spurred by any
corrupt motive." Mistakes, no matter how patently clear, committed by a public officer are
not actionable "absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith."
Applying the foregoing, while petitioners may have violated the pertinent laws and
rules on procurement, there is reasonable doubt that they consciously and intentionally did
so in order to commit fraud, to purposely commit a crime, or to gain profit for themselves so
as to amount to fraud.
The testimony of the prosecution's witness was able to demonstrate that violations
of procurement law were committed by the petitioners. However, that was all that the
evidence proved. There was no evidence presented whatsoever showing that petitioners
were animated by fraudulent motives. On the contrary, the evidence shows that petitioners
honestly believed that their resort to direct purchase was proper.
It cannot be said that petitioners were spurred by any ill or corrupt motive in
resorting to direct purchase of the subject vehicles. After studying the previous procurement
experiences of the Provincial Government, which were all not questioned by the COA despite
having been done through direct purchase, petitioners deemed direct purchase to be a viable
and allowed mode of procurement for the subject vehicles in this case.
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The prosecution failed to establish manifest partiality. Likewise, there is no sufficient

evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners acted with manifest partiality
in relation to the subject procurements.
There is manifest partiality "when there is a clear, notorious or plain inclination or

predilection to favor one side or person rather than another." It should be remembered that
manifest partiality, similar to evident bad faith, is in the nature of dolo. Hence, it must be
proven that the accused had malicious and deliberate intent to bestow unwarranted
partiality upon Toyota Davao, Kar Asia, and Ford Davao. As already explained, the testimony
of the prosecution's witness did not establish in any manner any deceitful intent and
motivation behind the procuring of the subject vehicles from the three car dealers.
While there appears to be a degree of preference for a specific brand, a preference for
the brand's performance record and reliability, this preference does not rise to the level of
manifest partiality that would show an ulterior motive or purpose on the part of petitioners.
Therefore, the conviction of petitioners based on manifest partiality cannot stand as the
required threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt was not met by the prosecution.
The prosecution failed to establish gross inexcusable negligence.

The commission of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 through gross inexcusable negligence
requires more than simple negligence. The negligence committed must be both gross and
inexcusable, characterized by the want of even slight care, wherein the accused was
consciously indifferent as to the compliance with his or her duty as a public officer. More
than committing a breach of a legal duty, it is necessary that in committing the said breach,
the public officer was inattentive, thoughtless, and careless.
The records show that petitioners, as BAC members, did conduct a study, albeit
limited and not reduced to writing. Moreover, as earlier discussed, they no longer considered
public bidding based on their past experiences and the belief that direct purchase was
availing. While it is arguable that a more thorough study would have led petitioners to
conclude that direct purchase was not proper for the subject procurements, their actions
cannot be characterized as without even slight care and conscious indifference as to the
compliance with their duties so as to make them liable for gross inexcusable negligence.
Hence, they cannot be held liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 on this account.
Violations of R.A. 3019 must be grounded on graft and corruption

Based on the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the prosecution failed to establish
evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence on the part of
petitioners to satisfy the second element for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019.
In criminal cases, it is hornbook principle thatall the elements of the crime must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt in order to convict the accused.
Page 397 of 435

Case Digests
In the instant case, petitioners' act of pursuing the subject procurements was
motivated not by any corrupt intent to favor one car dealer over another or to unduly receive
any pecuniary benefit. Based on the evidence on record, petitioners' actuations were simply
based on their honest belief that direct procurement was legally permissible.
Indeed, while public office is a public trust, the Court is called upon to refrain from
interpreting the laws to effectively be a disincentive to individuals in joining the public
service. It is simply absurd to criminally punish every minute mistake that incidentally
caused a benefit to private parties even when these acts were not done with corrupt intent.
Page 398 of 435

Case Digests

G.R. No. 242684, February 17, 2021, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
A person’s capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an adult
activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental age.
FACTS
The accused XXX was charged with two counts of Qualified Rape. At the time of the
rape incidents, the 23-year-old victim, AAA, lived with her siblings. She suffers from epilepsy
and mild mental retardation. Her highest educational attainment is Grade Six.
In Feb. 2004, told AAA “para gumaling ang epilepsy mo, may gagawin lang ako sa iyo.”
AAA was perplexed and unwilling. However, the accused undressed her, took off his own
clothes, and inserted his penis inside her vagina while they were on a wooden bed. AAA felt
pain in said part. The second rape occurred on July 2004. Inside the kitchen, the accused
forcibly undressed AAA, took off his own clothes, and inserted his penis inside AAA’s vagina.
The accused employed the same pretest that AAA would be cured of her disease once she
allowed the accused to do something to her.
The RTC found the accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape. The CA affirmed
the decision with modifications. The CA found him guilty of Qualified Rape.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two courts of Qualified Rape.
RULING
NO. As correctly held by the RTC and CA, the prosecution was able to sufficiently
establish all the elements of the crime of Rape. However, considering that AAA is a mental
retardate and Ms. De Guzman, a witness, determined that her mental age is equivalent to that
of an eight-year old child, the accused-appellant should be guilty of the crime of Statutory
Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d), and not paragraph 1(b) of the RPC as held by the
CA.
Jurisprudence provides that if a mentally retarded or intellectually disabled person
whose mental age is less than 12 years old is raped, the rape is considered committed under
paragraph 1(d), and not paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-A of the RPC.
A person’s capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an

adult activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental age.
Therefore, in determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-
A (l) (d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the
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Case Digests
child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual
disability is established.
As shown in the Psychological Report submitted by Ms. De Guzman, AAA was found
to be suffering from mild mental retardation with an IQ of 54. Her mental age is equivalent
to that of an eight-year-old child.
Page 400 of 435

Case Digests
BENJAMIN M. OLIVEROS, JR., OLIVER M. OLIVEROS and MAXIMO Z. SOTTO v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
It is well-settled that in order to convict an accused for the crime of Frustrated Murder
or Homicide, as the case may be, the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim should be
fatal. Otherwise, the accused can only be convicted of Attempted Murder or Homicide.
FACTS
An information for Frustrated Murder was filed against petitioners, namely Benjamin
and Oliver. On October 30, 2013, inside the public market of Población, Binmaley,
Pangasinan, the accused in conspiracy with each other assaulted Glenn Apostol. Oliver held
on the back (sic) of the said victim while Benjamin hacked the face of Apostol.
Apostol fell to the ground. The said accused together with John Doe mauled him. As a
result of said assault on the unarmed victim, he suffered a “Hacking wound 9 cm zygomatic
area left, Hacking wound 5 cm, shoulder right, Lacerated wound 3 cm., frontal area.”
The RTC found the accused guilty of Frustrated Murder as co-conspirators. The CA
affirmed with conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of petitioners for the crime of
Frustrated Murder.
RULING
YES. The Court affirms the conviction of petitioners but only for the crime of
Attempted Murder, not Frustrated Murder. Petitioners should be liable for Attempted
Murder and not Frustrated Murder, as the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim were
not proven by the prosecution to be fatal.
First, the medico-legal officer testified that the injuries may only possibly cause the
victim's death. Second, if ever the victim would die because of the wounds he sustained, his
death would not be caused by the wounds themselves, but his injuries might cause blood loss
or he might possibly die due to infection or tetanus if timely medical attention had not been
given.
It is well-settled that in order to convict an accused for the crime of Frustrated Murder
or Homicide, as the case may be, the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim should be
fatal. Otherwise, the accused can only be convicted of Attempted Murder or Homicide.
Page 401 of 435

Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALDO DECHOSO y DIVINA
DOCTRINE
In a prosecution for rape, credibility becomes the single most important issue. The
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are normally involved demands
that the testimony of the private complainant must always be scrutinized with great caution.
Conviction frequently rests on the basis of the testimony of the victim which must be credible,
natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
FACTS
AAA was walking near the railroad track where she was working as a street sweeper.
She was then four months pregnant. Dechoso approached her, blocked her path, and hugged
her. He dragged AAA towards the railroad track, removed her uniform, and sucked on her
nipples. He inserted his private part into AAA’s vagina and had carnal knowledge of her.
AAA noticed Dechoso’s wallet protruding from his waist. AAA grabbed the same and
threw it towards a grassy area along the railroad track. When Dechoso left, AAA examined
an ID inside the wallet. Dechoso returned and grabbed the ID from AAA. However, Dechoso
could not find the wallet anymore.
Upon inspection back at the barangay hall, the wallet contained another ID belonging
to Dechoso, whom BBB and CCC recognized because Dechoso was a former junior volunteer
for the rescue team of the barangay. AAA identified Dechoso as the rapist.
The RTC found Dechoso guilty of the crime of Rape. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Dechoso of the crime of Rape.
RULING
NO. The arguments of Dechoso crumble in the face of the evidence of the prosecution
which, did, in fact, establish his guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape. The
elements of rape under Article 266-A paragraph 1 (a) of the RPC are: (1) The act is committed
by a man; (2) That said man had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) That such act was
accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation.
The first element is uncontroverted. The second is shown by the narration of AAA
showing sexual intercourse. Notably, while the Medico-Legal Report shows no injuries
sustained by AAA on her genitalia, the examining physician clarified that this circumstance
does not negate rape as it was possible that no injuries arose as a result thereof because: (a)
the rapist could have lubricated his penis and/or the victim's vagina; or (b) the vaginal wall
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Case Digests
of the victim had already widened after giving birth. In fact, AAA, during the incident of rape,
was already a mother of five children. Regarding the third element, AAA is categorical that
her life was repeatedly threatened by Dechoso if she continued to resist the rape.
About the assessment of the credibility of AAA as a victim, the Court assessed the
records and the testimony of AAA and therefrom, can only affirm the conclusion of RTC and
CA that same is credible and positive.
In a prosecution for rape, credibility becomes the single most important issue. The
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are normally involved demands
that the testimony of the private complainant must always be scrutinized with great caution.
Conviction frequently rests on the basis of the testimony of the victim which must be
credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things.
AAA’s testimony shows that she had several opportunities, and the crime scene was
illuminated enough for her, to not only see the aggressor, but also observed what he was
wearing, and thereafter found and recovered Dechoso’s ID.
Page 403 of 435

Case Digests
MICHAEL CASILAG y ARCEO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
The presence of the required witnesses at the time of the inventory is mandatory, and
that the law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an essential purpose,
i.e., to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Casilag for violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165
of The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended.
PO1 Ramos and Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Gutierrez and Police Officer De Leon
were conducting a monitoring and surveillance operation of persons involved in illegal drug
activities in San Pedro, Laguna, after receiving information that drugs were sold rampantly
in said place.
While they were walking towards an alley, Ramos noticed two men talking to each
other and who seemed to have an ongoing transaction. One of them was holding in his left
hand a transparent plastic sachet, which appeared to contain grounded candy.
Ramos approached them. The two men ran away but Ramos was able to catch the one
holding the two plastic sachets. He then seized and marked the sachets. They prepared a
Certificate of Inventory and photographed appellant and sachets. A forensic chemist
conducted a qualitative examination of the specimen yielding positive results for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.
Casilag was convicted by the RTC of the crime charged. The CA affirmed his
conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Casilag of the crime charged.
RULING
YES. The Court acquits Casilag for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt. The
Court emphasized that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the inventory is
mandatory, and that the law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an
essential purpose, i.e., to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of
the seized drug.
Only a representative from the media was present in the conduct of the inventory, as
shown by the Certification of Inventory wherein only Mr. Nick Luares from The Laguna
Page 404 of 435

Case Digests
Expose Star signed as a witness to the inventory. That only a media representative witnessed
the inventory was likewise confirmed by the testimonies of both Ramos and De Leon.
Here, the police officers and the prosecution were unable, nor did they attempt to
explain the deviations from the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Thus, the
prosecution simply failed to establish the integrity of the seized items — the corpus delicti
of the crime in drugs cases such as this one. The acquittal of the Casilag must thus perforce
follow.
Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 provides for the procedure in conducting required

inventory immediately after the arrest of a person involved in dangerous drugs:
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Page 405 of 435

Case Digests
EUFROCINA N. MACAIRAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; IMELDA Q.

AGUSTIN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIP F. DU v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES; ROSALINDA U. MAJARAIS, MD. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
HORACIO D. CABRERA and ENRIQUE L. PEREZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
ANTHONY M. OCCAMPO and PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 215104, 215120, 215147, 215212, 215354-55, 215377, 215923 &
215541, March 18, 2021, First Division (CAGUIOA, C.J.)
DOCTRINE
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. in a catena of cases decided by the Court, it has
been consistently ruled that a mere signature or approval appearing on a document does not
meet the required quantum of proof to establish the existence of conspiracy.
FACTS
The consolidated petitions involve the purchase made by the DOH-NCR sometime in
May 1996 of 10,000 bottles of Paracetamol Suspension and 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate
with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid. The Office of the Ombudsman received an
Anonymous Letter complaining about the alleged irregularity in these purchases of DOH-
NCR and implicating four pharmaceutical companies including Aegis Pharmaceuticals
(Aegis) and Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory (Lumar).
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge
petitioners of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Subsequently, an Information
charging petitioners Majarais, Camposano, Cabrera, Du, Agustin, Perez, and Ocampo for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, in relation to the purchase of 10,000 bottles of
Paracetamol Suspension by the DOH-NCR from Aegis, was filed with the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan convicted Majarais, Cabrera, Du, Agustin, Perez and Ocampo for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. It found that all elements of the crime were present.
The Sandiganbayan held that Majarais and Cabrera, acted with evident bad faith in
purchasing 10,000 bottles of overpriced Paracetamol Suspension at PP25.00 from Aegis,
owned by Ocampo, when the January 1996 to June 1996 price list for 11 hospitals issued by
the DOH Central Office indicates that the price of Paracetamol Syrup/Suspension is P5.63.
According to the Sandiganbayan, their actions gave Aegis unwarranted benefits and caused
undue damage to the government in the amount of P193,700.
It further held that Du, Perez and Agustin acted in conspiracy with Majarais, Cabrera
and Ocampo, with the exception of Camposano. It explained that the signatures of Du, Perez
and Agustin on the Requisition and Issue Vouchers (RIV), Purchase Orders (PO) and
Disbursement Vouchers (DV), which made possible the payment to Aegis, unquestionably
Page 406 of 435

Case Digests
signify their assent to the transaction, a conspiracy to disburse public fund despite the fact
that there was no necessity to purchase the same at that time and despite the overprice.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed a grave and serious error in finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
RULING
YES. In a previous case, this Court has emphasized the need to stamp out graft and
corruption in the government. Indeed, the tentacles of greed must be cut and the offenders
punished. However, this objective can only be accomplished if the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, which must closely be scrutinized under the lens of the spirit that animates R.A.
No. 3019, passes the test of moral certainty. Where doubt lingers, as in this case, the Court is
mandated to uphold the presumption of innocence guaranteed by our Constitution to the
accused.
First, the prosecution failed to establish conspiracy among the petitioners. Allegedly
conspired and confederated with one another in giving unwarranted benefits to Aegis and
Lumar to the damage and prejudice of the government. The prosecution hinges its theory of
conspiracy solely on petitioners' respective signatures appearing on the following
documents: RIVs, POs, Certificate of Acceptance, DVs. To the Sandiganbayan, this was
sufficient to make petitioners liable as co-principals by reason of conspiracy.
However, the Court disagrees. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. in a catena of
cases decided by the Court, it has been consistently ruled that a mere signature or approval
appearing on a document does not meet the required quantum of proof to establish the
existence of conspiracy.
The Court explained in the case of Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan that conspiracy cannot
solely be predicated on the very functions that a public officer had to discharge in the
performance of his official duties, especially when there is no indication that he had
foreknowledge of the irregularity committed by his co-accused. Indeed, a public officer may
have been lax and administratively remiss in his duty by relying too much on the reports
submitted by his co-accused, "but for conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be
a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of
intentionality on the part of cohorts.
Second, the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime penalized under
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Court finds that the element of evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, as well as the element of causing undue injury to any party including the
Government, is wanting in this case. Even if it were to be conceded that the failure to conduct
the requisite public bidding for the questioned transactions was unjustified, no other
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Case Digests
evidence was presented to establish that petitioners' actions were animated by malicious
motive or fraudulent intent to defraud the government. Since there is no bad faith and
manifest partiality on the part of petitioners, the purchase of the Paracetamol Suspension
and Ferrous Sulfate cannot be reasonably said to have given unwarranted benefits.
Page 408 of 435

Case Digests
LYNNA G. CHUNG v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN-FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE
DOCTRINE
While the Court has a policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's exercise of its
constitutionally mandated powers, this should be weighed against the purpose of a preliminary
investigation, which is securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and protecting one from an open and public accusation of crime from the trouble,
expense and anxiety of a public trial.
FACTS
The PNR Bids and Awards Committee passed BAC Resolution recommending Direct
Contracting with Pandrol Korea in the procurement of 170,000 sets of rail fastenings and
50,000 pieces of clips and insulators for the repair of rail tracks and replacement of parts in
the Quezon Province and in the Bicol Region. As basis for the procurement, PNR BAC relied
on the IRR of R.A. 9184. The prices indicated were quotations by Pandrol Korea.
Petitioner was among the members of the PNR-BAC, particularly the Department
Manager of Administrative and Finance. However, she inhibited herself from the
proceedings of the procurement. Through its General Manager, Andal, PNR entered into a
contract with Pandrol Korea. Petitioner was then directed to effect the payment for the
supplies, to which she complied with.
Respondent OMB-FIO then filed a complaint against members of the PNR-BAC and
several other individuals for violation of R.A. 3019 and 6713, alleging that she and Andal
were responsible for the unusually hasty payments to Pandrol Korea. All payments to
Pandrol Korea were made in full without adhering to the 15% and 85% schedule of
payments. The Ombudsman found petitioner and other PNR officials liable for the said
violation.
ISSUE
Whether the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding probable cause
against petitioner for violation of R.A. 3019.
RULING
YES. While it may appear that the acts of all the defendants in this case are connected
in that they sprang from the same transactions, the act taken against petitioner is distinct
and severable from the acts of her co-defendants. It should hold no sway, therefore, whether
the case of petitioner before the Sandiganbayan has been consolidated with the other cases
involving the PNR-BAC members, or that those against Andal have recently been decided by
the anti-graft court with a finding of his guilt.
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Case Digests
While, indeed, the Court has consistently recognized and generally deferred to the
plenary investigative and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman, the Court has, at the
same time, been quick to step in when the conduct of the Ombudsman of the preliminary
investigation was attended with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court, sitting en banc, had the occasion to once again uphold this exception in the
very recent case of Non v. Office of the Ombudsman, wherein it was held that it will not shirk
from its duty to intervene upon proof of commission of grave abuse of discretion by the
Ombudsman as it is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a
grave abuse of discretion, in which case the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court may be
invoked. Even at the probable cause stage, it is already evident that not every element of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is present in this case. In particular, there is no showing that the act
of petitioner was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence, or that she gave any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to another,
or that undue injury was caused to the government.
Evident bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, but of having
a "palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.” Here, petitioner clearly explains,
and evidence show that she made the letters upon the instructions of Andal, and that they
merely authorize the opening of a Letter of Credit, which was in accordance with the
stipulation in the contract. Thus, she is not liable for violation of R.A. 3019.
All told, while the Court has a policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's exercise
of its constitutionally mandated powers, this should be weighed against the purpose of a
preliminary investigation, which is securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and protecting one from an open and public accusation of crime
from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial.
Page 410 of 435

Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GABRIEL CAMPUGAN CABRIOLE

G.R. No. 248418, May 5, 2021, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
In prosecuting for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, the prosecution must prove
beyond reasonable doubt not only every element of the crime or offense charged but must also
establish the identity of the corpus delicti, i.e., the seized drugs. It is, therefore, the duty of the
prosecution to prove that the drugs seized from accused-appellant were the same items
presented in court. The chain of custody requirement performs this function by ensuring that
unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the drugs seized are removed.
FACTS
In October 2016, PO1 Doño was at the Intelligence Section of Gingoog City Police
Station attending a briefing regarding the buy-bust operation to be conducted against
Accused-appellant Gabriel Campugan Cabriole and accused Daniel Gumanit Abad.
At the said briefing, PO1 Doño was designated as poseur-buyer. It was agreed that the
prearranged signal would be the removal of his sunglasses.
During the operation, PO1 Doño gave the 500-peso bill to Daniel who in turn gave it
to accused-appellant as payment for one sachet of shabu. Accused-appellant handed over the
shabu to Daniel who in turn handed it over to PO1 Doño.
Upon receiving the shabu, PO1 Doño removed the sunglasses, the pre-arranged signal
for consummation of the sale of drugs. Immediately, the other police officers came in and
pursued Daniel and accused-appellant. Accused-appellant was arrested but Daniel got away.
PO3 Javier searched accused-appellant and found in his lower middle pocket three
(3) plastic sachets believed to contain shabu, a 500-peso bill with Serial Number EX265351,
and aluminum foil strips.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 which CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether the accused appellant is guilty for violating both Sections 5 and 11 of RA
9165.
RULING
NO. The elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165
are: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
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Case Digests
While the elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11 of R.A.
No. 9165 are: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited
drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
In both offenses, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt not only every
element of the crime or offense charged but must also establish the identity of the corpus
delicti, i.e., the seized drugs.
It is, therefore, the duty of the prosecution to prove that the drugs seized from
accused-appellant were the same items presented in court.
The chain of custody requirement performs this function by ensuring that

unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the drugs seized are removed.
After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court affirms accused-
appellant's conviction in violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. The Court finds that the
prosecution was able to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of the crime
charged as well as the identity and integrity of the three sachets of drugs seized from
accused-appellant.
However, the accused-appellant is acquitted for violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165
it can be gleaned that the confiscated item subject of the sale was not immediately marked
upon seizure. Worse, PO1 Doño failed to ventilate the precautionary measures taken in
preserving the identity of the seized item given that he did not mark it when he left the area
where the buy-bust operation took place, to the area where he dropped the confidential
informant in a safe location, to the time when he blended in with the crowd, until he finally
delivered the seized item to PO3 Javier. In other words, the confiscated item remained
unmarked while in the custody of PO1 Doño. Clearly, the probability that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti being compromised existed, as it was easily
susceptible to tampering, alteration, or substitution.
PO1 Doño admitted that he placed the plastic sachet seized from accused-appellant
inside his right pocket before handing it over to PO1 Javier for marking and inventory. This
calls into question the identity of the item that was later marked and inventoried, for the
third-party witnesses would not have known whether the seized item delivered by PO1 Doño
being marked and inventoried in their presence was actually confiscated from accused-
appellant.
The belated marking adversely affected the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drug subject of the sale.
Page 412 of 435

Case Digests
ZENAIDA LAYSON VDA. DE MANJARES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 207249, May 14, 2021, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation, punished under Article
315 (1) (b) of the RPC are: (1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for
administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (2) that there is
conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a denial on his
part that he received it; (3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another;
and (4) that there be demand for the return of the property. On the first element, the offender
acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received."
The Court finds that Zenaida only had material possession, and not juridical possession, of the
goods delivered to her for sale in Alson's Polangui. Juridical possession means a possession
which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against
the owner.
FACTS
Based on the testimonies of both petitioner Zenaida and Paulo Ballesteros, the former
was initially engaged in the business of buying-and-selling of appliances, furniture, and other
products. She would buy from Ballesteros' business —Alson's Trading in Iriga City — around
once a month. Because she had become a regular customer, she and Ballesteros had an
agreement that her store would be used to establish Alson's Polangui and that she would be
its branch manager.
According to Ballesteros, Zenaida had the following obligations as the branch

manager: "1) receive the stocks; 2) sell and document them properly, following the standard
pricing for cash or installment; 3) hire and terminate employees; 4) document and deposit
collections in the bank the next banking day; and 5) be accountable for any
shortages in the collection."
Meanwhile, Ballesteros' obligation was to pay the monthly salaries of Zenaida and the
other employees.
Ballesteros narrated in his testimony that he visited Alson's Polangui one time and he
did not find any cash there. He grew suspicious, so he asked auditor Rafael Pan to conduct a
preliminary audit. The preliminary audit revealed a shortage of around P65,000.00 per
month of operation. He confronted Zenaida about this, and she allegedly promised to pay the
shortages back within 15 days.
Based on Pan's audit, Zenaida's total accountability was allegedly P730,811.59.

Zenaida was found guilty of Estafa by the RTC which was affirmed by CA.
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ISSUE
Whether the salary of a water district's general manager is covered by the Salary
Standardization Law.
RULING
NO. The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation, punished under
Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC are: (1) that personal property is received in trust, on
commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (2)
that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it
or a denial on his part that he received it; (3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to
the injury of another; and (4) that there be demand for the return of the property.
Anent the first element, when "the money, goods, or any other personal property is
received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for
administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical
possession of the thing received."
The Court, however, finds that Zenaida only had material possession, and not juridical
possession, of the goods delivered to her for sale in Alson's Polangui. It is undisputed that
Zenaida was the "branch manager" of Alson's Polangui.
Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner.
Ballesteros had control over the operations of Alson's Polangui through his verbal
instructions. To the mind of the Court, these testimonies establish that Zenaida was a mere
employee —not an agent — of Ballesteros and Alson's Polangui.
An agent can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous,
right to retain goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to
reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without
his fault.
The Court cannot find anything which indicates that Zenaida would
have independent title over the goods as against Ballesteros. Ballesteros had (1) the power
to control the operations of Alson's Polangui, (2) the power to control what Zenaida could
and could not do, and (3) the responsibility to pay the salaries of all Alson's Polangui's
employees, including Zenaida. The foregoing indicates the existence of employer-employee
relationship between Ballesteros and Zenaida. Thus, the Court holds that Zenaida did not
have juridical possession of the goods delivered to her.
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND BENJAMIN

ABALOS
DOCTRINE
The "finality-of-acquittal" rule, which, as the name implies, makes a judgment of
acquittal unappealable and immediately executory upon its promulgation. The State with all
its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
FACTS
This case involves the Contract for the Supply of Equipment and Service for the
National Broadband Network Project (NBN Project) between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), and Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment, Inc. (ZTE), a Chinese corporation
doing business in the People's Republic of China.
In September 2006, ZTE filed a proposal with the Commission on Information and
Communications Technology (CICT) for the implementation of an NBN project in the
country.
In October 2006, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc. (AHI) conducted a presentation before

the NEDA on its own proposed version of an NBN project.
According to the prosecution's theory, Abalos, for a fee or commission, brokered in

favor of ZTE for the implementation of the NBN Project, a project of the Philippine
Government and requiring approval by the NEDA; hence, he directly or indirectly had
financial or pecuniary interest therein despite being prohibited from doing so by the
Philippine Constitution.
In support of this theory, the prosecution presented evidence which tended to

establish that Abalos attended meetings where the NBN Project was discussed. Abalos also
purportedly offered bribes to NEDA Sec. Neri in relation to approving ZTE's NBN
proposal and to Jose C. De Venecia, Jr., in consideration of the withdrawal of AHI's NBN
proposal.
Abalos denied offering bribes to JDV III and Sec. Neri. The Sandiganbayan found that
the prosecution's evidence was only able to prove that Abalos was brokering the
collaboration between AHI and ZTE, but not that he brokered the contract between ZTE and
the Philippine Government for a fee. While Abalos’ presence at meetings with officers from
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Case Digests
ZTE and the Philippine Government was established, evidence on what was taken up during
the said meetings was "minimal or sketchy" and the Sandiganbayan refused to rely on such
evidence to conclude that Abalos asked for favors from government officials as regards the
contract between ZTE and the government.
Abalos' alleged brokering between the government and ZTE was the basis of the
prosecution's theory that he had financial interest in the NBN-ZTE contract. In turn, Abalos'
alleged financial interest is the cornerstone of the charge of violation of Section 3 (h) of R.A.
No. 3019. Because of the prosecution's failure to prove such fact, Abalos was acquitted of the
crime charged.
ISSUE
Whether the decision of the Sandiganbayan can be reversed without violating double
jeopardy.
RULING
NO. Petitioner's failure to adequately establish grave abuse of discretion by the
Sandiganbayan not only takes this case out of the purview of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari; it also makes the reversal of the Assailed Decision — one of acquittal — repugnant
to Abalos' constitutional right against double jeopardy.
The requirements for double jeopardy to exist are as follows: (1) a valid information
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the
accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
The case at hand meets all the foregoing requirements. Abalos was charged with
violation of Section 3 (h) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan under an information
dated July 15, 2010. He was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty on August 10, 2010. On May
11, 2016, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the Assailed Decision acquitting Abalos
of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. This was affirmed by the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division in its Assailed
Resolution dated September 29, 2016, which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The existence of double jeopardy in this case calls for the application of the "finality-
of-acquittal" rule, which, as the name implies, makes a judgment of acquittal unappealable
and immediately executory upon its promulgation.
The State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
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anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he
may be found guilty.
The "finality-of-acquittal" rule has one exception: it is inapplicable where the Court
which rendered the acquittal did so with grave abuse of discretion that is strictly limited
whenever there is a violation of the prosecution's right to due process such as when it is
denied the opportunity to present evidence or where the trial is sham or when there is a
mistrial, rendering the judgment of acquittal void.
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REX SORONGON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
The general rule is that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by payment,
indemnification, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amounts misappropriated, or by
the novation of the contract. Nevertheless, in cases involving the type of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b), where there is an underlying contractual relationship or bilateral
agreement between the parties which they can modify or alter, novation may serve to either
prevent the rise of criminal liability, or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic
transaction. The prevention of the rise of criminal liability happens when there is novation
before an Information is filed in court. Here, Nelly and Sorongon entered into an amicable
settlement before the former’s filing of Information for estafa against the latter. There, the
parties agreed that they would desist from filing countercharges in the future. Hence, Sorongon
should not be held liable for estafa.
FACTS
In January 2006, petitioner Rex Sorongon was charged with estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Private complainant Nelly Van der Bom testified that she and her husband hired
Sorongon, a civil engineer, to put up a water system for their water refilling business.
Sometime in July 2004, after the project was completed, Sorongon asked to borrow the
subject cement mixer for his project in Iloilo City. Nelly agreed to lend the cement mixer on
the condition that Sorongon would return it as soon as his project is completed. Nelly claimed
that Sorongon, however, failed to return her cement mixer when she demanded for it after
several months had passed. She then asked her lawyer to write a formal demand letter to
Sorongon, but the same went unheeded.
For the defense, Barangay Kagawad Rudy de la Torre testified that Nelly and her
husband filed a complaint in the barangay against Sorongon about unpaid accounts, which
included a cement mixer valued at P40,000. Considering that Nelly failed to present any
receipts for her claims, Rudy purportedly advised her to just settle the case amicably. Nelly
eventually agreed and the parties signed an amicable settlement in March 2005. Sorongon
corroborated the testimony of Rudy that he and Nelly reached an amicable settlement before
the barangay. Thereafter, however, he received the complaint in the instant case.
The amicable settlement provided that the parties agreed that there will be no
countercharges “related to this case” to be filed “in the future.” Nelly also agreed therein to
waive her ownership of the properties subject of their dispute in favor of Sorongon, and one
of these properties was the cement mixer.
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Sorongon also testified that in January 2005, he filed a labor case against the Van der
Borns where he submitted the amicable settlement he and Nelly agreed to before the
barangay. The National Labor Relations Commission allegedly took note of Sorongon’s
indebtedness contained in the settlement agreement and deducted the same from the award
it granted in his favor.
The Regional Trial Court convicted Sorongon as charged. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction. The appellate court held that the amicable settlement between
Sorongon and Nelly did not exonerate him from criminal liability, as nowhere in the said
settlement did Nelly relinquish her rights or interests over her claims. At any rate, a
compromise or amicable settlement entered into after the commission of a crime does not
extinguish an accused’s criminal liability since the offense is against the State.
ISSUE
Was Sorongon’s conviction for estafa proper?
RULING
NO. The general rule is that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by payment,
indemnification, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amounts misappropriated, or
by the novation of the contract. Nevertheless, in cases involving the type of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), where there is an underlying contractual relationship or
bilateral agreement between the parties which they can modify or alter, novation may serve
to either prevent the rise of criminal liability, or to cast doubt on the true nature of the
original basic transaction. The prevention of the rise of criminal liability happens when there
is novation before an Information is filed in court.
As the Court first held in People v. Nery: The novation theory may perhaps apply prior
to the filing of the criminal information in court by the state prosecutors because up to that
time the original trust relation may be converted by the parties into an ordinary creditor-
debtor situation, thereby placing the complainant in estoppel to insist on the original trust.
But after the justice authorities have taken cognizance of the crime and instituted action in
court, the offended party may no longer divest the prosecution of its power to exact the
criminal liability, as distinguished from the civil. The crime being an offense against the state,
only the latter can renounce it.
The Court further emphasized in Nery that in order for novation to effectively prevent
the incipience of criminal liability, its concept under the Civil Code has to be followed as well.
Novation in the Civil Code is found in Article 1291, which provides that novation arises when
there is a substitution of an obligation by a subsequent one that extinguishes the first, either
by changing the object or the principal conditions, or by substituting the person of the
debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. For a valid novation to
take place, there must therefore be: (a) a previous valid obligation; (b) an agreement of the
parties to make a new contract; (c) an extinguishment of the old contract; and (d) a valid new
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contract. Novation, likewise, is never presumed. For it to be effective, it is imperative that the
extinguishment be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations
be on every point incompatible with each other. In case of only slight modifications, the old
obligation would still prevail.
In the present case, the Court finds that the original contract of commodatum between
the herein parties was effectively novated when they entered into an amicable settlement
before the barangay in March 2005, which amicable settlement came about before the
Information for estafa against Sorongon was filed in January 2006. To reiterate, the subject
of the amicable settlement were the unpaid accounts which Sorongon supposedly owed
Nelly and her husband. The purpose of the proceedings, in other words, was to settle these
monetary or civil liabilities of Sorongon to the spouses Van der Born. These unpaid accounts
included the value of the cement mixer and some other personal properties, as well as
alleged loans and cash advances which Sorongon and his wife had borrowed from the
couple.
Correlatively, in January 2005, or prior to the barangay proceedings in March 2005,

the lawyer of the Van der Borns wrote a demand letter to Sorongon about the supposed
monetary liabilities which he incurred from the couple. The amount of P25,000 representing
the amount of the cement mixer which Sorongon obtained from the couple in 2004 was
among those listed, along with other sums which were all included in the unpaid accounts
made subject of the barangay proceedings. Also, in his testimony before the trial court, De la
Torre affirmed that the cement mixer was included as a subject matter before the barangay
proceedings. The amicable settlement stipulated, in no uncertain terms, that the parties
agreed that they would desist from filing countercharges in the future. The minutes of the
proceedings further revealed that Nelly agreed to waive her ownership of the properties
subject of their dispute in favor of Sorongon. Unmistakably, one of these properties was the
cement mixer.
Moreover, the waiver made by Nelly was on the condition that Sorongon would not
file any case or countercharge against Nelly in the future. Sorongon kept to his end of this
bargain. The labor case which he filed against the couple was not a violation of the agreement
since it was filed in January 2005, or prior to the barangay proceedings in March 2005. With
Nelly waiving her ownership over the cement mixer in favor of Sorongon in exchange for the
concession that he would refrain from filing any case against her in the future, there was
clearly an implied novation of the original contract of commodatum between her and
Sorongon. The waiver effectively extinguished the original contract of Sorongon and Nelly
and, in its stead, a new contract in the form of the amicable settlement they executed before
the barangay, emerged. The intention to extinguish the old obligation might not have been
done expressly, but considering that the new contract of the parties was, by all accounts,
incompatible with their original contract of commodatum, novation had effectively occurred.
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In plain terms, prior to the filing of the Information in court, Nelly had already
renounced or relinquished her ownership over the property subject of the criminal case in
favor of Sorongon. Consequently, therefore, the elements of the crime of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC became nonexistent. In particular, there is no longer any duty
or obligation on the part of Sorongon to deliver or return the cement mixer to Nelly or to any
other person for that matter because the ownership thereof had already been transferred to
Sorongon by Nelly’s waiver and renunciation in his favor. It follows, too, that there is no
longer any prejudice caused to another. Perforce, with the new obligation under the amicable
settlement between Nelly and Sorongon having the effect of novating their old obligation,
Nelly is now estopped from insisting on the latter. Sorongon is acquitted of estafa.
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Case Digests
ASELA BRINAS Y DEL FIERRO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
“Section 10(a) is clear in that it punishes acts of child abuse which are "not covered by
the Revised Penal Code." Hence, on this point, Briñas is correct — she cannot be convicted of
grave oral defamation under the RPC in relation to Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610. “
“In Escolano v. People, which involved facts similar to the instant case, the Court held
that the mere shouting of invectives at a child, when carelessly done out of anger, frustration,
or annoyance, does not constitute Child Abuse under Section 10 (a) of RA 7610 absent evidence
that the utterance of such words were specifically intended to debase, degrade, or demean the
victim's intrinsic worth and dignity.”
FACTS
On or about the 25th day of January 2010 in the afternoon, at the Challenger
Montessori School, Inc. in Brgy. Zone VI, Municipality of Iba, Province of Zambales,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
deliberate intent of bringing 16-year old Micolie Mari Maevis S. Rosauro and 16-year old
Keziah Liezle D. Polojan, into discredit, disrepute and contempt, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and publicly utter the following defamatory words, to wit:
"pinakamalalandi, pinakamalilibog, pinakamahadera at hindot," "Mga putang ina kayo.” and
other words similar thereto, which debased, degraded and demeaned Micolie Mari Maevis S.
Rosauro and Keziah Liezle D. Dolojan of their intrinsic worth and dignity, and to the grave
humiliation, embarrassment, damage and prejudice of said minors Micolie Mari Maevis S.
Rosauro and Keziah Liezle D. Dolojan.
Briñas was charged with the crime of Grave Oral Defamation in relation to R.A. 7610
in an Amended Information. Upon arraignment, Briñas pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the
merits ensued thereafter.
In its Decision dated April 13, 2018, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution's
testimonies, found Briñas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged but
appreciated in her favor the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
Briñas appealed to the CA. Thereafter, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), and the private complainants filed their respective appeal briefs. In the
assailed Decision, the CA affirmed, with modification, the RTC's Decision. The CA concluded
that the prosecution was able to establish that Briñas had publicly defamed the private
complainants, with intention to debase, degrade, and demean their intrinsic worth as human
beings. It gave no credence to the claim of Briñas that she merely acted in the heat of anger
and intended to discipline the students
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ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Briñas of the crime of grave
oral defamation in relation to Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610.
RULING
YES. Section 10(a) is clear in that it punishes acts of child abuse which are "not
covered by the Revised Penal Code." Hence, on this point, Briñas is correct — she cannot be
convicted of grave oral defamation under the RPC in relation to Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610.
From the plain language of Section 10(a), the acts punished under it and those punished
under the RPC are mutually exclusive. Acts which are already covered by the RPC are
excluded from the coverage of Section 10(a). Thus, the Court holds that the CA and the RTC
erred in finding Briñas guilty of violation of Section 10(a) in relation to Section 3(b)(2) of
R.A. 7610.
In Escolano v. People, which involved facts similar to the instant case, the Court held
that the mere shouting of invectives at a child, when carelessly done out of anger,
frustration, or annoyance, does not constitute Child Abuse under Section 10 (a) of RA
7610 absent evidence that the utterance of such words were specifically intended to
debase, degrade, or demean the victim's intrinsic worth and dignity.
A study of relevant jurisprudence reveals that a specific intent to debase, degrade or

demean the intrinsic worth of a child as a human being is required for conviction under
Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610 in relation to Section 3(b)(2). This is especially true if the acts
allegedly constituting child abuse were done in the spur of the moment, out of emotional
outrage.
"Debasement" is defined as the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of

something; "degradation," on the other hand, is a lessening of a person's or thing's character
or quality while "demean" means to lower in status, condition, reputation, or character.
Hence, the prosecution must not only prove that the acts of child abuse under Section
3(b)(2) were committed, but also that the same were intended to debase, degrade or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the minor victim as a human being.
Here, the Court, upon an assiduous and careful review of the records, finds that the
lower courts misinterpreted vital facts that demonstrate merit in Briñas’ contentions. In
simple terms, there was a failure to establish the specific intent to debase, degrade or
demean required in child abuse cases punished under Section 10(a) in relation to Section
3(b)(2) of R.A. 7610.
Indeed, the evidence presented shows that Briñas' acts were only done in the heat of
anger, made after she had just learned that the private complainants had deceivingly used
her daughter's name to send a text message to another student, in what Briñas thought was
part of a bigger and harmful scheme against the student body
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DENNIS OLIVER CASTRONUEVO LUNA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 231902, June 30, 2021 (Caguioa, J)
DOCTRINE
“Concept of possession contemplated under Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 goes beyond
mere actual and physical possession of the drug specimen. Otherwise, an unsuspecting person
who is victimized by the planting of evidence will be unjustly prosecuted based on the sheer fact
that illegal drugs were found to be in his possession. It must be proven that the person in whose
possession the drug specimen was found knew that he/she was possessing illegal drugs.”
“Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by

taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the
surrounding circumstances.”
FACTS
On July 10, 2005, Police Superintendent Acierto of the PNP together with his team
conducted a buy-bust operation when they received and information from a confidential
informant concerning Peter Angeles and other Chinese members belonging to his group, who
were allegedly involved in drug trafficking activities. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
a certain "Sexy", known as the negotiator of Peter Angeles, called the mobile number of the
confidential informant, who was then at Camp Crame. "Sexy" then discussed the details
regarding the delivery of the "shabu" and that the designated poseur-buyer disguised as
"Mike", as regards the manner of payment.
At around 4:30 in the afternoon "Sexy" called the informant's mobile phone again and
told them to proceed to Hap Chan Restaurant instead, which is also located along Quezon
Avenue, and look for a silver-colored Toyota Revo with plate number XHY 278. As regards
the payment, "Sexy" instructed them to give the money to the driver and take the drugs found
thereat.
When they arrived and saw the Toyota Revo, SPO3 Parreno alighted and walked
towards the parked car. When he opened the door, he saw petitioner Luna to whom he asked
where "Sexy" is. Instead of giving a responsive answer, Petitioner asked him if he is "Mike"
to which he answered in the affirmative.
Forthwith, Petitioner told him to get the blue bag at the back seat and leave the money
there as instructed by "Sexy". At once, SPO3 Parreno took the blue bag from the Toyota Revo
and opened it. He then saw six (6) brown envelopes containing white crystalline substance
inside a plastic bag which he suspected to be "shabu". Promptly, he disembarked from the
Toyota Revo and left the boodle money, which was dusted with ultraviolet light, at the back
seat. He immediately waved his right hand signaling his team of the consummation of the
buy bust operation. At that point, POI Caluag and POI Nepomuceno approached the Toyota
Revo and apprehended Petitioner.
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On petitioner’s version of facts, He denied ownership or knowledge of the confiscated

shabu. According to him, the car is owned by Susan Lagman, his former neighbor, who often
hires him to drive for her. He also happened to drive several times for a certain "Sexy", a
woman introduced by Susan to him. During those instances, "Sexy" would contact Susan and
the latter would go to his house to ask him if he can drive for someone the following day.
On that day, "Sexy" at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, told him to proceed to Hap Chan
along Quezon Avenue by himself. "Sexy" instructed her that if "Mike", whom she was
supposed to meet, will arrive early at Hap Chan, he will have to tell "Mike" to get the bag at
the rear passenger's seat and if "Mike" has something to leave for "Sexy", he will just have to
leave it at the back of the Toyota Revo. Afterwards, he drove towards Hap Chan and waited
inside the vehicle. At around 4:30 in the afternoon, a man approached the Toyota Revo,
introduced himself as "Mike" and asked where "Sexy" was. In reply, he told "Mike" to get the
bag placed at the back seat and wait for "Sexy" because she was on her way. As instructed,
"Mike" took the bag. Suddenly, "Mike" announced that he is arresting him for carrying illegal
drugs.
On September 23, 2005, an Information was filed against petitioner Luna for violation
of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of2002," as amended.
The RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. the CA held that since petitioner Luna was driving the
vehicle where the bag, which supposedly contained the seized packs of drug specimen was
retrieved, he constructively possessed the alleged packs of drug specimen.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting petitioner Luna for violating
Section 11 Article II of R.A. No. 9165
RULING
YES, the appeal is meritorious and the Court hereby acquits petitioner Luna for failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
It is well-settled that criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts
mala prohibita. In other words, "intent to commit the crime is not necessary, but intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law must be shown.” Nevertheless, despite the
offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs being malum prohibitum, "this, however,
does not lessen the prosecution's burden because it is still required to show that the
prohibited act was intentional." 11 In cases involving the illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, "the prosecution is not excused from proving that possession of the prohibited act
was done 'freely and consciously,' which is an essential element of the crime.”
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Hence, a critical element of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs is the
element of intent to possess or animus possidendi. The Court has held that in criminal cases
involving prohibited drugs, there can be no conviction unless the prosecution shows that the
accused knowingly, freely, intentionally, and consciously possessed the prohibited articles
in his person, or that animus possidendi is shown to be present together with his possession
or control of such article. To prosecute an accused for illegally possessing illegal drugs, it is
not enough to show that the accused knowingly and intentionally possessed the bag or
receptacle that contained illegal drugs. The prosecution must go beyond and provide
evidence that the accused knowingly, freely, consciously, and intentionally possessed illegal
drugs.
In this case, the Court believes that the surrounding factual circumstances, as
established by the evidence on record, fail to clearly establish that there was animus
possidendi on the part of petitioner Luna. The testimony of petitioner Luna establishes that
the bag retrieved from the vehicle during the buy-bust operation did not come from and was
not owned by petitioner Luna. In short, the person who effectively wielded control over the
bag was Sexy and not petitioner Luna.
Thus, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to satisfy the required quantum of
evidence that would show that petitioner Luna had knowledge as to the contents of the bag
seized by the police. The prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that there
was animus possidendi on the part of petitioner Luna. Therefore, petitioner Luna is acquitted
of the crime charged against him.
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PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER ET AL. V. JUAN PONCE ENRILE

G.R. No. 229440, July 14, 2021, First Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It is settled that "[i]n determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used
are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that
they were used and understood in another sense."
In jurisprudence, "malice" connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty
but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice in law is a presumption of law: it dispenses with the
proof of malice when words that raise the presumption are shown to have been uttered. It is
also known as constructive malice, legal malice, or implied malice. On the other hand, malice
in fact is a positive desire and intention to annoy and injure. It may denote that the defendant
was actuated by ill will or personal spite. It is also called express malice, actual malice, real
malice, true malice, or particular malice.
Under the general rule stated in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious. This is malice in law. The presumption of malice,
however, does not exist in the following instances: 1. A private communication made by any
person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and 2. A fair and true
report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or
other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.
The exceptions provided in Article 354 are also known as qualifiedly privileged
communications. The enumeration under Art. 354, however, is not an exclusive list of
qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public
interest are likewise privileged. Like "fair commentaries on matters of public interest," fair
reports on matters of public interest is also included in the list of qualifiedly privileged
communications, and are thus included under the protective mantle of privileged
communications. In order to successfully claim that an utterance covered under qualifiedly
privileged communications is libelous, the plaintiff must prove the existence of malice in fact.
FACTS
On December 4, 2001, the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on its front page a news
article with the heading: "PCGG: no to coconut levy agreement" co-written by Cueto and
Pazzibugan.
In the said news article, the following statements were made: “In her public statement
since the controversy on the settlement erupted last week, Yorac said the settlement would
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Case Digests
allow Marcos cronies, who had benefited from the coco levy fund, particularly businessman
Eduardo "Danding" [Cojuangco], Jr., Zamboanga City Mayor Maria Clara Lobregat and former
Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, to keep their plundered loot. xxx The present terms of the
compromise agreement brokered by Dante Ang for an unknown client will neither provide
economic relief for millions of coconut farmer nor attain the equally important policy of
recovering ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses, Danding Cojuangco, Clara Lobregat, Juan
Ponce Enrile and the Accra lawyers who helped them plunder the coco levy fund, Yorac said.”
After reading the news article, Enrile through his counsel, wrote to Commissioner
Yorac to confirm whether she uttered the defamatory words attributed against her. In
response, Commissioner Yorac issued a Letter denying the statements attributed to her by
the Inquirer. In another Letter, Commissioner Yorac called the attention of the Inquirer to
correct the news article.
Enrile repeatedly demanded that the news article be corrected but his demands
proved futile as no correction was made. Left with no recourse, he filed a Complaint for
Damages against Defendants-Appellants alleging that the news article imputed upon him
defamatory acts of (a) having benefited from the coco levy fund, (b) accumulating ill-gotten
wealth, and (c) being a Marcos crony.
In their Answer, Defendants-Appellants contended that the Complaint failed to state

a cause of action against them. They claimed that if the questioned paragraphs in the news
article are to be read in its entirety, it will disclose that it did not impute any crime, anomaly
or wrongdoing against Enrile. They insisted that the news article only narrates or reports
what the PCGG, through its Commissioner, has stated to be the reason for objecting to, or
finding as unacceptable, the reported compromise agreement on the coconut levy funds.
Defendants-Appellants added that the news article is a true and fair report on a matter of
public interest and concern, and hence, privileged in nature.
Cueto testified that one of her editors called her up seeking clarification on the matter
because Commissioner Yorac was denying that she made those statements and because
Enrile was threatening to file a libel suit. After hearing this, she was surprised because she
thought all the while that Commissioner Carranza had the go signal of Commissioner Yorac.
She then confronted Commissioner Carranza and asked him why did this happen. He told
her not to worry and that he was going to make a sworn affidavit. He assured her that there
would be no problem and the case will be later on dismissed because it was privileged
communication.
In a Decision dated October 30, 2013, the RTC ruled in favor of Enrile. The RTC held
that the article in question did defame Enrile by imputing to him the following acts: (a)
having benefitted from the coco levy funds; (b) accumulating ill-gotten wealth and (c)
committing the crime of plunder. The RTC added that the publication of the subject article
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Case Digests
was undoubtedly malicious, for the newspaper attributed the words to the late PCGG
Chairperson Haydee Yorac (Yorac) who, in turn, denied making the said statements.
On appeal, the CA upheld the RTC's findings. The CA held that the statements uttered
in the article clearly imputed upon Enrile the following disparaging remarks: "plunderer,"
"looter," "possessor of ill-gotten wealth" and "Marcos crony." The CA added that the news
article was published with malice, for it was shown "to have been written and published with
the knowledge that they are false.”
ISSUE
Whether or not the questioned article was libelous.
RULING
NO. Libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead." Consequently, the following elements constitute
libel: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the
imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.
The presence of the second and third elements are not in dispute; the article in
question was admittedly published by Inquirer in its newspapers, and Enrile was
undoubtedly mentioned in the article. Hence, the Court's analysis will only focus on the
presence of the first and fourth elements of libel, namely, (1) the imputation of a
discreditable act or condition; and (2) the existence of malice.
On imputation of a discreditable act or condition:
It is settled that "[i]n determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used
are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears
that they were used and understood in another sense."
A closer look at the article involved in this case reveals that it was not Cueto, the
author of the article, who was asserting that Enrile was a "plunderer" or a "Marcos crony."
In both of the paragraphs complained of, the author was merely repeating a supposed
statement from PCGG Chairperson Yorac. It is true that Yorac subsequently disclaimed
ownership of any of such statements, but the foregoing fact did not thereby make the
defamatory imputations automatically from Inquirer or Cueto.
Both the RTC and the CA committed the error of discontinuing its analysis on whether
the article imputed defamatory remarks against Enrile. Courts, in deciding libel cases, should
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always bear in mind that "[w]hether or not it is libelous depends upon the scope, spirit and
motive of the publication taken in its entirety."
Here, both courts did not consider that the article, read in its entirety, clearly just
reports the statements supposedly made by Yorac. More importantly, both courts failed to
view the article from the perspective of the reader, doing which would have led them to the
conclusion that the article merely impresses on the reader that "Yorac said the following"
instead of "Enrile is a plunderer and a Marcos crony."
To reiterate, the fact that Inquirer failed to verify if the statements were indeed made
by Yorac did not make the imputations in the article as its own. To stress, the perspective of
the reader — or how the words are used in their entirety and taken in their plain, natural
and ordinary meaning, as they would naturally be understood by persons hearing or reading
them — remain the judicial guiaepost in determining whether an utterance is libelous.
Applying the foregoing in this case, the subject article was a mere replication — a plain
report that "a person said this" — albeit inadvertently attributed to the wrong person. Hence,
it is certainly not libelous.
On the existence of malice:
In jurisprudence, it is provided that "malice" connotes ill will or spite and speaks not
in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies
an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the
author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.
Malice in law is a presumption of law: it dispenses with the proof of malice when
words that raise the presumption are shown to have been uttered. It is also known as
constructive malice, legal malice, or implied malice. On the other hand, malice in fact is a
positive desire and intention to annoy and injure. It may denote that the defendant was
actuated by ill will or personal spite. It is also called express malice, actual malice, real malice,
true malice, or particular malice.
Under the general rule stated in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious. This is malice in law. The presumption
of malice, however, does not exist in the following instances:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any

legal, moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
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nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any

other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
The exceptions provided in Article 354 are also known as qualifiedly privileged
communications. The enumeration under Art. 354, however, is not an exclusive list of
qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public
interest are likewise privileged. Like "fair commentaries on matters of public interest," fair
reports on matters of public interest is also included in the list of qualifiedly privileged
communications, and are thus included under the protective mantle of privileged
communications.
In order to successfully claim that an utterance covered under qualifiedly privileged

communications is libelous, the plaintiff must prove the existence of malice in fact.
The subject matter of the article is undoubtedly a matter of public interest. As the RTC
itself correctly observed, "these are matters about which the public has the right to be
informed, talcing into account the public character of the funds involved." The Court itself,
in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation v. Republic, characterized the coco levy funds as
"special public funds."
Enrile is likewise unquestionably a public figure. A public figure has been defined as
a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession
or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his
character, has become a "public personage." He is, in other words, a celebrity.
From the foregoing, it could be indisputably inferred, therefore, that the presumption
of existence of malice does not arise for the article, as the same is considered a "fair report
on matters of public interest" — and thus a qualifiedly privileged communication. While,
generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character of a
communication destroys the presumption of malice. The onus of proving actual malice then
lies on Enrile.
The Court, however, holds that Enrile failed to discharge the said burden. It was error
for the CA to conclude that the article was published with the knowledge that they were false.
To recall, the article was published on December 4, 2001, while the letters of Chairperson
Yorac disclaiming ownership of the statements were executed only on December 6, 2001.
What constitutes malice is not the fact that the articles contain matters which are
false. For there to be malice, it must be that the articles were published with the
knowledge that the matters in the article were false. It could not be said, however, that at the
time of the article's publication on December 4, 2001 that petitioners already knew that the
statement did not, in fact, come from Yorac.
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In Villanueva vs PDI, it was held that the failure of news outlets to counter-check or
verify their reports, which may later on turn out to be false, does not per se make the
publication of such reports done with malice. To reiterate Villanueva, "a reporter may rely
on information given by a lone source although it reflects only one side of the story provided
the reporter does not entertain a 'high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity.'"
To the mind of the Court, the reporter, Cueto, could not have had a "high degree of
awareness" that the statement contained falsities when the same was handed to her by no
less than a PCGG Commissioner.
In the present case, there is likewise no proof that the publication of the subject article
was made to harass, vex, or humiliate Enrile. Also, as previously discussed, the article was a
straightforward narration: a plain report that "a person said this," although it was
erroneously attributed to a person who did not utter the statements.
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Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUVENAL AZURIN Y BLANQUERA

G.R. No. 249322, September 14, 2021, First Division, (Caguioa, J)
DOCTRINE
The proper mode of appeal from the Sandiganbayan's judgment of conviction in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court is via a Notice of Appeal pursuant to
the Sandiganbayan Rules.
The elements of the crime charged are that (1) the offender threatened another person
with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3)
the threat was not subject to a condition. This felony is consummated "x x x as soon as the
threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened."
FACTS
According to Jaime Clave, on November 13, 2013, at around 12mn, he received a
phone call from Azurin, then Regional Director of the PDEA Regional Office II. In the
conversation, Azurin asked Clave “may sama ka ba ng loob sa akin” to which Clave replied
none. Azurin uttered the remark “Clave, papatayin kita!” several times during the
conversation.
Clave suspected that Azurin was upset because Clave had sent a text message to the
PDEA Deputy Director General for Administration (DDGA) regarding some office issues
pertaining to operational funs.
Clave feared for his life as he knew that Azurin, being a PDEA RD who had an office-
issued firearm, a former Navy officer and a member of the Magdalo group, was capable of
carrying out his threats.
Later, Clave went to the police station to report the incident and took photographs of
his cell phone to record the calls he received, the name of the callers and the duration of the
calls. Thereafter, he filed an administrative complaint against Azurin before the Internal
Affairs Services Office of the PDEA and a criminal complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB).
Clave testified that during the subject phone call, Azurin informed him that he was
being relieved as team leader and designated him to PDEA Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya. IO2
Mendoza also testified that Clave narrated to him the phone call made by Azurin and that his
life was threatened. IO1 Agleham also testified that Azurin mentioned that Clave would be
relieved because of an incident which occurred between them. Calbaza also testified that she
received a missed call from Azurin around the time of the subject phone call of Azurin to
Clave. After the incident, she was likewise informed by Clave of the subject phone call made
to him by Azurin.
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Case Digests
Azurin admitted to place the phone call to Clave on the night of the incident, but it
was only to inform him of his reassignment to Nueva Vizcaya. He admitted that he was
informed by the PDEA DDGA about a complaint on some operational issues made thru text
messages and that this upset and disappointed him.
The Sandiganbayan found Azurin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Grave Threats. The Sandiganbayan found all three elements of grave threats present. It gave
credence to the version of facts of the prosecution and ruled that although the threats were
only made in a telephone conversation, hence with no independent corroboration, the
immediate reaction of Clave after the conversation coupled with the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses on antecedent and succeeding events were sufficient to support a
finding of guilt against Azurin.
Azurin filed an appeal to the Court through an Appellant's Brief dated June 22, 2020,
wherein he maintains that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt because, at most, what
was proven by the prosecution was merely the occurrence of the phone conversation
between him and Clave, but not the substance of said conversation.
The People, through the OMB Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed its Plaintiff-
Appellee's Brief (Appellee's Brief) dated August 26, 2020. It argues that Azurin should have
availed a petition for review on certiorari filed with the Court. Further, the Sandiganbayan
correctly found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Azurin availed of the correct mode of appeal by filing a notice of appeal
with the Sandiganbayan.
2. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is correct in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.
RULING
1. YES. The proper mode of appeal from the Sandiganbayan's judgment of conviction in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court is via a Notice of Appeal
pursuant to the Sandiganbayan Rules.
The Sandiganbayan Rules prevail over the Rules as it is a later set of rules and a special
statute specifically providing for modes of review of judgments and final orders of the
Sandiganbayan. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over
a general law. As it is, the Sandiganbayan Rules effectively amended the relevant provisions
of the Rules and the latter apply only in a suppletory manner. Hence, Rule 45 of the Rules
being invoked by the People is unavailing in the present case.
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Case Digests
2. YES. Nevertheless, Azurin's appeal, although proper, must fail on its merits. From the
records, the prosecution was able to prove his guilt for Grave Threats (without a condition)
The elements of the crime charged are that (1) the offender threatened another
person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) such wrong amounted to a crime;
and (3) the threat was not subject to a condition. This felony is consummated "x x x as soon
as the threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened."
Applying these parameters to the instant case, it is evident that Azurin's threats to kill
Clave are wrongs amounting to the crime of either homicide or murder. The crime was
consummated as soon as Clave heard of the threats during their telephone conversation.
It is clear that what Azurin is assailing are the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan
and the credence it gave to the prosecution witnesses over the defense's. Without doubt,
Azurin can raise questions of fact in the present ordinary appeal.
It is well-settled that in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and substance

that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings
of the trial court, owing to the latter's peculiar position of observing, first hand, the witnesses
as they testified.
The Sandiganbayan’s findings already addressed the factual issues raised by Azurin.
Contrary to Azurin's claim, the statements made by the witnesses are admissible as they are
considered independently relevant statements under the Rules, not being intended to
establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement but presented only for the purpose
of placing the statement in the record to establish the fact that the statement was made or
the tenor of such statement.
Page 435 of 435

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Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Criminal Law

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