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On The Nature of Mathematical Truth
On The Nature of Mathematical Truth
Author(s): C. G. Hempel
Source: The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 52, No. 10 (Dec., 1945), pp. 543-556
Published by: Mathematical Association of America
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ON THE NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL TRUTH
C. G. HEMPEL, QueensCollege
1. The problem. It is a basic principleof scientificinquirythat no proposi-
tion and no theoryis to be accepted withoutadequate grounds. In empiricalsci-
ence, whichincludesboth the natural and the social sciences,the groundsforthe
acceptance of a theoryconsist in the agreementof predictionsbased on the the-
ory with empirical evidence obtained either by experimentor by systematic
observation. But what are the groundswhichsanction the acceptance of mathe-
matics? That is the question I propose to discuss in the presentpaper. For rea-
sons which will become clear subsequently, I shall use the term "mathematics"
here to referto arithmetic,algebra, and analysis-to the exclusion,in particular,
of geometry[1].
2. Are the propositionsof mathematicsself-evidenttruths?One of the sev-
eral answers which have been given to our problem asserts that the truthsof
mathematics, in contradistinctionto the hypotheses of empirical science, re-
quire neitherfactual evidence nor any otherjustificationbecause they are "self-
evident." This view, however, which ultimately relegates decisions as to
mathematical truthto a feelingof self-evidence,encountersvarious difficulties.
First of all, many mathematical theoremsare so hard to establish that even to
the specialist in the particular fieldthey appear as anythingbut self-evident.
Secondly, it is well known that some of the most interestingresults of mathe-
matics-especially in such fieldsas abstract set theoryand topology-run coun-
ter to deeply ingrained intuitions and the customary kind of feeling of self-
evidence. Thirdly, the existence of mathematical conjectures such as those of
Goldbach and of Fermat, which are quite elementaryin content and yet un-
decided up to this day, certainlyshows that not all mathematical truthscan
be self-evident.And finally,even if self-evidencewere attributed only to the
basic postulates ofmathematics,fromwhichall othermathematicalpropositions
can be deduced, it would be pertinentto remark that judgments as to what
may be consideredas self-evidentare subjective; they may vary frompersonto
person and certainlycannot constitutean adequate basis fordecisions as to the
objective validity of mathematical propositions.
3. Is mathematicsthe most general empiricalscience? Accordingto another
view, advocated especially by JohnStuart Mill, mathematicsis itselfan empiri-
cal science which differsfromthe other branches such as astronomy,physics,
chemistry,etc.,mainly in two respects: its subject matter is more general than
that of any other field of scientificresearch, and its propositions have been
tested and confirmedto a greater extent than those of even the most firmly
established sections of astronomyor physics.Indeed, according to this view, the
degree to which the laws of mathematics have been borne out by the past ex-
periencesof mankind is so overwhelmingthat-unjustifiably--we have come to
think of mathematical theorems as qualitatively differentfromthe well-con-
firmedhypothesesor theoriesof otherbranches of science: we considerthem as
543
544 ON THE NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL TRUTH [December,
the followingsense: Every termof the theoryis definablein termsof the primi-
tives, and every propositionof the theoryis logically deducible fromthe postu-
lates. To be entirelyprecise,it is necessaryalso to specifythe principlesof logic
whichare to be used in the proofof the propositions,i.e. in theirdeductionfrom
the postulates. These principlescan be stated quite explicitly.They fall into
two groups: Primitivesentences, or postulates, of logic (such as: If p and q is
the case, then p is the case), and rules of deduction or inference(including,for
example, the familiar modus ponens rule and the rules of substitutionwhich
make it possible to infer,froma general proposition,any one of its substitution
instances). A more detailed discussion of the structureand content of logic
would, however,lead too farafieldin the contextof this article.
6. Peano's axiom systemas a basis formathematics.Let us now considera
postulate system fromwhich the entire arithmeticof the natural numberscan
be derived. This systemwas devised by the Italian mathematicianand logician
G. Peano (1858-1932). The primitivesof this system are the terms "0," 'num-
ber," and "successor." While, of course, no definitionof these terms is given
withinthe theory,the symbol "0" is intended to designate the number 0 in its
usual meaning,while the term "number" is meant to referto the natural num-
bers 0, 1, 2, 3 - * * exclusively. By the successor of a natural numbern, which
will sometimes brieflybe called n', is meant the natural number immediately
followingn in the natural order. Peano's systemcontains the following5 postu-
lates:
P1. 0 is a number
P2. The successor of any numberis a number
P3. No two numbershave the same successor
P4. 0 is not the successor of any number
PS. If P is a propertysuch that (a) 0 has the propertyP, and (b) whenevera
numbern has the propertyP, then the successor of n also has the property
P, then every number has the propertyP.
The last postulate embodies the principle of mathematical induction and
illustratesin a very obvious mannerthe enforcementof a mathematical "truth"
by stipulation. The constructionof elementaryarithmeticon this basis begins
with the definitionof the various natural numbers. 1 is definedas the succes-
sor of 0, or brieflyas 0'; 2 as 1', 3 as 2', and so on. By virtue of P2, this process
can be continuedindefinitely;because of P3 (in combinationwith P5), it never
leads back to one of the numbers previouslydefined,and in view of P4, it does
not lead back to 0 either.
As the next step, we can set up a definitionof addition which expresses in a
precise formthe idea that the addition of any natural number to some given
number may be considered as a repeated addition of 1; the latter operation is
readilyexpressibleby means of the successor relation.This definitionofaddition
runs as follows:
1945] ON THE NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL TRUTH 547
classes which contain at least one element; but the number 0, by definition,
applies to a class ifand only ifthat class is empty.-While the truth of PI, P2,
P4, P5 can be inferredfromthe above definitionssimplyby means of the prin-
ciples of logic, the proofof P3 (No two numbershave the same successor) pre-
sents a certain difficulty.As was mentionedin the precedingsection,the defini-
tion of the successor of a numbern is based on the process of adding, to a class
of n elements,one element not yet contained in that class. Now if thereshould
exist only a finitenumber of thingsaltogether then this process could not be
continued indefinitely,and P3, which (in conjunction with P1 and P2) implies
that the integersforman infiniteset, would be false. Russell's way of meeting
this difficulty[9] was to introducea special "axiom of infinity,"which stipu-
lates, in effect,the existence of infinitelymany objects and thus makes P3
demonstrable.The axiom of infinitycan be formulatedin purely logical terms
and may thereforebe considered as a postulate of logic; however, it certainly
does not belong to the generallyrecognizedprinciplesof logic; and it thus intro-
duces a foreignelement into the otherwiseunexceptionable derivation of the
Peano postulates frompure logic. Recently, however, it has been shown [to]
that a suitable systemof logical principlescan be set up which is even less com-
prehensivethan the rules of logic which are commonlyused [It], and in which
the existence of infinitelymany objects can be proved without the need fora
special axiom.
10. Mathematics as a branch of logic. As was pointed out earlier,all the the-
oremsof arithmetic,algebra, and analysis can be deduced fromthe Peano postu-
lates and the definitionsof those mathematical termswhich are not primitives
in Peano's system. This deduction requires only the principlesof logic plus, in
certain cases, the axiom of choice. By combiningthis result with what has just
been said about the Peano system,the followingconclusion is obtained, which
is also known as thethesisof logicismconcerningthenatureof mathematics:
Mathematics is a branch of logic. It can be derived fromlogic in the follow-
ing sense:
a. All the concepts of mathematics,i.e. of arithmetic,algebra, and analysis,
can be definedin terms of four concepts of pure logic.
b. All the theoremsof mathematics can be deduced fromthose definitions
by means of the principlesof logic (includingthe axiom of choice).
In this sense it can be said that the propositionsof the system of mathe-
matics as heredelimitedare trueby virtueof the definitionsof the mathematical
concepts involved,or that they make explicitcertain characteristicswith which
we have endowed our mathematicalconcepts by definition.The propositionsof
mathematicshave, therefore,the same unquestionablecertaintywhichis typical
of such propositionsas "All bachelors are unmarried,"but they also share the
complete lack of empiricalcontentwhich is associated with that certainty:The
propositionsof mathematics are devoid of all factual content; they convey no
informationwhatever on any empiricalsubject matter.
1945] ON THE NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL TRUTH 553
to empiricalsubjectmatter.This
of mathematics
11. On the applicability
result seems to be irreconcilablewith the fact that after all mathematics has
proved to be eminentlyapplicable to empiricalsubject matter,and that indeed
the greater part of present-day scientificknowledge has been reached only
through continual reliance on and application of the propositions of mathe-
matics.-Let us try to clarifythis apparent paradox by referenceto some ex-
amples.
Suppose that we are examininga certain amount of some gas, whose volume
v, at a certainfixedtemperature,is found to be 9 cubic feetwhen the pressurep
is 4 atmospheres.And let us assume furtherthat the volume of the gas forthe
same temperatureand p =6 at., is predicted by means of Boyle's law. Using
elementaryarithmeticwe reason thus: For correspondingvalues of v and p,
vp= c, and v = 9 when p = 4; hence c = 36: Therefore,when p = 6, then v= 6. Sup-
pose that this predictionis borne out by subsequent test. Does that show that
the arithmeticused has a predictivepower of its own, that its propositionshave
factual implications? Certainlynot. All the predictivepower here deployed, all
the empirical content exhibited stems fromthe initial data and fromBoyle's
law, which asserts that vp= c forany two correspondingvalues of v and p, hence
also forv = 9, p = 4, and forp = 6 and the correspondingvalue ofv [12 ]. The func-
tion of the mathematicshere applied is not predictiveat all; rather,it is analytic
or explicative: it rendersexplicit certain assumptions or assertions which are
included in the contentof the premisesof the argument (in our case, these con-
sist of Boyle's law plus the additional data); mathematical reasoning reveals
that those premises contain-hidden in them, as it were,-an assertion about
the case as yet unobserved. In accepting our premises-so arithmeticreveals-
we have-knowingly or unknowingly-already accepted the implication that
the p-value in question is 6. Mathematical as well as logical reasoningis a con-
ceptual technique of making explicit what is implicitlycontained in a set of
premises. The conclusions to which this technique leads assert nothingthat is
theoreticallynew in the sense of not being contained in the content of the
premises. But the resultsobtained may well be psychologically new: we may not
have been aware, beforeusing the techniquesof logic and mathematics,what we
committedourselves to in accepting a certain set of assumptions or assertions.
A similar analysis is possible in all other cases of applied mathematics,in-
cluding those involving,say, the calculus. Consider,forexample, the hypothesis
that a certainobject, movingin a specifiedelectricfield,will undergoa constant
acceleration of 5 feet/sec2.For the purpose of testingthis hypothesis,we might
derivefromit, by means of two successive integrations,the predictionthat ifthe
object is at rest at the beginningof the motion,then the distance covered by it
at any time t is 4t2feet. This conclusion may clearlybe psychologicallynew to
a person not acquainted with the subject, but it is not theoreticallynew; the
contentof the conclusionis already contained in that of the hypothesisabout the
constantacceleration.And indeed, here as well as in the case of the compression
of a gas, a failureof the predictionto come true would be consideredas indica-
554 ON THE NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL TRUTH [December,
those which grow out of arithmeticand ultimatelyout of pure logic, have the
functionof an analytic tool, which brings to light the implicationsof a given
set of assumptions but adds nothingto theircontent.
But while mathematicsin no case contributesanythingto the contentofour
knowledgeof empiricalmatters,it is entirelyindispensableas an instrumentfor
the validation and even for the linguisticexpression of such knowledge: The
majorityof the morefar-reachingtheoriesin empiricalscience-including those
whichlend themselvesmosteminentlyto predictionor to practicalapplication-
are stated withthe help ofmathematicalconcepts; the formulationofthese theo-
ries makes use, in particular,of the numbersystem,and of functionalrelation-
ships among different metricalvariables. Furthermore,the scientifictest ofthese
theories,the establishmentof predictionsby means of them, and finallytheir
practical application, all require the deduction,fromthe general theory,of cer-
tain specific consequences; and such deduction would be entirelyimpossible
without the techniques of mathematics which reveal what the given general
theoryimplicitlyasserts about a certain special case.
Thus, the analysis outlined on these pages exhibits the system of mathe-
matics as a vast and ingeniousconceptual structurewithout empirical content
and yet an indispensable and powerfultheoreticalinstrumentforthe scientific
understandingand masteryof the worldof our experience.
References
1. A discussionofthestatusofgeometry is givenin myarticle,Geometry and EmpiricalSci-
ence,AmericanMathematicalMonthly,vol. 52, pp. 7-17, 1945.
2. The objectionis sometimes raisedthatwithoutcertaintypesofexperience, suchas encoun-
teringseveralobjectsof the same kind,the integersand the arithmetical operationswiththem
wouldneverhave beeninvented, and thattherefore thepropositionsofarithmeticdo havean em-
piricalbasis.This typeofargument, however, involvesa confusion ofthelogicaland thepsychologi-
ical meaningof the term"basis.' It mayverywellbe the case thatcertainexperiences occasion
psychologically theformation ofarithmetical ideas and in thissenseforman empirical"basis"for
them;but thispointis entirely irrelevantforthelogicalquestionsas to thegrounds on whichthe
propositions of arithmetic may be acceptedas true.The pointmade above is thatno empirical
"basis"orevidencewhateveris neededto establishthetruthofthepropositions ofarithmetic.
3. A preciseaccountof thedefinition and theessentialcharacteristicsoftheidentity relation
maybe foundin A. Tarski,Introduction to Logic,New York,1941,Ch. III.
4. For a lucidand conciseaccountoftheaxiomaticmethod,see A. Tarski,I.c., Ch. VI.
5. BertrandRussell,Introduction to MathematicalPhilosophy, NewYorkand London,1919,
p. 71.
6. For a moredetailedaccountoftheconstruction ofthenumbersystemon Peano'sbasis,cf.
BertrandRussell,l.c.,esp. Chs. I and VII.-A rigorous and concisepresentationofthatconstruc-
tion,beginning, however, withthesetofall integers ratherthanthatofthenaturalnumbers, may
be foundin G. Birkhoff and S. MacLane,A SurveyofModernAlgebra,NewYork1941,Chs. I, II,
III, V.-For a generalsurveyof the construction of the numbersystem,cf.also J. W. Young,
Lectureson theFundamentalConceptsofAlgebraand Geometry, New York, 1911,esp. lectures
X, XI, XII.
6a. As a resultofverydeep-reaching carriedout by K. Godelit is knownthat
investigations
arithmetic,and a fortiori
mathematics,
is an incompletetheoryin the followingsense:Whileall
thosepropositions whichbelongto theclassicalsystemsofarithmetic,algebra,and analysiscan
556 ON THE NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL TRUTH