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A321, Charlo!e NC
USA, 2015
Summary

On 15 August 2015, an Airbus A321 on approach to

Charlotte commenced a go around but following a
temporary loss of control as it did so then struck
approach and runway lighting and the undershoot
area sustaining a tail strike before climbing away. The
Investigation noted that the 2.1g impact caused
substantial structural damage to the aircraft and
attributed the loss of control to a small microburst
and the crew’s failure to follow appropriate and
recommended risk mitigations despite clear evidence
of risk given by the aircraft when it went around and
available visually.

Event Details

When August 2015

Actual or Potential Human Factors, Loss of

Event Type Control, Weather

Day/Night Day

Flight Conditions VMC

Flight Details

Aircra" AIRBUS A-321

Operator American Airlines

Domicile United States

Public Transport
Type of Flight
(Passenger)

Atlanta/Hartsfield-
Origin
Jackson International

Intended Destination Charlotte/Douglas

Take off Commenced Yes

Flight Airborne Yes

Flight Completed Yes

Flight Phase Missed Approach

APR

Location - Airport

Airport Charlotte/Douglas

HF

Manual Handling,
Tag(s) Procedural non
compliance

LOC

Environmental Factors,
Hard landing,
Unintended transitory
Tag(s)
terrain contact,
Incorrect Aircraft
Configuration

WX

Precipitation-limited IFV,
Tag(s)
Low Level Windshear

Safety Net Mitigations

Wind Shear Escape

Partially effective
Guidance

Outcome

Damage or injury Yes

Aircra" damage Major

Non-aircra" damage Yes

Causal Factor Group(s)

Group(s) Aircraft Operation

Safety Recommendation(s)

Group(s) None Made

Investigation Type

Type Independent

Description
On 15 August 2015, an Airbus A321
(N564UW) being operated by American
Airlines on a domestic passenger flight from
Atlanta to Charlotte as flight 1851 and on
short final to runway 36L at destination in
day VMC commenced a go around but then
struck approach lighting and the paved
runway undershot area sustaining a tail
strike before climbing away. The flight was
subsequently completed without further
event but damage to the aircraft was
substantial and approach and runway
lighting were also damaged. However, none
of the 159 occupants were injured.

Investigation
An Investigation was carried out by the
NTSB. Relevant data from the CVR and the
FDR were downloaded to inform the
Investigation and when it became apparent
that a temporary loss of control attributable
to meteorological conditions may have been
a factor in the event, a comprehensive
specialist analysis of the available data in
that area was commissioned.

It was noted that the 58 year-old Captain,

who was PF for the flight, had a total of
13,621 hours flying experience including
10,030 hours on type and that the 40 year-
old First Officer had a total of 1,877 hours
flying experience including 838 hours on
type.

The crew stated that they were on a three-

day pairing and the accident flight was the
first flight of the second day. It was
established that it had proceeded
uneventfully until it neared its destination
with the aircraft weather radar on for the
whole flight and set to automatic mode. An
ILS approach to runway 36L was briefed
with autobrake at low because of possible
water on the runway and using ‘CONF FULL’
(full flap) rather than the usual ‘CONF 3’.

On contacting Charlotte APP at 11,000 feet

and reporting that they had ATIS ‘Y’, 36L
was confirmed and ATIS ‘U’ advised as
current. The crew subsequently
acknowledged that a low-level wind shear
advisory was in effect for the approach and
the Captain reported noting a rain cell close
to the airport just after this commenting to
the First Officer that this was preventing
him seeing the runway. The flight was
cleared for the 36L ILS approach about 5
minutes out and soon afterwards, the First
Officer was recorded as saying "that thing a
really is just like on the approach end isn't
it?" to which the Captain responded that
the rain shower was "right over the field"
but that it had "cleared the right half".

As the aircraft descended through 2,500

feet, the Captain disconnected the AP and
called for flaps to ‘CONF FULL’ about 30
seconds later. On transfer to TWR, “the
flight was cleared to land on runway 36L
following a CRJ ahead of them” and were
advised a windshear alert with a 20 knot
loss of airspeed on a one mile final and
advised that the aircraft ahead had reported
a gain of 8-15 knots airspeed at 300 feet.
Half a minute later, the CRJ ahead went
around and after a further half minute, the
A321 entered rain at around 180 feet agl and
the auto callout "one hundred" followed
about 5 seconds later. Almost immediately,
a ‘WINDSHEAR’ aural alert was annunciated
and the Captain immediately called "go
around, TOGA". Three seconds later, the
aircraft hit the ground, recording a 2.6 g
impact. The First Officer advised TWR that
they were going around and reported “a 20
knot loss of airspeed at about 10 feet”. The
flight was subsequently radar vectored for a
landing on runway 36C without further
event.

FDR data showed that during the minute

prior to the windshear encounter, the
airspeed has been between 140 and 145
knots with a 5-10 knot headwind
component. Then, about seven seconds
prior to impact, the airspeed began to
decrease and the headwind component,
which had increased to 15 knots quickly
became a tailwind component of a similar
amount which persisted for around seven
seconds before switching back to a
headwind over about four seconds.

A subsequent inspection of the aircraft

found that the aft lower fuselage had
sustained abrasion damage over an area
about 6 metres long by 1½ metres wide
which was “concentrated at the frame and
stringer locations” with “several punctures
of the lower fuselage skin and several
fractured or deformed fuselage frames”.
The potable water service door was missing
and recovered from the undershoot and
one of the main landing gear tyres had
sustained several cuts and had pieces of
metal embedded in it.

Inspection of the impact area found

“damage to several lights and evidence of
fuselage contact with the paved undershoot
surface”. Main landing gear tyre marks
began “prior to the last row of High
Intensity Approach Lighting System" (HIRL)
and there was impact over an area of about
14 metres long by 1 metre wide with blue
paint and aluminium metal transfer
beginning a little over 9 metres from the
runway 36L threshold. Three HIRLs and two
REILs (Runway End Identifier Lights) had
been sheared off at their bases and in
addition to the detached service door,
debris from these lights and small pieces of
fuselage skin were recovered from the
paved runway undershoot and runway 36L
surface.

A detailed study of the prevailing weather

conditions and the communication to pilots
was performed by the Investigation. Prior to
departure from Atlanta, the forecast given
to the crew included rain showers in the
vicinity of the destination around landing
time and this was then amended after the
flight’s departure to include “a temporary
period of thunderstorms and moderate rain
around arrival time”.

Recordings from the nearest ground

weather surveillance radar to Charlotte was
found to show “the rapid development of
two defined cells over the approach path
and airport” between eight minutes prior to
the commencement of the go around and
one minute afterwards which, within 15
minutes, had merged into a single larger
cell. These cells had no lightning activity
associated with them and “a three-
dimensional cross section showed bases
near 6,000 feet and tops up to 15,000 feet”.
The Charlotte Terminal Doppler Weather
Radar system which provided ATC with real-
time weather information was found to
have shown “several small echoes along the
flight path and a larger echo above the
runway 36L TDZ from five minutes before
the commencement of the go around and
one minute afterwards”. This encounter
with a short period of rapidly changing wind
velocity was considered to be clearly
indicative of passage through a “small
microburst”.

It was noted that ATC receive information

and predictions which include windshear
and microbursts integrated from “various
weather sensors around the airport” and
the corresponding display had, from 20
minutes prior to the commencement of the
go around until one minute afterwards,
been showing “detected windshear
conditions at or in the terminal area”. At the
time of the accident, this system “was
depicting a 25 knot windshear condition
over runway 36L and 36C associated with
an area of echoes over the area” and “the
ribbon display indicated a windshear alert
for arrivals on 36L with an expected 20
knot loss of airspeed at 1 mile final” which
was the alert provided to the flight by the
APP controller. This ATC system was found
to have “detected several microburst
conditions around the airport area in the
minutes prior to the accident" [but] there
were no microburst alerts were active for
any of the runways at the time of the
accident", the earlier windshear advisory
given to the crew having expired.

The composite weather radar reflectivity image about 90

seconds after go around began (the black dots indicate the
approach flight path). [Reproduced from the Specialist
Meteorological Report carried out for the Investigation]

Guidance provided in the parts of the

American Airlines QRH applicable to low
level windshear classified pilot reports of
airspeed changes greater than or equal to
15 knots as representing a high risk actual
windshear. The precautions to be
considered in the event of this (or even a
medium) windshear risk were given in the
QRH as using flap 3 rather than full flap and
increasing VAPP by up to 15 knots above
VREF. In the presence of TWR advice of a
windshear alert for a 20 knot loss of
airspeed at one mile final and awareness
that the CRJ ahead had reported an 8-15
knot airspeed gain at a similar position and
then gone around, no such precautionary
action was taken by the A321 crew.

The Probable Cause of the accident was

determined to be “an encounter with a
small microburst on short final at low
altitude that resulted in a loss of lift and a
tail strike during the go-around”.

A Contributory Factor to the accident was

also identified as “the Captain's decision to
continue the approach without applying
appropriate windshear precautions in
accordance with published guidance”.

The Final Report of the Investigation was

published on 8 June 2020. Note that the
Official Report does not include the ‘Figure
1’ it refers the reader to on page 5. No
Safety Recommendations were made.

Related Articles
Loss of Control
Low Level Wind Shear
Microburst
Quick Reference Handbook (QRH)

Category: Accidents and Incidents

This page was last edited on 14 September

2020, at 06:30.
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