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Aristotle's de Anima:
A Common Point of Departure for Averroistic and Thomistic Noetics*
Daniel D. De Haan
9/12/10

The commentaries on the de Anima by Averroes of Cordoba, and Saint

Thomas of Aquino are two of the most well known medieval interpretations of

Aristotle’s cryptic account of the two intellects from de Anima III. In this paper I

will focus on Averroes’ and Aquinas’ noetic doctrines and in particular their

respective interpretations of Aristotle’s account of the material or possible intellect.1

My analysis will center on a number of Aristotelian theses or points of

departure which are common to both Averroes and Aquinas’ interpretations. By

focusing on their common starting points I will bring into greater relief the real

significance of the few points on which they disagree, and how these points of

difference effect their overall interpretation of the de Anima and Aristotle’s noetic.2

I should note that this is only the second part of a multi-part analysis on

Aristotle’s de Anima as a common point of departure for the noetics of Averroes

and Aquinas. In the first part I presented a detailed comparison of their noetic

* This paper was presented at Aquinas and the Arabs / Thomas d’Aquin et ses sources arabes,
Hosted by the Center for Thomistic Studies, University of St. Thomas Houston, TX, in conjunction
with the Aquinas and the Arabs International Working Group, Marquette University, and the
Commissio Leonina, Paris, France, September 10-12, 2010.

1
As we will see, their interpretations find agreement with each other on a remarkable number of
points, such as their identification of the crucial philosophical difficulties, on what other Aristotelian
principles can be of service to these problems, and which earlier commentator’s interpretations
should be adopted or altered. It is often only in their more rare moments of philosophical novelty
wherein Averroes and Aquinas introduce creative solutions to the Aristotelian text and thereby go
their separate ways.
2
By following these relatively few points of disagreement all the way through to their ultimate
doctrinal conclusions, I will then be able to distinguish the real load-bearing theses of their
respective interpretations, from those theses which are more or less completely determined, or
perhaps, contorted into the shape imposed on them by more exigent theses.

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doctrines and then examined their respective interpretations of Aristotle’s definition

of the soul, as it is found in the early chapters of book II of the de Anima. Since a

few of my earlier conclusions will be requisite to this paper’s primary concern,

which is Averroes and Aquinas’ treatment of the material or possible intellect, I will

briefly summarize some of my early conclusions.

Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of intellect in III, 5. There is an intellect

“that can become all things”3 and so we might say that this intellect is in potency to

formal actuation, like matter. This kind of intellect was later designated by the 3rd

century Greek commentator, Alexander of Aphrodisias, as the “material intellect,”

an appellation adopted by Averroes; it was also called the potential and possible

intellect by other commentators, like Aquinas.4 The other intellect, which Aristotle

said, “can make all things”5 was given such appellations as “active intellect,”

“productive intellect,” and “agent intellect.”

Averroes is of course notorious for holding that there is one material intellect

shared by all men. Thomas Aquinas is well known for his criticism of this position

and other Latin scholastics that were influenced by it. Aquinas holds that there is a

diversification of material or possible intellects, i.e., there is an individuated

possible intellect in every single human being. Aquinas is also one of the earliest

commentators on Aristotle to hold that the agent intellect is an immanent natural

faculty found in each individual human.

3
Aristotle, de Anima, III. 5. 430a15-16 (trans. Apostle).
4
Alexander of Aphrodisias, de Anima, 81.
5
Aristotle, de Anima, III. 5. 430a16 (trans. Apostle).

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The foundation of Averroes’ and Aquinas’ interpretations on the material or

possible intellect, the agent intellect, and the ontological nature of man is

established, and in many ways is set, by the definition of this science’s subject and

principles, which are given at the beginning of book II of the de Anima. Averroes

and Aquinas have significantly different interpretations on the universality of

Aristotle’s general definition of the soul, and this conditions their interpretations

throughout the rest of the science, but in particular, their views about the intellect.

The medieval Aristotelians recognized that the epistemological account of

science presented in the Posterior Analytics offered an illuminating ordering

principle for scientific discovery and explication. Most of his early commentators

thought that Aristotle employed the ordering schema of the Posterior Analytics

within his own scientific treatises. Averroes and Aquinas are not exceptions. We

find throughout their commentaries numerous remarks concerning the three

elements which Aristotle declared is necessary for every science; there must be a

subject, its proper and common principles, and the proper attributes or objects of

inquiry, which are demonstrated of the subject, by its principles.6

At the beginning of the de Anima Aristotle himself explains that within the

scientific study of the soul “our aim is to grasp and understand, first its essential

nature, and secondly its properties.”7 After he completes his historical dialectic

through the doctrines of prior thinkers - the task of book I - he opens book II with

“a completely fresh start, endeavoring to answer the question, What is soul? i.e., to

6
Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I. 10.76b12-23.
7
Aristotle, de Anima I. 1.402a7-8. (trans. J.A. Smith).

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formulate the most general possible account of it.”8 In other words, Aristotle wants

to first know what is essential to the nature of the soul as such.

Not surprisingly Aquinas and Averroes both agree. Aquinas states that this

science begins first with an inquiry on “the substance of the soul, and secondly [it

seeks to] know its accidents or proper attributes (proprias passiones).”9 Averroes

likewise notes that “what is to be sought and thoroughly investigated in [this]

science is knowledge of the nature of the soul, i.e., its substance, then knowledge

of all the characteristics which accrue to it, just as with other things to be

considered in natural science.”10

In the first chapter of book II Aristotle presents his definition of the soul; I

will give two different formulations of this definition.

… the soul is the first actuality of a natural body with the potentiality of having life;
and a body of this kind would be one which has organs.11

If, then, there is something common to be said about every [kind of] soul, this
would be: “the first actuality of a natural body which has organs.12

8
Aristotle, de Anima II. 1.412a3-5 (trans. J.A. Smith).
9
Aquinas, In de Anima I. lt. 1. n. 9. Cf In PA I. lt. 18. p. 68.127-133: “Omnis enim demonstrativa
sciencia circa tria est, quorum unum est genus subiectum cuius per se passiones scrutatur; et aliud
est communes dignitates, ex quibus sicut primis demonstrant; tercium autem est passiones, de
quibus unaqueque sciencia accipit quid significet.”
10
Averroes, LCDA 3, n. 3 {6}. Cf. LCDA 1, n.5 {9} p. 7: “… we have to know the principles proper
to every single genus to be examined. For the principles of things differing in genus are themselves
different. That is why knowledge of that method is not enough for knowing the definitions of things,
unless the principles proper to those things are known. For definitions can only be compiled from
the proper principles which are in the thing.”
11
Aristotle, de Anima II. 1. 412a29-30. (trans. Apostle). Cf. “… the soul must be a substance as the
form of a natural body potential with life, and [such] substance is an actuality. So the soul is the
actuality of such a body.” Aristotle, de Anima II. 1. 412a20-22. (trans. Apostle).
12
Aristotle, de Anima II. 1.412b4-6. (trans. Apostle). Cf. “We have now stated universally what the
soul is: with respect to its formula, it is a substance, and this is the essence in such and such a
body,…”. Aristotle, de Anima II. 1.412b10-11. (trans. Apostle). See also: II.2 414a17-19; 414a28-
30. And II.3 415a14: “… the formula most appropriate to each of these [powers] is also the formula
of each [kind of] soul.” Also: “It is also clear that the soul is the primary substance and the body is
matter, and man or animal is the compound of both taken universally.” Meta. Z 11.1037a5-7.

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Now that Aristotle has established a general definition concerning what is universal

to every kind of soul,13 he can, following the order of a demonstrative science, treat

the various parts of the soul, that is, seek their specific differences and demarcate

the subject genus into its specific kinds of soul.14

Averroes on the Definition of the Soul

Averroes and Aquinas understand Aristotle’s definition of the soul in

essentially the same way.15 What they do not agree about is the scope of this

definition’s application. In his earlier Middle Commentary on the de Anima

Averroes wrote that this “is the most conceivably comprehensive definition of the

soul there is.”16 But this is not the position maintained by Averroes in his later Long

Commentary.

By the time of his mature position, Averroes no longer thinks that this

definition of the soul must be universally employed in all the scientific

13
Cf. Ibid. 412b10-12: “It has been stated, then, what the soul in general is. It is ‘substance’ as
definable form; and this means what is the essence of such a kind of body.”
14
Aristotle, de Anima II. 2. 413b13-15 and 4.415a14-16.
15
Averroes repeatedly states Aristotle’s definition that “the soul must be a substance insofar as it is
the form of a natural body having life to the extent that it is said to have that form potentially, so that
it carries out the actions of life through that form.”Averroes, LCDA 2, n. 4 {134} p. 110. Cf. Ibid. n.
5: “The substance which exists as form {135} is an actuality of the body having form – and it was
already explained that the soul is form – it is necessary that soul be the actuality of such a body, that
is, that actuality of a natural body having life potentially, insofar as it is made actual by the soul.”
Just as Aquinas notes that the “soul is the primary act of a physical body potentially alive, where act
means the same sort of actuality as [science].” Aquinas, Sentencia Libri De Anima, (Lenonia, 1985 v.
45.1) II, c.1, p. 71.12-14: Vnde concludit quod, cum anima sit actus sicut sciencia, quod sit actus
primus corporis phisici potencia uitam habentis.
16
Averroes, MCDA 2.1. p. 44 (118) [412b4] Also, MCDA 2.3 (141) p. 54.2-7: “Whoever finds this
sort of definition of the soul [that is, one which is applicable to all its faculties] and abandons it
deserves to be derided, as does one to whom something similar would occur with the definition of
figure, since the definition [sought] of a single nature is not one of those which is understood
through the species which comprise it.”

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demonstrations concerning specific kinds and powers of the soul.17 Instead he

argues the contrary and emphasizes that Aristotle qualifies his own definition with a

conditional: if there were anything we could say about all souls, this would be it.18

Not surprisingly, Averroes contends that there is another kind of soul that is not the

first actuality of a body, which is precisely why Aristotle has made this qualification;

Aristotle wants us to recognize that this definition of the soul is neither universal

nor univocal but rather equivocal.

Let us be clear about what just happened. Averroes has just interpreted

Aristotle’s general definition of the soul and its place in the de Anima in

anticipation to the interpretation he will give to one kind of soul in book III. In

other words, Averroes has come to recognize that there is a doctrinal tension

between Aristotle’s apparent statements that this is a universal definition of soul,

and his newly found mature position on the separate material intellect which

cannot be the actuality of a body, and Averroes has sought to resolve this tension by

qualifying the “universality” of the definition of soul given in book II, 1.19

17
Averroes’ final position contends that this definition of the soul is not universal and will not
necessarily be employed in all the scientific demonstrations concerning specific kinds and powers
of the soul.
18
By emphasizing the conditional in one of Aristotle’s definitions of the soul, Averroes argues that
Aristotle has suggested that if there was anything true of all souls this definition would be it.
However, Averroes holds that this definition is not univocal, but equivocal, for once we arrive at III,
5 we will realize there is another kind of soul that is not the act of an organic body. This
conditional serves as the pivot for Averroes’ interpretation on the universality of book II’s definition
of soul, an interpretation completely different from his earlier position in the Middle Commentary.
19
Later in the commentary, and after showing that the material intellect is separate Averroes will
return to this earlier distinction. Averroes explains that, “It has therefore been explained that the first
actuality of the intellect differs from the first actualities of the other powers of the soul and that this
word “actuality” is said of these in an equivocal way, contrary to what Alexander thought. For this
reason Aristotle said in regard to the definition of the soul that it is the first actuality of a natural
organized body, because it was not yet evident whether the body is actualized through all the
powers in the same way or [whether] there is some [power] among these in virtue of which the

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This was not a position which came easily to Averroes. According to recent

scholarship, Averroes held four different positions on the nature of the material

intellect, and the topic was treated in at least eight different works. Averroes seems

to have restlessly returned to Aristotle’s text as he patiently crafted the final position

taken in the Long Commentary. The result of his numerous studies on the text is

this conclusion: that the controlling principle in Aristotle’s de Anima is not

Aristotle’s universal definition of the soul, but the doctrine of the material intellect.

This, however, is not a minor shift. Averroes has essentially abandoned the

ordering principle of all Aristotelian sciences. On Averroes’ mature interpretation

the more known common whole has not been established at the beginning for the

sake of all the parts. Rather, the subject genus has been divided, and where this

should be cause for differentiating another science, Averroes is instead implicitly

contending that Aristotle’s de Anima is a single science with two subjects.20

Aquinas on the Definition of the Soul

This was not the conclusion of Thomas Aquinas, whose interpretation has

more in common with Averroes’ earlier position in the Middle Commentary.

Aquinas contends that the general definition of the soul given by Aristotle is

universally true of all the specifically different kinds of souls. He writes, “the

body is not actualized, and if [that other power] is actualized, it will be in another way.” Av. LCDA
III. n. 5 {405} p. 320. Also, Av. LCDA III. n. 5 {397} p. 313: “What he «Alexander» supposes is
evident concerning general accounts in regard to the soul [is something] Aristotle himself clearly
said is not evident in regard to all the parts of the soul. For to say form and first actuality is to speak
equivocally about the rational soul and about the other parts of the soul.” We should not be
surprised that Averroes’ interpretation of the whole has been determined by one of its parts.
Averroes candidly reveals to his readers that the Long Commentary is in many ways ordered
towards Averroes’ sui generis account of the material intellect in book III.
20
N.b Aristotle does say that intellect itself is not treated in this science, but in another; but this is an
intellectual soul here.

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definition of the soul itself comprises what is most common or general, whereas

that of each of its parts or potencies comprises only some special aspect of it.”21 It

is essential to Aquinas’ understanding of this demonstrative science that this

definition of the subject be one and universal, because “… definition is the

principle of demonstration. Since things are defined by their essential principles,

diverse definitions reveal a diversity of essential principles; and this implies a

diversity of sciences.”22

Aquinas is not saying anything novel; he is simply following the

epistemological order prescribed by the Posterior Analytics; an order that fixes the

subject and principles of a science from the beginning. So when it comes to the

discussion on the intellect in de Anima, III. 4-9, the philosophical horizon has

already been set as far as Aquinas is concerned. For Aquinas, this is a work about

the soul, and the soul is the formal actuality of an organic physical body. Whatever

else we might discover about some specific aspect of the soul it will necessarily be

understood as a qualification that presupposes the universality of this definition of

the soul as such.

As I hope has become clear, it was necessary to begin with Aristotle’s

general definition of the soul because Averroes and Aquinas’ considerably different

interpretations of this definition, commit them at the beginning to a particular field

of conclusions later on. And this is why principles are thought to be more than half

the whole. Aquinas has set his interpretation within the parameters of a universal

21
Aquinas, In de Anima II. lt. 1. n. 211.
22
Aquinas, In de Anima I. lt. 2. n. 29.

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definition of the soul; Averroes had already tried that in a number of treatises and

found it to be an unsuccessful approach when one confronts Aristotle’s treatment of

the material intellect in book III. Grounded with this definition in place, the

intellectual soul for Aquinas, whatever else it might be, must at least be the

substantial form and first actuality of an organic body. Averroes, however, is not so

restricted and is open to other possibilities when approaching Aristotle’s text in

book III.23

PART II
Aristotelian Aporia on the Material/Potential Intellect24

We are now in a position to begin examining how Averroes and Aquinas’

understood Aristotle’s intellect which is able to become all things. I have identified

fourteen “Aristotelian” theses that are common points of departure for both

Averroes and Aquinas’ interpretations. All of these can at least be found inchoately

in Aristotle, albeit, some of them were given a more precise formulation through

the commentary tradition.25 Some of these are principles, some are conclusions,

and implications implied by other theses.

23
But is the pay off worth it? According to Aquinas, a move like Averroes’ would seem to
completely undermine the integrity of a science. Rather then having one subject, it now seems to
have two. I also think that it is significant to remember that Averroes has changed his mind so much
–treats it 8 times with 4 positions if we accept that there is an additional transitional position prior to
the completion of the long commentary. Aquinas treats the topic of Averroes’ doctrine 7 times
explicitly, and in a host of other places. The position Aquinas contends is substantially the same
from the Sentences to the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists, this, despite his numerous
differences from the position of his teacher Albertus Magnus and other scholastic contemporaries.
24
Since it would be beyond the aims of this paper to take up their accounts of the agent intellect,
and because I am not entirely certain that their commitments to the general definition given in book
II essentially affects their interpretation of the agent intellect, I will leave off discussing it and go
directly to the nature of reception had in the material or potential intellect.
25
Bazán. 1981. pp. 425-6; Black. 1993. p. 160, recognizes the importance of principles (1) and (3)
and all four principles can be found in passim in Davidson. 1986. In this particular version of the

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Aristotelian Theses Common to Averroistic and Thomistic Noetics

1. Impassibility Thesis – The intellectual part of the soul is impassible in

contrast to sensation which is passible.26
2. Blank Slate Thesis – Intellect is capable of receiving the form of the object –
intellect is potentially a form but not the form itself 27 - the intellect is like a
tablet with no actual writing28
3. Analogy w/ Sensation Thesis – Intellect is related to its object as sense is
related to its object29
4. Unmixed w/ Matter Thesis B/c the intellect can think every thought,30 it
must be unmixed31 – its nature is mere potentiality and so it is actually
nothing prior to thought32 – it is potentially the place of forms33
5. Separability Thesis – The intellect is separable from the body, but the senses
cannot be without the body.34
6. Cognitive Corruptibility Thesis - The intellect is incorruptible, but thought
and knowledge are corruptible.35
7. Union in Intellection Thesis - The intellect is united with the object
understood in the act of intellection.36
8. Immateriality of Intellection Thesis - Actually intelligible objects are without
matter, objects in matter are only potentially intelligible37 - Intellection is
immaterial
9. Phantasms are Necessary for Intellection Thesis - Sensibles: sensation::
Phantasms: intellect38 – the intellect does not think w/o a phantasm39
10. Recipient Thesis - An object is received into a recipient according to the
mode of a recipient40
11. Intentionality Thesis – This receptivity is such that the intellect is able to
think the form of any thing without becoming the thing itself. E.g., signate
ring and wax41

paper I will not discuss their heritage from Aristotle through their Greek, Latin and Arabic,
Peripatetic and neo-Platonic developments.
26
Aristotle, De Anima, III.4, 429a15-16; 429a24-16; 429a30-b1-4.
27
Aristotle, De Anima, III.4, 429a17.
28
Aristotle, De Anima, III.4, 430a1.
29
Aristotle, De Anima, III.4, 429a17.
30
Aristotle, De Anima, III.4, 429a18; III. 5, 430a15
31
Aristotle, De Anima, III.4, 429a18.
32
Aristotle, De Anima, III.4, 429a22 & 429a24
33
Aristotle, De Anima, III.4, 429a27-30.
34
Aristotle, De Anima, III.4, 429b5-6
35
Aristotle, De Anima, I.4, 408b19-30.
36
Aristotle, De Anima, III.4, 430a4-5; III.5, 430a20; III. 7. 431a1.
37
Aristotle, De Anima, III.4, 430a6-7.
38
N.b. Intellect which can be affected is destructible and without it [it] cannot think Aristotle, De
Anima, III.5, 430a25.
39
Aristotle, De Anima, III.7, 431a15-16.
40
Aristotle, De Anima, II.2, 414a27-28.
41
Aristotle, De Anima, II.12, 424a17-21.

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12. Matter is a Principle of Individuation Thesis42

This list of Aristotelian theses seems to consist in one philosophical difficulty

after another. How can an intellectual soul be individuated and yet not be

contracted with matter, especially if the same intellectual soul is also the primary

actuality of this material body? Consider also, how can a nature which is pure

potentiality, be the primary formal actuality of an organic material body, which is a

principle of individuation, and yet still receive an immaterial universal intelligible

in act, with which it somehow one with the act of the intellect?

Further, how can this intellect be incorruptible and separate, always think

with a phantasm, yet have no nature except its potentiality for the reception of

intelligibles, and still have its thought remain perishable? It almost seems that every

thesis demands conditions which are incommensurable to what is commanded by

some other thesis on the nature of the object or subject of intellection.

These are the problems that Averroes and Thomas Aquinas encountered as

commentators on Aristotle’s de Anima, but nevertheless each of these Aristotelian

theses can be found in some way with the noetics of Averroes and Aquinas.43

Clearly the problems that they beset their interpretations are many; I will focus on

one thesis that is especially germane to our concerns. I will argue that the central

point of contention amidst these common Aristotelian points of departure rests on

their interpretation and philosophical account of intelligible reception, that is, what

42
Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.8,1034a7-8; XII.8, 1074a32-37.
43
These principles are found throughout the corpus of Aquinas, I will cite from the Summa as the
paradigmatic synthesis of Thomas’ thought. (1) in ST. I. 87. 1. ad. 3., (3) in ST. I. 84. 7, (4) in ST. 76.
1. ad. 5 and 89.1 and (5) in ST. I. 79. 2.

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is the nature of the intellect’s reception of actually intelligible objects? I will begin

with Averroes.

Averroes on the Material Intellect

Despite the prima facie implausibility of Averroes’ position that all human

beings share the same intellect, Averroes does explicate an illuminating

interpretation that attempts to reconcile and even seems to be supported by these

fundamental Aristotelian theses.

Consider Aristotle’s unequivocal statements on the unmixed nature of the

intellect and the union of the intelligible object in act with the intellect. It was such

theses that led Averroes to adopt a strict interpretation on the manner in which an

actually intelligible object can be received into a recipient. Averroes contends that

since intellection requires its object to be both immaterial and universal, it follows

that the recipient of an actual intelligible cannot be either enmattered or an

individuated member of a species.44 Anything less then this on the part of the

subject or its operation would undermine Aristotle’s contention on the unmixed

nature of the material intellect.45

Nothing could be more Aristotelian then for Averroes to make explicit this

connection between individuation, matter, and reception. If an intelligible form is

enmattered or individuated (or is received into a recipient that is enmattered or

individuated) it follows that it is necessarily only an intelligible in potency. The

44
Cf. Long Commentary. III. comm. 4, pp. 385-386 and comm. 5, p. 396.
45
Place of forms, but none of them prior to reception… so is it without form altogether? Or without
nature? Aquinas Averroes answer in accord. Cf. Averroes, III. {410} {385-386} Aquinas. III. lt. 7 n.
681.

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intellect and its intelligible form can only be actually intellectual if they are truly

universal and immaterial.46

Thus far Averroes’ interpretation remains consistent with the theses of

Aristotle. His examination of what kind of soul is required to receive actually

intelligible objects is consistent with Aristotle’s insistence on the separation of the

intellect from any mixture with matter. But if he are will to grant him this much, we

must also be willing to concede the rest.

As we have already noted, the object received into the intellect must be

actually intelligible and universal, i.e., not individuated. This reception allows for

actual intellection, and according to Aristotle, intellection involves the union of the

intellect with its object. This receptive union is clarified by the thesis that every

object is received into its recipient according to the manner of the recipient; and

according to Averroes this recipient cannot be unlike its object, if the object is to

truly be received as universal and actually intelligible. We are compelled to

conclude that the subject of reception is necessarily incorporeal, separate, and

unmixed with matter. But if there is no matter then the recipient cannot be

individuated. Hence, and contrary to Aquinas and Averroes’ earlier positions, the

intellect cannot be an individuated species and a fortiori cannot be individuated by

being formally conjoined to matter as the substantial form of a body. Richard

Taylor has remarked that for Averroes,

46
“Et ex hoc apparet quod ista natura [i.e., intellectus materialis,] non est aliquid hoc, neque corpus
neque virtus in corpore; quoniam, si ita esset, tunc reciperet formas secundum quod sunt diversa et
ista, et si ita esset, tunc forme existents in ipsa essent intellecte in potentia, et sic non distingueret
naturam formarum secundum quod sunt forme …” Long Commentary. III. 5, p. 388, ll. 37-43. (My
emphasis) cf. Ibid. p. 402, ll. 432-440.

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[W]hat is received into a particular existing entity is itself particularized when it is

received into the particular individual. What is a body or a power of a body is a
'this' and cannot receive universal forms without transforming them into particular
cognitions which are intelligibles in potency, not intelligibles in act. From this it
follows that the Material Intellect in which the intelligibles in act exist cannot itself
be a particular, a 'this,' since it must contain intelligibles in act.47

It seems then that Averroes account of intelligible reception is one of the

most, if not the most, salient features of his mature noetic, and his gloss on this

thesis determines the way he will order all the other Aristotelian theses. If we recall

the considerably different interpretation Averroes had on this principle in his earlier

thought, I think there is strong evidence in favor of recognizing the theoretical

prominence of his understanding of intelligible reception. His mature

interpretation of this thesis entails that the material intellect must be separate in

order to preserve theses (1), (2), (4), (5), (11) that the intellect is a immaterial, in

potency to intelligible forms, it is free from admixture with material organs, it is

able to become forms intentionally, and is in fact separate, and is impassible.48

Since the intelligible object of the material intellect is received as actual and

therefore immaterial and universal Averroes preserves theses (7), (8), & (10) on the

immaterial reception and union of actual intelligibles in intellection.49 These latter

principles all determine a further novelty of Averroes’ noetic, namely, the

operational union of the phantasm with the material intellect in what is called

theoretical intellect (intellectum speculativum). Averroes’ theoretical intellect is

47
Taylor. 1999. pp. 159-160. cf. Davidson. 1986. p. 117. & Black. 1993. pp. 169-170.
48
Cf. Long Commentary. III. comm. 5, pp. 399-401 and 404-407.
49
Averroes interpretation of (1) can be found in the Long Commentary. III. comm. 5, p. 404, ll. 501-
506: “Dicamus igitur quod manifestum est quod homo non est intelligens in actu nisi propter
continuationem intellecti cum eo in actu. Et est etiam manifestum quod materia et forma
copulantur adinvicem ita quod congregatum ex eis sit unicum, et maxime intellectus materialis et
intentio intellecta in actu…” cf. Black. 1999.

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the intellectual manifestation of his two-subject theory of cognition. To put it

briefly, cognition for Averroes consists in a subject of cognitional content or truth

content and a subject for the cognitive operation which cognizes the content. In

the case of intellection the theoretical intellect designates the operational union of

the abstracted phantasms, the subject of intelligible content, with the material

intellect’s operation of understanding, which is the subject of the cognitive

operation.

This doctrine of the two-fold subject of cognition proves useful to

reconciling a number of theses with his doctrine of the separated material intellect.

Averroes now has an account for thesis (9), that the intellect always employs a

phantasm50 because the phantasm is the subject of content in the theoretical

intellect and because such phantasms are in sensation, he has also aptly dealt with

the corruptibility of knowledge in thesis (6) while still maintaining thesis (7) on the

union of the object with the intellect in the act of intellection. Internal to his

doctrine of the two-fold subject of cognition is Averroes’ preservation of the blank

slate thesis (2) and the analogy with sensation thesis (3). This is because the

intellect is in potency to forms which act from without as subjects of content, just

as they do in sensation.51

There are many details being left out here, but even this short story reveals

that the various connections woven into Averroes’ noetic are principally

determined by his account of material individuation, intelligible reception, and

50
Cf. infra. 44 and 49.
51
Cf. Long Commentary. III. comm. 5, p. 401, ll. 420-423; Bazán. 1981. p. 428, esp. n. 16;
Davidson. P. 290; Taylor. 1999. pp. 160-163.

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actual intellection. Let us also remember that this doctrine only remains a viable

scientific option in view of Averroes’ interpretation of book II’s definition of the

soul. The soul encountered here is not the first actuality of an organic body, but a

separated immaterial intellect that is common to all men and is only able to

actually understand because it is not individuated by any individual man.

Aquinas on the Potential Intellect:

Averroes’ position, however, is not even a possibility for Aquinas. A soul

that is not the first actuality of an organic body simply is not a soul according to

Aristotle’s definition in de Anima II. Aquinas’ position is unwavering, whatever the

intellectual soul is, it is at least the first act of an organic body.52 Aquinas reveals

how fundamental he thinks this Aristotelian definition of the subject is for the

science of the soul when he begins his polemic against the Latin Averroists. The

point is treated at length both exegetically and philosophically; Aquinas is

convinced that Aristotle’s de Anima is structured around its subject matter, because

the Posterior Analytics asserts that this is the foundation of every science.

What we need to see here is that even though Averroes and Aquinas adopt

the same Aristotelian theses, the scientific context is completely different. For

Aquinas all of these Aristotelian theses are scientifically determined by the universal

definitions of soul given in de Anima II, for Averroes they are not. Since we do not

have time to consider all the differences between Averroes and Aquinas I will

continue to focus on the theses concerning the intellectual reception of

52
Cf. In de Anima III. lect. 7 n. 696.

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intelligibles.

In order to properly situate Aquinas’s position on the matter we must

recognize that he approaches this problem with a different metaphysic. Aquinas’

metaphysical approach to the problem utilizes a few Avicennian insights, such as

admitting of both essential and existential determinations. And since there are both

essential and existential acts and perfections, this results in a shift within the order

of potency; no longer is it restricted to the material, but there is also a kind of

formal potency to existential act. With this in place Aquinas can comfortably

defend the position that there are immaterial singulars that are in potency to their

act of existence and are distinct from God. Such things are not individuated

species, but they are individuals. More germane to the problem of intelligible

reception, however, is that this Avicennian metaphysic allows Aquinas to

consistently deny Averroes contention that singularity impedes intelligibility.53

Rather intelligibility is impeded by pure potentiality and lack of determination, and

this is not a condition of singularity, but a condition of matter.54

For Aquinas existence can be a causal determination of singularity without

matter. Matter individuates an individual existent as a member within a species,

but existence is sufficient for the singularity of, e.g., immaterial thoughts, acts of

will, separated substances, their thoughts and voluntary acts. The latter do not

differ as distinct members of a species, but the former of course do, but not in

53
It is also on account ofAquinas’s Avicennian notion that he thinks Averroes’ position entails that
God can be the only knower with a singular act. Cf. DUI. 5. 107.
54
Cf. SCG. II. 75 n. 10; DQSC. IX. ad 15; DQdA. 3. ad 17; ST. I. 76. 2. ad 3. In IV Sent. d.
12.1.1.ad1 and ad3; SCG. II. 75 n. 10; DQSC. IX. ad 15; DQdA. 3. ad 17; ST. I. 76. 2. ad 3;
ST.III.77.2 DUI 5. n. 102; 112.

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virtue of their faculties, but by virtue of their substantial subject and its material

principle of individuation.

In this way Aquinas can maintain that an abstracted immaterial intelligible

species, is received into a singular immaterial intellectual faculty of an individual

rational supposit, which is an existing hylomorphic composite, and whose

substantial form is the act of an organic body. This composite is individuated as a

singular member of a species in virtue of its substantial material principle.55

The Reception of Aristotelian Theses in Aquinas

So long as Aquinas can maintain that the intellect remains an immaterial

faculty of an individuated human person,56 he can consistently hold to his

interpretation of Aristotle’s universal definition of the soul and account for the

intelligible reception of actualized intelligible species in theses (8), (10) & (11); the

of union intelligible species with the possible intellect in intellectual operation,

thesis (7); the necessity of the phantasms as the proximate sensory source of the

55
Nota Bene: that that the human soul is not the form the organic body in virtue of its intellectual
power (which is immaterial and operates without any organ). The human soul as a substantial form
is the first actuality of an organic body which is the ontological ground of its faculties, one of which
operates without any corporeal organs. We must keep distinct the 1) soul (an intellectual soul
defined – not identified- by its highest faculty/part) as substantial formal principle, 2) the organic
body as material principle, 3) the faculties of the human being which have their formal principle in
the soul, 4) the esse of the human person which is communicated through the substantial form to
the organic body (formal determination (animation) presupposes existential determination (esse) – it
communicates animated esse), and finally the 5) whole concrete human person, i.e., the rational
animal. The human soul does exist through itself because it is the ontological formal principle of a
faculty that has its own per se immaterial operation, and operation follows being. cf. DUI 83-85;
112; operari sequitur esse, De Anima I. 1.403a10-12. DUI. 37-38 N.B. The being of the substantial
form which is communicated to the composite, does not cease with the corruption of the
composite. Further, faculties are not individuated of themselves but through their subject, if that
subject is man then they are individuated in virtue of being a faculty of a human person that is
individuated by matter but an individual through his existential act.
56
The intellect is not a substantial principle, but a part which follows the existence of its formal
principle.

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proper object of the intellect, thesis (9)57; the analogy of sensation to intellection

and the corruptibility of knowledge, theses (3) & (6); the intellect’s pure potency

and non-mixture with matter theses (1), (2), (4).58

Aquinas’s distinction between individuation and existential singularity opens

up a philosophical vista which is excluded by Averroes rejection of Avicenna.

Aquinas’ assimilation of Avicennian insights allowed him to avoid Averroes’ strict

account of intellectual reception as non-singular.59 This novel assimilation and

introduction of Avicennian elements allowed Aquinas the possibility of weaving

together a cogent and consistent Aristotelian exegesis and philosophical

anthropology, without altering the integrity or unified order of Aristotle’s science of

the soul. Rather then alter the subject matter of Aristotle’s science; Aquinas places

the science of the soul within the larger context of an Avicennian metaphysics, the

science which the de Anima ultimately presupposes. On this interpretation the

integrity of both sciences remains. The novelty of Averroes is to abandon the

universality of the definition of the soul and his bifurcation of the subject of

psychology.

57
Human intellection is that of a rational animal, and so is naturally oriented towards the quiddity
of material things, man must always understand with a phantasm, which is the condition for the
corruptibility of some cognition.
58
But how does he defend all this with the thesis concerning the separability of the intellect? If I
may be allowed to anticipate the fourth part of this study, Aquinas’ metaphysic also provides a
solution to this problem unavailable to Averroes due to his rejection of Avicenna’s metaphysic.
How the intellect can be separable by a per se operation it follows that there is a per se ontological
principle. Soul is not the act of the body through its faculties but by its essence, that is, as substantial
form. Cf. DUI 28. The animating principle of a live oak is not the act of an organic body by virtue
of its metabolic faculties, but by virtue of its substantial form, which is the ontological ground of this
faculties.58 Faculties are individuated or become singulars by their substance.
59
Part of the problem my be Averroes exaggerated correct; he moves from a basically a materialist
point of view to another extreme.

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CONCLUSION

There are of course numerous other motivations behind Averroes and

Aquinas doctrines on the material and possible intellect. For instance, both have

epistemological concerns for adopting their position and rejecting others, such as

Averroes’ Themistian concern about the unity of a science. Aquinas is especially

well known for his hic homo intelligit arguments which appeal to psychological

experience. This paper has been concerned with bringing into relief their common

point of departure as philosophers and exegetes, who adopt similar Aristotelian

theses, identify similar points of tension, and by introducing their own novel

innovations into the Aristotelian tradition seek to resolve these Peripatetic

difficulties.60

60
There is of course much more to be said and I plan to attend to more of this in detail in the future. I hope
to continue this section of the paper by drawing out further similarities and dissimilarities between the two
noetics; for instance, the influence of Averroes’ two-subject theory of cognition on Aquinas’ understanding
of the role of the phantasm in the operations of the possible intellect.

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