HR Law Lesson 1

HR LAW LESSON 1
I. a. Cases
1. Brigido Simon, et al., v. CHR, GR No 100150
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, Respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners. chanrobles virtual law library
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition for
prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR
from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al." chanrobles virtual law library
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as
an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and
received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said
notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned
premises of North EDSA. 1Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo
that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". 2On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque
Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR
Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the
demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR
Case No. 90-1580. 3On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and
shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR. 4 chanrobles virtual law library
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection,
and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, 5the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than
P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and
again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation
for contempt and arrest." 6 chanrobles virtual law library
A motion to dismiss, 7dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby
Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of
the structures of poor dwellers; chanrobles virtual law library
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office
admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors; chanrobles virtual law library
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . .
and chanrobles virtual law library
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a certain business
establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued,
upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8 chanrobles virtual law library
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21
September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should
be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated
in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business." 9 chanrobles virtual law library
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt charge that had
meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss
was still then unresolved). 10 chanrobles virtual law library
In an Order, 11dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On 1 March 1991, 12the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-
vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. 13 chanrobles virtual law library
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to
investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal
measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently
ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and children, and their
health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to
such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.
In an Order, 14dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Hence, this recourse. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution 16of
18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing
CHR No. 90-1580." 17 chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioners pose the following: chanrobles virtual law library
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction: chanrobles virtual law library
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the
petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City; chanrobles virtual law library
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and chanrobles virtual law library
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for public respondent CHR.
The latter thus filed its own comment, 18through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense
with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991,
requiring such comment. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petition has merit. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

Constitution. 19It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, 20issued on 5 May 1987, in
the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human
Rights. 21 chanrobles virtual law library
The powers and functions 22of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to -
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court;chanrobles virtual law library
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos
residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection; chanrobles virtual law library
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; chanrobles virtual law library
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; chanrobles virtual law library
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations
of human rights, or their families; chanrobles virtual law library
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights; chanrobles virtual law library
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary
or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority; chanrobles virtual law library
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions; chanrobles virtual law library
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and chanrobles virtual law library
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the
Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In
Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, 24the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed
that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that
resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function
of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat,
the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine
the extent of CHR's investigative power. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried,
could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the
University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?"
The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts of the world, whether
the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic
freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to
public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education, employment,
and social services. 25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are
inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it. 26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and
inalienable. 28 chanrobles virtual law library
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to
include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the
term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and
inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific
provisions on human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the
country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our
fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by
others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present
State of Human Rights in the Philippines," 29observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights expressed in the
International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action
then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite
periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to
petition for the redress of grievances became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass
media were subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
and judges lost independence and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of
resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared by international
bodies like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following discussions during its 26 August
1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human rights and also because civil
and political rights have been determined by many international covenants and human rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as
the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we
might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers
civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw the line? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human rights advocates, as well as in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the right to
fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents and
legal instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished this right against
torture.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are other violations of rights of
citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be
authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary
investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific parameters which cover civil and political
rights as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of governments regarding the particular political and civil
rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we
would now like to safeguard. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time
we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights
that we envision here? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts of that. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human rights? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the past regime, everytime we
invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the
rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to
confuse the issue? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees;
2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and
hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make the proposed Commission more
effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the
term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to the rights embodied
in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained
therein. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,
mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other convention which I do not remember. Am I
correct? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.
virtual law library
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not
have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in that other convention which may not
be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like "convention,"
rather than specify the rights contained in the convention. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of amendments, could specify to
us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political rights, not for the purpose of including these
in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be included, without
prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado
as to whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by
this provision - freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes
involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to
protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite
areas. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the concept of the
Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an international instrument. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GUINGONA. I know. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil
and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social rights. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to organize,
the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how much we need a
Commission on Human Rights. . . . chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they
are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate - torture, salvaging, picking up
without any warrant of arrest, massacre - and the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the
military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be independent. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs
this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political violations because if we open this to
land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we will not receive any response. . . . 30(emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on
Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights" (Sec. 1). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The term "civil rights," 31has been defined as referring -
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected
with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws,
freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state
or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches and
seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32 chanrobles virtual law library
Political rights, 33on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights
appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. 34 chanrobles virtual law library
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a
Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for
instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of
tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against
the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement
of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in
peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve,
instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the
Commission, taking into account its recommendation." 35 chanrobles virtual law library
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as
well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More
than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The
consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to
have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the
standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the
order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of
"human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its
revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in
accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be
understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with
the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority
vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies
(including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only
be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the
Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any appropriate
agency of government. 37 chanrobles virtual law library
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by the
demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to
question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially
consider.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and academic since the case
before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act
already accomplished. 38Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580.
The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. 39 chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further
proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.
chanrobles virtual law library
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library
I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204
SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The
Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to
maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order
maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary
shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of
the civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the
CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners. Positive action and
results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and
vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the
CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights
violations. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Separate Opinions
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.
2. Oposa v. Factoran GR No 101083
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and
RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by
their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN,
JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents
GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed
SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN,
all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all
surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed
ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed
QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the
twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have
a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was
the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition
by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a
1 2
taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
3
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
4
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares
and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain
a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be
utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and
other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a)
water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of
the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality
of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at
one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of
the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the
Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of
typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the
absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of
supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide
gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse
effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration
that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's
land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of
the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of
the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut
the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays
and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the
plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare
and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a
final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors
who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which
the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with
each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State
to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)."
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
(Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-
preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the
plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim
7
— that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a
sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No.
192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover
more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case
because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still
be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for
which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a
valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which
should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an
action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a
TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations.
Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties
are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We
find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality
to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
9
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas
and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
10
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of
their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the
parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe
that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are
seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to
state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy,
may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-
equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific
legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint
itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-
founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second,
the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit
nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right
in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not
impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution
concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June
13
1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
14
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest
and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and
the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the
state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
15
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as
well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural
resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications
relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment."
Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the
agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental
right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment
Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." As its goal, it
16
speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." The latter statute, on the other
17
hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate
and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the
plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to
19
the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of
falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is:
admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? In Militante vs.
20
Edrosolano, this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on
21
the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically
admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific
averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis
thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise
of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
22
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred
as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
23
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a
quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent
Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with
utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands
of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the
Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession,
permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the
due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, this Court held:
25
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which
can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state,
or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor
is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession
area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20
of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance
declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-
impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the
state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. this Court stated:
28
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, to wit:
29 30
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern.
The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent
Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet
existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases
decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of
the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity.
I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-
12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal
interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership
in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is
vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on
the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and
presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without
doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right
to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention
and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into
rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land,
streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral
reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain
species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1,
Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and
abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific
environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of
the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment
Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing
with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action
on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is
in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order
of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by
petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a
constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be
expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments —
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts
should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public
respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and
this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed
wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for
the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases
decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of
the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity.
I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-
12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal
interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership
in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is
vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on
the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and
presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without
doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right
to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention
and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into
rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land,
streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral
reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain
species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1,
Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and
abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific
environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of
the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment
Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing
with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action
on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is
in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order
of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by
petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a
constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be
expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments —
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts
should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public
respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and
this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed
wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for
the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
3. Pestilos v. Generosa GR No. 182601
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ, Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the
1
resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91541.
2
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos,
Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno
Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside. 3
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police Station) to report the incident. Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl
4
Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. SP02 5
Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than
one hour after the alleged altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.
6 7
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills
Police Station for investigation. The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor
8 9
of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. 10
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO
GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able to parry the attack, to his
damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 11
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested.
12
They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime.
They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary
investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. 13
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. The court likewise denied the
14
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 15
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation.16
The Assailed CA Decision
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest
17
executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty.
Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a
consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly
state the facts and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had
sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17, 2008; hence, the present petition.
18
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE
FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued; they went to the police station only as a response to
the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the word "invited. "
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident
happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless
arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not
properly issued.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was
employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants
and establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present
case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the current applicable interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902, and the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions all protect the right of the
19 20 21 22
people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. " 23
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the
writings of Sir Edward Coke and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the bank of
24
the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215. The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown to
25
proclaim certain liberties under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war. The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the
26 27
foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. It provides: 28
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise
29
destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will
not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right. [Emphasis supplied]
30
In United States v. Snyder, the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures
31
without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable. With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of
32
reasonableness. 33
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of
America and England that, according to the Court, were not different from the Spanish laws. These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests
34
based on the provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines. 35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson that Section 37 of Act No. 183, or the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to
36 37
arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al., the Court held that in the absence of any provisions under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held
38
similar functions as those of the officers established under the common law of England and America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the
Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos that the rules on warrantless arrest were based on common sense and reason. It further held that
39 40
warrantless arrest found support under the then Administrative Code which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of public
41
offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza, the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were
42 43
provisions taken from the Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest
are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forth with delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under
Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. 44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision applicable in the present case. This provision has undergone changes through the
years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its
appropriate present application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in
the Philippines. In Fortaleza, the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that:
45
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some
offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the
case would warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent
who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested, although no formal complaint has been filed against him,
provided the following circumstances are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime."
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila, which provided that certain officials, including police officers may, within
the territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably
tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace.
In Santos, the Court cited Miles v. Weston, which ruled that a peace officer may arrest persons walking in the street at night when there is reasonable
46 47
ground to suspect the commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable
cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing that
the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another requirement. Once these conditions are complied with, the
peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person turned out to be innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that
a crime was actually committed. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it. In addition, it was also
established under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest
would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach.
48
In The US. v. Hachaw, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the arresting person did not state in what way the Chinaman
49
was acting suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was
the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated in its
commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this
discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court

(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of
Court as follows:50
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old
rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest.
Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has been committed and whether
the person to be arrested has committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the
element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules
of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was re-worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under
paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly,
however, it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This
limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of
the arresting officer's determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first,
the contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested
should be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and
(2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere
suspicion or hearsay. 51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed;
and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the element of probable cause, followed by the elements that
the offense has just been committed, and the arresting officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances,
within his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant
52
although such arrests must be reasonable. According to State v. Quinn, the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of violating the
53
law is not a violation of due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States that the Fourth Amendment limited the circumstances under which warrantless
54
arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the arrest
probable cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds." 55
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The
standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case
where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the arresting officer
possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information acquired later. 56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves
probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be
determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular offense involved. 57
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his
observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general
suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on
information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information. 58
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al., the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
59
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in preliminary
investigations and the judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for triat. In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and
60 61
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the respondent was based on the submitted documents of the
complainant, the respondent and his witnesses. 62
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been
committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in
detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest.
63
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to
actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making.the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, or an actual belief or
64
reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts. 65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the
judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe
that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its
existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use the same standard of a
reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on
the evidence submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available information that he must personally gather within a
limited time frame.
Hence, in Santos, the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its
66
determination in these instances. The Court held that one should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle
reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape
of the criminal.
67
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:

The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken together in the Court's
determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman, the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas
68
requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and
Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos, one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited
69
him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest
Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest
was the information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.
In People v. del Rosario, the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed means that there must be a large measure of
70
immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the
commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he was arrested only a day after the commission of the crime
and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver
of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
In People v. Cendana, the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed
71
sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.
In Rolito Go v. CA, the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the crime was held invalid because the crime had not just been
72
committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim.
The information upon which the police acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the accused was the
gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife. That
information did not constitute "personal knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr., the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts
73
which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente, the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held
74
that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The
warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Alvario, the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers received information from the victim of the crime. The Court held
75
that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who
raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v. Jayson, there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were
76
summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the shooting. The Court
held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the
assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Acol, a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims
77
saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the
policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. CA, there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to
78
Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message. When they reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated the report about
the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity.
Based on the reported statements of the complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was held
valid.
In Doria, the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness
79
the commission of the offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team
headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was
implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of the
incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita
III agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to run towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of
the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled
with the incident report which they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of
probable cause. Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and
''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case.
However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law Dictionary, "circumstances are attendant or accompanying
80
facts, events or conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police
officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if,
based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made
immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts
or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause
finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information
gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of
immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would
necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision
adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could
effect a valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the
matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting
officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal
knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with
the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the
requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has
the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest,
would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? We rule in the
affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules

of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts in its decision. From a review of the records, we conclude
81
that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a
warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to the resolution of the
issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.
Based on the police blotter entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in
82
for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005,
along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police station, would
connote that the arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2)
hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners'
admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas, although they asserted that they
83
did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate that was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the
84
alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following findings:
"Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral
aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible
abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic
conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers
responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso
and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty.
85
Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their
86
participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired. 87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they
have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation,
perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal
knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson, the police officers in the present case saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he
88
positively identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go
with the police officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr. where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the
89
petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what
transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the
requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested
committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render
personal assistance to the victim. This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime
90
had been committed - the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed. 1âwphi1
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene
while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the
immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest
proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to

mean as an authoritative command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the
taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
91
physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other
and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. 92
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest, SP02 Javier could not but have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty.
93
Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police
station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including
the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in connection with a
particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges against them before taking them to
Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. 94
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary

investigation is valid
In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying the petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for
allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
95 96
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of
the accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and
hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts
found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary
incidents leading up to the trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the
proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its
denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and
hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City
Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice
b. history/Non-Law Sources of Human Rights
i. Religion
1. Ten commandments
2. Our father Prayer
Our Father, who art in heaven, hallowed be

thy name. Thy kingdom come, thy will be done,
on earth, as it is in heaven. Give us this day our
daily bread and forgive us our trespasses as we
forgive those who trespass against us; and lead us
not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.
iii. others
1. the four freedoms park speech by Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941
PDF FORM
2. Kartilla ng katipunan by Emilio Jacinto
PDF FORM
3. What I’ve Learned by Jose Diokno
WHAT I'VE LEARNED
JOSE W. DIOKNO
(1922-1987) Former Senator of The Philippines,
founding chair of the Commission on Human Rights
.
I wanted to study mechanical engineering because I like gadgets. My parents were pressuring me to study law and I was
resisting. We compromised. I said, “I’ll just study commerce or business, because there are law subjects in business.”
Well, I found out that it was the law subjects I liked best. And I didn’t tell my parents anything more, I just enrolled in
law school.
The good lawyer, in preparing his case, is incredulous. He is a man who questions and bites. I like to think of myself as one
of that.
There is a practical reason why the lawyer must have courage. That is, that a lawyer with courage will persuade a judge
more easily than a lawyer without courage. When the judge knows that you will fight him all the way, as high as
necessary, you can be sure that the judge will study your cases very well and make sure that the judgments, if they are
going to be against you, are well studied.
In court, I may be talking to the judge and my attention may appear to be centered fully on him, but I am watching the
adverse party and all his known witnesses. I watch how they move, I watch how they talk. I try to see what degree of
education they have even before they take the witness stand. If it is a very important case, I usually bring an associate
and that’s his job—to be my other pair of eyes and see exactly what is happening. So, warn your witnesses not to be
talkative while they are in the courtroom or in the premises.
Katarungan. Our language employs the same word, katarungan, for both justice and fairness, as it does for both justice
and equity. And although we use a native word, karapatan, for right, we use a Spanish derivative, pribilehiyo, for privilege.
So it seems logical to conclude that the fundamental element in the Filipino concept of justice is fairness; and that
privilege and naked power—two of the worst enemies of fairness—are alien to the Filipino mind.
.
"Do we mean by development that we are developing a better people—people
with a conscience, people with a heart, people with the guts to stand up and
defend those rights?"

.
Filipinos seek God’s help because we have been made to believe we cannot help ourselves. Religion in the past contributed
to our sense of powerlessness. The Church is changing now, but much of the sense of powerlessness remains, and since
this makes many of us seek a father in earth as in heaven, this makes it easy for government to be authoritarian, to
manipulate and to mislead.
Authoritarianism does not let people decide; its basic premise is that people do not know how to decide. So it promotes
repression, not development, repression that prevents meaningful change, and preserves the structure of power and
privilege. Development is not just providing people with adequate food, clothing, and shelter; many prisons do as much.
Development is also people deciding what food, clothing, and shelter are adequate, and how they are to be provided.
I did yoga while I was in solitary confinement. I also did indoor exercise, like stationary jogging. And walking inside the
room, pacing it. I got into the practice of really observing everything. I was even beginning to train a small colony of ants
in my room.
Most political prisoners were married. When the husband was detained, his wife was reduced to living on charity, and his
children forced to drop out of school. When the wife was detained— and in some cases, both husband and wife were—the
children were left motherless.
I had met a young man before martial law. He was a university student, a leader: brilliant, articulate, involved. That day in
the courtroom he sat in a rattan chair, almost motionless, staring blankly ahead, his mouth half open, totally oblivious to
the people and the chatter around him; for he had been brutally detained under martial law; punished so repeatedly and
so brutally, and subjected to so large a dose of what the military call the truth serum, that his mind had cracked. He is
confined, to this day, in the mental ward of a military hospital. Beside him stood his wife, straight and proud, one hand
lightly resting on the crown of his head, the other touching his shoulder tenderly yet defiantly, ready to spring on anyone
who might still wish to hurt her husband.
Marcos had built his entire program on the principle of depending on the U.S. and Japan and getting all the loans that he
could. We just build our nation on the principle of depending on ourselves and getting as loans only what we need, not
what we can get.
What do we mean by development and growth? Do we mean only that we will become richer? Do we mean only that we
will have automobiles, radios, televisions, that we can eat in restaurants like A&W? Is that what we mean solely by
development, or do we mean by development that we are developing a better people—people with a conscience, people
with a heart, people with the guts to stand up and defend those rights?
Our elite gained access to their world of privilege, as elites always have, by being close to government, whether that
government was Spanish, American, or the Marcos family. Their ostentation creates great social tension because they do
not invest their money in ways that would develop our economy or create new jobs. The elite have chosen to live behind
heavily guarded walls, either because they are afraid of the people or unwilling to mix with them.
Society can only act through government once a society reaches a certain degree of complexity, as almost all societies
have. But government always remains only an agent of society; it never becomes society itself; it never becomes the
people themselves. It is always and only an instrument of the people.
4. watch The Story of Human Rights in YOUTUBE
c. Attributes of Human Rights
3. Cases and Law
a. Article 2, Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made
on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent,
trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
b. Simon v. CHR, GR No. 100150
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, Respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners. chanrobles virtual law library
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition for
prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR
from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al." chanrobles virtual law library
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as
an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and
received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said
notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned
premises of North EDSA. 1Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo
that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". 2On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque
Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR
Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the
demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR
Case No. 90-1580. 3On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and
shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR. 4 chanrobles virtual law library
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection,
and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, 5the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than
P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and
again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation
for contempt and arrest." 6 chanrobles virtual law library
A motion to dismiss, 7dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby
Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of
the structures of poor dwellers; chanrobles virtual law library
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office
admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors; chanrobles virtual law library
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . .
and chanrobles virtual law library
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a certain business
establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued,
upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8 chanrobles virtual law library
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21
September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should
be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated
in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business." 9 chanrobles virtual law library
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt charge that had
meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss
was still then unresolved). 10 chanrobles virtual law library
In an Order, 11dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On 1 March 1991, 12the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-
vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. 13 chanrobles virtual law library
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to
investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal
measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently
ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and children, and their
health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to
such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.
In an Order, 14dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Hence, this recourse. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution 16of
18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing
CHR No. 90-1580." 17 chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioners pose the following: chanrobles virtual law library
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction: chanrobles virtual law library
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the
petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City; chanrobles virtual law library
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and chanrobles virtual law library
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for public respondent CHR.
The latter thus filed its own comment, 18through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense
with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991,
requiring such comment. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petition has merit. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

Constitution. 19It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, 20issued on 5 May 1987, in
the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human
Rights. 21 chanrobles virtual law library
The powers and functions 22of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to -
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; chanrobles virtual law library
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court;chanrobles virtual law library
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos
residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection; chanrobles virtual law library
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; chanrobles virtual law library
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; chanrobles virtual law library
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations
of human rights, or their families; chanrobles virtual law library
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights; chanrobles virtual law library
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary
or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority; chanrobles virtual law library
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions; chanrobles virtual law library
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and chanrobles virtual law library
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the
Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In
Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, 24the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed
that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that
resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function
of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat,
the Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine
the extent of CHR's investigative power. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried,
could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the
University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?"
The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts of the world, whether
the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic
freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to
public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education, employment,
and social services. 25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are
inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it. 26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and
inalienable. 28 chanrobles virtual law library
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to
include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the
term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and
inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific
provisions on human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the
country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our
fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by
others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present
State of Human Rights in the Philippines," 29observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights expressed in the
International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action
then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite
periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to
petition for the redress of grievances became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass
media were subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
and judges lost independence and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of
resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared by international
bodies like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following discussions during its 26 August
1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human rights and also because civil
and political rights have been determined by many international covenants and human rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as
the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we
might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers
civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw the line? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human rights advocates, as well as in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the right to
fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents and
legal instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished this right against
torture.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are other violations of rights of
citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be
authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary
investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific parameters which cover civil and political
rights as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of governments regarding the particular political and civil
rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we
would now like to safeguard. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time
we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights
that we envision here? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts of that. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human rights? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the past regime, everytime we
invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the
rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to
confuse the issue? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees;
2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and
hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make the proposed Commission more
effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the
term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to the rights embodied
in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained
therein. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,
mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other convention which I do not remember. Am I
correct? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.
virtual law library
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not
have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in that other convention which may not
be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like "convention,"
rather than specify the rights contained in the convention. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of amendments, could specify to
us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political rights, not for the purpose of including these
in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be included, without
prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado
as to whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right? chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by
this provision - freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes
involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to
protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite
areas. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the concept of the
Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an international instrument. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GUINGONA. I know. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil
and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social rights. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to organize,
the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how much we need a
Commission on Human Rights. . . . chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they
are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate - torture, salvaging, picking up
without any warrant of arrest, massacre - and the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the
military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be independent. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs
this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political violations because if we open this to
land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we will not receive any response. . . . 30(emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on
Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights" (Sec. 1). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The term "civil rights," 31has been defined as referring -
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected
with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws,
freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state
or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches and
seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32 chanrobles virtual law library
Political rights, 33on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights
appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. 34 chanrobles virtual law library
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a
Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for
instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of
tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against
the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement
of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in
peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve,
instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the
Commission, taking into account its recommendation." 35 chanrobles virtual law library
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as
well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More
than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The
consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to
have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the
standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the
order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of
"human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its
revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in
accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be
understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with
the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority
vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose
human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies
(including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only
be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the
Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any appropriate
agency of government. 37 chanrobles virtual law library
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by the
demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to
question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially
consider.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and academic since the case
before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act
already accomplished. 38Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580.
The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. 39 chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further
proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Separate Opinions
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.

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HR LAW LESSON 1

1. Brigido Simon, et al., v. CHR, GR No 100150

G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

The City Attorney for petitioners. chanrobles virtual law library

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

Hence, this recourse. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The petitioners pose the following: chanrobles virtual law library

The petition has merit. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

MR. GUINGONA. I know. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

The term "civil rights," 31has been defined as referring -

chanrobles virtual law library

chanrobles virtual law library

PADILLA, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library

PADILLA, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library

2. Oposa v. Factoran GR No 101083

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

xxx xxx xxx

hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

A cause of action is defined as:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

3. Pestilos v. Generosa GR No. 182601

G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014

The Antecedent Facts

petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 15

The Assailed CA Decision