Plato's Biography: The Seventh Letter

Author(s): R. S. Bluck
Source: The Philosophical Review , Sep., 1949, Vol. 58, No. 5 (Sep., 1949), pp. 503-509
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review

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 DISCUSSION

PLATO'S BIOGRAPHY:

THE SEVENTH LETTER

IN AN interesting article in the Philosophical Review (LVII, Sept.,

1I948, 439-457), Professor George Boas discusses the sources of
our knowledge of Plato's life. I should like to make some remarks by
way of a reply, confining myself, for the most part, to his arguments
against the authenticity of the Seventh Letter.
Professor Boas cites thirty-two "verbal echoes or citations of
seventeen different dialogues." Their presence, however, need not
surprise us, for there are many parallel passages in the Platonic dia-
logues; and I would merely refer to Dr. C. Vink, Plato's Eerste
Alcibiades (pp. I42 if.), who shows that Book VI of the Republic
contains over forty passages that may be compared with others
occurring in sixteen of the accepted dialogues. These similarities no
more concern "pet phrases" than do the passages cited from the
Seventh Letter. Professor Boas objects in particular to the "God wot"
in Boeotian dialect at 345a. To me the use of the exclamation in this
connection seems natural enough. It may be used, as Burnet sug-
gests,1 simply because the phrase struck Athenian ears as a quaint
one,2 and may not be due to any reminiscence of Phaedo 62a. The
total number of "verbal echoes" contained in the Letter seems well
within the limits of what one might expect.3
A more serious allegation, perhaps, is the charge that the writer
of the Letter has on occasion misunderstood passages in the genuine
dialogues. Under the heading "Misunderstandings of the Dialogues,"
Professor Boas instances four passages, with which I will deal one by
one.

'Edition of the Phaedo, note on 62a8.

2Cf. Aristophanes' A charnians 9ii.
3Republic VI is contained in twenty-eight pages of Stephanus, the Seventh Letter
in slightly over twenty-eight.

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 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

(i) "Whereas 337 C gives fifty as the right number of guar

city of io,ooo, Laws 753 D, says that thirty-seven guards w
enough for a city of 5,037 householders." In the first plac
words at 337c certainly look like a marginal gloss that has
corporated (not without damage, and the eventual addition
necting particle) into the text.4 But whether they are a gl
genuinely part of the original text, this body is clearly only
rary committee, and therefore not comparable with the thir
Law-wardens of the Laws.5 That the number is rather large
with the ten who are to legislate for the colony at Cnossos at L
may be due partly to a desire to placate the democratic pa
partly to the large size of the citizen body at Syracuse, whi
have exceeded io,ooo in number6 (the word often translated
can mean simply "populous"7). As for the appropriateness
comment to the situation in Syracuse, our writer is here m
concrete proposals, and that a commentator in a gloss, or ev
himself in a parenthesis, should suggest the number fifty for t
of commissioners seems to me natural enough.
(2) 33gb "echoes Philebus, I2 B, but completely reverses th
ing of it." Now at Philebus I 2b, Philebus, in handing over h
the argument to Protarchus, "calls the goddess herself" to
his action, thereby suggesting, as the context shows, an id
tion of Pleasure with Aphrodite. Socrates then says that th
"begin with the goddess herself, who, according to our fr
called Aphrodite, though her real name, he tells us, is P
and he goes on to express his fear that names given to gods
please them, and to observe that there are many kinds of
which, since a god is necessarily of single nature, refutes
identification.8 At 335b in our Letter we read that the ma
selfish and poor in spirit "shamelessly snatches everywhere
he supposes . . . will provide him with . . . satisfaction in the
that slavish and unlovely pleasure that is wrongly called by
of the goddess of Love."9 The meaning is surely the same

4Cf. Harward, The Platonic Epistles, p. 209.

5Cf. Harward, loc. cit.
6See note in my edition of the Seventh and Eighth Letters on 332c, p. 96.
7So far as I can discover from the appropriate lexica, the word does not occur
elsewhere in Plato, or in Xenophon, Thucydides, or any of the orators, and only
once each in Aristotle and Isocrates. In Isocrates, Panathenaicus 286e, it cer-
tainly means no more than "populous."
8Cf. Hackforth, Plato's Examination of Pleasure, p. 14.
9For this article I have used (with permission) my translation of the Letter in
Plato's Life and Thought, just published by Messrs. Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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 DISCUSSION

passages: the goddess Aphrodite is sometimes associated

not be, with the baser forms of pleasure.
(3) 33od-33id is "obviously based" on Republic 425e, but is a
"misunderstanding" of it. The Republic passage is concerned with
the futility of over-much detailed legislation. Those states which,
having a bad form of government, forbid any radical change in the
constitution, under penalty of death, but honor those who minister
to their whims by proposing a host of petty regulations, are like
invalids who try all sorts of ineffective remedies, but "in their de-
praved condition refuse to give up their unwholesome way of life."
In the Letter, our writer describes the principles which have always
guided him in the giving of advice, and in particular the giving of
advice to "a sick man who leads a life that is incompatible with
health." In such circumstances he will give advice only if it is likely
to be accepted; similarly he will give advice to a city, but only if he
is sure "that his words are not going to fall on deaf ears, and that he
is not going to die for his pains" (33 id). The suggestion seems to be
that just as a radical change of outlook was required if Dionysius
was to become a good king, so also it is needed now if his readers are
to achieve peace. In both passages the point being made is that
where a fundamental change is needed, whether in the behavior of
individuals or in the government of a state, the genuine would-be
reformer can achieve nothing if violent opposition is shown to the
only sort of reform that could accomplish the required end. The same
theme appears at Republic 496c and Apology 3 d-32a (where Plato
was probably thinking partly, at least, of his own early ambitions).
None of these passages, in my view, shows "misunderstanding" of
any of the others.
(4) 344C "echoes Phaedrus 277 D, in saying that no serious man
would write down his deepest thoughts and thus deliver them over
to the mob; but the reasons are not the same in both places." Now
in the Letter10 we are told that no man of sense will put his highest
thoughts into writing, especially as the written word is unalterable
(343a), because sensible objects are always imperfect-what we call
"round" always contains a measure of straightness, and vice versa-
and neither a name nor a definition is really "reliable" (0313aLov);
nothing is "really reliably fixed"; names and definitions, as instru-
ments in an attempt to communicate truth, are "not clear" ('abatfs,
343b). They fill everyone "with every kind of bewilderment and
perplexity" (a/aaelag, 343c).
10 have tried in my edition to show that the "philosophical digression" is not,
as Professor Boas declares, "absurd." See also my translation.

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 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

I still believe-despite Professor Tate (Classical Review, LXII,

p. I3I; cf. my translation [footnote 9])-that this unreliability of
names is meant to be thought of as largely due to the indeterminate
nature of the objects to which they refer; for we find that names and
definitions, as well as the objects themselves, can be "refuted by the
senses" (363c).

The Phaedrus draws a sharp distinction between oral guidance

which can take into account the psychology of the pupil (277bc, cf.
27 IC-2 72b), and written discourses which resemble paintings in
being unable to answer questions (275de). If anyone writes a political
treatise "supposing that there is any real reliability (03EIaL06rTra)
and clearness (aa$'vELac) in his account," it is disgraceful." The
reasons, then, for not trying to express one's highest thoughts in
written treatises are, according to both works (a) the fixity of written
words which prevents them from answering questions, and (b) their
lack of "reliability" and "clarity." The main difference between the
two passages, to my mind, is that the Letter explains more fully
what is meant by lack of reliability, which suggests that the Letter
is not slavishly copying the Phaedrus. I find in the Letter, then, no
misunderstanding of any of the dialogues.

Professor Boas sees a mark of "internal inconsistency" at 34IC fT.

Our writer, he thinks, follows up his remark, "I have never written
a treatise about them and never shall," by saying in effect, "I shall
now begin to expound what I have just said was ineffable." Now,
as we have seen, the Phaedrus also suggests that philosophical truth
cannot be communicated in a written work (and the same belief is
implied in the Laws"2), and yet in several of the accepted dialogues
we find dialectical method discussed at least as fully as in this Letter.
But to describe the manner in which one should set about attaining
knowledge is very different from attempting to put that knowledge
itself into words. The matters about which the writer of the Letter
claims never to have written a treatise are those which he regards as
really important" (repi cIw ads oYwov tvco, 34Ic); they are the truths
which must be "seriously valued" and reside in the soul (344c),13 "the
chief and primary facts of nature" (344d). From 344b-c it is clear
that he means those truths about the ideas which dialectic (and only
"Because it implies (as in the Letter) "ignorance of the nature of justice and
injustice and of good and evil" (277de).
"By the admission that that work is a mere "pastime" (685a, 769a).
"The "fairest place" he has must be the soul. Cf. Phaedrus 276a: the only
"word" of real value is that which is graven in the pupil's soul.

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 DISCUSSION

dialectic) can reveal.'4 Plato often describes the function of the Ideas
but never tries to communicate their essential nature. This passage
explains why the nature of the Good is ineffable, but certainly does
not undertake to describe it.5

Professor Boas objects to the use of certain terms as "Aristotelian."

(i) T7 rotov rT. If we accent this expression as it is usually accented
at 343C (76 wrotv T), we have precedents in Plato, e.g., Republic
438b,e, Cratylus 432b, cf. Philebus 37c. If we write To wroZov Tr, and
note that this is contrasted with "the 'what"' (,T rt) at 343c, we
must take it as a general expression for the answer to the question,
"What sort of thing is it?" But in view of the context it seems
natural to translate this not as "qualities" (as opposed to substance),"6
or even as "the thing qualified," but simply as "the vague general
likeness." And in this sense the expression is not Aristotelian. It
was probably one of many such expressions that originated in the
Academy and came to have a special meaning in Aristotle's doctrine,
and I can see no reason why the ancients should have remarked on
this particular instance. (2) "The discussion of the five elements
needed for science is illustrated as in Aristotle (Metaph. 997 B. 35
998 A, 4)." Aristotle is saying that if there must be mathematical
"intermediates," the objects of astronomy should be "intermediate"
as well, for its objects are as exact as those of the geometrician.
What more natural than that he should take the mathematical
circle as an instance of exactitude? So far as I can see, the passage
bears no other resemblance to the Letter. (3) rev w r pXe'q1v, 34Ie
(= "thesis"). Our writer seems to be apologizing'7 for the use of
the term by adding the word Xeyo~e'v7pv (= "so-called," cf. 335b);
but Laws 63 ia and 722d suggest that the word was at least beginning
to have a technical sense in Plato's time.

'4Professor Cherniss (Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, p. 245

note) remarks that "the very detail of the catalogue of Ideas" at 342d may
"justly arouse suspicion." Certain indications have suggested that in this passage
Plato may be using old material, a transcript of an oral lecture (cf. Post, Thirteen
Epistles of Plato, pp. 56, 152); but in any case the universal applicability of the
doctrine of Ideas is an important link in the argument.
'5Hence I cannot agree with Professor Cherniss (The Riddle of the Early Acade-
my, p. 13) that, if this Letter is genuine, Plato has himself borne witness against
anything we may write about the real purport of his thought. Christian theology
can be described by an unbeliever; so, too, one who has not "seen the Idea of the
Good" can describe Plato's beliefs; what we cannot do is communicate Plato's
own personal spiritual feeling.
'6It is shown, in fact, that language and sensible objects do not give us a cl
notion even of qualities (343ab).
"7Cf. the apology for the use of O L O'T6s at Theaetetus i82a.

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 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

I conclude with a few general remarks. Professor Boas, like Jowett,

is impressed by the lack of further testimony to Plato's Sicilian
visits. Harward"8 has observed that this may be ascribed to the loss
of many histories and other works concerned with Sicily at this
period. But Morrow"9 has shown that Diodorus on the one hand, and
Nepos and Plutarch on the other, almost certainly used Ephorus
and Timaeus respectively for their accounts of the banishment of
Dion, and that Timaeus must have used Philistus' history as well
as the Letter. This at least affords a priori ground for believing that
Timaeus found Philistus' account in general agreement with the Letter,
for Timaeus was a careful historian, and even Plutarch is prepared
to admit a discrepancy in the evidence when he finds one.20 For my
part, I am convinced of the Letter's authenticity; but even if I were
not, I should be inclined to accept it as on the whole biographically
accurate. It is one thing to create a legend about, for example, the
divine parentage of a famous personality, but quite another to invent,
at a date not very long, anyhow, after they are supposed to have
occurred, an account of journeys that he never made. As for the
absence of mention of these visits in the dialogues, Plato's political
ideals (which he never entirely abandoned) were rooted in theory
rather than in experience, and it was his practice in any case to re-
frain from autobiography; but many of the touches in the picture of
the "tyrannical man" in Republic IX have reminded commentators
of Dionysius,2" in much the same way as at 494c "Plato is portraying
the type although Alcibiades sits for the portrait"22; and Post has
shown that the early books of the Laws reflect quite clearly Plato's
interest in Dionysius and Syracuse.23 Again, if our writer's tone
appears "dogmatic," we must remember that Plato nowhere, apart
from the Letters, speaks in his own person, and also that dogmatism
was in the philosophic tradition. It goes right back to the "inspired"
poet-philosopher-seer of early antiquity,24 and is reflected, as I be-
lieve, in the authoritarian regimes of the Republic and the Laws.
Lastly, if it seems strange that Plato should introduce Critias and
Charmides into his dialogues if he regarded them as the Letter would
seem to show, it is no less strange that he should introduce Anytus

18The Platonic Epistles, p. 74.

19Studies in the Platonic Epistles, University of Illinois Bulletin XXXII, 43, 31ff
20Dion, t 20.
21Cf. Morrow, op. cit., p. 5o; Adam, notes on Republic 592b, 499b; Harward,
op. cit., p. 13.
22Adam, note ad loc.
23Transactions of the American Philological Association LX (1929), 13ff.
24Cf. Cornford, Journal of Hellenic Studies LXII (1942), 7.

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 DISCUSSION

into the Meno despite the part that he had played in th

of Socrates-and that within a decade of writing the Ap
it seems, could suppress his personal feelings in the creatio
of art.
I have so far confined myself to discussion of the Sevent
I am tempted to remark on one further point. Professor
of "the legend of the Platonic fusion of Pythagoreanism
ism"; and the unreliable nature of Diogenes Laertius' account of
Plato's debt to the Heracliteans leads him to declare that "one begins
to suspect that the Heracliteanism of Plato is of a piece with his
Pythagoreanism and should be relegated to the dustbin of legend."
It would appear that he is dismissing the evidence of Aristotle as
readily as he dismisses the stories of later writers; but that is surely
carrying skepticism too far.
R. S. BLUCK
Fettes College, Edinburgh

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