This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article to be published in Quality

& Quantity. The final authenticated version is available online at:

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11135-019-00861-1.
A full-text view-only version can be accessed at: https://rdcu.be/btXlo.

Global cultural zones the empirical way: Value structure of cultural zones and their

relationship with democracy and the communist past

Abstract. The paper empirically identifies the world‘s cultural zones, comprised of the
countries with the distinctive patterns of values, and determines their relationship with the
country‘s communist past and current state of democracy. The analysis is based on the
countries‘ average values on the two main dimensions of cross-cultural variations: the
traditional versus secular-rational and the survival versus self-expression values. The
World Values Survey and European Values Study data from 101 countries were used.
The K-means method of cluster analysis and the Variance Ration Criterion for
determining the final number of clusters were performed. The solution with three clusters
appeared as the most appropriate and theoretically meaningful, representing three broad
cultural value syndromes. The first value syndrome was defined by low self-expression
and high secular-rational values (the zone of secularized authority), the second one by
low secular-rational and low self-expression values (the zone of traditional authority),
while the third was characterized by high values on both value dimensions (the zone of
emancipation). The countries‘ cluster membership is highly correlated with the (non-
)communist past and the level of socioeconomic development. The countries in three
cultural zones significantly differ in terms of the state of democracy: democracy is more
fully developed in the countries in the cultural zone of emancipation, and the least
developed in the countries with the prevailing traditional authority cultural outlook.

Keywords: Values, Political culture, Cultural map, World Values Survey, European
Values Study.

1
1. Introduction

There are several different approaches proposed in the literature for analysing the

cross-cultural differences in values (e.g. Hofstede 1984; Triandis 1993; Schwartz 2007). One

of them was developed by the leading figure of the World Values Survey (WVS) project,

Ronald Inglehart, who has been on the forefront of the cross-cultural study of values for

decades. In his highly influential work, he repeatedly demonstrated the existence of an

empirical link between socioeconomic development, cultural change and its institutional

consequences, as well as the utmost importance of values and mass attitudes for broader

political processes in a society (e.g. Inglehart 2007; 2018; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

Inglehart‘s Global Cultural Map has almost become a meme – a simple and comprehensive

illustration of cultural differences around the world, as well as their major antecedents and

consequences. Although Inglehart expressed preference for theoretical over empirical

clustering (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 62), the question of the congruence between his

theoretical model and the empirical evidence is still open.

In the current paper, we demonstrate inadequacies in the clustering of the world‘s

countries in the Global Cultural Map, and, relying on empirical criteria, develop a different

view of the nature and number of global cultural zones. We empirically test the idea that

there are different cultural zones worldwide by identifying homogenous and distinctive

groups of countries (i.e. cultural zones) in terms of the traditional/secular-rational and the

survival/self-expression values. Instead of simply plotting the mean values on a two-

dimensional graph and arbitrarily drawing the boundaries around the groups of countries, the

‗appropriate‘ number of groups of countries, i.e. cultural zones, was decided empirically and

defined in terms of the associated characteristic value patterns. In addition, we investigate the

political relevance of cultural zones, defined in the manner we have just outlined.

2
 We proceed as follows: we first briefly present Inglehart‘s main ideas, the logic

behind the cultural map and the main empirical findings related to it. We then discuss some

of the shortcomings of the proposed model of cultural zones and its inadequacy in empirical

terms. Next, we describe the analytic procedure applied here for determining the number of

cultural zones based on the same WVS and European Values Study (EVS) data. Finally, we

elaborate on the newly identified, smaller number of cultural zones, and discuss the

implications regarding the proposed dimensions of cross-cultural variation and their political

and institutional implications.

1.1. The revised theory of modernization and the Global Cultural Map

In his revised theory of modernization (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and

Welzel 2005: 15-47; Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann 2003) or, more recently, under the

human development perspective or the human empowerment model (e.g. Inglehart 2018: 8-

25; Welzel and Inglehart 2009), Ronald Inglehart and his collaborates have argued that

socioeconomic development is closely linked with the change of values and cultural shifts in

a society. The classic modernization view presents value change as a rather uniform and

linear process (Inkeles 1969; Inkeles and Smith 1974). Inglehart, on the other hand, describes

modernization as a two-stage process, comprising of an industrial and a post-industrial phase.

Each is conducive to changing world views.

Industrial revolution caused a shift from the traditional to secular values, engendering

bureaucratization, centralization, standardization and secularization of authority. This shift is

not about challenging the dominant authorities but rather about ―switching‖ the sources of

authority, from traditional and religious figures to secular-rational sources (Inglehart and

Welzel 2005: 25-30). Materialistic ideologies emerge in this stage of the modernization

3
process, offering secular interpretations of the history and utopia. However, they are equally

dogmatic as religion, as a consequence of the rigid, disciplined and standardized organization

of the industrial society, and of work and life in it (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 48-76).

The emergence of the post-industrial society has caused a different kind of a value

shift. The prolonged economic growth and growing welfare state improved the living

standards in a way that the satisfaction of basic material needs can be taken for granted. The

rising education levels and mass-media expansion increase the people‘s intellectual skills and

capacities, while the increasing social complexity, de-standardization of economic activities

and of social life in general broaden and diversify people‘s social capacities (Inglehart and

Welzel, 2005: 48-76). Taken together, this results in increasing material, intellectual and

social autonomy, which consequently leads to challenging the unconditional authority over

people and susceptibility to the idea of individual freedom and equality – growing

emancipation from both the religious and secular-rational authority (Inglehart and Welzel

2005: 48-79; Welzel 2013: 37-56).

Apart from the common tendency to increase the existential security,

industrialization and post-industrialization essentially differ in the degree in which they

enhance the human autonomy. Although they both reshape the orientations towards the

authority, secularization of authority is the major cultural consequence of the industrial

phase of modernization, while the post-industrial phase enables emancipation from authority

(Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 25). This process represents the sort of a humanistic

transformation of modernization – the growing self-expression values become the major

cultural manifestation of modernization (Inglehart 2018: 114-139; Inglehart and Welzel

2005: 3-5). Freedom of choice becomes a leading theme in all areas of human life, from

politics to child rearing practices, work motivation, religion, civic engagements etc.

4
 Based on the data collected in the WVS, Inglehart established two main dimensions

of cross-cultural variation (Inglehart 2007; 2018: 36-76; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart

and Welzel 2005: 48-65). Using factor analysis and orthogonal (Varimax) rotation, he

identified two latent dimensions underlying 10 items which operationalize the two value

dimensions. One is described as the traditional versus secular-rational value dimension,

which refers to the respect for religious, family and national authorities. This value

dimension is expressed through five items related to the importance of God in one‘s life, the

evaluation of the justifiability of abortion, the preference for independence and

determination as opposed to obedience and religious faith as a quality that children should

learn, the sense of national pride and favouring of more respect for authority in general. The

second dimension is a polarization between the survival and self-expression values which

emphasize the importance of personal autonomy, subjective well-being and the quality of

life, as opposed to physical and economic security. The dimension of the survival versus

self-expression values covers five items related to (post)materialist values, the assessed level

of happiness, the justifiability of homosexuality, taking part in or willingness to sign a

petition, and interpersonal trust.

Using aggregate-level measures and Huntington‘s cultural zone guide (Huntington

1996), Inglehart plotted the mean values of the two value syndromes for numerous countries

around the world on a two-dimensional graph and created the so-called Global Cultural Map

of the world (Inglehart 1997: 93; Inglehart 2018: 46; Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 63). In the

latest version of the map, countries are grouped into nine cultural zones: the Protestant

Europe (e.g. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland), English Speaking (e.g. Great Britain,

Canada, New Zealand), Catholic Europe (e.g. Austria, Spain, France), Confucian (e.g. Japan,

China, Taiwan), Baltic (e.g. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), Orthodox (e.g. Serbia, Bulgaria,

Ukraine), South Asia (e.g. India, Vietnam), Latin America (e.g. Chile, Brazil, Argentina) and

5
African-Islamic (e.g. Zimbabwe, Jordan, Ghana). Countries‘ groupings are interpreted as the

evidence of the national culture path dependency (Inglehart 2018: 42-55; Inglehart and

Welzel 2005: 19). The national culture, in this view, is the consequence of historical and

modernization tendencies which are repeatedly demonstrated in close relatedness of the two

value dimensions to numerous macro measures on the aggregate level, such as GDP, %

workforce in the service sector, religious denomination etc. (Inglehart and Baker 2000: 39;

Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 48-76; Inglehart 2018: 36-59).

1.2. The political consequence of value shift

Although societies‘ cultural shift is a ―two-way‖ path, via secular and self-expression

values, in debating the role of values in democracy the focus in Inglehart‘s work is almost

exclusively on one of the two value dimensions. Self-expression values have been described

as the essence of democratic political culture; the emphasis on self-expression values among

the masses (or the public) promotes and strengthens democracy, making political elites more

accountable, and democracy more effective (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 245-272). In a post-

industrial society, socioeconomic development, self-expression values and effective

democracy make a coherent ―syndrome‖, giving resources, values and rights which make

people capable, willing and dedicated to shape their own life by their own, autonomous

choices (Inglehart 2007; Inglehart and Oyserman 2004; Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 149-172).

Furthermore, in line with the well-known culturalist view of political change (e.g.

Almond and Verba 1963; Eckstein 1988), the assumption of primacy of culture (i.e. values)

over structure/institutions is made explicit (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 149-172; Inglehart

2018: 114-139). Self-expression values have a decisive role in promoting democracy – 52 per

cent of variation in formal democracy and 80 per cent of variation in effective democracy is

6
explained by cross-national variation in self-expression values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005:

158). On the other hand, democratic institutions have a relatively minor effect on self-

expression values, which are primarily shaped by socioeconomic development.

1.3. Global Cultural Map: A comment

Inglehart‘s work has been criticized on various grounds, from the operationalization

of values and the lack of theoretical consideration of the nature of values (Haller 2002;

Schwartz 2004; 2007) to the sensitivity of the employed measures to the socio-political

context (Davis and Davenport 1999; Clarke et al. 1999) or the overemphasis on the

socialization hypothesis (Duch and Taylor 1993). Some empirical studies dealing specifically

with the two dimensional model and the cultural zone groupings provide only a limited

support for the proposed theoretical elements of Inglehart‘s revised theory of modernization.

In testing the measurement and explanatory aspects of the revised theory of

modernization, Dülmer‘s analysis has shown several important things (Dülmer, Inglehart and

Welzel, 2015). First of all, in order to obtain a reliable measure, four out of ten items used in

operationalizing the two dimensions need to be given up – ‗national pride‘ and ‗respect for

authority‘ in the case of the traditional/secular values, and ‗happiness‘ and ‗trust‘ in the case

of the self-expression values. These items showed very low correlations with the remaining

items in the respective groups of items. Confirmatory multi-level factor analysis showed that,

in order to fit the data, the measurement model needs additional considerable modification –

the independence assumption, i.e. the assumption of orthogonal value dimensions, proved to

be unattainable (Dülmer et al. 2015: 78-80). Two value dimensions should not be treated as

independent of each other. This point is important because the mutual independence of the

two value dimensions is an a priori assumption of Inglehart‘s model.

7
 Perhaps more importantly, there are theoretical reasons that do not favour the

independence assumption. As Schwartz (2004: 71-72) argues, value dimensions used in

cross-cultural comparisons are most likely correlated. Values are rooted in the basic issues of

managing life in a society and it is not reasonable to expect that preferences for resolving one

issue will remain independent of those for other issues (Schwartz 2004: 53-55). Inglehart‘s

value dimensions have been identified by factor analysis and orthogonal rotation; yet, both

value dimensions, in part, concern the degree to which an individual is autonomous versus

embedded in collectivity (Schwartz 2004). Self-expression values express these tendencies

well indeed and are therefore correlated with the Autonomy versus Embeddedness value

dimension from the Schwartz‘s model (Inglehart and Oyserman 2004; Schwartz 2004; 2007).

However, the traditional/secular-rational value dimension is also correlated with the

Schwartz‘s Autonomy measure (Schwartz 2004). Whatever the final product of the industrial

phase of modernization in value terms, the weakening of the proscribed structures and an

absolute standard in a secular society enables people to think more independently, at least in

comparison to a traditional society – and that is the essence of autonomy. That said, secular

values could be interpreted not as independent of the preferences for emancipation but as

being half-way from tradition to full autonomy, i.e. emancipation (see also, Dülmer et al.

2015: 79-80).

Bearing this in mind, the disproportional weight which is given to the role of self-

expression values in promoting democracy becomes debatable. If strengthening of self-

expression values in a society implies, say, more prominent secular values at the same time,

the value preconditions of democracy should possibly be sought in the pattern of two value

dimensions.

A related question is that of the number of cultural zones. Although Inglehart‘s

cultural map seems intuitive and is similar to several other cultural mappings (e.g. those using

8
the Schwartz values inventory, see: Schwartz 2004), it is not beyond dispute. Inglehart

himself claimed that the boundaries drawn around the groups of countries on the map are

subjective and could have been made in a number of different ways (Inglehart and Welzel

2005: 65-66). He also recognized that applying the clustering techniques might be a useful

alternative approach, but never presented such results, claiming instead that statistical

clustering produces results that are very similar to the proposed theoretical solution (Inglehart

and Welzel 2005: 62, footnote 6). The countries‘ locations on the map are thus evidence

based, but their grouping and the description of cultural zones are not; it is a theoretical or

speculative rather than an empirical classification.

The groups of countries are clustered relying on at least three overlapping criteria –

the predominant religious denomination, language and geographic position. Yet, as others

have already noticed (Bonikowski 2010: 329), cultural zones are based on the set of

inconsistent criteria; idiosyncratic attributes of a country could be picked to produce

groupings that fit the points on the map. But it is impossible to do the same with any single

attribute if it is applied consistently across all the cases (Bonikowski 2010: 329-330).

Additionally, it is not clear how cultural zones differ in terms of the underlying value

patterns, e.g. what pattern of values defines, for instance, the Protestant Europe cultural zone

and in what ways it differs from the neighbouring zone, the English speaking zone (which

itself includes some Protestant countries, like Great Britain). Because of this ad hoc drawing

of the cultural zone boundaries, there are some obvious misclassifications, Greece in the

Catholic Europe cultural zone, or Poland and Malta in the Latin America cultural zone.

Similarly perplexing is the merger of the previously separated African and South Asian

countries (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 63) into the African-Islamic countries zone in the

recent version of the cultural map (Inglehart 2018: 46), without clear elaboration of the

reasons justifying this change.

9
 While Ingehart and his collaborators assert that the cultural map zones are indeed

based on the similarity of the basic values and that historical factors give rise to distinctive

value systems (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 48-76; Inglehart and

Oyserman 2004), this issue still awaits empirical demonstration. Societies with similar

religious traditions or colonial histories are ad hoc grouped together. In line with the path

dependency assumption, it is then concluded that the societies with common heritage,

because of their simple spatial proximity on the map, do indeed fall together into common

clusters, sharing similar values.

The assumption of cultural zones and path dependency of national culture has been

empirically tested as well. Bonikowski (2010) tested the relational view of value change by

using the same data as Inglehart, applying cluster analysis. The data showed that, for

example, cluster membership is far from stable over the period from 1990 and 2000.

Similarly, Bonikowski depicted an eight-cluster solution in order to compare the inductive

cluster membership with the eight cultural zones identified by Inglehart and Baker in their

2000 paper (Inglehart and Baker 2000). Still, the empirical analysis failed to support the

cultural zone groupings in the data. More importantly, systematic testing of the criteria on

which Inglehart and Huntington‘s civilization classification is based proved that none of the

three most important factors – religious traditions, linguistic families and co-presence in

geographical regions – is systematically related to the value similarities (Bonikowski 2010:

332-336). The membership in former empires was the only significant predictor of cultural

similarities. Value similarity is thus not rooted in primordial civilizations and path-

dependency but instead the consequence of institutional legacies of colonial rule. Of special

relevance for the purposes of our paper is the finding that being the former member of the

Soviet ―empire‖ leads to cultural similarity (Bonikowski 2010: 332-334). Dülmer‘s analysis

10
also showed that communism caused value/cultural homogenization, both via its ideology

and via causing the social disorganization after its fall (Dülmer et al. 2015: 85).

These findings bear important theoretical implications. They demonstrate that cross-

national interactions, i.e. the contact between nations, lead to cultural similarity (Bonikowski

2010) that complements the modernizing effects of economic development. They are quite in

line with the theoretical models that describe the cultural convergence in terms of

institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell 1983), world polity theories (Meyer et al.

1997) or different models, such as institutional learning, lifetime learning or habituation,

which assume the effects of structure on culture – institutions ―cause‖/create compatible

values (Rustow, 1970; Muller and Seligson, 1994; Jackman and Miller, 1998; Mishler and

Pollack, 2003; Hadenius and Teorell 2005; Pavlović 2015; 2016; 2018; Seligson 2002;

Spaiser, Ranganathan, Mann, and Sumpter 2014). We have already seen the evidence that the

communist rule and Soviet ―empire‖ homogenized the culture of various nations

(Bonikowski 2010; Dülmer et al. 2015). Similar processes are ―these days‖ manifested in the

fact that EU countries are becoming more similar in terms of values. The longer the country

has been a part of the EU, the more closely its values approximate those of the EU founding

countries, which in turn are the most homogenous (Akaliyski 2018). Put simply, rather than

being the consequence of historical legacies and/or socioeconomic development, cultural

similarities could be the consequence of shared institutional arrangements and a rational

response of citizens to a changing pattern of reinforcement contingencies that they create (see

also: Schwartz and Bardi 1997).

11
 1.4. The present study

The aim of this paper is to empirically identify global cultural zones as distinctive

combinations of two overarching value dimensions, the traditional/secular and survival/self-

expression values. We build on the results of the extant research. Comparably to Dülmer et

al. (2015), the two value dimensions were operationalized by the smaller number of items and

the non-orthogonal, Promax rotation was applied. The number of cultural zones, defined as

distinctive value profiles, was decided empirically, using cluster analysis.

Additionally, we examine the role of the communist past in homogenizing the

national culture. We expect the majority of ex-communist countries to be the members of the

same cultural zone, defined by the specific pattern of values, which would imply the value

similarities between ex-communist countries.

Finally, we identify the cultural zones/values that are conducive to the development of

well-functioning democracy. Thus, we deal with not just the between-country (dis)similarities

in values, but also describe the ―content‖ of the pro-democratic political culture in terms of

the secular and self-expression values. We already know that there are similarities in

culture/values between ex-communist countries (Bonikowski 2010; Dülmer et al. 2015), as

well as that survival values are dominant over self-expression values in post-communist

societies (e.g. Inglehart & Welzel 2005: 63). The self-expression values in post-communist

countries are lower even compared to poorer and less developed African and Asian countries

(Inglehart & Welzel 2005: 110). Still, if we assume that the prominence of self-expression

values is not unrelated to secular values, by taking into account both value dimensions we

could grasp the value prerequisites of effective democracy more fully and describe the

peculiarities of the political culture of the post-communist countries in more detail. By

establishing the link between communist past, values, cultural zones and democracy, we will

12
shed some additional light onto the relationship between culture (values) and structure

(institutions) and broaden the understanding of the content of the democratic political culture

in terms of secular and self-expression values.

2. Methodology

2.1. Sample

The analysis is based on the data collected in the WVS and EVS (EVS, 2015; WVS, 2015).

The WVS has included six waves of surveys so far, conducted in periodic time intervals from

1981 to 2014; EVS includes four waves of surveys, conducted from 1981 to 2008. Since both

the values and the countries‘ position on the Cultural Map change over time, and, on the other

hand, the number of included countries varies from wave to wave, we focused on a relatively

short time interval and selected the data from the fourth, fifth and sixth waves of surveys of

the WVS (from 1999 to 2014) and the third and fourth wave of the EVS (conducted in 1999

and 2008)1. This provided a relatively large number of countries surveyed in a relatively short

time span; the data from 101 countries including 334,963 respondents in total were used in

the analysis. The countries were included systematically. All of the countries surveyed in

three waves of the WVS and two waves of the EVS for which the data were available have

been included in the analysis. Some countries were surveyed more than once during the

observed period. The data in these cases have been combined and treated as one survey.2

Data were weighted by the pre-existing weight variable.

1
The WVS and EVS methodology is highly similar and overlapping.
2
Included countries, their abbreviations used later in the text and survey years (given in parentheses) are as
follows: ALB – Albania (2002; 2008), DZA – Algeria (2002; 2014), AND – Andorra (2005), AZE – Azerbaijan
(2008; 2011), ARG – Argentina (1999; 2006; 2013), AUS – Australia (2005; 2012), AUT – Austria (1999;
2008), BHR – Bahrain (2011), BGD – Bangladesh (2002), ARM – Armenia (2008; 2011), BEL – Belgium
(1999), BIH – Bosnia (2001; 2008), BRA – Brazil (2006; 2014), BGR – Bulgaria (1999; 2006; 2008), BLR –
Belarus (2000; 2008; 2011), CAN – Canada (2000; 2006), CHL – Chile (2000; 2006; 2012), CHN – China
(2001; 2007; 2013), TWN – Taiwan (2006; 2012), COL – Colombia (2005; 2012), HRV – Croatia (1999; 2008),
CYP – Cyprus (2006; 2008; 2011), CZE – Czech Rep. (1999; 2008), DNK – Denmark (1999; 2008), ECU –
Ecuador (2013), ETH – Ethiopia (2007), EST – Estonia (1999; 2008; 2011), FIN – Finland (2000; 2005; 2009),
FRA – France (1999; 2006; 2008), GEO – Georgia (2008; 2009; 2014), PSE – Palestine (2013), DEU –

13
 2.2. Variables

Tradition/secular-rational values. Contrary to Inglehart‘s original model (Inglehart and

Welzel 2005: 49) which operationalized each value dimension by five items, the modified list

of items, as proposed by Dülmer (Dülmer et al. 2015), was used in the analysis.

Traditional/secular-rational values were operationalized by the following items: ―God is very

important in respondent‘s life‖, ―It is more important for a child to learn obedience and

religious faith than independence and determination‖ (Autonomy index), and ―Abortion is

never justifiable‖.

Survival/self-expression values. The second value dimension was operationalized by three

items as well. The following items were used: ―Respondent gives priority to economic and

physical security over self-expression and quality of life.‖ (4-item Materialist/Postmaterialist

Values Index), ―Homosexuality is never justifiable‖, and ―Respondent has not and would not

sign a petition‖.

Cluster membership. The possible cultural grouping of countries around the world was

empirically tested. The K-means method of cluster analysis and Variance Ratio Criterion for

determining the final number of clusters was performed. The Variance Ratio Criterion

Germany (1999; 2006; 2008-9; 2013), GHA – Ghana (2007; 2012), GRC – Greece (2008), GTM – Guatemala
(2004), HK – Hong Kong (2005; 2014), HUN – Hungary (1999; 2008-9), ISL – Iceland (1999; 2009-10), IND –
India (2001; 2006; 2012), IDN – Indonesia (2001; 2006), IRQ – Iraq (2004; 2006; 2013), IRL – Ireland (1999;
2008), ISR – Israel (2001), ITA – Italy (1999; 2005; 2009), JPN – Japan (2000; 2005; 2010), KAZ – Kazakhstan
(2011), JOR – Jordan (2001; 2005; 2010), KOR – South Korea (2001; 2005), KGZ – Kyrgyzstan (2003; 2011),
LBN – Lebanon (2013), LVA – Latvia (1999; 2008), LBY – Libya (2014), LTU – Lithuania (1999; 2008), LUX
– Luxembourg (1999; 2008), MYS – Malaysia (2007; 2012), MLI – Mali (2008), MLT – Malta (1999; 2008),
MEX – Mexico (2000; 2005; 2012), MDA – Moldova (2002; 2006; 2008), MNE – Montenegro (2001; 2008),
MAR – Morocco (2001; 2007; 2011), NLD – Netherlands (1999; 2006; 2008; 2012), NZL – New Zealand
(2004; 2011), NGA – Nigeria (2000; 2012), NOR – Norway (2007; 2008), PAK – Pakistan (2001; 2012), PER –
Peru (2001; 2006; 2012), PHL – Philippines (2001; 2012), POL – Poland (1999; 2005; 2008; 2012), PRT –
Portugal (1999; 2008), PRI – Puerto Rico (2001), ROU – Romania (1999; 2005; 2008; 2012), RUS – Russia
(1999; 2006; 2008; 2011), RWA – Rwanda (2007; 2012), SRB – Serbia (2001; 2006; 2008 ), SGP – Singapore
(2002; 2012), SVK – Slovakia (1999; 2008), VNM – Viet Nam (2001; 2006), SVN – Slovenia (1999; 2005;
2008; 2011), ZAF – South Africa (2001; 2006; 2013), ZWE – Zimbabwe (2001; 2012), ESP – Spain (1999;
2000; 2007; 2008; 2011), SWE – Sweden (1999; 2006; 2009-10; 2011), CHE – Switzerland (2007; 2008), THA
– Thailand (2007; 2013), TTO – Trinidad and Tobago (2006; 2010), TUN – Tunisia (2013), TUR – Turkey
(2001; 2007; 2008; 2012), UGA – Uganda (2001), UKR – Ukraine (1999; 2006; 2008; 2011), MKD –
Macedonia (2001; 2008), EGY – Egypt (2001; 2008; 2013), GBR – Great Britain (1999; 2005; 2009-10), TZA –
Tanzania (2001), USA – United States (1999; 2006; 2011), BFA – Burkina Faso (2007), URY – Uruguay (2006;
2011), VEN – Venezuela (2000), YEM – Yemen (2014), ZMB – Zambia (2007), KOS – Kosovo (2008).

14
introduced by Calinski and Harabasz (1974), which computes the ratio of between- and

within-cluster sums of squares for k clusters, was used. The value of the variance criterion

was calculated by the following formula:

where VRCk – the variance ratio criterion, k – the number of clusters, Bk – the overall

between-cluster variation, Wk – the overall within-cluster variation with respect to all

clustering variables, n – data objects.

The value of ωk for a different number of possible clusters was then computed by the

following formula:

ωk = (VRCk+1 – VRCk) – (VRCk – VRCk-1).

The suitable number of clusters is that with the maximum value of VRC and the minimum

value of ωk.

After determining the final number of clusters, the cluster membership was described

in terms of differences in the countries‘ communist past and the level of socioeconomic

development.

Socioeconomic development. One of the most elaborated and common measures of the

country‘s development, the Human Development Index (HDI), is used as a measure of the

country‘s level of socioeconomic development. HDI is a composite index of life expectancy,

education and per capita measures (UNDP 2016). As such, it captures the broad and long-

term human development outcomes. It ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values implying a

higher level of human development. The usual grouping of countries based on the HDI values

into four categories has been applied: low human development (HDI below 0.550), medium

15
(0.550-0.669), high (0.700-0.799) and very high (0.800 and above). The HDI value for 2008

(a year around which the largest number of countries were surveyed) was used.

Communist past. Countries were classified as being either ex-communist or non-communist,

depending on their political past.

Level of democracy. The Democracy Index created by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU

2018) is a measure of the state of democracy worldwide. It is based on 60 indicators covering

five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of the

government, political participation, and political culture. The index values range from 0

(Authoritarian regimes) to 10 (Full democracies). Furthermore, the fourfold categorization of

the types of regime has been developed and could be useful in describing the included

countries: full democracies (index values higher than 8), flawed democracies (values 6 to 8),

hybrid regimes (values from 4 to 6) and authoritarian regimes (values lower than 4). The

relationship between the identified cultural zones and the state of democracy of the member

countries (as measured by the EIU Democracy Index in 2008) was analysed.

3. Results

We proceed with the analysis as follows. We first present the results of the factor

analysis and the structure of the two value dimensions. We then present the VRC and ω

values for a different number of possible clusters. The solution with the smallest ω value was

chosen as the most adequate and the clusters were defined and described in terms of the

combination of the two values dimensions and treated as separate cultural zones. The

differences between groups of countries are then additionally described in terms of the level

of socioeconomic development and communist past. Finally, the relationship between the

newly defined cultural zones and the level of democracy was analysed.

16
 3.1. Dimensions of cross-cultural variation

As described earlier, six items were used as measures of two value dimensions.

Country average/aggregated values on these variables were first calculated and used in the

factor analysis. Exploratory principal component factor analysis with Promax rotation yielded

two factors. The three items related to the survival/self-expression values showed the highest

loadings on the first factor. Three traditional/secular-rational values items showed the highest

loadings on the second factor. The factor loadings on the two value dimensions are shown in

Table 1.

Table 1. Factor loadings of the two value dimensions

National-level analysis
(n=101)
1. Factor 2. Factor
Materialism-Postmaterialism index (scale: 0-2) .90 .32
Homosexuality is always justifiable (scale: 0-9) .91 .67
Respondent would not/might/has signed a petition (scale: 0-2) .88 .65
God is unimportant in respondent‘s life (scale: 0-9) .55 .91
Autonomy index (scale: 0-4) .36 .87
Abortion is always justifiable (scale: 0-9) .73 .89
% of Variance 66.94 17.01
Notes: data from the EVS and WVS 1996 - 2014, Promax rotation, listwise exclusion.

The factor structure obtained in this analysis is quite in line with the original model

and previous research on a smaller number of items (Dülmer et al. 2015). It confirms a two-

factor solution and the psychological nature of two value dimensions. The two dimensions

are significantly and positively correlated (r = .58, p < .01) which means that, on the average,

countries which are higher on self-expression values are at the same time more secular and

17
vice versa. Average factor scores on two dimensions for each country were calculated and

used in the subsequent analysis. Higher factor scores imply more prominent secular and self-

expression values.

3.2. How many cultural zones are there?

Table 2 presents the VRC measures and ω values for the solutions ranging from two

to 12 clusters. Judged by the ω values, the solution with three clusters proves to be the most

appropriate and was chosen as the final number of clusters.

Table 2. VRC Values

Number of clusters VRC ωk

2 290.82
3 323.47 -73.01
4 283.11 40.54
5 283.30 -25.53
6 258.13 52.93
7 285.89 -22.35
8 291.30 -31.47
9 265.25 2.46
10 241.65 13.03
11 231.09 45.18
12 265.72 -37.82
13 262.52

As shown in Table 3, the first cluster is defined by relatively high secular and survival

values. The second cluster is characterized by relatively high traditional and survival values,

while the third is defined by high secular and self-expression values. Bearing in mind the

combinations of the two value dimensions and their conceptualization, the determined groups

18
of countries can be described as three relatively distinct cultural zones: the cultural zone of

secularized authority (cluster 1), the cultural zone of traditional authority (cluster 2) and the

cultural zone of emancipation (cluster 3).

Table 3. Final Cluster Centres

Cluster
1 2 3
Traditional/secular-rational values .45 -1.01 1.07
Survival/self-expression values -.51 -.50 1.37

The scattering of countries in the two-dimensional graph and their membership in

cluster groups is presented in Figure 1. The zone of traditional authority is the most numerous

group and includes 43 countries in total. Those are predominantly African, Asian and South

American countries. The zone of secularized authority includes 31 countries. The majority of

them are East and South European countries. The Confucian countries, such as China, Japan,

and Taiwan, are members of this group of countries as well. Finally, the smallest group of

countries, the members of the zone of emancipation, comprises 27 predominantly Protestant,

Western countries.

19
 Figure 1. Countries‘ positioning on two value dimensions and cluster membership

Note: see footnote 2 for full country names.

Three groups of countries significantly differ on the two dimensions. There are

significant between-group differences in regard to the traditional/secular-rational values, F(2,

98) = 210.00, p < .001, η² = .81, and the survival/self-expression values, F(2,98) = 113.476, p

< .001, η² = .70. The post-hoc test showed that all pairs of between-group comparisons on the

measure of secular values are significant values at .001 level (Figure 2). The post-hoc

comparison between the average levels of self-expression values in three groups of countries

showed that the countries in the zone of emancipation outscore the countries in the other two

zones by a wide margin. Self-expression values are significantly more prominent in this

20
group (at .001 level). On the other hand, the difference between the traditional and the

secularized authority zone in self-expression values is not significant.

Figure 2. Average level of the Traditional/Secular-rational and Survival/Self-expression

values by three cultural zones (with 95% CI)

Although a more detailed analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of the current

paper, empirical clustering, apart from a smaller number of cultural zones, does not support

Inglehart‘s cultural mapping in some other ways. In regard to the three newly identified

cultural zones, some of Inglehart‘s cultural zones are, as a whole, the member of one of them.

For example, all of the countries from the Protestant and English-speaking zones are

members of the cultural zone of emancipation; all Baltic countries are in the secularized

authority zone. Still, the majority of Inglehart‘s zones are cross-cut by the new categories.

For example, four countries from the South Asia zone are in the secularized authority group,

21
two are in the traditional authority and one in the zone of emancipation. On the other hand, if

we select nine cluster solutions and compare them to Inglehart‘s mapping that includes nine

cultural zones, theoretical and empirical overlapping is very small. There is no empirical

cluster that includes those and only those countries that are members of one theoretical

cultural zone, quite the opposite. Catholic countries are, for example, dispersed in five

empirical clusters; African Islamic countries are members of four empirical clusters. Put

differently, apart from the Baltic countries that are all members of one empirical cluster

(which, however, includes some Orthodox, Confucian and Catholic countries as well), there

is no instance in which an empirically identified cluster includes those and only those

countries which Inglehart‘s cultural map treats as members of the same cultural zone.

3.3. Antecedents of the cultural zones

From the description above, it is already clear that three groups of countries differ in

certain macro or societal features. We focused on the differences in political history and the

level of socioeconomic development. The results are shown in Figure 3.

22
 Figure 3. The level of socioeconomic development and communist past by three cultural
zones

Note: Per cents in a respective category were calculated out of the total number of countries in a respective
cultural zone.

The distribution of countries by cultural zones is significantly different in regard to

their communist past, χ² (2) = 39.48, p < .001, Cramer‘s V = .633, and the level of

socioeconomic development, χ² (6) = 65.68, p < .001, Cramer‘s V = .584. The between-cluster

differences are quite prominent. All but one country in the zone of emancipation are countries

with a very high HDI (96%); all but two countries are non-communist countries (92%).

3
Germany was excluded from this analysis.
4
Due to missing data, Taiwan, Kosovo and Puerto Rico were excluded from this analysis.

23
Almost three quarters of countries in the secularized zone were communist in the past (74%).

They are predominantly developed in socioeconomic terms (equal numbers of them are in the

group of very high and high HDI). The traditional authority cultural zone countries are, on

the average, less developed than the countries in the remaining two cultural zones. One third

of them are in the group of low HDI values (31%) and one quarter in the medium HDI group

(24%). Only two countries are those with a very high HDI. The minority of countries in this

group were communist in the past (14%).

3.4. Quality of democracy and cultural zones

Since values are described as the essence of political culture, especially in Inglehart‘s

work, the final pieces of evidence of the alternative cultural groupings would be to examine

the between-zones differences in the quality of democracy. In order to provide a benchmark

for evaluating the effectiveness of our model, we first analyse the differences in the state of

democracy among Inglehart‘s cultural zones. Figure 4 shows the average level of the state of

democracy by eight Inglehart‘s cultural zones. Figure 5 offers the corresponding results for

the three cultural zones identified in this study.

The omnibus test of the between-zones comparison shows that Inglehart‘s cultural

zones significantly differ on this measure, F(8,89) = 20.99, p < .001, η² = .65. Still, the post-

hoc comparisons indicated that only a minority of the between-zones comparisons are

significant. Protestant countries, for example, do not differ in the state of democracy from the

English-speaking or Confucian countries; the South Asia zone, on the average, significantly

differs only from the English-speaking and Protestant zones; Confucian countries are not

different from any other zone in regard to the state of the democracy. In other words, it is

impossible to identify one cultural zone that is systematically higher on the level of

24
democracy from all other cultural zones. In order to achieve that, we must look for the

commonalities in value terms that cross-cut Inglehart‘s mappings.

Figure 4. Average state of democracy as measured by the EIU index by Inglehart‘s cultural

zones (with 95% CI)

On the other hand, differences in the state of democracy between the three empirically

defined cultural zones are significant, F(2,95) = 55.50, p < .001, η² = .54. The post-hoc test

has shown that all between-zones differences are significant as well (at the .001 level). The

state of democracy is, on the average, the worst in the countries in the traditional authority

cultural zone and the best in the emancipation zone.

25
 Figure 5. Average state of democracy as measured by the EIU index by three cultural zones

(with 95% CI)

In terms of the previously described typology of the types of regime, all countries in

the cultural zone of emancipation are democracies, predominantly full democracies (89%).

Two thirds (67%) of countries in the secularized authority zone are democracies,

predominantly flawed (57%), and one third (31%) of the traditional zone countries are

(exclusively flawed) democracies. Regimes of the countries in the cultural zone of traditional

authority are mostly hybrid (36%) and authoritarian (33%); regimes in 20% of the countries

in the cultural zone of secularized authority are hybrid and 13% are authoritarian. There is no

country in the zone of emancipation that is either authoritarian or under the rule of a hybrid

regime.

4. Discussion

The performed cluster analysis of the data from three waves of the WVS and two

waves of the EVS on the countries‘ aggregate measures of the traditional/secular-rational and

26
the survival/self-expression values showed that the model with three clusters is the most

appropriate and theoretically meaningful. Three broad cultural value syndromes can be

empirically described. The first is defined by low self-expression and high secular-rational

values (the zone of secularized authority), the zone of traditional authority is defined by low

secular-rational and low self-expression values, while the zone of emancipation is

characterized by high levels on both value dimensions. The three newly identified cultural

zones are homogeneous and significantly different in terms of the two dimensions of cross-

cultural variation. The countries‘ cluster membership is highly correlated with the (non-

)communist past, and socioeconomic development. The three cultural zones significantly

differ in terms of the state of democracy as well. Democracy is more fully developed in the

countries in the cultural zone of emancipation, and the least developed in the countries where

the traditional authority cultural outlook prevails.

The presented results have several important implications. As Schwartz (2004: 71-74)

has argued, the models of cross/cultural differences in values need to address the issue of the

degree of cultural homogeneity within each hypothetical region and the extent to which

regions differ from each other. An a priori categorization is insufficient in this regard. We do

not need empirical data on values in order to conclude that, for instance, Confucian countries

share a religious background, or that African countries share geographical proximity. As

such, there is a clear methodological benefit from the suggested cultural zones differentiation

since theoretically important variables are not a priori the classification criteria. Their

relevance is established as the result of the comparison between the zones defined by the

specific and empirically identified value patterns.

There are theoretical reasons for not imposing independence as well. Inglehart himself

claimed that both the industrial and post-industrial stages of development increase both

secular and self-expression values, but at a different pace (Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 15-47;

27
Inglehart 2018: 8-24); industrialization leads to a massively growing emphasis on secular

values and slowly growing emphasis on self-expression values, while post-industrialization

works the other way around. Making two measures aimed at capturing these value

preferences orthogonal is thus not adequate and calls into question the logic of interpretation.

Capturing these theoretical and measurement nuances is only possible by observing the value

patterns on both dimensions at the same time and allowing them to be correlated.

Furthermore, the identified patterns of values are theoretically meaningful and

expected. Low secular and self-expression values cover mutual and compatible goals towards

which people can aspire. Being subjected to higher, unquestionable religious or traditional

authority is compatible with not being prone to see oneself as emancipated from authority in

general. This refers to the second cluster obtained in our analysis. Similarly, a combination of

high secular and low self-expression values is a reasonable possibility – as the first cluster of

countries in the current analysis testifies. Distancing oneself from the regulations prescribed

by the traditional and religious authorities, does not necessarily imply becoming a self-

regulated individual, emancipated from the rational-legal authorities. As we have seen, these

processes can be a consequence of an imposed secular ideology (like communism) or a

consequence of generally secular religious teachings, like Buddhism. Finally, in line with the

second cluster, valuing autonomy (high self-expression values) and free choice goes hand in

hand with the rejection of traditional and religious authority figures (low traditional values).

People are, in that case, self-regulated and self-governed citizens, focused on their own and

their fellow citizens‘ welfare.

This further suggests that theoretical assumptions regarding the antecedents and

consequences of values should be reconsidered. As we have seen, socioeconomic

development and political history are important antecedents of the three cultural zones‘ value

profiles. These factors play the decisive role in Inglehart‘s analysis as well. In that line, he

28
argues that the modernization effects on values are path dependent (Inglehart and Welzel

2005: 48-76). The identified cultural zones are distinctive today because they were different

in relevant factors long ago (e.g. in religion) and will continue to remain at the ―cultural

distance‖, despite the general homogenizing tendencies that result from the socioeconomic

development. Yet, if the Orthodox and, say, Confucian countries are not, as we have shown,

such distinctive cultural zones after all, or if ex-communist countries of different religion and

level of development show value similarity, we must question the relevance given to those

factors in explaining the cultural differences. If we bear in mind that distinctive value profiles

encompass the countries of different religions or socioeconomic development, the value

change does not seem to be path dependent after all. More precisely, if there is any path

dependency visible in the cultural map it is the fact that societies move on it along a similar

and predetermined trajectory – from the bottom left corner on the Cultural Map (high

traditional values), to the upper left corner (higher secular values), and then to the upper right

(higher self-expression values). In other words, one has to become secular before striving for

self/expression (or becoming autonomous).

It is possible that, at least in some cases, the pre-communist political culture changed

the ―communism‖ more than being changed by it (Almond 1983). Yet, it does not seem

probable that predominant values in the post-communist societies today are not, in part, a

consequence of living under the communist regime in the not so distant past. Previous

research showed that, as a consequence of communism, East Europeans downgraded the

importance of those values whose expression would be counterproductive, like autonomy or

mastery, and upgraded the importance of values which were easily attained, like conservatism

and hierarchy (Schwartz and Bardi 1997: 401-402). This is consistent with lower emphasis of

independence and self-expression observed in our data and preference for certainty and

security, as expressed in higher prominence of survival values. Put differently, people

29
acclimate and adapt their value priorities to prevailing societal conditions (Schwartz and

Bardi 1997). These processes caused similarities in values across the post-communist

countries as well as the consequent difficulties in achieving effective democracy. Similarly,

our results showed that what more democratic countries have in common is not a shared

denomination or language, but shared values. If secularized culture could be the consequence

of communism, i.e. shared institutional arrangements, it is equally likely that the culture of

emancipation and self-governed citizens is the result of living under well-functioning

democracy (in addition to material well-being).

Finally, instead of relying on self-expression values only in political culture terms, the

view of the democratic political culture in terms of the adequate combination of the two main

dimensions of cross-cultural variation would be more appropriate. If culture is indeed a

precondition and precursor of the democratic political structure, the identification of different

value patterns in terms of their democracy payoffs is of utmost importance. Instead of the

cultural zones as proposed by Inglehart, the democratic political culture seems to be a matter

of a specific combination of both value dimensions – the zone of emancipation.

5. Limitations and recommendations for future research

This analysis was of a rather limited scope in terms of the antecedents of the

identified cultural zones. Bearing in mind the relevance of various macro variables in the

cross-cultural analysis of values, future research could focus on the relevance of some of

these, especially those that have an important role in Inglehart‘s theory (such as the type of

economy). In order to obtain a relatively large number of countries in the analysis, we have

included the countries surveyed at different time points. An alternative approach could test

the stability of the empirically identified cluster membership of a smaller number of countries

30
surveyed in the consecutive waves of the WVS/EVS. Finally, the question of

intergenerational differences in terms of the value systems identified here could provide very

important insights into the mechanism of values and political culture change, which would be

of special importance in the case of post-communist countries.

31
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