No. L-42088.
 May 7, 1976.* The lower court in its order of February 24, 1975 appointed Alfredo G. Baluyut as
ALFREDO G. BALUYUT, petitioner, vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, ENCARNACION
LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT, JOSE ESPINO and CORAZON ESPINO, respondents.
Settlement of estates; Letters of administration; To whom issued; Although
surviving spouse with preferential right to be appointed administrator, hearing should
be held to determine the said spouse’s competency to discharge trust; Reasons .—
While the probate court correctly assumed that the surviving spouse enjoys
preference in the granting of letters of administration it does not follow that she
should be named administration without conducting a full-dress hearing on her
competency to discharge that trust. Even the directive of the testator in his will
designating that a certain person should act as executor is not binding on the probate
court and does not automatically entitle him to the issuance of letters testamentary. A
hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his fitness to act as executor. He might
have been fit to act as executor when the will was executed but supervening
circumstances might have rendered him unfit for that position. It was held that a
hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be
appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and
affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition.
Same; Conversion of proceedings for issuance of letters of administration into
testamentary proceedings where deceased died with a will. —It is necessary to
convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary proceeding. The
probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. After the
will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked and proceedings
for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will should be
conducted.
Certiorari; When available.— Certiorari lies when a grave abuse of discretion
was patently committed by the lower court or if the petitioner’s contention is clearly
tenable or when the broader interests of justice or public policy justify the nullification
of the questioned order.
PETITION for certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon
City).
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Mary Concepcion-Bautista for petitioner.
     Santiago, Salunat and Agbayani for respondent Encarnacion Lopez Vda. de
Baluyut.
AQUINO, J.:
Sotero Baluyut died in Manila on January 6, 1975 at the age of eighty-six, leaving an
estate allegedly valued at not less than two million pesos.
A few weeks later, or on February 20, his nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, filed in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City a verified petition for letters of administration.
He alleged that the deceased was survived by his widow, Encarnacion Lopez, who
was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent’s estate. Alfredo
surmised that the decedent had executed a will. He prayed that he be appointed
regular administrator and in the meantime as special administrator.
special administrator with a bond of P100,000.
Mrs. Baluyut in her verified opposition of March 8, 1975 alleged that she was
unaware that her deceased husband executed a will. She characterized as libelous
the allegation as to her mental incapacity. She prayed that she be named
administratrix and that the appointment of Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator
be set aside.
The lower court in its order of March 24, 1975 cancelled Baluyut’s appointment as
special administrator. In that same order the lower court noted that after asking Mrs.
Baluyut a series of questions while on the witness stand, it found that she “is healthy
and mentally qualified”.
Alfredo G. Baluyut moved for the reconsideration of that order. Acting on that
motion, the lower court in its order of March 31, 1975 appointed Baluyut and Jose
Espino as special administrators.
Mrs. Baluyut in her verified amended opposition of September 2, 1975 asked that
Espino, former governor of Nueva
Vizcaya and an alleged acknowledged natural child of Sotero Baluyut, be appointed
administrator should she not be named administratrix.
On November 12, 1975 Mrs. Baluyut filed an urgent motion praying that she be
appointed administratrix. She reasoned out that Alfredo G. Baluyut had no more
interest in the decedent’s estate because as a collateral relative he was excluded by
Espino and other supposed descendants of the deceased who had intervened in the
proceeding, and, therefore, it was not necessary to continue with the reception of his
evidence.
Alfredo G. Baluyut opposed the urgent motion. He alleged that Espino was not a
natural child of Sotero Baluyut because Espino’s parents were the spouses Elino
Espino and Josefa de Guzman. Alfredo further alleged that Mrs. Baluyut was declared
an incompetent by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City in its
order of September 25, 1975 in Special Proceeding No. QC-00939 for the
guardianship of Mrs. Baluyut. That proceeding was instituted by her sisters, Cristeta
Lopez Vda. de Cuesta and Guadalupe Lopez-Viray.
At the hearing of Mrs. Baluyut’s urgent motion on November 17, 1975 no oral and
documentary evidence was presented. The lower court merely examined Mrs. Baluyut
as follows:
“Court: We want also to hear her testimony.
     xxx      xxx      xxx
Atty. Salunat: We are now therefore presenting the widow, your Honor, to take
the witness stand for examination by the court.
xxx      xxx      xxx      xxx
Court to witness: Can you testify in English?—No, your Honor, Pampango.
Q. Ilocano?—A. No, your Honor.
Atty. Salunat: She can testify in Tagalog, your Honor, which is comprehensible.
Court: You remember when you were born, Mrs. Baluyut?—A. March 25, 1901.
Q. Where did you graduate?—A. Madres Dominicas.
Q. When did you get married to Sec. Baluyut?—A. I cannot remember the date
but it was in Lingayen.
Q. What church?—A. Catholic.
Court: You want to ask some more questions, Attorney?
Atty. Salunat: Just a few clarificatory questions, Your honor.
 Q. Do you know Gov. Jose Espino?—A. Yes.
Q. Why do you know him?—A. Because he is like a son to me.
Q. Do you know whether Gov. Espino has any relationship with the late Don Sotero
Baluyut?—A. Yes, why not.
Q. Will you please tell us what is the relationship if there is any?—A. He is his
son, sir.
Atty. Salunat: I think that would be all, your Honor.
Court: Submitted?
Atty. Salunat: We will ask the Court to (be allowed to) submit a rejoinder, your
Honor.”
The probate court in its order of November 27, 1975 terminated the appointments of
Espino and Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrators and appointed Mrs. Baluyut
as regular administratrix with a bond of P20,000. The order was based on the fact
that as surviving spouse she has a preferential right to be appointed as administratrix
of her deceased husband’s estate and that she is entitled to three-fourths of the
conjugal estate: one-half in her own right and one-fourth as heir of the deceased.
The lower court said it was convinced of the widow’s capacity and that her “sufficient
understanding” justified her appointment.
Letters of administration were issued to Mrs. Baluyut after she posted her bond.
She took her oath of office on November 29, 1975.
On December 13, 1975 Alfredo G. Baluyut filed against respondent Judge, Mrs.
Baluyut and the Espino spouses this special civil action of certiorari in order to set
aside the order of November 27 appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.
This court issued a restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the
order of November 27 and from disposing of the funds or assets of the estate in their
possession or deposited in certain banks.
The Espinos in their comment alleged that Alfredo G. Baluyut is aware that Jose
Espino was acknowledged in a notarial instrument by Sotero Baluyut as his natural
child.
Mrs. Baluyut in her comment alleged that Alfredo G. Baluyut instituted the
administration proceeding after he had failed to get from her a check for P500,000
belonging to the decedent’s estate and that he grossly misrepresented that she was
mentally incompetent. She further alleged that the order of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court declaring her an incompetent was issued in a blitzkrieg
manner because it was based on the report of Doctor Lourdes V. Lapuz which was
filed in court just one day before the order was issued.
90
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Baluyut vs. Paño
Mrs. Baluyut’s main contention is that it is the probate court and not the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court that should decide the issue as to her competency to act as
administratrix.
Alfredo G. Baluyut in his manifestation of February 2, 1976 disclosed that Sotero
Baluyut executed a notarial will on April 14, 1973. In that will he bequeathed to Mrs.
Baluyut his one-half share in certain conjugal assets and one-fourth of the residue of
his estate. The remaining three-fourths were bequeated to his collateral relatives
named Irene, Erlinda, Estrellita, Eliseo and Alfredo, all surnamed Baluyut, and
Emerita, Emilio and Benjamin, all surnamed Miranda. The testator designated Mrs.
Baluyut as executrix. Espino is not mentioned in that will.
In this Court’s resolution of May 7, 1976 respondents’ comments were treated as
their answers. The case was deemed submitted for decision.
The issue is whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.
We hold that while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs. Baluyut as
surviving spouse enjoys preference in the granting of letters of administration (Sec.
6[a], Rule 78, Rules of Court), it does not follow that she should be named
administratrix without conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency to
discharge that trust.
Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person
should act as executor is not binding on the probate court and does not automatically
entitle him to the issuance of letters testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order
to ascertain his fitness to act as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor
when the will was executed but supervening circumstances might have rendered him
unfit for that position.
Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability
of the person to be appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove
his qualifications and affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition ( Matute
vs. Court of Appeals, L-26106, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 768, 791).
In this case the probate court briefly and perfunctorily interrogated Mrs. Baluyut
in order to satisfy itself on her mental capacity. The court did not give Alfredo G.
Baluyut a chance to contest her qualifications. He had squarely raised the issue as to
her competency. The probate court assumed that
91
VOL. 71, MAY 7, 1976 91
Baluyut vs. Paño
Alfredo G. Baluyut had no interest in the decedent’s estate. As it now turned out, he
is one of the legatees named in the decedent’s alleged will.
Moreover, it is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a
testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a
matter of public policy (Art 838, Civil Code; Sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Guevara
vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249).
After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked
and proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under
the will should be conducted (Sec. 1, Rule 82, Rules of Court; Cartajena vs. Lijauco
and Zaballa, 38 Phil. 620; Rodriguez vs. De Borja , L-21993, 64 O.G. 754, 17 SCRA
418).
Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in the interest of
the orderly administration of justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs.
Baluyut’s fitness to act as executrix or administratrix . Persons questioning her
capacity should be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present
evidence.
The lower court departed from the usual course of probate procedure in
summarily appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix on the assumption that Alfredo
G. Baluyut was not an interested party. That irregularity became more pronounced
after Alfredo G. Baluyut’s revelation that the decedent had executed a will. He
anticipated that development when he articulated in his petition his belief that Sotero
Baluyut executed wills which should be delivered to the court for probate.
Certiorari lies when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed by the
lower court or if the petitioner’s contention is clearly tenable or when the broader
interests of justice or public policy justify the nullification of the questioned order
(Manila Electric Company and Sheriff of Quezon City vs. Hon. Enriquez and
Espinosa, 110 Phil. 499, 503; Pachoco vs. Tumangday and Fernando , 108 Phil.
238; Rañeses vs. Teves, L-26854, March 4, 1976).
Before closing, a pending incident herein should be resolved. Alfredo G. Baluyut
in his motion of January 15, 1976 prayed that respondent Judge be enjoined from
acting on Mrs. Baluyut’s motion for the appointment of Espino as special
administrator. In view of Alfredo G. Baluyut’s manifestation of
92
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Baluyut vs. Paño
April 2, 1976 that his motion had become moot, the same is hereby denied.
WHEREFORE, the lower court’s order of November 27, 1975 appointing Mrs.
Baluyut as administratrix is set aside. The letters of administration granted to her are
cancelled. The probate court is directed to conduct further proceedings in consonance
with the guidelines delineated in this decision. Costs against respondent Mrs. Baluyut.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115925. August 15, 2003.*
SPOUSES RICARDO PASCUAL and CONSOLACION SIOSON, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and REMEDIOS S. EUGENIO-GINO, respondents.
Civil Law; Trusts; Implied Trust; Prescription; The ten-year prescriptive period
begins to run from the date the adverse party repudiates the implied trust .—It is now
well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or
mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is ten
years pursuant to Article 1144. This ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from
the date the adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes place
when the adverse party registers the land.
Same; Same; Same; allegations of fraud in implied trusts must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence.—Allegations of fraud in actions to enforce implied
trusts must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure require that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest who is the party who stands to benefit or suffer from the
judgment in the suit. If one who is not a real party-in-interest brings the action, the
suit is dismissible for lack of cause of action.
Civil Procedure; Actions; Parties; Real Party-in-Interest; If one who is not a
real party-in-interest brings the action, the suit is dismissible for lack of cause of
action.—The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure require that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest who is the party who
stands to benefit or suffer from the judgment in the suit. If one who is not a real
party-in-interest brings the action, the suit is dismissible for lack of cause of action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Until admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect
and no right can be claimed thereunder .—Article 838 of the Civil Code states that
“[N]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.” This Court has interpreted this provision to
mean, “until admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect whatever and no right can be
claimed thereunder.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Delos Santos, Delos Santos and Delos Santos for petitioners.
     Virgilio C. Manguera and Associate for private respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review of the Decision 1 dated 31 January 1994 of the Court of
Appeals ordering the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III, to place TCT No.
(232252) 1321 in the name of respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino. The Decision
ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the names of petitioners Ricardo Pascual and
Consolacion Sioson (“petitioners”) in TCT No. (232252) 1321. The Decision also
directed petitioners to pay respondent moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees.
The Facts
Petitioner Consolacion Sioson (“CONSOLACION”) and respondent Remedios S.
Eugenio-Gino (“REMEDIOS”) are the niece and granddaughter, respectively, of the
late Canuto Sioson (“CANUTO”). CANUTO and 11 other individuals, including his sister
Catalina Sioson (“CATALINA”) and his brother Victoriano Sioson (“VICTORIANO”),
were co-owners of a parcel of land in Tanza, Navotas, Metro Manila. The property,
known as Lot 2 of Plan Psu 13245, had an area of 9,347 square meters and was
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 4207 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Rizal. CATALINA, CANUTO, and VICTORIANO each owned an aliquot 10/70 share or
1,335 square meters of Lot 2.2
2
 OCT No. 4207 indicates the sharing of the co-owners as follows:
Simeon Sioson ..................... 10/70
Victoriano Sioson ................ 10/70
Catalina Sioson .................. 10/70
Fermina Sioson ................... 10/70
Canuto Sioson ..................... 10/70
Calixto Sioson ....................... 5/70
Felipe Sioson ......................... 5/70
Marciana Gabriel ................. 2/70
107
VOL. 409, AUGUST 15, 2003 107
Pascual vs. Court of Appeals
On 20 November 1951, CANUTO had Lot 2 surveyed and subdivided into eight lots
(Lot Nos. 2-A to 2-H) through Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 which the Director of Lands
approved on 30 May 1952. Lot No. 2-A, with an area of 670 square meters, and Lot
No. 2-E, with an area of 2,000 square meters, were placed under CANUTO’s name.
Three other individuals took the remaining lots.3
On 26 September 1956, CANUTO and CONSOLACION executed a Kasulatan ng
Bilihang Tuluyan4 (“KASULATAN”). Under the KASULATAN, CANUTO sold his 10/70
share in Lot 2 in favor of CONSOLACION for P2,250.00. The KASULATAN, notarized
by Notary Public Jose T. de los Santos of Navotas, provides:
Na ako, CANUTO SIOSON, mamamayang Pilipino, may katampatang gulang, kasal
kay Raymunda San Diego, at naninirahan sa Tanza, Navotas, Rizal, sa bisa at
pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay nagpapatunay at nagpapatibay:
1. Na ako ang lubos at tunay na may-ari ng 10/70 bahaging hindi hati (10/70 porcion
pro-indiviso) ng isang lagay na lupa (Lote No. 2, Piano Psu-13245), na nasa sa nayon
ng Tanza, Municipio ng Navotas, Provincia ng Rizal, at ang descripcion o
pagkakakilanlan ng nasabing lote ay nakasaad sa Certificado Original, de Titulo No.
4207 ng Oficina ng Registrador de Titulos ng Rizal, gaya ng sumusunod:
xxxx
2. Na dahil at alang-alang sa halagang Dalawang Libo Dalawang Daan at
Limampung Piso (P2,250.00), salaping Pilipino, na sa akin ay ibinayad ni
CONSOLACION SIOSON, kasal kay Ricardo S. Pascual, may-sapat na gulang,
mamamayang Pilipino, at naninirahan sa Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal at ang
pagkakatanggap ng nasa
_______________ ng Notario Publico Jose T. de los Santos nang pechang nabanggit, sa Navotas, Rizal,
(Doc. No. 194, Page No. 84; Book No. IV; Series of 1956);
Na ang nasabing lupa na ipinagbili ng aming Ama kay Consolacion Sioson ni
Isabelo Gabriel ..................... 2/70
Pascual, ay nakikilala ngayong mga Lote No. 2-A at Lote 2-E ng
Margarito Gabriel ................ 2/70 Plano de Subdivision Psd-34713; na pinagtibay ng Assistant Director of Lands noong
Susana Gabriel ..................... 2/70 Mayo 30, 1952;
Emilio Gabriel ...................... 2/70 Na aming ngayong pinatitibayan ang pagka-pagbili ng bahagi ng aming Ama kay
3
 Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 Lot 2 subdivided the remaining portion of Lot 2 as Consolacion Sioson ni Pascual ng ngayo’y nakikilalang Lote No. 2-A at Lote No. 2-E
follows: ng Plano de Subdivision Psd-34713. (Emphasis supplied)
On 28 October 1968, CONSOLACION registered the KASULATAN and the JOINT
Fermina Lot 2-D, 670 sq. AFFIDAVIT with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal (“Register of Deeds”).
Sioson.......................... meters Based on these documents, the Register of Deeds issued to CONSOLACION Transfer
  Lot 2-H, 2003 sq. Certificate of Title No. (232252) 1321 covering Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E of Subdivision
Plan Psd 34713 with a total area of 2,670 square meters.
meters On 4 February 1988, REMEDIOS filed a complaint against CONSOLACION and her
Calixto Lot 2-F, 500 sq. spouse Ricardo Pascual in the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 165, for
Sioson............................ meters ‘‘Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title] and Damages.”
REMEDIOS claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E because CATALINA
Esteban Lot 2-G, 2,499 sq. devised these lots to her in CATALINA’s last will and testament 7 (“LAST WILL”) dated
Sioson .......................... meters 29 May 1964. REMEDIOS added that CONSOLACION obtained title to these lots
Lot 2-C, 837 sq. meters   through fraudulent means since the area covered by TCT (232252) 1321 is twice the
4
 Exhibit “7” for Petitioners size of CANUTO’s share in Lot 2. REMEDIOS prayed for the cancellation of
bing halaga ay aking inaamin at pinatutunayan, ay aking ipinagbili, inilipat at isinalin, CONSOLACION’s title, the issuance of another title in her name, and the payment to
sa pamamagitan ng bilihang tuluyan at walang pasubali a favor [sic] sa nasabing si her of damages.
CONSOLACION SIOSON, sa kanyang tagapagmana at mapaglilipatan ang lahat ng Petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription.
aking titulo, karapatan at kaparti na binubuo ng 10/70 bahaging hindi hati (10/70 Petitioners claimed that the basis of the action is fraud, and REMEDIOS should have
porcion pro-indiviso) ng loteng descrito at tinutukoy sa itaas nito . (Emphasis supplied) filed the action within lour years from the registration of CONSOLACION’s title on 28
CONSOLACION immediately took possession of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. She later October 1968 and not some 19 years later on 4 February 1988. REMEDIOS opposed
declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding real estate taxes. 5 the motion, claiming that she became aware of CONSOLACION’s adverse title only in
On 23 October 1968, the surviving children of CANUTO, namely, Felicidad and February 1987. CONSOLACION maintained that she had timely filed her complaint
Beatriz, executed a joint affidavit6 (“JOINT AFFIDAVIT”) affirming the KASULATAN in within the four-year prescriptive on 4 February 1988.
favor of CONSOLACION. They also attested that the lots their father had sold to In its order of 28 April 1988, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
CONSOLACION were Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E of Subdivision Plan Psd 34713. The JOINT The trial court held that the reckoning of the prescriptive period for filing REMEDIOS’
AFFIDAVIT reads: complaint is evidentiary in nature and must await the presentation of the parties’
KAMING sina FELICIDAD SIOSON at BEATRIZ SIOSON, pawang mga Pilipino, kapuwa evidence
may sapat na gulang at naninirahan, ang una sa Tanza, Navotas at ang ikalawa sa during the trial. During the pre-trial stage, REMEDIOS clarified that she was claiming
Concepcion, Malabon, lalawigan ng Rizal, sa ilalim ng isang ganap na panunumpa only CATALINA’s 10/70 share in Lot 2, or 1,335 square meters, which constitute 1/2
alinsunod sa batas, ay malayang nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod: of the area of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E.8 The trial of the case then ensued.
Na kami ang mga buhay na anak na naiwan ni CANUTO SIOSON na nagmamay- The Ruling of the Trial Court
ari ng 10/70 bahaging hindi hati (10/70 porcion proindiviso) ng isang lagay na lupa On 26 November 1990, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case and
(Lote No. 2, piano Psu-13245), na nasa Nayon ng Tanza, Navotas, Rizal, at ang mga ordering REMEDIOS to pay petitioners PI0,000 as attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.
palatandaan nito ay nasasaad sa Certificado Original de Titulo No. 4207 ng The trial court held that the action filed by REMEDIOS is based on fraud, covered by
Tanggapan ng Registrador de Titulos ng Rizal; the four-year prescriptive period. The trial court also held that REMEDIOS knew of
Na sa lubos naming kaalaman, ay ipinagbili ng aming Ama na si Canuto Sioson petitioners’ adverse title on 19 November 1982 when REMEDIOS testified against
ang kaniyang buong bahagi na 10/70 sa nasabing Lote No. 2, kay CONSOLACION petitioners in an ejectment suit petitioners had filed against their tenants in Lot Nos.
SIOSON, may-bahay ni Ricardo S. Pascual, na taga Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal, sa 2-A and 2-E. Thus, the complaint of REMEDIOS had already prescribed when she filed
halagang P2,250.00, salaping pilipino, noong ika 16 [sic] ng Septiembre, 1956, sa it on 4 February 1988.
pamamagitan ng isang KASULATAN NG BILIHANG TULUYAN na pinagtibay sa harap The trial court further ruled that REMEDIOS has no right of action against
petitioners because CATALINA’s LAST WILL from which REMEDIOS claims to derive
her title has not been admitted to probate. Under Article 838 of the Civil Code, no will
passes real or personal property unless it is allowed in probate in accordance with the
Rules of Court. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision provides:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against
plaintiff, ordering:
1. 1.The dismissal of this case;
2. 2.The plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)
Pesos as and for attorney’s fees; and
3. 3.The plaintiff to pay the costs of suit.”9
REMEDIOS appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 31 January 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment reversing the decision
of the trial court. The appellate court held
that what REMEDIOS filed was a suit to enforce an implied trust allegedly created in
her favor when CONSOLACION fraudulently registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and
2-E. Consequently, the prescriptive period for filing the complaint is ten years, not
four. The Court of Appeals counted this ten-year period from 19 November 1982.
Thus, when REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4 February 1988, the ten-year
prescriptive period had not yet expired.
The appellate court held that CATALlNA’s unprobated LAST WILL does not
preclude REMEDIOS from seeking reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E as the LAST
WILL may subsequently be admitted to probate. The dispositive portion of the
appellate court’s ruling provides:
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Registry
of Deeds of Rizal or Metro Manila, District III, is ordered to place Transfer Certificate
of Title No. (232252) 1321 under the name of Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino as executor
of the will of Catalina Sioson and cancel the names of the Spouses Ricardo Pascual
and Consolacion Sioson inscribed over said title as owners of the covered lot.
Defendants-appellees spouses Ricardo Pascual and Consolacion Sioson are ordered to
pay plaintiff-appellant Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, exemplary damages of P20,000.00 and attorney’s fees of P20,000.00
and P500.00 per appearance.”10
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the ruling. However, the Court of Appeals
denied their motion in its order dated 15 June 1994.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners allege the following assignment of errors:
1. I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT’S CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION
WHICH FINDING IS MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
2. II.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT DOES NOT HAVE ANY TITLE AND HAS UTTERLY FAILED TO
PROVE ANY TITLE TO THE LOTS INVOLVED
1. IN THIS-CASE, AND IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF PETITIONERS.
2. III.THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION AND IN GROSS VIOLATION OF
THE RULES OF COURT IN ORDERING THE ENTIRE PROPERTY COVERED
BY TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. (232252) 1321 TO BE PLACED
IN THE NAME OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, BECAUSE THE CLAIM OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS LIMITED ONLY TO ONE- HALF (1/2) PORTION
OF THE PROPERTY, AND THE OTHER HALF THEREOF UNQUESTIONABLY
BELONGS TO PETITIONERS.
3. IV.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS
ACTED FRAUDULENTLY AND IN BAD FAITH IN SECURING THEIR
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE TO THE PROPERTY INVOLVED IN THIS CASE, AND
IN ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MORAL
DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES. 11
The pivotal questions are: (1) whether prescription bars the action filed by
REMEDIOS, and (2) whether REMEDIOS is a real party-in-interest.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has merit.
The Action is Barred by Prescription
The trial court held that the action tiled by REMEDIOS is one based on fraud.
REMEDIOS’ action seeks to recover real property that petitioners allegedly acquired
through fraud. Consequently, the trial court held that the action prescribes in four
years counted from REMEDIOS’ actual discovery of petitioners’ adverse title. The trial
court concluded that REMEDIOS belatedly filed her suit on 4 February 1988 because
she actually knew of petitioners’ adverse title since 19 November 1982.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals held that what REMEDIOS filed was a
suit to enforce an implied trust. REMEDIOS had ten years counted from actual notice
of the breach of trust, that is, the assertion of adverse title, within which to bring her
action. The
appellate court held that REMEDIOS seasonably filed her complaint on 4 February
1988 because she allegedly discovered petitioners’ adverse title only on 19 November
1982.
What REMEDIOS filed was an action to enforce an implied trust but the same is
already barred by prescription.
Prescriptive Period is 10 Years Counted
From Registration of Adverse Title
The four-year prescriptive period relied upon by the trial court applies only if the
fraud does not give rise to an implied trust, and the action is to annul a voidable
contract under Article 139012 of the Civil Code. In such a case, the four-year
prescriptive period under Article 139113 begins to run from the time of discovery of
the mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
In the present case, REMEDIOS does not seek to annul the KASULATAN.
REMEDIOS does not assail the KASULATAN as a voidable contract. In fact, REMEDIOS
admits the validity of the sale of 1,335 square meters of land under the KASULATAN.
However, REMEDIOS alleges that the excess area of 1,335 meters is not part of the
sale under the KASULATAN. REMEDIOS seeks the removal of this excess area
from TCT No. (232252) 1321 that was issued to CONSOLACION. Consequently,
REMEDIOS’ action is for “Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title]
and Damages.”14
REMEDIOS’ action is based on an implied trust under Article 1456 since she
claims that the inclusion of the additional 1,335 square meters in TCT No. (232252)
1321 was without basis. In effect, REMEDIOS asserts that CONSOLACION acquired
the additional 1,335 square meters through mistake or fraud and thus
CONSOLACION should be considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of
the rightful owner of the property. Clearly, the applicable prescriptive period is ten
years under Article 1144 and not four years under Articles 1389 and 1391.
It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by
fraud or mistake, giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 15 of the Civil Code,
is ten years pursuant to Article 1144.16 This ten-year prescriptive period begins to run
from the date the adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes
place when the adverse party registers the land.17
REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4 February 1988 or more than 19 years after
CONSOLACION registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E on 28 October 1968.
Unquestionably, REMEDIOS filed the complaint late thus warranting its dismissal. As
the Court recently declared in Spouses Alfredo v. Spouses Borras,18—
Following Caro,19 we have consistently held that an action for reconveyance based on
an implied trust prescribes in ten years. We went further by
specifying the reference point of the ten-year prescriptive period as the date of the
registration of the deed or the issuance of the title.
The Court of Appeals’ Reckoning of
Prescriptive Period from Actual Notice
of Adverse Title Not Justified
In holding that the action filed by REMEDIOS has not prescribed, the Court of Appeals
invoked this Court’s ruling in Adille v. Court of Appeals.20
In Adille, the Court reckoned the ten-year prescriptive period for enforcing
implied trusts not from registration of the adverse title but from actual notice of the
adverse title by the cestui que trust. However, the Court, in justifying its deviation
from the general rule, explained:
[W]hile actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes ( sic) in ten years, reckoned
from the date of the registration of the property, we x x x are not prepared to count
the period from such date in this case. We note the petitioner’s sub rosa efforts to
get hold of the property exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulent
misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial settlement that he is “the
only heir and child of his mother Feliza[”] with the consequence that he was able to
secure title in his name also. (Emphasis supplied)
Such commission of specific fraudulent conduct is absent in the present case. Other
than asserting that petitioners are guilty of fraud because they secured title to Lot
Nos. 2-A and 2-E with an area twice bigger than what CANUTO allegedly sold to
CONSOLACION, REMEDIOS did not present any other proof of petitioners’ fraudulent
conduct akin to Adille.
CONSOLACION obtained title to Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E through the KASULATAN
executed by CANUTO and the JOINT AFFIDAVIT executed by his surviving children,
one of whom, Felicidad, is the mother of REMEDIOS. The KASULATAN referred to the
sale of CANUTO’s 10/70 share in Lot 2 without specifying the area of the lot sold. The
JOINT AFFIDAVIT referred to the “Piano de Subdivision Psd-34713” without also
specifying the area of the lot sold. However, Subdivision Plan Psd 34713, as certified
by the Assistant Director of Lands on 30 May 1952, showed an area of
_______________
20
 G.R. No. L-44546, 29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 455.
116
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pascual vs. Court of Appeals
2,670 square meters in the name of CANUTO. Based on these documents, the
Register of Deeds issued TCT No. (232252) 1321 to CONSOLACION covering an area
of 2,670 square meters.
REMEDIOS does not assail the KASULATAN or the JOINT AFFIDAVIT as fictitious
or forged. REMEDIOS even admits the authenticity of Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 as
certified by the Assistant Director of Lands. 21 Moreover, REMEDIOS has not contested
petitioners1 claim that CANUTO doubled his share in Lot 2 by acquiring VICTORIANO’s
share.22
Plainly, the increase in the area sold from 1,335 square meters to 2,670 square
meters is a glaring mistake. There is, however, no proof whatsoever that this increase
in area was the result of fraud. Allegations of fraud in actions to enforce implied
trusts must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 23 Adille, which is anchored
on fraud,24 cannot apply to the present case.
At any rate, even if we apply Adille to this case, prescription still bars REMEDIOS’
complaint. As executrix of CATALINA’s LAST WILL, REMEDIOS submitted to the then
Court of First Instance of Caloocan in Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 the
inventory of all the property comprising CATALINA’s estate, which included Lot Nos.
2-A and 2-E. In a motion dated 7 November 1977, CONSOLACION sought the
exclusion of these lots from the inventory, invoking her title over them. REMEDIOS
was served a copy of the motion on 8 November 1977 against which she filed an
opposition. Nevertheless, the trial court overruled REMEDIOS’ objection. In its order
of 3 January 1978, the trial court granted CONSOLACION’s motion and ordered the
exclusion of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E from the estate of CATALINA. REMEDIOS did not
appeal from this ruling.
REMEDIOS thus had actual notice of petitioners’ adverse title on 8 November
1977. Even if, for the sake of argument, the ten-year prescriptive period begins to
run upon actual notice of the adverse title, still REMEDIOS’ right to file this suit has
prescribed. REMEDIOS had until 11 November 1987 within which to file her
complaint. When she did so on 4 February 1988, the prescriptive period had already
lapsed.
Respondent is Not a Real Party-in-Interest
Not only does prescription bar REMEDIOS’ complaint. REMEDIOS is also not a real
party-in-interest who can file the complaint, as the trial court correctly ruled.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure require that every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest who is the party who stands to
benefit or suffer from the judgment in the suit. 25 If one who is not a real party-in-
interest brings the action, the suit is dismissible for lack of cause of action. 26
 REMEDIOS anchored her claim over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E (or over its one-half
portion) on the devise of these lots to her under CATALINA’s LAST WILL. However,
the trial court found that the probate court did not issue any order admitting the
LAST WILL to probate. REMEDIOS does not contest this finding. Indeed, during the
trial, REMEDIOS admitted that Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 is still pending. 27
Article 838 of the Civil Code states that “[N]o will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.” This
Court has interpreted this provision to mean, “until admitted to probate, [a will] has
no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder.” 28 REMEDIOS anchors
her right in filing this suit on her being a devisee of CATALINA’s LAST WILL. However,
since the probate court has not admitted CATALINA’s LAST WILL, REMEDIOS has not
acquired any right under the LAST WILL. REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of
action either to seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to enforce an implied
trust over these lots.
The appellate court tried to go around this deficiency by ordering the
reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E to REMEDIOS in her capacity as executrix of
CATALINA’s LAST WILL. This is inap-
_______________
25
 Rule 3, Sec. 2.
26
 Sustiguer v. Tamayo, G.R No. 29341, 21 August 1989, 176 SCRA 579.
27
 TSN, 17 March 1989, p. 15 (Remedios Eugenio-Gino).
28
 Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 110427, 24 February 1997, 268 SCRA 640.
118
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pascual vs. Court of Appeals
propriate because REMEDIOS sued petitioners not in such capacity but as the alleged
owner of the disputed lots. Thus, REMEDIOS alleged in her complaint:
1. 3.The plaintiff is a niece and compulsory heir of the late CATAL1NA SIOSON
who died single and without any child of her own and who, during her
lifetime, was the owner of those two (2) parcels of land located at Tanza,
Navotas, Rizal (now Metro Manila), formerly covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 4207 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, x x x.
2. 4.The plaintiff, aside from being the compulsory heir of the deceased
CATALINA SIOSON, has sole and exclusive claim of ownership over the
above-mentioned two (2) parcels of land by virtue of a will or “Huling
Habilin at Pagpapasiya” executed by Catalina Sioson on May 19,
1964 before Notary Public Efren Y. Angeles at Navotas, Rizal, in which
document the deceased Catalina Sioson specifically and exclusively
bequeathed to the plaintiff the above-mentioned Lots 2-A and 2-E of Psd-
34713 approved by the Bureau of Lands on May 30, 1952. Copy of the
“Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya” consisting of four (4) pages is hereto
attached and forms an integral part hereof as Annex “A;”
3. 5.Sometime on or about February, 1987, plaintiff discovered that the above-
mentioned Lots 2-A and 2-E of subdivision plan Psd-34713 are now
registered or titled in the name of the defendants under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. (232252) 1321 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal,
now Metro-Manila District III. Copy of the title is hereto attached and
forms an integral part hereof as Annex “B;”
4. 6.Upon further inquiry and investigation, plaintiff discovered that the
defendants were able to obtain title in their name of the said parcels of
land by virtue of a “Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan” allegedly executed by
Canuto Sioson on September 26, 1956 before Notary Public Jose [T.] de
los Santos of Navotas, Metro-Manila. Copy of the said document is hereto
attached and forms an integral part hereof as Annex “C;”
5. 7.The plaintiff also discovered that although x x x the original sale did not
specify the parcels of land sold by Canuto Sioson, the defendants
submitted an alleged Affidavit executed by Felicidad Sioson and Beatriz
Sioson identifying the lots sold by Canuto Sioson to the defendants as Lots
2-A and 2-E of subdivision plan Psd-34713. Copy of the Affidavit dated
October 3, 1968 on the basis of which the present Transfer Certificate of
Title No. (232252) 1321 was issued to the defendants is hereto attached
and forms an integral part hereof as Annex “D;”
6. 8.The defendants are clearly guilty of fraud in presenting the
aforementioned Affidavit (Annex “D”) to the Register of Deeds as the basis
of their claim to’ Lots 2-A and 2-E in view of the fact that the parcels sold
to them by Canuto Sioson, assuming there was such a sale, were different
119
VOL. 409, AUGUST 15, 2003 119
Pascual vs. Court of Appeals
parcels of land, Lots 2-A and 2-E being the properties of the late Catalina Sioson who
bequeathed the same to the plaintiff.
xxxx
1. 12.Because of the defendants’ fraudulent actuations on this matter, plaintiff
suffered and continues (sic) to suffer moral damages arising from anxiety,
shock and wounded feelings. Defendants should also be assessed
exemplary damages by way of a lesson to deter them from again
committing the fraudulent acts, or acts of similar nature, by virtue of which
they were able to obtain title to the parcels of land involved in this case x x
x.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, all throughout the proceedings below and even in her Comment to this
petition, REMEDIOS continued to pursue her claim as the alleged owner of one-half of
the disputed lots.
Other Matters Raised in the Petition
The Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon the other errors petitioners assigned
concerning the award of damages and attorneys fees to REMEDIOS. Such award
assumes that REMEDIOS is a real party-in-interest and that she timely filed her
complaint. As earlier shown, this is not the case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
31 January 1994 and its Resolution dated 15 June 1994 are SET ASIDE. The
complaint filed by respondent Remedios Eugenio-Gino, dated 2 February 1988 is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
No. L-57848. June 19, 1982.*
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents.
Civil Law; Wills and Succession; Probate; Probate of a will is
mandatory; Reason.—Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. The law enjoins
the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory.
Same; Same; Same; Probate of will does not look into its intrinsic validity .—
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. “x x x The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which
the law
prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic) of the provisions, these may be impugned as
being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to
these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has
been authenticated x x x”
Same; Same; Preterition and disinheritance, distinguished. —“x x x Preterition
‘consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.’ (Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil.
325). Disinheritance, in turn, ‘is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory
heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law,’ (Justice J.B.L. Reyes
and R.C. Puno, ‘An Outline of Philippine Civil Law’, 1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing
cases) Disinheritance is always, ‘voluntary’, preterition, upon the other hand , is
presumed to be ‘involuntary’ (Sanchez Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil 2nd edition,
Volumen 2.o, p. 1131).”
Same; Same; Same; Effects of preterition and disinheritance. —Preterition
under Article 854 of the New Civil Code ‘shall annul the institution of heir.’ This
annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary
dispositions in the form of devices or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under
Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also ‘annul the institution of
heirs’, but only ‘insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited’, which last phrase
was omitted in the case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines,
1961 Edition, p. 172). Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that
portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.”
Same; Same; Will should not be denied legality based on dubious grounds.—As
held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, “x x x it is as important a matter of
public interest that a purported will is not denied legalization on dubious grounds.
Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its
foundation, x x x”
Same; Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Certiorari; Act done by a probate
court in excess of its jurisdiction correctible by certiorari; Certiorari available where
appeal not a speedy remedy.—Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to
state
480
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
0 ANNOTATED
Maninang vs. Court of Appeals
that in view of our finding that respondent Judge had acted in excess of his
jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case, Certiorari is a proper remedy. An act done
by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by Certiorari. And
even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule that in
the broader interests of justice, a petition for Certiorari may be entertained,
particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief.
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA. J.:
A Petition to Review the Decision of April 28, 1981 of respondent Appellate Court in
CA-G.R. No. 12032-R entitled “Rafael E. Maninang and Soledad L. Maninang vs. Hon.
Ricardo Pronove, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch XI, and
Bernardo S. Aseneta”.
Pertinent to the controversy are the following antecedental facts:
On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium
Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will, the pertinent portions of which are
quoted hereunder:
“x x x
“It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City,
Albay and Legaspi City and all my personal properties shall be inherited upon my
death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived continuously for
around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang and her husband Pamping have been
kind to me. x x x I have found peace and happiness with them even during the time
when my sisters were still alive and especially now when I am now being troubled by
my nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as Nonoy would like
me to appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not
consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things against my will.”
“x x x”
481
VOL. 114, JUNE 19, 1982 481
Maninang vs. Court of Appeals
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will
of the decedent with the Court of First Instance-Branch IV, Quezon City (Sp. Proc.
No. Q-23304, hereinafter referred to as the Testate Case).
On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son,
claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate
proceedings with the Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Pasig, Rizal (Sp. Proc. No.
8569, called hereinafter the Intestate Case, for brevity).
On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered
consolidated before Branch XI, presided by respondent Judge.
 Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the
ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only
compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. In support of
said Motion to Dismiss, respondent Bernardo cited the cases of Neri vs. Akutin (72
Phil. 322); Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449), and Ramos vs. Baldovino (2 CA Rep.
2nd, 878).1
In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it is
still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the Court’s area of inquiry is limited
to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that
respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent. 2
On September 8, 1980, the lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case
in this wise:
“For reasons stated in the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Bernardo S. Aseneta
which the Court finds meritorious, the petition for probate of will filed by Soledad L.
Maninang and which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304 is DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.”
On December 19, 1980, the lower Court denied reconsideration for lack of merit and
in the same Order appointed Bernar-
do as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Clemencia Aseneta
“considering that he is a forced heir of said deceased while oppositor Soledad
Maninang is not, and considering further that Bernardo Aseneta has not been shown
to be unfit to perform the duties of the trust.”
Petitioners Maninang resorted to a Certiorari Petition before respondent Court of
Appeals alleging that the lower Court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the Orders of
dismissal of the Testate Case (September 8, 1980) and denial of reconsideration
(December 19, 1980).
On April 28, 1981, respondent Court 3 denied Certiorari and ruled that the trial
Judge’s Order of dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of the Testate
Case and, therefore, appeal was the proper remedy, which petitioners failed to avail
of. Continuing, it said that even granting that the lower Court committed errors in
issuing the questioned Orders, those are errors of judgment reviewable only by
appeal and not by Certiorari.
Thus, this Petition before us.
We find that the Court a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed
the Testate Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory.
“No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.”4
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless
the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person
to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory. 5
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
“x x x The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch
upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine
nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic) of the provisions,
these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication.
The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised
even after the will has been authenticated x x x”6
“Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot
be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine
if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law.”7
Respondent Bernardo, however, relies on the pronouncement in Nuguid vs. Nuguid 8,
reading:
“In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court’s area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites
or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only
after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However,
where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue.  (Italics supplied)
Our ruling in Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez9 had a similar thrust:
“The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity even before
its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.”
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. The
intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate
because “practical considerations” so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in
the Nuguid case, the “meat of the controversy” was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in
fact, the parties in that case “shunted aside the question of whether or not the Will
should be allowed probate.” Not so in the case before us now where the probate of
the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the
Will demanded.
Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically
invalid as it completely preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a
crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent’s
Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether
it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
“x x x Preterition ‘consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.’ (Neri
vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 325). Disinheritance, in turn, ‘is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by
law.’ (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, ‘An Outline of Philippine Civil Law’, 1956
ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases) Disinheritance is always ‘voluntary’, preterition, upon
the other hand, is presumed to be ‘involuntary’ (Sanchez Roman, Estudios de
Derecho Civil 2nd edition, Volumen 2.o, p. 1131).” 10
The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.
“x x x The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the New Civil Code ‘shall annul the
institution of heir.’ This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition,
testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective
disinheritance
under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also ‘annul the
institution of heirs’, but only ‘insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited’,
which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of
the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172). Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is
limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally
deprived.”11
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial
issue has not been thoroughly considered. We gather from the assailed Order of the
trial Court that its conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited. We
are of opinion, however, that from the face of the Will, that conclusion is not
Indubitable.
As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso12
“x x x it is as important a matter of public interest that a purported will is not defied
legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary
succession will be shaken to its foundation. x x x”
Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our finding
that respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate
Case, Certiorari is a proper remedy. An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its
jurisdiction may be corrected by Certiorari. 13 And even assuming the existence of the
remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a
petition for Certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford
speedy and adequate relief.
WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set aside and the Orders of the Court of
First Instance-Branch XI, Rizal, dated September 8, 1980 and December 19, 1980,
are nullified. Special Proceeding No. Q-23304 is hereby remanded to said Court of
First Instance-Branch XI Rizal, therein to be
reinstated and consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 8569 for further proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
No. L-56340. June 24, 1983.* Same; Same; The Supreme Court affirmed in the previous case only what was
SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. and MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, adjudged in the Probate Court’s Probate Order.—What, therefore, the Court of
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN Y. REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH I, Appeals and, in effect, the Supreme Court affirmed en toto when they reviewed the
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU and LEWELLYN BARLITO QUEMADA, Probate Order were only the matters properly adjudged in the said Order.
respondents. Same; Same; Probate Court erred in assuming in its implementing Order that
Succession; The question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter in a the Probate Order adjudged the issue of ownership.—It was, therefore, error for the
probate proceeding.—In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with
and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that,
being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Court directed
prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot 887
resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property VOL. 122, JUNE 24, 1983 887
should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
Succession; In case of death of one of the spouses their respective proprietary
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
rights must be liquidated and the debts paid in the succession proceedings for the
Judgment; Execution; Writ of execution must conform with the dispositive
deceased spouse.—When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife,
portion but body of decision may be consulted in case of ambiguity .—The rule is that
aside from his two legitimate children and one illegitimate son. There is therefore a
execution of a judgment must conform to that decreed in the dispositive part of the
need to liquidate the conjugal partnership and set apart the share of PASTOR, SR.’s
decision. (Philippine-American Insurance Co. vs. Honorable Flores , 97 SCRA 811.)
wife in the conjugal partnership preparatory to the administration and liquidation of
However, in case of ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the decision may be
the estate of PASTOR, SR. which will include, among others, the determination of the
scanned for guidance in construing the judgment. ( Heirs of Presto vs. Galang, 78
extent of the statutory usufructuary right of his wife until her death. When the
SCRA 534; Fabular vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 329; Robles vs. Timario, 107 Phil.
disputed Probate Order was issued on December 5, 1972, there had been no
809.)
liquidation of the community properties of PASTOR, SR. and his wife.
Same; Succession; Issue of ownership was not resolved by the probate court
Same; Same.—So also, as of the same date, there had been no prior definitive
in this case.—Nowhere in the dispositive portion is
determination of the assets of the estate of PASTOR, SR. There was an inventory of
there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is
his properties presumably prepared by the special administrator, but it does not
manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the
appear that it was ever the subject of a hearing or that it was judicially approved.
question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing
The reconveyance or recovery of properties allegedly owned but not in the name of
a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will “with
PASTOR, SR. was still being litigated in another court. There was no appropriate
respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to
determination, much less payment, of the debts of the decedent and his estate. x x x
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.” It declared that the intestate estate
Certiorari; Certiorari is proper where probate court issued erroneous
administration aspect must proceed “subject to the outcome of the suit for
implementing orders of its Probate Order.—Under the circumstances of the case at
reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties in Civil
bar, the challenge must be rejected. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
Case 274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu.” [Parenthetically, although the
jurisdiction is much too evident in the actuations of the probate court to be
statement refers only to the “intestate” aspect, it defies understanding how
overlooked or condoned. Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to
ownership by the estate of some properties could be deemed finally resolved for
what properties compose the estate of PASTOR, SR. in the face of conflicting claims
purposes of testate administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the estate
made by heirs and a non-heir (MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR) involving properties
be the owner of a property for testate but not for intestate purposes?] Then again,
not in the name of the decedent, and in the absence of a resolution on the intrinsic
the Probate Order (while indeed it does not direct the implementation of the legacy)
validity of the will here in question, there was no basis for the Probate Court to hold
conditionally stated that the intestate administration aspect must proceed “unless . . .
in its Probate Order of 1972, which it did not, that private respondent is entitled to
it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner does not
the payment of the questioned legacy. Therefore, the Order of Execution of August
exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator,” which clearly implies that the
20, 1980 and the subsequent implementing orders for the payment of QUEMADA’s
issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact not
legacy, in alleged implementation of the dispositive part of the Probate Order of
resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of allowing
December 5, 1972, must fall for lack of basis.
QUEMADA to remain as special administrator of estate properties not covered by the
Succession; Taxation; Legacy made in a will cannot be distributed without a
holographic will, “considering that this (Probate) Order should have been properly
prior liquidation of the decedent’s estate and
issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the
payment of debts and taxes.—The ordered payment of legacy would be
aforestated will.”
violative of the rule requiring prior liquidation of the estate of the deceased, i.e., the
determination of the assets of the estate and payment of all debts and expenses,
before apportionment and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
(Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 7 SCRA 367.) Neither has the estate tax been paid on
the estate of PASTOR, SR. Payment therefore of the legacy to QUEMADA would
collide with the provision of the National Internal Revenue Code requiring payment of
estate tax before delivery to any beneficiary of his distributive share of the estate
(Section 107 [c]).
Same; Judgment; A legacy is not a debt of the estate for which a writ of
execution may issue.—The above provision clearly authorizes execution to enforce
payment of debts of estate. A legacy is not a debt of the estate; indeed, legatees are
among those against whom execution is authorized to be issued.
Execution; Certiorari; An order of execution that varies the terms of a final
order can be questioned in a certiorari proceeding. —It is within a court’s competence
to order the execution of a final judgment; but to order the execution of a final order
(which is not even meant to be executed) by reading into it terms that are not there
and in utter disregard of existing rules and law, is manifest grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the rule that certiorari may not be
invoked to defeat the right of a prevailing party to the execution of a valid and final
judgment, is inapplicable. For when an order of execution is issued with grave abuse
of discretion or is at variance with the judgment sought to be enforced ( PVTA vs.
Honorable Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172), certiorari will lie to abate the order of execution.
Same; Same; Action; Motions; A motion for leave to intervene need not be
resorted to first and certiorari may be commenced at once in case of urgent relief
from an implementing order.—Petitioner MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, wife of
PASTOR, JR., is the holder in her own right of three mining claims which are one of
the objects of conflicting claims of ownership. She is not an heir of PASTOR, SR. and
was not a party to the probate proceedings. Therefore, she could not appeal from the
Order of execution issued by the Probate Court. On the other hand, after the issuance
of the execution order, the urgency of the relief she and her co-petitioner husband
seek in the petition for certiorari militates against requiring her to go through the
cumbersome procedure of asking for leave to
intervene in the probate proceedings to enable her, if leave is granted, to
appeal from the challenged order of execution which has ordered
the immediate transfer and/or garnishment of the royalties derived from mineral
properties of which she is the duly registered owner and/or grantee together with her
husband. She could not have intervened before the issuance of the assailed orders
because she had no valid ground to intervene. The matter of ownership over the
properties subject of the execution was then still being litigated in another court in a
reconveyance suit filed by the special administrator of the estate of PASTOR, SR.
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Pelaez, Pelaez, & Pelaez Law Office for petitioners.
     Ceniza, Rama & Associates for private respondents.
PLANA, J.:
I. FACTS:
This is a case of hereditary succession.
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5,
1966, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died on October 21, 1966),
their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de
Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn
Barlito Quemada (QUEMADA). PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen, having been
naturalized in 1936. SOFIA is a Spanish subject. QUEMADA is a Filipino by his
mother’s citizenship.
On November 13, 1970, QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance
of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch I (PROBATE COURT), docketed as SP No. 3128-R. The will contained
only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30%
of PASTOR, SR.’s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims in Piña-Barot, Cebu.
890
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
On November 21, 1970, the PROBATE COURT, upon motion of QUEMADA and after
an ex parte hearing, appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of
PASTOR, SR., whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. He
assumed office as such on December 4, 1970 after filing a bond of P5,000.00.
On December 7, 1970, QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against
PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the
estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy and which were in the
names of the spouses PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who
claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The
action, docketed as Civil Case No. 274-R, was filed with the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch IX.
On February 2, 1971, PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their opposition to
the petition for probate and the order appointing QUEMADA as special administrator.
On December 5, 1972, the PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to
probate. Appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52961-R, the order was
affirmed in a decision dated May 9, 1977. On petition for review, the Supreme Court
in G.R. No. L-46645 dismissed the petition in a minute resolution dated November 1,
1977 and remanded the same to the PROBATE COURT after denying reconsideration
on January 11, 1978.
For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA filed
pleading after pleading asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties
subject of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the
ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court
of First Instance. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the PROBATE COURT.
On March 5, 1980, the PROBATE COURT set the hearing on the intrinsic validity
of the will for March 25, 1980, but upon objection of PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA on the
same ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held on March
25. Instead, the PROBATE COURT required the parties to submit their respective
position papers as to how
much inheritance QUEMADA was entitled to receive under the will. Pursuant thereto,
PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA submitted their Memorandum of authorities dated April 10,
which in effect showed that determination of how much QUEMADA should receive
was still premature. QUEMADA submitted his Position paper dated April 20, 1980.
ATLAS, upon order of the Court, submitted a sworn statement of royalties paid to the
Pastor Group of claimants from June 1966 (when Pastor, Sr. died) to February 1980.
The statement revealed that of the mining claims being operated by ATLAS, 60%
pertained to the Pastor Group distributed as follows:
1. A. Pastor, Jr. ................................. 40.5%
2. E. Pelaez, Sr. ................................. 15.0%
3. B. Quemada .................................. 4.5%
On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the PROBATE COURT issued the now assailed
Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the
royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to QUEMADA was not
inofficious. [There was absolutely no statement or claim in the Order that the Probate
Order of December 5, 1972 had previously resolved the issue of ownership of the
mining rights of royalties thereon, nor the intrinsic validity of the holographic will.]
The order of August 20, 1980 found that as per the holographic will and a written
acknowledgment of PASTOR, JR. dated June 17, 1962, of the above 60% interest in
the mining claims belonging to the Pastor Group, 42% belonged to PASTOR, SR. and
only 33% belonged to PASTOR, JR. The remaining 25% belonged to E. Pelaez, also
of the Pastor Group. The PROBATE COURT thus directed ATLAS to remit directly to
QUEMADA the 42% royalties due decedent’s estate, of which QUEMADA was
authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee and to deposit 25% with a reputable
banking institution for payment of the estate taxes and other obligations of the
estate. The 33% share of PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees was ordered garnished
to
892
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
answer for the accumulated legacy of QUEMADA from the time of PASTOR, SR.’s
death, which amounted to over two million pesos.
The order being “immediately executory”, QUEMADA succeeded in obtaining a
Writ of Execution and Garnishment on September 4, 1980, and in serving the same
on ATLAS on the same day. Notified of the Order on September 6, 1980, the
oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily on the ground
that the PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question
of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of QUEMADA’s legacy after
prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will. In the meantime, the
PROBATE COURT ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due PASTOR, JR.
and/or his assignees until after resolution of oppositors’ motion for reconsideration.
Before the Motion for Reconsideration could be resolved, however, PASTOR, JR.,
this time joined by his wife Ma. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction (CA-G.R. No. SP-11373-R). They assailed the Order dated August 20, 1980
and the writ of execution and garnishment issued pursuant thereto. The petition was
denied on November 18, 1980 on the grounds (1) that its filing was premature
because the Motion for Reconsideration of the questioned Order was still pending
determination by the PROBATE COURT; and (2) that although “the rule that a motion
for reconsideration is prerequisite for an action for certiorari is never an absolute
rule,” the Order assailed is “legally valid.”
On December 9, 1980, PASTOR, JR. and his wife moved for reconsideration of the
Court of Appeal’s decision of November 18, 1980, calling the attention of the
appellate court to another order of the Probate Court dated November 11, 1980 (i.e.,
while their petition for certiorari was pending decision in the appellate court), by
which the oppositors’ motion for reconsideration of the Probate Court’s Order of
August 20, 1980 was denied. [The November 11 Order declared that the questions of
intrinsic validity of the will and of ownership over the mining claims (not the royalties
alone) had been finally
893
VOL. 122, JUNE 24, 1983 893
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
adjudicated by the final and executory Order of December 5, 1972, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, thereby rendering moot and academic the
suit for reconveyance then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX.
It clarified that only the 33% share of PASTOR, JR. in the royalties (less than 7.5%
share which he had assigned to QUEMADA before PASTOR, SR. died) was to be
garnished and that as regards PASTOR, SR.’s 42% share, what was ordered was just
the transfer of its possession to the custody of the PROBATE COURT through the
special administrator. Further, the Order granted QUEMADA 6% interest on his
unpaid legacy from August 1980 until fully paid.] Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals
denied reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition for Review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 18, 1980 as
well as the orders of the Probate Court dated August 20, 1980, November 11, 1980
and December 17, 1980, filed by petitioners on March 26, 1981, followed by a
Supplemental Petition with Urgent Prayer for Restraining Order.
In April 1981, the Court (First Division) issued a writ of preliminary injunction, the
lifting of which was denied in the Resolution of the same Division dated October 18,
1982, although the bond of petitioners was increased from P50,000.00 to
P100,000.00.
Between December 21, 1981 and October 12, 1982, private respondent filed
seven successive motions for early resolution. Five of these motions expressly prayed
for the resolution of the question as to whether or not the petition should be given
due course.
On October 18, 1982, the Court (First Division) adopted a resolution stating that
“the petition in fact and in effect was given due course when this case was heard on
the merits on September 7, (should be October 21, 1981) and concise memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments on the merits of the case were filed by the
parties pursuant to the resolution of October 21, 1981 . . .” and denied in a resolution
dated December 13, 1982, private respondent’s “Omnibus
894
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
motion to set aside resolution dated October 18, 1982 and to submit the matter of
due course to the present membership of the Division; and to reassign the case to
another ponente.”
Upon Motion for Reconsideration of the October 18, 1982 and December 13, 1982
Resolutions, the Court en banc resolved to CONFIRM the questioned resolutions
insofar as they resolved that the petition in fact and in effect had been given due
course.
II. ISSUES:
Assailed by the petitioners in these proceedings is the validity of the Order of
execution and garnishment dated August 20, 1980 as well as the Orders
subsequently issued allegedly to implement the Probate Order of December 5, 1972,
to wit: the Order of November 11, 1980 declaring that the Probate Order of 1972
indeed resolved the issues of ownership and intrinsic validity of the will, and
reiterating the Order of Execution dated August 20, 1980; and the Order of December
17, 1980 reducing to P2,251,516.74 the amount payable to QUEMADA representing
the royalties he should have received from the death of PASTOR, SR. in 1966 up to
February 1980.
The Probate Order itself, insofar as it merely allowed the holographic will in
probate, is not questioned. But petitioners denounce the Probate Court for having
acted beyond its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the
assailed Orders. Their argument runs this way: Before the provisions of the
holographic will can be implemented, the questions of ownership of the mining
properties and the intrinsic validity of the holographic will must first be resolved with
finality. Now, contrary to the position taken by the Probate Court in 1980—i.e.,
almost eight years after the probate of the will in 1972—the Probate Order did not
resolve the two said issues. Therefore, the Probate Order could not have resolved
and actually did not decide QUEMADA’s entitlement to the legacy. This being so, the
Orders for the payment of the legacy in alleged implementation of the Probate Order
of 1972 are unwarranted for lack of basis.
895
VOL. 122, JUNE 24, 1983 895
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
Closely related to the foregoing is the issue raised by QUEMADA: The Probate Order
of 1972 having become final and executory, how can its implementation (payment of
legacy) be restrained? Of course, the question assumes that QUEMADA’s entitlement
to the legacy was finally adjudged in the Probate Order.
On the merits, therefore, the basic issue is whether the Probate Order of
December 5, 1972 resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic
validity. A negative finding will necessarily render moot and academic the other issues
raised by the parties, such as the jurisdiction of the Probate Court to conclusively
resolve title to property, and the constitutionality and repercussions of a ruling that
the mining properties in dispute, although in the name of PASTOR, JR. and his wife,
really belonged to the decedent despite the latter’s constitutional disqualification as
an alien.
On the procedural aspect, placed in issue is the propriety of certiorari as a means
to assail the validity of the order of execution and the implementing writ.
III. DISCUSSION:
1. Issue of Ownership—
(a) In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is
restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
(Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and
is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. [3
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court  (1980 ed.), p. 458; Valero Vda. de
Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540.]
(b) The rule is that execution of a judgment must conform to that decreed in
the dispositive part of the decision.
896
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
(Philippine-American Insurance Co. vs. Honorable Flores , 97 SCRA 811.) However, in
case of ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the decision may be scanned for
guidance in construing the judgment. (Heirs of Presto vs. Galang, 78 SCRA
534; Fabular vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 329; Robles vs. Timario, 107 Phil. 809.)
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the
Probate Order of December 5, 1972 which allegedly resolved the question of
ownership of the disputed mining properties. The said Probate Order enumerated the
issues before the Probate Court, thus:
“Unmistakably, there are three aspects in these proceedings: (1) the probate of the
holographic will; (2) the intestate estate aspect; and (3) the administration
proceedings for the purported estate of the decedent in the Philippines.
“In its broad and total perspective the whole proceedings are being impugned by
the oppositors on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., that the fact of the decedent’s residence
and existence of properties in the Philippines have not been established.
“Specifically placed in issue with respect to the probate proceedings are: (a)
whether or not the holographic will (Exhibit “J”) has lost its efficacy as the last will
and testament upon the death of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. on June 5, 1966, in Cebu City,
Philippines; (b) Whether or not the said will has been executed with all the formalities
required by law; and (c) Did the late presentation of the holographic will affect the
validity of the same?
“Issues In the Administration Proceedings are as follows: (1) Was the ex-parte
appointment of the petitioner as special administrator valid and proper? (2) Is there
any indispensable necessity for the estate of the decedent to be placed under
administration? (3) Whether or not petition is qualified to be a special administrator
of the estate; and (4) Whether or not the properties listed in the inventory (submitted
by the special administrator but not approved by the Probate Court) are to be
excluded.”
Then came what purports to be the dispositive portion:
“Upon the foregoing premises, this Court rules on and resolves some of the problems
and issues presented in these proceedings, as follows:
 897
VOL. 122, JUNE 24, 1983 897
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
1. “(a)The Court has acquired jurisdiction over the probate proceedings as
it hereby allows and approves the so-called holographic will  of testator
Alvaro Pastor, Sr., executed on July 31, 1961 with respect to its extrinsic
validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Let, therefore, a certificate of
its allowance be prepared by the Branch Clerk of this Court to be signed by
this Presiding Judge, and attested by the seal of the Court, and thereafter
attached to the will, and the will and certificate filed and recorded by the
clerk. Let attested copies of the will and of the certificate of allowance
thereof be sent to Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation,
Goodrich Bldg., Cebu City, and the Register of Deeds of Cebu or of Toledo
City, as the case may be, for recording.
2. “(b)There was a delay in the granting of the letters testamentary or of
administration—for as a matter of fact, no regular executor and/or
administrator has been appointed up to this time—and the appointment of
a special administrator was, and still is, justified under the circumstances
to take possession and charge of the estate  of the deceased in the
Philippines (particularly in Cebu) until the problems causing the delay are
decided and the regular executor and/or administrator appointed.
3. “(c)There is a necessity and propriety of a special administrator and later on
an executor and/or administrator in these proceedings , in spite of this
Court’s declaration that the oppositors are the forced heirs and the
petitioner is merely vested with the character of a voluntary heir to the
extent of the bounty given to him (under) the will insofar as the same will
not prejudice the legitimes of the oppositors , for the following reasons:
1. 1.To submit a complete inventory of the estate of the decedent-testator
Alvaro Pastor, Sr.;
2. 2.To administer and to continue to put to prolific utilization of the properties
of the decedent;
3. 3.To keep and maintain the houses and other structures and fences
belonging to the estate, since the forced heirs are residing in Spain, and
prepare them for delivery to the heirs in good order after partition and
when directed by the Court, but only after the payment of estate and
inheritance taxes;
1. “(d)Subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and
possession of real and personal properties  in Civil Case No. 274-T before
Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the intestate estate
administration aspect must proceed, unless, however, it is duly proven by
the oppositors that debts of the
898
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
decedent have already been paid, that there had been an extrajudicial partition or
summary one between the forced heirs, that thelegacy to be given and delivered to
the petitioner does not exceed thefree portion of the estate of the testator,  that the
respective shares ofthe forced heirs have been fairly apportioned, distributed
anddelivered to the two forced heirs of Alvaro Pastor, Sr., afterdeducting the property
willed to the petitioner, and the estate andinheritance taxes have already been paid
to the Government thru theBureau of Internal Revenue.
“The suitability and propriety of allowing petitioner to remain as special administrator
or administrator of the other properties of the estate of the decedent, which
properties are not directly or indirectly affected by the provisions of the holographic
will (such as bank deposits, land in Mactan, etc.), will be resolved in another order as
separate incident, considering that this order should have been properly issued solely
as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated
will.” (Italics supplied.)
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific
properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved.
For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for
and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the
holographic will “with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly
authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.” It declared
that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed “subject to the outcome
of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal
properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu.” [Parenthetically,
although the statement refers only to the “intestate” aspect, it defies understanding
how ownership by the estate of some properties could be deemed finally resolved for
purposes of testate administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the estate
be the owner of a property for testate but not for intestate purposes?] Then again,
the Probate Order (while indeed it does not direct the implementation of the legacy)
conditionally stated that the intestate administration aspect must proceed “unless . . .
it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner does not
exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator,” which
899
VOL. 122, JUNE 24, 1983 899
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
clearly implies that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity)
was in fact not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of
allowing QUEMADA to remain as special administrator of estate properties not
covered by the holographic will, “considering that this (Probate) Order should have
been properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow
and approve the aforestated will.”
1. (c)That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the
properties listed in the estate inventory was appropriate, considering that
the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the
 reconveyance suit that was still pending in Branch IX of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu.
2. (d)What, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the Supreme Court
affirmed en toto when they reviewed the Probate Order were only the
matters properly adjudged in the said Order.
3. (e)In an attempt to justify the issuance of the Order of execution dated
August 20, 1980, the Probate Court in its Order of November 11, 1980
explained that the basis for its conclusion that the question of ownership
had been formally resolved by the Probate Order of 1972 are the findings
in the latter Order that (1) during the lifetime of the decedent, he was
receiving royalties from ATLAS; (2) he had resided in the Philippines since
pre-war days and was engaged in the mine prospecting business since
1937 particularly in the City of Toledo; and (3) PASTOR, JR. was only
acting as dummy for his father because the latter was a Spaniard.
Based on the premises laid, the conclusion is obviously farfetched.
1. (f)It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude
that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of
the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion,
the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed the special
administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
900
900 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
2. Issue of Intrinsic Validity of the Holographic Will—
1. (a)When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife, aside from
his two legitimate children and one illegitimate son. There is therefore a
need to liquidate the conjugal partnership and set apart the share of
PASTOR, SR.’s wife in the conjugal partnership preparatory to the
administration and liquidation of the estate of PASTOR, SR. which will
include, among others, the determination of the extent of the statutory
usufructuary right of his wife until her death. ** When the disputed Probate
order was issued on December 5, 1972, there had been no liquidation of
the community properties of PASTOR, SR. and his wife.
2. (b)So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior definitive
determination of the assets of the estate of PASTOR, SR. There was an
inventory of his properties presumably prepared by the special
administrator, but it does not appear that it was ever the subject of a
hearing or that it was judicially approved. The reconveyance or recovery of
properties allegedly owned but not in the name of PASTOR, SR. was still
being litigated in another court.
3. (c)There was no appropriate determination, much less payment, of the
debts of the decedent and his estate. Indeed, it was only in the Probate
Order of December 5, 1972 where the Probate Court ordered that—
“. . . a notice be issued and published pursuant to the
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
provisions of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, requiring all persons having money claims
against the decedent to file them in the office of the Branch Clerk of this Court.”
1. (d)Nor had the estate tax been determined and paid, or at least provided
for, as of December 5, 1972.
2. (e)The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the legitime of
the forced heirs in concrete figures could not be ascertained.
3. (f)All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possible to determine
whether the legacy of QUEMADA—a fixed share in a specific property
rather than an aliquot part of the entire net estate of the deceased—would
produce an impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
4. (g)Finally, there actually was no determination of the intrinsic validity of the
will in other respects. It was obviously for this reason that as late as March
5, 1980—more than 7 years after the Probate Order was issued—the
Probate Court scheduled on March 25, 1980 a hearing on
the intrinsic validity of the will.
3. Propriety of Certiorari—
Private respondent challenges the propriety of certiorari as a means to assail the
validity of the disputed Order of execution. He contends that the error, if any, is one
of judgment, not jurisdiction, and properly correctible only by appeal, not certiorari.
Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the challenge must be rejected.
Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction is much too evident in the
actuations of the probate court to be overlooked or condoned.
1. (a)Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what
properties compose the estate of PASTOR, SR. in the face of conflicting
claims made by heirs and a non-heir (MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR)
involving properties not in the name of the decedent, and in the absence
of a resolution on the intrinsic validity of the will here in question, there
was no basis for the Probate Court to hold in its Probate
902
902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
1. Order of 1972, which it did not, that private respondent is entitled to the
payment of the questioned legacy. Therefore, the Order of Execution of
August 20, 1980 and the subsequent implementing orders for the payment
of QUEMADA’s legacy, in alleged implementation of the dispositive part of
the Probate Order of December 5, 1972, must fall for lack of basis.
2. (b)The ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the rule requiring
prior liquidation of the estate of the deceased, i.e., the determination of
the assets of the estate and payment of all debts and expenses, before
 apportionment and distribution of the residue among the heirs and
legatees. (Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 7 SCRA 367.)
3. (c)Neither has the estate tax been paid on the estate of PASTOR, SR.
Payment therefore of the legacy to QUEMADA would collide with the
provision of the National Internal Revenue Code requiring payment of
estate tax before delivery to any beneficiary of his distributive share of the
estate (Section 107 [c]).
4. (d)The assailed order of execution was unauthorized, having been issued
purportedly under Rule 88, Section 6 of the Rules of Court which reads:
“Sec. 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees, legatees, or heirs have been
in possession.—Where devisees, legatees,  or heirs have entered into possession of
portions of the estate before the debts and expenses have been settled and paid and
have become liable to contribute for the payment of such debts and expenses, the
court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing,
settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner
each person shall contribute, and may issue execution as circumstances require.”
The above provision clearly authorizes execution to enforce payment of debts of
estate. A legacy is not a debt of the estate; indeed, legatees are among those against
whom execution is authorized to be issued.
“. . . there is merit in the petitioners’ contention that the probate court generally
cannot issue a writ of execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution
because its orders usually refer to the adjudication of claims against the estate which
the executor or
903
VOL. 122, JUNE 24, 1983 903
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
administrator may satisfy without the necessity of resorting to a writ of execution.
The probate court, as such, does not render any judgment enforceable by execution.
“The circumstances that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate
court may issue execution (a) to satisfy (debts of the estate out of) the contributive
shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the decedent’s assets (Sec. 6,
Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and
(c) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings
(Sec. 13, Rule 142) may mean, under the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion
alterius, that those are the only instances when it can issue a writ of execution. ( Vda.
de Valera vs. Ofilada, 59 SCRA 96, 108.)
1. (d)It is within a court’s competence to order the execution of a final
judgment; but to order the execution of a final order (which is not even
meant to be executed) by reading into it terms that are not there and in
utter disregard of existing rules and law, is manifest grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the rule that
certiorari may not be invoked to defeat the right of a prevailing party to
the execution of a valid and final judgment, is inapplicable. For when an
order of execution is issued with grave abuse of discretion or is at variance
with the judgment sought to be enforced ( PVTA vs. Honorable
Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172), certiorari will lie to abate the order of execution.
2. (e)Aside from the propriety of resorting to certiorari to assail an order of
execution which varies the terms of the judgment sought to be executed or
does not find support in the dispositive part of the latter, there are
circumstances in the instant case which justify the remedy applied for.
Petitioner MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, wife of PASTOR, JR., is the holder in her
own right of three mining claims which are one of the objects of conflicting claims of
ownership. She is not an heir of PASTOR, SR. and was not a party to the probate
proceedings. Therefore, she could not appeal from the Order of execution issued by
the Probate Court. On the other hand, after the issuance of the execution order, the
urgency of the relief she and her co-petitioner husband seek in the petition for
certiorari militates against requiring her to go through the cumbersome procedure of
904
904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
asking for leave to intervene in the probate proceedings to enable her, if leave is
granted, to appeal from the challenged order of execution which has ordered
the immediate transfer and/or garnishment of the royalties derived from mineral
properties of which she is the duly registered owner and/or grantee together with her
husband. She could not have intervened before the issuance of the assailed orders
because she had no valid ground to intervene. The matter of ownership over the
properties subject of the execution was then still being litigated in another court in a
reconveyance suit filed by the special administrator of the estate of PASTOR, SR.
Likewise, at the time petitioner PASTOR, JR. filed the petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, appeal was not available to him since his motion for
reconsideration of the execution order was still pending resolution by the Probate
Court. But in the face of actual garnishment of their major source of income,
petitioners could no longer wait for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration.
They needed prompt relief from the injurious effects of the execution order. Under
the circumstances, recourse to certiorari was the feasible remedy.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-11373-R is
reversed. The Order of execution issued by the probate Court dated August 20, 1980,
as well as all the Orders issued subsequent thereto in alleged implementation of the
Probate Order dated December 5, 1972, particularly the Orders dated November 11,
1980 and December 17, 1980, are hereby set aside; and this case is remanded to the
appropriate Regional Trial Court for proper proceedings, subject to the judgment to
be rendered in Civil Case No. 274-R.
SO ORDERED.
No. L-23445. June 23, 1966.
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs. FELIX NuGUID and PAZ SALONGA
NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
Wills; Succession; Probate of will; Court’s area of inquiry is limited to extrinsic
validity of will; When Court may rule on intrinsic validity. —In a proceeding for the
probate of a will, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the
testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the com-
pliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic
validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has
been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court
should meet that issue.
Same; Preterition; Omission of forced heirs in the will.—Where the deceased
left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending line—her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit
them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the
parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.
Same; Preterition distinguished from disinheritance. —Preterition “consists in
the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.” (Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil., 325).
Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir
of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.” (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and
R.C. Puno, “An Outline of Philippine Civil Law”, 1966 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases.)
Disinheritance is always “voluntary”; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to
be “involuntary” (Sánchez Román, Estudios de Derecho Civil, 2nd edition, Volumen
2.o, p. 1131).
Same; Effects flowing from preterition and disinheritance. —The effects flowing
from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition under
Article 854 of the New Civil Code “shall annul the institution of heir”. This annulment
is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the
form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same
Code, such disinheritance shall also “annul the institution of heirs”, but only “insofar
as it may prejudice the person disinherited”, which last phrase was omitted in the
case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172).
Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of
which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
Same; When institution of heirs is void. —Where the onesentence will institutes
the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and
it contains no specif ic legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by
itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.
Same; When legacies and devises merit consideration. —Legacies and devises
merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing
in Article 854 of the New Civil Code suggests that the mere institution of a universal
heir in a will—void because of preterition—would
451
VOL. 17, JUNE 23, 1966 451
Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al.
give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is
inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition
granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of
heir.
Same; Institution of heirs cannot be considered a legacy.—If every case of
institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments
reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 of the
old Civil Code, regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would be absolutely
meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the remaining provisions
contained in said articles concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or
betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817 of
the same Code.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, San Diego, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant.
     Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single,
without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters,
namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed
Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17,
1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted
to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the
legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their
opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the
institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased,
oppositors—who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line—
were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
452
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and
objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to
dismiss.
The court’s order of November 8, 1963, held that “the will in question is a
complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased
Rosario Nuguid” and dismissed the petition without costs.
 A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court
on appeal.
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is
for the probate of a will. The court’s area of inquiry is limited—to an examination of,
and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the
testatrix’s testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be
acted upon, by the court Said court at this stage of the proceedings—is not called
upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the
legality of any devise or legacy therein. 1
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question
of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case
is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. 2 But petitioner and oppositors, in
the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will
intrinsically a nullity? We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for
probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the
court rejects the will, probability exists that the
case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or
nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These
are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet
head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. 3 After all,
there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
2. Petitioner’s sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the
conclusion below that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the
disputed will and the applicable statute.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
“Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having
amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of
the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid,
age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my
name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID"
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part,
provides:
“ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. x x x”
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of
Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus—
“Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments 4 shall be valid, in so
far as they are not inofficious. x x x”
A comprehensive understanding of the term preteri-
tion employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa comments:
“La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra
siquiera, o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se
le deshereda expresamente, ni se le asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando
privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el
testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte
corresponda la herencia forzosa.
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la
omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento." 5
It may now appear trite but nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the
problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:
“To ‘annul’ means to abrogate, to make void; x x x In re Morrow’s Estate, 54 A. 342,
343, 204 Pa. 484."6
“The word ‘annul’ as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of
divorce decree upon wife’s remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate;
obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50—
38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34–35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N.J Eq.
132."7
“ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no
effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14
S.E. 2d. 771, 774."8
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending line—her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid.
And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the
testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly
disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition, Such preterition in the words of
Manresa “anulara siempre la institucion de heredero,  dando caracter absoluto a este
ordenamiento”, referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil
Code.9 The one-sentence
will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir—nothing more. No specif ic
legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the
nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
“En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir,
¿ en todo o en parte? No se añade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el
que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto perjudique a la
legitima del deseheredado. Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o
total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva, rige con preferencia
al 817."10
The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman:—
“La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por
pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la
sucesion intestada, total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la
pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en
favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la
generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la
pretericion, el de que ‘anulara la institucion de heredero/ x x x"11
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping
the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance
results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of
universal heir—without any other testamentary disposition in the will—amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms,
Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive
meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez
Roman cites the “Memoria annual del Tribunal Supremo, correspondiente a 1908",
which in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:
“x x x El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la
institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona
instituida en el sentido antes expuesto, aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso pudiera
ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la
suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo, por lo tanto,
procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde
falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos f orzosos en todo caso, como
habria que llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos
sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto
que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia,
con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta
voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que
sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del
derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada
con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun
cuando asi f uese, sera esto razon para modif icar la ley, pero no autoriza a una
interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que informan la
testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho
constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion,
desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere
establecer."12
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment
notwithstanding, ‘the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious”. Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly
given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a
universal heir in a will—void because of preterition—would give the heir so instituted
a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition
to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart
and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the
two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the
institution of the heir “totalmente por la pretericion”; but added (in reference to
legacies and bequests), “pero subsistiendo, x x x todas aquellas otras disposiciones
que no se refieren a la nstitucion de heredero x x x". 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment
throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including “la porcion libre
(que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion." 14
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution
of petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And,
intestate succession ensues,
4. Petitioner’s mainstay is that the present is “a case of ineffective disinheritance
rather than one of preterition” 15 From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that
Article 854 “does not apply to the case at bar”. This argument fails to appreciate the
distinction between preterition and disinheritance.
Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited."16 Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law."17 In
Manresa’s own words: “La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye
la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion."18 Sanchez
Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance “es
siempre voluntaria”; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to
be “involuntaria".19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported
by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix’s
parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than
be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer
from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally
different from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code,
we repeat, “shall annul the institution of heir”. This annulment is in toto, unless in the
will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or
legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also “annul the institution of heirs”, put only “insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited”, which last phrase was omitted in the case of
preterition.21 Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of
the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa’s
expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case
of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs
thus: “Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados solo les corresponde un
tercio o dos tercios,22 el caso."23
5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled
to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir “is not invalidated,” although
the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24 ,
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in
the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:
“But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in f avor of the
children by the second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and,
accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if
adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil
Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be
________________
21
 III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, 172.
22
 Now, one-half, Articles 888 and 889, Civil Code.
23
 Manresa, id., p. 430,
24
 Petitioner’s brief, p. 13,
459
VOL. 17, JUNE 23, 1966 459
Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al.
made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest
accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial
nullity of the institution, would be absolutely meaningless and will never have any
application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning
the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because
they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be
destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to
distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a
special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only provision material to
the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein
dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are
separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in
said article but because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a
bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific
property bequeathed by a particular or special title. x x x But again an institution of
heirs cannot be taken as a legacy."25
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question “a complete nullity”.
Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies “the institution of heir”.
Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of
petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will
is null.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review
is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
Chief Justice Concepcion and Justices J.B.L.
Reyes, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, J.P. Bengzon and Zaldivar, concur.
Order affirmed
G.R. No. 160530. November 20, 2007.*
CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER, petitioner, vs. DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER
(Deceased), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES and THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI (Branch 59), respondents.
Probate; Letters Testamentary; Forum Shopping; Pleadings and
Practice; Where the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is but a mere
continuation of the original petition for the probate of the decedent’s will, it is not an
initiatory pleading—hence, failure to include a certification against forum shopping is
not a ground for outright dismissal of the said petition. —Revised Circular No. 28-91
and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of the Court require a certification against
forum-shopping for all initiatory pleadings filed in court. However, in this case, the
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an initiatory pleading, but a
mere continuation of the original petition for the probate of Dr. Nittscher’s will.
Hence, respondent’s failure to include a certification against forum shopping in his
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not a ground for outright dismissal
of the said petition.
Same; The authority of the probate court is limited to ascertaining whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law—a widow’s claim of title to the properties forming part
of her husband’s estate should be settled in an ordinary action before the regular
courts.—As a final word, petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husband’s
will is conclusive only as to its due execution. The authority of the probate court is
limited to ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the
will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Thus, petitioner’s claim of
title to the properties forming part of her husband’s estate should be settled in an
ordinary action before the regular courts.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner.
     R.P. Nogales Law Offices for private respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision 1 dated July 31, 2003 and Resolution 2 dated
October 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55330, which affirmed
the Order3 dated September 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59,
Makati City, in SP Proc. No. M-2330 for the probate of a will.
The facts are as follows.
On January 31, 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of
Makati City a petition for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of
letters testamentary to herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales.
On September 19, 1991, after hearing and with due notice to the compulsory
heirs, the probate court issued an order allowing the said holographic will, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Holographic Will of the petitioner-testator
Dr. Werner J. Nittscher executed pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph
of Article 838 of the Civil Code of the Philippines on January 25, 1990 in Manila,
Philippines, and proved in accordance with the provision of Rule 76 of the Revised
Rules of Court is hereby allowed.
SO ORDERED.”4
On September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for
letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr.
Nittscher’s surviving spouse, herein petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the
dismissal of the said petition. However, the court in its September 29, 1995 Order
denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss, and granted respondent’s petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary, to wit:
In view of all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. The petition for the
issuance of Letters Testamentary, being in order, is GRANTED.
Section 4, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides “when a will has been
proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person
named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust and gives a bond as
required by these rules.” In the case at bar, petitioner Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales of the
R.P. Nogales Law Offices has been named executor under the Holographic Will of Dr.
Werner J. Nittscher. As prayed for, let Letters Testamentary be issued to Atty. Rogelio
P. Nogales, the executor named in the Will, without a bond.
SO ORDERED.”5
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit. On
May 9, 1996, Atty. Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as
executor.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent’s petition for
the issuance of letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she was denied due process.
The appellate court dismissed the appeal, thus:
“WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the
assailed Order is AFFIRMED in toto.
The court a quo is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below.
SO ORDERED.”6
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision was denied for
lack of merit. Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:
I.
BOTH THE CA AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE
PETITION FOR LETTERS … TESTAMENTARY FILED BY ATTY. NOGALES WHEN,
OBVIOUSLY, IT WAS FILED IN VIOLATION OF REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 28-91 AND
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II.
THE CA ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LOWER COURT [HAS] NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PRESENT SUIT.
III.
THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SUMMONS WERE PROPERLY ISSUED TO
THE PARTIES AND ALL PERSONS INTERESTED IN THE PROBATE OF THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF DR. NITTSCHER.
IV. SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally .
—…
THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE LOWER COURT.7 his compulsory heirs.”
Petitioner contends that respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and
lacked a certification against forum-shopping. She adds that the RTC has no Dr. Nittscher’s children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case because Dr. Nittscher was allegedly registered mail, of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to
not a resident of the Philippines; neither did he oppose respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also
leave real properties in the country. Petitioner claims that the properties listed for filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a motion for
disposition in her husband’s will actually belong to her. She insists she was denied reconsideration of the issuance of the letters testamentary and of the denial of her
due process of law because she did not receive by personal service the notices of the motion to dismiss. We are convinced petitioner was accorded every opportunity to
proceedings. defend her cause. Therefore, petitioner’s allegation that she was denied due process
Respondent Atty. Nogales, however, counters that Dr. Nittscher did reside and in the probate proceedings is without basis.
own real properties in Las Piñas, Metro Manila. He stresses that petitioner was duly As a final word, petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husband’s will
notified of the probate proceedings. Respondent points out that petitioner even is conclusive only as to its due execution. 11 The authority of the probate court is
appeared in court to oppose the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and limited to ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the
that she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. Respondent maintains that will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. 12 Thus, petitioner’s claim of
the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary need not contain a certification title to the properties forming part of her husband’s estate should be settled in an
against forum-shopping as it is merely a continuation of the original proceeding for ordinary action before the regular courts.
the probate of the will. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision
We resolve to deny the petition. dated July 31, 2003 and Resolution dated October 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
As to the first issue, Revised Circular No. 28-91 8 and Administrative Circular No. CA-G.R. CV No. 55330, which affirmed the Order dated September 29, 1995 of the
04-949 of the Court require a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City, in SP Proc. No. M-2330 are AFFIRMED.
pleadings filed in court. However, in this case, the petition for the issuance of letters No pronouncement as to costs.
testamentary is not an initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of the original SO ORDERED.
petition for the probate of Dr. Nittscher’s will. Hence, respondent’s failure to include a
certification against forum-shopping in his petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary is not a ground for outright dismissal of the said petition.
Anent the second issue, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.— If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of any province in which he had estate. … (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr.
Nittscher was a resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Such
factual finding, which we find supported by evidence on record, should no longer be
disturbed. Time and again we have said that reviews on certiorari are limited to
errors of law. Unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally
devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous, this Court will not analyze or weigh
evidence all over again.10
Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of
Makati City, which then covered Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the petition for the probate
of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
Regarding the third and fourth issues, we note that Dr. Nittscher asked for the
allowance of his own will. In this connection, Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
states:
 G.R. No. 156407. January 15, 2014.*
THELMA M. ARANAS, petitioner, vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,
CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M.
ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, respondents.
Civil Law; Succession; The approval of the inventory and the concomitant
determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory
were provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings.—The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s
motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying
her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the
properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their ownership.
Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the
ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and
subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The final judgment rule embodied in
the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, which also governs appeals
in special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and
resolutions) of a court of law “that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable” may be the subject of
an appeal in due course.—An appeal would not be the correct recourse for
Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied
in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, which also governs
appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and
resolutions) of a court of law “that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable” may be the subject of
an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or
resolution (interlocu-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
195tory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits
is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable.
Same; Same; Same; Multiple Appeals; Multiple appeals are permitted in special
proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that material issues may be
finally determined at various stages of the special proceedings .—Multiple appeals are
permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that
material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special
proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court  enumerates the specific
instances in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz.:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. —An interested
person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a
Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order
or judgment: (a) Allows or disallows a will; (b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of
a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such person is
entitled; (c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a
deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim
against it; (d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the
lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be
allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and (f) Is the final order or
judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person
appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for
reconsideration.
Civil Law; Succession; Settlement of Estates Deceased Persons; Under Section
6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at
the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to
serve when the person dies intestate.—Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to
the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies
intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC
becomes duty-
196bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the
properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty
and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of
letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the
inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising
the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and
in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to
facilitate the administration of the estate .”—The objective of the Rules of Court  in
requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is “to aid the court
in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the
administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate
and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate.” Hence, the RTC that
presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the
question of what properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta
v. Peralta, 71 Phil. 66 (1940), the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant
that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from
the inventory in the absence of “positive abuse of discretion,” for in the
administration of the estates of deceased persons, “the judges enjoy ample
discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to
replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive
abuse of discretion.” As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of
discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its
judicial duty.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; There is no dispute that
the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited .—There is
no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and
limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the
decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent.
All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not
they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
197administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised.
Same; Evidence; Notarized Documents; A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed
the presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per
se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the
contents purported to be.—The fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by
Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently
justify the exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed
of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its
notarization did not per se  guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the
deed, and what the contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity could be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. As the Court has observed
in Suntay v. Court of Appeals: x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in
question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the
function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the
first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto.  The
intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in
determining the true nature of a contract.  that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
Civil Law; Land Titles; The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to
lands; it is merely a system of registration of titles to lands .—The fact that the
properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty could
not be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the
circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment. This
is because: The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely
a system of registration of titles to lands. However, justice and equity demand that
the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or
negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud
or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to
quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title,
except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or that may
arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever
be sullied by the ineptitude and ineffi-
198ciency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have
regularly performed their duties.
Same; Succession; Collation; Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every
compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, to “bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition .”—Article 1061 of the Civil Code  required every compulsory
heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to “bring into the mass of the
estate any property or right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and
in the account of the partition.” Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided
that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir “may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final
order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and
on the heir.” Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC
as an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the
decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed
by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.
Same; Same; The determination of which properties should be excluded from
or included in the inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and
discretion of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as an intestate court .—The determination
of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate
properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate
court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and
proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the
possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to
Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually
part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion,
its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial
duty. Grave abuse of discretion  means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power
was exercised in an
199arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when
such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Zosa & Quijano Law Offices for respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties
for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested
parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such
as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the
inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
Antecedents
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his
second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V.
Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and
Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two chil-
200dren by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner
Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned
corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson
Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in
exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian,
Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a
petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate
(Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB).[1] The RTC granted the petition considering
that there was no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita were
issued on September 7, 1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on
December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in
the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no real properties but
only personal properties” worth P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of
P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at
P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30
shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.[2]
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the
inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to
be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s motion through the order of
January 8, 1993.
_______________
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8,
1993,[3] supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering
the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock;[4] the deed of assignment executed by
Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the market value of
P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par
value of P4,440,700.00;[5] and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for
300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.[6]
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined
under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which
to file a formal opposition to or comment on the inventory and the supporting
documents Teresita had submitted.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties
to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve
the motion for approval of the inventory.[7]
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked
leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on
the issue of what properties should be included in or excluded from the inventory, the
RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.[8]
Ruling of the RTC
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on
March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita
had excluded properties that should be included, and accordingly ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations,
the Court hereby denies the administratrix’s motion for approval of inventory.
The Court hereby orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of
properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio
S. Mercado by including therein the properties mentioned in the last five
immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and then submit the revised
inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of this order.
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her
administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come
to her possession. She must render such accounting within sixty (60) days
from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.[9]
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the
reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real
properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to
Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had
already come into the possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty.
[10] Thelma opposed the motion.
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration,[11] stating that
there was no cogent reason for the re-
_______________
consideration, and that the movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the
issue of what properties should be included or excluded from the inventory already
estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
Decision of the CA
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
approve the inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to include real properties
that had been transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four children and
her stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on March
14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by petition for certiorari, stating:
I
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
HOLDING THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION
(MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE
ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
II
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
HOLDING THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF AND
ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR
REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE
OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.204
III
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING
ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES
SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO MERCADO.[12]
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, disposing as
follows:[13]
 
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition
is GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders dated March 14, 2001 and May
18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as the inclusion of parcels
of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301
square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November
9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of
Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised
inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned and affirmed in
all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
 The CA opined that Teresita, et al.  had properly filed the petition
for certiorari  because the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of properties
was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil Code, to the effect that
the ownership of the thing sold “shall be transferred to the vendee”
_______________
[12] Id., at p. 25.
[13] Id., at pp. 21-34; penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole
(retired), and concurred by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.
(retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino.
205upon its “actual and constructive delivery,” and to Article 1498 of the Civil Code,
to the effect that the sale made through a public instrument was equivalent to the
delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had transferred
the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute sale
executed on November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio had thereby ceased
to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had assigned the parcels of land
to Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989 “for the purpose of saving, as in
avoiding taxes with the difference that in the Deed of Assignment dated January 10,
1991, additional seven (7) parcels of land were included”; that as to the January 10,
1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been “even at the losing end considering
that such parcels of land, subject matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment dated
February 12, 1989, were again given monetary consideration through shares of
stock”; that even if the assignment had been based on the deed of assignment dated
January 10, 1991, the parcels of land could not be included in the inventory
“considering that there is nothing wrong or objectionable about the estate planning
scheme”; that the RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power to take cognizance
of and determine the issue of title to property registered in the name of third persons
or corporation; that a property covered by the Torrens system should be afforded the
presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the presumption,
had transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on
the matter; and that the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in holding that
Teresita, et al. were estopped from questioning its jurisdiction because of their
agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties should be included in
the inventory.
The CA further opined as follows:
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that
petitioners are estopped from ques-
206tioning its jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to submit
themselves to its jurisdiction of determining what properties are to be
included in or excluded from the inventory to be submitted by the
administratrix, because actually, a reading of petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed before public respondent court
clearly shows that petitioners are not questioning its jurisdiction but the
manner in which it was exercised for which they are not estopped, since that
is their right, considering that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated
March 14, 2001 denying the administratrix’s motion for approval of the
inventory of properties which were already titled and in possession of a third
person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under
the law possessed a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders,
and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the
presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty
Corporation should stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no
authority to determine the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of
corporate fiction and even if public respondent court was not merely acting in
a limited capacity as a probate court, private respondent nonetheless failed to
adjudge competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the
veil of corporate fiction because to disregard the separate
jurisdictional personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and
convincingly established since it cannot be presumed.[14]
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of
Teresita, et al.[15]
_______________
Issue
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain
properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either
transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the
decedent during his lifetime?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
I
Was certiorari the proper recourse
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the resort to
the special civil action for certiorari  to assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita and
her co-respondents was not proper.
Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained. 
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari  as a remedy depended on
whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature.
In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,[16] the Court distinguished
between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well
known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to
enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not
completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon.
An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the
merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain
whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the
order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect
to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for
the writ of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and
should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal
from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of
 the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will
necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length
of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for
one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental
questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or
issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an
appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for
appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory
order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Then is certiorari  under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval
of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for
reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in
the inventory was not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the
approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership as
basis for inclu-
209sion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at
anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals ,[17] the Court, in affirming the
decision of the CA to the effect that the order of the intestate court excluding certain
real properties from the inventory was interlocutory and could be changed or
modified at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings, held that
the order of exclusion was not a final but an interlocutory order “in the sense that it
did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots.” The Court
observed there that:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the
probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such
determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in
a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by
the parties (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages
448-9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262,
266).[18] (Bold emphasis supplied)
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals ,[19] where the Court
declared that a “probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only
pass upon questions of title provisionally,” and reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of
Appeals, that the “patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the
principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion
from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.” In-
_______________
deed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,[20] the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as
to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
(Bold emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et
al. to take against the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,[21] which also governs appeals in
special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions)
of a court of law “that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable” may be the subject of an
appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution
(interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits
is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of
the possibility that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the
special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court  enumerates the
specific instances in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special
proceedings, viz.:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. —An
interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or
judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, where such order or judgment: 
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the
distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate
of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset
to a claim against it; 
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or
guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
determination in
_______________
In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule 65.
212the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal
shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and 
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the
substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or
denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under
any of the instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.
II
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the inclusion
of the properties in the estate of the decedent?
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion for including properties in the inventory notwithstanding their having been
transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime, and for disregarding the
registration of the properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying
the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its
conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders
of the RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration
may be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is
competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the
letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to
direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate,
and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility
213to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of
administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months.
—Within three (3) months after his appointment every executor or
administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of
all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into
his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the
court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or
their assistance.
The usage of the word all  in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the
real and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory.[22] However, the
word all  is qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge ,
which signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to
the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no
exception, for the phrase true inventory  implies that no properties appearing to
belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being
in the possession of another person or entity.  expediency and convenience.
The objective of the Rules of Court  in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the
estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining
the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable
distribution (partition) of the estate and other-
_______________
[22] The word all  means “every one, or the whole number of particular; the
whole number” (3 Words and Phrases 212, citing State v. Maine Cent. R. Co.,  66 Me.
488, 510). Standing alone, the word all  means exactly what it imports; that is,
nothing less than all (Id., at p. 213, citing In re Staheli’s Will, 57 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188).
214wise to facilitate the administration of the estate.”[23] Hence, the RTC that
presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the
question of what properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta
v. Peralta,[24] the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the
RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from the
inventory in the absence of “positive abuse of discretion,” for in the administration of
the estates of deceased persons, “the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and
the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken
by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of
discretion.”[25] As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its
orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is
special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be
a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that
of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still
revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:[26]
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with
the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons,
but does not extend to the determination of questions of
_______________
ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule
is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in
several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings,
whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do
as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to
an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or
exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to final determination of ownership in a separate
action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or
the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to
the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of
third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent
to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as
the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in
the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.[27] (Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied)
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its
directive for the inclusion of the properties in question in its assailed order of March
14, 2001, viz.:
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio
Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina Mercado who, upon her death, left
several properties as listed in the inventory of properties submitted in Court in
Special Proceedings No. 306-R which are supposed to be divided among her
heirs. The administratrix admitted, while being examined in Court by the
counsel for the petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory submitted
by her in this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of
Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties constituting Emigdio Mercado’s
share in the estate of Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory of
properties required to be submitted to the Court in this particular case.
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado
also admitted in Court that she did not include in the inventory shares of stock
of Mervir Realty Corporation which are in her name and which were paid by
her from money derived from the taxicab business which she and her
husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these shares of stock
partake of being conjugal in character, one-half thereof or of the value
thereof should be included in the inventory of the estate of her husband.
 
In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado
admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank account in her name at Union
Bank which she opened when her husband was still alive. Again, the money in
said bank account partakes of being conjugal in character, and so, one-half
thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties constituting as
estate of her husband.
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case
that Lot No. 3353 of Pls-657-D located in Badian, Cebu containing an area of
53,301 square meters as described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu is still
registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now. When it was the
subject of Civil Case No. CEB-12690 which was decided on October 19, 1995,
it was the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be the owner
thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the said case in order
to be the owner thereof. This fact was admitted by Richard Mercado himself
when he testified in Court.
x x x So the said property located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the
inventory in this case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land
by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January 10,
1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said day
(Exhibit N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a transfer
in contemplation of death. It was made two days before he died on January 12,
1991. A transfer made in contemplation of death is one prompted by the
thought that the transferor has not long to live and made in place of a
testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section 78 of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that the gross estate of the
decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of
all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at
any time made a transfer in contemplation of death. So, the inventory to be
approved in this case should still include the said properties of Emigdio Mercado
which were transferred by him in contemplation of death. Besides, the said
properties actually appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S.
Mercado at least ten (10) months after his death, as shown by the certification
issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s Office on October 31, 1991 (Exhibit O).[28]
_______________
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court  and the
jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the
administrator. The aforequoted explanations indicated that the directive to include
the properties in question in the inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and thus
was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado
should be included in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact
about the shares being inherited by Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code  in August 3, 1988, their property regime was the conjugal
partnership of gains.[29] For purposes of the settlement of Emigdio’s estate, it was
unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains.
The party asserting that specific property acquired during that property regime did
not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and that
party must prove the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and
convincing evidence.[30] In the absence of or pending the presentation of such
proof, the conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally
liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected properties were,[31] and
which of the properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. The portions that
pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of
Mervir Realty, the RTC made findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB-
12692, a
dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the
estate of Emigdio, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was
still in Emigdio’s name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March 14, 2001, or ten
years after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the name of Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB-12692.
Such lack of interest in Civil Case No. CEB-12692 was susceptible of various
interpretations, including one to the effect that the heirs of Emigdio could have
already threshed out their differences with the assistance of the trial court. This
interpretation was probable considering that Mervir Realty, whose business was
managed by respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita herself as its President. In
other words, Mervir Realty appeared to be a family corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of
Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from
the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per
se  guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the
contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary.[32] As the Court has observed in Suntay v.
Court of Appeals:[33]
 x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor
the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the
notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first
place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The
intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration
in determining the true nature of a contract. (Bold emphasis supplied)
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of Mervir
Realty with the real properties owned by Emigdio would still have to be inquired into.
That Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two days prior to his death was a
circumstance that should put any interested party on his guard regarding the
exchange, considering that there was a finding about Emigdio having been sick of
cancer of the pancreas at the time.[34] In this regard, whether the CA correctly
characterized the exchange as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be
validated by the facts to be established in court.
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of
Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the
inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of the
deed of assignment. This is because:
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely
a system of registration of titles to lands. However, justice and equity demand
that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the
mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his
complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose
of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any
question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the
certificate at the time of registration or that may arise subsequent thereto.
Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by
the ineptitude and inefficiency of land 221registration officials, who are
ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties.[35]
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of assignment
of January 10, 1991, such lots should still be included in the inventory to enable the
parties, by themselves, and with the assistance of the RTC itself, to test and resolve
the issue on the validity of the assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an
intestate court might have constricted the determination of the rights to the
properties arising from that deed,[36] but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate
court from ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that
deed. This is because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with special and
limited jurisdiction, was still “deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise
such jurisdiction to make it effective.”[37]
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for
the important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to
the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code  required every compulsory heir and the
surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to “bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.” Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that
any
_______________
[35] Rabaja Ranch Development Corporation v. AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits System, G.R. No. 177181, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 201, 217, citing Republic
v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424, 445.
[36] Reyes-Mesugas v. Reyes, G.R. No. 174835, March 22, 2010, 616 SCRA 345,
350, citing Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , Nos. L-62431-
33, August 3, 1984, 131 SCRA 606.
[37] Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra  at p. 621.
222advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir “may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final
order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and
on the heir.” Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC
as an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the
decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed
by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.[38]
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the
inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC
as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with
circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all
properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator
to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end
to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse
of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its
judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion  means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial
power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.[39]
_______________
223In light of the foregoing, the CA’s conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15,
2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed
with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the
late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner , and to resolve the case;
and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176943. October 17, 2008.*
DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD, DIVINA ALUAD, PROSPERO ALUAD, and CONNIE
ALUAD, petitioners, vs. ZENAIDO ALUAD, respondent.
Civil Law; Ownership; For the right to dispose of a thing without other
limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership. —The statement
in the Deed of Donation reading “anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or
anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of
any or even all the parcels of land herein donated” means that Matilde retained
ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right to
dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an
attribute of ownership. The phrase in the Deed of Donation “or anyone of them who
should survive” is of course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that
it would take effect upon the death of the donor,
hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners
themselves concede that such phrase does not refer to the donee, thus: x x x [I]t is
well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the disputed paragraph should
only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she was the only surviving spouse at
the time the donation was executed on 14 November 1981, as her husband – Crispin
Aluad [–] had long been dead as early as 1975.
Same; Wills and Succession; Donation; The donation being then mortis causa,
the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it was
witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil
Code.—As the Court of Appeals observed, “x x x [t]hat the donation is mortis causa is
fortified by Matilde’s acts of possession as she continued to pay the taxes for the said
properties which remained under her name; appropriated the produce; and applied
for free patents for which OCTs were issued under her name.” The donation being
then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were
not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article
805 of the Civil Code. Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause
the execution of which clause is a requirement separate from the subscription of the
will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the will.
Same; Same; An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. —
x x x Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental
witnesses sign each page of the will from the requisite that the will be “attested and
subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]. The respective intents behind these two
classes of signature[s] are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand
corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the
page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the
attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements
contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate
and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results
in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand
margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures
cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures
that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.699
VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 699
Aluad vs. Aluad
Same; Same; Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. —The witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the
notary public, which is not in accordance with the requirement of Article 806 of the
Civil Code that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. More. The requirement that all the pages of the will must
be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page was not
also followed.
Same; Same; Donations; The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed,
one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and
transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother. —The Deed of Donation which is, as
already discussed, one of mortis causa,  not having followed the formalities of a will, it
is void and transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother. But even
assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no
right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed
of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the
qualification that her (Matilde’s) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676,
the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August
26, 1991.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; As a general rule, points of law, theories, and issues
not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.—Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the
lower courts, however, they having laid their claim on the basis of inheritance from
their mother. As a general rule, points of law, theories, and issues not brought to the
attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. For a contrary
rule would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present
further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been
aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Jose S. Diloy, Jr.  for petitioners.
  Orlanda B. Lumawag  for respondent.
700
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aluad vs. Aluad
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were
raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin).
Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680,
and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated
the lots to herself.1
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled “Deed of Donation
of Real Property Inter Vivos”2 (Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners’ mother
Maria3 covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin. The
Deed of Donation provided:
“That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR [Matilde]
for the DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been brought up by the
former the DONOR, by these presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION,
unto the DONEE the property above-described, to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR, but in the event that the DONEE should die before the
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further
force and effect; Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR
or anyone of them who should survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose
of any or even all of the parcels of land herein donated.”4 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676
were issued in Matilde’s name.
On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property.5
Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and
testament,6 devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her “remaining
properties” including Lot No. 674 to respondent.
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same
year.7
On August 21, 1995, Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint, 8 for declaration and recovery of
ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against
respondent, alleging:
“That in 1978, plaintiff[s] possessed the two (2) parcels of land above-described
until January 1991 when defendant entered and possessed the two (2) parcels of
land claiming as the adopted son of Crispin Aluad who refused to give back
possession until Matilde Aluad died in [1994] and then retained the possession
thereof up to and until the present time, thus, depriving the plaintiffs of the
enjoyment of said parcels of land x x x;
That after the death of Matilde R. Aluad, the plaintiffs succeeded by inheritance
by right of representation from their deceased mother, Maria Aluad who is the sole
and only daughter of Matilde Aluad[.]”9
To the complaint respondent alleged in his Answer. 10
“That Lot 674 is owned by the defendant as this lot was adjudicated to him in the
Last Will and Testament of Matilde Aluad x  x x while Lot 676 was purchased by him
from Matilde Aluad. These two lots are in his possession as true owners
thereof.”11 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners later filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Already Filed to
Conform to Evidence12 to which it annexed an
Amended Complaint13 which cited the donation of the six lots via  Deed of Donation in
favor of their mother Maria. Branch 15 of the RTC granted the motion and admitted
the Amended Complaint.14
Respondent filed an Amended Answer15 contending, inter alia,  that the Deed of
Donation is forged and falsified and petitioners’ change of theory showed that “said
document was not existing at the time they filed their complaint and was concocted
by them after realizing that their false claim that their mother was the only daughter
of Matild[e] Aluad cannot in anyway be established by them”; 16 and that if ever said
document does exist, the same was already revoked by Matilde “when [she]
exercised all acts of dominion over said properties until she sold Lot 676 to defendant
and until her death with respect to the other lots without any opposition from Maria
Aluad.”17
The trial court, by Decision18 of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not
have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she having
previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. Thus it disposed:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the subject Lots Nos. 674
and 676, Pilar Cadastre;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver the possession of the subject lots to the
plaintiffs;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs:
a. Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees;
b. Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), representing the income from
subject Lot 676, a year from 1991 up to the time said lot is
delivered to the plaintiffs, together with the interest thereof at the legal rate
until fully paid;
c. Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), representing the income from the
subject Lot No. 674, a year from 1991 up to the time said lot is delivered to
the plaintiffs, plus legal interest thereof at the legal rate until fully paid; and
d. The costs of the suit.
Defendant’s counterclaim is ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”19
On petitioners’ motion, the trial court directed the issuance of a writ of execution
pending appeal.20 Possession of the subject lots appears to have in fact been taken by
petitioners.
By Decision21 of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa,
not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a
will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses
and had no attestation clause which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil
Code, reading:
“Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the
end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will shall, also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page
thereof, except the last on the left margin and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written, and the fact that that testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the
will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator, and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to them.”
While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot
No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matilde’s last will and
testament had not yet been probated. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed:
“WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition worthy of merit, the same is
hereby GRANTED and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch
15, dated 20 September 1996, in Civil Case No. V-6686 for declaration of ownership,
recovery of ownership and possession, and damages is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
A new one is entered in its stead declaring defendant-appellant as the lawful
owner of Lot [No.] 676 of the Pilar Cadastre. Accordingly, plaintiffs-appellees are
directed to return the possession of the said lot to the defendant-appellant.
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay P40,000.00 to defendant-
appellant as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.”22 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Their Motion for Reconsideration 23 having been denied,24 petitioners filed the
present Petition for Review,25 contending that the Court of Appeals erred:
I should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and
X X X WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW (RTC, Branch 15,
Roxas City) HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONERS’ MOTHER IS IN FACT A DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.
II
X X X WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT IS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT NO.
676 AS LOT BUYER ON THE BASIS OF A DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE DONOR
WHO HAD NO MORE RIGHT TO SELL THE SAME.
III
X X X WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE PETITIONERS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT
NO. 674 AFTER HAVING RULED WHEN IT HELD THAT RESPONDENT CANNOT BE
DECLARED OWNER THEREOF.
IV
X X X WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION PENDING
APPEAL IS IN VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH (a) SECTION 2, RULE 39, OF THE RULES
OF COURT (AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RETURN POSSESSION OF LOT 676 TO
RESPONDENT) AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND
COST[S] OF SUIT.26
As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners’ mother one
of mortis causa,  it having the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee  before the death of the
transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by
the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.27 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation “to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did
not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners’ mother during her
(Matilde’s) lifetime.28
The statement in the Deed of Donation reading “anytime during the lifetime
of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber
or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein
donated”29 means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her
the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations
than those established by law is an attribute of ownership. 30 The phrase in the Deed
of Donation “or anyone of them who should survive” is of course out of sync. For the
Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of the donor,
hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners
themselves concede that such phrase does not refer to the donee, thus:
“x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the disputed
paragraph should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she was the only
surviving spouse at the time the donation was executed on 14 November 1981, as
her husband – Crispin Aluad [–] had long been dead as early as 1975.” 31
The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned:
“x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or period when the
donor provides in the aforequoted provisions, “but in the event that the DONEE
[of] no further force and effect”. When the donor provides that should the “DONEE”
xxx die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of]
no further force and effect” the logical construction thereof is that after the execution
of the subject donation, the same became effective immediately and shall be
”deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect” upon the arrival of a
resolutory term or period, i.e., the death of the donee which shall occur before that
of the donor. Understandably, the arrival of this resolutory term or period cannot
rescind and render of no further force and effect a donation which has never become
effective, because, certainly what donation is there to be rescinded and rendered of
no further force and effect upon the arrival of said resolutory term or period if there
was no donation which was already effective at the time when the donee
died?”32 (Italics supplied)
A similar ratio in a case had been brushed aside by this Court, however, thus:
“x x x [P]etitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners
[donee] die ahead of [donor] Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the
nature of the donation as inter vivos.
Petitioners’ arguments are bereft of merit.33
x x x x
x x x The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be
rescinded in case [donees] the petitioners predecease [the donor] Conchita
Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda, one of the decisive  characteristics of a
donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor
should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her
donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during her
lifetime and that the ownership of
the properties donated to the donee or independently of, and not by reason of her
death, she would not have expressed such proviso in the subject
deeds.”34 (Underscoring supplied)
As the Court of Appeals observed, “x x x [t]hat the donation is mortis causa is
fortified by Matilde’s acts of possession as she continued to pay the taxes for the said
properties which remained under her name; appropriated the produce; and applied
for free patents for which OCTs were issued under her name.” 35
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been
observed36 but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more
witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.37
Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause 38 the execution of
which clause is a requirement separate from the subscription of the will and the
affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the will. So the Court present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it
has emphasized: been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court. 45
“x x x Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
witnesses sign each page of the will from the requisite that the will be “attested and SO ORDERED.
subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]. The respective intents behind these two
classes of signature[s] are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand
corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the
page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the
attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements
contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate
and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned
attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental
witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned
attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings
in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards
a wholly different avowal.
x x x It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805
to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that the
testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental
facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.”39 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the notary
public,40 which is not in accordance with the requirement of Article 806 of the Civil
Code that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses.
More. The requirement that all the pages of the will must be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page was not also followed. 41
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa,  not
having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to
petitioners’ mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed,
since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to
Maria.42 Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and
testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matilde’s) will must be
probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold
by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.
Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No. 674 in
favor of their mother is indeed mortis causa, hence, Matilde could devise it to
respondent, the lot should nevertheless have been awarded to them because they
had acquired it by acquisitive prescription, they having been in continuous,
uninterrupted, adverse, open, and public possession of it in good faith and in the
concept of an owner since 1978.43
Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the lower
courts, however, they having laid their claim on the basis of inheritance from their
mother. As a general rule, points of law, theories, and issues not brought to the
attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 44 For a
contrary rule would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to
G.R. No. 176831. January 15, 2010.*
UY KIAO ENG, petitioner, vs. NIXON LEE, respondent.
Remedial Law; Mandamus; Definition of Mandamus; Definition recognizes the
public character of the remedy and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted
to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no
interest.—Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court,
tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a
particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the
party to whom
the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the
public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted
to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no
interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right
and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public
right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision
instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station.
Same; Same; Grounds for the issuance of the writ of mandamus; It is essential
to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the relator should have a clear legal right
to the thing demanded and it must be imperative duty of respondent to perform the
act required.—The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to
do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to
the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to
enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt
exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the
right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the
absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person
against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or
[b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded
petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is
entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ
of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it
must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.
Same; Same; Mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights
and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public
or quasi-public duty is imposed. —Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the
principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations.
Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not
lie against an individual unless some obligation in the na-
 
 
213
ture of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to
enforce a private right against an individual. The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the
execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly,
issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a
prerogative writ.  To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the
redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.
Same; Same; Mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of
procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. —An important principle
followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy
of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases
where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford
relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and
its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the
writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the amended decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Suarez and Narvasa Law Firm for petitioner.
   Urbano, Palamos & Perdigon for respondent.
 
NACHURA, J.:
 
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the August 23, 2006 Amended Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 91725 and the February 23, 2007 Resolution,2 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a
holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother,
respondent Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 01100939, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
to compel petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance
thereof could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother
to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their
respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason. 3
In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the
complaint and posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-compliance with a condition precedent
for the filing thereof. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original
holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that
photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of
fact, respondent was able to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil Case
No. 224-V-00 before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Petitioner further contended that
respondent should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the
controversy with her before he filed the suit.4
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s
evidence, petitioner demurred, contend-
ing that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic
will. Importantly, she asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence presented,
aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and irrelevant to the issue involved in
the petition—they did not prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus.5
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. 6 In its February 4, 2005
Order,7 however, it granted the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied on September
20, 2005.8 Hence, the petition was dismissed.
Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. On April 26, 2006,
the CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ
of mandamus would issue only in instances when no other remedy would be available
and sufficient to afford redress. Under Rule 76, in an action for the settlement of the
estate of his deceased father, respondent could ask for the presentation or
production and for the approval or probate of the holographic will. The CA further
ruled that respondent, in the proceedings before the trial court, failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove that his mother had in her custody the original copy of
the will.9
Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, in the assailed
August 23, 2006 Amended Decision, 10 granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling,
issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorney’s
fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show
by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will.
Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
The appellate court denied this motion in the further assailed February 23, 2007
Resolution.11
Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court,
contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and
that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is
inadmissible.12
The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ.
The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently
provides that—
“SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other
is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by
the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner,
and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of
the respondent.”13
 
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in
the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular
duty therein specified, which duty results from the
official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of
law.14 This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly
excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the perfor-
mance of duties in which the public has no interest. 15 The writ is a proper recourse
for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a
public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the
Constitution.16 As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. 17
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. 18 Nor will mandamus issue to
enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt
exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the
right is clear and
the case is meritorious.19 As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the
following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the
action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such
court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. 20 On the part of the
relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a
clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of
respondent to perform the act required.21
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus  cannot be
used to enforce contractual obligations.22
Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will
not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-
public duty is imposed.23 The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against
an individual.24 The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when,
otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to
the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. 25 To preserve
its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs,
but only in matters relating to the public.26
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there
should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other
than the remedy of mandamus being invoked.27 In other words, mandamus  can be
issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are
powerless to afford relief.28 Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is
equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable
principles.29 Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of
the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the
nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be
availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a
photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of
probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate
proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or
not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:
“Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will .—Any executor, devisee,
or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any
time, after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the
will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.”
 
An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the
production of the original holographic will. Thus—
“SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.—The person who has custody of a will
shall, within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the
will to the court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust .—A person named as
executor in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the
testator, or within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he
obtained such knowledge after the death of the testator, present such will to the
court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other manner,
and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust
or his refusal to accept it.
SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect .—A person who
neglects any of the duties required in the two last preceding sections without excuse
satisfactory to the court shall be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.
SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed. —A person having custody of a
will after the death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver
the same, when ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed
to prison and there kept until he delivers the will.” 30
 
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of.
Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus,
the Court grants the demurrer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is
GRANTED. The August 23, 2006 Amended Decision and the February 23, 2007
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 01100939 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 203770. November 23, 2016.*
 
MANUELA AZUCENA MAYOR, petitioner, vs. EDWIN TIU and DAMIANA CHARITO
MARTY, respondents.
Persons and Family Relations; Artificial Persons; Artificial persons include (1) a
collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; and (2) a collection
of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. This
class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law. Example is
the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person. —Artificial persons include (1) a
collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; and (2) a collection
of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. This
class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law. Example is
the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.
Same; Same; The estate of the deceased person is a juridical person separate
and distinct from the person of the decedent and any other corporation. This status
of an estate comes about by operation of law. —From this pronouncement, it can be
gleaned that the estate of the deceased person is a juridical person separate and
distinct from the person of the decedent and any other corporation. This status of an
estate comes about by operation of law. This is in consonance with the basic tenet
under corporation law that a corporation has a separate personality distinct from its
stockholders and from other corporations to which it may be connected.
Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction; Under this doctrine, the court looks at the
corporation as a mere collection of individuals or an aggregation of persons
undertaking business as a group, disregarding the separate juridical personality of
the corporation unifying the group.—The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has
no relevant application in this case. Under this doctrine, the court looks at the
corporation as a mere collection of individuals or an aggregation of persons
undertaking business as a group, disregarding the separate juridical personality of the
corporation unifying the group.
Another formulation of this doctrine is that when two business enterprises are
owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when
necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that two
corporations are distinct entities and treat them as identical or as one and the same.
Same; The purpose behind piercing a corporation’s identity is to remove the
barrier between the corporation and the persons comprising it to thwart the
fraudulent and illegal schemes of those who use the corporate personality as a shield
for undertaking certain proscribed activities. —The purpose behind piercing a
corporation’s identity is to remove the barrier between the corporation and the
persons comprising it to thwart the fraudulent and illegal schemes of those who use
the corporate personality as a shield for undertaking certain proscribed activities.
Same; Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all
or nearly all of the capital stocks of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for
disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities. —The probate court
ordered the lessees of the corporation to remit rentals to the estate’s administrator
without taking note of the fact that the decedent was not the absolute owner of
Primrose but only an owner of shares thereof. Mere ownership by a single
stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stocks of a
corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate
corporate personalities. Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a
corporation, the wrongdoing cannot be presumed, but must be clearly and
convincingly established.
Probate Courts; For the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should, or should not, be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate
court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. —
In Pastor, Jr. v. Court of Appeals , 122 SCRA 885 (1983), the Court explained that, as
a rule, the question of ownership was an extraneous matter which the probate court
could not resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should, or should not, be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional,
not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
Same; It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be part of the estate but which are equally claimed to belong to
outside parties.—It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be part of the estate but which are equally claimed to belong to
outside parties. It can only determine whether they should, or should not, be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be overseen by the administrator. If
there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator
and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination
of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
Same; Torrens System; The existence of a Torrens title may not be discounted
as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons.—The probate court should have recognized the incontestability accorded to
the Torrens title of Primrose over Marty’s arguments of possible dissipation of
properties. In fact, in the given setting, even evidence purporting to support a claim
of ownership has to yield to the incontestability of a Torrens title, until after the same
has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself. In other words, the
existence of a Torrens title may not be discounted as a mere incident in special
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons.
Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction; Piercing the veil of corporate entity
applies to determination of liability not of jurisdiction; it is basically applied only to
determine established liability.—Piercing the veil of corporate entity applies to
determination of liability not of jurisdiction; it is basically applied only to determine
established liability. It is not available to confer on the court a jurisdiction it has not
acquired, in the first place, over a party not impleaded in a case.
Same; The doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction comes to play only
during the trial of the case after the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the
corporation.—The doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction comes to play only
during the trial of the case after the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the
corporation. Hence, before this doctrine can be even applied, based on the evidence
presented, it is imperative that the court must first have jurisdiction over the
corporation.
 Same; A corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the court’s probate court to: 1) order an immediate inventory of all the properties subject of the
process of piercing the veil of its corporate fiction. — Hence, a corporation not proceedings; 2) direct the tenants of the estate, namely, Mercury Drug and
impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the court’s process of piercing the veil of its Chowking, located at Primrose Hotel, to deposit their rentals with the court; 3) direct
corporate fiction. Resultantly, any proceedings taken against the corporation and its Metrobank, P. Burgos Branch, to freeze the accounts in the name of Rosario,
properties would infringe on its right to due process. Primrose Development Corporation (Primrose) or Remedios; and 4) lock up the
Primrose Hotel in order to preserve the property until final disposition by the court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. On July 8, 2008, Remedios and Manuela filed their Comment/Opposition 10 to the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. urgent manifestation averring that Marty was not an adopted child of the Villasins
   Michael Felipe A. Mercado for petitioner. based on a certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tacloban City,
   Pacifico Borja for Mr. Tiu. attesting that no record of any adoption proceedings involving Marty existed in their
   Chavez, Miranda, Aseoche Law Offices for Mrs. Marty. records. They also argued that the probate court had no jurisdiction over the
properties mistakenly claimed by Marty as part of Rosario’s estate because these
MENDOZA, J.:
properties were actually owned by, and titled in the name of, Primrose. Anent the
 
prayer to direct the tenants to deposit the rentals to the probate court, Remedios and
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Manuela countered that the probate court had no jurisdiction over properties owned
assailing the October 5, 20111 and September 24, 20122 Resolutions of the Court of
by third persons, particularly by Primrose, the latter having a separate and distinct
Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 06256, which dismissed the petition filed by
personality from the decedent’s estate.
Remedios Tiu (Remedios) and Manuela Azucena Mayor (Manuela) for procedural
In her Reply,11 dated July 15, 2008, Marty cited an order of the Court of First
infirmities. The said CA petition
Instance of Leyte (CFI Leyte) in S.P. No. 1239,12 claiming that as early as March 3,
challenged the January 20, 20113 and June 10, 20114 Orders of the Regional Trial
1981, the veil of corporate entity of Primrose was pierced on the ground that it was a
Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City (RTC-Br. 6), in Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-30, a case
closed family corporation controlled by Rosario after Primo’s death. Thus, Marty
for Probate of Last Will and Testament and Issuance of Letters of Testamentary.
alleged that “piercing” was proper in the case of Rosario’s estate because the
 
incorporation of Primrose was founded on a fraudulent consideration, having been
The Antecedents
done in contemplation of Primo’s death.
 
Further, on July 22, 2008, in her Opposition to the Petition for the Approval of the
On May 25, 2008, Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan ( Rosario), the widow of the
Will of the Late Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan, 13 Marty impugned the authenticity
late Primo Villasin (Primo), passed away and left a holographic Last Will and
of her holographic will.
Testament,5 wherein she named her sister, Remedios Tiu (Remedios), and her niece,
Meanwhile, Edwin Tiu (Edwin), a son of Remedios, also filed his
Manuela Azucena Mayor (Manuela), as executors. Immediately thereafter, Remedios
Opposition,14 dated June 13, 2008.
and Manuela filed a petition for the probate of Rosario’s holographic will 6 with prayer
After a protracted exchange of pleadings, the parties submitted their respective
for the issuance of letters testamentary ( probate proceedings). The petition was
memoranda.
raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City ( RTC-Br. 9) and docketed
 
as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-30. They averred that Rosario left properties valued at
The January 14, 2009 Order
approximately P2.5 million.
 
On May 29, 2008, respondent Damiana Charito Marty ( Marty) claiming to be the
In its January 14, 2009 Order, 15 the RTC-Br. 9 granted the motion of Marty and
adopted daughter of Rosario, filed a petition for letters of administration before the
appointed the OIC Clerk of Court as special administrator of the Estate. The Probate
RTC, Branch 34, Tacloban City ( RTC-Br. 34), docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-
Court also ordered Mercury Drug and Chowking to deposit the rental income to the
32, but it was not given due course because of the probate proceedings. Per records,
court and Metrobank to freeze the bank accounts mentioned in the motion of Marty.
this dismissal is subject of a separate proceeding filed by Marty with the CA Cebu
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was applied in the case considering that
City, docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 04003.7
Rosario had no other properties that comprised her estate other than Primrose.
On June 12, 2008, in its Order, 8 the RTC-Br. 9 found the petition for probate of
According to the probate court, for
will filed by Remedios and Manuela as sufficient in form and substance and set the
the best interest of whoever would be adjudged as the legal heirs of the Estate, it
case for hearing.
was best to preserve the properties from dissipation.
Consequently, Marty filed her Verified Urgent Manifestation and Motion, 9 dated
On January 22, 2009, Remedios and Manuela filed their Motion for Inhibition 16 on
June 23, 2008, stating that Remedios kept the decedent Rosario a virtual hostage for
the ground of their loss of trust and confidence in RTC-Br. 9 Presiding Judge Rogelio
the past ten (10) years and her family was financially dependent on her which led to
C. Sescon (Judge Sescon) to dispense justice. Later, they also filed their Motion for
the wastage and disposal of the properties owned by her and her husband, Primo.
Reconsideration Ad Cautelam,17 dated February 3, 2009, arguing that Rosario’s estate
Marty averred that until the alleged will of the decedent could be probated and
consisted only of shares of stock in Primrose and not the corporation itself. Thus, the
admitted, Remedios and her ten (10) children had no standing to either possess or
probate court could not order the lessees of the corporation to remit the rentals to
control the properties comprising the estate of the Villasins. She prayed for the
the Estate’s administrator. With regard to the appointment of a special administrator,
Remedios and Manuela insisted that it be recalled. They claimed that if ever there
was a need to appoint one, it should be the two of them because it was the desire of
the decedent in the will subject of the probation proceedings.
In its Order,18 dated March 27, 2009, the RTC-Br. 9 denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed its January 14, 2009 Order. The
presiding judge, Judge Sescon, also granted the motion for inhibition and ordered
that the records of the case be referred to the RTC Executive Judge for re-raffling.
The case was later re-raffled to RTC-Br. 6, Judge Alphinor C. Serrano, presiding
judge.
Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Remedios and
Manuela filed a petition for certiorari with the CA in Cebu City, docketed as C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 04254, assailing the January 14, 2009 and March 27, 2009 Orders of the
RTC-Br. 9.19
Ruling of the CA
 
In its October 16, 2009 Decision, 20 the CA reversed the assailed orders of the
RTC-Br. 9, except as to the appointment of a special administrator insofar as this
relates to properties specifically belonging to the “Estate.” It held that Primrose had
a personality separate and distinct from the estate of the decedent and
that the probate court had no jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil.
According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed orders of the probate court was it
stated that its determination of the title of the questioned properties was only for the
purpose of determining whether such properties ought to be included in the
inventory. When the probate court applied the doctrine of “piercing,” in effect, it
adjudicated with finality the ownership of the properties in favor of the Estate. The
CA stated that RTC-Br. 9 had no jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of a property
claimed by another based on adverse title; and that questions like this must be
submitted to a court of general jurisdiction and not to a probate court.
The CA added that assuming that the probate court’s determination on the issue
of ownership was merely intended to be provisional, Marty’s contentions still had no
merit. The properties, which she claimed to be part of the estate of Rosario and over
which she claimed co-ownership, comprised of real properties registered under the
Torrens system. As such, Primrose was considered the owner until the titles to those
properties were nullified in an appropriate ordinary action. The CA further stated that
the RTC erroneously relied on the order issued by the CFI Leyte in 1981, in the
probate proceedings involving the estate of Primo. Whatever determination the CFI
made at the time regarding the title of the
properties was merely provisional, hence, not conclusive as to the ownership.
By reason of the favorable decision by the CA, Remedios and Manuela filed their
Motion to Partially Revoke the Writ of Execution Enforcing the January 14, 2009
Order of the Honorable Court and Manifestation in Compliance with the October 21,
2009 Order (Ad Cautelam),21 dated October 27, 2009.
In its Order,22 dated November 17, 2009, the RTC-Br. 6 partially granted the
motion as it revoked the power of the special administrator to oversee the day-to-day
operations of Primrose. It also revoked the order with respect to Mercury Drug and
Chowking, reasoning out that the said establishments dealt with Primrose, which had
a personality distinct and separate from the estate of the decedent. In the said order,
Atty. Blanche A. Salino nominated by oppositors Marty and Edwin, was appointed
special administrator to oversee the day-to-day operations of the estate. The same
order also upheld the January 14, 2009 Order, as to the conduct and inventory of all
the properties comprising the estate.
This order was not questioned or appealed by the parties.
 
Omnibus Motion
 
On September 24, 2010, or almost ten (10) months after the November 17, 2009
Order of the probate court was issued, Marty, together with her new counsel, filed
her Omnibus Motion,23 praying for the probate court to: 1) order Remedios and
Manuela to render an accounting of all the properties and assets comprising the
estate of the decedent; 2) deposit or consign all rental payments or other passive
income derived
from the properties comprising the estate; and 3) prohibit the disbursement of funds
comprising the estate of the decedent without formal motion and approval by the
probate court.
 
Ruling of the RTC-Br. 6
 
In its January 20, 2011 Order, the RTC-Br. 6 granted Marty’s Omnibus Motion.
Although it agreed with the October 16, 2009 CA Decision reversing the January 14,
2009 Order of the RTC-Br. 9, nonetheless, it acknowledged the urgency and necessity
of appointing a special administrator. According to the probate court, considering that
there was clear evidence of a significant decrease of Rosario’s shares in the
outstanding capital stock of Primrose, 24 prudence dictated that an inquiry into the
validity of the transfers should be made. A final determination of this matter would be
outside the limited jurisdiction of the probate court, but it was likewise settled that
the power to institute an action for the recovery of a property claimed to be part of
the estate was normally lodged with the executor or administrator. Thus, the probate
court disposed:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons aforestated, and so as not to render moot any
action that the special administrator, or the regular administrator upon the latter’s
qualification and appointment, may deem appropriate to take on the matter ( i.e.,
Whether or not to institute in the name of the estate the appropriate action for the
recovery of the shares of stock), this Court hereby GRANTS Oppositor Marty’s
Omnibus Motion, dated September 24, 2010, and thus hereby:
1. DIRECTS petitioners, either individually or jointly, to: (a) RENDER AN
ACCOUNTING of all the properties and assets comprising the estate of the decedent
that may have come into their possession; and (b) DEPOSIT OR CONSIGN all the
rentals payments or such other passive incomes from the properties and as-
sets registered in the name of Primrose Development Corporation, including all
income derived from the Primrose Hotel and the lease contracts with Mercury Drug
and Chowking Restaurant, both within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order;
2. DIRECTS the Special Administrator to take possession and charge of the
properties comprising the decedent’s estate, specially those pertaining to the
sharesholding of the decedent in Primrose Development Corporation, to determine
whether or not action for the recovery of the shares of stock supposedly transferred
from the decedent to petitioners Remedios Tiu, Manuela Azucena Mayor should be
instituted in the name of the estate against the said transferees and to submit a
Report on the foregoing matters to this Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
this Order; and
3. ORDERS that no funds comprising the estate of the decedent shall be
disbursed without formal Motion therefor, with the conformity of the Special
Administrator, duly approved by this Court.
SO ORDERED.25 [Underscoring supplied]
The partial motion for reconsideration of the above order filed by Remedios and
Manuela was denied in the other assailed order of the RTC-Br. 6, dated June 10,
2011.26
Dissatisfied, Remedios and Manuela availed of the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, and filed a petition before the CA.
 
Action by the CA
 
The CA, however, in its October 5, 2011 Resolution, 27 dismissed the same based
on the following infirmities: 1) there was no proper proof of service of a copy of the
petition on the
respondents which was sent by registered mail; 2) petitioners failed to indicate on the
petition the material date when the motion for reconsideration was filed; 3) the copy
of the assailed order was not certified true and correct by the officer having custody
of the original copy; and 4) the serial number of the commission of the notary public,
the province-city where he was commissioned, the office address of the notary public
and the roll of attorney’s number were not properly indicated on the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping.
Remedios and Manuela moved for reconsideration of the assailed CA resolution,
but to no avail, as the appellate court denied the motion in its September 24, 2012
Resolution.
Hence, this petition before the Court, filed only by Manuela as Remedios had also
passed away, and anchored on the following:
Grounds
 
I.
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES
WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT MISAPPLIED SECTION 13, RULE 13 OF
THE RULES OF COURT AND DECLARED THAT THERE WAS NO PROPER
PROOF OF SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL.
 
II.
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES
WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT MISAPPLIED JURISPRUDENCE AND RULE
65 AND IT HELD THAT PETITIONER MAYOR DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
MATERIAL DATE RULE.
 
 
269
VOL. 810, NOVEMBER 23, 2016 269
Mayor vs. Tiu
 
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE
RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER
MAYOR FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1, RULE
65 FOR FAILING TO ATTACH CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE
TRIAL COURT.
 
IV.
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES
WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER MAYOR
DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.
 
V.
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES
WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT ALLOWED TECHNICALITIES TO BE USED
TO DEFEAT SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE PARTIES.
 
VI.
PETITIONERS HAVE GOOD CAUSE AND A MERITORIOUS CASE AGAINST
HEREIN RESPONDENTS AS PARAGRAPH 1(B) OF THE DISPOSITIVE
PORTION OF THE FIRST ASSAILED ORDER SHOULD HAVE BEEN REVERSED
BECAUSE IT OVERTURNS THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
DATED 16 OCTOBER 2009 WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.28
Petitioner Manuela argued that:
1)   There was actual compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The
CA petition was accompanied by a notarized affidavit of service and filing of
registered mail. At the time the petition was filed, this was the best evidence of
the service. The other registry receipts for the other parties were also attached to
the petition. Further, the available registry return card was furnished the CA in
the motion for reconsideration.29
2)   The failure of the petition to comply with the rule on a statement of material
dates could be excused because the dates were evident from the records. 30
3)   The petitioner went to the RTC of Tacloban to secure certified true copies of the Finding that the requisites for preliminary injunctive relief were present, 43 the
assailed orders. Only the stamped name of the Clerk of Court, however, appeared Court issued the TRO44 in favor of Manuela
thereon, because the particular branch had no stamp pad which had the phrase on October 14, 2013. At the outset, the Court was convinced that the rights of
for certification. The branch did not even have a typewriter in order to affix the Primrose sought to be protected by the grant of injunctive relief were material and
phrase on the copies. These inadequacies could not be attributed to the substantial and the TRO was issued in order to prevent any irreparable damage to a
petitioners.31 corporate entity that could arise from the conduct of an accounting by the court-
4)  The lack of information pertaining to the notary public in the verification and appointed inventory.
certification against forum shopping should not invalidate the same because,  
again, it was not attributable to the parties.32 The Court’s Ruling
 
5)  Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of a party. 33 The Court now resolves the subject case by the issuance of a permanent
injunction, as prayed for by petitioner Manuela. This position is supported by law and
 
jurisprudence, as follows:
In its January 23, 2013 Resolution,34 the Court ordered the respondents to file
First. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons
their respective comments. Marty, in her Comment, insisted that the petitioner failed
forming a corporation; and (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the
to comply with the procedural requirements as stated by the CA.35
capacity of having rights and duties. This class of artificial persons is recognized only
In her Reply to Comment, 36 petitioner Manuela clarified that the affidavit of
to a limited extent in our law. Example is the estate of a bankrupt or deceased
service was executed on August 31, 2011, which was after the petition was signed by
person.45 From this pronouncement, it can be gleaned that the estate of the deceased
the lawyers and after it was verified by the petitioner herself. After contesting Marty’s
person is a juridical person separate and distinct from the person of the decedent and
arguments on the alleged procedural infirmities of the petitions with the CA and this
any other corporation. This status of an estate comes about by operation of law. This
Court, Manuela asserted that the final and executory October 16, 2009 Decision of
is in consonance with the basic tenet under corporation law that a corporation has a
the CA already held that Primrose had a personality separate and distinct from the
separate personality distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to
estate of decedent Rosario.
which it may be connected.46
Meanwhile, in his Manifestation,37 dated May 29, 2013, Edwin affirmed that he
Second. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has no relevant application in
and Manuela decided to patch up their differences and agreed to settle amicably.
this case. Under this doctrine, the court looks at the corporation as a mere collection
Accordingly, he manifested that he was withdrawing from the case pursuant to their
of individuals or an aggregation of persons undertaking business as a
agreement.
group, disregarding the separate juridical personality of the corporation unifying the
On June 18, 2014, Manuela filed her Motion for Issuance of Temporary
group. Another formulation of this doctrine is that when two business enterprises are
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction 38 on the ground that a flurry of
owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when
orders had been is-
necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that two
sued by the RTC-Br. 6 in the implementation of the assailed January 20, 2011 Order,
corporations are distinct entities and treat them as identical or as one and the
such as the Order,39 dated May 27, 2013, wherein the probate court vaguely ordered
same.47 The purpose behind piercing a corporation’s identity is to remove the barrier
“the inventory of the exact extent of the ‘decedent’s estate.’” Then another order was
between the corporation and the persons comprising it to thwart the fraudulent and
issued appointing an auditing firm to conduct an inventory/audit of the Estate
illegal schemes of those who use the corporate personality as a shield for undertaking
including the rentals and earnings derived from the lease of Mercury Drug and
certain proscribed activities.48
Chowking Restaurant, as tenants of Primrose. 40 According to petitioner Manuela,
Here, instead of holding the decedent’s interest in the corporation separately as a
although an inventory of the assets of the decedent was proper, the probate court
stockholder, the situation was reversed. Instead, the probate court ordered the
ordered an inventory of the assets of Primrose, a separate and distinct entity.
lessees of the corporation to remit rentals to the estate’s administrator without taking
Manuela asserts that it was clearly in error.
note of the fact that the decedent was not the absolute owner of Primrose but only
In her Supplement to the Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
an owner of shares thereof. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,41 dated June 17, 2013, Manuela informed the
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stocks of a corporation is not of itself a
Court that the inventory and accounting of Primrose would already commence on
sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate
June 19, 2013.
personalities.49 Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a
Marty filed her Opposition, 42 dated July 3, 2013, stating that the petition of
corporation, the wrongdoing cannot be presumed, but must be clearly and
Manuela had been rendered moot and academic as the probate court had declared
convincingly established.50
her as the sole heir of Rosario and appointed her administrator of the estate. She
Third. A probate court is not without limits in the determination of the scope of
argued that an injunctive relief would work injustice to the estate because of the total
property covered in probate proceedings. In a litany of cases, the Court had defined
assimilation by petitioner of the shareholdings of the decedent in Primrose and her
the parameters by which a probate court may extend its probing arms in the
share in the corporation’s income corresponding to her shareholdings.
determination of the question of title in probate proceedings. In Pastor, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals,51 the Court explained that, as a rule, the question of ownership was an
extraneous matter which the probate court could not resolve with finality. Thus, for
the purpose of determining whether a certain property should, or should not, be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the
title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. It is a well-settled rule that a
probate court or one in charge of proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate but which
are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. It can only determine whether they
should, or should not, be included in the inventory or list of properties to be overseen
by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate
court cannot do so.52
In this case, respondent Marty argues that the subject properties and the parcel
of land on which these were erected should be included in the inventory of Rosario’s
estate. More so, the arrears from the rental of these properties were later on ordered
to be remitted to the administrator of the estate grounded on the allegation that
Rosario had no other properties other than her interests in Primrose. To the Court’s
mind, this holding of the probate court was in utter disregard of the undisputed fact
the subject land is registered under the Torrens system in the name of Primrose, a
third person who may be prejudiced by the orders of the probate court. In Valera v.
Inserto,53 the Court stated:
x x x, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court),
acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to
take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third
person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the other parties having
legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the
question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are
not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the question of
whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court ( e.g., probate,
land registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural
one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived.
x x x x
x x x These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the
Torrens title to the property is not in the decedent’s names but in others, a
situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule .54 [Emphasis
and underscoring supplied]
 
Thus, the probate court should have recognized the incontestability accorded to
the Torrens title of Primrose over Marty’s arguments of possible dissipation of
properties. In fact, in the given setting, even evidence purporting to support a claim
of ownership has to yield to the incontestability of a Torrens title, until after the same
has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself. In other words, the
existence of a Torrens title may not be discounted as a mere incident in
special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. Put clearly,
if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, “the presumptive conclusiveness of
such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling
evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the
property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in
the persons named in the title.”55
Additionally, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152956 proscribes a collateral attack
on a Torrens title:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. —A certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
 
In Cuizon v. Ramolete,57 the property subject of the controversy was duly
registered under the Torrens system. To this, Court categorically stated:
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession
of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in
the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the
motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in
question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no
authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership
of the property.58 x x x [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
A perusal of the records of this case would show that no compelling evidence was
ever presented to substantiate the position of Marty that Rosario and Primrose were
one and the same, justifying the inclusion of the latter’s properties in the inventory of
the decedent’s properties. This has remained a vacant assertion. At most, what
Rosario owned were shares of stock in Primrose. In turn, this boldly underscores the
fact that Primrose is a separate and distinct personality from the estate of the
decedent. Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of
Rosario are in the possession of, and are registered in the name of, Primrose, Marty’s
claims are bereft of any logical reason and conclusion to pierce the veil of corporate
fiction.
Fourth. The probate court in this case has not acquired jurisdiction over
Primrose and its properties. Piercing the veil of corporate entity applies to
determination of liability not of jurisdiction; it is basically applied only to determine
established liability. It is not available to confer on the court a jurisdiction it has not
acquired, in the first place, over a party not impleaded in a case. 59 This is so because
the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction comes to play only during the trial
of the case after the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the corporation.
Hence, before this doctrine can be even applied, based on the evidence presented, it
is imperative that the court must first have jurisdiction over the corporation. 60
Hence, a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the court’s
process of piercing the veil of its corporate fiction. Resultantly, any proceedings taken
against the corporation and its properties would infringe on its right to due process.
In the case at bench, the probate court applied the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil ratiocinating that Rosario had no other properties that comprise her
estate other than her shares in Primrose. Although the probate court’s intention to
protect the decedent’s shares of stock in Primrose from dissipation is laudable, it is
still an error to order the corporation’s tenants to remit their rental payments to the
estate of Rosario.
Considering the above disquisition, the Court holds that a permanent and final
injunction is in order in accordance with Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
which provides that  “[i]f after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is
entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall
grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the
commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory
injunction.” Undoubtedly, Primrose stands to suffer an irreparable injury from the
subject order of the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Temporary Restraining Order,
dated June 14, 2013, is hereby made PERMANENT, effective immediately. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City, is ENJOINED from enforcing and
implementing its January 20, 2011 and June 10, 2011 Orders, insofar as the
corporate properties of Primrose Development Corporation are concerned, to avert
irreparable damage to a corporate entity, separate and distinct from the Estate of
Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan.
SO ORDERED.
No. L-56504. May 7, 1987.*
POMPILLO VALERA and EUMELIA VALERA CABADO, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE
SANCHO Y. INSERTO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, Branch 1, and MANUEL R. FABIANA, respondents.
Nos. L-59867-68. May 7, 1987.*
EUMELIA V. CABADO, POMPILLO VALERA and HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, petitioners-
appellants, vs. MANUEL FABIANA, JOSE GARIN and HON. COURT OF APPE ALS
(Tenth Division), respondents-appellants.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Estates; Jurisdiction of probate court, Rule
that a court of first instance (now RTC) acting as a probate court exercises but
limited jurisdiction and without power to determine the issue of title to property
claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent; Exception; Reason for
exception.—As regards the first issue, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited
jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of
title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the
claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the property consent,
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason
for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should
be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court (e.g., probate, land registration, etc), is in reality not a
jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which
may be waived.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Function of resolving whether or not property
should be included in the estate inventory is clearly within the probate court's
competence, which determination is merely provisional in character, Exception to the
rule, not applicable in case at bar. —The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not
call for the application of the exception to the rule. As already earlier stressed, it
was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was
being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of
settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question
being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary civil action/' but merely to
determine whether it should or should not be included in the inventory. This function
of resolving whether or not property should be included in the estate inventory is, to
be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence, although the Court's
determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Hearing by the probate court on the issue arising
from the parties' conflicting claims over the fishpond, valid; Purpose of hearing; If a
third person asserts a right to the property contrary to the decedent's, the probate
court has no authority to resolve the issue but a separate action must be instituted. —
The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court, expressly invoked by the Probate Court in justification of its holding a
hearing on the issue arising from the parties' conflicting claims over the fishpond. The
examination provided in the cited section is intended merely to elicit evidence
relevant to property of the decedent from persons suspected of having possession or
knowledge thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away the same.
Of course, if the latter lays no claim to the property and manifests willingness to turn
it over to the estate, no difficulty arises; the Probate Court simply issues the
appropriate direction for the delivery of the property to the estate. On the other
hand, if the third person asserts a right to the property contrary to the decedent's,
the Probate Court would have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate action
must be instituted by the administrator to recover the property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Probate court authorized to admit a complaint in
intervention after obtaining the consent of all interested parties to its assumption of
jurisdiction over the question of title to the properties. —Parenthetically, in the light of
the foregoing principles, the Probate Court could have admitted and taken cognizance
of Fabiana's complaint in intervention, after obtaining the consent of all interested
parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the question of title to the fishpond, or
ascertaining the absence of objection thereto, But it did not. It dismissed the
complaint in intervention instead. And all this is now water under the bridge.
535
VOL. 149, MAY 7, 1987 535
Valera vs. Inserto
Same; Same; Same; Same; Execution, not a case of; Where the determination
by the probate court of the question of title to the property was merely provisional, it
cannot be the subject of execution, and where the Torrens title to the property is not
in the decedent's name but in others. —Since the determination by the Probate Court
of the question of title to the fishpond was merely provisional, not binding on the
property with any character of authority, definiteness or permanence, having been
made only for purposes of inclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at
the hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be subject of execution, as against
its possessor who has set up title in himself (or in another) adversely to the
decedent, and whose right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an
appropriate action. These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the
Torrens title to the property is not in the decedents' names but in others, a situation
on which this Court has already had occasion to rule.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Primary jurisdiction over title issue in court taking
cognizance of separate action, deemed superior to the contrary order of the probate
court in the exercise of provisional jurisdiction over the same question; Reason. —
Since, too, both the Probate Court and the estate administrators are one in the
recognition of the proposition that title to the f ishpond could in the premises only be
appropriately determined in a separate action , the actual filing of such a separate
action should have been anticipated, and should not therefore have come as a
surprise, to the latter. And since moreover, implicit in that recognition is also the
acknowledgment of the superiority of the authority of the court in which the separate
action is filed over the issue of title, the estate administrators may not now be heard
to complain that in such a separate action, the court should have issued orders
necessarily involved in or flowing from the assumption of that jurisdiction. Those
orders cannot in any sense be considered as undue interference with the jurisdiction
of the Probate Court. Resulting from the exercise of primary jurisdiction over the
question of ownership involving estate property claimed by the estate, they must be
deemed superior to otherwise contrary orders issued by the Probate Court in the
exercise of what may be regarded as merely secondary, or provisional, jurisdiction
over the same question.
PETITIONS to review the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Br. I and
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
536
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Valera vs. Inserto
     Eduardo S. Baranda and Avelino T. Javellana for petitioners.
     Dominador G. Garin for private respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Conflicting claims over a fishpond asserted by the administrators of the estate of
deceased spouses, on the one hand, and by the heirs of a daughter of said spouses
and their lessee, on the other, have given rise to the proceedings now docketed in
this Court as (1) G.R. No. 56504 and (2) G.R. Nos. 59867-68.
Sp. Proc. No. 2223, CFI, Iloilo
In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent spouses,
Rafael Valera and Consolacion Sarrosa1 1—in which Eumelia Cabado and Pompillo
Valera had been appointed administrators 2—the heirs of a deceased daughter of the
spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a motion asking that the Administratrix, Cabado, be
declared in contempt for her failure to render an accounting of her
administration.3 Cabado replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose
Garin, Teresa's husband and the movant heirs' father, delivered to the administrator
an 18-hectare fishpond in Baras, Barotoc Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the estate, 4 and
she in turn moved for the return thereof to the estate, so that it might be partitioned
among the decedents' heirs. Jose Garin opposed the plea for the fishpond's return to
the estate, asserting that the property was owned by his children and this was why it
had
never been included in any inventory of the estate.
The Court, presided over by Hon. Judge Midpantao Adil, viewed the Garin Heirs'
motion for contempt, as well as Cabado's prayer for the fishpond's return to the
estate, as having given rise to a claim for the recovery of an asset of the estate
within the purview of Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. 5 It accordingly set said
incidents for hearing during which the parties presented evidence in substantiation of
their positions6 Thereafter, the Court issued an Order dated September 17, 1980
commanding the Heirs of Teresa Garin "to reconvey immediately the fishpond in
question ** to the intestate Estate of the Spouses." 7
The Order was predicated upon the Court's factual findings mainly derived from
the testimony of the two administrators that:
1. 1.the fishpond originally belonged to the Government, and had been given
in lease to Rafael Valera in his lifetime;
2. 2.Rafael Valera ostensibly sold all his leasehold rights in the fishpond to his
daughter, Teresa Garin; but the sale was fictitious, having been resorted to
merely so that she might use the property to provide for her children's
support and education, and was subject to the resolutory term that the
fishpond should revert to Rafael Valera upon completion of the schooling of
Teresa Garin's Children; and
3. 3.with the income generated by the fishpond, the property was eventually
purchased from the Government by the Heirs of Teresa Garin, collectively
named as such in the Original Certif icate of Title issued in their favor.
Upon these facts, Judge Adil ruled that an implied trust had been created, obligating
Teresa Garin's heirs to restore the
property to the Valera Spouses' Estate, in accordance with Articles 1453 and 1455 of
the Civil Code providing as follows:
"Article 1453. When property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared
intentions to hold it for, or transfer it to another or the grantor, there is an implied
trust in favor of the person for whose benefit it is contemplated."
"Article 1455. When any trustee, guardian or other person holding a fiduciary
relationship uses trust funds for the purchase of property and causes a conveyance to
be made to him or to a third person, a trust is established by operation of law in
favor of the person to whom the fund belongs.''
The Court also held that the action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had
not yet prescribed, Cabado's motion for the fishpond's reversion to the estate having
been filed well within ten (10) years from June 30, 1980, the date on which Teresa
Garin's heirs allegedly acquired title over it. 8
There seems little doubt, however, that the Court's pronouncement regarding the
estate's title to the fishpond was merely provisional in character, made solely to
determine whether or not the fishpond should be included in the inventory of estate
assets. So it was evidently understood by the administrators who have more than
once asserted that "the probate court has jurisdiction to determine the ownership of
the fishpond for purposes of inclusion in the inventory  of the properties."9 So it was
made clear by the Probate Court itself which, at the outset, stated that the hearing
on the matter10 was meant "merely to determine whether or not the fishpond should
be included as part of the estate and whether or not the person holding it should be
made to deliver and/or return ** (it) to the estate." 11 And so it was emphasized in
another Order. denying reconsideration of the Order of September 17, 1980, which
states that:
"** (i)t is never the intendment of this court to write a finis to the issue of ownership
of the fishpond in dispute. The movants may pursue their claim of ownership over the
same in an ordinary civil action. Meanwhile, however, it is the finding of this probate
court that the f ishpond must be delivered to the estate.
"Clearly, there is no incompatibility between the exercise of the power of this
probate court under Section 6 in relation to Section 7, both of Rule 87, and the
contention of the movants that the proper forum to settle the issue of ownership
should be in a court of general jurisdiction."12
Judge Adil afterwards granted the administrators' motion for execution of the order
pending appeal, and directed the sheriff to enforce the direction for the Garin Heirs to
reconvey the fishpond to the estate. 13 The corresponding writ was served on Manuel
Fabiana, the supposed encargado or caretaker. Voicing no objection to the writ, and
declaring to the sheriff that he was a mere lessee,14 14 Fabiana voluntarily
relinquished possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. The latter, in turn, delivered it
to the administrators.15
 Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with the Probate Court
seeking vindication of his right to the possession of the fishpond, based on a contract
of lease between himself, as lessee, and Jose Garin, as lessor. 16 But Judge Adil
dismissed his complaint on the following grounds, to wit:
1. (1)it was filed out of time because not only had judgment been rendered,
but execution as regards transfer of possession had already taken place;
and
2. (2)the lease contract had not been registered and hence was not binding as
against the estate.17
G.R No, 56504
Fabiana thereupon instituted a separate action for injunction and damages, with
application for a preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil Case No.
13742 and assigned to Branch I of the Iloilo CFI, Hon. Sancho Y. Inserto,
presiding.18 Judge Inserto issued a temporary restraining order enjoining estate
administrators from disturbing Fabiana in the possession of the f ishpond, as lessee. 19
The estate administrators filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve
the temporary restraining order, averring that the action was barred by the Probate
Court's prior judgment which had exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of the lease,
and that the act sought to be restrained had already been accomplished, Fabiana
having voluntarily surrendered possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. 20 When
Judge Inserto failed to act on their motion within what the administrators believed to
be a reasonable time, considering the circumstances of the Case, the administrators
filed with the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus, with a
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order, which
was docketed as G.R. No. 56504. 21 In their petition, the administrators contended
that Branch I of the Iloilo CFI (Judge Inserto, presiding) could not and should not
interfere with the Probate Court (Branch II, Judge Adil, presiding) in the legitimate
exercise of its jurisdiction over the proceedings f or the Settlement of the estate of
the Valera Spouses.
G.R. Nos. 59867-68
In the meantime, Jose Garin—having filed a motion for reconsideration of the above
mentioned order of Judge Adil (declaring the estate to be the owner of the fishpond),
in which he asserted that the Probate Court, being of limited jurisdiction, had no
competence to decide the ownership of the fish-
pond,22 which motion had been denied23—filed a notice of appeal from said
Order.24 But he quickly abandoned the appeal when, as aforestated, 25 Judge Adil
authorized execution of the order pending appeal, instead, he initiated a special
action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus )with prayer for preliminary
injunction) in the Court of Appeals, therein docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-1154-R.
Fabiana followed suit. He instituted in the same Court of Appeals his own action
for certiorari and injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-11577-R; this,
notwithstanding the pendency in judge Inserto's sala of the case he had earlier
filed.26
These two special civil actions were jointly decided by the Court of Appeals. The
Court granted the petitions and ruled in substance that:
1. 1.The Probate Court indeed possessed no jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
ownership based merely on evidence adduced at the hearing of a "counter-
motion" conducted under Section 6, Rule 87;
2. 2.The original and transfer certificates of title covering the fishpond stand in
the names of the Heirs of Teresa Garin as registered owners, and therefore
no presumption that the estate owns the fishpond is warranted to justify
return of the property on the theory that it had merely been borrowed; and
3. 3.Even assuming the Probate Court's competence to resolve the ownership
question, the estate administrators would have to recover possession of
the fishpond by separate action, in view of the lessee's claim of right to
superior possession, as lessee thereof.
From this joint judgment, the administrators have taken separate appeals to this
Court by certiorari,27 docketed as G.R. Nos. 59867 and 59868. They ascribe to the
Appellate Court the following errors, viz:
1. 1)in holding that the Probate Court (Judge Adil, presiding) had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the issue of title covering a
fishpond being claimed by an heir adversely to the decedent spouses;
2. 2)in ruling that it was needful for the administrators to file a separate action
for the recovery of the possession of the fishpond then in the hands of a
third person; and
3. 3)in sanctioning the act of a CFI Branch in interfering with and overruling
the final judgment of another branch, acting as probate Court, and
otherwise frustrating and inhibiting the enforcement and implementation of
said judgment.
Jurisdiction of Probate Court
As regards the first issue, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited
jurisdiction,28 and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of
title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the
claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the property consent,
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, 29 the reason
for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should
be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court (e.g., probate, land registration, etc), is in reality not a
jurisdictional but in essence of pro-
cedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived.30
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the
exception to the rule. As already earlier stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court
as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title
over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and
permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for
determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it should
or should not be included in the inventory. 31 This function of resolving whether or not
property should be included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within
the Probate Court's competence, although the Court's determination is only acknowledgment of the superiority of the authority of the court in which the separate
provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a action is filed over the issue of title, the estate administrators may not now be heard
separate action that may be instituted by the parties. 32 to complain that in such a separate action, the court should have issued orders
The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section 6, Rule 87 of the necessarily involved in or flowing from the assumption of that jurisdiction. Those
Rules of Court, expressly invoked by the Probate Court in justification of its holding a orders cannot in any sense be considered as undue interference with the jurisdiction
hearing on the issue arising from the parties' conflicting claims over the of the Probate Court. Resulting from the exercise of primary jurisdiction over the
fishpond.33 The examination provided in the cited section is intended merely to elicit question of ownership involving estate property claimed by the estate, they must be
evidence relevant to property of the decedent from persons suspected of having deemed superior to otherwise contrary orders issued by the Probate Court in the
possession or knowledge thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed exercise of what may be regarded as merely secondary. or provisional, jurisdiction
away the same. Of course, if the latter lays no claim to the property and manifests over the same question.
willingness to turn it over to the estate, no difficulty arises; the Probate Court simply WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 56504 is DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The
issues the appropriate direction for the delivery of the property to the estate. On the petitions in G.R. No. 59867 and G.R. No. 59868 are DENIED, and the judgment of the
other hand, if the third person asserts a right to the property contrary to the Appellate Court, subject thereof, is affirmed in toto. The temporary restraining order
decedent's, the Probate Court dated April 1, 1981 is lifted. Costs against petitioners.
would have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate action must be instituted by
the administrator to recover the property.34
Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the Probate Court could
have admitted and taken cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in intervention, after
obtaining the consent of all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over
the question of title to the fishpond, or ascertaining the absence of objection thereto.
But it did not. It dismissed the complaint in intervention instead. And all this is now
water under the bridge.
Possession of Fishpond Pending
Determination of Title Thereto
Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond
was merely provisional, not binding on the property with any character of authority,
definiteness or permanence, having been made only for purposes of inclusion in the
inventory and upon evidence adduced at the hearing of a motion, it cannot and
should not be subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in
himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess has not
been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These considerations
assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the
decedents' names but in others, a situation on which this Court has already had
occasion to rule.
"In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property
covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title
should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be consider as the owner of the property in
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action,
particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the
persons named in the title. "35
Primary Jurisdiction over Title issue in
Court Taking Cognizance of Separate Action
Since, too, both the Probate Court and the estate administrators are one in the
recognition of the proposition that title to the fishpond could in the premises only be
appropriately determined in a separate action, 36 the actual filing of such a separate
action should have been anticipated, and should not therefore have come as a
surprise, to the latter. And since moreover, implicit in that recognition is also the

G.R. No. 230404, January 31, 2018
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF REYNALDO GUZMAN
RODRIGUEZ; ANITA ONG TAN, Petitioner, v. ROLANDO C. RODRIGUEZ,
RACQUEL R. GEGAJO*, ROSALINDA R. LANDON, REYNALDO C. RODRIGUEZ,
JR., ESTER R. FULGENCIO, RAFAEL C. RODRIGUEZ AND REYNEST C.
RODRIGUEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 assailing the Decision2 dated June
13, 2016 and Resolution3 dated March 3, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 105665 filed by petitioner Anita Ong Tan (Anita).
The Facts of the Case
Respondents Rolando Rodriguez, Racquel Gegajo, Rosalinda Landon, Reynaldo
Rodriguez, Jr., Ester Fulgencio, Rafael Rodriguez and Reynest Rodriguez are children
of Reynaldo Rodriguez (Reynaldo) and Ester Rodriguez (Ester), who died on August
27, 2008 and September 11, 2004 respectively.4
Reynaldo and Ester left several properties to their surviving children. On February 13,
2009, respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late
Reynaldo and Ester.5
On the other hand, Anita is a co-depositor in a Joint Account under the name Anita
Ong Tan and Reynaldo with account number 003149-0718-56 in the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI). When Reynaldo passed away, said joint account continued to
be in active status.6
On August 31, 2009, BPI sent a letter to Anita and informed her that her joint
account with Reynaldo would become dormant if no transaction will be made. As
such, Anita decided to withdraw her funds. BPI, however, required her to submit
additional requirements, one of which is the extrajudicial settlement of the heirs of
Reynaldo.7 To comply with the same, Anita approached respondents and asked them
to sign a waiver of rights to the said joint account. Respondents refused to sign the
waiver as they believed that the funds in the said joint account belonged to their
father.8
Respondents then submitted documents to BPI for the release of half of the funds
deposited in said joint account.9
BPI withheld the release of the funds because of the conflicting claims between Anita
and respondents.10
In 2011, Anita filed before the trial court a petition for the: (a) settlement of the
Intestate Estate of the late Reynaldo; and (b) issuance of letters of administration to
any competent neutral willing person, other than any of the heirs of Reynaldo.
Anita alleged that the funds used to open the BPI joint account were her exclusive
funds, which came from her East West Bank (East West) account. To prove her claim,
she presented as evidence a Debit Memo from East West Bank, which was used for
the issuance of a Manager's Check in the amount of One Million Twenty-One
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty Eight and 30/100 Pesos (P 1,021,868.30), which exact
amount was deposited to the BPI joint account. 11 Anita presented the testimony of
Mineleo Serrano, Branch Manager of East West in Tomas Morato, to corroborate her
testimony that the subject amount came from her East West account. 12
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the funds deposited in the BPI
joint account belonged exclusively to Reynaldo.
In 2014, Rolando Rodriguez was appointed and took his oath as an administrator of
the subject estate.
In an Order13 dated March 13, 2015, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of
Anita. The RTC held that Anita sufficiently adduced evidence to rebut the
presumption that the funds deposited under the BPI joint account of Anita and
Reynaldo were owned by them in common. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, petitioner's claim against the estate of deceased Reynaldo G.
Rodriguez is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Rolando Rodriguez, in his capacity as
the appointed Administrator of the intestate estate of Reynaldo G. Rodriguez, is
hereby directed to withdraw, together with the petitioner, the funds under Joint
Account No. 003149-0718-56 deposited with the Bank of the Philippine Islands,
Kamuning Branch, Quezon City and the entire proceeds thereof be given to
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.14
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order dated
May 25, 2015.
Undaunted, respondents filed an appeal before the CA.
In a Decision15 dated June 13, 2016, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. In giving
credence to respondents' contention, the CA maintained that the presumption of co-
ownership as regards the nature of joint accounts was not sufficiently overturned, as
Anita failed to prove that she is indeed the sole owner of the funds therein. The CA
disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
assailed Order  dated March 13, 2015 and Order  dated May 25, 2015 of the
Region[al] Trial Court [,] Branch 74, Ma1abon City is hereby MODIFIED.
The bank deposit under the Joint Account number 003149-0718-56 is to be divided in
equal shares between Petitioner-appellee on one hand and the Respondents-
appellants on the other on a 50-50 proposition.
SO ORDERED.16
Anita filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution 17 dated
March 3, 2017, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner-appellee's Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.18
The Issue
In sum, the sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in declaring Anita
and Reynaldo as co-owners of the subject bank deposits despite the evidence
submitted by Anita to prove otherwise.
The Ruling of the Court
A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or by two or
more juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are joint owners
or co-owners of the said account, and their share in the deposits shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proved.19 The nature of joint accounts is governed by the
rule on co-ownership embodied in Article 485 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall
be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the
contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proved.
While the rule is that the shares of the owners of the joint account holders are equal,
the same may be overturned by evidence to the contrary. Hence, the mere fact that
an account is joint is not conclusive of the fact that the owners thereof have equal
claims over the funds in question.
In line with this, it is also indispensable to consider whether or not there exists a
survivorship agreement between the co-depositors. In said agreement, the co-
depositors agree that upon the death of either of them, the share pertaining to the
deceased shall accrue to the surviving co-depositor or he can withdraw the entire
deposit.20
It must be noted that there exists no survivorship agreement between Anita and
Reynaldo. Hence, it is but rightful to determine their respective shares based on
evidence presented during trial.
On this note, the Court agrees with the findings of the lower court that Anita
sufficiently proved that she owns the funds in the BPI joint account exclusively.
It can be gleaned from the records that the money in the BPI joint account amounts
to One Million Twenty-One Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Eight Pesos and Thirty
Centavos (P1,021,868.30), and it is undisputed that said amount came from Anita's
personal account with East West. In East West, Anita opened a Trust Placement in
August 2007 with the amount of Two Million Fourteen Thousand Twenty-Four Pesos
and Twenty-Five Centavos (P2,014,024.25). Based on East West's records, as
testified to by its Branch Manager, two withdrawals were subsequently made: first, in
the amount of One Million Twenty-One Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Eight Pesos
and 30 Centavos (P1,021,868.30); and second, in the amount of One Million Three
Thousand One Hundred Eleven Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P1,003,111.11). In all
such withdrawals, manager's checks were issued.
The exact amount which was first withdrawn from the East West account, i.e., One
Million Twenty-One Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Eight Pesos and Thirty Centavos
(P1,021,868.30), was the exact amount used to open the BPI joint account. Notable
is the fact that these transactions occurred within the same day on November 14,
2007.21 It is also significant to consider that no further transaction in said joint
account was made after the same was opened until the death of Reynaldo.
With all these, it is apparent that Anita owned the funds exclusively as she sufficiently
overturned the presumption under the law. It bears stressing that despite the
evidence shown by Anita, respondents failed to refute her evidence, other than their
bare allegations that Anita and Reynaldo had an amorous relationship and that Anita
had no source of income to sustain the funds in a bank.22
The Court also takes note of the fact that respondents admitted that they knew the
existence of the joint account, yet they still failed to include the same in the list of
included properties in the inventory when they executed an extrajudicial settlement.
Their failure to include said joint account in the list of the items owned by Reynaldo
for the purposes of determining his estate obviously refutes their claim that Reynaldo
was the sole owner of the funds in said joint account.
Taken together, the Court finds the ruling of the trial court that Anita is the sole
owner of the funds in question proper.
Lastly, noteworthy is the fact that even if the probing arms of an intestate court is
limited, it is equally important to consider the call of the exercise of its power of
adjudication especially so when the case calls for the same, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
June 13, 2016 and Resolution dated March 3, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 105665 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Order dated March
13, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 74 is REINSTATED.

While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted capacity and
exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue orders
involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the estate of
the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over
properties, it is no less true that such authority conferred upon by law and
reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due
regard and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case.23

The facts obtaining in this case call for the determination of the ownership of the
funds contained in the BPI joint account; for the intestate estate of Reynaldo has
already been extrajudicially settled by his heirs. The trial court, in this case, exercised
sound judiciousness when it ruled out the inclusion of the BPI joint account in the
estate of the decedent.

Equally important is the rule that the determination of whether or not a particular
matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (probate, land registration,
etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural question
involving a mode of practice "which may be waived." 24

Such waiver introduces the exception to the general rule that while the probate court
exercises limited jurisdiction, it may settle questions relating to ownership when the
claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly
or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment. 25

Such waiver was evident from the fact that the respondents sought for affirmative
relief before the court a quo as they claimed ownership over the funds in the joint
account of their father to the exclusion of his co-depositor.

In this case, the Court notes that the parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the
intestate court in settling the issue of the ownership of the joint account. While
respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, which hypothetically admitted all the
allegations in Anita's petition, the same likewise sought affirmative relief from the
intestate court. Said affirmative relief is embodied in respondents' claim of ownership
over the funds in said joint account to the exclusion of Anita, when in fact said funds
in the joint account was neither mentioned nor included in the inventory of the
intestate estate of the late Reynaldo. Therefore, respondents impliedly agreed to
submit the issue of ownership before the trial court, acting as an intestate court,
when they raised an affirmative relief before it. To reiterate, the exercise of the trial
court of its limited jurisdiction is not jurisdictional, but procedural; hence, waivable.