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Kinship Politics in Post-War Philippines: The Lopez Family, 1945-1989

Author(s): Mina Roces


Source: Modern Asian Studies , Feb., 2000, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Feb., 2000), pp. 181-221
Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/313115

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Modern Asian Studies 34, 1 (2ooo), pp. 181-221. @ 20oo Cambridge University Press
Printed in the United Kingdom

Kinship Politics in Post-War Philippines: The


Lopez Family, I945- 1989
MINA ROCES

The University of New South Wales, Sydney

On being awarded the Legion of Honor by Preside


Aquino, Joaquin 'Chino' Roces, publisher of The Ma
pleaded with the president:
Please allow me to remind you, first. That our people bro
government to power because our people felt an urgent need
That change was nothing more and nothing less than that of mo
into a new moral order. The people believed, and many of th
that when we said we would be the exact opposite of Marcos,
just that. Because of that promise which the people believed,
over Marcos was anchored on a principle of morality .... To
dare propose that new moral order is best appreciated in t
response to graft and corruption in public service. We cannot af
ernment of thieves unless we can tolerate a nation of highwa

Roces' statement summarized a persistent theme in Phi


war political history: charges of graft and corruption are
levied against an administration, foreshadowing its de
next election contest, only to be replaced by a similar
regime. The 1986 'revolution' which brought Corazo
power found many supporters among those who belie
corruption and excesses of the Marcos regime had gone too
ever, as the Roces speech poignantly illustrated, the Aq
which replaced it was itself guilty of similar crimes form
uted to the Marcos years preceding it. The irony of it a
was Roces who first sought the two million signatures tha
Corazon Aquino to run for president in the first place.
Such fluctuations in Philippine politics have been an
pattern since independence was granted in 1946. In th
period, 1945-1972, (with the exception of President
Marcos), presidential administrations exposed for blatan

' Joaquin 'Chino' Roces, 'A Call for New Moral Order', The Manila
July 1988, p. 3.

oo0026-749X/oo/$7.50+$.1
181

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182 MINA ROCES

corruption, were summarily voted


only to be replaced by an admin
the same sins as its predecessor.
declared martial law and launch
lasted until 1986. The excessive
much documented, the first fa
sole beneficiaries of political and
which reached hitherto unprece
the public support, the 'people p
ancy to the presidential office. Bu
revealed, President Aquino was c
ership, and for allowing her fam
of the wealth previously associ
media lamented that 'cronyism'
How can one explain such 'cycl
This paper proposes a framewor
flict between traditional social va
kinship politics and western val
accounts for these cyclical tren
political organization is seen as
kinship politics. This concept is
wherein the kinship groups ope
acting with other kinship group
thrives in a setting where elite
compete with each other for po
gained by one family alliance,
family wealth and prominence,
the law to gain access to specia
The colonial period introduced
term western values or western institutions is used for lack of a

2 See Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making o
American Policy (New York, 1987); Filemon Rodriguez, The Marcos Regime Rape of th
Nation (Quezon City, 1986); Sterling Seagrave, The Marcos Dynasty (New York
1988); Charles McDougald, The Marcos File (San Francisco, 1987); 'Some ar
Smarter than Others', article published clandestinely by a group of Filipino busi
nessmen (Manila, 1979); andJohn Doherty, 'Who Controls the Philippine Economy
Some Need Not Try as Hard as Others', in Belinda Aquino (ed.), Cronies and Enemies
The Current Philippine Scene, Philippine Studies Occasional Paper No. 5 (Honolulu
1982).
3 'Moral Disorder', Time, 22 Aug. 1988, p. 22, and Antonio C. Abaya, 'Et Tu
Chino?', 'On the Other Hand' column, Business World, 29 July 1988, p. 2.
4 Lisa Beyer, 'An Outcry Over Politics as Usual', Time, to Oct. 1988, p. 29.

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 183
better term to refer to non-indigenous influences introduced into
the society), which eventually became incorporated into the cultural
milieu of political behavior. Some of these values were in direct con-
flict with the traditional elements of kinship politics. The set of west-
ern values which penetrated and influenced Philippine political cul-
ture may be classified into three categories. First, a new set of ethics
and morals, introduced in the Spanish period through the vehicle of
Catholicism, provided a novel standard with which to conduct and
judge behavior, often intruding into the established methods of
comport. Secondly, bureaucratic professionalism inculcated in the
American colonial period, emphasized a different method of particip-
ating in politics and business-that of utilizing impersonal norms,
the assessment of people on the basis of achievement, and main-
taining objectivity in major decisions involving personalities. Finally,
the concept of loyalty to a nation-state, an entity far surpassing the
specific confines of the family or village, began to emerge as national-
ist ideas spread throughout the archipelago from the revolutionary
days to the movement for independence in the twentieth century.
Once independence was granted and Filipinos assumed the mantle
of full political leadership, tensions between these two opposing sets
of values surfaced. This unreconciled tension explains the peculiar
behavior of post-war politics where there was a cyclical rise and fall
of governments as each administration was voted out of office for
graft and corruption. Families who operated in the traditional style
found themselves exposed and criticized in the free press by rivals
who used the rhetoric of western values to attack the families in
power. Having been shown to have neglected the national interest
in favor of the familial one, these families failed to retain their power
beyond one administration. In this framework, the Marcos regime
(1972-1986), represents the epitome of pure kinship politics as one
family alliance alone had monopoly of political power and owned
most of the country's major corporations.
This paper argues that the unresolved tension was responsible for
the ambivalent behavior exhibited by Filipino families who have used
political power for familial ends. On the one hand, they sincerely
believed from their education at school, that corruption was bad,
that the western values of professionalism, ethics and morals and
the concern for the national interest should override the familial
interests in the political sphere. They used the yardstick of western
values to criticize other families who had in their eyes used political
power to build a business empire. At the same time they were blind

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184 MINA ROCES
to their own faults-almost oblivious to
politics. In this manner they continue
(western values) to their rival families, a
politics) to themselves. I do not stip
values are 'good' and kinship politics is
that the tension between these conflic
Philippine political behavior.
Kinship politics and western values ar
dynamics of political and social action;
To suggest this, however, is not to de
such norms as a reflection of sincerely h
politics and western values are not fixe
ship politics and western values are
courses, used by individuals in the ide
relations and political actions.
For example, Marcos claimed that ma
through which he could implement the r
civil order and transform the 'precar
democracy. Obviously, Marcos was u
rhetoric to justify the declaration of ma
one cannot doubt the sincerity of those i
their lives for the restoration of demo
'people power revolution'. In the realm
Corazon Aquino's refusal to investigat
made against her family might be int
Filipinos her staunch but superficial ad
alternatively, she may have strongly f
relatives, feeling trapped by the utang n
in traditional values.

Factionalism and patron-client ties have been isolated as the main


structures of Philippine politics.5 In this model, scholars have rightly

' For an analysis of personal ties and factionalism in Philippine politics see Carl
Lande, Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics, Yale University
Southeast Asian Studies Monograph Series No. 6 (New Haven, 1965). Alfred
McCoy, 'Yloilo: Factional Conflict in a Colonial Economy, Iloilo Province Philip-
pines, 1931-1955', Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1977; and Mary
Hollnsteiner, The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality (Quezon City, 1963).
(Lande's work is the classic model of factionalism in Philippine politics.) For an
analysis of patronage politics or patron-client ties and Philippine political behavior,
see Benedict Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion (Quezon City, 1979); Willem Wolters,

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 185
observed that the two major national parties are identical in com-
position and policy. Furthermore, intraparty solidarity is minimal
and party switching is common. The explanation given for this phe-
nomenon is the fact that the parties are composed of dyadic ties
(patron-client ties). These patron-client ties which are built into
larger rival political factions are inherently unstable personalized
alliances, and are the building blocks of Philippine political behavior.
These models, however, content to describe and isolate fac-
tionalism as a characteristic of Philippine behavior, do not probe
deeper into what factors provoked factionalism in the first place.
Although it is admitted that these dyadic ties are 'a reflection of
behavioral patterns rooted in the Philippine kinship system',6 further
investigation into these 'behavioral patterns' which gave birth to fac-
tionalism is not attempted. Hence, these models describe merely the
effects but do not diagnose the causes of Philippine political
behavior. What compels individuals and families to coalesce into
tenuous factional alliances? Why is personalism a trademark of Phil-
ippine political behavior? If ideology is not a contending factor in
national politics, what is?
This paper argues that politica defamilia (or the traditional values
of Philippine society which compel individuals to think in terms of
family solidarity to the detriment of any other socio-political unit
outside the family), is what motivated political and economic
behavior in post-war Philippines. It is politica defamilia that motivates
families to ally into temporary factions to fulfill familial economic
ambitions. Traditional values ensure that the Filipino is more
inclined to perceive the world in terms of how outside resources
could be used to improve the status of the family in socio-economic
terms. Examined through this prism, factionalism and patron-client
ties, elements that the above scholars have isolated as the main

Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict in Central Luzon (Institute of Social Studies, The
Hague, The Netherlands, Research Project Series No. 14, 1983); and Amando
Doronila, 'The Rise of the Patron State in the Philippines, a Study of the Trans-
formation of Patron-Client Relations and its Political Consequences', M.A. thesis,
Monash University, 1982. These studies acknowledge the importance of families as
the basic building blocks of factionalism and patron-client ties, but the treatment
of family dynamics remains peripheral to the main concerns of their work. Lande,
Hollnsteiner and McCoy are more concerned with the dynamics of factionalism;
Kerkvliet and Wolters with patron-client ties and the erosion of landlord-tenant
relations, and Amando Doronila on showing how patronage politics later evolved
into the creation of a patron state under Marcos.
6 Lande, Leaders, p. 1.

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186 MINA ROCES

structures of Philippine politi


kinship politics or politica de f
ated individuals and families to
alliances, to legislate on behalf o
and corruption of those outsid
Filipino's primary allegiance
dwarfing any sentiments that
for the national interest. And
power in order to promote its e
tions and the interlocking netw
behind Philippine political beh
The use of cultural conflict as
pine post-war history has not b
a sufficient body of literature
Philippine politics in the post-
which make the connections b
versus western values, and the
Grossholtz's study on Philippine
her analysis of Philippine poli
rectly perceived the dominanc
recent values which opt for u
explanation for this dominan
and system of obligations: 'Th
toward dependence on others
kinship and social obligations
a more complex set of quid
responsible for policy decision
In a 1987 article, political sci
inconsistencies between per
(really politica defamilia and w
predict the likely success of
Philippines. He has observed t

7 Lande, Leaders; McCoy, 'Yloilo'; Hol


Rebellion; Wolters, Politics; Jean Gros
Doronila, 'The Rise'; Dante Simbulan,
ippine Politics and Government,
National University, 1965; Remigio Ag
of Politics in Occidental Mindoro (Man
Development and Decay (Quezon City,
8 Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippin

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 187
makes it difficult for democratic values to take root.9 Green and
Grossholtz were the only scholars who looked at the conflict of values
as an important framework for analyzing the idiosyncracies of Philip-
pine political culture in the post-war period.'0
This argument, however, does not deny the importance of patron
age politics, the main stranglehold of the factional model. At the
same time it does not endorse the view that a call to a more rigid
application of western values was only mere rhetoric. The fact tha
politicians feel compelled to declare that they are upholding the
western values of democracy and are anti-graft and corruption
reveals that these values are prestigious in the public mind. But as
the general argument postulates, two sets of values exist side by
side and are responsible for the ambivalent behavior exhibited by
Filipinos. While patronage is a factor (patronage is an offshoot of
kinship politics), it appears that in major turning points in Philippine
post-war history, western values have made the difference. In the
republican period, no administration could get re-elected. Had pat-
ronage politics been the sole determining factor, then we would find
the incumbent administration winning re-election almost consist
ently since it has more patronage sources in its power. Another
example is the 1986 'revolution' where people risked their lives for
the restoration of democracy-patronage politics was not operatin
there, instead western values was the motivation.
The factional model stressing patronage politics as the sole deter
minant of political behavior leaves no room for ideology or issues a
another contending factor in political culture. (In fact, the mode
argues that ideology is not a factor at all.) In a 1991 book, scholars
have questioned the applicability of the factional model in post-1972
Philippines. The scholars concluding from their own research on
local elections revised the factional model by emphasizing that pat
ronage politics was not the only factor determining politica
behavior:

9 Justin J. Green, 'Political Socialization, Filipino Values, and Prospects for


Democracy', in Carl H. Lande (ed.), Rebuilding a Nation: Philippine Challenges and
American Policy (Washington D.C., 1987), pp. 261-78.
i0 Studies on bureaucratic corruption in Asia have also focused on the conflict
between traditional norms and legal norms as an explanation for the persistence
and tolerance of bureaucratic corruption in these societies. See Rance P. Lee, 'Bur-
eaucratic Corruption in Asia: The Problem of Incongruence between Legal Norms
and Folk Norms', in Ledivina Cariflo (ed.), Bureaucratic Corruption in Asia (Manila,
1986), pp. 69-io8.

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188 MINA ROCES

What we conclude is that factio


but one factor among many as p
perceived benefits from Marcos-sty
qualities most important for holdin
people's calculations."

While those revising the facti


that applies to post-1972 Philip
thesis grapples with both the
logy, and offers a more lucid ex
ippine political behavior, and for the 'cycles' of political
administrations that span the three eras of post-independence
history.
The conflict hypothesis enables us to make two important inter-
pretations-the first suggests an explanation for the endless cycles,
as well as the ambivalence of familial political behavior, and the
other involves the nature of traditional kinship politics itself, a phe-
nomenon which, though very basic to an understanding of Philippine
political behavior, has remained hitherto largely unexamined in
scholarly literature on the Philippines (and Asia generally). Both
these interpretations challenge, or at least modify, previous models
on Philippine politics. Empirical evidence for the hypothesis and for
the mechanics of kinship politics will be provided through the case
study of one of the most prominent families of the era-the Lopez
family.
The term family is used here to mean the family alliance group.
This group refers to the bilateral extended family, the wider circle
of ritual kin, and the close friends, employees, workers, clients and
allies of the family who are personally loyal to the family patriarch.
For example, a journalist who works for the Lopez-owned newspaper
The Manila Chronicle is considered by all as a Lopez man and is per-
sonally loyal to the Chronicle publisher Eugenio Lopez. The employees
of The Manila Times called the late publisher Joaquin 'Chino' Roces,
'tatay' (father) and his sister Isabel 'Bebeng' Roces, 'nanay'
(mother). The elite family's allies are directly loyal to their employer
(the family patriarch) and not the family-owned company in which
they work.
But although the family network ostensibly included the alliance
group, the allies themselves were constantly shifting their allegiance.

" Benedict J. Kerkvliet and Resil B. Mojares, 'Themes in the Transition from
Marcos to Aquino: An Introduction', in Benedict J. Kerkvliet and Resil B. Mojares

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 189
Thomas Kiefer used the adjective 'fluid' when he described the rela-
tionship between Tausug leaders and their allies because individuals
constantly changed sides in situations of political violence. And since
in the Tausug world view whoever is not one's friend is undisputably
one's enemy, such fluidity accounts for extremely unstable alliances.
The characteristics of politica defamilia are markedly similar to that
of Tausug behavior in conflict.'" Politica defamilia presupposes a con-
test for power between rival elite family alliances and allies are free
to switch loyalties from one family group to the other.13 Thus, it
must be stressed that the family alliance group is composed of mem-
bers both kin and non-kin who are temporarily allied with a family
leader or patriarch.

Case Study of the Lopez Family

Although by the 196os the Lopez family had become the most prom-
inent family in national politics, it was a family with a very young
history--its origins made it barely a hundred and fifty years old at
the height of its power. Family genealogist and historian Oscar
Lopez, traced the family's ancestry to Basilio Lopez (a Chinese
mestizo), and Sabina Jalandoni of Jaro, in the Visayan province of
Iloilo, around 1834.'4 One son Eugenio Lopez was responsible for
acquiring the vast amount of sugar lands that became the foundation
for the Lopez family wealth and subsequent prominence in the west-
ern Visayas.'5
His son Benito Lopez catapulted the family into the mainstream
of the regional politics of the western Visayas when he became gov-
ernor of Iloilo at the turn of the twentieth century. His political
career, however, was abruptly ended when, upon re-election he fell

(eds), From Marcos to Aquino: Local Perspectives on Political Transition in the Philippines
(Manila, 1991), pp. 9-Io.
12 The definition of family alliance has been influenced by Thomas Kiefer's study
on the Tausug. See Thomas Kiefer, The Tausug: Violence and Law in a Philippine
Moslem Society (New York, 1972), especially pp. 8, 59-75-
13 Scholars who have studied the structure of Philippine politics argued that this
fluidity has resulted in the formation of unstable political factions composed of elite
family groups. See Lande, Leaders; McCoy, 'Yloilo'; and Hollnsteiner, The Dynamics.
'4 Oscar Lopez, The Lopez Family, Vol. 1 (Metro-Manila, 1982), pp. xxiii-xxxvii.
'3 Ibid., pp. xliv-xlvi. Also Oscar M. Lopez, 'Man for All Seasons', in First Lopez
Family Reunion, Descendants of Basilio Lopez-Sabina Jalandoni, in Jaro, Iloilo City,
Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1982, Lopez Memorial Museum, Manila.

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190 MINA ROCES

victim to assassination.'6 Wh
two young sons, Eugenio and
transform the Lopez family fro
Philippine national politics, an
a formidable financial empire.
Eugenio Hofilefia Lopez was b
in Manila at the Ateneo for hi
of the Philippines for a law
degree from Harvard Universi
from America, he practiced la
lawyer at that time-Vicente J
received his education in Man
the University of Santo Tomas
Immediately after his mar
return to the sugar plantation
Negros Occidental. He gave up
lish businesses in Iloilo-Negros
(The company with the name
1926.) He revived his father's
its corresponding English daily
Iloilo Shipping Company provi
and Negros Occidental. He the
ments to include Iloilo Transp
bus company (Panay Autobus)
an airline (1933), the Iloilo-Ne
He dabbled in real estate un
built a chain of cinema house

16 Not much is known about Benit


family stops with the first Eugenio
Worcester Papers charged the govern
officials, and of buying votes at elect
ofJoaquin Gil, Benito Lopez, Governo
in Iloilo, Particularly the Testimony
19o7, and 'Report of the Chief of the
Preferred byJoaquin Gil', found in th
Vol. 1, Item No. 27, Department of
Hatcher Library, The University of M
"7 Eugenio Lopez Sr, 'Biographical
Career', Attachment No. 7-C Eugen
Question 12, file, Lopez Memorial M
Philippines. Interview with Presenta
interview with Pacita Moreno Lopez,

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 191
the food business with the formation of Velvet Ice Cream.'8 All these
investments made the Lopez brothers' commercial interests the larg-
est in Iloilo City by 1940o.9 In the political arena the family was
linked to the Zulueta family political faction, one of the two domin-
ant factions of Iloilo at the time (the other being the Confesor-
Caram alliance)."
The Second World War put a temporary halt on many profitable
business ventures. The Lopez-owned El Tiempo was taken over and
used by the Japanese for their propaganda purposes. The Panay
Autobus buses were first appropriated by the Japanese and then util-
ized by the USAFFE. Eugenio Lopez and his immediate family left
for safety in the hills of Baguio and Luzon. Fernando Lopez and his
family however, stayed in the vicinity of Negros Occidental and Iloilo
province.
After the war the Lopez family moved to Manila and began to
expand their business interests increasingly on a national scale. The
move to Manila became a watershed in Lopez family history as it
symbolized the family's transition from regional elite to major prot-
agonist in national politics. Business ties to Iloilo gradually
weakened, although the western Visayas would always remain the
major political foothold in electoral politics. It was inevitable that
Eugenio would move to Manila, Iloilo had become too small for his
corporate plans." At this time, Fernando Lopez made his political
debut. On September 29, 1945, President Sergio Osmefia appointed
him mayor of Iloilo city.22
The political debut of Fernando Lopez which began with a mayor's
appointment in 1945 launched a political career that lasted 25 years
(put to an untimely end only by the declaration of martial law by
President Ferdinand Marcos in 1972) reaching the post of vice-
presidency and the choicest cabinet position (Secretary of Agricul-
ture and Natural Resources) for three terms. Thus began a symbiotic

18 Interview with Pacifico Villaluz (who has worked as treasurer for the Lopez
interests since the pre-war days, and was manager of Iloilo Transportation
Company), Manila, 5 July 1988, and Eugenio Lopez, 'Biographical Data', pp. 1-2.
'9 McCoy, 'Yloilo', pp. 124 and 165-
20 Alfred W. McCoy, '"Politics by Other Means": World War II in the Western
Visayas, Philippines', in Alfred W. McCoy (ed.), Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupa-
tion, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series No. 22, 1980, pp.
158-203.
21 Interview with Oscar M. Lopez, son of Eugenio Lopez, Manila, 27 March 1988.
22 The Times, 29 Sept. 1945, p. 1.

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192 MINA ROCES

relationship between politics


closeness of the two brothers. Wi
family had the passkey to the r
them access to the credit and franchises sealed off to families
deprived of political power. While one brother made political connec
tions, the other was the shrewd and ruthless businessman who util-
ized these special privileges for the family business corporations.23
The unusual closeness of the brothers further guaranteed family
unity and financial success. The brothers trusted each other and
never fought. In this partnership Eugenio made all the busines
decisions and all businesses he fathered were shared equally with
Fernando.24 The extent of their trust was manifested in the fact that
at least one bank account was in the name of Fernando and Eugenio
Lopez with the stipulation that either of them could withdraw any
amount.25
Fernando Lopez' rapid rise in national politics could only be
described as meteoric. In 1945, President Sergio Osmefia appointed

23 This paper only presents the highlights of the Lopez family history; for a more
comprehensive account see Maria Natividad Roces, 'Kinship Politics in Post-War
Phliippines: The Lopez Family, 1945-1989', Ph.D. dissertation, The University of
Michigan, 199o, ch. 4-
24 Interview with Fernando Lopez, Manila, 8 April 1988; interview with Mariquit
(Maria Salvacion) Javellana Lopez, Bacolod, 16 April 1988; interview with Oscar
M. Lopez, Manila, 27 March 1988; interview with the Eugenio Lopez family and
their spouses during their Sunday dinner reunion, Manila, 27 March 1988
(Presentacion Lopez-Psinakis, Oscar M. Lopez, Manuel M. Lopez, Roberto M.
Lopez, Steve Psinakis, Connie Rufino Lopez, and Marites Lagdameo Lopez); inter-
view with Pacita Moreno Lopez, 17 May 1988; interview with Eugenio 'Geny' Lopez
Jr, Manila, 2 May 1988; interview with Pacifico Villaluz, Manila, 5 July 1988; inter-
view with Marcelo Fernando, Lopez family lawyer in the 196os, Manila, 12 April
1988; interview with Alfredo Montelibano Sr, close associate of Eugenio Lopez in
the sugar bloc and cumpadre of Fernando Lopez since his son married Fernando's
daughter Mita, Manila, 20 April 1988; and interview with Lydia M. Fullon, cashier
of the Lopez family (BISCOM and PASUMIL sugar centrals) who worked with them
from 1937 to the present, Manila, 18 March 1988.
25 The wife of Eugenio Lopez, Pacita Moreno Lopez, and his children, Presenta-
cion Lopez-Psinakis and Oscar M. Lopez deny this. Interview with Pacita Moreno
Lopez, Manila, 17 May 1988; interview with Presentacion Lopez-Psinakis, Manila,
26 May 1988; and interview with Oscar M. Lopez, Manila, 27 March 1988. How-
ever, Hilarion Henares Jr, who was close to the Lopezes, claimed that he had seen
this account. Interview with Hilarion Henares Jr, godchild of Fernando Lopez, eco-
nomist, former vice-president of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and col-
umnist of The Philippine Daily Inquirer responsible for exposing the Lopez family
scandal involving the Manila Electric Company in August 1988, Manila, 30 June
1988. This observation was confirmed by Pacifico Villaluz who said both brothers
could sign any amount they wanted. Interview with Pacifico Villaluz, Manila, 5 July
1988. (Also confirmed by one Lopez employee who wishes to remain anonymous.)

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 193

him mayor of Iloilo. A year later his successor, President Ma


Roxas re-appointed him mayor of Iloilo.26 Roxas then invited
nando to join the Liberal Party (Fernando supported Osmefia's
didacy and ran with his Nacionalista Party), and worked for his n
ination as senatorial candidate two years later.27 Typical of m
politicians Lopez switched political parties as the family al
shifted. At the end of July, 1947, Lopez launched his campaig
senator in his home province of Iloilo, and resigned as Iloilo m
a month later in order to concentrate on the senatorial campai
At this critical point in the political career of Fernando Lo
brother Eugenio acquired a major national newspaper bas
Manila, The Manila Chronicle on September 27, 1947.29 This ne
per then became the major political weapon of the Lopez fam
aptly described by Lopez critics later as the 'mouthpiece' of Eu
Lopez. The most salient point to make about The Manila Chroni
a Lopez investment was that it never made any money.30 Why
Eugenio Lopez, a hard businessman, then keep it running at
for twenty-four years?
Media was a powerful weapon that could be used to attac
political and business enemies, even the president of the Philip
Applying the values of politica defamilia the Lopezes consistently
the newspaper to serve their familial interests. The paper was not
ous for biassed reporting. It continuously endorsed Lopez pol
candidates and censured Lopez enemies. The paper was also us
pressure political and business rivals (including the president o
Philippines) to capitulate to demands in the interests of the
family. During the campaigns of Fernando Lopez, every activit

26 The Times, 3 May 1947, P. i, and The Manila Chronicle, 4 May 1947, P. 2.
27 Interview with Fernando Lopez, Manila, 8 April 1988; and The Times, 2
1947, p. 1.
28 The Times, 31 July 1947, p. 1; The Manila Times, 30o July 1947, pp. 1 a
and The Manila Times, 1 Aug. 1947, pp. 1 and 28. In fact the entire Liberal
senatorial slate embarked on their campaign in Iloilo upon the invitation o
nando Lopez. Lopez resigned as Iloilo mayor on 29 Aug. 1947. See The Manila
29 Aug. 1947, p. 5.
29 The Times, 27 Sept. 1947, p. 1.
30 Interview with Conrado Sanchez Jr, economist, former governor of the
of Investments, now with the UNCTAD, Manila, 5 June 1988, and interview
Pacifico Villaluz, Manila, 5July 1988. This observation is also made by former
man (who worked with Eugenio Lopez at the Meralco), Rafael Salas who l
became President Marcos' Executive Secretary. See NickJoaquin, The World ofR
Salas (Metro-Manila, 1987), p. 83. 'The Chronicle had been losing money for
years. It was known as a Lopez mouthpiece and therefore biased in favor
owners. Other businesses of the Lopez empire had been subsidizing the Chro

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194 MINA ROCES

every speech no matter how trivi


icle. Furthermore, the Lopez bu
in The Manila Chronicle suppleme
In just two years Fernando Lo
senator on December 30, 1947
later, the sugar barons groomed
candidate with Elpidio Quirino f
ferred to have Jose Yulo or Ma
But the Visayan delegates, deter
to bolt the Liberal Party unless
candidate.33
The sugar barons were not onl
well organized, complete with
Federation of Sugar Planters (N
The enormous wealth and powe
on the fact that the sugar indu
dollar earning product in the P
second world war. The governm
annual revenue from taxes paid
and three companies engaged in
of its capital to sugar.34
After the war, priority was also
try. The planters and millers w
compensate for their crops, to re
centrals. Credit was extended t
terms. The Rehabilitation Fin
founded to create credit facilities
and industry damaged by the w
sugar, and the province of Neg
from the financial aid provided

s The Manila Times, 30 Dec. 1947, p.


32 The Sunday Times Magazine, 24 Apr
13 For the account of the 'battle for
Times, I June 1949, pp. 1 and lo; The M
Manila Times, 7 June 1949, pp. 1 and
4; The Manila Times, lo June 1949, pp. 1
p. 1; The Manila Times, 11 June 1949,
1949, pp. I and 4; and Philippines Free P
3 E. J. C. Montilla (First Vice-Presid
Past, Present and Future of Our Sugar
1950), p. 12.
3 Ibid., p. 13, Eduardo Romualdez (ch
in Philippine Rehabilitation and Recon
1955), pp. 104-6; Delfin Buencamino,

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 195

became the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)


only government banking institution which granted long-term
to the sugar industry."6 The Philippine National Bank (PN
vided short-term crop loans which were supposed to be liq
after every crop. Nonetheless the PNB was (and still is) the
commercial banking institution in the Philippines and if on
political power it was easier to borrow money from the P
importance accrued to the sugar industry was such that the PN
usually headed by a Negrense (one from Negros in the Visa
backbone of the sugar industry).37
Eugenio Lopez' influence emanated from his leadership
organization of sugar barons. Two of his closest friend
Ledesma and Alfredo Montelibano Sr.) served as presidents
NFSP at some point in their careers. The group was a pote
formidable political force in post-war politics, so much so that
ential aspirants courted the planters by promising aid to th
industry-beginning with the first post-war president Manu
who in a campaign speech promised to aid the sugar industr
limit' if elected.38 The sugar barons' endorsement of Fernan
for vice-president was nearly a command thrust into the lap o
ino, and at the same time it carried with it the wealth and r
of the planters-practically a recipe for success at the poll
end, during the tight elections, Quirino would have no re
regret relenting to the sugar bloc, for in the hectic campaign
that followed, The Manila Chronicle not only published fu
advertisements for Quirino-Lopez, but also repeatedly mad
the Visayan endorsement of the pair."9 Exercising its prero
an instrument of kinship politics, the newspaper did not
advertisements for the opposition-the Laurel/Briones or A
Francisco tickets. Such a vigorous campaign supported by t
powerful agricultural and industrial barons was crucial
obtaining the victory of Quirino and Lopez who were proc
president and vice-president on December 14, 1949.40

the Philippine Economic Blueprint', Fookien Times Yearbook (Manila, 195


4 and 57; and The Manila Chronicle, 26 Nov. 1949, pp. 7 and lo.
36 Manuel Elizalde, 'The Philippine Sugar Industry in 1959', Fookien Tim
book (Manila, 1959), P. 182.
3 Interview with Conrado Sanchez Jr, Manila, 5 June 1988.
38 The Manila Times, 7 Feb. 1946, p. 1.
39 The Manila Chronicle, 23 Oct. 1949, p. 17; The Manila Chronicle, 30
pp. 1 and 4; The Manila Chronicle, 5 Nov. 1949, PP. 1 and 5; The Manila Chr
Nov. 1949, p. 1; and The Manila Chronicle, 12 Nov. 1949, p. 1.
4 The Manila Times, 14 Dec. 1949, p. 1.

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196 MINA ROCES
During Fernando Lopez' term as vice-p
Agriculture and Natural Resources,4' bro
February 19, 1951, the largest sugar cen
Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company (BIS
curement of the sugar central transform
headed by Lopez into millers as well. In 1
a second sugar central, this time in L
Mill (PASUMIL). His investments incl
Cement, The Manila Chronicle, Industrial
bags for the sugar), in 1957, the ABS-CB
tion, and finally in 1961, the jewel of
Manila Electric Company (Meralco).
Although all these corporations were a
Lopez' political career, he consistently str
office to serve the people. His defense r
prior to his entrance into politics, he wa
and was capable of earning four or five
president's salary of P15,ooo a year, had h
practice.42 In public, and also in his own
interests between his presence in politic
tions his brother was purchasing and en
concerned, he himself was no longer i
'Nobody could tell us that I am taking ad
senator, as vice-president to enhance ou
until the late 198os when asked question
with Philippine presidents and other po

4' Fernando Lopez was also awarded the choices


Agriculture and Natural Resources by Quirino w
alliance to make the appointment. See The Manila
5; and interview with Fernando Lopez, Manila, 8
Jalandoni to Malacafian, 12 Sept. 1950; Iloilo City
pondence, Iloilo; The Manila Times, 25 May 1950,
26 May 195o, p. 1; The Manila Times, 27 May 1950
2 June 1950, p. 1; The Manila Times, 12 June 1950,
1950, pp. 1 and 12; Philippines Free Press, 3 June 19
Aug. 1950, p. 4; The Manila Chronicle, io Sept. 195
Oct. 1950, p. 4; The Manila Chronicle, 21 Oct. 195
Strange Case of Vice-President Lopez vs. President
29 April 1950, pp. 2-3; 'Lopez Pleads for Moral Aust
April 1950, p. 37; Leon O. Ty, 'Parting of the Ways
1950, p. 4; The Manila Times, 5 Sept. 1950, p. 1;
1950o, p. I.
42 The Sunday Times, 16 April 1950, p. 2.
43 Interview with Fernando Lopez, Manila, 8 April 1988.

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 197

simply dismiss this with the statement that all quarrels with
presidents were with his brother, he himself oblivious to the reaso
for the dissent.44 Fernando's statement was confirmed by other L
allies and rivals-Don Fernando was the naive, charming 'Mr N
Guy' who could not hurt a fly-the quintessential politician, the
whom no one intentionally challenged, while Don Eugenio was
shrewd businessman who controlled the family business from behi
the scenes.45
Fernando Lopez' reactions reflected the ambivalent behavior of
families who expressed endorsement of western values stressing the
importance of the national interest over the family, and yet continu-
ing to practice kinship politics in day-to-day life. In his mind, the
contradiction was 'resolved' by the 'separate' roles that distinguished
him from his elder brother. And yet in reality, the brothers' interests
and identities were practically fused. The family felt compelled to
advocate western values despite the fact that in actual practice they
continued to abide by the values of politica defamilia.
That the Lopez corporations were built from the special privileges
gained through the practice of kinship politics was an undisputed
fact exposed by President Diosdado Macapagal. At the very start of
his administration President Diosdado Macapagal launched a major
attack on the Lopez family, as part of his 'moral regeneration' drive.
Beginning with a speech warning the sugar bloc against engaging in
organized power politics as a means to promote its interests," he
then proceeded to show how this bloc, which he labelled the 'Lopez
sugar bloc', used their influence to secure special bank loans. Maca-
pagal's attempt to criticize the practice of kinship politics was funda-
mentally sincere-he sought to implement the western values of
ethics, professionalism, and the concern for the national interest.
(He did not build a family business empire though he himself
emerged a wealthy man.) The battle had raged for the entire four
years of his presidency and cost Macapagal his re-election, since the
elite families practicing kinship politics decided to, in the words of
Montelibano, 'go for broke' to ensure his defeat. Such a prolonged

44 Ibid.
45 Interview with Hilarion HenaresJr, Manila, 3oJune 1988; interview with Con-
rado Sanchez Jr, Manila, 5 June 1988; interview with Marcelo Fernando, former
lawyer of the Lopez family, Manila, 8 April 1988; and interview with President
Diosdado Macapagal, Manila, 16 April 1988.
46 The Manila Times, 14 Feb. 1962, pp. 1 and 12-A; and Philippines Free Press, 3
March 1962, p. 1.

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198 MINA ROCES
and systematic exposure and condemn
the Lopez family (some other families
Yulos)47 hitherto unprecedented, would o
of their financial support at election t
boy from Lubao' with no personal 'fam
been aware of the risk he was taking.
Macapagal's aim was to impose the w
prise 'which should make available t
citizens equal and fair opportunity to
tactics but according to the merits of ev
became necessary to put an end to wha
'the era of special privileges'.'4 Amo
first: 'those who have utilized organized
ness empires and vice-versa, to which
pertain'.50
In the four years of his tenure, Macapagal unleashed a continuous
series of attacks against the Lopezes. To substantiate the main
theme of the attacks, that of using political power to build a business

47 Macapagal also attacked the Yulos and exposed thatJose Yulo had acquired his
vast Canlubang sugar estate with loans obtained from the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation (RFC) when he was chairman of the RFC. Macapagal rightly pointed
out that it was both unethical and unconstitutional to be involved in a business
transaction of this nature when one was in the government service. The case was
brought out in the press and there were threats to oust the plantation from Yulo.
A complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna where there was a
move to expropriate the estate. Complaint, Republic of the Philippines, Court of
First Instance of Laguna, Bifian branch, Republic of the Philippines versus Jose
Yulo, Tomas Yulo, CJ Yulo & Sons, Inc, Vicente Madrigal, Bank of the Philippine
Islands, China Banking Corporation, Commercial Bank and Trust Company, Philip-
pine Bank of Communications, Development Bank of the Philippines, Luis Yulo,
Teresa Jugo, Maria Elena Y. Quiros del Rio, Jose Yulo Jr, Regina Abreu, Ramon
Yulo, Carmen de Vera, Jesus Miguel Yulo, Maria Cecilia Yulo and Leandro Locsin,
Civil Case No. B-362, document given to the author by President Diosdado Macapa-
gal. The case was also heard in the Supreme Court. See also The Manila Chronicle,
25 Aug. 1962, pp. 1 and 9; The Manila Chronicle, 25 Jan. 1963, p. 1; The Manila
Chronicle, 1 Feb. 1963, p. 12; The Manila Chronicle, 13 Feb. 1963, p. 1; The Manila
Times, 21 Sept. 1962, p. 1; and The Manila Times, 25 Sept. 1962, p. 1.
48 Diosdado Macapagal, 'The Big Drive', Radio-TV Address, 28 Aug. 1962, in
Diosdado Macapagal, New Hope for the Common Man, speeches and statements of
President Diosdado Macapagal, Vol. 2, Research and Special Projects, Malacafiang
Press Office, June 1963, PP. 97 and io1; Diosdado Macapagal, 'The Big Drive',
Radio-TV Address, published in The Manila Chronicle, 29 Aug. 1962, pp. 1, 7 and 9.
4 Napoleon G. Rama, 'The Era of Special Privileges is Over!', Philippines Free
Press, 3 March 1962, pp. 6 and 75.
50 Diosdado Macapagal, 'The Big Drive', p. 102, and interview with President
Diosdado Macapagal, Manila, 2 June 1988.

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 199

empire, Macapagal argued that during the period of their


activities, the Lopez brothers and their associates in the su
acquired the following choice businesses: the BISCOM, the
MIL, The Manila Chronicle, the ABS and the CBN television
and the Meralco.5' Furthermore, their political connections
them to receive special loans and credits from government
and financial institutions, loans which enabled them to buy th
businesses in the first place. Macapagal published a presum
breakdown of Lopez credits to state institutions:

1. Development Bank of the Philippines:


a. Binalbagan Central P32,490,ooo
b. Pampanga Central 4,788,ooo
c. Philippine Portland Cement 2,355,000
d. Industrial Company 1,450,000
e. Bolinao Electronics (Alto Broadcasting) 6oo,ooo
f. CBN Broadcasting 2,275,000
g. Southern Lines (Shipping company) 1,730o,000
Total P45,688,ooo

2. Philippine National Ba
a. Meralco P35,ooo,ooo
b. Chronicle 2,000,000
c. Binalbagan Sugar Central 3,500,000
d. Pampanga Sugar Mill 1,200,000
e. Bolinao Electronics (Alto Broadcasting) 485,000
Total P42,185,ooo

3. Government Service I
a. Alto-CBN (building construction) P5oo,ooo

All of these totalled P88,373,ooo.52

Second: Macapagal denounced the Lopezes for thei


influence in the legislature, and the judiciary. Mac
example, accused what he nicknamed the 'Lopez s
(composed of 36-strong men in the House with an u
number of senators under the leadership of Senate Pre
Tempore Fernando Lopez), of controlling the political an

"' The Manila Times, 24 Feb. 1962, pp. 1 and 12A.


52 'Palace Versus the Lopezes', Philippines Free Press, 19 Jan. 196
Manila Times, 1 March 1962, pp. 1 and 2-A; and The Manila Chronicle, 1
p. 15-

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200 MINA ROCES

life of the nation. Th


politicians as allies thr
fees as 'legal counsel' or
lishments.3 According
to control both the sen
senate president) and t
Romualdez as House Sp
Lopez bloc had also s
ranking and key position
institutions like the Ph
Bank of the Philippines
Bank. Their patronage
hand in the appointmen
to the justices of the p
The president's campai
catalogue of Lopez fam
courts. One case was ta
for a Pro million tax e
tional violation where th
Homesite and Housing

5 Leoncio R. Parufigao (Ma


Brothers', Philippines Free Pr
' The Manila Times, 3 Marc
1962, pp. 1 and 16-A. For g
attempts to control the sen
pp. 1-2; and The Manila Tim
5 Leoncio R. Parufigao, 'Th
56 The Lopezes were accused
ities in order to pay a smal
the Lopez brothers falsified
that the total liabilities of th
pany Inc. was P32,261,38o.2
of only P16,377,276.56 in re
that the Lopez brothers ove
Times, 20o Aug. 1962, p. 12
seizure because it neglected t
pp. 1 and 2-A. Bureau of In
charged a P1,286,039 broker
tax it failed to pay from 195
restrained the BIR from exe
pp. 1 and to-A. For reporta
Times, 3 Jan. 1963, pp. 1 a
Manila Times, 9 March 1963
Supreme Court to restrain th
Times, 7 March 1963, p. 1; a

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 201

residence of the underprivileged), and built thei


there.57 The lot was bought during Fernando Lop
and was against the constitutional provision whi
no senator shall be directly interested in any con
ernment during his term of office.58
Don Eugenio Lopez was well-known for his tre
spirit. In fact he fought with every single Ph
(except Carlos Garcia) and many family opponent
satirized, criticized and exposed vehemently i
Chronicle. The primary strategy this time, howe
trate their efforts in a presidential campaign (f
defeat Macapagal at the polls. A statement attri
Lopez summed up succinctly the psychology behi
conduct: 'We will not give in to Macapagal becau
around when the time comes that he will no lon
The first full-blown relentless Chronicle attacks
administration began once Fernando Lopez annou
to seek the Nacionalista Party's presidential nomi
elections. From here on, the Chronicle persisten
presidential administration, particularly in the sp
Lopez who had begun an arduous campaign with
all over the country. From July to November 19
an aggressive campaign, traveling all over the cou
Nacionalista leaders, giving numerous speeches ho
port for the NP nomination. True to family pol
Chronicle followed the senator throughout all his
Despite such an aggressive campaign (complete
tional posture that he would not settle for the v
and instead retire from politics if not nominated),
inand Marcos in the NP convention.60 Just as i
Fernando would retire from politics greatly
Imelda Marcos approached him in his Manila

57 For information on the PHHC lot case see The Manila


pp. i and 12-A; The Manila Times, a1 Aug. 1962, pp. i and 1
5 Jan. 1963, pp. 1 and 8-A; Teodoro M. Locsin, 'The Mills of
Free Press, 1 2 Jan. 1963, p. 6; Edward R. Kiunisala, 'The Boom
a Feb. 1963, pp. 66-7.
58 The constitutional reference is to section 17, article 6 of
9 Interviews with President Diosdado Macapagal, Manila
June 1988.
6 The Manila Chronicle, 12 Nov. 1964, pp. 1 and 15; The Manila Chronicle, 23 Nov.
1964, pp. 1 and 15; The Manila Times, a23 Nov. 1964, p. 1.

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202 MINA ROCES

tears, begged him to


the point of view of M
machine would be abso
husband. From the Lo
ture the presidency, th
the power behind the t
pagal's assaults had th
their efforts to succee
recourse but to defea
(In fact the Macapagal
sell the two sugar m
these, two other cor
Industrial Company.)
To the Lopez family,
era of special privileges
replace these with west
democracy, only succe
'to succeed in business
Jr summed up his fat
Like dad-he always bac
this time so Macapagal w
ino Stonehills and went
them, many many thin
weight to his desire to
business because you see
are completely helpless.63

Ironically, the preside


the opposite reaction
loss of their privilege
their decline in powerf
mined than ever to re
familia.
The Marcos-Lopez campaign was launched on January 6, 1965.
During the entire year of 1965 The Manila Chronicle had almost daily
reports on the activities and the speeches of both candidates, while

61 Interview with Fernando Lopez, Manila, 8 April 1988; Bonner, Waltzing with a
Dictator, p. 24 , and Carmen Navarro Pedrosa, Imelda Marcos (London, 1987), P. 10o 1.
62 The Manila Chronicle, 16 Sept. 1965, p. 1. This axiom was confirmed in inter-
views with Eugenio 'Geny' Lopez Jr, Manila, 21 May 1988, and President Diosdado
Macapagal, Manila, 16 April 1988.
63 Interview with Eugenio 'Geny' Lopez Jr, Manila, 21 May 1988.

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 203

the Macapagal administration was continuously and rut


attacked.64 The entire Lopez family was mobilized for the ve
time to instigate an 'all out' effort to defeat Macapagal at t
The wives of the Lopez clan, in particular, Pacita Moreno Lop
of Eugenio Lopez Sr) and daughter Presy (Presentacion) joi
Blue Ladies of Mrs Marcos and accompanied her, attired in
blue uniforms, to the campaign sorties all over the Philippin
expense nor effort was spared; the Lopez multi-media comp
exploited, and the Meralco company planes were borrowed
provincial travels.66 At the end of the campaign (dubbed th
campaign in Philippine history) the Lopezes had spent a tot
million.67 As Lopez ally Alfredo Montelibano was supposed
said, the strategy was to 'go for broke' against Macapag
indeed, the crusade was fruitful: Ferdinand Marcos and Fer
Lopez took their oaths as president and vice-president respe
on December 30, 1965.68
The beginning of the year 1966 heralded the peak of the
family history in terms of political power and economic empir
family was in control of Meralco, which was an extremely pro
monopoly,69 it controlled a good segment of the media via The
Chronicle, two television stations (ABS-CBN) and twenty-tw
stations all over the country (all under the umbrella of the
company-Alto Broadcasting-formerly Bolinao Electronics).
time the family had bought also the controlling shares of the
pine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and was maki
to establish the Philippine Petroleum Company which wou
the monopoly of the lubricating oil industry in the Philip
Although the family had left the sugar milling business w
BISCOM and PASUMIL sugar centrals were sold in 1962
with Philippine Portland Cement and Industrial Company
manufactured the jute bags for the sugar), the family still own
sugar lands and other real estate items managed under the

64 See The Manila Chronicle, 9 Jan.-15 Dec. 1965.


65 Interview with Pacita Moreno Lopez (wife of Eugenio Lopez), Manila
1988, and interview with Presentacion Lopez Psinakis, Manila, 26 May 1
66 Interview with Pacita Moreno Lopez, Manila, 17 May 1988.
67 Interview with Lopez campaign manager and cousin, Vicente 'Tikin
Jr, Manila, 18 May 1988.
6 The Manila Times, go Dec. 1965, p. i, and The Manila Chronicle, 30 D
p. 1. The Manila Chronicle also put out a special supplement on the inaug
69 Interview with Pacita Moreno Lopez, Manila, 17 May 1988.

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204 MINA ROCES

corporation BENPRES (this stoo


parents of Eugenio and Fernan
At the same time the major co
companies like Philippine Engin
engineering sector of the Mera
Corporation (MSIC) which built
angas province to the various M
ary company of the ABS-CBN b
engaged in the business of prep
cials. Other 'sideline' investmen
Insurance and Surety Company
1956 and as a typical business e
(since the companies needed to
insure with a family-owned in
Sheraton Hotel, renamed the H
investment was relinquished later
was the Lopez Memorial Museu
in memory of his parents, toda
of Filipiniana as well as valuabl
the creations of Eugenio and no
owned equal shares of all these
was associated with Fernando L
inaugurated in March 1968 wit
Not surprisingly, in 1966 too,
their political power. Fernando
but also immediately appointed
Resources. President Marcos also named him Rice and Corn Coord-
inator. Lopez' position was very powerful since he was in charge of
dispensing lumber, timber, and logging licenses. In September 1966
The San Francisco Chronicle reported that Eugenio Lopez, 'the richest
man in Manila,' gave a grandiose party for President Marcos. Lopez
was described as 'the most powerful man in the Philippines' and 'the
power behind the throne'.70
The Marcos-Lopez alliance survived one term and was viable
enough to win a re-election (the first time a presidential administra
tion was re-elected in post-war history) in 1969. The tenuous alli-
ance, however, broke down after a year (January 1971) when Marco
announced his intention to destroy the 'oligarchy' and the 'vested
interests' and began a savage attack against the Lopez family.

70 San Francisco Chronicle, 26 Sept. 1966, clipping from the scrapbook of Eugenio
Lopez, Lopez Memorial Museum, Manila.

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 205

Although Marcos claimed that his campaign was again


'oppressive oligarchs' in an overall crusade to destroy the oligar
it was patently obvious that he was particularly interested
troying the Lopez family; an intention verified in the sub
martial law period. From the start, the press echoed the pu
sensus that Marcos was fundamentally insincere, and many
curious to sit back and watch the joust from the wings, aw
the consequences of the tournament would not affect the
since it was, after all, merely a personal and familial fight.7
The details of this quarrel are more explicitly discuss
where73 but suffice it to say that Ferdinand Marcos argued
from the standpoint of western values; that his crusade wa
at eliminating familism (kinship politics) by preventing t
family from its next move-the possession of the monopoly
the Philippines. Marcos continued this vendetta with ruthl
in the subsequent martial law period which followed twenty
after his first tirade against the Lopez family.

Martial Law

In his book, Today's Revolution: Democracy (appropriately dubbed the


Marcos blue-print for the New Society even by Marcos himself74
Marcos published the first and most comprehensive rationale for t

7' Teodoro L. LocsinJr, 'A Fairy Tale', Philippines Free Press, 13 Feb. 1971, p.
72 These articles were all taken from the personal scrapbook of Eugenio Lop
entitled 'Clash of Titans', which compiled all the articles about the Lopez famil
battle with President Marcos in 1971: Greg M. Datuin, 'Battle to Death', Malaca
ang Profile column, Daily Mirror, 12 Jan. 1971; Ricarte M. Baliao, 'Blackout Spawn
Naughty Speculations', in Passing Column, The Evenings News, 14 Jan. 1971, p.
Willie Ng, Column 8, Philippines Herald, 15 Jan. 1971; Amando E. Doronila, 'A Stu
of FM-DM Tactics, Fair or Foul', Check and Balance Column, Daily Mirror, 16 J
1971; Amelita Reysio-Cruz, Merry-Go-Round Column, Manila Daily Bulletin, 18 Ja
1971; 'Lopez Taxes Get Palace Attention', Evening News, 18 Jan. 1971; Charlie
Castafieda, 'FM Concentrates Fire on Meralco', Evening News, 18 Jan. 1971; Da
Bidan, 'Government Maps Moves on Meralco', Philippines Herald, 19 Jan. 1971; L
Beltran, 'After Five Years of Trying, Marcos May Yet Succeed', A Place in the
Column, The Sun, 9 Jan. 1971; Amelito R. Mutuc, 'Battle of the Century', Week
Nation, 25 Jan. 1971; Guillermo 'Willie'Jurado, 'The Battle of Titans', a series
six articles in the Weekly Nation, 25 Jan., 1 Feb., 8 Feb., 15 Feb., 22 Feb., and
March 1971. The Republic Weekly ran a series of 8 articles on the Lopezes under t
heading 'Case Studies of our Oligarchs', found also in the scrapbook but was n
dated.
7- See Maria Natividad Roces, 'Kinship', pp. 152--9.
74 Ferdinand E. Marcos, Notes on the New Society of the Philippines (Manila, 1973),
p. vii.

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20o6 MINA ROCES
declaration of martial law in 1972. Here Ma
on the evils of Philippine politics and societ
through what he termed the 'democratic re
it 'revolution from the center'). Of primary
was his focus on the oligarchy as the major
of a society characterized by a wide gap b
poor. Marcos was perceptive enough to obs
administration fell because of its record of gr
pattern seemed to perpetuate itself indefin
this was the result of the fact that the oligar
in political power as such but in the pursu
social privilege.75 Marcos laid the sole blame o
presence of social corruption.76
Martial law was the method Marcos chose t
and transform the Philippine 'precarious d
democracy. Since Marcos had pointed out t
lican system did not work, as it merely unl
administrations guilty of graft and corrup
release Filipino society from this endless quag
that Marcos expressed the entire rationale
ern values. He condemned the 'old society'
of kinship politics. The so-called 'democratic r
violence and unleashed 'from above' was the best method to initiate
changes in Philippine social structure and bring equality to the
majority of the Filipinos suffering from poverty. In his treatises77
Marcos was unequivocally championing western values over that of
kinship politics as the dogma for the 'new society'. And indeed, his
criticism of traditional family values was very apt from the standard
of western values.
Martial law equipped Marcos with unlimited powers with which to
carry out his vendetta against the oligarchic families, put a halt to
the practice of kinship politics, and thus break the endless cycles of
corrupt administrations. Instead the reverse occurred. Whereas,
prior to martial law many families competed at election time for the

5 Ferdinand Marcos, Today's Revolution: Democracy (Manila, 1971), pp. 71-2.


76 According to Marcos, 'In the institutional sense, the oligarchs, for being privil-
eged, are guilty of bringing about this state of affairs' (social corruption), ibid., p.
74.
77 See Ferdinand Marcos, Today's Revolution; and the following: Ferdinand Marcos,
Notes, Ferdinand Marcos, Revolution from the Center (Hongkong, 1978), and Ferdinand
Marcos, Progress and Martial Law (Manila, 1981).

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 207

political power that would grant them access to the special priv
with which to build financial empires, after martial law only
family alliance had this unique opportunity. Since Marcos ass
dictatorial powers and elections were abolished, the Marcos f
alliance had the monopoly over the practice of kinship politics for
indefinite period. The corruption of the Marcos family all
termed 'crony capitalism' revealed that Marcos, although b
dishing western values at the start of martial law, had fully inten
to practice kinship politics for the benefit of his own familial alli
In this case Marcos' call to western values was mere rhetoric, f
aware of the prestige these values held in the public mind.
Nevertheless, the martial law powers had enabled him to des
a number of elite families and in particular his main riva
Lopez family. When Marcos declared martial law, Eugenio
was at that time vacationing abroad and his brother Fernando
him from Manila and advised him to remain in exile. In lieu of the
family patriarch, Marcos imprisoned instead Eugenio 'Geny' Lopez
Jr allegedly for his involvement in an assassination plot against the
president.78 With Geny as hostage, Marcos was able to pressure Eug-
enio Lopez to relinquish his family interests in the Meralco and the
media. With the declaration of martial law, the Lopez family's for-
tunes plummeted. Believing Marcos' promise that his son would be
released if he agreed to sell Meralco to the Meralco Foundation Inc.
(MFI-the Marcoses), Eugenio Lopez signed away his biggest com-
pany for a mere pittance (P133,337,511.24), with only Pio,ooo paid
initially. In the agreement, signed on December 27, 1973 at Honol-
ulu, Hawaii, the Lopez family corporation BENPRES, sold all its
Meralco Securities Corporation shares to the Foundation. The
foundation was to pay BENPRES in sixteen annual installments if
and when the buyer can afford to pay.79
Marcos also appropriated the Lopez media interests-The Manila
Chronicle and the television stations-ABS-CBN, and PT & T, a tele-
communications subsidiary of ABS-CBN. By 1974, Lopez had con-
ceded all his multimillion-properties, and Geny was still in jail. In
March of 1974, Eugenio was told that his terminal illness would only

78 Bagumbayan, Oct. 1977, P. 2.


79 Stock Purchase Agreement, Annex 'C', Agreement between BENPRES Cor-
poration and Meralco Foundation Inc., document provided by Oscar M. Lopez, and
Agreement, Annex 'E', Agreement between BENPRES Corporation and Meralco
Foundation Inc., document provided by Oscar M. Lopez. See also Steve Psinakis,
Two Terrorists Meet (San Francisco, 1981), p. 228.

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208 MINA ROCES

permit him a few more months


son freed before he died. The d
trip to Manila to plead with th
surrender, but he returned emp
How did the Lopez family resp
to destroy their family empire
imprisonment restrained them
the usual ferocity attributed t
once Geny, convinced that his f
ation, decided to put his life on
signs of standing up to the Mar
In November 1974, Geny decid
it was 'the only way open to me t
on all the 'thousands of detainee
for months and years without be
them'."' Although a major reason
ate his father from the humili
detention, Geny had linked his
prisoners in the Philippines, wh
one man aspired to dictatorial pow
strike, Marcos promised to con
both prisoners recuperated (Gen
Sergio 'Serge' Osmefia III), they
now fully aware that Marcos w
faced with Marcos' demands for a
ing martial law, Eugenio decided
In the American press, Eugenio
Lopez family of their corporation
lobby in the US congress for atte
to Marcos' corruption and black
of Marcos' treatment of the Lop
the powers that be in the Unit

8 Harvey Stockwin, 'Amnesty, But H


Review, 29 Nov. 1974, P. 11, interview
1988, and interview with Presentacion
8' Harvey Stockwin, 'Amnesty, But Har
Two Terrorists Meet, pp. 146-7. The la
married Eugenio Lopez' daughter Pre
Marcos and discusses the Marcos extort
82 Joseph Lelyveld, 'Rich Family Los
New York Times, 22 April 1975, p. 2, a
July 1988. See also Steve Psinakis, Two T

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 209

Marcos dictatorship and ignore its victims. Dispossessed and


ated, the dying Eugenio Lopez requested presidential permi
see his two sons Oscar and Manolo in Manila. These petitio
ignored and the most powerful man in the Philippines prior
tial law died a broken man in 1975, without all his childre
whom he had been so close, at his deathbed.8 He had lost th
est battle of his life.
Shortly afterwards, Geny and his immediate family, with the help
of sister Presy Lopez-Psinakis and her husband Steve Psinakis (a
Greek national with American citizenship living in the US), suc-
ceeded in engineering a sensational escape from prison. The cost of
the escape, which was entirely a family affair, amounted to around
$loo,ooo involving the purchase of a plane and ending in the grant-
ing of political asylum in the United States." Subsequently, Geny
joined the anti-Marcos movement in the US, but his role was con-
spicuously minimal. This was not surprising since the motivations
for the escape were not ideological but personal and familial, despite
all the publicity emphasizing the ideological reasons for Geny's
'struggle'. Besides, the family still left behind vulnerable members,
younger brothers Oscar and Manolo and their mother had to be
protected. It was brother-in-law Steve Psinakis who was more vigor-
ously involved in the anti-Marcos crusade. He wrote a regular column
for the two Filipino community newspapers: The Philippine News and
The Philippine Times. He also wrote letters and petitions to American
congressmen exposing Marcos' extortion of the Lopezes and other
families as well as the torture of political prisoners. He joined Raul
Manglapus' Movement for the Free Philippines. When Benigno

83 Interview with Eugenio 'Geny' Lopez Jr, Manila, 21 May 1988; interview with
Pacita Moreno Lopez, 17 May 1988; interview with Presentacion Lopez-Psinakis,
Manila, 26 May 1988; interview with Steve Psinakis, Manila, 15 July 1988; The
Washington Post, 19 July 1975, p. B7; the Philippines Free Press, 3 May 1986, p. 23;
and Bernard Wideman, 'Goodbye to the Maker of Dollars and Men', Far Eastern
Economic Review, 25 July 1975, p. 25-
8 For a detailed account of the escape based on the notes of Augusto Almeda
Lopez (Geny's close friend who was involved in the escape) see Augusto Almeda
Lopez, 'An Exclusive Account of the Lopez-Osmeiia Escape: Prison Break from Fort
Bonifacio', serialized in Who, 6 March 1982, pp. 10-12, and 13 March 1982, pp.
10-12. The author also has a copy of the handwritten notes of Augusto Almeda
'Jake' Lopez on the escape. See also 'The Great Escape', Time, 17 Oct. 1977, P. 35;
Newsweek, 17 Oct. 1977, p. 12; and Bagumbayan, Oct. 1977. There is also an account
of the escape in the book by Steve Psinakis, Two Terrorists Meet, pp. 158-67, a reprint
of the account published in The Boston Phoenix, 8 Nov. 1977, by Stu Cohen entitled
'The Great Escape'.

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210 MINA ROCES

'Ninoy' Aquino Jr, Mar


to exile in the United S
friends. Psinakis convin
United States which fo
the 'purchase agreeme
Lopez family was not a
minimal, while simultan
itics of his regime.86
Apart from the activi
Lopez family in Manila
the rules of kinship po
at least in the initial te
the methods with whi
family itself was ostra
observed that 'Many sn
fessed that many friend
ino mind the family had
ily's turn to benefit from
the vicissitudes ofpolitic
provoked the rise and fa
Shortly after the assass
unleashed the pent up r
scale corruption and o
holed up in Manila at l
protest rallies as the p
roomed. In January an
a series on how the Ma
from the Lopez family
Club Filipino where he

85 Steve Psinakis, Two Terror


86 There was some tension w
bers in Manila continued to
Interview with Steve Psinak
Lopez-Psinakis, Manila, 26
Manila, 17 May 1988.
87 Interview with the Lope
March 1988.
' Ruby Villavicencio, 'Grow
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 18
89 Bernardo V. Lopez, 'Why
1985, pp. 20-3; Augusto Al
ABS-CBN Without Paying a
pp. 9-15, and 18-24Jan. 198

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 211

CBN television stations were taken from them. Here he criticized


Marcos 'crony capitalism' of which the seizure of the ABS-CBN was
a classic example. As he denounced the 'cronies and scoundrels' for
their 'dastardly actuations',90 Oscar was applying the yardstick o
western values to judge the behavior of the Marcos family whose
excessive corruption was merely kinship politics in its purest form.
The Lopezes were echoing the general public clamor for a stop to
Marcos' excessive endorsement of kinship politics. A snap election
held inJanuary 1986 illustrated to the international press the exten
of Marcos' cheating and in February 1986, the people took to the
streets to defend the army faction that initiated a coup against the
regime. The Lopez family supported the EDSA revolution (the Feb-
ruary Revolution is fondly called EDSA revolution since EDSA is the
shortened form of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue where the people
defended the army rebels from Marcos' retaliation) from its incep
tion, with the public press release:
Inasmuch as the Marcos martial law government illegally and forcibly
seized the 5 television and 21 radio broadcasting facilities of the ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation scattered around the country in 1972, and sinc
the Marcos government and cronies operated them to their benefit and
profit without any compensation whatsoever, the rightful owners-Lopez
Family announce that they are offering the use of these facilities including
Channel 4 at Broadcasting Center, Bohol Avenue, Quezon City, to the new
government for the duration of the crisis.91

In this move the Lopez family declared their support of the coup
d' tat-turned-people-power-revolution, that demanded a return to
democratic values and a shunning of the excessive kinship politic
practiced by President Marcos.
Although their anti-Marcos campaign, if it can be called that, wa
very limited and indulged in short spurts, the Lopez family, one of
the prime victims of martial law, criticized Marcos in the languag
of western values. Marcos was exposed for his corruption and extor
tion of rival elite families, and his detention of political prisoners a
hostage for the dispossession of these families. In all their state-
ments against the Marcos regime the Lopez family was making a
stand against the Marcos practice of kinship politics.

90 Oscar M. Lopez, Statement Given at Press Conference on ABS-CBN on to


Jan. 1985 at the Club Filipino, document provided the author by Oscar Lopez.
91 Press Statement, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, Fernando Lopez
Chairman, Oscar M. Lopez, President, 24 Feb. 1986, in the ABS-CBN file, Lopez
Memorial Museum, Manila.

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212 MINA ROCES

After Febrev

When the 'people power revolution' of February 1986 deposed Pres


ident Marcos and ushered in a new regime that was committed to
restoration of the pre-martial law democratic system, the Lopez
family members overseas ended their years in exile and returned t
the Philippines. Eugenio Lopez had four sons and one daughter: Eug
enio Lopez Jr (Geny), Oscar (Oskie), Manuel (Manolo), Robert
(Robie), and Presentacion (Presy) married to Steve Psinakis. In
1986, Geny, Robie and the Psinakis's returned to the Philippines
and like the other families who were victims of martial law,
attempted to regain the family enterprises surrendered to the
Marcos family. The family was primarily interested in the Meralco,
the two television stations channels 2 (ABS) and 4 (CBN) and the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) now renamed
the Philippine Commercial and International Bank. This time the
family was once again close to the powers that be-the new president
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino (Cory) was the widow of Benigno Aquino,
a close friend of Psinakis from the anti-Marcos crusade overseas.
Family friend Jake Lopez approached presidential adviser and then
cabinet minister Joker P. Arroyo asking three favors on behalf of the
Lopez family: that Geny would take over the ABS-CBN and th
PCIB, that Oscar Lopez oversee the First Philippine Holdings Cor-
poration (FPHC), the holding company of the Meralco, and tha
Manolo head the Meralco.92
These favors were granted, the most controversial ones being
Cory's nomination of Oscar as head of FPHC and Manolo as presid-
ent of Meralco. The nominations were supposed to be transitory;
that is, the men were in their positions as officers-in-charge (OIC)
only until such time as ownership and management of these compan-
ies were settled. The appointment of Manolo, for example, was criti-
cized in the press which argued that he gained his position only
because he was a Lopez and not because he was competent and quali-
fied for it. One journalist emphasized that Manolo was a graduate
from University of the East, bypassing many government technocrats
with Harvard or Wharton business degrees.93 Minister Arroyo also
reorganized the MFI board, and in turn MFI itself reorganized the

92 Hilarion Henares Jr, 'Recapturing the Glorious Days of Empire', Philippine


Dail Inquirer, 14 July 1988, p. 1.
93Hilarion Henares Jr, 'Lopez out of Meralco, Monsod Sneaks In', Make My Day
Column, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 9 Sept. 1988, p. 5.

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 213

FPHC board to include Christian Monsod, Augusto Almeda


C. D. Quiazon, Stephen Psinakis and Finance Secretary
Jayme, mostly Lopez men.94 (Jake Lopez was a close frien
Lopez family, while Quiazon was the family lawyer, and Psin
married to a Lopez.)
The initial emotional euphoria that was unleashed by the
'People Power' revolution was accompanied by an aversion
kinship politics that dominated political and economic prac
fourteen years.95 The 1986 constitution ratified a few mont
Mrs Aquino took office, had distinct provisions inserted pre
prevent the resurgence of tendencies towards the practice of k
politics. For example, it stated that no family should be all
have the monopoly over media and industry. Also, certain p
were made against the establishment of political dynasties
several family members served in political office simultane
senators, congressmen, governors, and mayors.96 In their attem
prevent another resurgence of Marcos' style kinship politics, t
constitution therefore was declaring the official adherence to w
values.
The constitutional delegates were not the only ones antipathetic
to the possible reincarnation of kinship politics a la Marcos. Soon
after Febrev (as the 1986 revolution was fondly called) journalists
expressed paranoia over the return to 'oligarchy and cronyism'."
Confronted with this public general apprehension the Lopez family
published a clarification of its demands:
1. Members of the family seek to redress an injustice perpetrated upon
them by the martial law regime. We want nothing more than a reasonable

94 Hilarion Henares Jr, 'Meralco Deal Lopezes Air Their Side', Philippine Daily
Inquirer, 16 July 1988, p. 8.
9 This aversion to family monopolies in business was manifested in the 1986
constitution although subsequent events (post-1988) revealed that kinship politics
has become the status quo again.
96 The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Republic of the Philippines The
Constitutional Commission of 1986, Quezon City, 15 Oct. 1986. See provisions on
pp. 6, 15-16, 29, 39, 43, 55, 59, 65, and 85.
97 'Oligarchy Redux', Philippines Free Press, 15 July 1987, pp. 15 and 38; 'The
Return of the "Old Oligarchs" ', Philippines Free Press, 3 May 1986, pp. 16, 17, 23,
and 39; Luis R. Mauricio, 'The Return of Oligarchy', Malaya, 27 June 1987, p. 4;
Luis Mauricio, 'Defiance of the Constitution', Malaya, 3oJune 1987, p. 4; 'The Case
of Channel 4', Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2 July 1987, p. 4; Luis R. Mauricio, 'Another
Attempt at Deception', Malaya, 2 July 1987, p. 4; Emil P. Jurado, 'The KBP
"Pawns" ', Manila Standard, 7 July 1987, p. 4; 'Back to Oligarchy', The Manila Times,
9July 1987, p. 4.

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214 MINA ROCES
settlement of our claims or the fam
seized or clearly underpaid by the
3. In pursuing its objectives, the Lo
continue to seek to identify its aspir
est, being fully aware of the urgent
new wealth but to promote a more
a means of achieving a stable, dem

In a public statement therefo


declaring its endorsement of t
national interest above the fam
ally that the family 'has always
that of the nation. But viewed w
the Lopez family betrayed amb
to its own faults, practised kinsh
their former business corpor
(group).
One example will illustrate the Lopez family's reliance on the
methods of kinship politics. Unfortunately for them, the rekindling
of the aggressive familial behavior which in an earlier era had won
for them the ownership of major Philippine corporations, would be
partially blocked in the new era that was initially somewhat less toler-
ant of behavior that was so reminiscent of the Marcos regime. The
manner in which the Lopezes sought to reclaim the Manila Electric
Company cannot be described other than as the aggressive applica-
tion of kinship politics.
The 'reclaiming' of Meralco proved to be an extremely complic-
ated issue because in this case the Lopezes received compensation
for it from the Marcoses (after Psinakis filed a suit in the United
States), albeit minuscule. At the same time the company itself had
expanded its operations since 1972 with funds outside of the Lopez
family. It would be very difficult, then, to determine just how much
of the company was still rightfully owned by them. The company
itself was heavily indebted to the Development Bank of the Philip-
pines (DBP) and was unable to repay its loans. The DBP then held
the Meralco shares mortgaged as collateral for the loans. Further-
more, the new government's attitude that no family be allowed the
monopoly of major industries and businesses predicated that at least
in theory, the Lopez family would not be granted the 'special franch-
ise' to turn such a major public utility into a family company. Presid-

98 'Lopez Family States Position', Philippines Daily Express, 11 June 1986, p. 5.

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 215

ent Aquino herself, 'in a bid to dispel fears of an underha


with the Lopezes', insisted that plans for the privatization of M
should ensure that not a single business group or famil
receive outright control.99 Meralco was perceived to be too
a company to be in the hands of a dynasty or oligarchy.'00
Nonetheless, in July 1988 a columnist, Hilarion 'Larry' H
Jr, exposed a major scandal involving the family's attempts
control of the Meralco. In a series of articles for the Philippine
Inquirer, Henares brought to public attention the 'Mera
wherein the Lopez family acquired control of 51% of Meralco w
putting up the capital for it.'o' In a convoluted arrangeme
which Henares confessed was so complex that it required fiv
with a computer to figure out and which still left many puzzle
deal transferred 16.5 million Meralco shares (65.12% of outs
shares) from the DBP to two Lopez companies for only P69o
or P41.73 per share when the market value then was Pigo pe
The money for the shares would not come from the Lopez
but the J. P. Morgan bank and the Bank of the Philippine
(BPI) which would buy 11.8 million shares (46.45% outstan
P58.5o0 per share. The rest of the shares would be transferred
Lopezes 'with absolutely no cash outlay'.'02 The furtiveness
the deal was concocted also violated Cory's policy of transpa
major government transactions. In the national context, th
ling of Meralco was significant because it was to be the 'mo
the privatization of the other government-owned and controlle
porations such as the Philippine Air Lines, the Philippine
Oil Corporation, the Manila Hotel, Cocobank, Oriental Petr
and the San Miguel Brewery.'03
The Lopez family had criticized the Marcoses for approp
their company without just compensation. And yet once the
selves were back in power, they would not hesitate to acquir
ity stock without putting up the collateral. Such behavior is ev
for the conflict between kinship politics and western valu

99 The Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 July 1988, p. 92.


'00 Jesus P. Estanislao, 'A Rejoinder: The Meralco Share Dispersal Progr
ippine Daily Inquirer, 24 July 1988, p. 9.
101 See Philippine Daily Inquirer from 11 July to 17 July 1988.
102 Hilarion Henares Jr, 'Are the Oligarchs Back?', Philippine Daily Inq
July 1988, p. 1.
o03 Hilarion Henares Jr, 'Lopez-Meralco Deal From the Beginning was
Makaw', Philippine Free Press, 20 Aug. 1988, p. 8.

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216 MINA ROCES

family perceived the faults


familia and criticized them
but did not apply those sa
clever social dynamics, an
motivated it to behave in t
first. For not unlike the
the past, the Meralco deal
tions with key individual
institutions. The family's
them the confidence that
ing and support. Despite the
the government decided t
compromise agreement tha
syndicate were compelled
with the government.'04 T
close the chapter on the M
had to resolve whether the
was legal.'06 It took four
sequestration on the FPHC
ary 9, 1992 that the share
the public market. The im
selling of the FPHC's Mer
1992, FPHC profits rose b
Thus although initially t
d'jtat-turned-revolution was
crony capitalist mode, kin
itself. For despite the att
skillful use of kinship polit
empire,'08 the latest devel
the resurgence of kinship p
'0 For more details on the Mer
pp. 188-9.
10s The Sandiganbayan is the court established to try public officials.
'6 The Business Star, 29 Aug. 1989, pp. 1 and 3.
'07 Maria Teresa Colayco, The Cornerstone, The Story of First Philippine Holdings Cor-
poration (Pasig, 1992), p. 117. This is a book commissioned for the thirty-year anni-
versary of FPHC and published by FPHC, following the Philippine tradition of pub-
lishing books and hagiographies that would give prestige to family corporations.
' The Lopez family's attempts to reclaim channels 2 and 4 were blocked. They
received channel 2 but not channel.4 which became a government channel. The
family's attempts for the franchise on the telecommunications satellite was blocked
in 1989. See Maria Natividad Roces, 'Kinship', pp. 190-20o3.
I9 Corruption in the Aquino regime revealed evidence of the constitution being
ignored as corruption h la crony capitalism continued to flourish at a pace similar
to that of the Marcos regime.

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 217

Even more than Karl Marx, Filipino businessmen have alw


acutely aware that politics and business are inextricably rela
Lopez family's strategies for success mirrored this symbiotic r
ship between political power and the special privileges that
ated the rise of an economic conglomerate: family member
political arena provided the means through which the fami
build up a business empire. As long as Fernando Lopez was in
whether as senator, or vice-president, brother Eugenio wa
acquire the special privileges, particularly the preferent
loans that generated the capital for business investments. G
symbiotic relationship between political power and the con
necessary for business success, it was not surprising that the f
height of political power (vice-president for two successiv
1965-1971) coincided with the summit of their economic w
Once political power was completely lost in the martial law
the family was stripped of its business corporations overnig
While the techniques of politica defamilia practically ensu
family's success, it inevitably courted criticism. In crucial
post-war history, such criticism caused a fall from power
sequently a loss of economic wealth. The continuing rise an
the family paralleled the cycles of administrations in the p
period up to contemporary times. At the same time the f
ambivalence towards kinship politics and western values wa
of many political families of the era who continued to use
politics to build social prominence, while criticizing their rival
they perceived as immoral, precisely because they were adv
kinship politics.

Conclusion

The conflict hypothesis explains the recurring cycles of politi


administrations in post-war Philippines and provides a meanin
framework with which to analyze patterns within specific periods
across different eras-the republican period, the martial law per
and the Aquino administration. Political administrations are co
posed of family alliances in power. The conflict between the two se
of values triggers the rise and fall of family alliances, and
sequently, these endless cycles. The conflict hypothesis also expl
the ambivalent behavior of families who apply the yardstick of wes

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218 MINA ROCES

ern values when criticizing their


kinship politics. Such ambivalenc
vented resolution of the conflict.
A steady deterioration of Philippine economy and politics has
occurred at the end of each successive cycle. Instead of a linear devel-
opment, a downhill trend is observed, as the Philippines declines
in prosperity and institutions reveal signs of breaking down. The
republican period (1945-1972) witnessed the marginal prosperity of
the Philippine economy being siphoned off by politicians and families
who were later criticized for graft and corruption. The period experi-
enced the classic oscillations wherein families entered politics,
carved business empires, were criticized for such immoral behavior,
then were voted out and replaced by other families who not long
after became guilty of the same sins. President Macapagal's attempts
to end the era of special privileges only met with staunch resistance
from the elite families who became more determined to deny him
another term of office and replace him with a president more predis-
posed to the practice of kinship politics. With American support,
Marcos as the first president to gain a second term of office, broke
these seemingly never ending political cycles by escalating the pat-
ronage system, and crippling the country's finances in an extravagant
re-election campaign. This break was further made apparent by his
assuming dictatorial powers under martial law. But the crony capital-
ism that characterized the Marcos regime merely escalated the mag-
nitude of graft and corruption to unprecedented heights. The Aquino
administration riding on a popular 'revolution' against crony capital-
ism failed to check the magnitude of crony corruption and instead
increased the rate at which fortunes could be amassed; the Coju-
angco family (Mrs Aquino is a Cojuangco) alliance has been accused
of acquiring crony assets in less time than it took the crony capital-
ists to accumulate them."' Thus, despite the ratification of the 1986
constitution which championed western values, and whose provisions
specifically sought to bar the family alliance from excessive kinship
politics, kinship politics is still dominant in contemporary Philip-
pines. Apparently, deteriorating economic conditions have increased
the needs of families, thereby worsening the magnitude of corrup-
tion;-and the cycle continues.

o Due to spatial constraints material on the Marcos and Cojuangco families is


not included here. See Maria Natividad Roces, 'Kinship', chapter five, for data on
these families.

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 219

The case study of the Lopez family presents the conflict in tang
form. The family's rapid rise to national prominence after the
was largely due to its aggressiveness in applying the techniqu
politica defamilia. Their actions were exposed and censured par
larly by Presidents Diosdado Macapagal and Ferdinand Ma
Throughout the period Fernando Lopez in his political speeches
tinually reiterated his commitment to western values. Marco
1972 declared martial law ostensibly to destroy the oligarchy
put an end to the practice of kinship politics and herald a ne
of democratic western values. Although he succeeded in vanqui
his rivals, including the Lopez family, Marcos instead instituti
ized kinship politics as the only form of political behavior viable,
his own family alliance becoming the only possible practitione
the art. The Lopez family, clear victims of the Marcos ven
against the rival family alliances, when finally roused to chall
the Marcos regime, and applying the standard of western val
accused it of kinship politics. But when in 1986 the Aquino adm
tration replaced the Marcos regime and the Lopez family was
more close to the powers that be, despite their public statem
declaring the family's loyalty to the national interest, the next
eration of Lopezes utilized kinship politics to regain former cor
tions lost to President Marcos.
The history of the Lopez family is also a microscopic view of the
life cycle of kinship politics. The Lopez family built its entire empire
through the use of kinship politics; by utilizing political power to
acquire special privileges. The saga of the family's rise and fall mir-
rors its success and failures in implementing the techniques of pol-
itica de familia. Kinship politics was the vehicle used by families to
build a successful economic empire. Coupled with family unity and
talent it became a formidable force in the national political arena.
In fact, comparatively speaking it seemed almost necessary for a
family to operate using politica defamilia if it wanted to achieve suc-
cess, albeit temporary. Nevertheless these families did not perceive
themselves to be champions of the precepts of kinship politics.
Instead, they saw themselves as dutiful family members fulfilling
their obligations to their family by aiding in the prosperous growth
of their family's prominence. At the same time, because they had
also been imbued with western cultural values they insisted (and
perhaps really believed) that their actions were purely altruistic, and
that they had not neglected to consider the national interest.
The case study of the Lopez family demonstrates that success

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220 MINA ROCES

engineered bypolitica def


ephemeral. It was politi
cial privileges used for t
tion: loans from govern
allocations, special busin
exemptions. But eventu
of the national interest a
Once political power w
this artificial and arbitr
As the Lopez family his
the underlying formid
decision making in Phil
politics subverts United
democratic system in t
two parties, family riv
structure and placed th
that both parties are n
through which kinship
arena, merely a method
other for malakas (stron
tion to power at least le
turns the democratic sy
behavior of the family
kinship politics despite
values. Thus the outside
for instance, The Manil
operated not as a profit
of the Lopez family int
corporations is conduct
family, and political offi
an economic empire for
Finally, by diagnosing k
and economic behavior,
from the conflict betw
a 'history from below', n
elite point of view," no

"' This approach does not l


behavior of all Filipino famili
with a politically powerful or
nies were not originally of t
more, because of the vertica

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KINSHIP POLITICS IN POST-WAR PHILIPPINES 221

politics, but an attempt at a 'history from wit


is interpreted according to Filipino cultura
which incorporate both the traditional ethos
brought in by the colonial experience. Finally,
politics may even provide a new theoretical
to undertake similar studies in other countries of Southeast Asia.
Family dynamics was present for example in Ngo Dinh Diem's South
Vietnam, Chiang Kai Shek's Kuomintang regime, Suharto's Indone
sia and even Nicaragua under Somoza."2 The conflict hypothesi
itself could be used to explain not only the ambivalent behavior of
family alliances and the cycles of administrations, but one could
speculate, quite possibly the dramatic oscillations between demo-
cracy and authoritarianism that pepper the experience of post-war
Southeast Asia; Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines in
particular.

members of the alliance, all of whom identify with the elite family. Since the elite
families are inveterate rivals, the alliances are between the elite families and their
poorer clients who identify with them. The Lopez employee thinks of himself as
part of the Lopez family network and the Lopez family members consider their
employees as part of 'family'.
12 Latin America would provide an excellent point of comparison. For example,
Nicaragua under Somoza would be very similar to the Philippine case. In fact, the
term politica defamilia was taken from the Latin American literature which boasts
of a sophisticated body of literature on family studies. The Latin American scholars
used this term to refer to the phenomenon wherein prominent families occupied
several political posts, or family-based politics and kin networks, and sometimes to
the patterns wherein regional elites controlled the politics and economic activities
of the region. Though I used the term to refer to kinship politics and the family's
use of political power to build a business empire, the Latin American studies are
excellent models of the idiosyncracies involving the actual practice of kinship polit-
ics. See Diane Balmori, 'Family and Politics: Three Generations (1790-1890)',
Journal of Family History, Vol. io, No. 3; Linda Lewin, 'Some Historical Implications
of Kinship Organization for Family-Based Politics in the Brazilian Northeast', Com-
parative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 21, No. 2, April 1979; Linda Lewin, Politics
and Parentela in Paraiba. A Case Study of Family-Based Oligarchy in Brazil (Princeton,
1987); Billy Jaynes Chandler, The Feitosas and the Sertao dos Inhamuns. The History of
a Family and a Community in Northeast Brazil, I700-193o (Gainsville, 1972); Mark
Wasserman, Capitalists, Caciques and Revolution. The Native Elite and Foreign Enterprise
in Chihuahua, Mexico, 1854-Irg9 (London, 1984).

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