Study Guide No 3 PART 2

Evidence Atty.
Jelyne Guadalupe
Atty
PART II
3. ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS
SECTION 27. Admission of a party. – The act, declaration or

omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him or her.
1. What is an admission?
Any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or

unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with
the facts alleged by him.
2. Read and digest the case of Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-
15, April 3, 2001.
Facts:
For resolution are petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos.
146710-15 and Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the Court’s Decision
of March 2, 2001.
ISSUE:
Whether The Angara Diary Is Inadmissible For Being Violative Of The
Following Rules On Evidence: Hearsay, Best Evidence, Authentication,
Admissions And Res Inter Alios Acta.
RULING:
Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged
improper use by this Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that the use of
the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the
issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay
evidence.
Held: We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara Diary is not an out
of court statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases
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Evidence Atty. Jelyne Guadalupe
Atty
of bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the

Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said
Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings.
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court
statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule. 6 Evidence is
called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on
the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by
whom it is sought to produce it. There are three reasons for excluding
hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of
demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. 8 Not all hearsay
evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge
body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their
relevance, trustworthiness and necessity.
A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further

determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of
exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will
show that they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary
belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that "the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him." 11 It has long been settled that these admissions
are admissible even if they are hearsay.
The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can

be categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap
presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his statement that
he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo
Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second
envelope would be opened by Monday and "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko
na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy,
intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any more of this — it’s too painful.
I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to
clear my name, then I will go." We noted that days before, petitioner has
repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite the growing clamor
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for his resignation. The reason for the meltdown is obvious — his will not
to resign has wilted.
It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the
petitioner, hence, non-binding on him. The argument overlooks the
doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction
to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat
the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the
other person. Jones explains that the "basis for admissibility of admissions
made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption by the
party of the statements which the other person had made." To use the
blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, this process of attribution is not
mumbo jumbo but common sense." In the Angara Diary, the options of the
petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support
from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary
Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to
consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation." Petitioner did not
object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the
country. Petitioner’s silence on this and other related suggestions can be
taken as an admission by him.
Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara Diary against
him violated the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section
28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: "The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided." virtua1aw library
Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule
has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130
with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the

petitioner. He was the Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by the
petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned
Malacañang Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner
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told Secretary Angara: "Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na

lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin." (Since the start of
the campaign, Ed, you have been the only one I’ve listened to. And now at
the end, you still are.)" 17 This statement of full trust was made by the
petitioner after Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress of the first
negotiation. True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if
he would already leave Malacañang after taking their final lunch on January
20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as
saying to Secretary Angara: "Ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do I have
to leave now?)" 18 Secretary Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner
cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that
met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and
orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment of the powers of the
presidency. The Diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by
Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara
acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before
respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently, petitioner is
bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary

Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner). Jones very well explains
the reasons for the rule, viz: "What is done, by agent, is done by the
principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So, whatever is said
by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time
and accompanying the performance of any act within the scope of his
authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the
particular contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the
language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his
principal and admissible in evidence against such principal."
3. Distinguish ADMISSIONS under Section 27 of Rule 130 from

JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS under Section 4 of the same rule.
4. State the rule on admissibility as evidence of an offer of

compromise in civil cases.
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It is for the reason that parties are encouraged to enter into

compromises. Courts should endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil
case to agree upon some fair compromise (Art. 2029, NCC). During pre-
trial, courts should direct the parties to consider the possibility of an
amicable settlement. (Sec. 2(a), Rule 18)
It is NOT an admission of any liability and is NOT admissible against

the offeror. (Sec. 27, Rule 130)
5. Read and digest the case of Tan v. Rodil Enterprises, G.R. No.
168071, December 18, 2006.
FACTS:
Rodil Enterprises filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed against
Luciano Tan, alleging that under a Contract of Sublease, Tan bound himself
to pay P13,750.00 as monthly rentals. However, Tan refused to pay the
rentals from September 1997 up to the time of the filing of the Complaint.
In his Answer, Luciano Tan insists that he is a legitimate tenant of the
government who owns the Ides ORacca Building and not of Rodil
Enterprises. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint, and for
the return of whatever amount Rodil Enterprises had collected from 1987
to 1997, or during such time when he was still paying rentals to the latter.
On 27 June 2000, the MeTC issued an Order, recognizing an agreement
entered into in open court by Luciano Tan and Rodil Enterprises. The
Order, inter alia, declared, thus:
On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open

court to the following terms to put an end to this civil case for ejectment
between them:
1.) that [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from
September, 1997 up to the present, which is the outstanding obligation of
[Luciano Tan] as of June, 2000, on or before June 30, 2000; and
2.) [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on
or before the 5th day of each month after June 30, 2000.
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Tan filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, averring

therein that he had agreed to pay all the rentals due on the subject
premises and to pay the subsequent monthly rentals as they fall due; that
the rentals in arrears from September 1997 amounted to P467,500.00; and
in line with his good faith in dealing with Rodil Enterprises, he would like to
deposit the aforesaid amount, and the subsequent monthly rentals as they
fall due. He prayed that he be allowed to deposit the Managers Check for
the amount of P467,500.00, made payable to the City Treasurer of Manila.
However, on 15 August 2000, the MeTC denied the Motion on the
rationalization that Luciano Tan's prayer to deposit the specified sum with
the City Treasurer of Manila contravenes Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of Rodil Enterprises.
According to the MeTC, notwithstanding the evidentiary norm in civil

cases that an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and
is not admissible in evidence against the offeror, the court cannot overlook
the frank representations by Luciano Tan's counsel of the former's liability
in the form of rentals, coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The foregoing
gestures, as appreciated by the MeTC, were akin to an admission of a fact,
like the existence of a debt which can serve as proof of the loan, and was
thus, admissible. The court pronounced that Luciano Tan had explicitly
acknowledged his liability for the periodic consideration for the use of the
subleased property. Estoppel, thus, precludes him from disavowing the fact
of lease implied from the tender of payment for the rentals in arrears.
Petitioner posits that the aforesaid admission, made in open court, and
then, reiterated in his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals,
cannot be taken as an admission of his liability, citing Section 27, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, which states, inter alia, that an offer of compromise
in a civil case is not a tacit admission of liability.
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ISSUE: WON the admission of Tan, made in open court and reiterated in
his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals be taken as an admission
of his liability?
RULING:
Yes. The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not
an admission of liability. It is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated by this Court
in Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to

compromise, the circumstances of the case and the intent of the party
making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the
existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying
peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in
the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the existence of an
indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then,
the admission is admissible to prove such indebtedness. Indeed, an offer of
settlement is an effective admission of a borrowers loan balance.
Similarly, in the case of Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co. the

Court applied the exception to the general rule. In Varadero there was
neither an expressed nor implied denial of liability, but during the course of
the abortive negotiations therein, the defendant expressed a willingness to
pay the plaintiff. Finding that there was no denial of liability, and
considering that the only question discussed was the amount to be paid,
the Court did not apply the rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations.
In the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court of Appeals properly
appreciated petitioners admission as an exception to the general rule of
inadmissibility. The petitioner did not contest the existence of the sublease,
and his counsel made frank representations anent the former's liability in
the form of rentals. This expressed admission was coupled with a proposal
to liquidate. The Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals was as an
explicit acknowledgment of petitioners liability on the subleased premises.
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The existence of the Contract of Lease, dated 18 October 1999 was not
denied by petitioner.
6. State the rule on admissibility as evidence of an offer of

compromise in criminal cases.
It may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

Except in the following cases:
1. In quasi-offenses where there is no criminal intent (negligence), such

as reckless imprudence;
2. In criminal cases allowed by law to be compromised such as:
a. NIRC (Sec. 7c) – The CIR has the power to compromise minor
criminal violations as may be determined by the Secretary of
Finance;
b. LGC (Sec. 408) – Allowed in minor offenses whose penalties do
not exceed one year;
c. RPC (Art. 266-C) – In cases of marital rape, where subsequent
forgiveness by the wife extinguishes the criminal action or
penalty. (Suarez and De la Banda, 2006)
7. Cite instances where laws allow compromise in criminal

cases.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal

negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.
No compromise is valid in the following cases:

1. Civil status of persons;
2. Validity of a marriage or legal separation;
3. Any ground for legal separation;
4. Future support;
5. Jurisdiction of courts;
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6. Future legitime;
7. Habeas corpus; and
8. Election cases (Herrera, 1999)
8. Read and digest the case of San Miguel Corp. v. Kalalo, G.R.
No. 185522, June 13, 2012.
FACTS:
Respondent Kalalo ad been a dealer of beer products of petitioner
SMC. SMC failed to send a detailed statement of account to respondent
despite several requests made by the latter. In order to protect her rights
and to compel SMC to update her account, she ordered her bank to stop
payment on the last seven checks she had issued to petitioner. Instead of
updating the account of respondent, SMC sent her a demand letter for the
value of the seven dishonored checks.
In the face of constant threats made by the agents of SMC,

respondent's counsel wrote a letter (the "Offer of Compromise") wherein
Kalalo "acknowledged the receipt of the statement of account demanding
the payment of the sum of P816,689.00" and "submitted a proposal by way
of 'Compromise Agreement' to settle the said obligation." It appears,
however, that SMC did not accept the proposal. Subsequently, SMC filed a
Complaint against respondent for violating the Bouncing Checks Law. In
the meantime, Kalalo kept reiterating her demands that SMC update her
account. During trial, and after the prosecution had rested its case,
petitioner finally complied. After tallying all cash payments and funded
checks and crediting all returned empty bottles and cases, the Statement
of Account showed that the net balance of the amount owed to petitioner
was P71,009. Respondent thereafter recanted her Offer of Compromise
and stated that, at the time she had the letter prepared, she was being
threatened by SMC agents with imprisonment, and that she did not know
how much she actually owed petitioner.
The MeTC acquitted Kalalo of the BP 22 cases. SMC appealed the civil
aspect of the case to the RTC but its appeal was dismissed. In its present
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petition before the SC, petitioner argues that, in her Letter of Offer of
Compromise, respondent unequivocally admitted her liability to private
complainant-appellant duly assisted by her counsel."
ISSUE:
Whether the Offer of Compromise may be considered as evidence
against respondent Kalalo.
RULING:
No. The letter does not contain an express acknowledgment of
liability. At most, what respondent acknowledged was the receipt of the
statement of account, not the existence of her liability to petitioner.
The fact that respondent made a compromise offer to petitioner SMC

cannot be considered as an admission of liability. The reasons why
compromise offers must not be considered as evidence against the offeror
are as follows:
1. Since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a

person is entitled to "buy his or her peace" without danger of being
prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any communication made
toward that end will be regarded as privileged. Indeed, if every offer to buy
peace could be used as evidence against a person who presents it, many
settlements would be prevented and unnecessary litigation would result,
since no prudent person would dare offer or entertain a compromise if his
or her compromise position could be exploited as a confession of
weakness.
2. Offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not intended
as admissions by the parties making them. A true offer of compromise
does not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on the part of a
defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that
his or her claim is groundless or even doubtful, since it is made with a view
to avoid controversy and save the expense of litigation. It is the
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distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is made tentatively,

hypothetically, and in contemplation of mutual concessions.
Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by respondent, the Offer of

Compromise was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint against
her for a violation of BP 22. The Offer of Compromise was clearly not made
in the context of a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be
considered as an implied admission of guilt.
9. Read and digest the case of People v. Nazareno, G.R. No.

180915, August 9, 2010.
FACTS:
Appellant Charlie Nazareno y Melanios was charged with murder in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The facts, based on the eyewitness account of Jericho Capanas, are

as follows:
At around 3:30 o’clock in the morning of 23 September 2001, Jericho

Capanas was awakened from his sleep by a noise coming from outside his
house. When he peeped through his door, he saw appellant being unruly in
front of their neighbor’s house, breaking bottles and hacking the jalousie of
their neighbor’s window. Upon reaching the victim’s house, appellant
kicked the door and when the door flung open, Romeo de Guzman, the
victim, who was sleeping behind the door, stood up. The victim was,
however, unable to step out of the door as appellant suddenly grabbed him
by the hair and delivered a thrust to his chest using a bladed weapon.
Jericho Capanas was less than an arm’s length from appellant and the
victim when all these were happening. The doors of their (the victim’s and
Jericho Capanas’) houses are adjacent and only a wall separates the two
houses.
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After stabbing the victim, appellant hurriedly left the scene. Jericho
Capanas called the police, after which, he helped bring the victim to the
hospital.
RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed the guilt of the appellant. Hence,
this appeal. 14 October 2001, while in detention, appellant wrote a letter to
the victim’s brother asking the latter’s forgiveness for the killing of Romeo
de Guzman.
ISSUE:
Whether appellant’s letter to the victim’s brother asking the latter’s
forgiveness for the killing of Romeo de Guzman may be considered as an
attempt to compromise.
RULING:
Yes. The records disclose nothing that would indicate any motive on
the part of Jericho Capanas to testify falsely against appellant. Absent any
showing that a witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper
motive, his positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand,
under the solemnity of an oath, deserve full faith and credence.
In the case at bar, the identity of the killer of Romeo de Guzman is
not unknown. Not only was appellant positively identified by an eyewitness
as the assailant, but no less than appellant himself, on two occasions,
admitted authorship of the crime:
First, 14 October 2001, while in detention, appellant wrote a letter to

the victim’s brother asking the latter’s forgiveness for the killing of Romeo
de Guzman. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court held that
appellant’s act of pleading for forgiveness may be considered as analogous
to an attempt to compromise, which in turn, can be received as an implied
admission of guilt under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
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Then, second, on 26 September 2005, while on re-direct examination

on the witness stand, appellant admitted having killed Romeo de Guzman.
Thus:
Appellant’s testimony amounts to a judicial admission of guilt which

may be given in evidence against himself under Section 26 Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
Considering the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, the guilt

of appellant was clearly proved beyond reasonable doubt.
10. Read and digest the case of People v. Abadies, G.R. Nos. 139346-50.
July 11, 2002.
11. Is the flight of an accused, after the commission of a crime, an

implied admission of guilt? How about non-flight?
12. Read and digest the case of People v. Bangcado, G.R. No. 132330,
November 28, 2000
SECTION 29. Admission by third party. – The rights of a party

cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, except as hereinafter provided.
13. What is the RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE?
This principle literally means “things done between strangers ought

not to injure those who are not parties to them.” (Black’s Law Dictionary,
5th Ed.; Dynamic Signmaker Outdoor Advertising Services, Inc. v.
Potongan, G.R. No. 156589, June 27, 2005)
On principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts

are binding upon himself and are evidence against him. So are his conduct
and declarations. It would not only be rightly inconvenient but also
manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
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unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of

strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against
him. (People v. Guittap, G.R. No. 144621, May 9, 2003)
14. Read and digest the case of People v. Cachuela, G.R. No.
191752, June 10, 2013.
FACTS:
At around 9:00 a.m. of July 26, 2004, Henessy arrived at WSC and
rang the doorbell, but no one opened the door. She went to the back of
the office where the firing range was located, and called Zaldy Gabao,
another employee of WSC. Zaldy answered from inside the store but
Henessy did not understand what he said. Henessy returned to the front
door and called again. Zaldy replied that he could not open the door
because his hands were tied. Henessy called Raymundo Sian, the
company's operations manager, and informed him that Zaldy's hands had
been tied. After one hour, the police arrived; they opened the gate at the
back using acetylene. When Henessy and the police entered the premises,
they saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed to the vault. Zaldy informed the
police that the company's gunsmith, Rex Dorimon, was inside the firing
range. The police entered the firing range, and saw the lifeless body of
Rex.[4] Dr. Voltaire Nulud conducted an autopsy on the body of Rex, and
found that the victim suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax
and abdomen, caused by a .45 pistol.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received an information

from an asset that the group of Cachuela was involved in the robbery of
WSC and in the killing of one of its employees; and that Cachuela had been
looking for prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI formed an entrapment
team and proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the operation. Upon their
arrival, Melvin Nabilgas approached them and told them that he had been
sent by Cachuela and Ibañez to look for buyers of firearms. The police
introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that they were conducting an
entrapment operation against the suspects of the robbery at WSC. Nabilgas
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surrendered to the police, and gave the names of the other persons
involved in the crime.
Thereafter, the asset contacted Cachuela and informed him that

Nabilgas had already talked to the buyers, and that they would like to see
the firearms being sold. Cachuela set up a meeting with the buyers at a
gasoline station in Naic, Cavite. NBI Special Investigator Allan Lino,
Supervising Agent Jerry Abiera and the asset went to the agreed place.
Cachuela came and talked to them, and brought them inside his house
where Cachuela showed them several firearms. When the agents inquired
from Cachuela whether the firearms had legal documentation, the latter
sensed that the meeting was a set-up. The NBI agents arrested Cachuela
before he could make any move. The agents recovered four (4) firearms
from Cachuela's house, including a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number
T1102-03E000151.
The NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Ibañez whom the asset

also contacted. Ibañez directed the asset to bring the prospective buyers to
his residence in Imus, Cavite. The NBI agents went to Imus and there met
Ibañez whom they saw inside a Nissan California car bearing plate no. PMN
645. Lino, Abiera and the asset entered the car, and asked Ibañez where
the firearms were. Ibañez brought out two (2) firearms, and showed them
to the agents. The agents asked whether the guns had legal
documentation; they then arrested Ibañez when they sensed that he was
already becoming suspicious. The agents recovered two guns from Ibañez,
viz.: a .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML 245 and a .45 Llama with serial
number 04490Z.
At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a

police line-up, as the persons responsible for the robbery at WSC and for
the killing of Rex.[10] Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession
implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime.
ISSUE:
WON the out of court identification of Zaldy was admissible?
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RULING:
Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons

involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex in a police line-up
held at the NBI Main Office on Taft Avenue, Manila. We note that Zaldy did
not testify in court since he was brought to the National Center for Mental
Health, and subsequently died there during the trial. For this reason, we
examine with greater scrutiny Lino's testimony regarding Zaldy's alleged
out-of-court identification.
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways.

It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face-to-face
with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also
done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of
persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and
relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the
totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors,
viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of
any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of
the identification procedure. [italics and emphasis supplied]
In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police
line-up, identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of
WSC and in the killing of Rex. Lino did not state when the line-up took
place; how this line-up had been conducted; who were the persons in the
line-up with the appellants (if there were indeed other persons included in
the line-up); and whether the line-up was confined to persons of the same
height and built as the appellants. Lino likewise did not indicate who
accompanied Zaldy before and during the line-up, and whether there had
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been the possibility of prior or contemporaneous improper insinuations on

Zaldy regarding the appearance of the appellants.
Section 30. Admission by co-partner or agent - The act or

declaration of a partner or agent authorized by the party to make
a statement concerning the subject, or within the scope of his or
her authority and during the existence of the partnership or
agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a
joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with
the party.
15. What are the requisites for the declaration made by a

partner/agent to be binding upon the partnership/principal?
Requisites for an admission of a partner to bind his co-partners or for

an agent to bind his principal:
1. The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party must be

within the scope of his authority;
2. The admission was made during the existence of the partnership or
agency; and
3. The existence of the partnership or agency is proven by independent
evidence other than such act or declaration. The Articles of
Incorporation or a Special Power of Attorney may be presented for
such purpose. (Suarez and De la Banda, 2000)
16. What is the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of

Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001 in relation
the exceptions on the RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE?
The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is
provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-
partner or agent.
Atty
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary

Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner). Jones very well explains
the reasons for the rule, viz: "What is done, by agent, is done by the
principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So, whatever is said
by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time
and accompanying the performance of any act within the scope of his
authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the
particular contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the
language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect, said by his
principal and admissible in evidence against such principal."||| (Estrada v.
Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 & 146738 (Resolution), [April 3, 2001], 408
PHIL 194-255)
Section 31. Admission by conspirator - The act or declaration of a

conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
17. Read and digest the case of Salapuddin v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 184681, February 25, 2013.
FACTS:
On November 13, 2007, shortly after the adjournment of the day's
session in Congress, a bomb exploded near the entrance of the South Wing
lobby of the House of Representatives (HOR) in the Batasan Complex. The
blast led to the death of Representative Wahab Akbar and several others.
The explosion was caused by an improvised bomb planted on a motorcycle
that was parked near the entrance stairs of the South Wing lobby.
Acting on a confidential information, the police raided an alleged ASG

safehouse located in Payatas, Quezon City, leading to the arrest of several
persons, one of which was Ikram Indama, who was the driver of petitioner
Atty
Gerry Salapuddin. In one of the affidavits executed by Ikram, he said that

he heard Salapuddin ordering Redwan to kill Rep. Akbar of Basilan.
The prosecution later on included Salapuddin in the complaint

for murder and multiple frustrated murder based on the affidavits of
Ikram. Later on, the Secretary of Justice issued a resolution excluding
Salapuddin from the charges.
Respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan filed a petition for

certiorari before the CA questioning the Secretary of Justice's resolution.
The CA reversed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice stating that the
totality of the evidence "sufficiently indicates the probability that
Salapuddin lent moral and material support or assistance to the
perpetrators in the commission of the crime.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the inclusion of Salapuddin in the case was proper.
RULING:
No. Indeed, probable cause requires less proof than necessary for
conviction. Nonetheless, it demands more than bare suspicion and must
rest on competent relevant evidence. A review of the records, however,
show that the only direct material evidence against Salapuddin, as he had
pointed out at every conceivable turn, is the confession made by Ikram.
While the confession is arguably relevant, this is not the evidence
competent to establish the probability that Salapuddin participated in the
commission of the crime. On the contrary, as pointed out by the Secretary
of Justice, this cannot be considered against Salapuddin on account of the
principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet expressed in Section
28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 28. Admission by third-party. – The rights of a party cannot be

prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided.
Atty
Clearly thus, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the

confessant. It cannot be admitted against his or her co-accused and is
considered as hearsay against them.
The exception provided under Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
to the rule allowing the admission of a conspirator requires the prior
establishment of the conspiracy by evidence other than the confession. In
this case, there is a dearth of proof demonstrating the participation of
Salapuddin in a conspiracy to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds and
thereby kill Congressman Akbar. Not one of the other persons arrested and
subjected to custodial investigation professed that Salapuddin was involved
in the plan to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds. Instead, the
investigating prosecutors did no more than to rely on Salapuddin’s
association with these persons to conclude that he was a participant in the
conspiracy.
Mere association with the principals by direct participation, without

more, does not suffice. Relationship, association and companionship do not
prove conspiracy. Salapuddin’s complicity to the crime, if this be the case,
cannot be anchored on his relationship, if any, with the arrested persons or
his ownership of the place where they allegedly stayed while in Manila.
It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt

act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. In fact, mere knowledge,
acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or approval to
cooperate, is not sufficient to prove conspiracy. There must be positive and
conclusive factual evidence indicating the existence of conspiracy, and not
simple inferences, conjectures and speculations speciously sustained
because "it cannot be mere coincidence."
It must not be neglected that strict adherence to the Constitution and

full respect of the rights of the accused are essential in the pursuit of
justice even in criminal cases. The presumption of innocence, and all rights
associated with it, remains even at the stage of preliminary investigation. It
is, thus, necessary that in finding probable cause to indict a person for the
Atty
commission of a felony, only those matters which are constitutionally

acceptable, competent, consistent and material are considered. No such
evidence was presented to sufficiently establish the probable cause to
indict Salapuddin for the non-bailable offenses he is accused of. It, thus,
behooves this Court to relieve petitioner from the unnecessary rigors,
anxiety, and expenses of trial, and to prevent the needless waste of the
courts' time and the government's resources. (Salapuddin vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 184681, February 25, 2013)
18. What are the requisites for the exception provided for under
Section 31?
Requisites of an admission by a conspirator

1. The declaration or act be made or done during the existence of the
conspiracy;
2. The declaration or act must relate to the purpose and object of the
conspiracy; and
3. The conspiracy must be shown by evidence other than the
declaration or act (evidence aliunde). (Sec. 30, Rule 130)
This rule applies only to extrajudicial acts or admission and not to

testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness. (People v. Baharan, G.R. No. L-188314,
January 10, 2011)
The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or admission of one

accused is admissible only against the said accused but is inadmissible
against the other accused. The same rule applies if the extrajudicial
confession is made by one accused after the conspiracy has ceased.
However, if the declarant/admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial
confession during trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity
to crossexamine the admitter, such confession or admission is admissible
against both accused. The erstwhile extrajudicial confession or admission
when repeated during the trial is transposed into judicial admissions.
(People v. Buntag, G.R. No. 123070, April 14, 2004)
Atty
Section 32. Admission by privies - Where one derives title to

property from another, the latter’s act, declaration, or omission, in
relation to the property, is evidence against the former if done
while the latter was holding the title.
19. When is there privity under Section 32 of Rule 130 of the

Rules of Court?
There is a privity if there are persons who are partakers or have an

interest in any action or thing, or any relation to another. (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 5th Ed.)
20. Read and digest the case of Gevero v. IAC, G.R.No. 77029, August
30, 1990.
SECTION 33. Admission by silence. - An act or declaration made in

the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who
does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as
naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when
proper and possible for him or her to do so, may be given in
evidence against him or her.
21. What is the ruling in the case of Estrada v. Desierto, G.R.

Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001 related to ADMISSION BY SILENCE
(ADOPTIVE ADMISSION)?
An adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a statement or action

by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party's reaction as an
admission of something stated or implied by the other person. Jones
explains that the "basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is
that arising from the ratification or adoption by the party of the statements
which the other person had made." To use the blunt language of Mueller
and Kirkpatrick, this process of attribution is not mumbo jumbo but
common sense." ||| (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 & 146738
(Resolution), [April 3, 2001], 408 PHIL 194-255)
Atty
22. Read and digest the case of People v. Castañeda, G.R. No. 208290,
December 11, 2013.
23. Read and digest the case of People v. Guillen, G.R. No.
191756, November 25, 2013.
FACTS:
Around 12 midnight, AAA was inside her room on the second floor of
a two-storey house in Sampaloc, Manila. At that time, she was playing
cards while waiting for her common-law husband to arrive. Momentarily,
someone knocked at the door and when she opened the door, appellant
Jonas Guillen (neighbour) entered the room and suddenly poked a balisong
on her neck. Appellant then turned off the lights, removed his clothes,
placed himself on top of AAA and inserted his penis inside her private
parts. After the rape was consummated, appellant stood up and casually
left the room. AAA immediately went out and sought assistance from her
sister-in-law. After being told of the incident, the sister-in-law contacted
the police. When the responding police officers arrived, appellant who was
readily identified by AAA since he was her neighbor, was immediately
arrested.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the victim gave consent.
RULING:
The failure of “AAA” to shout for help should not be taken against
her. People react differently when confronted with a shocking or startling
situation. Some may show aggressive resistance while others may opt to
remain passive. The failure of “AAA” to shout for help and seek assistance
should not be construed as consent, or as voluntarily engaging in an illicit
relationship with the appellant, as implied by the defense. It would be
recalled that appellant poked a knife at “AAA’s” neck. Such threat of
immediate danger to her life cowed “AAA” to submit to the carnal desires
of the appellant. However, immediately after appellant left, “AAA” lost no
Atty
time in seeking the help of her sister-in-law and in reporting the incident to
the police authorities. In fact, the police authorities were able to apprehend
appellant because “AAA” immediately reported the incident to them.
SECTION 34. Confession. – The declaration of an accused

acknowledging his or her guilt of the offense charged, or of any
offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence
against him or her.
24. What is the ruling in Salapuddin v. CA, G.R. No. 184681, Feb.
25, 2013 related to extrajudicial confessions?
Extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. Tamargo v.

Awingan 128 elaborated on the reason for this rule, viz.:
[O]n a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own

acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his
conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but
also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against
him.||| (Salapuddin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 184681 (Resolution),
[February 25, 2013], 704 PHIL 577-609)
4. PREVIOUS CONDUCT AS EVIDENCE
SECTION 35. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one did or

did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he or she did or did not do the same or a similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like.
25. What is the second rule of RES INTER ALIOS ACTA?
Atty
Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time. (Sec. 34, Rule 130)
26. Read and digest the case of People v. Losano, G.R. No.
127122. July 20, 1999.
FACTS:
On March 13, 1996 Jovito Losano was charged with raping his
daughter Rowena. The Information alleges that the offense happened
sometime in May 1995, Rowena being only 6 years old when the incident
happened.
Losano entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued. Prosecution

presented as witness Veronica Losano, the grandmother of Rowena and
mother of Jovito.
Veronica testified that she discovered the rape incident when Rowena
told her about it on September 25, 1995. Veronica had Rowena examined
by Dr. Ronald Bandonill, a medico-legal officer on October 3, 1995.
Bandonill issued a medical certificate which states that 1) at the time of the
examination, there were no extra-genital injuries on Rowena's body; and
2) that her physical virginity was preserved. It did however state that: “The
presence of congestion and inflammation at the vestibular mucosa and the
hymenal area coupled with intense pain and tenderness indicates the
probability of attempted penetration of the area by the hard-erect male
organ which was not successful.”
Rowena testified that the rape happened in their house. She

remembers that her father took her clothes off, fondled her breast, and got
on top of her. She testified that it happened at night. She was sleeping
with her older sister and their grandmother Veronica when Jovito came in
and carried her outside and raped her.
Atty
Jovito testified that case was filed to discredit him. He stated that his
sister Priscilla and their mother Veronica held a grudge against him for not
selling some pieces of property to them. Jovito admitted that his other
daughter, the older sister of Rowena, filed a case against him for acts of
lasciviousness. Jovito's counsel adopted the medical certifate of Dr.
Bandonill.
TC: Jovito guilty of rape. Imposed death penalty

Due to imposition of death penalty, automatic review to SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial erred in finding that Jovito had the propensity to
sexually abuse his children on the basis of the pending acts of
lasciviousness case filed against him by his other daughter.
RULING:
Yes. The accused-appellant scores the trial court for holding that he
had the propensity to sexually abuse his children on the basis of a pending
case for acts of lasciviousness filed against him by another child. Upon this
particular, accused-appellant raises a valid point. The trial court, in its
assessment of the evidence, found that accused-appellant had admitted
that a case for acts of lasciviousness had been filed against him. Based on
Section 34 of Rule 130 providing that similar acts may be received to prove
a specific intent, plan, system, scheme, and the like, the trial court drew
the conclusion that the accused-appellant had the propensity to prey on his
daughters.
The admission of the accused-appellant that he was facing a charge

of acts of lasciviousness filed by his eleven-year old daughter only proves
that such a case was filed and pending with the municipal court. It does
not prove the propensity of the accused-appellant to crave for his children.
The pendency of the case of acts of lasciviousness is not equivalent to
evidence that the accused-appellant was guilty of the same. In equating
the pendency of said case to his guilt thereof, the trial court ignored the
constitutional presumption of innocence afforded to the accused-appellant.
Atty
The trial court’s error on this point does not, however, obliterate the
fact that the prosecution was able to prove that indeed, accused-appellant
raped his daughter. In sum, we find no reason to disturb the finding of the
trial court that the guilt of the accused-appellant has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court

dated September 27, 1996 imposing the death penalty on accused-
appellant Jovito Losano y Nacis is hereby AFFIRMED.
27. Read and digest the case of People v. Nardo, G.R. No.
133888, March 1, 2000.
FACTS:
On Feb. 24, 1996, around noon, Lorielyn was in their house together
with her father, accused-appellant, two younger brothers, and maternal
grandfather. After they had lunch, grandfather left for work. Alfredo told
his sons, to go out. He then ordered Lorielyn to get his cigarettes in his
bedroom. When Lorielyn went inside the bedroom, her father followed her.
He embraced Lorielyn from behind and began mashing her breasts.
Lorielyn pleaded. Her father ignored her. Instead, he undressed her and
pushed her to the bed. Lorielyn started to cry, while Alfredo took off his
clothes. Then, he lay on top of her and had sexual intercourse with her. He
kissed her from the neck down. She tried to free herself but Alfredo took
hold of a knife from a nearby cabinet and pointed it at her right ear. He
threatened to kill their whole family if Lorielyn told anyone what he did.
When he was finished, Alfredo left the house. During all this time,
Lorielyn's mother, was washing clothes about five houses away. Her
mother returned home at about 3:00 o'clock p.m. She saw Lorielyn crying
while washing the dishes. She asked Lorielyn why she was crying, but her
daughter said nothing.3
Atty
On March 19, 1996, Lorielyn was washing clothes when her father
approached her and whispered, "We will play tonight near the river."
Lorielyn understood this to mean that her father wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her again. She finished the laundry and left the house.
She took a passenger jeepney and proceeded to the house of her aunt.
She stayed there until her aunt ask her and finally told her problem.
Immediately, her aunt reported the matter to the police. She later returned
home with two policemen, and together they brought Lorielyn to the Police
Station. The policemen then brought her to the Municipal Health Office to
examine her. From there Lorielyn was brought to the Municipal Trial Court
of Camalig-Albay to file a formal complaint for rape against her father.
Dr. Orbe stated that based on these findings, it is possible that Lorielyn
had sexual intercourse.
Her mother, father and grandfather al denied her testimony because

she has a boyfriend that time.
RTC found her father guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant assails the trial court's finding that Atty. Gonzales

was his employer and therefore was likely to testify in his favor; and that
he could not have noticed accused-appellant leave the farm in the
afternoon of February 24, 1996 because he had one drink too many.
Accused-appellant contends that the court should not have been too quick
to condemn him when his witness was a lawyer. Furthermore, he argues
that Lorielyn's conduct after the alleged rape, specifically from February 25
to March 19, 1996, during which she stayed in the house with her father
and continued to do her daily chores, creates a doubt on the veracity of
the charge.
The defense submitted 4 letters that the victim repented. Accused-

appellant relies on these letters to obtain a reversal of the trial court's
judgment of his conviction. However, the said letters were not subscribed
and sworn to by Lorielyn.
Atty
ISSUE:
Whether or not the letter of the victim be given importance.
RULING:
Be that as it may, recantations are frowned upon by the courts. A
recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the
probability that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated. Courts
look with disfavor upon retractions, because they can easily be obtained
from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration. A
retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. Especially,
recantations made after the conviction of the accused deserve only scant
consideration.
Moreover, any recantation or affidavit of desistance, by itself, even

when construed as a pardon in the so-called "private crimes," is not a
ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been
instituted. The pardon to justify the dismissal of the complaint should be
made prior to the institution of the criminal action, Parenthetically, the
crime in the case at bar was committed in 1996, i.e., prior to the passage
of the R.A. 8353, The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which reclassified rape as a
crime against persons.
Even if it were sworn, Lorielyn's recantation could hardly suffice to overturn
the finding of guilt by the trial court which was based on her own clear and
convincing testimony, given during a full-blown trial. An affidavit of
recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to
the testimony given in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject
the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the witness
who gave it later on changed his/her mind for one reason or another. Such
a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at
the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
Well settled is the rule that no woman would concoct a story of

defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and submit herself to
public humiliation and scrutiny via an open trial, if her sordid tale was not
true and her sole motivation was not to have the culprit apprehended and
Atty
punished.49 A young girl's revelation that she has been raped, coupled
with her voluntary submission to medical examination and her willingness
to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details
of an assault on her dignity by, as in this case, her own father, cannot be
so easily dismissed as a mere concoction. 50 Courts usually give credence
to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, particularly if it
constitutes incestuous rape because, normally, no person would be willing
to undergo the humiliation of a public trial and to testify on the details of
her ordeal were it not to condemn an injustice. Needless to say, it is settled
jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and
credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity.
28. Read and digest the case of People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 141644, May
27, 2004.
29. Read and digest the case of People v. Magpayo, G.R. Nos.
92961-64, September 1, 1993.
FACTS:
Appellant Benjamin C. Magpayo was charged with Rape, Robbery,
Robbery with Hold-up and Forcible Abduction with Rape before the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon in four (4) separate complaints and
informations allegedly committed.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all the

charges. After trial, he was found guilty of all the offenses charged in a
joint decision rendered by the trial court.
Appellant vehemently questions the trial court's decision finding him

guilty beyond reasonable doubt because the prosecution witnesses
allegedly failed to positively identify him.
Atty
ISSUE:
WON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING SECTION 34, RULE
130 OF THE REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE IN CONVICTING APPELLANT.
RULING:
No, the trial court committed no error.
Appellant assails the application of the doctrine of res inter alios acta
(Sec. 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence) allegedly because the
similarity of the acts involved (i.e., molestation) was not sufficiently
established.
After careful review of the records before us, we hold that the trial
court committed no error in applying the exception to the above doctrine.
The Rules provide:
Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one did or did not
a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not
do the same or similar thing at another time; but it may be received to
prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit,
custom or usage, and the like (Emphasis supplied.)
As a rule, evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show,

that the accused in a criminal case has committed a crime wholly
independent of the offense for which he is on trial. It is not competent to
prove that he committed other crimes of a like nature for the purpose of
showing that he committed the crime charged in the complaint or
information.
An exception to this rule is when such evidence tends directly to

establish the particular crime, and it is usually competent to prove the
motive, the intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme
or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to
each other that proof of one tends to establish the other, or the identity of
the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.
Atty
In the case at bar, evidence was introduced in Criminal Case No.

6443 (Forcible Abduction with Rape) committed by appellant against 11-
year old Mara N. Chico on November 20, 1987, not as evidence of similar
acts to prove that on April 10, 1988, the said appellant also committed a
similar act of rape (and robbery) against the person of 10-year old Lilibeth
Bobis (Criminal Case No. 6436). These offenses are separate crimes and
are the subject of separate complaints and proofs though jointly tried.
Hence, the evidence in one was not offered and admitted to prove the
other but only to show the plan, scheme or modus operandi of the
offender.
As aptly noted by the trial court:

It is to be observed that in all the above-entitled cases, the
modus operandi of the offender is that of approaching young girls of
not more than twelve years of age, and taking advantage of their
innocence, imputed to them the commission of a crime and brought
them to an isolated place where the offenses charged were
committed. These young girls narrated in detail in a clear and
convincing manner what the offender did to them and likewise
positively identified said offender as herein accused during the
investigation at the Malabon Police Station on May 22, 1988
immediately after the arrest of the accused, as well as during the
trial. Thus, Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence
provides that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at
one time may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like.
(Rollo, p. 28; Joint Decision, p. 6)
SECTION 36. Unaccepted offer. — An offer in writing to pay a

particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument or
specific personal property is, if rejected without valid cause,
equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money,
instrument, or property.
Atty
30. Under the Civil Code, what constitutes a valid tender of payment?
What the relation of the civil law concept of tender of payment to Section
36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court?

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Evidence Atty.

3. ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS

SECTION 27. Admission of a party. – The act, declaration or

Any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or

of bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the

A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further

The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can

Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the

told Secretary Angara: "Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na

Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary

3. Distinguish ADMISSIONS under Section 27 of Rule 130 from

4. State the rule on admissibility as evidence of an offer of

It is for the reason that parties are encouraged to enter into

It is NOT an admission of any liability and is NOT admissible against

On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open

Tan filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, averring

The MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of Rodil Enterprises.

According to the MeTC, notwithstanding the evidentiary norm in civil

To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to

Similarly, in the case of Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co. the

6. State the rule on admissibility as evidence of an offer of

It may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

1. In quasi-offenses where there is no criminal intent (negligence), such

7. Cite instances where laws allow compromise in criminal

In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal

No compromise is valid in the following cases:

In the face of constant threats made by the agents of SMC,

The fact that respondent made a compromise offer to petitioner SMC

1. Since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a

distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is made tentatively,

Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by respondent, the Offer of

9. Read and digest the case of People v. Nazareno, G.R. No.

The facts, based on the eyewitness account of Jericho Capanas, are

At around 3:30 o’clock in the morning of 23 September 2001, Jericho

First, 14 October 2001, while in detention, appellant wrote a letter to

Then, second, on 26 September 2005, while on re-direct examination

Appellant’s testimony amounts to a judicial admission of guilt which

Considering the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, the guilt

11. Is the flight of an accused, after the commission of a crime, an

SECTION 29. Admission by third party. – The rights of a party

13. What is the RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE?

This principle literally means “things done between strangers ought

On principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts

unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received an information

Thereafter, the asset contacted Cachuela and informed him that

The NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Ibañez whom the asset

At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a

Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways.

been the possibility of prior or contemporaneous improper insinuations on

Section 30. Admission by co-partner or agent - The act or

15. What are the requisites for the declaration made by a

Requisites for an admission of a partner to bind his co-partners or for

1. The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party must be

16. What is the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of

Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary

Section 31. Admission by conspirator - The act or declaration of a

17. Read and digest the case of Salapuddin v. Court of Appeals,

Acting on a confidential information, the police raided an alleged ASG

Gerry Salapuddin. In one of the affidavits executed by Ikram, he said that

The prosecution later on included Salapuddin in the complaint