Felonies and Circumstances which Affect Criminal Liability

Abdulla vs. People, G.R. No. 150129, 6 April 2005

Facts:

Appellant Norma Abdulla was charge before the Sandiganbayan of the

crime of illegal use of public funds along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud
Darkis, appellant was charged under an Information which pertinently
reads: That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused: Norma Abulla and Nenita
Aguil, both public officers, being then the President and cashier,
respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their
positions and duties are accountable for public funds under their
administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and
confederating with Mahmud Darkis, also a public officer, being then the
Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the
payment of wages of casuals, the amount of forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which amount was appropriated for the
payment of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the said
school, to the damage and prejudice of public service .Appellant’s co-
accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only
appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan with a
fine of three thousand pesos and was imposed the penalty of temporary
special disqualification for a period of six (6) years. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellant’s sentence by
deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her. Still
dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court on petition for review under
rule 45, persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.
Issues:

Whether or not there was unlawful intent on the appellant’s part.

2) Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of technical

malversation is present.

Ruling:

1) NO. The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to

all charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds
for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said
to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the
Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits
such employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws. There is
no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose– payment of the
wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality.

2) No. The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary
differentials of secondary schoolteachers of the Sulu State College in RA
6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which
requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law,
is therefore absent.

People v. Cordova, G.R. Nos. 83373-74, 5 July 1993

Facts:

Marcelo Barruela and Segundo Maguad were killed in Barangay Bantique,

Pontevedra, Capiz in the evening of 29 May 1986. Upon the complaint of
the former's widow, Teresita Barruela, Criminal Case No. 705 for Double
Murder was filed against the accused and Clarita Cordova with the 2nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Pontevedra-Panay in the Province
of Capiz by the Station Commander of Pontevedra on 16 June 1986.After
conducting a preliminary examination, the MCTC ruled that a probable
cause existed against all the respondents with the exception of Clarita
Cordova. Thus, on 25 June 1986, the Station Commander filed an Amended
Criminal Complaint against the accused. In due course, a warrant for the
arrest of the accused was issued. Upon their arrest, the accused moved for
the immediate transmittal of the records of the case to the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal for the purpose of filing the appropriate information if a
prima facie case warranted the same. After undertaking a reinvestigation of
the case, Acting Provincial Fiscal Claro A. Arches of Capiz recommended
the filing of two separate and distinct information for murder;6
consequently, two cases were filed on 29 January 1987 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City which were docketed as Criminal Case No.
C-2422 and Criminal Case No. C-2423. Both cases were raffled off to Branch
16 of the said court.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellants are acquitted on ground for

reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

The law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to

presume that acts were done unconsciously. The quantum of evidence
required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Since insanity is in the nature of a confession and
avoidance, it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, an
accused is presumed to have been sane at the time of the commission of the
crime in the absence of positive evidence to show that he had lost his
reason or was demented prior to or during the perpetration of the crime.
Eduardo's mother was already making a conclusion when she stated that
Eduardo had no work because he was insane. More concrete acts showing
the mental condition of the person alleged to be insane need to be shown in
order that insanity may be appreciated in his favor.
Wherefore, the challenged Decision in Criminal Case No. C-2422 and
Criminal Case No. C-2423 of Branch 16 of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas
City is hereby Reversed. The accused-appellants are guilty for acquitted on
ground of reasonable doubt. Their immediate release from detention is
hereby ordered, unless other lawful cause would warrant their further
detention.

Guevarra v. Almodovar, G.R. No. 75256, 26 January 1989

Facts:

On October 29, 1984, the Petitioner who was then 11 years old was playing
with best friend Teodoro Almine Jr. and three other children in their
backyard. The children were target-shooting bottle caps placed 15 to 20
meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of
game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his
unfortunate death.

The examining fiscal after investigation exculpated petitioner due to his

age and because the unfortunate appeared to be an accident.

Victim’s parents appealed to Ministry of Justice, who ordered fiscal to file a

case against petitioner for Homicide through reckless imprudence

Issue: Whether or not an evelen year old could be a subject for crime
homicide thru reckless imprudence.

Ruling:

If discernment is the equivalent of ‘with intent’, then the allegation in the

information that the accused acted with discernment and willfully
unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a reckless and
imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber’ is an inherent contradiction
amount to failure of the information to allege a cause of action or constitute
a legal excuse or exception."
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment"
convey two distinct thoughts. While both are products of the mental
processes within a person, the former refers to the desired of one’s act
while the latter relate to the moral significance that person ascribes to the
said act. Hence a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware
of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the
same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect, therefore,
to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but
below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done.
He may negligently shoot his friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and
at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.

This petition is hereby Dismissed for lack of merit and the Temporary
Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is Lifted. This case be
remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits.

People v. Puno, G.R. No. 97471, 17 February 1993

Facts:

January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who
is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in
Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at Mrs.
Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC. He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her
own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so Isabelo will
temporarily take his place

When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig,
she got into her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving. After the
car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man,
accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver

Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs
to "get money" from her. Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she
handed to the accused.But the accused said that they wanted P100,000
more.

The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo
asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a check for P100,000. Mrs. Sarmiento drafted
3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check. Isabelo then turned
the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and
turned the car again towards Pampanga

According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the
other side of the superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's
van, her dress had blood because according to her, she fell down on the
ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car

The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except
that according to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely
allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car

He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that
his employer had gotten a ride

He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running
across the highway

Issue:

1. Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for

ransom as charged

2. Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway

robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery
Law of 1974)
Holding:

1. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive,

nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts
against complainant, other than the extortion of money from
her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.

• For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the
actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended
party of her liberty

• In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an

incident in the commission of another offense primarily
intended by the offenders

• This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention

2. Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American

occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery
and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was
inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the
Brigandage Law was passed (this is the origin of the law on highway
robbery)

People v. Macoy, G.R. Nos. 96649-50, 1 July 1997

Facts:

Lyndon Macoy who was found in front of Bottoms Up with a gun in his
hand was arrested by patrolmen Ferdinand Tumakay, Felipe Nonong,
Gaudencio Javier, and Pelayo Dingcong. The policemen, who were on
patrol duty, were within ten (10) meters from Bottoms Up when they heard
a gunshot and a commotion. In response to what they had heard they went
to the beerhouse. They saw accused-appellant carrying a gun, a.38 snub-
nosed paltik Smith and Wesson revolver, which he surrendered to the
police officers. Three live bullets and two empty shells were retrieved from
the gun. Paul Ocampo was taken to the Cebu Community Hospital where
he was dead on arrival.

On July 5, 1989, two cases, one for murder and another for illegal
possession of firearms, were filed against Macoy. Upon being arraigned, he
pleaded not guilty, after which the cases were consolidated and tried. On
May 31, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment, acquitting Macoy of the
charge of violation of PD 1866 (illegal possession of firearms) but
convicting him of murder.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of murder.

Ruling:

In case number CBU-15909. Murder, the Court finds the accused Lyndon
Macoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and hereby
imposes upon him the penalty, by way of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua.

People v. Belbes, G.R. No. 124670, 21 June 2000

Facts:

In the evening of February 16, 1990, Pat. Domingo Belbes and Pat. Jose
Pabon were assigned to maintain peace and order at the Junior and Senior
Prom of Pili Barangay High School. Around 9:00 p.m. while Teacher-In-
Charge Mila Ulanca, Pat. Pabon and Belbes were watching the dance, two
students approached Mrs. Ulanca and said "Ma'am, it seems that there is
somebody making trouble."
Pat. Belbes and Pat. Pabon, armed with an Armalite rifle and a .38 caliber
revolver, respectively, responded forthwith. Moments after the two police
officers left, bursts of gunfire filled the air. Fernando Bataller, a graduating
student was hit on different parts of his body and died. The accused Pat.
Belbes stated that they acted in self-defense.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused appellant guilty of murder.

HELD:

The decision of the trial court convicting appellant Domingo Belbes of the
crime of murder is hereby modified . Appellant is found guilty of the crime
of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of
prison mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion
temporal minimum, as maximum.

Quizon v. Justice of the Peace, G.R. No. L-6641, 28 July 1995

Facts:

On December 19, 1952, the respondents Chief of Police of Bacolor,

Pampanga, filed a criminal complaint against the herein petitioner,
Francisco Quizon, with the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality
charging Quizon with the crime of damage to property through reckless
imprudence, the value of the damage amounting to P125.00. Quizon filed a
motion to quash on the ground that, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty which might be imposed on the accused would be a fine
or from P125.00 to P375.00, which is in excess of the fine that may be
imposed by the justice of the peace court. The Justice of the Peace
forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, but the
latter returned it to him for trial on the merits, holding that the justice of
the peace court had jurisdiction. The defendant appealed from this ruling
of the Court of First Instance to this Court on the question of law raised.

Issue:

Whether the justice of the peace court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
court of first instance.

Ruling:

To hold that the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to try cases of
damage to property through reckless negligence, because it has jurisdiction
over cases of malicious mischief, is to assume that the former offense is but
a variant of the latter.

Section 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296) provides in
part as follows:

Original jurisdiction Courts of First Instance shall have original

jurisdiction:(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two
hundred pesos: Section 87 of said Acts reads as follows: Original
jurisdiction to try criminal cases.

—Justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered cities

shall have original jurisdiction over:(c) All criminal cases arising under the
laws relating to:

(6) Malicious mischief;

Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code is as follows: ART. 327.

Who are liable for malicious mischief --Any person who shall deliberately
cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of
the next preceding chapter shall be guilty of malicious mischief.
 People v. Agliday, G.R. No. 140794, 16 October 2001

Facts:

Prosecution witness Conchita Agliday, wife of appellant Reynaldo

Agliday, testified that about 8:00 o'clock on the evening of February 25,
1999 while washing dishes in the kitchen of their house, her son Richard
Agliday was shot with a shotgun by her husband-appellant Ricardo
Agliday. As a result, her son Richard fell on his belly; her husband-
appellant ran away. Although shocked, Conchita was able to rush out of
her house to call for help. Richard was first brought to the Sto. Niño
Hospital, then to the San Carlos General Hospital, and finally to the Region
I Hospital in Dagupan City.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant should be convicted not of parricide, but only
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

Ruling:

No. Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do,

without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing
to perform such act. Past jurisprudential cases of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide were as follows: (1) exhibiting a loaded revolver to a
friend, who got killed by the accidental discharge arising from negligent
handling; (2) discharging a firearm from the window of one’s house and
killing a neighbor who, at just that moment, leaned over a balcony front;
and
(3) firing a .45 caliber pistol twice in the air to stop a fist fight; and, as the
fight continued, firing another shot at the ground but, after the bullet
ricocheted, hitting a bystander who died thereafter.
Intent is not lacking in the instant case. Appellant’s external acts prove
malice or criminal intent. A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
inconsistent with reckless imprudence. In this case, resenting his son’s
meddling in his argument with his wife, appellant purposely took his gun
and shot his son.

Taer v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85204, 18 June 1990

Facts:

That on or about the 5th day of December, 1981, in barangay Lantang,

municipality of Valencia, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with the
intent of gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and lead away two
(2)
male carabaos with the total value of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS
(P4,000.00),
Philippine Currency, belonging to and owned by Tirso Dalde and Eladio
Palaca; to the damage and prejudiced of the said offended parties in the
aforestated amount.
City of Tagbilaran, June 1, 1982.
After proper proceedings and trial, Saludes and Cago were acquitted but
Taer and Namocatcat were convicted. The dispositive portion of the
decision.

Issue:
Whether or not their conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt to
convict the accused as principal for the crime of cattle rustling as defined
and punished by PD 533.

Ruling:
No. Conspiracy must be established not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. The same degree of proof necessary to establish the
crime is required to support a finding of the presence of criminal
conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus mere
knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without cooperation or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy absent the intentional participation in the transaction with a
view
to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. At most the facts
establish Taer's knowledge of the crime. And yet without having
participated either as principal or as an accomplice, for he did not
participate
in the taking of the carabaos, he took part subsequent to the commission of
the act of taking by profiting himself by its effects. Taer is thus only an
accessory after the fact.
The decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Tagbilaran and affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
modified in that the herein JORGE TAER is convicted as an accessory of
the crime of cattle-rustling as defined and penalized by PD No. 533
amending Arts. 308, 309, and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and he will
serve the minimum penalty within the range of arresto mayor medium,
which we shall fix at 4 months’ imprisonment and the maximum penalty of
prision correccional minimum which we shall fix at 2 years.

Dela Torre v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 121592, 5 July 1996

Facts:

Petitioner Rolando dela Torre was disqualified from running as mayor of

Cavinti Laguna on the ground that he was convicted of violation the Anti-
Fencing Law.

He argues that he should not be disqualified because he is serving

probation of his sentence and hence, the execution of his judgment was
suspended together with all its legal consequences.
Issue:

Whether or not Dela Torre is disqualified to run for the election due to
crime involving mural turpitude.

Held:

Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity

in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals.

Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of

the fact that property received as stolen displays the same degree of
malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the
robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.
And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs
in point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s
of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain – thus
deliberately reneging the process “private duties” they owe their
“fellowmen” in a manner “contrary to accepted and customary rule of
right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals.”

Note: In determining whether a criminal act involves moral turpitude, the

Court is guided by one of the general principle that crimes mala in se
involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not. However, SC
admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude
does or does not exist by merely classifying as crime as mala in se or as
mala prohibita. Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is
ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstance.
 Loney v. People, G.R. No. 152644, 10 February 2006

Facts:

Loney, Reid and Hernandez are the President, CEO and Senior Manager
and Resident Manager for Mining Operation of Marcopper in Marinduque.
Marcopper built concrete plug at the tunnels discharging tons of tailing
into Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

DOJ then filed separate charges against the petitioners in MTC

Marinduque for violation of Art. 19 of PD 1067 or the Water code of the
Philippines, Section 8 of PD 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree,
Section 108 of RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 2005 and Art. 365 of
the RPC for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.

Petitioners moved to quash the information saying that the (1) information
was duplicitous for it charges more than one offense for a single act, (2)
that Loney and Reid were not yet officers when this incident took place
and (3) that the informations contain allegations which constitute legal
excuse or justification.

Issues:

Whether the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed
for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property should stand.

Ruling:

No duplicity. Duplicity of charges means a single complaint or information

charges more than on offense. The filing of several charges is proper. A
single act or incident might offend two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution for more than
one offense.
 Matalam v. People, G.R. No. 221849-50, 4 April 2016

Facts:

The Office of the Ombudsman charged Matalam, Regional Secretary of the

Department of Agrarian Reform-Autonomous Region for Muslim
Mindanao (DAR-ARMM), with the commission of crimes under "Section 52
(g) of Republic Act No. 8921, otherwise known as the [Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS)] Act of 1997, and Section 1, Rule XIII of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7742". According
to the Prosecution, Matalam, Lawi, and Unte were the officers involved in
the collection and remittance of accounts to the GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund
and, thus, were accountable for the non-remittance. Matalam and his co-
accused failed and/or refused to remit the required contributions without
justifiable cause despite repeated demands.

The Sandiganbayan found Matalam guilty of non-remittance of the

employer's share of Pag-IBIG Fund premiums. According to the
Sandiganbayan, under the pertinent rules and law, it is the employer who
is penalized for the non-remittance to Pag-IBIG Fund. Matalam comes
before the Court and assails the Sandiganbayan Decision. He argues that
even if the offenses he allegedly committed are mala prohibita, his guilt
must still be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The pieces of evidence
presented in this case create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Thus, a re-
evaluation of the evidence is required.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner Datu Guimid P. Matalam is guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of non-remittance of the employer's share of the GSIS and Pag-IBIG
Fund premiums.

RULING:

When an act is malum prohibitum, "it is the commission of that act as

defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines
whether or not the provision has been violated." The non-remittance of
GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums is malum prohibitum. What the
relevant laws punish is the failure, refusal, or delay without lawful or
justifiable cause in remitting or paying the required contributions or
accounts.

In this case, however, petitioner failed to prove a justifiable cause for his
failure to remit the premiums. We cannot subscribe to petitioner's defense
that the funds for the remittances were not directly credited to DAR-
ARMM but to the account of the Office of the Regional Governor of the
ARMM, which had the obligation to remit to the various line agencies of
the ARMM the specific amounts provided to them. As head of the Regional
Office, petitioner was a public officer who had the obligation to ensure the
proper remittance of the employer's share of the premiums to the GSIS and
Pag-IBIG Fund.

People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257, G.R. No. L-47722, 27 July 1943

Facts:

Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a notorious

criminal and escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, and if overpowered, to
get him dead or alive. They went to the suspected house then proceeded to
the room where they saw the supposedly Balagtas sleeping with his back
towards the door. Oanis and Galanta simultaneously or successively fired
at him which resulted to the victim’s death. The supposedly Balagtas
turned out to be Serepio Tecson, an innocent man.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent

mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties.
2. Whether or not Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the
performance of their duty.

Held:

1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar. “Ignorance
facti excusat” applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness. The fact that the supposedly suspect was sleeping, Oanis and
Galanta could have checked whether it is the real Balagtas.

2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs no criminal
liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of
a right or office. There are 2 requisites to justify this: (1) the offender acted
in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, (2)
that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the
due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
In this case, only the first requisite is present.

People v. Hilario, G.R. No. 128083, 16 March 2001

Facts:

Joh Hilario was charged with 3 counts of murder which, without

counsel, he pleaded guilty. During the trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the PAO
took over representing the client in view of the death of the latter’s counsel.
The RTC subsequently rendered its decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentenced him to 8years 1
day of prison mayor and 14 years8 months of reclusion temporal
Unassisted by counsel, Hilario filed a Petition for Relief contending that he
was already confined at the promulgation of the judgement. The RTC
dismissed the petition for relief due to failure to perfect the appeal.
Petitioner contends that he has no way to file the notice of appeal except by
his lawyer who he had instructed to do so. However, no notice of appeal
was filed by his lawyer in defense of his clear instructions. The decision
was likewise received by his lawyer but the latter did not inform him
of any action taken thereon. The CA also dismissed his petition for
certiorari. Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de officio
cannot be binding on him for the latter’s defiance of his instruction to
appeal automatically breaks the fiduciary relationship between counsel
and client and cannot be against the client who was prejudiced.

Issue:

Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case due to the
defiance of the petitioner’s counsel de officio to seasonably file a Notice
of Appeal, constitutes excusable negligence to entitle the undersigned
detention prisoner to pursue his appeal?

Held:

There was no basis for the RTC to dismiss the petition concluding that the
claim of petitioner that he instructed the PAO lawyer to file an appeal as
self-serving and unsubstantiated. The RTC's dismissal of the petition for
relief was done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to an
undue denial of the petitioner's right to appeal as it did not touch on
the question whether the PAO lawyer was indeed negligent in not
filing the appeal as it merely stated that even if said omission should
be considered as negligence, it is a well-settled rule that negligence of
counsel is binding on the client.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.

People v. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307, G.R. No. L-1477, 18 January 1950

Facts:

On March 10, 1947, in an event sponsored by the Liberal Party at Plaza

Miranda in Quiapo, Manila, Guillen planted a hand grenade near the stage
and threw another one toward then President Manuel Roxas in an
apparent assassination attempt born out of Guillen's spite for the President
over the latter's perceived failure to fulfill his promises and his call for the
passage of the so-called parity measure. General Castaneda managed to
kick the grenade off the stage. However, its explosion caused the death of
Simeon Varela (Barrela). It also caused the injuries of Alfredo Eva, Jose
Fabio, Pedro Carillo, and Emilio Maglalang.

Guillen pleaded not guilty to the consequent charges of murder and

multiple frustrated murder filed against him. At one point, he even tried to
use the insanity excuse, but he was found to have been mentally stable.

Later on, by his own admission, he confessed to his crimes. He was

subsequently found guilty of all the charges and was sentenced to death.

Issue:

Whether or not the conviction of the accused was proper.

Held:

No, the SC ruled that Guillen's actions on March 10, 1947 and their
penalties were covered by Art. 48 of the RPC, not sub-section 1 of Art. 49.
The Court said that by a single act -- throwing a hand grenade at President
Roxas -- he committed two grave felonies:

(a) murder and (b) multiple attempted murder.

And lastly, the Court ruled that the injuries sustained by the other victims
constitute attempted and not frustrated murder. The Court reasoned that
Guillen's failed attempt to kill President Roxas was due to some reason or
accident (General kicking the grenade off the stage) other than his own
spontaneous desistance. In the end the Court affirmed the death sentence
handed out by the lower court.
 People v. Adriano, G.R. No. 205228, 15 July 2015

Facts:

Between January and April, 1945, during the occupation of the Philippines
by the Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva Ecija, the above-
named accused, Apolinar Adriano, a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to
the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, giving the
said enemy aid and comfort in the manner as a “member of the Makapili, a
military organization established and designed to assist and aid militarily
the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines.

The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the
facts alleged except that of defendant's having joined the Makapili
organization. What the People's Court found is that the accused
participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of
personal property. The acts of the accused had not been established by the
testimony of two witnesses.

Issue:

Whether or not the two-witness rule is required in establishing the guilt of

the accused in the crime of treason.

Held:

Yes. The two-witness rule required for conviction for treason is that no
person shall be convicted thereof unless on the testimony of two-witnesses
to the same overt act. If the overt act is separate, two (2) witnesses must
also testify to each part of overt act for conviction.
 People v. Centeno, G.R. No. 33284, 20 April 1989

Facts:

On that afternoon of December 1, 1968, Rolando Santos was enjoying

himself with some friends and plenty of beer that he eventually could not
carry. Within the hour, he would be dead of a massive brain hemorrhage.
The venue would be the municipal building itself. And the police chief
himself, together with one of his policemen, would be accused of
murdering him.

The prosecution says he was killed with karate blows dealt by the accused-
appellant. The defense denies this. It says Santos drunkenly staggered and
fell and hit his head and bled to death.

The trial court believed the prosecution and convicted the police chief
while absolving his co-accused.

The medical evidence is not disputed. It is accepted that Santos died as a

result of internal bleeding in the brain due to trauma. The victim's head
showed various contusions and abrasions but not in the nape of the neck
where the karate blows were allegedly delivered.

Issue:

Whether or not Santos was so intoxicated that he reeled and fell and hit his
head and suffered the internal brain hemorrhage that killed him.

Ruling:

This claim, it introduced Mercedes Bautista, chief forensic chemist of the

NBI, who testified that at the time of Santos's death he had 0.21% of alcohol
in his blood. She declared on cross-examination that the effect of such
quantity would vary according to the person's physical condition although
there would surely be emotional instability in every case.
There is also the argument that no external injuries were found on the nape
of the neck, where the karate blows were administered although there were
abrasions and contusions elsewhere in the victim's head. As Dr. Vidal
explained, however, even if no marks were left on the neck, karate blows
thereon could cause the generalized and extensive bleedings that caused
the victim's death

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed, except as to the civil

indemnity, which is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against the accused-
appellant. It is so ordered.

Wacoy v. People, G.R. No. 213792, 22 June 2015

Facts:

On April 2014, in the province of Benguet, the accused, Guillermo Wacoy

and James Quibac, comprising with each other, mauled and kicked the
stomach of Elner Aro y Laruan, inflicting upon him blunt traumatic
injuries, which directly caused his death thereafter.

The Regional Trial Court ruled that the accused are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of death caused in Tumultuous Affray.
Contrary to the RTC’s findings, the Court of Appeal ruled that Wacoy and
Quibac should be convicted of the crime Homicide, with circumstances of
lack of intent to commit grave as it was shown that the purpose of their
assault was only to maltreat or inflict physical harm on him.

Issue:

Whether or not the court of appeal found Wacoy and Quibac guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
Ruling:

The petition is without merit. The evidence clearly established that there
were only two persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one defenseless
individual, Aro, and attacked him repeatedly. There was no tumultuous
quarrel or affray.

Therefore, the Court of Appeal correctly held that Wacoy and Quibac’s act
of mauling Aro was the proximately cause of death. And such, they must
be held criminally liable for the crime of homicide.

US v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, 19 March 1910

Facts:

The defendant was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open

the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was
being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room.

The room was very dark and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a
robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I
will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the
edge of the chair which had been placed against the door.

In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had
been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he
supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable
that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden
opening of the door against which it rested. Eizing a common kitchen knife
which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the
intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
Issue:

Whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible, who, by

reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be
exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be,
but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the
actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed
the act.

Held:

The Court holds that under such circumstances there is no criminal

liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was
not due to negligence or bad faith. In broader terms, ignorance or mistake
of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the
offense charged "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an
acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a
conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in
cases where, under the provisions of Article 1 of the Penal Code one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for
any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that
which he intended to commit.

People v. Gervero, G.R. No. 206725, 11 July 2018

Facts:

In an Information, dated 27 March 1992, the accused were charged with

multiple murder. The information reads:

That on or about the 25th day of November, 1991, in the Municipality of

Lemery, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
with one another, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, armed
with firearms, they were then provided, through treachery, evident
premeditation and superior strength, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and hit Hernando
Villegas, Jose Villegas and Benito Basug, Jr. with said firearms inflicting
upon said Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas and Benito Basug, Jr. numerous
gunshot wounds on different parts of their bodies which caused their
deaths immediately thereafter.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty for multiple murder.

Ruling:

In its decision, the RTC found the accused guilty of murder. It found the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses straightforward, credible, and in
accord with the physical evidence.

With the Court of Appeal’s decision that the accused are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

People v. Acuram, G.R. No. 117954, 27 April 2000

Facts:

That on or about the 25th day of November, 1991, in the Municipality of

Lemery, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
with one another, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, armed
with firearms, they were then provided, through treachery, evident
premeditation and superior strength, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and hit Hernando
Villegas, Jose Villegas and Benito Basug, Jr. with said firearms
inflicting upon said Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas and Benito Basug, Jr.
numerous gunshot wounds on different parts of their bodies which caused
their deaths immediately thereafter.

Issues:

1) Whether the trial court erred in not appreciating the defense of

mistake of fact.
2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery qualified the killing to murder.
Ruling:

In its decision, the RTC found the accused guilty of murder. It found the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses straightforward, credible, and in
accord with the physical evidence.
With the Court of Appeal’s decision that the accused are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Abrogar v. Cosmos Bottling Company, G.R. No. 164749, 15 March 2017

Facts:

This case involves a claim for damages arising from the negligence causing
the death of a participant in an organized marathon bumped by a
passenger jeepney on the route of the race. The issues revolve on whether
the organizer and the sponsor of the marathon were guilty of negligence,
and, if so, was their negligence the proximate cause of the death of the
participant; on whether the negligence of the driver of the passenger
jeepney was an efficient intervening cause; on whether the doctrine of
assumption of risk was applicable to the fatality; and on whether the heirs
of the fatality can recover damages for loss of earning capacity of the latter
who, being then a minor, had no gainful employment.
In the RTC decision dated May 10, 1991, judgment was rendered in favor of
plaintiffs-spouses Romulo Abrogar and Erlinda Abrogar and against
defendants Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc. and Intergames, Inc., ordering
both defendants, jointly and severally, to pay and deliver to the plaintiffs
the amounts of Twenty Eight Thousand Sixty One Pesos and Sixty Three
Centavos (P28,061.63) as actual damages; One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) as moral damages; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
exemplary damages and Ten Percent (10%) of the total amount of One
Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Sixty One Pesos and Sixty Three
Centavos (P178,061,63) or Seventeen Thousand Eight Hundred Six Pesos
and Sixteen Centavos (P17,806.16) as attorney's fees. On the cross-claim of
defendant Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc., defendant Intergames, Inc, is
hereby ordered to reimburse to the former any and all amounts which may
be recovered by the plaintiffs from it by virtue of this Decision.

The RTC observed that the safeguards allegedly instituted by Intergames in

conducting the marathon had fallen short of the yardstick to satisfy the
requirements of due diligence as called for by and appropriate under the
circumstances; that the accident had happened because of inadequate
preparation and Intergames' failure to exercise due diligence; that the
respondents could not be excused from liability by hiding behind the
waiver executed by Rommel and the permission given to him by his
parents because the waiver could only be effective for risks inherent in the
marathon, such as stumbling, heat stroke, heart attack during the race,
severe exhaustion and similar occurrences; that the liability of the
respondents towards the participants and third persons was solidary,
because Cosmos, the sponsor of the event, had been the principal mover of
the event, and, as such, had derived benefits from the marathon that in
turn had carried responsibilities towards the participants and the public;
that the respondents' agreement to free Cosmos from any liability had been
an agreement binding only between them, and did not bind third persons;
and that Cosmos had a cause of action against Intergames for whatever
could be recovered by the petitioners from Cosmos.

All parties appealed to the CA. The petitioners contended that the RTC
erred in not awarding damages for loss of earning capacity on the part of
Rommel for the reason that such damages were not recoverable due to
Rommel not yet having finished his schooling; and that it would be
premature to award such damages upon the assumption that he would
finish college and be gainfully employed.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision,

(and) in holding that respondent Intergames was not negligent considering
that:

A. Respondent Intergames failed to exercise the diligence of a good father

of the family in the conduct of the marathon in that it did not block off
from traffic the marathon route; and

B. Respondent Intergames' preparations for the race, including the number

of marshal during the marathon, were glaringly inadequate to prevent the
happening of the injury to its participants.

2. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision,

(and) in holding that the doctrine of assumption of risk finds application to
the case at bar even though getting hit or run over by a vehicle is not an
inherent risk in a marathon race. Even assuming arguendo that deceased
Abrogar made such waiver as claimed, still there can be no valid waiver of
one's right to life and limb for being against public policy.

3. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision (and)
in absolving respondent Cosmos from liability to petitioners on the sole
ground that respondent Cosmos' contract with respondent Intergames
contained a stipulation exempting the former from liability.
4. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision and
consequently holding respondents free from liability, (and) in not
awarding petitioners with actual, moral and exemplary damages for the
death of their child, Rommel Abrogar.

Held:

1. Yes. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the "omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place. The Civil
Code makes liability for negligence clear under Article 2176, and Article 20.

2. Yes. The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily
exposes himself to an obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the
risk of injury that may result therefrom. It rests on the fact that the person
injured has consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct
toward him and to take his chance of injury from a known risk, and
whether the former has exercised proper caution or not is immaterial. In
other words, it is based on voluntary consent, express or implied, to accept
danger of a known and appreciated risk; it may sometimes include
acceptance of risk arising from the defendant's negligence, but one does not
ordinarily assume risk of any negligence which he does not know and
appreciate. As a defense in negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine
requires the concurrence of three elements, namely; the plaintiff must
know that the risk is present;he must further understand its nature; and his
choice to incur it must be free and voluntary. Neither was the waiver by
Rommel, then a minor, an effective form of express or implied consent in
the context of the doctrine of assumption of risk. There is ample authority,
cited in Prosser, to the effect that a person does not comprehend the risk
involved in a known situation because of his youth, or lack of information
or experience, and thus will not be taken to consent to assume the risk.
Clearly, the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply to bar recovery
by the petitioners.

3. No. The sponsorship of the marathon by Cosmos was limited to

financing the race. Cosmos did nothing beyond that, and did not involve
itself at all in the preparations for the actual conduct of the race. This verity
was expressly confirmed by Intergames, through Castro, Jr.

4. Yes. Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable
for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act
or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.

People v. Iligan, G.R. No. 75369, 26 November 1990

Facts:

That on or about 3:00 a.m., August 4, 1980, at sitio Lico II, barangay Sto.
Domingo, municipality of Vinzons, province of Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above
named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, with
treachery and evident premeditation, one of the accused Fernando Iligan
armed with a bolo (sinampalok) and with deliberate intent to kill, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, gang up and in a sudden
unexpected manner, hacked Esmeraldo Quiñones, Jr., on his face, thus
causing fatal injuries on the latter’s face which resulted to the death of said
Esmeraldo Quiñones.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused are liable for the victim’s death given that it
was due to a vehicular accident and not the hacking.
Ruling:
YES. We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed after Quinones,Jr.
had fallen from the bolo hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by
a vehicle. This finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from
liability for the death of Quinones Jr. This being under ART 4 of the RPC
which states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that

which he intended.
The essential requisites of Art 4 are: that an intentional felony has been
committed and that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct
natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender.
It is held that the essential elements are present in this case. The intentional
felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quinones the fact that it
was considered superficial by the physician is immaterial. The location of
the wound intended to do away with him.
The hacking incident happened on the national highway where vehicles
pass any moment, the hacking blow received by Quinones weakened him
and was run over by a vehicle. The hacking by Iligan is thus deemed as the
proximate cause of the victim’s death. Iligan is held liable for homicide
absent any qualifying circumstances.

Intod v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, 21 October 1992

Facts:

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian,

Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's
house. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was
in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his
family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one
was hit by the gun fire.
Issue:

Whether or not the crime committed is impossible crime.

Held:

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,

would not amount to a crime. Thus, legal impossibility would apply to
those circumstances where:

1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the

law;

2) there is intention to perform the physical act;

3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and

4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a
crime.

In Philippine jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The

impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense,
but an act penalized by itself.

Jacinto v. People, G.R. No. 162540, 13 July 2009

Facts:

Petitioner Jacinto was an employee of Megafoam International, received a

check amounting to Pho 10, 000 as payment of Baby Aquino to her
purchase to Megafoam. However, instead of delivering it to Megafoam, she
deposited it to her account. The check was later discovered to be unfunded.
Both Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeal ruled that the petitioner
was guilty of qualified theft. Petitioner filed a petition for review of
certiorari to supreme court.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is correctly convicted for the crime of Qualified

Theft.

Ruling:

No. Petitioner is guilty of committing an impossible crime of theft only.

The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would
be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with
evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or
the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.

Petitioner’s evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully

taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be
unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she
would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers.
Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check
being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented
the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner
turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually
dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of
said dishonored check.

Petition granted. Decision is modified. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is

foundguilty of an impossible crime and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.