Critique of Conflict Theory

Mats Winther

http://www.two-paths.com/brenner.htm

Abstract: ‘Conflict theory’ (psychoanalytic) mirrors the chaotic

configuration of the borderline psyche. Charles Brenner has effectively
discarded the separate psychic layers of conscious and unconscious.
The stream of outer and inner information is loosely connected,
mirroring the instability and contradictory nature of the borderline
psyche, as opposed to the more hierarchical and austere configuration
of drives and perceptions among normal people. It is an apt example of
a “neurotic theory”, since it cannot function as a model of the normal
psyche. Conflict theory is irreconcilable with neuroscience as well as
classical psychoanalysis and analytical psychology.

Keywords: compromise formation, structural model, language

philosophy, indeterminacy, post-structuralism, Freud, Giegerich.

Introduction

Charles Brenner’s conflict theory is the leading analytic theory taught in

psychoanalytic institutes throughout the United States. The theory is accredited by
the American Psychoanalytic Association. On this view there are no psychic
structures, such as ego and Id, or conscious and unconscious. The term unconscious
is very much relativized since the theory has eliminated the unconscious structure,
as such, although conflicts can be partly unconscious. According to Brenner there is
no ego and there is no realm of the unconscious. He drops the well-known
conceptions of both the topographic and the structural models. Brenner says:

I proposed the view that current data speak against the idea that
mental conflict, as well as other aspects of mental functioning, are best
explained by assuming that the mental apparatus consists of two or
three agencies, systems, or structures, the two system theory being the
topographic theory [conscious/pre-conscious/unconscious] and the
three system theory being the structural theory [ego/Id/super-ego].
(Brenner, 1998)

Compromises [1
1] according to Freud are derivatives of the ego defensive function,
which moulds and “improves” the unconscious content (cf. Freud, 1916). While in
itself an improbable idea, in Brenner’s theory it is developed into something quite
different and even more peculiar. The compromise formation is said to arise
autonomously when maximization of the gratification of desire forms a compromise
with the minimization of unpleasant restraints, deriving from social and moral
proscriptions of childhood origin.

Compromise formations, allegedly, are the sole contents of the psyche and the
formation of compromises takes place regardless of any conscious agency, and
without any involvement of superego, etc. There is no real difference between health
and pathology. If a compromise formation allows for an adequate amount of
pleasurable gratification of drive derivatives, then it’s normal—it is as simple as that!
(cf. Brenner, 2003). Due to the fact that there exists a myriad of compromise
formations, pathology is extremely relativized. The only thing that counts is to
increase gratification of drives, until a level is reached that is considered normal.
Comparatively, in Freud, conflict and compromise formations are considered to be in
and of themselves pathological.

Brenner uses the term ‘unconscious’ as an adjective, as if a compromise formation

goes into suspension. In Freud and Jung, the unconscious is of a different nature
than the ego system—a “realm” where different laws prevail. The unconscious realm,
ego and consciousness, are involved in a psychic economy that bears resemblance
to communicating vessels.

Psychic structure

Brenner’s idea is to discard the notion of the unconscious as a psychic realm.

Instead the term is used as an adjective applicable to compromise formations.
However, adopting such a view will have enormous consequences. The notion runs
counter to the findings of neuroscience which has corroborated the existence of
unconscious motivation. (The concepts of neuroscience aren’t necessarily directly
translatable to psychoanalytic notions, although they may corroborate the latter).
Brenner’s central tenet is that there exists no static function responsible of ego
defence mechanisms, such as repressions. Yet modern neurological research has
revealed a highly effective repressive function located in the medial frontal lobe.
Basically, it causes memories to be selectively remembered in order to prevent
unpalatable unconscious contents to alter a person’s “rational and good” self-image.

Furthermore, neuroscientists have identified unconscious memory systems that

bypass the hippocampus, which is responsible of generating conscious memories. It
confirms the existence of continuous unconscious memories that produce
unconscious motivations in the form of emotions (cf. Solms, 2004). Neuroscience
has corroborated notions of conscious ego vs. unconscious, a repressive
mechanism, and an unconscious motivation—the very factors that do not exist,
according to Brenner. Brenner is very radical in his wish to dissolve all the
hierarchies of the psyche. He repudiates the notion of a rational reality-function:

From these and other examples I concluded that there seems to be no

convincing evidence of a need for consistency or realism in what is
thought of as adult ego functioning and that inconsistency, illogic, and
disregard for reality are quite natural to those aspects of mental
functioning. (Brenner, 1998)
Yet neuroscience has convincingly demonstrated that there is an autonomous
function that efficaciously rationalizes away unwelcome facts, giving plausible but
invented explanations of unconsciously motivated actions. The most well-known
experiments have been made by neurologist V. S. Ramachandran. We have a
remarkable ability to repress memories selectively and to immediately create rational
explanations for the holes in the story. Ramachandran says that the left hemisphere
manifestly employs Freudian “mechanisms of defence”. We are extremely
rationalizing. Realism and regard for logic is autonomous. When facts don’t fit our
worldview, we immediately create logical stories to make up for the autonomous
repressions that have occurred (cf. Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998).

Thus, evidence is mounting in neuroscience that there is an autonomous repressive

function and a rationalizing function. We have conscious memories and we have
unconscious memories, which bypass hippocampus. However, in Brenner’s thinking
the mind is not composed of separate agencies. In his scheme there is no place for
an overlying repressive function:

Whatever helps minimize unpleasure associated with a drive derivative

is a defense. There are no special defense mechanisms; that is, there
are no mental mechanisms or activities that serve the function of
defense and of nothing else. Whatever thoughts or behavior serve to
diminish unpleasure are defenses. (Brenner, 1982)

Discoveries of neuroscience have confirmed the existence of a non-verbal implicit

memory and an unrepressed unconscious. Mauro Mancia says that “[the] implicit
memory is the archive for unconscious experiences that cannot be remembered or
described verbally” (Mancia, 2006, p.97). Such a region exists prior to the formative
principles of compromise formations (i.e., the unpleasant restraints deriving from
social and moral proscriptions). Thus, we can be certain that at least one region of
the psyche is not comprised of compromise formations. Mancia continues:

[The unrepressed unconscious] is the result of storage in the implicit

memory of experiences, fantasies, and defenses dating from the
presymbolic and preverbal stage of development, that therefore cannot
be recollected even though they carry on influencing a person’s
affective, emotional, cognitive, and sexual life even as an adult. (ibid.
p.107)

We are endowed with a dual memory system; the explicit or declarative memory,
which can be verbalized and recalled (essential to our identity and our
autobiography), and the implicit memory, which is unconscious and can neither be
verbalized nor recalled (p.12). Even during adulthood, strongly stressful or traumatic
experiences may alter the circuits of the explicit memory, so that they have to be
filed in the implicit memory, where they form the building blocks of a late
unrepressed unconscious (p.100). Although gaining access directly to the repressed
unconscious and the implicit memory is impossible, contents may be acquired
through a circuitous process. Luigi Cappelli explains:

According to Mancia [...], fear and anxiety stored in the emotional and
affective implicit memory can to some extent become independent of
external references that might trigger them. These memories, however,
 exert a constant pressure on a person’s conscious psychic life and on
the declarative memory, even if they are not formulated verbally and
cannot easily be called up voluntarily. As Mancia points out, in
psychoanalysis these nonthinkable, nonsymbolic emotional levels tend
to surface in non- verbal form, in the tones and rhythms of the voice,
and the structure of the language, more than the content of what the
patient is saying. Dreams and the transference are other gateways
through which they can irrupt in analysis. Mancia considers this level of
memory as part of an unrepressed unconscious that may contain
traumatic experiences. These presymbolic features, manifested in the
“musicality” of the patient’s language in the transference and through
the figurative and symbolopoietic aspects of the dream, can thus be
defined in explicit, conscious terms. (ibid. p.184)

Thus, it is evident that Brenner’s theory, which presupposes that the psychic content
has a linguistic and narrative nature, conflicts sharply with the findings of
neuroscience, not to speak of the findings of classical psychoanalysis and analytical
psychology.

A borderline theory

Logically, conflict theory does not hold water. How can we remember things and
have a continuous personality if we lack recourse to a permanent conscious faculty
called the ego? How do we explain the synthetic function whereby contents are
assimilated? The theory of projections, whereby everything unconscious remains
projected, suddenly hangs in the air. How can a reaction formation [2
2] be explained
in terms of compromise formations?

It’s evident that we cannot do without the notion of the ego. Thus, we are bound to
adopt the notion of the unconscious, too, as the idea of the conscious mind is
meaningless without a notion of the unconscious. Conscious and unconscious are
better viewed as “realms” where different psychological laws prevail. The
unconscious is by nature manifold, whereas the synthetic nature of consciousness
comes to expression in ego unity. In the unconscious realm incompatible elements
may exist side by side and remain alloyed. Consciousness requires consistency and
directionality, otherwise we wouldn’t be able to recognize people; nor would we be
capable of performing a monotonous work, like driving a train engine all day. This
only became possible after the development of the self-governed ego, a function
that remained unrealized in archaic man.

The quality of consciousness is synthetic, making it a different realm. At the rise of

consciousness psychic laws take shape that have bearing on the relation between
conscious and unconscious. They should be viewed as realms because they function
like realms (there is no need to introduce terms of ontology). How, then, is it
possible for Brenner to create a theory that flies in the face of reason? It’s because
he holds that “logic, consistency, and consonance with reality is not normative”.
There exists no ego, and thus no reality-function. Of course, such a theoretical
grounding allows Brenner to be as illogical as he wishes (cf. Brenner, 1968). In
therapy, then, the therapist may interpret the material as he wishes, due to the fact
that there is no logic or consistency in mental functioning. Instead, “indeterminate
meaning” is the basis of the psyche, in the form of a multitude of compromise
formations. Nothing is correct or incorrect, anyway.

Such an attitude poses an immediate danger to the fragile patient. It’s always
possible, in any person, to discern psychological conflicts of a trivial kind. People
having certain forms of borderline or narcissistic disorders are often rather acute
psychological observers. Their apparent nearness to other people’s unconscious
primarily derives from their ability to register minimal nuances in our verbal
expression, voice, facial expression, and other expressive motions, like our
involuntary bodily motions. The problem is that they register only the initial
impulse, but fail to heed its rectification via defence mechanisms and realistic
thinking. This psychological “talent”, together with the very befitting “conflict
theory”, would forebode a future with borderline doctors. They may keep to the
surface all the time and make any deduction they want.

It’s true that pathology and health can, in a way, be regarded as relative and not
absolute concepts. However, Brenner’s version of this relativism is over the top. A
sensible form of relativism, that retains the demarcation line between conscious and
unconscious, signifies a condition as pathological when the complex continually
disturbs consciousness. On the other hand, the subject cannot be regarded as
suffering from a pathology, such as neurosis, if the very same complex has not the
capacity to disturb consciousness.

If we are lacking a theoretical divide between conscious and unconscious then a

person’s feelings and perceptions must always be regarded as more or less
objective. If a subject is angry with Mr. Smith, then the subject knows he must be
right because otherwise he wouldn’t have had these feelings. Emotionally, he has
not established a division between inner and outer reality. This is same as the
narcissistic short-circuit. On the other hand, had the subject read something of
Freud, then he could begin to suspect that the feelings really spring from the
unconscious, and his perceptions might be misperceptions building on unconscious
expectations. His motive of leaping out at Mr. Smith has unconscious roots.

If we remove the theoretical demarcation line, then we are moving closer to a theory
that mimicks borderline psychopathology. Characteristic of this condition is that
there exists no inner and outer—the two are melded together. It means that every
definition of reality, as well as all action, is also a reflection of oneself. Effectively,
the subject’s ego and the world are one. It implies that the subject himself is
capable of defining the world. “Mr. Smith is a bad person because I have those
negative feelings toward him”. Anything that the subject creates, whether an
intellectual product or anything else, cannot be criticized because that would imply
an attack on his ego. It’s experienced as a lese-majesty. So the subject’s definition
of reality must be fully respected. Everybody else must follow him in rebuking
Mr. Smith. Otherwise, it’s again experienced as a direct attack on the subject’s ego.
Of course, this well-known pattern is easily recognizable in the narcissistic
pathology.
Post-structuralism

Brenner’s repudiation of psychic structure depends on his footing in post-

structuralist tradition. Post-structuralists hold that the concept of “self”, as a
singular and coherent entity, is a fictional construct. Instead, an individual
comprises conflicting tensions and knowledge claims, e.g. gender, class, profession,
etc. (cf. New World Encyc., here). It’s necessary for this theory to work that the
psychic content is of a linguistic and narrative nature, otherwise compromise
formations could not form. A symbol, on the other hand, may contain opposites
that, if formulated in language, will fly apart. Thus, if the psyche has a pre-linguistic
and symbolic layer, then Brenner’s theory collapses. Whereas a symbol can relate
undivided ‘meaning’ the compromise formation cannot, due to the indeterminacy of
meaning in language.

Post-structuralist thinking implies the relinquishment of all kinds of structures

(including Freud’s structural model), as well as the assumption that there are truths
to be uncovered, and a (neurotic) conflict to be resolved. This assumption is what we
had before, with Freud. According to the postmodern project, to which Brenner’s
theory belongs, there is merely inherent conflict and self-contradiction. The subject
is only capable of exchanging one inherent conflict, one compromise formation,
against another inherent conflict. He may ‘deconstruct’ one compromise formation,
but only to create another. This is modern philosophy in terms of Jacques Derrida, et
al. Brenner’s theory clearly belongs in the post-structuralist and postmodernist
project. It is in the same vein as solipsistic language philosophy.

The inner conflict of language is central to the postmodernist project, to which

Brenner belongs. If there is such a thing as ‘symbolic representation’, instead of
representations in the form of ‘linguistic narratives’, then Brenner’s model of the
mind collapses like a house of cards. A symbol is something that goes beyond
language. Hence it cannot be a part of any compromise formation. Opposites form
after an intervention of a language-dependent consciousness. Symbolic
representation, on the other hand, transcends the opposites of consciousness and
may carry meaning inexpressible in words. Thus, Brenner’s conflict model stands
and falls with the supremacy of language representation (cf. Bradley S. Peterson,
2002).

The impossibility of determining the precise meaning of utterances between

individuals, the alleged “indeterminacy of meaning”, underlies the multiplicity of
meaning in the compromise formations. These philosophers think that the
intrapsychic, too, wholly builds on language. Hence, its content is indeterminate,
and can be interpreted any way you like. There is no need for a reality-function (i.e.,
an ego), due to the fact that the extrapsychic and the intrapsychic can be interpreted
much as you like. There is no “absolute reality” to adapt to. So it has a strong smell
of the Wittgensteinian form of solipsism.

The influence from Anglo-Saxon language philosophy is marked also in many other
academic branches. In the humanities, the so-called post-structuralists argue that a
text, a film manuscript, or whatever, cannot reach outside itself, which means that
we are “enclosed in our language”. In that case one would expect these thinkers to
shut up, but the effect is the opposite. Since it doesn’t matter what they are writing,
they realize that they can just as well babble about anything. It doesn’t matter that
it’s senseless because there is never any true reference to an external meaning,
anyway. Should somebody create something seemingly deep and intelligent, one can
always ‘deconstruct’ it and reveal that it’s simply a petty bourgeoisie political motif
underlying the text, such as homophobia, misogynism, etc. This kind of thinking is
represented in psychology by Brenner’s ‘conflict theory’. The case material can be
interpreted in any way you like, due to a lack of reference to objective meaning.

I hold that this way of thinking is neurotic. Theories, in themselves, can be affected
by a “rational neurosis”. It means that any person that digests these theories, and
practices them, will acquire secondary and induced neurotic symptoms. It’s
essentially the same phenomenon as a person reading Communist books by Lenin.
With time he might even develop the characteristics of a personality disorder. Such
people really need to be “deprogrammed”, similarly to how sect members are
deprogrammed. It’s the thinking they subscribe to that is neurotic. This is why
“cognitive therapy” has achieved a degree of success. It encourages the patient to
challenge his/her distorted and unhelpful thinking. Much of the problems that
people have today really derives from the bunkum they have accumulated in their
heads—errant thoughtways that they have come to believe in.

Dream example

I have criticized the theory that the defining elements of the psyche consist of
compromises formed of narratives, that is, linguistic entities with indeterminate
meaning. To exemplify, let’s look at a common theme in dreams, namely “the failed
exam”: “I am about to take the exam, but I’m probably going to fail because I
haven’t studied diligently.” Arguably, this theme would compensate a sense of
failure, but not in the way of a compromise formation. A complex, i.e. a “failure
complex”, has formed. It is what it is: a sense of failure that resides in the
unconscious. As soon as consciousness realizes it clearly, it will dissolve: “In fact, I
have passed life’s exams and may walk straight-backed through life.”

This is one possible explanation. An alternative interpretation is that the dreamer is

too stressed up about things. An “achievement complex” has constellated in the
unconscious and is causing a disturbance in consciousness. When this is wholly
consciously realized the complex dissolves, and the subject may seat himself on the
pier with a fishing-rod in his hand. Again, it’s not the case of a compromise
formation, but of a complex. Its name is “achievement” and it is what it is.

Yet, these are, arguably, rather easy and atypical examples. The more difficult case
is when the failed exam dream points at a symbolic content. In this case the dream
says that the dreamer lags behind in “something”. When he wakes up he has the
feeling that he is missing out on something. The complex doesn’t dissolve. In this
case we are dealing with a symbolic content. The unconscious doesn’t “know” what
it is—only consciousness has the capability of formulating it. Typically it pertains to
matters connected with individuation. When the worldly education has finished, the
spiritual schooling has just begun. Such dreams in midlife, or later, would herald a
change of attitude, which will soon collapse the many preconceptions like a house of
cards. It is high time to pass a bridge (the exam) and arrive at a higher level of
consciousness.

None of the above explanations make use of compromise formations. So we are

dealing with complexes and with symbol formation. A theory of compromise
formation and linguistic narratives cannot explain the processes of the psyche. A
symbol is not a narrative. In fact, it is something that is not yet wholly formulated. A
complex is not a compromise. On the contrary, “what you see is what you get”.

The archaic mind

Brenner’s repudiation of Freud’s structural notions is echoed in

Wolfgang Giegerich’s Neo-Hegelian repudiation of Jung’s structures. Jung likewise
postulates an ego, whereas the Id is termed the “collective unconscious” and takes
on a more ideational character. According to Giegerich, there is no unconscious
because “technology” has replaced it. The magnum opus of our time is “making
money” (cf. Giegerich, 1996 & 2004).

It is not easy to understand the underlying motif of this manner of thinking. Of

course, in a pre-conscious human, or in an animal, there is no ego consciousness,
and thus there is no unconscious. In fact, ego consciousness emerges coincidentally
with the unconscious realm. It functions like a contrast effect. It seems that Brenner
aims to formulate a psychology based on the primitive or animal mind. The
borderline psyche represents, as some theorists have argued, a fallback to the
archaic psyche. Since the archaic standpoint cannot successfully harmonize with
modern society, a pathological conflict ensues.

Giegerich reasons along such lines. He has dropped the notion of the unconscious
and reverted to the archaic mind. Anyway, that’s how I understand his thinking. In
order for a projection to fall out there must exist an unconscious content (and
therefore an unconscious). However, in the archaic state of worldly identification
projection does not take place. For instance, the aborigine experiencing a divinity in
a stone has no doubts of the veracity of his experience. Since the psyche of archaic
man remained at one with the surrounding world there occurred no projection of
unconscious content. Comparatively, in a projective economy there is always critical
reflection and doubts arising, which means that a projection may be withdrawn.

Giegerich introduces the notion of primitive identity in the modern world and argues
that the modern psyche is at one with technology. So he interprets the modern
world in terms of pre-conscious mankind situated in a technological reality, whose
foremost drive it is to create money. The modern dweller has no unconscious mind
because he does not project. He is at one with the machines, as pre-conscious
mankind was at one with the trees, the watercourses, etc.

Comparatively, in Brenner, if there is no unconscious, where do all the repressed

contents go? The answer is that they don’t go anywhere, because there is no
repression. A cat doesn’t repress his hunting instinct nor does a human employ
repression. What takes shape are “compromise formations”, formed by
incommensurable contents in the individual. This means that childhood conflicts, as
well as certain compromise formations that they occasion, persist throughout life.
So childhood conflict is all, and this is what’s taught in psychoanalytic institutes in
the U.S., today (2007).

Conclusion

Brenner makes use of psychological definitions in an inconsistent way, disregarding

their original signification. It is a deceitful way of introducing a wholly new concept
of the psyche. Thus, although the psychological concepts really have a different
meaning, he may argue that he retains much of the former conceptuality. Conflict
theory means a radical departure from the “classic” economy of the psyche, which
includes the transactions between conscious and unconscious, defence and
repression, complexes and symbol formation. It is necessary to employ such notions
in psychotherapy because they are included in the natural language of the
unconscious. In dreams and fantasies the conscious and unconscious are depicted
as realms (entering a churchyard at night, for instance). The unconscious is
sometimes personified, and the daylight world may take shape as a father figure.
Complexes, including the Oedipus, can take any theriomorphic or anthropomorphic
form. The content is often of a symbolic nature and not necessarily a linguistic
narrative. The idea that classical models are translatable to conflict theory (i.e., that
the latter is a less cumbersome way of saying the same thing) cannot be proven and
it underrates psychic complexity.

Conflict theory is extremely relativistic. Since there is no real difference between

health and pathology the irresponsible therapist needn’t really bother about the
patient’s well-being. What determines normality is an adequate amount of
pleasurable gratification of drive derivatives. This connotes a standpoint of amorality
as it neglects notions of a constitutional morality. Judging from ethological research
and recent discussions in evolutionary psychology, such a conclusion is unfounded.

In Brenner’s form of relativism there is no clear demarcation line—no clear indicator

of pathology. It’s a gliding scale. This will have as consequence that notions of
pathology and health will become wholly subjective terms. It’s up to the doctor to
decide what he deems is healthy or sick. If the patient is still in conflict, it isn’t
necessarily a problem, since the psyche consists of conflicts. As a consequence,
psychological thinking will become arbitrary and shallow. Despite the fact that adult
life is the root of much psychological suffering, all emphasis is put on childhood
conflict. Such a theoretical preconception is damaging to the therapeutic relation.

The hidden premise of Brenner and Giegerich is a formulation of the healthy mind as
modelled on the archaic mind, existing in a state of world-identity. Such a way of
thinking will sustain the narcissistic psychotherapist since his ego may then wholly
envelop the patient. Thanks to an indeterminacy of meaning he may draw any
conclusion he wants, especially those that are self-gratifying. He may give free rein
to his own projections. There is no need for a painful, conscientious groping in the
dark, anymore. What a relief for the burdened therapist! What comes to mind is
Gresham’s Law (1858), which says that money with less intrinsic value will drive
good money out of market. From a patient perspective the dangers are obvious.
© Mats Winther, 2007.

Notes

(1) compromise formation n. In psychoanalysis, a form assumed by a repressed

wish, idea, or memory to gain admission to consciousness as a symptom, usually
neurotic (1), a dream (2), a parapraxis, or some other manifestation of unconscious
activity, the original idea being distorted beyond recognition so that the
unconscious element that needs to be repressed and consciousness that needs to be
protected from it are both partially satisfied by the compromise. The idea was
introduced by Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) in 1896 in his article ‘Further Remarks
on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence’ (Standard Edition, III, pp. 162–85, at p. 170)
and developed further in his book Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis
(1916–17): ‘The two forces which have fallen out meet once again in the symptom
and are reconciled. It is for that reason, too, that the symptom is so resistant: it is
supported from both sides’ (Standard Edition, XV-XVI, at pp. 358–9). (A Dictionary of
Psychology, Colman, 2001).

(2) reaction formation Defensive process by which an unacceptable impulse is

mastered by exaggeration (hypertrophy) of the opposing tendency. Solicitude may
be a reaction-formation against cruelty, cleanliness against coprophilia, etc. (A
Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis, Rycroft, 1995).

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