EMERGING AFGHAN-INDO NEXUS

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

A thesis submitted to Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, in partial

fulfillment of requirement of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by

ALI IMRAN ATTA

SCHOOL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD
JANUARY 2019

i
 ABSTRACT
Indo-Afghan mutual relationship is steeped in post-colonial history, but this association
sustained for a long time after the 9/11 incident. New Delhi gradually penetrated in
Afghanistan in the name of capacity building and started manipulating systematically and
economically. Both states signed planned agreements to make this relationship stronger. New
Delhi has its own submerged needs with this strategic partnership. Indo-Afghan planned
nexus destabilized the whole region. From there on, joint association is security threat for
Pakistan. Overstatedly region is facing acute implication but surely Islamabad is affecting
most due to this tactical partnership. The New Delhi foreign policy under the tutelage of
Pentagon has security implications for Islamabad. Moreover, New Delhi influence in
Afghanistan would be a continuous threat to the region but poses a reliance to Islamabad.
Consequently, it would not be possible to formulate peaceful settlement and sustainable
peace in Afghanistan without considering Islamabad.

2
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First of all, I am thankful to Allah Almighty who gave me the strength to complete this
project. Certainly, I am very lucky to have the opportunity to work with Dr. Aisha Younus as
the supervisor of my thesis. Her intellectual insight, guidance and encouragement made me
to accomplish this research work despite of his tough and busy schedule.

The completion of this undertaking could not be possible without generous help of Dr. Nazir
Hussain and Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal. These magnificent scholars of their field with their
apparently intense expression, literally showed hearts of gold while assisting to me during
this dissertation.

How may someone forget the most animated and endeared, Dr. Mujeeb Afzal who is
supposed to be big brother and rescuer by every student and who encourage students with his
convincing arguments in their of time of unhappiness and hopelessness. Every student
whether known or unknown to him, already knowns that he would be there for him or her
and help and facilitated with whatever there is available in his domain.

I am also greatly indebted to my friend/Mathematics friends, expressly Asim Bilal, Shehzad,

Muzzamil Hanif and Raja Jawad who have been greatly helped in typing my monograph.

Ali Imran Atta

3
 CONTENTS

ABSTRACT i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii

ABBREVIATIONS iv

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 11

CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL DYNAMICS OF INDIA-AFGHANISTAN NEXUS

1947:2001 23
2.1 India-Afghanistan Nexus: 1947-197
2.2 The Soviet Intervention of Afghanistan and Indo-Afghan Relations 1980s
2.3 United States Diplomacy with Kabul in the Pre-2001 Era

CHAPTER THREE: INDO-AFGHAN SECURITY NEXUS: 2001-2017 38

3.1 Indo-Afghan Nexus after 2001

CHAPTER FOUR: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN POST 9/11

48
4.1 Military Implications
4.2 Political Implications
4.3 Socio-Economic Implications

CONCLUSION 66

BIBLIOGRAPHY 70

4
 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BCM Billion Cubic Meters
CBMs Confidence Building Measures
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
DHQ Defense Headquarter
DRA Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Area
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HUA Harkat-Ul-Ansar
HUJI Harkatul Jihad Islami
HUM Harkatul Mujahedeen
ICC International Cricket Council
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence
JEM Jaish-E-Muhammad
KHAD Khadamat-E Aetela'at-E Dawlati
KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LET Lashkar-E-Tayyaba
LoC Line of Control
MOUs Memorandum of Understanding
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NWFP North West Frontier Province
OIC Organization of Islamic Countries
PDPA People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PML-N Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PPP Pakistan Peoples Party
PTA Preferential Trade Agreement
PTDC Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA South Asian Free Trade Area
5
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
UNs United Nations
USAID US Agency for International Development
WTO World Trade Center

6
 INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an effort to examine one central question: What are the implications of Indo-
Afghan nexus post 2001 for the security of Pakistan? It is argued that the Indo-Afghan
relations have exacerbated Pakistan’s security problem whereby it feels more insecure at its
eastern and western borders simultaneously in the post-9/11 period. India stretched its hand
of friendship to Afghanistan in the name of capacity building and started expanding its
influence in Afghan socio-political circles. Factually, India had cordial relations in with
Afghanistan past. However, the changing global structures and Indo-US growing cooperation
has immensely contributed in an upsurge if Indo-Afghan cooperation in the post-9/11 period.
For the Unite States, India could play substantive role in the stability of Afghan state and the
preservation of the Unite States interests in this region. The present study will explain the
partnership and its security implications for Pakistan from neo-realist perspective. It contends
that the structural constraints have forged Indo-Afghan partnership that has consequently
exacerbated Pakistan’s security concerns in the post-9/11 period.

Historically, various emperors have long been attempted to subjugate Afghanistan, hunted by
the empire constructers, and for periods, great armies have attempted to subdue it, leaving
signs their effort of their efforts in the form the great memorials, shrine and monument, now
collapsed to devastation. The country’s unfriendly and unpredictable scene of deserts and
elevations has left several regals’ desires to rest, as has the untiring resistance of its
aggressively independence lover people, so due to self-governing attitude people the country
has had failed to merge into a nation but has instead long tolerated as a patchwork of
challenging ethnic factions and ever-shifting alliances.1

India is indebted to Turk and Pathan warriors of the eleventh and twelfth centuries who
played their pivotal role in making Indian Sub-Continent as one the greatest cultural hub at
that time. They invaded it from the land of Afghanistan via Khyber Pass and Hindu Kush
Ranges. Indo-Afghan relations, post-partition of the Indian subcontinent relations with India
and then Pakistan Owing to the centuries old ties with the South Asian region, Afghanistan
has been maintaining good relations with India. Strong cultural ties with Afghanistan have

1
V. Srivastava, The pre-historic Afghanistan. (Allahabad: Indological Publications, 1982):10.
7
helped India in keeping firm political relations with Afghanistan. Former great powers like
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union played imperial game on the Afghan land in the past.2
Afghan rulers and the British rulers of India used to have border issues with each other, but
after the partition, the dispute transformed itself into Pak-Afghan border issue, giving India a
way to ease its ties with Afghanistan. The bitter enmity between Pakistan and India fostered
better Indo-Afghan relations after the partition, causing huge security problems for Pakistan
in the years to come.3

In the same way, Pakistani apprehensions of its insecurity from Indian side got worsened
when it saw a close security and strategic partnership between India and the Soviet Union,
especially in the background, when leaders like Nehru and Nasir were blowing the trumpet
of Non-Alignment during the Cold War era. India was one of the few countries in whole
world which supported the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Many people consider it the
lowest point of our foreign policy. India remained a close ally of communist Kabul
government, but it lost goodwill of Afghans. India continued to support communist
government of Najibullah’s government and after that India supported the coalition
government of Rabbani. But after some time, Taliban took over Kabul & most of
Afghanistan. India didn’t have any diplomatic relation with Taliban and India became
supporter of Northern Alliance led by Ahmed Shah Masoud. India along with Iran and
Russians supported Northern Alliance with money, arms and logistics. When Masoud was
injured before 9/11, he was taken to Indian run hospital.4 After 9/11 Northern alliance
captured Kabul with American help.

Thus, under the auspices of America, a new chapter started in Indo-Afghan friendship. India
has helped Afghanistan by money, developmental projects, humanitarian aids. India is only
one of the major powers who is totally against Taliban. India support Afghan government
resolve to eliminate complete Taliban (good & bad). India enjoy huge soft power in
Afghanistan and common Afghans acknowledge it. Indian films, songs, cricket etc. are very
popular in Afghanistan. India has supported democratic process in Afghanistan, and it enjoys

2
M. Naidis, and R. Rastogi “Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880-1900” The American Historical Review, 72(4),
(1967):1458.
3
Vartan Gregorian, The emergence of modern Afghanistan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969):128.
4
Ibid.
8
good relation with government & opposition. India is helping Afghanistan without any
hidden agenda. India wants a strong and stable government in Kabul. India wants Kabul free
of any unnecessary foreign intervention.

The United States hostile attitude toward Afghanistan has brought about unpredictable
challenges, ultimatum and frequent pressure not for Pakistan but stability of whole region
and world. Islamabad’s establishment policy after 2001, joined with India’s stretching her
arm and prolonged her stay in Afghanistan, has increase profound pressures on Rawalpindi
in terms of the low intensity of fight on the western boundaries. Islamabad being a frontline
state in the United State war against terrorism and a Muslim mainstream state had to allow a
supplementary brunt of Indian dominated and hostile state attitude which turn out to be its
lowest ebbs after the 2001 in South Asian political environment.

Rawalpindi smelling insecurity about India-Afghan nexus are getting strong both in terms
politics and strategic. Rawalpindi establishment and bureaucracy injected an ideology-based
national character for Pakistan at the core of which lay both spiritual nationalism and anti-
India feelings. Therefore, Islamabad, as a state, smell insecurity by it both immediate
neighbors, India and Afghanistan both of them have had old and civilizational nexus,
appeared to be antagonistic to its geographical and physical proximity and stressed on their
actuality and ethno-linguistic attendance. Pakistani establishment and policymakers have
continuously felt insecurity and devised a pincer movement and calculated hold responses if
India and Afghanistan cement their bonhomie and association.5

The Cold War era (1948-1991) forced both India and Pakistan to make mirror-image foreign
policies towards each other. India had to remain neutral in the Cold War era for some time
because it was among the pioneers of Non-Aligned Movement. Afghanistan followed the
example of neutrality and benefited from both the United States America and the Soviet
Union politically and economically. But this neutrality did not last long. Pakistan sided by
the United States America and Afghanistan sided by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
during the Cold War for their respective interests. The fast friendship of Afghanistan and the
USSR proved counterproductive for Afghanistan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
5
A. Pande, Explaining Pakistan's foreign policy (London: Routledge, 2014):68.
9
attacked its soil in 1979. At that time, India, as a close ally of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, supported the invasion of Afghanistan by the, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
drawing severe criticism from international community and loss of honor and credibility in
it.6

Indo-Afghan political and cultural contacts gradually increased, especially after 9/11 due to
the robust diplomacy between New Delhi and Kabul. Since 2001, Indian economy and its
standing have also risen tremendously. It also has made great efforts to capture permanent
Security Council seat and fulfill its long-awaited universal goals. The constraints put by the
global system, define the directions of the foreign policies of different states of the world.
Though, there is no denial that the individual decisions and domestic conditions may affect
the foreign policies, yet the decisive role is ultimately played by the respective pattern of the
given global system.

It seems pertinent to understand the courageous retaliation movements against foreign troops
in Afghanistan, exodus issues and radicalization of Pathans while comprehending the
security challenges being faced by Pakistan at present. The past 18 years of Afghan war have
proved tormenting and challenging for Pakistani army and civilian policy makers. As soon as
the United States invaded Afghanistan, Taliban virus spread across Pakistan as well. These
Taliban got a lot of support from Pakistani Pak toons because of close ethnic ties between
them. Over all speaking whole region continue to face serious implications but Pakistan
specifically is affected the most due to Indo-Afghan strategic nexus. These Taliban with the
support of many fanatic groups have massacred more than 20000 innocent Pakistani civilians
in the last one and a half decade.

On the other hand, long animosity with India has also been a security challenge for Pakistan
with which it has never been able to come to terms on many longstanding issues since
partition. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, for example, is a dead letter
due to a Pakistan-India dispute, a dispute the formation of the bloc has failed to resolve.
Ideally, Pakistan can benefit from establishing linkages with states in the region, especially

6
P.S., Ghosh, and R. Panda. “Domestic Support for Mrs Gandhi’s Afghanistan policy: The Soviet Factor in
Indian Politics” Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No.3, (1983):261.
10
South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Multilateral blocs can play a key role in
developing regional trade and cooperation, allowing freer flow of people, goods and ideas.

Literature Review
The literature review on the subject covers several books, journal articles and reports
published by renowned think tanks. Srivastva in his book Pre-Historic Afghanistan
highlighted the very old frame of reference. The contemporary limitations of Afghanistan
were recognized in the late 19th period in the perspective of a contention between majestic
United Kingdom and monarch Russia that Rudyard Kipling labeled the “Great Game.”
Modern Afghanistan developed a pawn in an effort over political philosophy and
commercial inspiration. In the previous quarter of the 20th period, Afghanistan agonized
the damaging effluence of civil war and seriously exacerbated by armed attacks and
subjected by the Soviet Union (1979–89).7

The renowned scholar Stanley Wolpert comprehensively explains the stressful relations of
Pakistan and India since their independence in his book India and Pakistan: Continued
Conflict or Cooperation? Both Pakistan and India have made several efforts to overcome
the rivalry but the Kashmir dispute has created hurdles in these efforts. Both countries have
fought three wars in 1948, 1965 and 1971.8

Major General Samay Ram, in his book The New Afghanistan: Pawn of America boldly
throws light on Indian dreams in the future of Afghanistan. According the way of his
perception the 9/11 incident provided India with an opportunity of playing a major political
role in Afghanistan. His book highlights the intricacies of Indian foreign policy making
during the major regional changes taking place in the post 9/11 era. Indians already had
concluded that the US invasion of Afghanistan would not be a temporary adventure and it,
instead, would last for decades. This stirred India to approach the US rulers with an
intention of developing long lasting rapport with them. But, in doing so, India remained
conscious of not annoying its decades old ally, Russia. The first section of the book asserts

7
V. Srivastava, The pre-historic Afghanistan. (Allahabad: Indological Publications, 1982):10.
8
Stanley Wolpert, India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation? (United States: University of
California Press, 2010):16.
11
that the Indian aims in Afghanistan are multifarious and multifaceted and the spectrum of
the objectives is large and vast. The main reason can be cited as the Indian interests of
pacifying the boiling Afghan political situation and to offer big economic grants to
Afghanistan to win the trust of Afghan politicians and masses.9

Even before the US invasion of Afghanistan, India had been vying to woo American
foreign policy makers. In order to achieve its regional objectives, it especially anticipated
the US rulers to help it out in the post 9/11 Afghanistan. In order to fulfill this wish, India
offered the US full fledge support and its sea and air routes to continue operations in
Afghanistan. But surprisingly, the choice of America was Pakistan. The territorial
contiguity, religious similarity and aerial proximity between Pakistan and Afghanistan
urged the US policy makers to choose Pakistan, instead of India. The material cost of this
choice was also very affordable to the USA. Also, former collaboration between Pakistan
and the USA in 1980s in beating the Soviet Union also arose American interest in Pakistan,
rather India. In addition to this, the cultural connections between Afghanis and Pakistanis
and the influence of Pakistani Army on Pashtoons Taliban also persuaded America to select
Pakistan, rather India. But as the war lengthened and crossed the mark of a decade, the
USA started to show apathy to Pakistani authorities. This paved the way for India, and it
started to convince the USA as a perfect replacement of Pakistan in the War on Terror. It
not only tried to mitigate the role of Pakistan in the War on Terror but also vied to take a lot
of economic and political benefits from the USA.

Analogous view has been depicting in the book published by Manas Publications in
2004, named Emerging India; Diplomatic Journey was authored by Harish Kapur. It
encompasses the overall foreign policy of India since its independence. It describes in
detail how the Indian foreign policy used to be made, what principles used to be followed
and who used to control it from beginning till present? The author highlights the
importance of Afghanistan in the making of Indian foreign policy and shows how crucial
and vital Afghanistan has been for India as an extended neighbor in the attainment of its
regional goals. All the three domestic, regional and global aspects have been
appropriately highlighted by the author in the formulation of Indian foreign policy. The
9
Samay Ram, The New Afghanistan: Pawn of America (New Deli: Manas Publications, 2004):43.
12
swelling economy, large army, great MNCs, technological boom and heavy arsenal have
encouraged India to consider itself the greatest regional power in South Asia, if not in the
world. It has also been goaded to claim for permanent seat in the UN Security Council.
India never misses a chance to project its might and power at the regional and global
levels and shows itself among the list of highly civilized and socially and economically
developed states of the world. It is also the member of BRICKS with the main purpose of
capturing the permanent seat of United Nations Security Council. Afghanistan has been
an integral part of Indian foreign policy making for decades and like all the other weak
South Asian neighbors of India, Afghanistan has also been exploited at the hands of this
great regional power along with the collusion of the great powers of the world.

Another well informed, the book Emerging Afghanistan in the Third Millennium
published by The Pentagon Publishers in 2009, was written by Mondira Dutta. The book
contains various articles written by various authors, explaining the various objectives of
Indian cross border activities in Afghanistan.10

Almost all the articles included in the book show how India has assisted Afghanistan in
the course of the time. The beginning of each article shows the same fact that Azerbaijan
alone has almost 130 billion barrels of oil. And almost 30 billion US$ have already been
invested in an attempt to get these unexplored reservoirs.11 Because of its extra rich oil
and gas reservoirs, the Central Asian region has gained great importance in the so-called
Great Game.12 The geo-political scenario of the region has been drastically changed
because of the over meddling of the great and regional powers in the recent past. Though
Central Asia was already a great source of attraction for the world powers before 9/11
because of its rich resources, yet after the 9/11 incidents, it especially captured their full
attention. This fact increased its geo-strategic complexities, especially for the regional
players like India, China and Russia. The US onslaught of Afghanistan may be deemed
as having the hidden intentions of capturing the oil and gas resources of Central Asia in
the coming future. This probably, may be one of the biggest reasons of the US prolonged

10
Mondira Dutta, Emerging Afghanistan in the Third Millennium (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2009):374.
11
Ibid.,17.
12
Lutz Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (London: Pentagon Press, 2009):14
13
stay in Afghanistan. This may also be meant to deter Russia and China in the region and
help India reach these natural resources. Russia and the USA are also competing with
each other on the issues of army bases and gas pipelines in Central Asia. In the same
way, China, by using the platform of SCO is increasing its leverage in the Central Asian
region. Many other Non-South Asian states like Iran and Turkey also want to take
advantage of the natural resources of Central Asia. But in the presence of chaos and war
like situation, it seems an uphill task to promote regional trade and integration. Similar
perception has been perceiving. In 2008 by, K. Warikoo in his book published a book
which contained three sections, named “Afghanistan; Challenges and Opportunities”.
The author has dealt with the variety of issues like democratization, peace building
process, economic revival and reconstruction of devastated Afghanistan. He opines, after
thoroughly examining the whole Afghan issue, that any act of aggression or
misadventure on behalf of any regional or world power may produce unintended
corollaries and repercussion for not only South Asia but also beyond it. The main focus
of the writer was on the emergence of Afghan Taliban and their main activities before
and after 9/11. Wariko, like many other political pundits, concludes that despite pouring
billions of dollars in Afghanistan and keeping thousands of troops for years, no real
productive outcomes have been achieved by the US and its allies. The peace situation is
still fragile and bleak on Afghan soil and Afghanis feel homeless within their homeland.
It is only India and Pakistan which have tried the most to take advantage of the worsened
Afghan peace situation. Though, other states also have tried to fish in the troubled waters
of Afghanistan, yet their respective interests have been far less in Afghanistan than the
arch rivals, Pakistan and India.

The first section deals with the internal Afghan situation. It shows how the world powers
got interested in Afghanistan and how Afghanistan could be a land passage to the Central
Asian states. The next section discusses the political, economic and security situation of
Afghanistan in the post 9/11 era. For almost twenty five year or so, Afghanistan faced the
worst episodes of corruption, anarchy and civil war among various tribes and interest
groups. The tribal war lords brought Afghanistan on the verge of collapse and total
failure. This situation affected the regional peace and stability and disturbed the
equilibrium of regional harmony prevailing among the member states. Blaming
14
Afghanistan of giving shelter to Al-Qaeda leaders, the whole international community
raised fingers to Afghanistan and declared it a terrorist state. The US, with the help of its
allies invaded Afghanistan and removed Mulla Umar and his aides from Afghan
government in 2001.

Thus, the 9/11 incident gave India, an opportunity to enter Afghan soil as an Afghan
well-wisher and it started to invest heavily in various development projects. The last
sections throw light on the connection of drug production and arms sale and purchase in
Afghanistan. This also examines the role of drug-arm relation during the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan in 1979. This section also shows the impact of drugs on Afghan
population as well as bordering nations like Pakistan. The distinguished authors from all
around the globe contributed to the book and made it a piece worth reading.

Relevance of the Study

There are many loopholes and shortcomings in the material available on Emerging
Afghan-India Nexus: Security Implications for Pakistan. The available material
highlights India-Afghanistan, Afghanistan-Pakistan and India-Pakistan security issues
separately. The thesis emphasizes the implications of Indo- Afghan nexus for Pakistan’s
security that will fill the gap in existing literature and, hence therefore, amount to be an
original contribution to knowledge.

Research Questions
1. Why and how did Indo-Afghan nexus emerge in the post 9/11 era?
2. What are military, political and socio-economic implications for Indo-Afghan
nexus Pakistan?
Central Argument
The Indo-Afghan nexus has adverse consequences for political and socio-
economic security of Pakistan.

Research Methodology
The emphasis of the thesis is on Qualitative Research, finding evidences from both primary
and secondary sources. Primary sources include the speeches of Afghan, Indian and
15
Pakistani policy makers, and autobiographies. Secondary sources are comprised of books,
newspapers, journal articles, research articles and reports by famous research institutes. Well
known newspapers of Pakistan like The News, Daily Times, and Dawn and Indian
newspapers The India, The Hindustan Times, The Statesman and The Times of India are
consulted. The reports and articles by Islamabad based think tanks such as Institute of
strategic studies Islamabad, Institute for reginal studies Islamabad and Delhi based think
tanks, Center for Strategic Studies & International Studies and Institute for defense studies
and Analysis provide an insight into the Indo-Afghan nexus and its effects on Pakistan. In
addition to this, many regional reports of the US think tanks, are consulted.

Organization of the Study

The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter one is Theorical Framework. The second
chapter “India-Afghanistan relations: 1947-2001 explores the historical context of this
relationship. The third chapter “The Dynamics of Indo-Afghan Nexus post- 9/11” to
2017. The fourth chapter Indo-Afghan relation, Implications for Pakistan; implications
for Pakistan “examines the political and socio-economic implications of Indo-Afghan
strategic partnership on Pakistan. The main findings of the thesis will be discussed in the
conclusion of the thesis.

16
 CHAPTER ONE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter expresses the trend of theorizing the major events of international politics in
the prospect of neorealism it might be traced back to the times of Thucydides and
Machiavelli but the recent developments in this regard probably began with the eruption
of two World Wars in the 20th century and whatever transpired before and after them in
the form of Cold War and formation of the United Nation etc. People like Carr and Waltz
became bewildered at the widespread destruction caused.by these two apocalyptic events
which engulfed many continents in a time span of merely few years. Berry Buzan
presented an alternative explanation of the study of international politics. But as these
wars came to an end an intellectual war began between the theorists of Realism and
Idealism later joined by Behaviorism and Marxism and recently Social Constructivism,
Post Modernism Feminism and others etc. Theories of Realism and neo realism are some
of the most popular theories of International Relations.

It has been eighteen years since the War on Terror started in 2001 but it seems that this
has endangered the world rather than making it a better place. The Americans and
Europeans are more in fear than ever before. The United States invasion of Afghanistan
has thwarted the peace of the world and it will not be restored till this war is over and the
nations affected are rebuilt. In this thesis, the theory of neorealism has been utilized to
provide a theoretical edifice for understanding the dynamics of Indian role in Afghanistan
with the backup of the United States and its impact on Pakistani security. Theoretical
paradigm helps researcher connect general reality to the theory. And theory makes the
understanding of that given reality more comprehensible. Theory also offers the technical
detail of that reality.13 The basic function of theory is to explain the phenomenon and
make it understand in depth. Philosophy takes Realism as an ontological term in complete
contrast to the theory of idealism in International Relations.

13
Berry Buzan, People, states and fear, rm agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era
(London: Pearson, 2004).
17
In the same way, Realism related to natural sciences is used as instrumentalism,
positivism and empiricism.14 In the books of Realists war is a necessary and unavoidable
evil. The people at the helm of state affairs have not only to protect their state in the pre-
ailing anarchic system but also maximize its military and economic capabilities in order to
assert its will on the other states competing with it.15 All this may be done by making
alliances, collecting heavy taxes and importing heavy machinery etc. National interest
should not be compromised at any cost during this discourse and all efforts should be
directed towards increasing arsenal using hard and soft diplomacy.16 This section of
research is the structure that emphasizes the importance of theory. Theoretical framework
or paradigm helps us in discovering the most suitable tools for analyzing data and as a
result making predictions in politics. It also lends a helping hand not only in identifying
different issues of structure but also to some extent, locating and solving unexpected
issues arising during research. Besides suggesting invaluable solutions for research, it also
hints at new dimensions of future research. Its roots are often found in a single theory, but
it may also intermingle itself with many other theories, depending on the nature of
research topic. Theoretical framework may also prove pivotal in determining how much a
theory is authentic, valid and relevant to various happenings of the past and present
times.17

Therefore, we legitimate our topic “Emerging Indo-Afghan Nexus: Security Implications

for Pakistan” by applying neo-nealism. Describing the separate roles of America, India
and Pakistan in the Afghan quagmire seems very pertinent here before moving on.
Afghanistan is excessively important for Pakistan in three distinct ways. First of all
Pakistan wants stability in Afghanistan once and for all. This is highly important to be
materialized. Using the United States as an aide, this task can be achieved. Once the
NATO forces withdrew in 2014 Afghanistan seemed wen on the track as it was during the
days of 1990s. This might have serious implications for Pakistan and its security.
Secondly. Pakistan wants an inclusive government in Kabul which represents all factions

14
Scott Burch III, Andrew Tiklater and Richard Devetak Theories of International Relations, 5th edition
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
15
Phyllis Bennis et al, War With No End, (New York: Verso Publishers, 2007).
16
“Proxies of the Pakistan Army History Essay” UK Essays, November 08, 2013.
17
KJ. Holsti, International Politics; A framework for Analysis, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1967):21.
18
of Afghanistan. None of the minorities should be given preference to majority. Thirdly,
Pakistan sees Indian influence in Afghanistan as a growing threat for regional stability.
Indian strategic involvement in Afghanistan does not go well with Pakistan. 18

Pakistani perspective about the future of Afghanistan is based on the assumption that the
American presence on Afghan land will be short term. This thing may send a negative
message to the regional actors and to the local institution in Afghanistan as well. Pakistan
is foreseeing that in the post 2018 Afghanistan, the United States security presence and
Indian involvement would be limited to counterterrorism mission. This worries almost all
the stakeholders in the conflict that the United States would not limit the role of India in
Afghanistan in its nation and state building.

Neo-Realism
Neo-Realism serves as the major paradigm whereas other concepts like Idealism and
Terrorism etc provide supplementary help in thesis. It offers the structural explanation of
the dynamics of international politics. Kenneth Waltz is credited as the real proponent of
neo-realism. He propounded the theory in 1979 in "Theory of International Politics”.
Using his past experience in Physics, he explained the dynamics of international politics
with the help of natural sciences’ principles. He proposed three levels. Of analysis
Individual State and System to unravel the conundrums and complexities of international
politics. He opines that global structure of politics controls the state behavior and survival
in world arena. The stronger states have more chances of successful survival than the
weaker states. This American theory of Neo-Realism revisits the earlier thoughts of
classical realists like Machiavelli and Hobbs etc and mainstreams them with the demands
of modern era in a unique and systemic way.

Neo-Realism emphasizes the importance of global political structure rather the

viciousness of individuals’ nature while explaining the root causes of the past, present and
future major political incidents that happened in the thousands of years long human
history or that are happening or may happen in the unprecedented future in the years to

18
Moeed Yusuf, “Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s
Foreign Policy Elite” US institute of Peace (July 2011):1-6.
19
come. In short, the structure or system controls the state behavior. In this structure, the
states use different means to achieve same ends which may slightly vary in form.

Anarchy is the only guiding rule which steers the course of international political events.
According to father of neo-realism, Kenneth Waltz, there may appear three different
political systems or patterns on the world stage depending on the relative distribution of
power and number of super powers present in the system. He enumerates them as
unipolar, bipolar and multipolar systems. But he personally prefers the middle one giving
the argument that the chain of power would be in the hands of only two great powers
minimizing the chances of external alliances. There would be internal balancing only
between two powers, no foreign great powers would interfere the system and pendulum of
balance would hang only between those two. This would create a stable world order as
compared to other political systems of world order.19

Neo-realists stress that due to the compulsions created by the global structure, the states of
the world are forced to ensure their survival by continuously vying for their security. But
in order to do so, they use different means like hard and soft diplomacy or covert or overt
attacks to tame other states. They do so because they are blind to each other’s real
intentions and destroying capabilities. They also do so because they are not equal in
economic resources and political clout. But the writings of Waltz do not clearly show
whether states merely want to survive or maximize their relative power as well? 20 Waltz
stressed the idea of survival while John Mearsheimer stressed the idea of power
maximization later on.

The main reason of states cooperation according to John Mearsheimer is the phenomenon
of Offensive Realism. In order to increase their relative power, especially economic power
the states tend to cooperate even in the environment of an intense competition. They
increase their foreign currency reserves trade volume and military arsenal etc. through
mutual interdependence in various fields and ultimately become offensive rather defense

19
Keneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill Publishers, 1979):132.
20
John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001).
20
in their approach towards each other and cause war.21

In the same way, another influential neo-realist on economic interdependence Joseph Nye
asserts that global system forces states to economically depend each other. The security
dilemma caused by the vicious system of global politics urges the states to cooperate with
each other. Though weaker states have to scarify a lot in such an interdependence, yet
their economic alliances do benefit a lot at the end. But the great powers curb their
freedom as a result.22

According to Neorealists, uniformity in the state behavior is created because of the

undeniable principle of Anarchy. The states are forced to behave in the same way and
ensure their survival by adopting self-defensive mechanisms in the global arena of
international politics. The Other main constraints offered to the states in the system may
be social constraints due to their respective domestic setups. Baldwin is full of praise for
Waltz for reinterpreting the early thoughts of people like Machiavelli and Hobbs etc to
explain the effect of international political structure on the state behavior. He further
notices that Waltz’s work was very unique in the sense that it explored the terms like
power and state behavior in a quite different way. Waltz is also reported to have declared
his work different than his predecessors in its novel treatment of the basic thoughts of
Classical Realists. While on the other hand, Keohane enumerates the different groups of
critics of Waltz’s theory. The first group abhors the idea of overstress on the state role in
the global politics and instead emphasizes the constructive role which international
regimes could play at the international level. This group also challenges the principles of
sovereignty as explained by Neorealists and dislikes the idea of giving state the primary
role in political affairs. The second group opines that we should pay more heed towards
interdependence whether financial or environmental. It also lays stress on alterations in
the functions of governments, international institutions and media. The third and last
group has some reservations regarding the epistemology used by the Neorealists.23

21
M. Rober A. Crawford, Idealism and Realism in International Relations: Beyond the Discipline (London:
Routledge, 2000):32
22
Robert Keohane, “International Liberalism Reconsidered” in John Dunn ed., The Economics Limits to
Modern Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1991)
23
FJtid Baldwin, Neolliberallism and Neorealism and World Politics, (Columbia University, 1993):45
21
The theory of neorealism is, very close to emerging Indo-Afghan nexus and security
implications for Pakistan because neorealism argues that there is an anarchy in the world
system. This anarchy is likely to continue in the future as, well. 24 This is also a neorealist
assumption that anarchy and. war, are there from the time of Thucydides. This
assumption of neorealists presents a pessimistic view of International Relations. This also
starkly negates the Democratic Peace Theory and Liberalism. This is indeed a great
challenge to nee-realists because if there is anarchy and wati1en what is the solution to
this problem of war. neorealists stress the subjectivity of democracy-type terms and opine
that super powers alter their meaning according to the suitability of their national and
political interests.25

Realpolitik and Neorealism are identical in terms of similarity in the determination of

final goals but differ on the question how those goals would be achieved using different
resources keeping in view the phenomenon of causes of different expected and
unexpected events and its effects on the international politics. Achievement of maximum
power should be the only aim in the eyes of a successful leader in view of Morgenthau.
He declares that power itself may be an end, not means. He explains his point by writing
that any state behavior may not necessarily have power as the only motivating force
behind it under some specific circumstances.26 On the contrary, neorealism asserts that
states would dream for power if they feel themselves extra weak or extra powerful in the
global structure. Extra weakness might goad some comparatively powerful state on
making an onslaught and grabbing the natural and financial resources of the weaker state.
And being afraid of the extra power of some strong state, a mosaic of states might form
alliance and attack it to lessen its power to ensure their own survival in the political
structure of the world. Neorealists consider those leaders wise who vie to accumulate
maximum power before crisis and use it as a means in that crisis. In warlike situations
when security becomes the top priority of the states, power serves as a great means to

24
D. Hume, Essays: Moral, Politics and Literary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).
25
Earl A. Reitan, Liberalism: Time Tested Principles for the Twenty First Century, (Indiana University Press,
2003):44.
26
David A. Baldwin, ‘Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics’ in David A. Baldwin (ed) Neorealism and
Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
22
ensure security in an insecure environment.27

Many students of world politics think that domestic factors play a vital role in
determining the true behavior of the states in global structure as is believed by many
followers of Karl Marx who try to find the reasons of every war in the domestic
structures of the states focusing the economic disparities among various classes. But
Waltz dismisses such ideas and he gives less importance to various economic, religious,
cultural, political and racial structures of any given state He stresses that all states
whether they were extra civilized or uncivilized, went for wars. No matter how rich the
institutes of the civilized states were, they could not avoid the calamity of war. All types
of big and small human groups from gangs to tribes to big empires went for war. These
human groups fought wars not for one identified reason but for multiple reasons during
history.28 In the same way, Variety in the domestic setups of various states and their ways
of interaction does not guarantee the real outcomes of their behavior in the global system.
Experts seem divided over the exact causes of World War I. Some are of the opinion that
World War I was fought because both the fighting blocs were almost parallel in terms of
material power. While the others seem to disagree by arguing that the catastrophe of
World War I happened because some countries could not create a balance of power by
not creating a formidable alliance in time against the bloc of some belligerent countries
of the world.29 Following the rules of Physics and Chemistry, Neorealists describe the
international political system in terms of units and sub systems. They arrange the states
(system units) with respect to their power distribution and resources. They assume states
to be the primary actors of the system in which they vie to survive at any cost.30 There is
no controlling force in the system which may pull the reins of the state behavior. This
could result in the creation of an anarchic environment. The changes in structure may be
hard to bring out, but it would still depend on the number of major powers existing in the
system.

27
Kenneth Waltz. ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’, Journal of interdisciplinary History, (Spring
1988): 61-62.
28
Charles Glaser, Realists as Optimists in Benjamin Frankel (ed) Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London
Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1996).
29
Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’ Journal of Interdisciplinary History, (Spring
1981):615-628.
30
“Neorealism and the Status Quo Bias” in Benjamin Frankel ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal,
(London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1996):90-121.
23
The individual and national level forces have nothing to do with the international level
forces according to system theory. Without devising an effective foreign policy theory at
the same time, it is almost impossible to make an exact relation between unit and system
levels of analysis. But in this regard, Waltz gives his unique idea once again that
international politics does not need foreign policy theories in great numbers anymore. He
mitigates the importance of foreign policy theories by comparing them to the theories of
markets and firms. He emphasizes that both the political and economic, system theories
describe how the units of a given system are controlled by it in a disciplined and rigid
way. These theories also expose those forces which constrain the behavior of different
units.

After identifying such forces, we may predict the future and future behavior of the units
like competition among them and their developmental and survival strategies in a given
system It is true that system curbs a little bit freedom of its units, but in doing so, it
makes the behavior prediction of its units possible.31 One of the greatest criticisms which
often come from neo-classical Realists against neo realists comes that it is the Statesmen
not the states which are the primary actors of global system. Their relative perceptions of
foreign policy work as a guideline for the state conduct in the structure. "World War II
was fought because of the whimsical policies adopted by Adolf Hitler and Stalin etc.
Another limitation of neo-realism is its less concern for domestic politics of any country.
It does not give much value to the system of government or social or cultural setup of a
given country as opposed. to the Marxist school of thought.32 When Al-Qaeda struck the
twin towers America attacked Afghanistan 'because of the systemic compulsions. In
international politics it is assumed or taken that sovereignty must be retained at any cost.
There shall be no compromise on the sensitivity of the sovereignty of a state. Such an
audacious attack like 9/11 could provoke any state for retaliatory action with the mass of
power that America possesses. In this regard American reaction of attacking Afghanistan
was a right 'by the systemic compulsions of the world political system which is anarchic
in its character.33 The theory of neo-realism does not offer explanation as to why a

31
Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, (Spring
1981):615-628.
32
John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001):17
33
Chris Brown, “Structural Realism, classical realism and human nature”, International Relations, (23:02):257-
24
particular war is fought but it elucidates the unfortunate repetition of war throughout the
history. It stresses less on the intentions of the heads of the states or foreign policy
makers and more on the complexities of global structure in which wars may break out
because of the accidental or automatic events.34 Anarchy causes cold war which results
into full fledge war. Neo-realism has every potential of explaining the current Afghan
situation and has the depth of discovering the complexities of the conflict, digging out the
real intentions of all the regional and international actors involved in it.35 America
allegedly invaded Afghanistan to achieve its aims but so far it has failed miserably.
America has not only lost sight of its aims but it has created more problems for itself.]n
the past many superpowers tried to invade and conquer Afghanistan 'but they
failed utterly. Today America is on the same path of Great Briton and Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics despite its huge military power it could not attain a considerate total
victory.36 our discourses of International Relations and security studies, terrorism was
deemed to be an attack on independent state elements by some non-state elements.
However, there are also examples in which states are involved in the acts of terrorism
against its own citizens. These acts may be committed against some minority a specific
class of masses and state itself. Experts call it state sponsored terrorism and states resort
to such kind of violence when many a time, full-fledge war is not affordable. It costs
more money and involve a lot of responsibility on part of the state. In this regard India s
role in Kashmir can be considered as an example. India has used all means of force and
persecution to subjugate Kashmiri Muslims.37 Under the international constraints and to
curb lndo-Afghan nexus the United States invaded Afghanistan in haste. There was more
coercion rather than deliberation on the outcome of the war. There are faint chances that.
America would be able to conquer Afghanistan and rule it. This unlikely scenario will
embarrass NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization a lot. Scores of unarmed masses
and solders have been ruthlessly murdered by them without achieving any tangible gains.
Afghanistan is geographically so important that it has been an apple of eye of almost all

270.
34
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
35
Kemmeth Waltz, Realism and World Politics (London: Routledge, 2011)
36
D. Robert, Crews and Amin Tarzi, The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan:59.
37
Nauman Ahmad et al, “terrorism” IPRI Journal, Vol. III, No, 2, (Summer, 2003):88.
25
the major regional and international powers.38 The United States administration made a
huge mistake by opening two wars simultaneously in the first decade of the twenty first
century. After a gap of only twenty four months, it made an onslaught on Iraq after
Afghanistan . Thus the world attention shifted from South Asia to West Asia in 2003. But
America suffered heavy losses, left Iraq and had to face huge embarrassment because no
Weapon of mass destruction were found there which were the false basis of its onslaught
on Iraqi soil. Today the United States and its allies are facing the same scenario in
Afghanistan. Taliban gave them tough time, especially when their big heads were
murdered by America and its allies in the so called War on Terror. After the expected
departure of America, Pakistanis are afraid that this may put them and their land into
trouble. American departure may encourage the anti-Pakistan elements in Afghanistan,
and they may cause distress in the border areas of Pakistan and foment rebellion against
Pakistan among the local Pakhtoons. For this matter it is necessary that Afghan rulers
shun their hostile approach towards Pakistan and never let terrorists use their land
against Pakistan.

It would be fair to conclude that Pakistan has not been very optimistic about Afghan
future. Many experts are of the opinion that this is because it has intentionally defied the
US instructions regarding Afghanistan, most of the times. This is termed right by most of
them because as an independent state, Pakistan has every right of making its own
regional plans and strategies.

It is, therefore, highly required that Pakistan and the United States must be on board in
order to devise a clear cut policy for the future of Afghanistan. The neo-realism theory is
pertinent to explain the two pronged United States policies with references to
Afghanistan India and Pakistan in particular and the region in general. Indo-Afghan
nexus and the United States exit strategy from Afghanistan are examples of neo-realist
discourse. United States by using its political clout has tried to influence the roles of
Afghanistan and India in relation to the operationalization of these no aforementioned
policies cum strategies. United States wants to keep a minimum presence in this

38
Dr. Subash Kaplla, “Afghanistan: United States Multidimensional Strategic Challenge”, South Asia Analysis
(16 Dec, 2008).
26
imbroglio and in this regard keeping in view of United States strategic interests and the
ongoing war against the terrorists the cooperation from Pawtan is quite essential in order
to yield better results. Different states of South Asia have different positive and negative
opinions about the American policies on Afghan land. The understanding of such
complex relations would provide a better insight of things going on in this theater of war.
With the help of neo-realism theory it can be deduced that what consequence the powers
at stake should be ready to face in the future ahead considering the dynamics of ongoing
war on relations between Afghanistan and India.

Neo-realism has widened the scope of international relation including strategic,

economic, trade and societal. But there is lag of structure between the developed and less
developed world that is why both could not strike the equal footings.39 In the relational
form that hence emerges is more tilted towards the rich countries than the poor countries.
In case of India Afghan relation such an equation exist but not clearly as in form of
Pakistan and United States of America. The comfort level of the average Afghan is more
pronounced as in case of relation with India.

In conclusive remarks, it may be opined that the global system proposed by the Neo-
Realists controls all the regional and focal systems of world politics around the globe.
The dynamics of all the subordinate systems are dependent on the global political system.
The regional system of South Asia is also no exception and its actors work strictly
according to the directions of world political system. Afghanistan has been ravaged by
the great powers during the last few decades and it has almost become a failed state in the
eyes of political pundits. And this weakness of Afghanistan has been negatively
benefitted by the relatively stronger regional states like India and Pakistan for their
respect regional and national interests. The United States of America facilitated their task
by attacking Afghan land in 2001 and setting petty governments there. It also thought to
create a regional power balance by making all three governments.

Afghanistan, India and Pakistan play in its hands through machinations, cheatings,
wooing and threats. Under the United States auspices, India and Afghanistan came closer
39
Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and the War (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1959).
27
to each other which rang the alarm bells for Pakistan. In the same way, India also felt
threatened by the deep Pak-Afghan religious and historical ties and it started to woo the
Afghanis by money and military training etc. This circle of security dilemma caused the
fear in every states heart and they 'began to ensure their survival in this volatile
atmosphere. Afghanistan felt itself like a sweating rat playing unwillingly among the
three powerful naughty cats. lt forged its foreign policy in such a way that none of these
powerful states would be annoyed in any way through its actions. It is not a vicious
triangle comprising India Pakistan and Afghanistan but a rectangle including the U.S.A
as well it will become triangle only if the United States of America leaves the region
which is not imminent in the near future.

28
 CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL DYNAMICS OF INDIA-AFGHANISTAN NEXUS 1947:2001
This interval discussion is the essence of Indo-Afghan Nexus from 1947 to 2001. It discusses
that the nexus between India and Afghanistan has been fluctuated between bonhomie,
association and aggression from 1947 to 2001. From to till 1947-1970s, India-Afghanistan
nexus continued pleasant throughout the Soviet interference in Afghanistan in till 1980s.
India stretched her arm of friendship to Kabul’s pro-Soviet government. However, the
Talibanization brought about the conducive environment in Afghanistan in 1990s and New
Delhi node with Afghanistan weakened quickly.

To argue, therefore, this chapter is divided in the consequent three sections: 1) India-
Afghanistan nexus: 1947-1979: 2) The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and Indo-Afghan
nexus: 1980s: and 3) Taliban and India-Afghan nexus: 1990- 2001.

INDIA-AFGHANISTAN NEXUS: 1947-1979

This part discusses about India-Afghan nexus from the start of the Indian sub-continent in
1947 to the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in December 1979. It discusses that both
states have had pleasant bonhomie throughout this historical period. Afghanistan has had a
very old history with ancient events which had continuously influenced the local dynamics.
Throughout its past, Afghanis identify themselves to be the defenders of a richer pasted
adventure and legacy. Ariana, which was in reality, the land of the Aryans, which is
Afghanistan being supposed to be today. Aryans had reached the area after passing over
massive steep Hindu Kush series, while other gatherings went more to southern achievement
of Indian sub-continent. During the 19th century, majestic and magnificent powers like
Russia and Great Britain used Afghanistan as a hostage in their ‘Great Game’.40 Remarkably
the nature of Indo-Afghan mutual association has gone over periods and India has
continuously sustained compressed cultural association with Afghanistan. Most notably, the
Hindu holy scriptures of Rig-Veda were composed in Afghanistan41 Rig-Veda was an
aboriginal collection of more than 1000 hymns, which include the myths of the Hindu faith

40
Sreedhar, ed., Taliban and the Afghan Turmoil; The Role of USA, Pakistan, Iran and China, (New Delhi:
Himalayan Publisher, 1997):124
41
Ayanjit Sen, ed., India's Neighbours; Problems and Prospects (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2001):9.
29
gods and spirits establishing the elementary fundamentals of the faith of Hinduism. The
contributory work by Aryans in the collecting of Rig-Veda had had happened due to the
formal and informal activities between the people of ancient India and Afghanistan.42 The
Afghanistan has always been supposed to be a buffer state and greeting welcoming area for
intruders into the sub-continent. The Assyrians, Shakas, Khushans, and the Greeks under
Alexander, all passed through that entry. Later with the arrival of Islam, the sub-continent
twisted into a hunting place for many prominent personalities of the past such as Ghauri and
Mehmood Ghaznavi.43 Ultimately, Islam flourished with the time being and Muslim scholars
came to the region more powerfully once Islam was able to make its progress in the region.

Dupree figured out that ‘associations among the people of Afghanistan and India trace back
to the in-Dud valley cultivation and civilization following Alexander the great’s short-lived
worked for the inheritor state of the Seleucid organized the region known today as
Afghanistan. In 305 Before Christ, they provided much of it to the Indian Mauiya Empire as
part of an alliance treaty Famous Greek historian and geographer threw light on ancient Indo-
Afghan ties. Alexander took these away from the Persians and recognized payments of his
own, but Seleucus Nicator gave them to Sandrocottus (Chandragupta), upon terms of
intermarriage and of getting in exchange 500 elephants.44

Controlled by racial Pushtuns, Afghanistan was an important country along with a

geographic location of a huge rough and mountainous significance. Historically, Afghanistan
had been a business nexus between East and West, and a hurdle state between competing
British and Russians Empires of the time. Fighters and intruders of their times had glided
India for their ventures through Afghanistan. Due to the huge lust of Afghans for power and
sovereignty, it has never been probable to settle themselves. The Mughal rule made many
Afghans to settle in India, which had been underpinning of socio-economic ties between
Russia and British India caused into a series of bleeding wars which were known as the
ANGLO-Afghan wars. This chain of wars resulted with the Durand Line treaty in 1893,
which had cleared geopolitical limitations between both powers. British establishments, due

42
Ibid.
43
Sreedhar, Op Cit:124.
44
Nancy Dupree &Ali Kuhzad/An Historical Guide to Kabul-The Name,'(American International School of
Kabul,1972).
30
the freedom skirmish, India decided to go for division and freedom of India soon after the
results of World War II. There was substantial voice across the Durand line within Pashtun
public for the providing third option in the vote for the creation of a detached independent
state of Pashtunistan in spite of their annexation to either India or Pakistan. The population of
Indian side of the Durand bifurcation decided to become the portion of Pakistan this,
however, became bone of contention between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Kabul neither joined Soviet alliance during the World War II nor gave up its border
differences with Moscow. The population of the Pashtun dominant zones of the Indian side
of the Durand division went to Pakistan. This nexus made unhappy Kabul. It was supposed
that with the end of British reign in India in 1947, the arrangement of 1893 on the Durand
border had vanished its legality and because of this claim Kabul desired to extend Pashtun
inhabited zones across the Durand border to Afghanistan. Kabul totally refused to
acknowledge the acceptability of the Pak-Afghan transnational border and also disagreed
Pakistan’s annexation to United Nations in 1949, which caused to an inception of conflict.
On the other side, Kabul and India placed the foundation of their bilateral nexus amicably by
ratification the joint bonhomie agreement in 1950. However, ambassadors of both countries
got started visiting each other’s countries to strengthen their mutual relationship. Both
countries showed their reservations regarding Pak-US defensive agreement likewise the
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO 1955 to 1979) and SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization, in Manila 1954).

Pak-Afghan border was closed in 1961 due to raised tensions between both countries.
Islamabad always remained nervous about the emerging Indo-Afghan nexus with a military
perspective that intention of this nexus is to destabilize Pakistan. History proved that
Pakistan’s concerns were not baseless Division of Sub-Continent converted the flora of Indo-
Afghan communications just like the nexus of whole region changed. Partition blocked
India’s physical contiguity to Kabul. Islamabad became into a hurdle in the Indo-Afghan
nexus. However, King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan sustained decent nexus with New Dehli
and figured out Pakistan’s legal stance over Durand border after partition. India recognized
Afhan’s opinion on Durand border and in a result Afghanistan pushed New Delhi’s point on

31
Kashmir.45 As the Durand division shifted all the problems to Pakistan. India had no logical
perceptive nor a benefit from this issue and nexus with Afghanistan. When Pakistan come in
to being, Afghanistan and India had no communal periphery but, notwithstanding the
nothingness of border and any conventional linkage, familiarity of Indo-Afghan jingoism
produced both countries to make strengthen their nexus against Islamabad as was
comprehensibility elaborated by the Prime Minister of India Mr. Jawahar Laal Nehru, while
officially welcomed Afghan Prime Minister Daud, on his official call on to New Delhi in
1959 Nehru said that ‘The division of subcontinent disconnected direct links and
uninterrupted communication amongst the two nations. But it did a little bit change to pre-
historic interaction and our old nexus continued. And from then, we have come up nearer to
each other for variability of causes, of them being responded interest which always remains a
significant reason.’46

In the inception of Indo-Afghan Nexus and foreign relations, both countries never had any
dispute in any matter. Since partition of India, Nehru desperately comprehended the
understanding of two states and to enhance connection, New Delhi driven ‘Friendship
Treaty’ with Kabul in 1950. Ambassadors of both states paid official visits to each other that
eventually strengthened their nexus.47 In the 1950s and 60s, the Soviet Union's attitude
toward Kabul was mentioned on the basis of force for foreign funding to manage weak state
affairs. The Soviets used relief as an effective and reliable external tool to ensure the aid
strategy.

The Cold War demands that almost all foreign policy approaches be adopted in Afghanistan
and India. New Delhi was among those who engineered and sponsor the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM), and Kabul also referred and collided to the diplomacy of self-
government in accordance with the intentions of the Non-Aligned Movement. However, the
knowledge of Pakistan's familiarity with US policy and Soviet policy in providing massive
military and economic support to Kabul fell gently on the path of Soviet stimulus. On the
contrary, India also had reactionary relations with the Soviets, so not only did India and

45
Ibid.
46
Musa Khan Jalalzai, The Foreign Policy of Afghanistan, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication, 2003):376.
47
Reetika Sharma, Ramvir Goria, Vivek Mishra, Op Cit: 199.
32
Afghanistan create noble relations with the Soviet Union, but also continued ties. In this
sophisticated development, Pakistan has strategically touched itself in a weakened situation
with the emerging relationships in Kabul, New Delhi and Moscow.10

In 1979 the Soviets landed in Afghanistan and brought the Kabul throne in his command.
India, which operated a foreign policy under the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement,
was in a wall hanging on a slice of warm relations with the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.
However, at the time of the decision, India preferred to seal itself in the Soviet camp as a
return to the support and gratitude of the Soviet Union during the wars of 1965 and 1971.
India did not absorb the comforts of the Afghan adventure of the Soviets, nor did it invest the
Soviet nomads in Afghanistan as a grim prospect for people who crossed the Khyber Pass.
Accordingly, this account was generally accompanied by Orthodox observation in
Afghanistan as a geo stroke buffer between Central and South Asia, and with very
confidence, various Indian (privately) Soviet attacks were sentenced to death and other areas
of the region predicted the risks of conflict.

On the other hand governments, voluntarily, supported the Soviet Union. Ms. Gandhi was
deeply disappointed by India's association with the Communist bloc and its leadership and
did not want to lose a surviving partner in wartime. Thus, India supported the Soviet raid and
became the only South Asian country to verify the invasion of Afghanistan.48 While
Pakistan, however, adapted the American camp (capitalist) and helped in the Afghan jihad
against the Soviet Union and the states. US and Pakistan supported Mujahideen and shared
intelligence reports with the CIA ever. This crucial period of Afghan history was the first
pulse in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.

THE SOVIET INTERVENTION OF AFGHANISTAN AND INDO-AFGHAN

RELATIONS: 1980s
This section explores friendly relations between India and the pro-Soviet regime in
Afghanistan during 1980. It claims that pro-Soviet foreign policy in India, along with Indian
hostility towards Pakistan, supported the mujahideen in India's friendly relations with
Afghanistan in the 1980s.
48
MondiraDutta, ed., Emerging Afghanistan in the Third Millennium (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2009):331.
33
The Saur Revolution of 1978 opened a window to create the independent Republic of
Afghanistan. On December 5, 1978, an alliance accord was signed between Moscow and
Kabul. The regime in Kabul was under the influence of Moscow and had a socialist agenda.
In the end, it was on December 24, 1979, when the Red Army invaded the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan under the instructions of the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. The Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan with the logic of "helping the Communist government of Kabul against
Muslim guerrillas.49

It has a briefed history of Soviet maneuvering in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was laid between
two neighboring powers at the same time, British India and Russia. New Delhi was the first
country in South Asia to acknowledge and greeted the pro-Soviet administration in
Afghanistan. New Delhi also reinforced the existence of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and
extended its assistance in philanthropy and starting colliding there. India believed in
achieving its goals of resisting the establishment of Islamizing command in Afghanistan that
could be proved against New Delhi benefits in the her geographical clot. At the same time,
the pro-Soviet command of Kabul served as the basis for the convergence of benefits
between India and the Soviet Union. During this period of pro-Soviet foreign policy to India
(1979-1989), India cooperated with Afghanistan and invested huge sums in industrial
projects, irrigation and hydroelectricity, as well as aid for humanitarian reasons.

Because of the Mujahideen struggle, with the support of the United States, its buddies and
likewise Islamabad in the main stream of combat zone in Afghanistan was the "bear trap"
and like the "Vietnam War" in the Soviet Union, which brought about termination of union.
The Mujahideen were given the opportunity to establish their government during the
overthrow of the pro-Soviet regime of Muhammad Najibullah Ahmadzai in 1992, which was
not good for Indian cause and motives. India was relieved after the riots because of its
diplomatic isolation in Afghanistan, when Burhan Odin Rabbani established the dominant
non-fascist regime until the end of 1992.

Historically, the Russians have made a lot of interventions in Afghanistan. For them,
Afghanistan has always been a gateway to India. All invaders used geographical routes
49
A. Douglas, Borer, Superpowers Defeated; Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared (London: Cass., 1999):216.
34
throughout Afghanistan and made them a state of war-tom. Afghanistan was a buffer state
between Britain and Russian interests. Russia constantly desired to have friendly as well as
pro-Soviet governments in Kabul. Russia, before occupying Afghanistan, facilitated in
establishing pro-Soviet administration in Kabul. This administration was impressed by the
Russian political viewpoints. On the other side, India had already set up mutual ties with
Moscow. India had its own geopolitical benefits in the region that resulted into the merging
of Indo-Soviet benefits in Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union had to face condemnation from all over the world for its attack in
Afghanistan. Anti-European protests in Europe also appeared in the Muslim world. The
foreign ministers of 34 Islamic countries unanimously approved a resolution against the
unjustified Soviet invasion and called for the immediate and immediate withdrawal of the
Russian army from Afghanistan50 the United Nations also raised its voice against this work
together in a passing meeting with 104 votes.51

The Russian invasion had direct threat to the United States, Pakistan and the Islamic State.
The United States and its use have transformed the Afghan government into Mujahideen
Pakistan. An organized guerrilla war broke out against the Soviet army in Afghanistan. By
1982, the Afghan Mujahideen occupied more than 75 per cent of Afghanistan. The Afghan
fighters were religiously motivated, but the Soviet soldiers fought for their salaries and were
less motivated. Their military power, including sophisticated tanks, did not play well in the
mountains of Afghanistan, according to the expectations of men led by countries in the
Soviet Union. The long Soviet war in Afghanistan put its economy at risk, leading to a
previous withdrawal nine years later, on February 15, 1989, after the signing of the Geneva
Accord. However, the withdrawal of Soviet troops has plunged Afghanistan into a bloody
civil war.52

While the Afghans were carrying the Soviet attack, India became involved in political and
ethnic affairs in the 1980s, mainly in fangs. High-quality policy changes took place after

50
Moslems Condemn Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan', Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 29 January 1980.
51
'Analysis: Who are the Taliban?', BBC News, 20 December 2000.
52
Ibid:126.
35
Rajiv Gandhi took office, while the Soviets underwent the reforms of (Glasnost and
Perestroika),53 which he realized after realizing that the war in Afghanistan was seriously
damaging the Soviet economy and needed rapid change if it wanted to survive. The changing
environments were well identified by Rajab Gandhi, who then made necessary visits to the
United States and the Soviet Union in his efforts to integrate strategies and the Soviets into
Afghanistan.54 Fully aware of India's name and connection, the Soviets forged closer ties
between Delhi and Kabul after the fall of the Soviets. The Mujahideen emerged victorious
from the Afghan anarchy and gained political sympathy and great affection for the Afghan
community. In this context, India felt itself in a complicated situation because it felt that
decades of support for the Afghan and Soviet communists were worthless, as the bipolar
ocean was evolving.

THE TALIBAN AND INDIA-AFHGANISTAN RELATIONS: 1990-9/11

This part examines India's support for the Northern Alliance, with the aim of undermining
the Taliban and the future regime in Afghanistan. It claims that India supported the Northern
Alliance because India felt that the Taliban regime could be destructive to Indian interests
because of who wanted to undermine the Taliban regime in Kabul, which India wants to pay
at all costs.

Afghanistan became a democratic republic under the influence of the Saur Revolution and
signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in 1978. The Soviet army attacked
Afghanistan to support the Kabul government against Islamic revolutionary elements in the
country. India has recognized deadly regimes in Kabul and expanded its involvement in the
pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. However, the Soviet Union faced strong resistance to the
Afghan Mujahideen, supported by Washington and Islamabad. Afghanistan has become solid
and has collapsed in urban areas. The long war in Afghanistan has shattered the backbone of
the Soviet economy. After the Geneva Accord, the Soviet Union launched its own civil war
in Afghanistan. As a result, the Taliban in 1996 to take control of most of Afghanistan's
territory and announce Kandhare their capital. The country was converted to Muslim
Americans in Afghanistan and the Taliban regime was (1996-2001) indorsed and legitimated

53
Ibid.
54
Sreedhar, Op Cit:128.
36
by Islamabad, Riyadh and the Abu Dhabi. This system was not supported by many well-
known Muslim scholars due to strict policies and propaganda. India wanted to get rid of the
influence of the Taliban to reach occupied Kashmir, India, along with Iran, Russia and
Tajikistan, and gave full support to the Northern Alliance, which appeared to fight the
Taliban. India feared that the Taliban regime could be modest towards India, both in and out
of India, that India wanted to support the Taliban regime in Kabul, so that New Delhi was
always willing to pay any price.

"The Taliban" means students55 Who are the fundamentalist and fundamentalist entities in
Afghanistan. After a long and bloody civil war in Afghanistan, the Taliban ruled most of
Afghanistan, establishing their government to turn Kandahar into a capital and declare
Afghanistan as the Islamic Americans in Afghanistan. Only three countries are: Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have recognized the Taliban government as the
legitimate government of Afghanistan. Under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar,56
the Taliban controlled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. In the past, they had a strict and
different interpretation of Sharia law during their time in Afghanistan.57 Many Muslim
supporters disagreed with the interpretation of the Taliban, the application and application of
Islamic law. The Taliban were the same Mujahidin and freedom fighters who fought against
the Soviet occupation with the help of the United States.58

Due to sectarian and ideological connection Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden came together
in Sudan and composed a team in 1996, without any invitation from the Taliban or the
Afghan people.59 The United Islamic Front for the Rescue of Kabul, generally acknowledged
as the Northern Alliance of Kabul, was expressed after the Taliban took control of
Afghanistan's mainstream region and announce their directions in 1996. Substantial number
of Afghan bosses, led by the former president of Afghanistan and Ahmad Masoud Shah were
shrewd and potential part of this alliance against the Taliban. The classification of some

55
Analysis: Who are the Taliban?' BBC News, 20 December 2000.
56
Ibid.
57
Dennis Abrams, Modern World Leaders: Hamid Karzai (New York: Chelsea House Publications, 2007):14-
15.
58
Ibid.
59
United States vs. Osama bin Laden et al, S(7) 98Cr. 1023, Testimony of Jamal Ahmad Mohammad Al Fadl
(SDNY 6 February 2001)
37
induvial included nationalist fighters of mainly Tajiks, including foreigners, Pashtuns and
Uzbeks.60 The Northern Alliance was mostly a fragile forces alliance, laterally with a meager
amount of five percent zone in Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance received backup and
support mostly from the comrades, Tajikistan, India and Iran were in countering61 their
confrontation from the Taliban.

However, this obstacle to restoration of progress is noteworthy when Rabbani's foreign

minister traveled to India in 1992. New Delhi raised the issue of the work of the Mujahideen
in Kashmir, which India believes received support from the Afghan mujahideen during the
negotiations. In 1996, when the Taliban expelled Rabbani's government and captured Kabul,
India's interests became at stake. New Delhi, like other countries, did not recognize the
Taliban, mainly because of their tendency to Islamabad. India cut off its diplomatic relations
with Kabul. In the evolving development in Afghanistan, Mr. M. Ansari, a former Indian
diplomat in Afghanistan, was considered an Indian trial in Afghanistan despite anti-Indian
control of the Taliban in Kabul in the 1990s. He referred to the methods of India-Afghanistan
from that time under his direction: “No connection was established with the Taliban as a
result of the actions set for the Hindus and the Sikhs of the Afghans. In addition in the Indian
judgements were the Taliban's statements about Kashmir, Mujahedeen’s military drill,
Pakistanis and external fighters in the base camp in Afghanistan. This potentially damage
India’s basic dynamics of policy and this thing forced New Delhi to toughen its coaching
which was non-religious Pashtuns.62India has been very resistant due to the Taliban growth
in Afghanistan and the output of the Rabbinic decision and system. Talban wished New
Delhi’s existence in Kabul has been downgraded.

New Delhi prepared never to indorse the Taliban command as its pro-Islamabad character
and locked its diplomatic nexus with Kabul. In order to counter Pakistan's support to the
Taliban, New Delhi stretched her arm of friendship to anti the Taliban's alliance, Northern
League opposition groups, which took over several areas in northern Afghanistan and

60
'Who is the Northern Alliance?' BBC News, 13 November 2001. The Alliance primarily comprised three
non-Pashtun ethnic groups - Tajiks, Uzbeks and the Hazaras - and in the past relied on a core of around
15000 troops to defend its territories against the pre-dominantly Pashtun Taliban.'
61
Ibid
62
JN Dixit ed., External Affairs: Cross-Border Relations (New Delhi: Roli Books, The Lotus Collection,
2004):183.
38
provided them with financial support and emulations for the war.63 New Delhi referred to the
Taliban as a threat to expand its support to expand its support for the Northern League for
three reasons:

First, India has been feared that the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan would be aspirational for
the freedom of fighting in India-occupied Kashmir. Second, during the protest in India, in the
central Bamyan valley of Afghanistan destroyed Mahatma's historical and historical statues.
Third, an Indian plane was hijacked and finally transferred to Kandahar in 1999 when it was
on its way from Kathmandu to New Delhi. This hijacking lasted for seven days, so India had
to release three senior guerrilla commanders according to the hijacker’s demands.

After these three exclusive reasons, India developed full hostility with the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan. For the Indians, for the first time in Afghanistan, they faced an unfriendly and
hostile regime in Afghanistan. So far, they have enjoyed friendly relations with the Afghan
regimes since 1947, which were hostile to Pakistan. India saw the emerging of the Taliban
regime as "a major strategic mistake," and India therefore made a comprehensive effort to
eliminate the Taliban regime in Kabul.

UNITED STATES DIPLMACY IN CONNETION WITH KABUL IN THE PRE 2001

ERA
It is very complicated to gauge the existing circumstances in Afghanistan until and unless we
keep the past scenes in in our mind. Innumerable causes which have brought about
Afghanistan to this situation current. Between these causes, interference by the regional and
big powers likewise Britten, Unite States and Russia in the domestic issues Afghanistan, big
power competition in the period of the cold war and the emerging of unconstitutional ,
ruthless and de facto management of Talban to control all region are undeniably factors.
Their establishments and their blue prints have had push Afghanistan into a quagmire of
perineal chaos and philanthropical emergencies. United State uninvited involvement in the
already deprived country to hammer USSR’s entablement to come to warm water and to
have an approach to the oil rich Middle East. In the beginning nineteen ninety-two,
Afghanistan was dragged into quagmire of arms, well sound and skilled guerrillas without
63
Rahul Bed!, 'India Joins anti-Taliban Coalition', Jane's Intelligence Review.
39
caring international obligations came to fight. This act of nonsense faced the total
disintegration big power. The desolation and the devastation that spread in Afghanistan has
historic origins. The United Sate plans in Afghanistan from the conclusion of the cold war to
the current contributed to the terrible attracts on the twin tower in September 11.64 Its
involvement uninvited in the Afghan war which now brought about unending competition
likewise the cold war, legitimated upcoming clashes 9/11 was a repercussion and in
contradiction of the US strategies who produced and accomplished, subsidized and equipped
the Islamists supposed to have brought about an attack on twin towers no September 11.65

Now onwards, a shortest back ground of the Pentagon establishment policies towards
Afghanistan after 2001 period. It will evaluate the existing circumstances of Afghan in its
historical lenses. It will vindicate that the outline of United States’ policies of the Regan’s
beau racy and military establishment and General Zia spread the germs of Islamic
fundamentalism, fanaticism and aggressiveness in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It will vindicate
how Unite States facilitated Pakistan in proxy war and deteriorated its domestic relations of
Afghan and Pentagon’s miss-calculations about percussion were not predictable. Taliban
were emerged by Zia and used as a tissue paper of their planes. Halting, deterring and
repelling of the Soviet Union by using Mujahedeen were significant implications of the
Regan’s policy. The intensification and fanatism of Taliban might be bluntly linked to the
United States current policies throughout the cold war might be in 1947-1991 which brought
about the extremism in the Muslim generation and produced revolutionaries across the
Afghan Durand bifurcation.66 Arming insurgents during the cold war had worldwide
implications for global security.

Afghanistan was fallen down into the quagmire of the great and big power’s influence of the
competition and cold war formed fanatics, competent and skill full Islamic die-hards which
brought about tragic incident of September 11. United Sates procedure and plan of
rendezvous with Talban Afghanistan was motivated by its cold war plans, accordingly any

64
Douglas Kellner, chapter 1, Theorizing 9/11 pg no 31, available at
http://books.google.am/books?id=Ff2jfQ3P2jYC&printsec=frontcover&hl=hy&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&
cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false
65
Ibid:31
66
Zalmay Khalizad and Daniyal Bayman, ‘Consolidating a Rogue State’ The Washington Quarterly, winter
2000.
40
defensible confrontation which brought about damage of the Soviet, launched by
administration of Kabul was appreciated by Washington. The outcome was purely come
from because of sacrifices of the Afghan people and Pakistani Mujahedeen.

The Cold War (1947-1991) was the reaction of Afghan people and Pakistani Mujahedeen
belong to Wahabi sect Muslim has its origin in the cold war and polices of America, when
Afghanistan was taken as a tissue paper to encounter the Kremlin and her potential allies .
The authorization of the Geneva consensuses in (1954) finally and formally had brought
about the total gave in the region to Afghan nation and concluded 1979 with disintegration
of USSR. These globe giants yet have been sustaining since the 1979 and harming each other
by somehow. Washington isolation from Afghan war put Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia on
front for their performance in international arena.

The Unite States procedure to deal with Afghanistan has been fluctuated in deferent period.
The Pentagon establishment has been changed her procedure according geopolitical and geo
strategical attentions in whole world. United States disappointment to visualize a long period
dream, after having inevitable lesson from Afghan- Soviet cash. There was a meaningful
lesson to be learnt not only for Pakistan but all over world. The United States plan of
assignation and skipping has had prognosticating warning not for but Pakistan, South Asia
and also whole world’s stability.

Conclusion
Findings of this episode tell us that how United State and big powers of earth used vulnerable
state like tissue paper and explanations of Unites States disappointment in Afghan war. It
will maintain the claim that the Kabul have had some history of an active uprising in cold
war and the struggle has a geographical and strategic footage. American plan of mobilizing
the Pashtun and Pakistani Mujahedeen as a significant portion of Regan’s cold war policy
and Islamabad’s observation and Calculated about its plan in Afghanistan visa vis her
challenging enemy New Delhi formed a religiously and idiolectally motivated Mujahedeen.
Islamic philosophy was misinterpreted throughout the cold war. In simple words Islam and
Islamabad both were used as a fortification in confronting the Leninism or communism.
Islamabad’s and the American procedures have jumped the nation into a state of unending
41
and perianal ruthlessness and philanthropic trouble. Relinquishment of an area in the 1990’s
left Kabul and her accomplices with bleeding wounds. Pentagon created panic all over world
against the September 11 incident by introducing a new and ambiguous world order with
announcing war to counter an intangible adversary. The state safety benefits were clearly
demarcated and the fears and insecurity were added by concerning them to the weapons of
mass destruction and instigating war like an attack on Baghdad. The initiatives of strategy
were took in hurry and unwell implemented. Having dual front opened of war in Iraq
enhanced the fuel to the fire, twisted a lot of antipathy in the Muslim Uma and separated
itself from Western associates. Pentagon’s unilateralism, anticipatory raids and a wish to
restructure the globe in a Washington sketch did a lot of harm to the world community in
this worldwide movement. President Obama, however, did not reacted which are worldwide
acceptance yet his strategy could not brought about required output in Afghan war. Afghan
nexus Pak strategy express Pentagon use of force and tiredness. Significant complication
happen way of doing something. The strategy of leaving and stagnancy is very opposing. Use
of force and the strategy of resolution should have been followed at the same time which
deterred. Excesses use of force which did not compel Taliban to do reconciliation. Although
Islamabad was being named as the major all yet the nexus between the two was worsening as
the Washington along with Pakistan’s territory and took its responsivity to be involved in this
confrontation. Obama’s plan was neither capacity building nor rehabilitation it was just face
saving and needs Islamabad to deliver concealment for its retreat. The circumstances in
Afghanistan was far from being pleasing and exiting the nationwide in the current state of
chaos will have acute effects not only for the state but its belongings effects will too be
realized in the area.

American’s plan concerning Afghanistan throughout the cold war period, resulting the Soviet
uninviting involvement from 1979 to 1989 when the Soviets renounce. The United State
plans during that time intended to repel and deter Soviet Union grip in Afghanistan by
supporting the anti-Soviet Pakistanis Mujahedeen. The United States establishment initially
controlled by Carter and then directly controlled by Regan’s supervision providing absolute
economic and other necessary assets for effective operation to comprehend the Soviet
direction without keeping in mind the identifications and ideological motivation of the
Afghan Pakistani. Regan had to take very strict measure against communist comrades.
42
Global powers, however, wanted to stretch their arms to Afghanistan and made its pet. This
Global power competitiveness further enhanced the already prevailing cultural jealousy.
Segment would inspect the American procedure of disconnection and relinquishment in the
period of 1990’s while Kabul experienced the greatest and ruthless public confrontation
resulting in form of the “Taliban fundamentalist”. The Soviet extraction leave Kabul a
adversity and monster for the American diplomacy. 67 Osama Bin Laden had been welcomed
by Taliban. Afghan Pashtoons were subjugated for fighting and injected fundamentalism by
Pentagon and Rawalpindi. Therefore, the United States leaving the area with bleeding
wounds and chaos. This situation had opened the door for Pakistani radicals likewise Bin
Laden and their fundamentalist buddies.

67
Ibid.
43
 CHAPTER THREE
INDO-AFGHAN SECURITY NEXUS: 2001-2017
The chapter explores the bilateral Indo-Afghan relations from 2001-2017. The Neo-Realism
asserts that the anarchic nature of the global system puts the weaker states at the receiving
end and stronger states, like hungry wolves and vultures prey on them. In the South Asian
case, both India and Pakistan, remaining cautious of each other, are working like predators in
the region. They are feeling security dilemma from each other as well as America and are
preying on the feeble body of Afghanistan. This has created an unavoidable imbalance of
power in the region. In order to create a regional balance of power, The U.S.A is trying to
balance the roles of India and Pakistan in the region via hard and soft diplomacy like sending
military threats and providing financial assistance to both the major actors of South Asia.

The ambassadors of both the states have tried to minimize the misunderstandings existing
between the two nations and have tried to increase people to people contact at masses level
by providing more and more study and general visas to each other’s citizens. Both countries
claim to have many common social, historical, cultural and political values. Being a member
of the Soviet Bloc during the Cold War, India developed good ties with Soviet backed
Afghan government at the time of the Soviet attack. It won the public hearts in Afghanistan
during the second last decade of twentieth century by supporting the cause of Afghans and
giving them relief through economic and moral aid. Its relations became sour with Taliban
government during the last decade of the twentieth century which set themselves as rulers of
Afghanistan after a long civil trouble. Indian indignance against Taliban was also because of
the fact that they allied themselves with Pakistan and the U.S against the Soviets. The U.S
invasion of Afghanistan after the twin tower attacks in 2001 gave India another chance to
revive past relations with Afghan government. Three factors are responsible for Indian
immense interest in Afghanistan after 9/11.

Firstly, fear of Pakistani dominance over that of Indian in Afghanistan. Secondly, need of a
corridor to exploit rich Central Asian oil and gas reservoirs and thirdly, the Kashmir
problem. This chapter has been divided in the following these sections: 1) Indo Afghan
Relations: 1947-1979: 2) Indo Afghan Relations 1980s-9/11; and 3) Indo Afghan Nexus post
9/11.
44
INDO-AFGHAN NEXUS AFTER 2001
India could not digest the dominant role of Pakistan in the War on Terror and started ensured
the USA that it was more serious than Pakistan in eliminating terrorism from South Asia and
especially from Afghanistan. It wanted to get more weight in the eyes of USA than Pakistan.
For this purpose, Indian statesmen visited America and Afghanistan stressing how important
it was for the great powers to play their card in Afghanistan by backing anti-Taliban groups,
which were against Usama Bin Laden and his friends. Puppet governments like that of
Karzai and Ashraf Ghani helped USA control Afghan policies. India took advantage of this
and requested America to help it encroach in Afghanistan.

India is enjoying good rapport with the current Afghan government under the tutelage of
USA. It wants to watch over Pakistani activities by remaining present in Afghanistan. In fact,
all its policies are Pakistan centric and it wants to use Afghanistan as a base to counter
Pakistani clout in Afghanistan.68 In Indian eyes, Kashmiri separatists get money and weapons
from Pakistan to commit terrorism in India.69 In the same way, Afghanistan accuses Pakistan
of misappropriating U.S funds and offering sanctuaries to terrorist groups which carry out
attacks from Pakistani soil against Afghans.

During the Congress rule in India in early 2000s, India developed enviable relations with
Afghanistan by enhancing coordination in military and finance fields. The Congress party
interested in establishing amicable relations with the Afghan government during this
period.70 Karzai toured India several times for cooperation in investment, business and
defense. Karzai once admitted that India would prove to be a friend in need by supplying
whatever it could to his country.71 Whenever Afghan President went to India, he emphasized
defense coordination between India and Afghanistan. He signed many agreements of holding
joint military exercises and giving training to Afghan troops.

68
Saeed ur Rahman, “Indian Presence in Afghanistan: Dynamics of Regional Security,” ISSRA Papers 2, no. 1
(2010):36–51.
69
Ibid:44.
70
Fahmida Ashraf, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Post-9/11,” Strategic Analysis 27 (2007):8.
71
C. Christine Fair and Shuja Nawaz, “The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps,” The Journal of Strategic
Studies, 34, no. 1 (2011):63–94.
45
India is a big customer of Russian weapons and it has promised Afghanistan to give
helicopters and other war planes. Both India and Russia supply weapons to Afghanistan but
never admit it on media. They have become big defense partners of Afghanistan in recent
years. India is at the top among weapon buying nations and produces less munitions inside
the country. India is the biggest democracy of world and wants to protect its citizens from
Pakistan-backed terrorists and ready to pay any price for this purpose. Indo-Afghan security
nexus is also directed towards elimination of cross border terrorism. Huge investments by
India to renovate war ravaged Afghanistan have once again won the public sentiments for it
in Afghanistan and its popularity graph has risen among the Afghan masses.

India and Afghanistan are the covert allies of Afghanistan and they provide defence aid to
Afghanistan. India secretly provides helicopters and other weapons to Afghanistan. The
USSR, in the same way, assists Afghanistan in military areas in every possible way. India
always helped Afghanistan with money and gave assistance in almost every field. It
supported all the USSR backed puppet governments before and after 1979 attack and backed
them enthusiastically even sometimes in the face of western opposition.72 India has already
poured more than three billion dollars in Afghanistan and still gearing up the amount.73 As
opposed to Gwadar Port backed by China, India is backing an Iranian port which would
prove an alternative passage to Indian access to Central Asia. But Indian investors are not
much interested in this Iranian port because of the volatile condition in Afghanistan. The
picture looks also gloomy as far as the private Indian enterprise in Afghanistan is concerned.
India is making its policies keeping an eye on the fresh developments happening in
Afghanistan. India is of the view that with the lessening of foreign troops in Afghanistan, the
dangers to Indian security would mushroom as radicals would once against snatch the
government of Afghanistan with the help of ISI. This is the reason why India is making its
utmost efforts to stabilize Afghanistan by making relentless investments and military
assistance.74 Indo-Afghan bilateral treaties aim to reinvigorate the dead economy of
Afghanistan. India is also giving great assistance in education, health, and infrastructure and

72
Crossette, “India to Provide Aid to Government in Afghanistan.”
73
Matt Waldman, “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan,” ACBAR Advocacy Series, 2008:33.
74
‘The Tashkent Declaration: Broken Promises of a Grandiose Structure” The Express Tribune, Islamabad.
46
running regional. Reconstruction projects, student exchanges, setting up of hospitals and
participation in regional organizations are the hallmarks of this rigorous cooperation.

It is a vow of India with Afghanistan to assist and train ANA and provide help to thousands
of people against major chronic.75 In the meanwhile, Afghanistan has also tried to play the
role of a mediator to help India and Pakistan normalize their differences. Different heads of
the states have discussed this possibility many times. India has also assured Afghanistan that
it would protect the most sensitive areas in its territory which are highly vulnerable to
terrorists. India seems quite resolute in eradicating all terrorist bases from Afghanistan and
assisting Afghan Army in their counter attacks against terrorists. An Indian Official stated
that: ‘Only those willing to respect democracy, human dignity and laws of Afghanistan
should be allowed to become part of peace process. Those who promise to shun radicalism
and weapon culture should have the right to become members of new integration.’76

Reconstruction of Afghanistan with the help of other regional states would provide India an
opportunity to become a leading player of the region.77 Indian aim would be to decrease
ethnic differences in Afghanistan for creating peace and prosperity. In addition to this, India
Wants to explore Iranian natural resources and enhance its investment sphere in the region.
These Indian plans may prove detrimental to Pakistani business interests in the region and
embitter the ties between the two states.78

India wants Afghanistan to be a corruption and drug Free State because it believes that by
using these two tools, Taliban’s are making profits which are ultimately being used for
committing terrorism. These menaces could be checked through strong institutional role and
stopping opium production and it export. An awareness campaign could be run among
farmers in order to inform them the benefits of other important crops. People could be
warned of serious punishments in cases of violation.

75
India’s Role in Afghanistan,” IISS 2011, no. 22 (June 1, 2011).
76
Ibid.
77
Balachandar, “India’s Role in Afghanistan.”
78
Ibid.
47
Afghanistan would probably become the main ground of regional political game and every
regional country including India would want to increase its role in the Afghanistan time to
come. Some analysts are also of the view that Pak-Taliban alliance after the withdrawal of
foreign forces may not allow India to work as a major regional player. Afghanistan would
want Pakistan and India to play their positive roles as major regional players by giving it
assistance in many areas of life. They will have to work sincerely and minimize their
differences regarding Afghanistan. India would need to work for the common people of
Afghanistan and help them reconstruct Afghanistan.79

There is no denial of the fact that along with investing in infrastructure, India is also training
Afghan bureaucracy. In order to become sole hegemonic power of South Asia, India is
investing in almost every field of life in Afghanistan. From infrastructure to military, from
investment to construction and from agriculture to education, India is making its investment,
which would show results in the time to come. It would not only serve India’s regional goals
but also win the hearts of common masses of Afghanistan.

It was only Mulla Umar’s regime with which India could not patch up its ties, otherwise with
every other government of Afghanistan, India somehow managed to maintain good relations.
Due to the land proximity, most of the invaders entered India via Afghanistan. This also
bears the fact that they are historically and politically linked together. Afghanistan has
always had no reluctance in admitting that India played a significant role in Afghan
rebuilding. Politics, if not culture, has definitely brought them closer. India wants to use
Afghanistan as a corridor for its economic prosperity and it has maintained good ties with
Afghanistan since 2001. Keeping in view the regional interests of Pakistan and global
interests of America, Indo-Afghan security nexus can be better understood. Indian and
Afghan economic and security interests are reciprocal as both need each other for the
accomplishment of their goals. In spite of this, India would always remain perturbed by the
Pakistani agencies’ involvement in Afghan affairs. But it should be kept in mind that in
global political structure, states very well know how to maximize their power by forging a
balanced foreign policy regarding different regional and international players. India, on the

79
S. Smruti, Pattanaik et al., “Post-2014 Afghanistan and India‟s Options,” IDSA, Policy Brief, July 8, 2012,
48
other hand, is also aware how important Afghanistan is for the achievement of its future
hegemonic goals in South Asia.

Since the demise of Taliban government in Afghanistan India has almost spent two billions
dollars for the reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Afghanistan. It is the fifth largest
donor to Afghanistan. India is also contributing enormously scholarships to the Afghan
students in the educational and cultural activities.80 Since Afghanistan is gateway to central
Asia for Indian accommodations that why India Afghanistan interests are converging in the
trade and commerce related activities. India is also building roads, school, and hospital, in
Afghanistan and is projecting very soft image in the minds of Afghans generations.

Modi visited Kabul in December and had a very fruitful meeting with president Ghani. Both
states leaders discussed not only the future cooperation in their bilateral diplomatic relations
but also.81 Chabhar port was also discussed as an alternative route for Afghanistan for Indian
goods. Both states leaders agreed to cooperate with each other on multiple issue such as
agreed to sign extradition treaty to transfer most wanted terrorists to each other. Acorrding to
them terrorism is the single most important threat to the peace, prosperity and development
of the region.

Ghani further maintained that Indian investments are not just about money rather it is the
confidence of both the people and the governments in each other. Dr. Mehdi a Professor of
International Relations in Kabul University is of the view that Indian investments are very
crucial for the people in Afghanistan but since India is not the direct neighbor of Afghanistan
that is why it cannot replace Pakistan which shares a long border with Pakistan.

In this meeting India also pledged one billion fresh aid to Afghanistan and encouraged it to
enhance official cooperation furthermore. India is very keen in investing in reconstruction
projects in Afghanistan to build its soft image. Even Indian foreign secretary is of the view
that the 1 billion fresh aid is for the institution and capacity building of afghan institutions.

80
C. Fair, (2010). India in Afghanistan and Beyond: Opportunities and Constraints. SSRN Electronic Journal.
81
D, S. (2015), ‘The importance of India Assistance to Afghanistan: A critical analysis’ African Journal of
Political Science and International Relations, 9(11):386-392.
49
Both the countries agreed to hold heart of Asia conference in Amritsar to explore the
possibilities of peace and stability in Afghanistan.

India, US and Afghanistan leaders met on the sideline of UN platform to talk about peace in
Afghanistan where they released a joint statement and reaffirmed their collective interests in
promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan.82 Furthermore, all the three states agreed on
the counter terrorism strategies including political, economic and developmental goals.

India has many key interests in Afghanistan which is indirectly threat to Pakistan’s stability.
Firstly, India wants to prevent the reemergence of Taliban in Afghanistan that could provide
Pakistan strategic depth in the region once more.83 Secondly India's growing economy
demand for new markets for its products in the region. Afghanistan is the gateway to Central
Asian States for Indian goods and services. Thirdly, India and Pakistan have a proxy wars in
Afghanistan. India wants to hegemon in this region by increasing their influence in
Afghanistan which is indirectly threat to Pakistan's sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence. India has opened numerous consulates on Afghanistan. Pakistan is of
the view that India is using all these consulates to destabilize Pakistan and to air the
liberation movements in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region of Pakistan Many
policy experts are of the view that to establish a permanent peace in Afghanistan it must
pursue a balanced and neutral policy towards Pakistan and India. This could only ensure the
safety and stability in the region.84 Pakistan’s fears of being encircled by India from eastern
and western side has led to the fluctuation in policy of Pakistan towards Taliban. The reason
behind Indian increasing developmental projects in Afghanistan is after the suicide bombing
attacks on Indian embassy in Afghanistan that killed many including Indian defense attaché.
India provided assistance to Afghanistan in many fronts.85 Their assistance to Afghanistan
can be categorized into four areas; First is security ties, In Security perspective Both states
have been engaged in intense security cooperation to each other. India has agreed to train
Afghanistan security forces. They have also signed strategic partnership agreement in 2011

82
S. D'Souza, (2011). India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership: Beyond 2014?. SSRN Electronic Journal.
83
P. Kauppert, and Hees, S. (n.d.). Future scenarios of Pakistan - India relations.
84
A. Rahi, (2018). Would India and Afghanistan have had a close relationship had Pakistan not been founded?.
[online] DAWN.COM. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1353172 [Accessed 18 Mar. 2018].
85
C. Fair, (2010). India in Afghanistan and Beyond: Opportunities and Constraints. SSRN Electronic Journal.
50
according to which India was not allowed to station and deploy its combat troops in
Afghanistan. In 2012 India trained almost 570 Afghan security troops whereas, this number
has increased in 2013 and reached to almost 1000 troops.

In 2016 Afghan Army Chief visited India and presented a wish list of arms and ammunition
before the Indian army chief. Although India is reluctant to entertain all the needs of
Afghanistan because of international pressure. Since, US is withdrawing from the region
gradually and expecting India to replace US in this regard. In its new South Asia policy
President Trump has authorized India an enhanced role in Afghanistan which is a matter of
grave security concern for Pakistan. Modi has also started a proactive defense policy towards
Afghanistan whit out fearing any backlash from Pakistan and has handed over four MI-25
attack helicopters to Afghanistan. Second is the Institutional capacity building where India
has signed numerous pacts with Afghanistan to build and enhance the capacity of different
Afghanistan Institutions? Some of the major areas of cooperation in this regard are given as;
India is committed to train Afghan army and police force so that they may control the reigns
of their own country and bring about a permanent peace in Afghanistan, India is granting
1300 scholarships for afghan students and civil servants so that they may contribute in the
development of their own country, India is also providing agriculture related scholarships to
afghan students since 2010 and Under the auspices of United Nations Development Program
India has provided almost 20 technical advisors to different Afghan ministries to build their
capacity and effectiveness.86 Thirdly Infrastructure development, where Indian Non-
Governmental organization (NGO’S) are working in Afghanistan for its infrastructure
development. Various projects and developments works that is being carried out is given as;
the most important contribution of India in Afghanistan is the construction of Afghan
Parliament building. It has become a symbol of democracy in Afghanistan, India is also
working on the power sector and has built many power lines with an investment of 120
million dollars, India has also invested an amount of $130 million on the Salma power
project in Afghanistan. This power plan is going to be the life line of Afghanistan economy
and industry, India is constructing a network of roads in Afghanistan that would reduce the
time and travel and would act as a catalyst to Afghan economic growth, Under the Afghan
Ministry of Health, India is constructing multiple hospitals and medical clinics for the better
86
S. D'Souza, (2011). India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership: Beyond 2014?. SSRN Electronic Journal.
51
affordability of health facilities for Afghan people, Numerous cold-storage and warehouse
are also being constructed to store the perishable food items. And lastly India is also
investing in the development of educational sector of Afghanistan and has constructed
numerous schools and Universities including agriculture and mining schools in
Afghanistan.87 India wants to influence the minds of the Afghan people by projecting its soft
image in the minds of Afghan people and at the same time polluting their minds vis-a-vis
Pakistan. Lastly Humanitarian Aid India is immensely cooperating in the humanitarian fields
with Afghanistan. India offered 500,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan and is also providing
wheat biscuits to the Afghan children’s. It has become a major Indian campaign with the
cooperation of UN to attract children to come to schools. Furthermore, India is taking active
part in reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan by which it is projecting its soft
image in Afghan population.88 This has become an effective diplomatic tool in Indian foreign
policy towards Afghanistan and to tarnish the image of Pakistan in the region.

India is the fifth largest import partner of Afghanistan and collectively it accounts for almost
20% of Afghan trade. Afghanistan primarily exports fresh fruits to India by air. Pakistan
allows Afghan goods transported to India and does not permit Indian goods to pass through
Pakistan’s territory.89 Indian public and private sector firms are also involved in different
projects of mining in Afghanistan. Both the states are deeply involved to take their bilateral
strategic relations to next level. Major trade activities are carried out through cargo flights
whereas, India has also developed a task force and dry ports especially for Afghanistan.

Their bilateral trade volume has reached almost $643 million in 2016.90 India is planning to
get access to central Asian states via Chabahar port in Iran bypassing its arch rival Pakistan
and landlocked Afghanistan. This port has also diluted the significance of Gwadar port of
Pakistan which in China’s calculation is the game changer in the region. President Ashraf
Ghani during his Indian visit pledged to take their bilateral trade volume up to $10 billion in
the next five years to come.

87
Ibid
88
Politics of South Asia | The Political Studies Association (PSA), (2018). Politics of South Asia | The Political
Studies Association
89
Diplomate, T. (2018). The Diplomate, [online] The Diplomate, Available at:
https://thediplomate.com/tag/afghanistan-pakistan-relations/
90
Ibid.
52
Conclusion
Except the Taliban period, India and Afghanistan enjoyed more or less good relations with
each other, whether it was the 1970’s era or 2010’s era. Both the super powers of the world
made them coordinate and cooperate with each other sometimes through coercion and
sometimes through courting. India also had to extend friendly hand to Afghanistan because
of its lofty dream of becoming regional hegemon. India also took advantage of the shared
history with Afghan people and made them realize the importance of true old ties.
Afghanistan and India also took Pakistan as a shared regional rival, which could threaten the
regional peace and stability, especially after becoming a nuclear behemoth in the late 1990’s.
India also took great interest in the resurrection and reconstruction of war ravaged
Afghanistan. It won the sympathies of Afghan government and public in this way. It is
debatable whether cultural or historical ties brought both the states together, but this fact is
beyond the doubt that political ties did brought them together. Especially, after the US
invasion of Afghanistan, both the states came closer, sometimes by their own efforts,
sometimes under the insecurity caused by Pakistan and sometimes under the auspices of the
U.S.A.

Both India and Afghanistan are highly dependent on each other as far as their regional
interests are concerned. Afghanistan needs economic, political and military security while
India needs an access to Central Asian resources and a hub to carry out activities against its
regional, Pakistan. In the same way, Pak-Afghan ties are also a main source of concern for
India, as they can affect its security and regional interests. Afghanistan, as a weak state of
South Asia, have to forge a balanced policy towards both the nuclear giants of South Asia in
order for its own survival. The presence of the U.S.A on its soil is yet another big challenge
for Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is the most vital country for the South Asian peace and stability and both India
and Pakistan will have to be considerate and cautious while dealing with Afghanistan,
especially in the presence of the U.S.A and Taliban. The same advice goes for the
Afghanistan while dealing with the three nuclear powers; India, Pakistan and the U.S.A

53
 CHAPTER FOUR
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN POST 9/11
The catastrophic incidents of 9/11 proved turning point for the security of the whole world
and especially that of South Asia. These incidents changed the total outlook and worldview
of American foreign policy makers. Pakistan, due to its geographic proximity with
Afghanistan, felt threatened after the American invasion of Afghanistan on October 8, 2001.
Americans traced the roots of attacks in the barren land of Afghanistan and started hunting
Mulla Omer and Osama Bin Laden. They put only two choices before Pakistan in a
threatening tone of joining them or Taliban in the War on Terror. Pakistan was left with no
choice but to join Americans against Taliban. Pakistan had to succumb to this warning to
save its own territory from American invasion in case of refusal. Developing states like
Pakistan feel dependent on Americans economically, scientifically and technologically and
may not bear an opposition to them. This Yes by the then President Musharraf proved very
crucial for Pakistan in the years to come. Pakistan took a lot of American funds in order to
fight Taliban inside and outside Afghanistan but America never felt satisfied and continued
the chatter of ‘Do More’. Moreover, Taliban carried out bomb blasts in the major cities of
Pakistan and made terrorist dens in its border areas and tribal agencies. Pakistani civilians
paid the price of allying U.S in Afghanistan as both America via drones and Taliban via
blasts started taking their lives after 9/11. Pakistan could not get that kind of appreciation
from world community as it expected because of the increased propaganda by RAW, Afghan
government and western and Indian media against it. The chapter discusses the Military,
Political and Socio-Economic implications of Indo-US-Afghanistan nexus for Pakistan.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

South Asia remained a war ground for world powers during and after the Cold War due to its
rich natural resources and unique geographic and strategic location. The incident of Twin
Tower attacks in 2001 was, however, that cataclysmic event which totally shifted the
attention of world powers, especially that of U.S. A. The 9/11 incident not only affected US
foreign policy but also of many countries of the rest of the world including Pakistan, India
and Afghanistan. The world politics took U-Turn after this gory incident of mass killing.
India also made many alterations in its foreign policy and started seeking U.S help against
China and Pakistan. U.S, in response, strengthened India-Afghanistan bond which increased
54
the regional worries of both China and Pakistan. As an arch rival of India, Pakistan saw this
development with a suspicious eye and started to follow such a balanced policy towards both
eastern and western neighbors which might also possibly not enrage the U.S statesmen
against it. Pakistani foreign policy makers concluded that Pakistan had to join the American
war in Afghanistan, otherwise, its own territorial sovereignty and teetering economy will be
in danger. It would not only face various sanctions but also disgrace in international
community. This unwanted alliance with the USA in this war gave birth to many unwanted
problems for Pakistan as well. Pakistan had to re-engineer its regional approach without
infuriating the USA. It also had to remain cautious of activities at borders adjacent to India
and Afghanistan.

Ironically, Pakistan, which joined as an anti-terrorism ally itself became a prey of terrorists
who carried out chain attacks in its major cities. This exacerbated the security situation in
Pakistan and above all, Afghani statesmen started alleging Pakistan for providing safe havens
to Taliban to carry out terrorism in Afghanistan.91 India also got an opportunity to fish in the
troubled waters and started to take advantage of the Afghan situation .By using diplomatic
means, India assured both America and Afghanistan of its greater friendship and cooperation
than Pakistan in the war on terror which increased the perturbance of Pakistan.

In order to bust the master minds behind 9/11 events, Americans attacked Afghanistan with
the help of NATO forces.92 This caused the refugee crisis in Afghanistan and masses began
to spill over the neighboring states crossing their borders legally and illegally, hence,
becoming a burden on their economies and territories. And Pakistan was at the top of such
receivers. Pakistan was already feeding millions of Soviet war Afghan refugees and new
ones just increased its headache. Pakistan made an effort to stop the refugee influx by
shutting down its doors to refugees in 2001 but it proved useless and futile.93 During the
American onslaught, Pakistan, as the front ally in the war on terror offered its bases to
American war planes to carry out strikes on Taliban hideouts. India could not remain mum
when Pakistan caught the eye of world community and became the center of attention

91
Khalid Iqbal, “Pakistan’s Post 9/11 Crisis Management,” Criterion Quarterly 9, no. 1 (January 25, 2014):14.
92
Gutilucian 23, “World Trade Center 2001 RI” (New York: CNN I Report, September 12, 2010).
93
Iqbal, “Pakistan’s Post 9/11 Crisis Management":14-16.
55
because of its rigorous involvement in Afghan crisis. India deems itself as the strongest state
among South Asian states and wants to remain at the top forever. Pakistan as the only
nuclear opponent in the region pokes in the Indian eyes like a straw and India always makes
a Pak-centric policy in the region. India offered its bases for aerial strikes at once when it
saw that U.S was willing to use Pakistani bases for operations in Afghanistan. It did not want
to miss the opportunity to get a weight in the eyes of the U.S by doing so.94 This was a
double edged move by India which aimed not only at pleasing U.S but also maintaining its
top position as the best regional actor by disturbing Pakistan from the direction of Afghan
border. But this request on behalf of India could not get much U.S attention due to the
geographical distance between Indian and Afghan borders.

Indian Parliament came under terrorist attacks in 2001 and as expected, Indian allegation
cannons turned their mouths towards Pakistan and a spree of media propaganda helped soar
border tensions between the neighbor states right after the attacks.95 Some are of the opinion
that all these attacks were planned and India only wanted to apply pressure on Pakistan from
Line of Control as Pak- Afghan border was already under red alert due to the fears of Taliban
infiltration into the soil of Pakistan. Pakistani army was guarding the border as Taliban were
desperately trying to make sanctuaries in its land to avoid the wrath of America, being shown
to them after the 9/11 incidents. As Pakistani forces were ordered to defend Indian side of
border, their numbers sufficiently decreased at Afghan border and Taliban made
encroachments in the border areas of Pakistan to make safe havens there.

At the same time, Indians alleged that Americans were showing duality in the war by not
treating them fairly and acknowledging their efforts in the war on terror. To defame Pakistan
in the world community, their media even started pointing out the places in Pakistan where
Taliban were expectedly present. Succumbing to Indian pressure and propaganda, the U.S
put all the Pakistan based Jihadi groups on its list of terror. As a result, many youngsters
were unfairly treated on the allegations that they were secretly working for the terrorist
organizations which were responsible for carrying on fight against Indian troops in

94
A. R Siddiq, “No Reunion, but Union Possible in Subcontinent,” Daily News, March 29, 2012.
95
Iqbal, “Pakistan’s Post 9/11 Crisis Management":17.
56
Kashmir.96 These steps by India heralded the victory of Indian diplomacy over Pakistani
diplomacy in the eyes of USA and Pakistan speeded up its efforts to beat India in this
regional melodrama. America and its allies started weapons’ sales to India and it encouraged
non-western states as well to strengthen their defence ties with India so that it could boost its
military resources and save its land from Pakistan based terrorists.97

The Taliban of Afghanistan cloaked themselves in the dress of common citizens after the
American attack and it became extremely difficult for the foreign troops to identify them and
distinguish them from common citizens of Afghanistan. Some of them started guerilla
warfare against American troops and others spilled over to neighboring countries like
Pakistan and Iran. Places like North Waziristan and South Waziristan got the attention of
Afghan Taliban and they started to build sanctuaries at these places to carry out attacks on
Afghan and American troops in Afghanistan and Pakistani Army and civilians in Pakistan.
Many of the sectarian and separatist groups also joined the ranks of the terrorists and vowed
to harm Pakistan in every possible way.

These splinter groups soon became an existential threat for Pakistani population and they
started to slaughter it via bomb blasts, suicide attacks and remote control bombs. This
situation created an environment of chaos in the big cities of Pakistan and state institutes
found it hard to arrest the culprits. It was a nightmare for Pakistani civilians who had been
living in peace for many years with the old Afghan refugees of 1980s. Pakistan became a
favourite place of terrorists and they decided to operate everywhere from here.

This caused a lot of multifarious security issues for Pakistan and its troops had to start
warfare within their own land against Taliban. All this was being done by Pakistan at the
behest of America which was consistently asking it to do more against these Taliban. The
situation exacerbated to such an extent that an assassination attempt was made on the
President of Pakistan by these Talibans. The crisis of IDPs arose as a result of these
operations, and Pakistani people became homeless refugees within their own beloved

96
Sadiqa Hameed, “Prospects for Indian-Pakistani Cooperation in Afghanistan” (Washington DC: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 2012):20.
97
Ibid.
57
homeland. This caused a humanitarian crisis within Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistani
Army forbade Americans and its allies to cross Pakistani border and operate against Taliban.
This was done to ensure the territorial sovereignty and liberty of Pakistan. But this act
angered the Americans and their allies and increased the level of mistrust between Pakistan
and America.98

Though it was a difficult time for Pakistan, yet it was an opportunity for it to demand more
favours from USA in return for the sacrifices being made by its civilians and army in the war
on terrorism but its government could not properly capitalize on this opportunity. At least, it
could not get that much of favours as it succeeded to get in Zia’s era but still USA lifted
sanctions of 1990s from it. It also managed to get only one and a half billion dollars in aid
against the demand of around eight billion dollars.99 It also requested America to ask its
eastern neighbour not to interfere in its internal affairs as it was facing Taliban in the war on
terror and could not afford confrontation with it at that crucial juncture. But India kept
meddling in its affairs and America did not do much to keep India away from Pakistan. All
this resulted because of the inability of Pakistani policy makers to persuade America to
pressurize India with regard to Pakistani matters. This also bears testimony to fragile
Pakistani foreign policy towards U.S at that time.100

This military operation by Pakistan put oil on the separatist fire of Pakhtoons living
alongside the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan and they decided to resist the operation and
convince local population to stand by them against Pakistani army. It was India which urged
Pakhtoons not to join Pakistan in 1947 but they had to do so by dint of sheer hard work of
Muslim League in referendum. India has always dreamed of separating Pakhtoons like
Bengalis from Pakistan. RAW got the opportunity and started reminding Pakhtoons once
again of Pakhtoonistan. This persuasion on behalf of RAW gave birth to many issues for the
right execution of operations by Pakistani troops. Pakhtoons living inside Afghanistan also
put hurdles in the way of American troops as well.

98
Ibid.
99
Jennifer Blanke and Thea Chiesa, “The Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report 2013” (Geneva: World
Economic Forum, 2013).
100
“Musharraf `bullied` into Supporting US War on Terror: Ex-General,” Zee News (Zee News, December 11,
2009).
58
The then president of Pakistan had to face music of world community because of launching
military operation within his own country against Pakhtoons and becoming a puppet in the
hands of USA. Even his own masses and religious entities reprimanded his controversial
acts. But international community was not fully right in cursing Pakistan as Pakistan had to
join America and get economic and political benefits as its military and economic power was
in no way comparable to the American military and economic might.It was left with no other
option as it was warned by GW Bush in a threatening tone of allying Taliban against USA.101

One can safely say that if Pakistan did not join America, it had to face a full fledge war
against America which it could not afford. But at the same time, it is also worth mentioning
that if it stood against Taliban, it could face the backlash of Taliban of whom it was an old
ally and they could declare it treacherous and disloyal. So, Pakistan was in a very difficult
position whether to leave an old ally or join the new ally. Ultimately, it decided to join the
later due to its strong economic and military background. Though this decision seemed
sagacious for the time being, yet it was to alter the course of events and even history of the
region in the years to come.

As Pakistan gave America the green signal to use its bases, it started to carry out aerial
attacks against Taliban of Afghanistan. With this permission, Pakistan gained currency
among American policy makers and they started to give it a lot of weightage which created
envy in Indian statesmen. The brutal aerial strikes by America on Afghan citizens and
Taliban made them flee Afghanistan and take shelter in Pakistan and Iran etc. This mass
exodus of Afghans badly affected Pakistan and exacerbated its already teetering financial
standing at world level.102 The numbers of displaced persons kept soaring and increasing the
tensions for Pakistani policy makers.

The western artillery broke the back of Taliban by continuous bombing and shelling and
destroyed their hideouts.103 As a result, many of them left Afghan soil and others mixed
themselves with the common men to hide their identity from foreign forces. The migrated

101
John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena Wille, “National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon The United States, 2003):236.
102
Nadia Mushtaq Abbasi, “Impact of Terrorism on Pakistan,” Strategic Studies 23 (2013):45.
103
“World Trade Center 2001 RI.”
59
Taliban established themselves in border areas inside Pakistan as these areas were outside the
jurisdiction of Pakistani forces and had been looking after their own freedom according to
local customs and tribal laws for years. Here, Taliban found many stalwarts who began to
give them secret help against Pakistani troops. This Taliban settlement in tribal areas
increased the security problems of Pakistan many folds.

Taliban not only began to reside in these areas but also aimed to spread inside country
through strong networking. Pakistani military tried to break this networking through ruthless
operation but Taliban once again guised themselves as common immigrants and escaped
from the eyes of Pakistani troops. The Taliban also clothed themselves under the dress of
different local and sectarian identities which made the task of Pakistani agencies even more
difficult.104 At the same time, different splinter groups tried to approach these terrorists and
established ties with them. These groups were dissatisfied with Pakistani government due to
one reason or the other and they saw a golden opportunity in joining hands with Taliban and
lending a helping hand to them in creating havoc in the major cities of Pakistan through
terrorism.105

Day by day, these Taliban got currency in the tribal areas and agencies and started recruiting
innocent people in their organizations and began to give them training to fight against
Pakistani troops and blasting bombs in urban areas. These Taliban began to demolish school
buildings and especially girls were banned from getting education in these areas. Internal
harmony of Pakistan was disturbed due to a spree of bomb blasts and suicide attacks. 106 All
the top officials were attacked and threatened. Pakistani institutions looked fragile and weak
before the innovative tactics of Taliban.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

It was December 1979, when the Soviets ventured into the land locked and hilly state of
Afghanistan. But it had to face tough retaliation from the Islamic and Communist forces
here. It had to leave Afghanistan after almost ten year of intrusion as America consistently

104
Burgess, “Struggle for the Control of Pakistan”: 87.
105
Ibid.
106
“Terrorist Proxies of the Pakistan Army History Essay.”
60
backed Anti-Soviet forces with money and weapons. A bloody civil war followed the Soviet
withdrawal and Taliban ascended to rule. But the unique strategic location and fragility of
Afghanistan government instigated America to attack it after 9/11 incidents. This arrival of
America in Afghanistan created security dilemma for Pakistan and it started to mould its
foreign policy towards U.S keeping in mind its own regional interests. It okayed to help U.S
beat Taliban but on certain conditions of providing aid and supporting Kashmir cause against
India etc.

This alliance with America against Taliban proved detrimental to Pakistan and it had to bear
the brunt of its decision in form of civilian casualties and soldiers’ deaths etc. This decision
put Pakistan at the edge of an imminent existential threat. 107 In the backdrop of all this,
Pakistan was forced to devise a new regional strategy and cater for security needs of its
masses. Its citizens were at the mercy of Taliban and it itself was at the mercy of USA. At
this critical juncture, how could India remain inactive? It also started to goad America
against Pakistan and vied to establish better ties with Afghanistan. It also painted Pakistan as
a terror sponsoring state. All this was being done by India to disgrace and humiliate Pakistan
in the international community.

Twin Tower attacks surprised every nation of the world and their plotters earned scathing
criticism.108 The international community expressed condolences with U.S on this sad event
and most of the states vowed to stand by America in hunting down the culprits responsible
for these gory attacks. America found that the plotters were hidden in Afghanistan and it
decided to storm Afghanistan with the help of its allies.109 America was convinced that
though Afghanistan was never capable of plotting these attacks, yet its territory was the hub
of the plotters of 9/11 events.

In the beginning, America requested Afghan government to hunt down the Al-Qaeda persons
hiding in Afghanistan and hand them over to America after arresting them from the clutches
of Taliban but unfortunately the Afghan government did not succeed to do so. Then the U.S

107
Calvocoressi, World Politics: 1045-2000:571.
108
23, “World Trade Center 2001 RI.”
109
Ibid.
61
approached the closed past Arab allies of Taliban and Pakistan for this purpose. The Arab
allies had already detached themselves from Taliban soon after the 9/11 attacks out of the
fear of America. So, there was only Pakistan which was left as a sole option to America
which could be used to contact Taliban and ask them to handover Al-Qaeda persons to it. So
all sorts of pressure was put on Pakistan to convince Taliban for cooperation with America.

Pakistan made the futile efforts to convince Taliban of the grave consequences for them as
well as Pakistan in case of non-cooperation with the USA. It played all its available cards at
the hand to convince Taliban but its efforts bore no fruit. The hard boiled response by
Taliban not only increased difficulties for themselves but also for Pakistan as America began
to suspect the sincerity of Pakistan and thought that Pakistan was secretly befriending
Taliban. The U.S suspicion tarnished the honour of Pakistan at world level and many other
states also started thinking the same about Pakistan. When UNSC decided to use force in this
regard, Pakistan agreed with it and stood by UN members to save its face before them.
Pakistan made radical changes in its approach towards Afghanistan.110

To put the oil on fire, Afghanistan also started alleging Pakistan of providing safe havens to
Taliban which brought a bad name for Pakistan at international level. In addition to this,
India got a chance to reinforce its political and economic clout in Afghanistan which had
nosedived in Taliban period.111 India, through its diplomatic means, succeeded in winning the
confidence of both America and Afghanistan which generated yet another challenge for
Pakistan and all its efforts seemed futile before Indian successes.

This fact cannot be denied that America forced Pakistan to jump into its war and fight against
Taliban by giving it flattering names like non-NATO ally etc.112 Pakistan suffered a lot in
this war economically and militarily. In order to kill Taliban and get dollars from America, it
had to offer its own soldiers and citizens as animals of sacrifice before Taliban. Ironically,
the number of causalities suffered by Pakistan in this Afghan war is greater than those
suffered collectively in all major wars against India. Inspire of all this, America never

110
Roth, Greenburg, and Wille, “National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States": 220.
111
23, “World Trade Center 2001 RI.”
112
Roth, Greenburg, and Wille, “National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States": 199.
62
seemed satisfied by Pakistani efforts and asserted for more. The U.S did not truly appreciate
Pakistani efforts and silently kept considering it a treacherous, disloyal and debauched ally.
The then Afghan and Indian governments kept alleging Pakistan of sheltering terrorists in its
territory.113 Above all, it became norm of the day to link all disruptive actions around the
globe with Pakistan. This bleak picture of Pakistan before world community urged America
to give Pakistan a lower rank in its eye than India.114 This American policy shift towards
India created waves of disturbance in Pakistani policy makers and they started considering
pull Pakistan out of this predicament. It also was a slap in their face as India, despite its less
efforts, was taking more advantages of this war than Pakistan. After the World Trade Centre
attacks, America re-engineered its political strategy towards India, Pakistan and
Afghanistan.115 For sometimes, its strategies remained singular about these states, but after
getting some victories with the help of Pakistan, it started tilting itself towards India leaving
Pakistan in lurch and showing apathy towards it. The unexpected and unwelcome Indo-US
friendship also pulled Afghanistan towards it and this trio seemed to create grave challenges
for Pakistani security in the times to come.

Karzai government was given the control of Afghanistan according to Bonn declaration for
the period of half a year. In the same way, ISAF was also created according to this
declaration for better resistance against Afghan insurgents. The new President of Afghanistan
acknowledged the importance of Afghan relations with India and Pakistan and gave positive
statements about these both neighbours of Afghanistan. He made official visits to these states
and met their heads in warm mood.116

He could not run his affairs well without taking both his neighbour states in confidence but
he was advertently or inadvertently more tilted towards India out of personal penchant or on
American directions. Mulla Umar government never allowed India to interfere in Afghan
matters and shut its embassy in India. India saw in Karzai a man of its interests and tried to
reassert its influence in Afghanistan with his and US help. He visited India and showed great

113
Abbasi, “Impact of Terrorism on Pakistan": 32.
114
Muhammad Ishaque Fani, “The Indo-US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan,”
Pakistan Vision 10, no. 2 (n.d.):136.
115
Roth, Greenburg, and Wille, “National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States": 200.
116
Hameed, “Prospects for Indian-Pakistani Cooperation in Afghanistan": 32.
63
enthusiasm and warmth while meeting Indian Businessmen. India poured a lot of money in
Afghanistan and launched a lot of business and construction programms in war ravaged
Afghanistan to win the hearts of Afghan public and government.

Indo-Pak ties are the main determinants of strategic culture of South Asia. Any kind of
imbalance in their ties may result in an imbalance in the whole strategic environment of
South Asia. An effort to create such an imbalance was made by America in the form of Indo-
US nuclear deal which arose the already existing suspicion of Pakistan regarding Indo-US
alliance against it. This development once again created a feeling of security dilemma among
foreign policy makers of Pakistan and they decided to increase their nuclear arsenal in order
to match with India in South Asian arms race.117 Pakistan began to use all its resources to
counter this dangerous move by India and America because sluggishness on behalf of
Pakistan this time could have severe repercussions and corollaries for Pakistan.

In the mid of the first decade of the twenty first century, many American officials made high
profile visits to India to assure it how important was their collaboration for each other at
regional and global levels.118 Moreover, they assured India that America would give it more
weightage than Pakistan in its dealings and it would transfer its nuclear technology to India
to help it solve its electricity issues.119

All these indications on behalf of America to India made Pakistan worried and it became
almost sure that it would not be treated in that way by America as it used to be treated in the
beginning of Afghan War.120 These fears of Pakistan compelled it to be worried about its
future in the region. It seemed a daunting task to it to keep itself up with India in the regional
race of weapons. It knew it would have to develop its own sophisticated defence
mechanisms, import costly munition and air crafts and double its military budget etc to deter
India in South Asia. It knew such a race would not leave a positive effect on the security
environment of South Asia but it had to do it for the protection of its own territorial
sovereignty in the region.

117
Ibid.
118
“Pak Makes Case for F-16s to Rice,” The Times of India, March 17, 2005.
119
Ibid.
120
Fani, “The Indo-US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11":123.
64
While all this was happening at the state level, Taliban were continuously fighting with
Pakistani troops in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Most of the border residing Pakhtoons and
local rebel groups were giving them full fledge economic and moral support and they were
creating a havoc among the innocent citizens of Pakistan by blasting bombs and committing
suicides. Army was also under scathing criticism by its own masses for commencing
operations in its own tribal agencies. Religious organisations sympathetic to Taliban groups
like Haqqani Group and TTP etc were also fomenting public agitation against army through
religious gatherings and emotional sermons.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

The War on Terror instead of decreasing terror, increased the terror in the hearts of Pakistani
and Afghani Public. Their collective terror was probably more than the terror which gripped
the American public after the Twin Tower attacks in 2001.It would be fair to stay that they
surely suffered more than Americans in this revenge war of 9/11 attacks. America probably
proved a bigger terrorist than the actual terrorists keeping in view the destruction it caused in
reaction of 9/11 attacks. Moreover, it made many states like Pakistan terrorists in order to
eliminate terrorists from the face of the Earth and generated more terrorists than it killed
during this global War on Terror. Not only Pakistani society but also its economy felt the
heavy blow of this Afghan war. The number of refugees increased, infrastructure got
destroyed, thousands of civilians massacred and financial position weakened. This was the
big socio-economic price Pakistan paid in the War on Terror.

The local residents of borders became IDPs due to military operation and almost 50 lakh
people had to leave their habitats and switch over to other areas of Pakistan. This was the
biggest exodus in the known archives of Pakistan.121 The so-called Mullas imposed their own
version of Islam and completely barred lasses from going to schools.122 The peaceful
northern areas became hell of violence when Taliban attacked hundreds of school going
females in a spree of attacks during 2000s.123 This denial of education to females might
affect generations of tribal areas as educated females could play a vital role in bringing up

121
Abbasi, “Impact of Terrorism on Pakistan"23.
122
A. Naqvi, Shah Zaman Khan, and Zainab Ahmad, “The Impact of Militancy on Education in FATA,” Tigah
11(2012):24.
123
Ibid.
65
civilsed children who might help these areas come out of backwardness in the near future.
These attacks also infused a sense of permanent fear in those girls which could create a lot of
psychological issues in them at the later stages of their lives.

All those areas which were once apples of visitor’s eyes became devoid of them due to the
persistent fear of life. Total anarchy because of the ongoing war between Taliban and
Pakistani troops deprived Pakistani economy of those huge sums which used to be earned out
of the visits of local and foreign tourists. Pakistani treasury had to bear a loss of more than
half a million rupees when terrorists attacked a tourists’ place in SWAT in mid of 2008.124 It
was a backlash by Taliban in response to the operations like Zarb-e-Azb. Though Pakistani
troops tried their best to stop such incidents but in vain. In the same way, terrorists carried
out attacks in Karakoram Mountains and murdered a lot of local and foreign nationals in
revenge of killing of Taliban spearheads in 2013.125 Terrorists even murdered the members
of the interrogation group which was given the orders of interrogating such incidents of
visitors’ killings. All the visitors were forbidden to go to those areas which caused a huge
deficit to the government treasury.126 According to WEFTTCI, Pakistan was amongst the
lowest visited countries in the world in early 2010s.127

Many cricketing nations excused to play in Pakistan in the early 2000s because of the fear of
insecurity in Pakistan. Bombs were blasted near the restaurants where their teams were
residing and they asked their teams to leave Pakistan without finishing different series. 128 In
2009, many players received injuries when the team of Sri Lanka was attacked on its way to
Qaddafi Stadium. Its players were lucky enough to survive because of the heroic driving of
their bus driver who showed brilliant presence of mind during the onslaught of terrorists.
Eight innocent citizens, though, got assassinated during this attack. This incident sent
shudders of fear in the other cricketing nations and they hesitated to send their teams to
Pakistan in future. As a result, The ICC forbade Pakistan of hosting WC 2011 which was
planned to be played on the soil of three South Asian countries including Pakistan. This

124
Abbasi, “Impact of Terrorism on Pakistan":35-40.
125
Ibid.
126
Ibid.
127
Blanke and Chiesa, “The Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report 2013.”
128
Abbasi, “Impact of Terrorism on Pakistan":38.
66
deprived PCB of a lot of revenue which was to be gained by world Cup matches scheduled to
be hosted by Pakistan. Alongside Cricket, many other sports like hockey met the same fate.
Terrorists were creating this panic only in reaction to military operation in their areas. Thus,
Taliban succeeded in destroying sports culture of Pakistan and causing great damage to its
sports revenue by committing these heinous acts of attacking teams. These incidents also
compelled Pakistan to hold future events in other states like Dubai which doubled not only
their costs but also decreased their profits. And above all these attacks tarnished the image of
Pakistan in the whole world.

America saw 9/11 only once but Pakistan saw it every day because of its decision to stand by
America against Taliban and both proved venomous and lethal for it. Pakistani civilians
remained in trance because of the spree of attacks on them by terrorists and ISI and institutes
like it seemed helpless before the unique and innovative methods of terrorists.129 Pakistan has
far less production in agriculture and industry than America and its reach to global and
European markets is also very limited as compared to America. That’s why it could not
afford such a prolonged war and heavy losses to its economy. According to some estimates,
Pakistan bore the losses of more than one hundred billion dollars in this war on terror in the
first decade of the twenty first century. Terrorists from tribal areas and Afghanistan
completely devastated the social and economic set up of Pakistan.130

This precarious economic plight stopped the foreign investors from investing in Pakistan and
already foreign working businessmen shifted their businesses in the neighboring states. In the
same way, local investors also bore the brunt of this war due to consistent attacks on their
mills and factories by these miscreants and they were forced to shut down their businesses.
This poor economic plight created severe joblessness, poverty and despair in Pakistan which
increased the socio-economic worries of Pakistan. These sporadic attacks by miscreants
produced a high level of fear among local investors which helped in low supplies of
products, inflation and devaluation of local products in the international market. This
situation led to the meagerest share of only eighteen percent in the history of Pakistan by

129
Ibid.
130
Hameed, “Prospects for Indian-Pakistani Cooperation in Afghanistan": 24.
67
industrial sector.131 Pakistani tribal areas including FATA and Waziristan etc are not
streamline areas of Pakistan and this is the reason why they lack big mills and factories.
People are not highly educated and run average and mediocre businesses. When War on
Terror began in these areas, their small businesses were badly destroyed by the continuous
fighting between insurgents and Pakistani forces. Most of the masses of tribal areas are either
peasants or shepherds. They rely heavily on these two professions.132 When counter
insurgency operations were begun by army against Taliban in these areas, their crops were
destroyed, and their agricultural lands were turned barren and infertile by the continuous
bombardment and shelling. Their cattle’s were killed which were the only way of their
livelihood in those hilly areas. An estimated agricultural loss was more than thirty five
billion Pakistani rupees.133

Same kind of destruction was also observed in Afghanistan as Afghanis living alongside
border also had more or less identical professions like their Pakistani consorts living in the
tribal areas of Pakistan. Afghanistan also had to face the same kind of socio-economic perils
during the course of American operation against Afghani Taliban and the small businesses,
agriculture and industry of Afghanis were also ruined the same way as that of Pakistanis. As
a result, many American aid agencies started the rehabilitation work of Afghanis. India also
saw the opportunity and plunged in to assist Afghanis in their rehabilitation.134 India toiled
hard to win the confidence of Karzai government and its masses. It also flattered the USA
and pestered Pakistan in the issue of Afghanistan. As the Afghan president had studied in
Simla in his student life, so he had an unconscious liking for India. Also the Khost governor
warned him of Pakistani military interference in a road project as India was given the
responsibility to construct that road for Afghanistan.135

India wanted Afghanistan to become a member of SAARC, but Pakistan was hesitant to see
Afghanistan in SAARC. This Indian dream came true and Afghanistan finally became

131
Abbasi, “Impact of Terrorism on Pakistan": 39.
132
Naqvi, Khan, and Ahmad, “The Impact of Militancy on Education in FATA": 30.
133
Abbasi, “Impact of Terrorism on Pakistan": 40.
134
Ibid.
135
Hameed, “Prospects for Indian-Pakistani Cooperation in Afghanistan": 30.
68
member of Afghanistan in 2007.136 Indo-Afghan defense and economic collaboration soared
to sky day by day. Al-Qaeda people assassinated an Indian in 2005 and India sent two
hundred troops to protect its people on Afghan soil.137 During this period, India succeeded in
assuring Afghan government that Pakistan was offering safe havens to anti-Afghanistan
Taliban and it was Pakistan which was backing Kashmiri freedom fighters.138 This
persuasion convinced the then government of Afghanistan of the dual character of Pakistan.
In order to gain hegemony in South Asia, it also tried to win the confidence of its
neighboring countries against Pakistan which further deteriorated the situation of South Asia.
Afghan government, in light of the above-mentioned Indian efforts to help it join SAARC
and build roads and infrastructure became sure of true Indian friendship and it also probably
got nods from America to befriend India more than Pakistan as America itself had shifted its
policy from Pakistan to India right after four years of the beginning of Afghan war.
Afghanistan also bent towards India because it generally enjoyed cordial ties with India
throughout its history except 1990s during Mulla Umar regime. Indo-Pak relations always
remained sour and bitter because of the longstanding issues like Siachin and Sircreek etc and
this fact not allowed them to sincerely work with Afghanistan simultaneously. Moreover,
both the giant South Asian nuclear rivals always dreamed of exploiting the power resources
of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan etc to boom their economies and enhance their
global prestige. And Afghanistan seemed to them the only passage to these states to fulfill
their long awaited dreams.

In the fourth month of 2006, the president of Afghanistan travelled to India to conclude
treaties related to Afghan countryside improvement, literacy uplift and Indian investment
boom in Afghanistan.139 Two years later, the political scenario in Pakistan altogether
changed with the resignation of Musharraf and ascent of Zardari to presidency, who firmly
stood by armed forces against Taliban.140 The new civilian government strongly and
unanimously backed its forces and accused India of helping terrorists with the provision of
both money and munition against Pakistani troops. The president of Afghanistan made many

136
Abbasi, “Impact of Terrorism on Pakistan": 43.
137
Ibid.
138
Iqbal, “Pakistan’s Post 9/11 Crisis Management": 17.
139
Rahil Majeed Lone and Naseer Ahmed Kalis, “Indo-Afghan Relations after September 11: Implications for
Pakistan,” Journal of Humanities and Social Science 15, no. 3 (2013): 6.
140
Sial, “Pakistan’s Role and Strategic Priorities in Afghanistan since 1980.”
69
defense related pacts with India in early 2010s which decreased Pakistani importance as a
main player of the region.141 Whenever Afghan heads of the state met with Indian heads of
the state, they never forgot to acknowledge the precious efforts of India being made in
Afghanistan regarding investment and infrastructure.142 Indian investments were being seen
with great respect and admiration in Afghanistan and Afghan government looked grateful to
India for such heavy investments in different and diversified fields.143

With the enhanced Indian engagement with Afghan matters arose the suspicion of Pakistan
and mistrust between two rival states reached its peak.144 The absence of any seaport in
Afghanistan and American needs of food and weapon supplies for foreign troops stationed in
Afghanistan compelled Afghanistan to keep friendly relations with Pakistan. Afghan sea
trade was also dependent on seaports of Karachi. A retired diplomat of Pakistan said that
Afghanistan was equally vital for both rival states because it was the sole passage to Central
Asian states in which both rivals were deeply interested for rich oil and gas resources.145
Though India and Afghanistan were going hand in hand fifteen years after the outbreak of
War on Terror on American instructions but still, deep in their hearts, they knew that the real
stability in South Asia would be impossible to achieve without the positive role of Pakistan.

India, for years has never let any regional or international power to downplay its importance
as the sole hegemonic power of the region. Its monopoly over the regional issues has become
an established fact and it is never ready to accept any rival whatsoever. No country is parallel
to India in South Asia as far as area, demographic features, military budget and financial
standings are concerned. It makes 3/4 of the regional population and territory, 8/10 of
economy and has five times bigger military budget than all of the South Asian states.146 India
is part of many regional and international organizations and tries to balance its ties with
regional actors with their help.

141
Ibid.
142
Lone and Kalis, “Indo-Afghan Relations after September 11": 3.
143
Ibid.
144
Ibid.
145
Ibid.
146
Blanke and Chiesa, “The Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report 2013.”
70
The regional policy of India and especially related with Afghanistan banks on Pakistani
policy. It makes changes in its regional policy after observing the changes and shifts in
Pakistani regional policy. It never seems ready to allow Pakistan to commit such acts in
Afghanistan which directly or indirectly may harm its territorial integrity. Also, its Afghan
policy is greatly affected by its wishes of using Afghanistan to reach states like Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan etc to explore their rich natural oil and gas resources. Due to its non-
proximity with Afghan land, it uses Iran to reach Afghanistan. At the same time, it tries to
mitigate Pakistani fears regarding its activities in Afghanistan through diplomatic means. 147

Since the American invasion of Afghanistan, the above mentioned three major actors of the
region have been playing political hide and seek in the region affecting each other’s
activities. Indo-Afghan friendship under the tutelage of America has created a lot of security
challenges for Pakistan since 9/11.India has got a lot of political weight in the eyes of
Afghan government by helping it renovate its infrastructure and resurrect its economy by
making heavy investments. On the other hand, Pakistan has gradually lost its currency in
Afghanistan. Moreover, unresolved issues like Kashmir have increased the trust deficit
between Pakistan and India and terrorist have attacked both states since 9/11.

This in turn, has started blame game between both rival states regarding the support of
Taliban. Neither of them is ready to accept such blames making the animosity more bitter
and distasteful. It is such a strange triangle that good relations between two in it might
infuriate the third actor. So, their policy makers always keep vying to engineer such
strategies which might not harm the overall balance of the triangle. The maintenance of this
balance is the need of the hour in these volatile circumstances. The exploration of oil and gas
resources of Central Asia is also possible only if they lessen the trust deficit existing among
them. Concentrated and sincere diplomatic efforts on behalf of these states and U.S, EU,
UNO and SAARC etc are needed to help these states resolve their longstanding issues and
the main issue of terrorism. The resolution of such issues would guarantee their mutual
friendship and economic prosperity.

147
Sana Qamar, “SHARM-EL-SHEIKH MEETING: AN ANALYSIS,” Reflections, no. 4 (2009): 2.
71
 CONCLUSION
In the whole thesis, Neo Realism and Neo realism have served as the basis for the
comprehension of the intricacies of Afghanistan-India-US trio in the region and its relevance
to Pakistani security. The above-mentioned paradigms differ from each other with respect to
subject matter. The farmer emphasizes the superiority of state role to that of system in world
politics while the later emphasizes vice versa. In addition to this, states weigh each other
abilities and treat each other accordingly in the system. The amalgamation of both the
paradigms helps to see a clearer picture of Afghan-India nexus and its relevance for Pakistan.
One thing seems evident in India-Pakistan relations when seen through the prism of both
these paradigms and that is they both always try to enhance their power in competition to
each other. Also, as the world structure got changed in the current and past centuries, so did
its effects on South Asian region. The continuous interventions and withdrawals of the great
powers from Afghanistan deeply affected the political and strategic environment of South
Asia and especially that of Pakistan. These events not only affected India-Afghanistan, Pak-
Afghanistan and India-Pakistan relations but also world powers’ relations with them.

Inspite of geographical and ideological proximity between Pakistan and Afghanistan, both
countries have not yet been able to develop consistent cordial relations between them. India
has always tried to take advantage of this political rift and vied to woo Afghanistan in
opposition to Pakistan. No stone has been left unturned by India to befriend Afghanistan at
all interaction levels. Pakistani government has never felt comfortable during this discourse
and this friendship has forced Pakistan to lift its eye-brows and become skeptic of its
deepness and purposes because it is almost impossible for Pakistan to remain dull and dumb
at the development of this friendship between its enemy and friend. It has its own reasons to
become worried and security reasons are at top of them all.

With the exception of Mulla Umar regime, India-Afghanistan ties remained more or less
cordial, congenial and friendly. Each Afghan government tried its best to adjust its foreign
policy with respect to the will of every invading major power. Moreover, in order to increase
its leverage and clout in Afghanistan and get access to central Asian oil and gas resources,
India did everything it could to please Afghans via public links and construction projects etc.
It also kept reminding them how both countries were culturally and historically linked and
72
how Afghanistan served as a passage to India for foreign invaders. Also, both have security
concerns regarding Pakistan and deem it common threat to their security. But it is hilarious
how a terrorised country could be so terrorising for both of these states? Since the American
intrusion in Afghanistan, both have become closer to each other considering Pakistan bigger
threat than the U.S which is physically present in Afghanistan. India has initiated different
construction projects in Afghanistan and tried to win Afghani hearts. Political relations have
definitely strengthened between India and Afghanistan since 9/11 and this fact has perturbed
Pakistan. The real peace would be a distant dream and a cry in wilderness if major powers do
not stop using Afghanistan as their war ground in near future. Benefits would be huge than
costs for India if it becomes successful in achieving its targets in Afghanistan and so far, it is
quite successful in its determined efforts, leaving Pakistan a bit behind in the regional race of
political influence.

Indo-Afghan ties bank on the American interests in the region. Also, the anti-China and pro
India approach by U.S is pivotal for both Pakistan and India ties. It is the U.S which holds
the steering of regional car carrying India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In recent past, both
India and Afghanistan have helped each other a lot in economics and defence fields.
Afghanistan is trying to resurrect itself with the help of India and the U.S after its complete
destruction as a result of Soviet and American invasions. In the same way, Pak-Afghan ties
would also remain a source of tension for India as their good ties would ring an alarm bell for
it as it rang during Taliban period. This is the reason why India would keep Afghanistan at
the top of its regional policy to secure its interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan and South Asia.
As far as Pakistani relations with Afghanistan are concerned, they unfortunately have never
been very good during the course of the history. Afghanistan enjoyed a long period of
monarchy under Zahir Shah who enjoyed the loyalty of tribal chiefs. The fast Russian
withdrawal from Afghanistan left the matters in the hands of local chiefs who created
oligarchies in their respective areas of influence worsening the already flawed and infected
political system of Afghanistan. The post-Soviet era gave Taliban a chance to rise. With a
lot of accumulated Soviet and American munition and increased clout, Taliban started a civil
strife in Afghanistan. This produced a security dilemma in the region and Pakistan felt itself
threatened by this strife. It not only started to approach Taliban but also hastened efforts to

73
end civil strife which at the end could endanger its own security and interests in the South
Asian region.

As a result of incessant efforts to woo Taliban, Pakistan succeeded in developing good

relations with Mulla Umar government but at the cost of its relations with the European
states and America which suddenly left Pakistan in lurch after the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghan soil. This also gave the journalists of India a chance to paint a bleak image of
Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, increasing the worries for Pakistan. Pakistani intelligence
agencies helped Taliban in every possible way. One of prominent religious Pakistani
politicians visited Arab states to ask for aid to assist Taliban. All the Pakistani governments
gladly stood by the side of Mulla regime in the last decade of the twentieth century and
agreed with theocratic government. At last, a military revolt changed all the political scenario
in Pakistan and it started to oppose Taliban government. Pakistan stood by America in war
against terror and started preserving its own land, people and border from expected Taliban
anger. Now a days, both states are trying to play win-win game rather zero-sum game in the
region. Indian presence in Afghanistan is detrimental to Pakistani security. This is the reason
why Pakistan is trying to preserve its territory adjacent to both Afghanistan and India by
following a tight-rope policy towards both the states.

Pakistani ties with its Eastern neighbor have always been marred by political immaturity,
ideological and religious clash, past bitterness and emotionalism. Right from partition of sub-
continent, the relations have remained sour between two rivals and security related issues
like Siachin and Kargil etc have determined the strategic culture of both Pakistan and India
resulting in nuclear arms race, wars and border clashes. Both the states also saw some
periods of detente in their seventy years history. In the first thirty two years, both did not vie
for regional dominance and kept the security issues only between them. Kashmir remained
the main source of distrust and both went for many wars. But at the same time, both tried to
reconcile the matters with the help of major powers and embassies. In 1980s, both went
relatively well but fear of war, verbal attacks, Kashmir problem and Mujahideen issues
continued to create hurdles in the path of bilateral peace. The platform of regional
organizations though, helped them a lot in easing the disturbed relations existing between
them.
74
From 1991 to 2000, relations remained bitter because of Pakistani support of Taliban,
nuclear experiments by both states, border disputes, Kargil war and blame game. After the
twin towers attacks, America attacked Afghanistan and the nature of India-Pakistan
altogether changed. The issues of terrorism, nuclear restraint, Kashmir, Afghanistan, U.S-
China ties, Indo-U.S nuclear deal and borders etc dominated the post 9/11 era.

Indo-Pak ties are a vital topic of studies at all levels. They not only have fought wars but also
used peaceful means to mitigate and allay the mutual fears and confusions but have failed to
resolve main issues of misunderstanding like Kashmir and Siachin etc. SAARC proved to be
a facilitator rather the mitigator of misperceptions between India and Pakistan. It looked
nothing more than a stooge in the hands of these both nuclear powers and failed to create a
peaceful environment in South Asia. Major powers also arbitrated the main issues only when
it suited their hegemonic interests. Tashkent Treaty in 1966 was reached under the auspices
of U.S.S.R only because it suited the Cold War interests of the Soviet Union. The Soviets
wanted to woo India as a close ally, so they pressurized Pakistan to return Indian occupied
land. As opposed to this, one may take the case of Kashmir, it is important issue but not too
important for the major powers to be resolved. So they keep ignoring it. China may help in
resolving Kashmir issue but certainly not now because of its own precarious position in the
system and bogus criteria of UNSC.

Pakistan, India and Afghanistan will have to reconsider and redefine their narrow definitions
of security and they will have to include many other dimensions of security in their
respective definitions of regional security. Keeping in mind the importance of all these three
regional players and their respective relations with each other and global powers, thinkers
from all factions and tiers of population are encouraged to invent ways for the regional
stability and better ties among them. Regional and international organizations and powers
will have to work sincerely if they really want to see peace and prosperity in the region of
South Asia.

75
 BIBLIOGRAPHY
“Analysis: Who are the Taliban,” BBC News, December 20, 2000.
“The Tashkent Declaration: Broken Promises of a Grandiose Structure,” The Express Tribune.
February 13, 2013.
“Who is the Northern Alliance,” BBC News, November 13, 2001.
2012. http://india.nydailynews.com/politicsarticle/f170bac17a33abf159fa3ec173644704/no-
23, Gutilucian. ―World Trade Center 2001 RI.‖ New York: CNN I Report, September 12, 2010.
Abbasi, Nadia Mushtaq. “Impact of Terrorism on Pakistan,” Strategic Studies 23, no. 1 (2013):
Abbasi, Nadia Mushtaq. ―Impact of Terrorism on Pakistan.‖ Strategic Studies 23 (2013):.
Abrams, Dennis. Modern World Leaders: Hamid Karzai. New York: Chelsea House
Publications, 2007.
Advani, Lal Krishinchand. My Country My Life. New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2008.
Agra and Beyond. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 2004.
Ahmad, Ishtiaq, Siachen: A By-Product of the Kashmir Dispute and a Catalyst for Its
Resolution.‖ Pak. J. Hist. Cult 27, no. 2 (2006): 102.
Ahmad, Naeem. ―Peace-Building in South Asia: A Need for Third Party Mediation.‖ Pakistan
Vision 13, no. 2 (2012): 9.
Ahmad, Syed Salahuddin. Foreign Policy of Pakistan: A Critical Study. Karachi:
Comprehensive Book Service, 1996.
Ahmed, Nauman. “Terrorism.” IPRI Journal III, no.2 (2003): 88.
Arif, Mohammad, The Kashmir Dispute and Pakistan-India Relations: 1972-1992 Pakistan
Horizon 47, no. 1 (1994): 10.
Ashgate, 2005.
Ashraf, Fahmida. “India-Afghanistan Relations: Post-9/11.” Strategic Analysis 27. no. 1 (2007):
8.
Ashraf, Fahmida. ―India-Afghanistan Relations: Post-9/11.‖ Strategic Analysis 27 (2007).
Bakhtiar, Idrees, and Irfan Malik. ―Reality Checkpoint on the Road to Peace,‘.‖ Herald Journal,
2001.
Balachandar, Shreshta. ―India‘s Role in Afghanistan: Past Relations and Future Prospects.‖
Foreign Policy Journal, November 30, 2012. Accessed August 13, 2015.

76
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/11/30/indias-role-in-afghanistan-past-relations-and-
future-prospects/.
Baldwin, D.A. Neoliberalism and Neorealism and World Politics. Columbia University, 1993.
Bashir, Muhammed Asif, and Mughees Ahmed. ―Pak-India Relations during Musharraf Era.‖
Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences 3 (2013): 11.
Bennis, Phyllis. War With No End. New York: Verso Publishers, 2007.
Bhutto, Benazir. Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2014.
Blanke, Jennifer, and Thea Chiesa. ―The Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report 2013.‖
Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2013.
Bokhari, Sarahh. ―Indo-Pak ‗new Peace.‘‖ ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs 1, no. 2
(2005): 145–50.
Borer, Douglas A. Superpowers Defeated; Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared. London: Frank
Cass, 1999.
Brown, Chris. “Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human Nature”, International
Relations 23, no. 02 (2009): 257-270.
Burch, Scott, Tiklater, Andrew and Richard Devetak. Theories of International Relations, 5th ed.
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
Burchill, Scott, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Matthew Paterson, and Jacqui True.
Burgess, Stephen F. “Struggle for the Control of Pakistan: Musharraf Takes on the Islamist
Radicals.” In Know Thy Enemy, 85–108. Washington DC: Counter proliferation Center, 2003.
Burke, Samuel Martin, and Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical
Buzan, Berry. People, states and fear, rm agenda for international security studies in the post-
cold war era. London: Pearson, 2004.
Calvocoressi, Peter. World Politics: 1045-2000. New Delhi: Paerson Education, 2001.
Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal. ―The Kashmir Dispute: Key to South Asian Peace.‖ IPRI Journal 14,
no. 1 (2014): 1–20.
Cordovez, Diego, and Selig S. Harrison. Out of Afghanistan: The inside Story of the
Crawford, Robert. Idealism and Realism in International Relations: Beyond the Discipline.
London: Routledge, 2000.

77
Crossette, Barbara. ―India to Provide Aid to Government in Afghanistan.‖ The New York
Times, March 7, 1989, sec. World.
Dash, Kishore C. ―The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia.‖ Pacific
Affairs 69, no. 2 (1996): 185–209.
Dixit, J. N. Dixit. External Affairs: Cross-Border Relations. New Delhi: The Lotus Collection,
2004.
Dixit, Jyotindra Nath. India-Pakistan in War and Peace. New Delhi: Routledge, 2003.
Donnelly, Jack. Realism and International Relations. USA: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Durani, Mohib Ullah, and Ashraf Khan. ―Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: Historic Mirror.‖ The
Dialogue 4, no. 1 (2002), 10.
Dutta, Mondira. Emerging Afghanistan in the Third Millennium. New Delhi: Pentagon Press,
2009.
Dutta,.Mondira. Emerging Afghanistan in the Third Millennium. New Delhi: Pentagon Press,
2009.
E- International Relations. “Comparing and Contrasting Classical Realism and Neorealism,”
July 23, 2009. Accessed June 10, 2018. http://www.e-ir.info/2009/07/23/comparing-and-
contrasting- classical-realism-and-neo-realism/.
Fair, Christine and Nawaz, Shuja. “The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps,” The Journal of
Strategic Studies 34, no. 1 (2011): 63–94.
Fani, Muhammad Ishaque. ―The Indo-US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for
Pakistan.‖ Pakistan Vision 10, no. 2 (n.d.): 136.
Ganguly, Sumit, and Devin T. Hagerty. Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow
of Nuclear Weapons. EwhaWomans University Press, 200
Ganguly, Sumit, and Nicholas Howenstein. ―India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan.‖ Journal of
International Affairs 63, no. 1 (2009): 127.
Ganguly, Sumit. Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947. Columbia University
Press, 2013.
Gehlot, N. S., and Anu Satsangi. Indo-Pak Relations: Twists and Turns from Partition to
Ghosh, P.S., and R, Panda. “Domestic Support for Mrs Gandhi’s Afghanistan policy: The Soviet
Factor in Indian Politics.” Asian Survey 23, no.3 (1983): 261.

78
Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983.
Glaser, Charles. Realism: Restatements and Renewal. London: Frank Cass and Company
Limited, 1996.
Grare, Frederic. ―Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era.‖ Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, no. 72 (2006).
Habib Curmally, Fazal. ―The Great Game and the Durand Line.‖ Defence Journal, Karachi 13,
no. 2 (2009): 63.
Hameed, Sadiqa. ―Prospects for Indian-Pakistani Cooperation in Afghanistan.‖ Washington DC:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012.
HAQ, NOOR UL, and Nargis Zahra. ―Pakistan-India Peace Process (2008-2009).‖ Islamabad:
IPRI, January 14, 2010.
Haqqani, Husain. ―The Role of Islam in Pakistan‘s Future.‖ Washington Quarterly 28, no. 1
(2004): 83–96.
Hilali, A. Z. US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Surrey, England:
Hobson, , John M. The State and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001.
Hobson, John M. The State and International Relations. London: Cambridge University Press,
2000.
Hobson, John M. The State and International Relations. London: Cambridge University Press,
2000. Jackson, Robert H., and Georg Sørensen. Introduction to International
Relations:
Holsti, K.J. International Politics; A framework for Analysis. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1967.
http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2013/05/29/indo-pak-cooperation-necessary-for-increased-
regional-trade-in-south-asia/.
http://epaper.thefrontierpost.com/e-paper/2016-01-17/-/.
Hume, D. Essays: Moral, Politics and Literary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.
Hussain, Khawar. ―Naval Postgraduate School,‖ 2005.
Hussain, Rifaat. ―Pakistan‘s Relations with Afghanistan: Continuity and Change.‖ Strategic
Studies 22, no. 4 (2002).
India‘s Role in Afghanistan.‖ IISS 2011, no. 22 (June 1, 2011).

79
India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan.‖ Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 (2009): 127.
Iqbal, Khalid. ―Pakistan‘s Post 9/11 Crisis Management.‖ Criterion Quarterly 9, no. 1 (January
25, 2014).
J. Tellis. Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella: India and Pakistani Lessons from the
Kargil Crisis. Saint Petersburg: Rand Corporation, 2001.
Jabeen, Mussarat, and Muhammad Saleem Mazhar. ―Security Game: SEATO and CENTO as
Instrument of Economic and Military Assistance to Encircle Pakistan.‖ Pakistan Economic and
Social Review, (2011): 109–32.
Jakobsen, Jo. ―Neorealism in International Relations – Kenneth Waltz.‖ Popular Social
Jalalzai, Musa Khan. The Foreign Policy of Afghanistan. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication,
2003.
Kakar, Hasan Kawun. Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir ‘Abd Al-
Rahman Khan. Texas: University of Texas Press, 2014.
Kartha, Tara. ―The Diffusion of Light Weapons in Pakistan.‖ Small Wars & Insurgencies 8, no.
1 (1997): 77.
Kegley, Charles. World Politics: Trends and Transformation. New York: Thomson Wadsworth,
2008.
Keohane, Robert. The Economics Limits to Modern Politics. Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Khalid, Iqbal. “Pakistan‟s Post 9/11 Crisis Management,” Criterion Quarterly 9, no. 1 (2014):
14.
Khan, Amanullah. ―What Prevents Cooperation Between India and Pakistan?‖ ISSRA Papers 2
(2010).
Khan, Shahrukh Rafi. Pakistan under Musharraf, 1999-2002: Economic Reform and Political
Change. New York: Vanguard Press, 2004.
Kleveman, Lutz. The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia. London: Pentagon Press,
2009.
Kumar, Sumita. ―Trends in Indo-Pakistan Relations.‖ Strategic Analysis 24, no. 2 (2000): 221–
46.
Kux, Dennis. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted
Allies. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001.

80
Lal, Rollie. Central Asia and Its Asian Neighbors: Security and Commerce at the Crossroads. 1st
ed. RAND Corporation, 2006.
Lone, Rahil Majeed and Kalis, Naseer Ahmed. “Indo-Afghan Relations after September 11:
Implications for Pakistan,” Journal of Humanities and Social Science 15, no. 3 (2013): 6.
Lone, Rahil Majeed, and Naseer Ahmed Kalis. ―Indo-Afghan Relations after September
Implications for Pakistan.‖ Journal of Humanities and Social Science 15, no. 3 (2013): 6.
M. Amir, Rana, and Safdar Sial. ―Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Common Security
Perspective.‖ Conflict and Peace Studies 5, no. 1 (April 2013): 9–34.
Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Oxford: Infinite Ideas, 2008), p.83.
Makhijani, Arjun. ―» Short History of Kashmir Dispute.‖ Institute for Energy and
Environmental Research, 2002.
Matinuddin, Kamal. The Taliban Phenomenon. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2001.
Mishra, Manoj Kumar. ―India‘s Role and Interests in Afghanistan.‖ International Centre for
Peace Studies New Delhi, (2012).
Mitra, Subrata K. ―War and Peace in South Asia: A Revisionist View of India-Pakistan
Musharraf `bullied` into Supporting US War on Terror: Ex-General.‖ Zee News. Zee News,
December 11, 2009. http://zeenews.india.com/news/south-asia/musharraf-bullied-into-
supporting-us-war-on-terror-ex-general_586640.html.
Musharraf, Pervez. In the Line of Fire: A Memoir. New york: Simon and Schuster, 2006.
Naess-Holm, Arne. ―Batting for Peace: A Study of Cricket Diplomacy between India and
Pakistan.‖ University in Oslo, 2007.
Nag, Diya. ―Indo-Pak Cooperation Necessary for Increased Regional Trade in South Asia | In
Asia,‖ May 29, 2013. Accessed April 16, 2015.
Naidis, M. and Rastogi, R. “Indo-Afghan Relations 1880-1900,” The American Historical
Review 72, no. 4 (1967): 1458.
Naqvi, A., Shah Zaman Khan, and Zainab Ahmad. ―The Impact of Militancy on Education in
FATA.‖ Tigah 11 (2012): 24.
Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre. Islamabad: Institute for Peace Studies as a research
analyst, 2013.

81
O‘Hanlon, Michael E. ―Hope in ‗A Deadly Triangle‘ of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.‖ The
Brookings Institution, July 3, 2013.
Pak Makes Case for F-16s to Rice.‖ The Times of India. March 17, 2005, sec. World.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Pak-makes-case-for-F-16s-to-
Rice/articleshow/1054374.cms.
Pakistan and the World during the Zia Regime.‖ Defence Journal, 1998.
Pande, Aparna. Explaining Pakistan's foreign policy. London: Routledge, 2014.
Pattanaik, Smruti S. “Post-2014 Afghanistan and India‟s Options,” IDSA Policy Brief 5, no. 1
(2012): 17.
Pattanaik, Smruti S. ―Indo-Pak Relations: Need for a Pragmatic Approach.‖ Strategic Analysis
23, no. 1 (1999): 85–110.
Pattanaik, Smruti S., Arvind Gupta, Ashok K. Behuria, and Vishal Chandra. ―Post-2014
Afghanistan and India‘s Options.‖ IDSA, Policy Brief, July 8, 2012, 7.
Price, Gareth. ―India‘s Policy towards Afghanistan.‖ Chatham House, ASP 4 (2013): 3.
Qamar, Sana. ―SHARM-EL-SHEIKH MEETING: AN ANALYSIS.‖ Reflections, no. 4 (2009):
2.
Rabbani, Muhammad Ikram. Pakistan Affairs. 4th ed. Lahore: Caravan Book House, 2003.
Rahman, Saeed. “Indian Presence in Afghanistan: Dynamics of Regional Security.” ISSRA 2,
no. 1 (2010): 36–51.
Rahman, Saeed-ur. ―Indian Presence in Afghanistan: Dynamics of Regional Security.‖ ISSRA
Papers 2, no. 1 (2010): 36–51.
Rana, Muhammad Amir, and Rohan Gunaratna. Al-Qaeda Fights Back–Inside Pakistani Tribal
Areas. Lahore: Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2007.
Rashid, Ahmed. Descent into Chaos: The US and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Central Asia. London: Penguin, 2008.
Rehman, Hanif-ur, and Jamshed Khan. ―Indo-Pakistan Zero-Sum Rivalry and Afghanistan.‖
Journal of Contemporary Studies 3, no. 2 (Winter 2014): 13.
Reitan, Earl A. Liberalism: Time Tested Principles for the Twenty First Century. Indiana
University Press, 2003.
Relations.‖ Contemporary South Asia 10, no. 3 (2001): 366.
reunion-but-union-possible-in-subcontinent-pakistani-writer#ixzz2idI8tJa0.

82
Riaz, Saqib, and Saadia Anwar Pasha. ―Indo-Pak Relations and Pakistani Media.‖ Margalla
Papers, 2010, 17.
Rizvi, Mujtaba. ―The Frontiers of Pakistan: Astudy of Frontier Problem in Pakistan‘s Foreign
Policy.‖ National Publishing House Ltd, Karachi, 1971, 9.
Rizvi, Murtaza. Musharraf: The Years in Power. HarperCollins Publishers India, a joint venture
with the India Today Group, 2009.
Roth, John, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena Wille. ―National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the United States.‖ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2003.
Rsshid, Ahmed. ―Pakistan‘s Coup: Planting the Seeds of Democracy?‖ Current History 98, no.
632 (1999): 409.
Rubin, Barnett. “Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror.” Choice Reviews
Online 51, no. 04 (2013): 51-2338
Sattar, Abdul. ―Afghanistan: Past, Present and Future, From Jihad to Civil War.‖ The Institute
of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 1997, 462–63.
Sattar, Abdul. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1947-2005: A Concise History. Oxford University
Press, USA, 2007.
Schweller, Randall L. “Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?”. Security
Studies 5, no.3 (1996): 6.
Science, November 6, 2013. Accessed July 3, 2015.
http://www.popularsocialscience.com/2013/11/06/neorealism-in-international-relations-kenneth-
waltz/.
Sen, Ayanjit. India 's Neighbours; Problems and Prospects. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications,
2001.
Sendilkumar, D. “The importance of India Assistance to Afghanistan: A critical
analysis,” African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 9, no. 11 (2015): 386-
392..
Shafqat, Saeed, and Raheem ul Haque. Pakistan, Afghanistan & US Relations. F.C. College,
Lahore: Centre for Public Policy and Governance, 2011.
Shah, Babar. ―Pakistan‘s Afghanistan Policy: An Evaluation.‖ Institute of Strategic Studies
Islamabad 2, no. 2 (2000).

83
Shahi, Agha, and Narasimh ‘a Rao. ―India Responded to the Proposal for
Force Reduction by the Pakistani Side with a Proposal for Mutual Trust and Security as a
Prelude.‖ Times of India. 1980.
Sial, Safdar, and Abdul Basit. ―Bonn Conference 2011: Prospects for Peace and Stability in
Afghanistan.‖ Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies 4, no. 3 (September 2011): 6.
Sial, Safdar. ―Pakistan‘s Role and Strategic Priorities in Afghanistan since 1980.‖ The
Sial, Safdar. ―Taliban on the March: Threat Assessment and Security Implications for the
Region.‖ Peace and Security Review 2, no. 2 (2009).
Siddiq, A.R. ―No Reunion, but Union Possible in Subcontinent.‖ Daily News. March 29,
Siddiqa-Agha, Ayesha. India-Pakistan Relations: Confrontation to Conciliation.
Islamabad: Centre for Democratic Governance, 2004.
Siddiqui, Azhar Javed, and Khalid Manzoor Butt. ―Afghanistan-Soviet Relations during the
Cold War: A Threat for South Asian Peace.‖ South Asian Studies 29, no. 2 (2014): 628.
Sorensen, George and Jackson, Robert. Introduction to International Relations: Theories and
Approaches, 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Soviet Withdrawal. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Sreedhar, J. Taliban and the Afghan Turmoil; The Role of USA, Pakistan, Iran and China. New
Delhi: Himalayan Publisher, 1997.
Srivastava, V. The Pre-Historic Afghanistan. Allahabad: Indological Publications, 1982.
Terrorist Proxies of the Pakistan Army History Essay.‖ UKEssays, November 2013. Accessed
March 10, 2014.http://www.ukessays.com/essays/history/terrorist-proxies-of-the-pakistan-army-
history-essay.php.
The Tashkent Declaration: Broken Promises of a Grandiose Structure.‖ The Express Tribune, n.d.
REPORTS
The Frontier Post E-Paper.‖ July 16, 1994, sec. Afghanistan.
Theories and Approaches. New York: Oxford University Press. 2007.
Theories of International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996.
Treaty of Friendship between the Government of India and the Royal Government of
Afghanistan.‖ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, January 4, 1950.
Vartan, Gregorian. The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1969.

84
Verma, Arjun, and Ambassador Teresita Schaffer. ―A Difficult Road Ahead: India‘s Policy on
Afghanistan.‖ Center for Strategic & International Studies, no. 144 (August 1, 2010): 5.
Waldman, Matt. “Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan,” ACBAR Advocacy Series
21, no. 2 (2008): 33.
Waldman, Matt. ―Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan.‖ ACBAR Advocacy Series,
2008, 33.
Waltz, Keneth. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw Hill Publishers, 1979.
Waltz, Kenneth. ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History
xviii, no. 4 (1988). 61-62.
Waltz, Kenneth. Man, the State and the War. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1959.
Waltz, Kenneth. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. Revised edition. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2001.
Waltz, Kenneth. Realism and World Politics. London: Routledge, 2011.
Wolpert, Stanley. India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation. New York: University
of California Press, 2010.
Wolpert, Stanley. India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation? United States:
University of California Press, 2010. Journals
Yusuf, Moeed. “Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite,” US institute of Peace (2011): 1-25.
Zain, Omer Farooq. ―Zulfi Bhutto‘s Foreign Policy: Vocalization for Self-Reliance and
Vivification of Integrity.‖ Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS) 32, no. 2 (2012): 427–35.
Newspapers
Zeihan, Peter. ―Three Points of View: The United States, Pakistan and India.‖ Stratfor, April 28,
2010. Accessed July 3, 2014.

85