Professional Documents
Culture Documents
List of Cases For Constitutional Law 1 (Atty. Allan Lozare) : Interpretation/Constructionof The Constitution
List of Cases For Constitutional Law 1 (Atty. Allan Lozare) : Interpretation/Constructionof The Constitution
Allan Lozare)
Judicial Review
FACTS ISSUE RULING
Petitioner, Jose Angara won the election for Whether or not No. The Constitution has rationally provided the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas the Court has Judiciary the power to determine the nature,
Angara v. Electoral Province. The National Assembly passed jurisdiction to scope and extent of the powers of government.
Commission, 63 Phil. Resolution No 8 declaring the deadline for filing review the And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
protest on 3 December 1935.On the other hand the rulings of the constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
139
Electoral Commission set the deadline on 9 Electoral superiority over the other departments; it does
December 1935. Losing candidate, Pedro Ynsua Commission not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of organized Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
Protest against the election of Angara. Angara under the sacred obligation assigned to it be by the
contended in his Motion to Dismiss the Protest that National Constitution to determine conflicting claims
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was Assembly. of authority under the Constitution and to
adopted in the legitimate exercise of its establish for the parties in an actual controversy
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period the rights which that instrument secures and
during which protests against the election of its guarantees them. This is “judicial supremacy”
members should be presented and that the protest which properly is the power of the judicial
was filed out of the prescribed period. review under the Constitution.
The petitioners having been arrested and held Whether or The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of
Aquino v. Enrile, 59 pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the not the the Constitution is upheld The power is inherent
SCRA 183 President (September 22, 1972), "for being validity of in the Judicial Department, by virtue of the
participants or for having given aid and Proclamation doctrine of separation of powers.
comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and No. 1081 is
state power in the country and to take over the subject to
Government by force ...", filed the petitions for judicial
habeas corpus. General Order No. 2 was issued inquiry?
by the President in the exercise of the powers
he assumed by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081
(September 21, 1972) placing the entire country
under martial law.
Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals Whether or Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at
SCRA 792 for a Congressional seat in the 4th District of not the bar without encroaching upon the function of
Pampanga. Pineda was a member of the Laban Supreme Court the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET.
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc may inquire The issue here is a judicial question. It must be
was a member of the Nacionalista Party (NP). upon the noted that what is being complained of is the act
Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc validity of the of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when
contested the result in the HRET (House of said act of the Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a
Representatives Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc won HRET without decision has already been made, members of the
in the protest and he was subsequently declared violating the tribunal have already voted regarding the
as the winner by the HRET. Pineda contends that doctrine of electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc
the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the separation of wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw
Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal is an powers? their representative from the HRET after the
official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine tribunal has already reached a decision. They
of separation of powers, the judiciary may not cannot hold the same election since the issue has
interfere. already become moot and academic. LDP is
merely changing their representative to change
the outcome of the election. That duty is part of
the judicial power vested in the courts by an
express grant under Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the
Constitution which states: “Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of Government.
Montesclaros v. The Local Government Code of 1991 limited its Whether or not No. Petitioner’s prayer to prevent Congress from
Comelec, G.R. No. membership to youths “at least 15 but no more than the proposed enacting into law a proposed bill lowering
152295. July 9, 2002 21 years of age.” On 11 March 2002 the Bicameral bill is subject to membership age in the SK does not present an
Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050 and House judicial review. actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is
Bill 4456, resetting the SK election to 15 July 2002 not subject to judicial review because it is not a
and lowered the membership age to at least 15 law. A proposed bill creates no rights and
but no more than 18 years of age. This was signed imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court.
by the President on 19 March 2002. The petitioners A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates
filed prohibition and mandamus for temporary no constitutional right or duty.
restraining order seeking the prevention of The Court has no power to declare a proposed
postponement of the SK election and reduction of bill constitutional or unconstitutional because
age requirement on 11 March 2002. that would be in the nature of rendering an
advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress.
Gonzales v. Narvasa,
G.R. No. 140835.
August 14, 2000
On 01 May 2001, Gloria Arroyo, faced by an angry Whether or not Dismissed The instant petitions have been rendered moot
and violent mob armed with deadly weapons the and academic as Gloria Arroyo ordered the
Lacson v. Perez, G.R. assaulting and attempting to break into Proclamation lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion on
No. 147780, May 10, Malacanang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring No 38 and 06 May 2001.
that there was a state of rebellion in the National General Order
2001
Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No 1 are
No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines unconstitutiona
and the Philippine National Police to suppress the l.
rebellion in the National Capital Region. On 06 May
2001 she ordered the lifting of the declaration of a
state of rebellion in Metro Manila. Petitioners assail
the declaration of a state of rebellion by Gloria
Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly
effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both
in fact an in law.
Defunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974)
Some 300 junior officers of AFP, stormed the Whether or not Dismissed The state of rebellion has ceased to exist and has
Sanlakas v. Executive Oakwood in Makati demanding for the resignation declaring state rendered the case moot. Nevertheless, courts will
Secretary, G.R. 159085, of the President, Sec of Defense and Chief of the of rebellion is decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable
February 3, 2004 PNP. State of rebellion was declared and the AFP needed to of repetition yet evading review. The case at bar
and PNP were directed to suppress the rebellion. declare General is one such case.
The state of rebellion was lifted. Petitions were filed order No 4? The President, in declaring a state of rebellion
challenging the validity of Proclamation of State of and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
Rebellion and calling out of the AFP. Sanlakas exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
Constitution does not require the declaration of a executive powers, vested on the President by
state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
Because of the cessation of the Oakwood delegated legislative powers contemplated by
occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis Section 23 (2), Article VI.
for the proclamation by the President of a state of
rebellion for an indefinite period. Solicitor General
argues that the petitions have been rendered moot
by the lifting of the declaration.
Gloria Arroyo issued appointments to various Whether or not Dismissed Due to the appointment of Gloria Arroyo to the
acting secretaries on 23 August 2004. The Congress the President respondents as ad interim immediately after the
Pimentel v. Ermita, commenced regular session on 26 July 2004 and may appoint in recess of the Congress, the petition has become
G.R. 164978, October some senators filed petition for certiorari and an acting moot. However as an exemption to the rule of
prohibition against respondents. The Senators secretaries mootness, courts will decide a question
13, 2005
contended that pursuant to Section 10 (2) Book IV without the otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet
of EO 292 the undersecretary shall be designated as consent of the evading review.
acting secretary in case of vacancy. Also, petitioners Commission on
assert that while Congress is in session there can be Appointments
no appointments without first obtaining consent while Congress
from Commission on Appointments. When is in session.
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004, Gloria
Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to the same
respondents.
During March 13, 1992, Republic Act 7227 were Whether No. It is settled that when questions of constituional
John Hay PAC. v. Lim, enacted. The R.A. 7227 is also known as “ Bases Proclamation signifance are raised, the court can exercise its
G.R. No. 119775, Oct. Conversion and Development Act of 1992” . This no. 420 is power of judicial review only if the following
24, 2003 grants Subic SEZ incentives which provides tax and constitutional requisites are present: (1) existence of actual and
duty free importations, exemption of business by providing appropriate case; (2) person challenging the act
therein from local and national taxes, to other for national must have the standing to question or have
hallmarks of liberated financial and bhsiness and local tax personal/substantial interest in the case; (3)
climate. This also gave authority to the President to exemption question of constitutionality must be raised at
create through executive proclamation, subject to within and earliest opportunit; (4) issue of constitutionality
the concurrence of local government units directly granting other must be the very lis mota of the case. There is
affected, other Special Economic Zones in the areas economic none that have been mentioned in R.A 7227, a
covered respectively by the Clark Military incentives to grant of tax exemption to SEZ yet to be
reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San the John Hay established in base areas, unlike the grant under
Fernando, La Union and Camp John Hay. SEZ?
July 5, 1994, President Ramos issued Section 12 which provides for tax exemption to
proclamation no. 420 which established a SEZ on the established Subic SEZ.
a portion of Camp John Hay. It was held that the controversy must be definite
and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of
parties who are pitted against each other due to
their adverse legal interests. It is not enough that
the controversy exists at the outset; to qualify for
adjudication, it is necessary that the actual
controversy be extant at all stages of the review,
not merely at the time the complaint is filed.
President Ejercito Estrada directed the AFP Whether or No. The IBP primarily anchors its standing o its
IBP v. Zamora, G.R. Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate not IBP has alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of
No. 141284, August 15, with each other for the proper deployment and legal standing law and the Constitution.
2000 utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in to assail Apart from this declaration, however, the
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless constitutionali IBP asserts no other basis in support of its
violence. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines ty of calling locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP
filed a petition seeking to declare the the AFP to of its duty to preserve the rule of law
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and assist PNP to and nothing more is not sufficient to clothe it
void and unconstitutional. Solicitor General suppress with standing in the case.
contend that petitioner has no legal standing to lawless
assail. violence,
invasion or
rebellion?
Republic Act 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Whether or not No. An association has standing to complain of
Executive Secretary v. Filipino Act of 1995) took effect on 15 July 1995. ARCO-Phil has injuries of its members. This view fuses the legal
CA, 429 SCRA 781, Prior to its effectivity, Asian Recruitment Council legal standing identity of an association with that of its
May 25, 2004 Philippine CHaptr Inc (ARCO-Phil) filed petition to assail RA members. An association has standing to file
for declaratory relief. They alleged that Section 6, 8042? suit for its workers despite its lack of interest if its
subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because members are affected by their action. An
licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are organization has standing to assert the concerns
placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It of its constituents.
contended that while the Labor Code distinguished However, the respondent has no locus standi to
between recruiters who are holders of licenses and file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled
non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, workers. We note that it even failed to implead
Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. In any unskilled workers in its petition.
their answer to the petition, they contend that
ARCO-Phil has no legal standing, it being a
non-stock, non-profit organization; hence, not the
real party-in-interest as petitioner in the action.
Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the Whether or not Yes. We find the instant petition to be of
Kilosbayan v. PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery Kilosbayan has transcendental importance to the public. The
Guingona, 232 SCRA system, the Berjaya Group Berhad (PGMC) became standing to issues it raised are of paramount public interest
110 (1994) interested to offer its services and resources to maintain and of a category even higher than those
PCSO. KILOSBAYAN submit that the PCSO cannot instant suit? involved in many of the aforecited cases. The
validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect
with the PGMC because it is an arrangement the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the people even in the remotest barangays of the
on-line lottery system in “collaboration” or country and the counter-productive and
“association” with the PGMC, in violation of retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line
Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. lottery system are as staggering as the billions in
Blg. 42. Respondents allege that the petitioners have pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing
no standing to maintain the instant suit. then of the petitioners deserves recognitio
Issue on the locus standi of the petitioners
should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A
party’s standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of
the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency
Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this
technicality because “the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.
Taxpayer’s Standing:
Voter’s Standing:
Legislative Standing:
Governmental Standing:
Facial Challenge:
a. Earliest Opportunity
Umali v. Guingona, 305 SCRA 533 (1999)
1. Mandatory Notice
Mirasol v. CA, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001
2. Functions of Judicial Review
Mitra vs Comelec, 104 SCRA 58 (1981)
5. Presumption of Constitutionality
Perez v. People, 544 SCRA 532 (2008)
b. Modern view
Serrano de Agbayani v. PNB, 35 SCRA 429
Belgica v. Ochoa, 710 SCRA 1 (2013)
Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
Cocofed v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514 (2012)
Sameer Overseas v. Cabilles, G.R. No.170139, August 5, 2014
League of Cities vs. Comelec, August 24, 2010
CIR vs. San Roque, G.R. No. 187485, October 08, 2013
7. Partial unconstitutionality
In Re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534
Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145
A. Amendment
1. Amendment vs Revision
Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006
Lambino Vs. Comelec Case Digest G.R. No. 174153 Lambino VS. ComeleC
FaCtS: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition
had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by
modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral-
presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative
petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
ISSue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complie s with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held
that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do
so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in
sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical
change, therefore a constitutes a revision.
FACTS:
This is a petition for declaratory judgment. Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in running as candidates for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such candidates.
These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.
ISSUE:
1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the parameters of such convention?
HOLDING:
The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the
petitioners are deemed as constitutional
RATIO:
1. Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes and these
votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent assembly. The Congress
also has the authority to enact implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details are within the competence of
the Congress in the exercise of its legislative power.
2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely an application with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and does not
constitute a denial of due process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding
the apportionment of delegates.
The challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not
arbitrary.
Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This
is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constitutional Convention.
Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction contained in the section is so narrow that basic
constitutional rights remain substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the constitutional guarantees invoked by the
petitioners.
Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on
their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it
applies to all organization,
Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions
were promulgated and filed, respectively.
Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a
vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the
atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by
the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must
also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the
fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a
negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In
declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is
an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices.
That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest
case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at
least ten cases may be cited.
i. Congress
ii. Constitutional Convention
iii. People
Republic Act No. 6735 - An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum
Facts:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to
increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180,
to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each
province shall have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates
from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the
House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that
the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the
general elections, which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Issue:
1. Does the Congress (through ordinary legislative process) have the power to amend or propose amendment to the Constitution?
2. May the proposed amendments be submitted at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular elections?
Held:
1. No. The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It
is part of the inherent powers of the people - as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, to make, and, hence, to amend their own
Fundamental Law.
Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a
constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution - they are the very source of all powers of government,
including the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from
the Fundamental Law, it follows that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. The
Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of
treaty-making power.
The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress - acting as a constituent assembly - violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not
political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.
2. Yes. The term “election” in article XV of the 1935 Constitution does not indicate that the “election” therein referred to is a “special”, not a
general election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special
elections merely shows that congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing
constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon
A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the
present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973
Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.
Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present
petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.
Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of
Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this
Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could
even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present
Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the
cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability
was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple
as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As
was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In
declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter
case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of
this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied
the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone
of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.
Facts:
- On October 23, 1989, RA 6766, entitled “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION” was enacted into law;
- Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and Provinces of Benguet, Abra, Mt. Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the autonomous region shall take
part in a plebiscite originally scheduled for December 27, 1989 but was reset to January 30, 1990 specifically for the ratification or rejection of the said act;
- By virtue of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), the Comelec issued Comelec Resolution No. 2167, Section 19 of which provides:
“Section 19. Prohibition on columnist, commentators or announcers.- During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.”
- On November 20, 1989, petitioner PABLITO V. SANIDAD who is a columnist (“OVERVIEW”) for the Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City
of Baguio and the Cordilleras, filed a petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Comelec to enjoin the latter from enforcing Section 19 of resolution No. 2167. Petitioner claims that the said provision is violative of his constitutional freedom of
expression and of the press and it also constitutes a prior restraint because it imposes subsequent punishment for those who violate the same;
- On November 28, 1989, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent from enforcing Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167;
- On January 9, 1990, Comelec through the Solicitor General filed its Comment and moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that Section 19 of Resolution
No. 2167 does not absolutely bar the petitioner from expressing his views because under Section 90 and 92 of BP 881, he may still express his views or campaign for
or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime.
Issue: Whether or not Section 19 of resolution No. 2167 is violative of the constitutional freedom of expression and of the press
Held: YES. What is granted by Art. IX-C of the Constitution to the Comelec is the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or
other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are insured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the
possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising time and space. This is also the reason why a columnist,
commentator or announcer is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period if he is a candidate.
HOWEVER, NEITHER ARTICLE IX-C OF THE CONSTITUTION NOR SECTION 11(B), 2ND PAR. OF RA 6646 CAN BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN THAT THE COMELEC HAS
ALSO BEEN GRANTED THE RIGHT TO SUPERVISE AND REGULATE THE EXERCISE BY MEDIA PRACTITIONERS THEMSELVES OF THEIR RIGHT TO EXPRESSION
DURING THE PLEBISCITE PERIODS. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during the plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates in a plebiscite.
While it is true that the petitioner is not absolutely barred from campaigning for or against the Organic Act, said fact does not cure the constitutional infirmity of
Section 19, Comelec Resolution No. 2167. This is so because IT IS STILL A RESTRICTION ON HIS CHOICE OF THE FORUM WHERE HE MAY EXPRESS HIS VIEW.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people’s right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would
be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, INCLUDING THE FORUM. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should
not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional. The restraining
order herein issued is hereby made permanent.
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the
respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution.
This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens
and voters similarly situated.
Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, including
respondents.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground the that the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without
power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was
not a free election, hence null and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same
import and objective.
ISSUES:
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people.
HELD:
Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the
disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void.
Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in
Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the
invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in
the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void.
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by
the persons taking part in plebiscites.
This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with
its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with
the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void.
The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without
complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73.
The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the
officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the
fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the
people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have
ratified the revised Constitution.
Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive"
charge to the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive. But
there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in
Proclamation No. 1102.
Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of
Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizen’s
assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such
citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines