S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 1
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S.
PAUG, and its officers and members, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAÑAGAS II, as
Liquidator of Pacific Banking Corporation, respondents.
G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
as Liquidator of the Pacific Banking Corporation , petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY
SHERIFF RAMON ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG JOO, ANG KEONG LAN and E.J
ANG INT'L. LTD., represented by their Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY,
respondents.
G.R. No. 109373. March 20, 1995.*
Remedial Law; Actions; Special Proceedings; Distinction Between an Ordinary Action
and a Special Proceeding.—Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary
action and a special proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states: Action is the act by which
one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which one
seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is
distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right
by one against another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status,
right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from another, his
remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a
guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the fact or
status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.
Same; Same; Same; A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be
classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary action.—Considering this
distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a
special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the
enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against
a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party’s
wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against any
person.
Same; Same; Same; The petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation’s state
of insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of payment of their
claims in the disposition of the corporation’s assets.—What it seeks is merely a
declaration by the trial court of the corporation’s insolvency so that its creditors may
be able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation’s debts and
obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the
corporation’s state of insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the order
of payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation’s assets.
Same; Same; Same; Liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for
interpleader.—Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation
proceedings do not resemble petitions for inter-pleader. For one, an action for
interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a person who has no interest
therein. This is not the case in a liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as
representative of the corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the
benefit of the creditors. He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the
corporation are paid only to rightful claimants and in the order of payment provided
by law.
Same; Same; Same; A liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the
settlement of estate of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court.
—Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of
estate of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have
a common purpose: the determination of all the assets and the payment of all the
debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the
administrator or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the
claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is not
disputed. The court’s concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights and
the determination of their order of payment.
Same; Same; Same; As in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in
proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent corporation.—Furthermore, as in the
settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for liquidation of
an insolvent corporation.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; A record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules
and Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are
allowed.—In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the
Liquidator’s notice of appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of
receipt of the order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors. However, the
Liquidator did not file a record on appeal with the result that he failed to perfect his
appeal. As already stated, a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and
Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed.
The reason for this is that the several claims are actually separate ones and a
decision or final order with respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the
original record on appeal must remain in the trial court where other claims may still
be pending.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In liquidation proceedings, the function of the trial court
is not limited to assisting in the implementation of the orders of the Monetary Board.

—The Union’s contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the function of the
trial court is not limited to assisting in the implementation of the orders of the
Monetary Board. Under the same section (§29) of the law invoked by the Union, the
court has authority to set aside the decision of the Monetary Board “if there is a
convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.”
PETITIONS for review the decisions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
    These cases have been consolidated because the principal question involved is the
same: whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, otherwise
known as the Central Bank Act, is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action. The
Fifth and the Fourteenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals reached opposite results on
this question and consequently applied different periods for appealing.
The facts are as follows:
I.
Proceedings in the CB and the RTC
On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under
receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to Resolution No. 699 of
its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was placed under liquidation 1 and a
Liquidator was appointed.2
On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch
31, a petition entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking
Corporation." 3 The petition was approved, after which creditors filed their claims with
the court.
On May 17, 1991, a new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Nañagas, 4 President of the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), was appointed by the Central Bank.
On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union
for short), petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking
payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary increase differential,
Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as
employees of PaBC. In its order dated September 13, 1991, the trial court ordered
payment of the principal claims of the Union. 5
The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On October 16,
1991, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the order. In his order
of December 6, 1991, the judge modified his September 13, 1991 6 but in effect
denied the Liquidator's motion for reconsideration. This order was received by the
Liquidator on December 9, 1991. The following day, December 10, 1991, he filed a
S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 2
Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. On
December 23, 1991, another Notice of Appeal was filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General in behalf of Nañagas.
In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's
Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt
of the decision. The judge declared his September 13, 1991 order and subsequent
orders to be final and executory and denied reconsideration. On March 27, 1992, he
granted the Union's Motion for issuance of a writ of Execution.
Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No. 112991, likewise
filed claims for the payment of investment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares
of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18. The shares of stocks, consisting of 154,462
common shares, constituted 11% of the total subscribed capital stock of the PaBC.
They alleged that their claim constituted foreign exchange capital investment entitled
to preference in payment under the Foreign Investments Law.
In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC directed the
Liquidator to pay private respondents the total amount of their claim as preferred
creditors.7
The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On September 30, 1992
he moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the court on October 2,
1992. He received the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on October 5,
1992. On October 14, 1992 he filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders of September
16, 1992 and October 2, 1992. As in the case of the Union, however, the judge
ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had been
filed without authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days. In his order of
October 28, 1992, the judge directed the execution of his September 11, 1992 order
granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim.
II.
Proceedings in the Court of Appeals
The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus  in the
Court of Appeals to set aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal from the
orders granting the claims of Union and of the Stockholders/Investors. The two
Divisions of the Court of Appeals, to which the cases were separately raffled,
rendered conflicting rulings.
In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R. No. 09373)
the Fifth Division8 held in the case of the Union that the proceeding before the trial
court was a special proceeding and, therefore, the period for appealing from any
decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the
Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision granting the Union's

claims, the appeal was brought on time. The Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the
orders of the lower court and directed the latter to give due course to the appeal of
the Liquidator and set the Record on Appeal he had filed for hearing.
On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division9 ruled in CA-G.R.
SP No. 29351 (now G.R. No. 112991) in the case of the Stockholders/Investors that a
liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action. Therefore, the period for appealing from
any decision or final order rendered therein is 15 days and that since the Liquidator's
appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed from,
deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration was pending, the
notice of appeal was filed late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed the
Liquidator's petition.
III.
Present Proceedings
The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this Court.
In G.R. No. 109373 the Union contends that:
1. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of the suit.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the petition
for certiorari filed by Nañagas who was without any legal authority to file it.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the case is a special proceeding
governed by Rules 72 to 109 of the Revised Rules of Court.
4. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding that the notice of appeal filed
by Nañagas was filed on time.
5. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in declaring that the second notice of appeal
filed on December 23, 1991 by the Solicitor General is a superfluity.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 112991 the Liquidator contends that:
1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking Corporation s a
Special Proceeding case and/or one which allows multiple appeals, in which case the
period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from receipt of the order/judgment
appealed from.
2. Private respondents are not creditors of PaBC but are plain stockholders whose
right to receive payment as such would accrue only after all the creditors of the
insolvent bank have been paid.
S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 3
3. The claim of private respondents in the amount of US$22,531,632.18 is not in the
nature of foreign investment as it is understood in law.
4. The claim of private respondents has not been clearly established and proved.
5. The issuance of a writ of execution against the assets of PaBC was made with
grave abuse of discretion.
The petitions in these cases must be dismissed.
First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is whether a
petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature of a special
proceeding. If it is, then the period of appeal is 30 days and the party appealing
must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in
order to perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary
action, the period of appeal is 15 days from notice of the decision or final order
appealed from.
BP Blg. 129 provides:
§39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or decision appealed
from: Provided, however, that in habeas corpus  cases the period for appeal shall be
forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire
record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively,
together with an index of the contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases
wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of
Court.
The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:
19. Period of Appeals. —
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus  cases and in the cases referred to in
paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment, order, resolution or award appealed from.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of
Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeals
shall be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required.

The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding is an
ordinary action similar to an action for interpleader under Rule 63. 10 The Fourteenth
Division stated:
The petition filed is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court where
there are conflicting claimants or several claims upon the same subject matter, a
person who claims no interest thereon may file an action for interpleader to compel
the claimants to "interplead" and litigate their several claims among themselves.
(Section I Rule 63).
An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action under Rule 62 which, like an
ordinary action, may be appealed only within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or order appealed from. Under Rule 62, the preceding rules covering
ordinary civil actions which are not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the
provisions of the rule relating to such civil actions are applicable to special civil
actions. This embraces Rule 41 covering appeals from the regional trial court to the
Court of Appeals.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an action is defined as "an
ordinary suit in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong." On the
other hand, Section 2 of the same Rule states that "every other remedy including one
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact shall be by special
proceeding."
To our mind, from the aforequoted definitions of an action and a special proceeding,
the petition for assistance of the court in the liquidation of an asset of a bank is not
"one to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." Contrary to the
submission of the petitioner, the petition is not intended to establish the fact of
insolvency of the bank. The insolvency of the bank had already been previously
determined by the Central Bank in accordance with Section 9 of the CB Act before the
petition was filed. All that needs to be done is to liquidate the assets of the bank and
thus the assistance of the respondent court is sought for that purpose.
It should be pointed out that this petition filed is not among the cases categorized as
a special proceeding under Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, nor among the
special proceedings that may be appealed under Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules.
We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2 of the Rules
of Court provide:
§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which
the party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.
S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 4
§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by special
proceeding.
Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special
proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states:" 11
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special
proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or
a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the
former is a formal demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is but a
petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to
recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is
to seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special
proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of
guardianship.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation
should be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition
does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress
of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising
from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be
enforced against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency
so that its creditors may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the
corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a
declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the
petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the
concomitant right of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the
disposition of the corporation's assets.
Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not
resemble petitions for interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves claims
on a subject matter against a person who has no interest therein. 12 This is not the
case in a liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the
corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the
creditors.13 He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the corporation are
paid only to rightful claimants and in the order of payment provided by law.
Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state
of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a
common purpose: the determination of all the assets and the payment of all the
debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the

administrator or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the
claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is not
disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights and
the determination of their order of payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in
proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent corporation. As the Fifth Division of the
Court of Appeals, quoting the Liquidator, correctly noted:
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number of cases
properly classified as "claims." It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The first
phase is concerned with the approval and disapproval of claims. Upon the approval of
the petition seeking the assistance of the proper court in the liquidation of a close
entity, all money claims against the bank are required to be filed with the liquidation
court. This phase may end with the declaration by the liquidation court that the claim
is not proper or without basis. On the other hand, it may also end with the liquidation
court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the claim shall be classified whether it is
ordinary or preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order
allowing or disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be appealed by the
party aggrieved thereby.
The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution plan
prepared by the duly appointed liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in detail the
total amount available for distribution to creditors whose claim were earlier allowed.
The Order finally disposes of the issue of how much property is available for disposal.
Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the liquidation proceeding — payment of all
allowed claims in accordance with the order of legal priority and the approved
distribution plan.
Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of allowance or disallowance of a
particular claim cannot be overemphasized. It is the operative fact that constitutes a
liquidation proceeding a "case where multiple appeals are allowed by law." The
issuance of an Order which, by its nature, affects only the particular claims involved,
and which may assume finality if no appeal is made therefrom, ipso facto creates a
situation where multiple appeals are allowed.
A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition by the
Solicitor General with a court of competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All claims against
the insolvent are required to be filed with the liquidation court. Although the claims
are litigated in the same proceeding, the treatment is individual. Each claim is heard
separately. And the Order issued relative to a particular claim applies only to said
claim, leaving the other claims unaffected, as each claim is considered separate and
distinct from the others. Obviously, in the event that an appeal from an Order
allowing or disallowing a particular claim is made, only said claim is affected, leaving
S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 5
the others to proceed with their ordinary course. In such case, the original records of
the proceeding are not elevated to the appellate court. They remain with the
liquidation court. In lieu of the original record, a record of appeal is instead required
to be prepared and transmitted to the appellate court.
Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation proceedings. Consequently, a
record on appeal is necessary in each and every appeal made. Hence, the period to
appeal therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required.
(Record pp. 162-164).
In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice
of appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the order
granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not file
a record on appeal with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already
stated a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in
special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason for
this is that the several claims are actually separate ones and a decision or final order
with respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal
must remain in the trial court where other claims may still be pending.
Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims
of the Stockholders/Investors became final. Consequently. the Fourteenth Division's
decision dismissing the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus  must be affirmed albeit for a different reason.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), we find that the
Fifth Division correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition
and Mandamus. As already noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion
for extension to file a record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of
his receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for the resolution
of his motion for extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 within the extension
sought a record on appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in disallowing the notice on
appeal and denying the Liquidator's motion for extension to file a record on appeal.
The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus and its decision should, therefore, be
affirmed.
Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265,
the court merely assists  in adjudicating the claims of creditors, preserves  the assets
of the institution, and implements  the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary
Board and that, therefore, as representative of the Monetary Board, the Liquidator
cannot question the order of the court or appeal from it. It contends that since the
Monetary Board had previously admitted PaBC's liability to the laborers by in fact
setting aside the amount of P112,234,292.44 for the payment of their claims, there
 S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 6

was nothing else for the Liquidator to do except to comply with the order of the
court.

The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the function of the

trial court is not limited to assisting in the implementation of the orders of the
Monetary Board. Under the same section (§29) of the law invoked by the Union, the
court has authority to set aside the decision of the Monetary Board "if there is a
convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith." 14 As this
Court held in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 15

There is no question, that the action of the monetary Board in this regard may be
subject to judicial review. Thus, it has been held that the Court's may interfere with
the Central Bank's exercise of discretion in determining whether or not a distressed
bank shall be supported or liquidated. Discretion has its limits and has never been
held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith (Ramos v. Central Bank of
the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).

In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank but also of
the insolvent bank. Under §§28A-29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he acts in behalf of the bank
"personally or through counsel as he may retain, in all actions or proceedings or
against the corporation" and he has authority "to do whatever may be necessary for
these purposes." This authority includes the power to appeal from the decisions or
final orders of the court which he believes to be contrary to the interest of the bank.

Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time
to file the record on appeal filed in behalf of the Central Bank was not filed by the
office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the Central Bank. This contention has no
merit. On October 22, 1992, as Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta
informed the trial court in March 27, 1992, the OSG had previously authorized
lawyers of the PDIC to prepare and sign pleadings in the case. 16 Conformably thereto
the Notice of Appeal and the Motion for Additional Time to submit Record on Appeal
filed were jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I. Saludares in behalf of the OSG and
by lawyers of the PDIC. 17

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the decisions appealed from
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ. concur.

 

G.R. No. 192828.  November 28, 2011.*
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., petitioners, vs. HON.
JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES
IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO S.
BALAJADIA, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Actions; Special Proceedings; Special Proceeding distinguish from
ordinary civil action; A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or particular fact; It is distinguished from an ordinary civil
action where a party sues another for the enforcement  or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong; To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and
not a complaint should be filed.—An action for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of
a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake
of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. A special proceeding is a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is
distinguished from an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. To
initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, otherwise, the
question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant.—It is an
elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise,
the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.
S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 7
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Chaves, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices for petitioners.
  Icaonapo, Litong, Morales, Geromo & Associates Law Office for respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1red under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the December 14, 2009 Decision2red and July 8, 2010
Resolution3red of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99856. The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision reads: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by
us DENYING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed Orders
dated March 15, 2007 and May 16, 2007 issued by the respondent Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, in Manila in Civil Case No. 02-105251. 4red
The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The Factual Antecedents
Sometime between November 25, 2002  and  December 3, 2002,5red the
respondents filed a Complaint6red against the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance
Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia
Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of  Manila and Malabon, and all
persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his successors-in-
interest.
The Complaint, captioned as one for " Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale,
Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary

Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction, " was docketed as Civil Case
No. 02-105251 and raffled to Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).
In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as causes of
action: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
First Cause of Action. They are the heirs of Lim San, also known as Antonio
Ching / Tiong Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy (Antonio). Respondents Joseph Cheng
(Joseph) and Jaime Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children of Antonio with his
common-law wife, respondent Mercedes Igne (Mercedes). Respondent Lucina Santos
(Lucina) claimed that she was also a common-law wife of Antonio. The respondents
averred that Ramon misrepresent edhimself as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in
truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth certificate was merely simulated. On
July 18, 1996, Antonio died of a stab wound. Police investigators identified Ramon as
the prime suspect and he now stands as the lone accused in a criminal case for
murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest issued against him have remain
edunserved as he is at large. From the foregoing circumstances and upon the
authority of Article 9197red of the New Civil Code (NCC), the respondents concluded
that Ramon can be legally disinherited, hence, prohibited from receiving any share
from the estate of Antonio.
Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the conclusion of the police
investigations tagging Ramon as the prime suspect in the murder of Antonio, the
former made an inventory of the latter's estate. Ramon misrepresented that there
were only six real estate properties left by Antonio. The respondents alleged that
Ramon had illegally transferred to his name the titles to the said properties. Further,
there are two other parcels of land, cash and jewelries, plus properties in Hongkong,
which were in Ramon's possession.
Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational attainment, was sweet-
talked by Ramon into surrendering to him a Global Business Bank, Inc. (Global Bank)
Certificate of Time Deposit of  P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio, and the
certificates of title covering two condominium units in Binondo which were purchased
by Antonio using his own money but which were registered in Ramon's name. Ramon
also fraudulently misrepresented to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes that they will
promptly receive their complete shares, exclusive of the stocks in Po Wing Properties,
Inc. (Po Wing), from the estate of Antonio. Exerting undue influence, Ramon had
convinced them to execute an Agreement 8red and a Waiver9red on August 20, 1996.
The terms and conditions stipulated in the Agreement and Waiver, specifically, on the
payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes of the amount
of P22,000,000.00, were not complied with. Further, Lucina was not informed of the
execution of the said instruments and had not received any amount from Ramon.
Hence, the instruments are null and void.
S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 8
Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which constitute 60%
of the latter's total capitalstock, were illegally transferred by Ramon to his own name
through a forged document of sale executed after Antonio died. Po Wing owns a ten-
storey building in Binondo. Ramon's claim that he bought the stocks from Antonio
before the latter died is baseless. Further, Lucina's shares in Po Wing had also
banished into thin air through Ramon's machinations.
Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate10red adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate
to the prejudice of the respondents. By virtue of the said instrument, new Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering eight real properties owned by Antonio were
issued in Ramon's name. Relative to the Po Wing shares, the Register of Deeds of
Manila had required Ramon to post a Surety Bond conditioned to answer for
whatever claims which may eventually surface in connection with the said stocks. Co-
defendant Stronghold Insurance Company issued the bond in Ramon's behalf.
Sixth Cause of Action .  Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-
defendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was
part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an
unreasonably low price. By reason of Ramon's lack of authority to dispose of any part
of Antonio's estate, the conveyances are null and void ab initio.
Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages Antonio's
estate. She has no intent to convey to the respondents their shares in the estate of
Antonio.
The respondents thus prayed for the following in their
Complaint: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. x x x a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the defendant RAMON
CHING and/or his attorney-in-fact Belen Dy Tan Ching from disposing, selling or
alienating any property that belongs to the estate of the deceased ANTONIO CHING;
xxx
4. x x x
a.) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who murdered his father ANTONIO
CHING disqualified as heir and from inheriting to (sic) the estate of his father;
b.) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING transfer (sic) of the six [6]
parcels of land from the name of his father ANTONIO CHING to his name covered by
TCT No. x x x;

c.) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER executed by plaintiffs x x x
in favor of x x x RAMON CHING for being patently immoral, invalid, illegal, simulated
and (sic) sham;
d.) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of stocks at (sic) PO WING from
the names of ANTONIO CHING and LUCINA SANTOS to the defendant ANTONIO  On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss18red the respondents'
CHING's name for having been illegally procured through the falsification of their
signatures in the document purporting the transfer thereof;
e.) Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect the AFFIDAVIT OF
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE executed by x x x RAMON CHING for being contrary to law
and existing jurisprudence;
f.) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic) executed by x x x RAMON CHING
(i) over two (2) parcels of land x x x to defendant ASIA ATLANTIC BUSINESS
VENTURES, Inc.; and (ii) one (1) parcel of land x x x sold to x x x ELENA TIU DEL
PILAR for having illegally procured the ownership and titles of the above properties;
x x x.11red
The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss12red alleging forum
shopping, litis pendentia, res judicata and the respondents as not being the real
parties in interest.
On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order13red denying the petitioners'
Motion to Dismiss.
The respondents filed an Amended Complaint14red dated April 7, 2005 impleading
Metrobank as the successor-in-interest of co-defendant Global Bank. The Amended
Complaint also added a seventh cause of action relative to the existence of a
Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the amount of P4,000,000.00
originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The respondents prayed that they be
declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately released to
them. Alternatively, the respondents prayed for the issuance of a hold order relative
to the CPPA to preserve it during the pendency of the case.
On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with
Counterclaim.15red
On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order16red admitting the respondents'
Amended Complaint. The RTC stressed that Metrobank had already filed
Manifestations admitting that as successor-in-interest of Global Bank, it now
possesses custody of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed willingness to abide by
any court order as regards the disposition of Antonio's deposits. The petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration filed to assail the aforecited Order was denied by the RTC
on May 3, 2006.
S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 9
On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim to
the respondents' Amended Complaint.
On August 11, 2006, the RTC issued a pre-trial order.17red
Amended Complaint on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the Amended
Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the respondents, the latter's declaration
as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, the suit partakes of
the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration of
nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC
acting as an ordinary court.
On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order19red denying the petitioners' Motion to
Dismiss on grounds: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar ,  an examination of the Complaint would disclose that the
action delves mainly on the question of ownership of the properties
described in the Complaint which can be properly settled in an ordinary
civil action. And as pointed out by the defendants, the action seeks to declare the
nullity of the Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of
Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title, which were all allegedly executed by
defendant Ramon Ching to defraud the plaintiffs. The relief of establishing the
status of the plaintiffs which could have translated this action into a
special proceeding was nowhere stated in the Amended Complaint. With
regard [to] the prayer to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owner[s] of
the CPPA and that the same be immediately released to them, in itself
poses an issue of ownership which must be proved by plaintiffs by
substantial evidence. And as emphasized by the plaintiffs, the Amended Complaint
was intended to implead Metrobank as a co-defendant.
As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes that during the Pre-trial of this
case, one of the issues raised by the defendants Ramon Ching and Po Wing
Properties is: Whether or not there can be disinheritance in intestate succession?
Whether or not defendant Ramon Ching can be legally disinherited from the estate of
his father? To the mind of the Court , the issue of disinheritance, which is one
of the causes of action in the Complaint, can be fully settled after a trial on
the merits. And at this stage, it has not been sufficiently established
whether or not there is a will.20red (Emphasis supplied.)
The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007 denying the
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, became the subjects of a petition
for certiorari filed with the CA. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99856,
raised the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it

denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact that the Amended
Complaint sought to establish the status or rights of the respondents which subjects
are within the ambit of a special proceeding.
On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision21red denying the
petition for certiorari on grounds: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations supporting the causes of
action of the amended complaint induced us to infer that nothing in the said
complaint shows that the action of the private respondents should be
threshed out in a special proceeding, it appearing that their allegations
were substantially for the enforcement of their rights against the alleged
fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon Ching. The private
respondents also instituted the said amended complaint in order to protect
them from the consequence of the fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching by
seeking to disqualify Ramon Ching from inheriting from Antonio Ching as
well as to enjoin him from disposing or alienating the subject properties,
including the P4 Million deposit with Metrobank. The intestate or probate court
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such issues, which must be submitted to the court in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Furthermore, we
agree with the trial court that the probate court could not take cognizance
of the prayer to disinherit Ramon Ching, given the undisputed fact that
there was no will to be contested in a probate court.
The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended complaint and
complicates the issue of jurisdiction by reiterating the grounds or defenses set up in
the petitioners' earlier pleadings. Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint
without regard to whether or not the private respondents (plaintiffs) are
entitled to recover upon all or some of the causes of action asserted
therein. In this regard, the jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon
the defenses pleaded in the answer or in the motion to dismiss, lest the
question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the petitioners
(defendants).22red Hence, we focus our resolution on the issue of jurisdiction on the
allegations in the amended complaint and not on the defenses pleaded in the motion
to dismiss or in the subsequent pleadings of the petitioners.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling
reason to still subject the action of the petitioners in a special proceeding
since the nullification of the subject documents could be achieved in the
civil case, the lower court should proceed to evaluate the evidence of the parties
and render a decision thereon upon the issues that it defined during the pre-trial in
Civil Case No. 02-105251. 23red (Emphasis supplied)
S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 10
The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA through a
Resolution24red issued on July 8, 2010.
The Issue
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari25red is anchored on the issue of:
Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by the
PETITIONERS on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the Amended Complaint, to wit, (a) filiations with Antonio of Ramon, Jaime
and Joseph; (b) rights of  common-law wives, Lucina and Mercedes, to be considered
as heirs of Antonio; (c) determination of the extent of Antonio's estate; and (d) other
matters which can only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary
civil action.
The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to determine (a)
who are the heirs of a decedent; (b) the validity of  a waiver of  hereditary rights; (c)
the status of each heir; and (d) whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
the exclusive property of  the deceased spouse.26red Further, the extent of Antonio's
estate, the status of the contending parties and the respondents' alleged entitlement
as heirs to receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA now in Metrobank's custody are
matters which are more appropriately the subjects of a special proceeding and not of
an ordinary civil action.
The respondents opposed27red the instant petition claiming that the petitioners are
engaged in forum shopping. Specifically, G.R. Nos. 175507 28red and
183840,29red both involving the contending parties in the instant petition were filed
by the petitioners and are currently pending before this Court. Further, in Mendoza v.
Hon. Teh,30red the SC declared that whether a particular matter should be resolved
by the RTC in the exercise of  its general jurisdiction  or its limited probate
jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. Besides,
the petitioners, having validly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC and
having actively participated in the trial of the case, are already estopped from
challenging the RTC's jurisdiction over the respondents' Complaint and Amended
Complaint.31red
The Court's Ruling
We resolve to deny the instant petition.
The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this Court directing them to file
their reply to the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant Petition. While the
prescribed period to comply expired on March 15, 2011, the petitioners filed their
Manifestation that they will no longer file a reply only on October 10, 2011 or after
the lapse of almost seven months.

Further, no reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when they both
ruled that the denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 02-
105251 was proper.
Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the respondents that the
petitioners engaged in forum shopping and are already estopped from questioning
the RTC's jurisdiction after having validly submitted to it when the latter participated
in the proceedings, the denial of the instant Petition is still in order.Although the
respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among others, the
disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA now
under Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil
action, and not a special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided
for in the Rules of Court.32red A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.33red It is distinguished from
an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.34red To initiate a special
proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will
wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC
and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint
sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting
the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for
Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a
special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.
The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint, seeking the
release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA under Metrobank's custody and the
nullification of the instruments subject of the complaint, necessarily require the
determination of the respondents' status as Antonio's heirs.
It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be declared as
the rightful owners of the CPPA which was in Mercedes' possession prior to the
execution of the Agreement and Waiver. The respondents also prayed for the
alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of a hold order relative to the
CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with Metrobank during the pendency of the case.
It can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was premised on
Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged collective ownership of the same, and
not on the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be
S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 11
emphasized that the respondents were parties to the execution of the
Agreement35red and Waiver36red prayed to be nullified. Hence, even without the
necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the standing to
seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there was
no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue influence and
committed fraud against them. Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the
Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonio’s estate executed by Ramon, and the
TCTs issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and void as well.
Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall first require a
declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not
determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction.
In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo,37red the Court
declared: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be
made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to
dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon
the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in
the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.
In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject
of Civil Case No. 02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this
specific case was instituted to protect the respondents from the supposedly
fraudulent acts of Ramon . In the event that the RTC will find grounds to grant the
reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence will be the reversion of
the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. Civil Case No. 02-
105251 was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the
administration, liquidation and distribution of Antonio's estate , hence, not the proper
subject of a  special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person  under Rules 73-91 of  the Rules of Court.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be
strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if
their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally
transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint
and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are
matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.
 S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 12

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners' (a) Opposition to the
respondents' Motion to Admit Substitution of Party; 38red and (b)
Manifestation39red through counsel that they will no longer file a reply to the
respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CARPIO, J.,  Chairperson,  BRION, PEREZ, and ARANAL-SERENO, JJ.

 

G.R. No. 168913. March 14, 2007.*
ROLANDO TING, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A.
LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE,
ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER,
respondents.
Land Registration; Judgments; The judgment rendered in a land registration
proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted from the
date of receipt of notice of the judgment.—Section 30 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 or the Property Registration Decree provides: SEC.30.When judgment becomes
final; duty to cause issuance of decree.—The judgment rendered in a land
registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to be
counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken
from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
Same; Same; It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is
taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.—In a registration proceeding
instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the
judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case
may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata
against the whole world. It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary
period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.
Same; Same; Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. [1 SCRA 1294, 1297 (1961)] enunciates the
raison d’être why Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration proceedings.
—Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al., 1 SCRA 1294 (1961), enunciates the raison d’être why
Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration proceedings, viz.: THAT THE
LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN THIS
LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO,
HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE. We fail to understand the
arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in so far as it
supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final,
it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another
proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the
provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5
years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule
39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil
action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse
party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided
in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 13
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except
when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning
party desires to oust him therefrom.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-983, then
Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7,
granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for
registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension,
Plan Rs-07-000787.
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29, 1977.
Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10, 1982 directing the
Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration and
the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot. The application
was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska,
Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn
Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to
petitioner's application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer 2 calling
attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become
final and executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of
petitioner's application on the ground of res judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on
motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner's application on the ground of res
judicata.3 Ï‚ηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari which raises the sole issue of
whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.

Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become final and
executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of registration has been issued by the
Land Registration Authority (LRA);4 it was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct"
decision belatedly surfaced as basis of respondents' motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-
N;5 and as no action for revival of the said decision was filed by respondents after the
lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the dormant
judgment passé[d] into extinction."6
Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis of res
judicata.7
The petition fails.
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree
provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree.  - The
judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the
expiration of thirty days8 to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the
judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil
cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to
forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the
Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding
certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. ( Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or
without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or
oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes,
when final, res judicata against the whole world.9 It becomes final when no appeal
within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and
registration.10
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court's approval
in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza's application for
registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world
including petitioner.
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No. N-983 had
become "extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA has not issued the decree of
registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey Assistance Section,
Land Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Region 7, Cebu City having claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral
S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 14
Extension is erroneous and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first
be approved by the Land Management Services of
the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in court; and that
the spouses Lirio did not comply with the said requirement for they instead submitted
to the court a mere special work order.11
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of Engineer
Belleza and that it reported such claim to the land registration court for appropriate
action or reconsideration of the decision which was its duty.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the
decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the
orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the
court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the
matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the
preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter
to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as
administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings." 12 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
As for petitioner's claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of
its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also
be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter
by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations[,]
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of
respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the
prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.13 enunciates the raison d etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does
not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN
THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS
AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above
assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land
registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period
of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision.
 S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 15

Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that
judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within
10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to
civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land
registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse
party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time
as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the

ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the

ownership has been proved and confirmed

by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary,

except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule
39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to
place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a
land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes
final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an
appeal.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.

Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.

SO ORDERED.

HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Negros
Occidental, ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HERMINIO
MARAVILLA, respondent.
Courts; Jurisdiction; Settlement of estates of deceased persons; Appellate jurisdiction
determined by value of entire conjugal estate and not merely by part pertaining to
deceased spouse.—In an appeal from an order of probate court appointing a special
co-administrator, such issue being merely incidental to the probate or testate
proceedings of the deceased spouse, the amount in controversy is not merely the
value of the portion of the conjugal estate pertaining to the deceased spouse but of
the entire conjugal estate, and it is this latter amount that determines what court will
have jurisdiction over said appeal.
Settlement of estates of deceased persons; Special co-administrator not authorized.—
The Rules ;of Court contain no provision on special co-administrator because the
appointment of such special administrators is merely temporary and subsists only
until a regular executor or administrator is duly appointed.
APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
BARRERA, J.:
Petitioners herein appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals (in
CA-G.R. No. 27200-R) wherein, over their objection, raising the question of
jurisdiction petition, the appellate court took cognizance of the petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by Herminio Maravilla and, in consequence thereof,
set aside the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as a special co-administrator of
the estate of the deceased Digna Maravilla. The pertinent antecedent facts are as
follows:
On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with he Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for probate of the will (Spec. Proc. No. 4977)
of his deceased wife Digna Maravilla who died on August 12 of that same year. In the
will the surviving spouse was named as the universal heir and executor.
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters
of the deceased Digna Maravilla) filed an opposition to the probate of the will, on the
ground, inter alia, that the will was not signed on each page by the testatrix in the
presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 16
On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was opposed by Pedro,
Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, the court issued an order appointing him special
administrator of the estate of the deceased, for the reason that:
... all the properties subject of the will are conjugal properties of the petitioner and
his late wife, Digna Maravilla, and before any partition of the conjugal property is
done, the Court cannot pinpoint which of the property subject of the Will belongs to
Digna Maravilla, exclusively, that shall be administered by the special administrator.
Hence, although it is true that the petitioner Herminio Maravilla has an adverse
interest in the property subject of the Will, the Court finds it impossible for the
present time to appoint any person other than the petitioner as special administrator
of the property until after the partition is ordered, for the reason that the properties
mentioned in the Will are in the name of the petitioner who is the surviving spouse of
the deceased.
On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of the will, as it
was not duly signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting
witnesses and of one another.
On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a
petition for appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla) as special co-
administrator to protect their interests, on the ground that the will, having been
denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent. Said petition was heard on
February 20, at which hearing, respondent's counsel orally moved for postponement,
because respondent's principal counsel (Salonga) had not been notified and was not
present. The court ordered presentation of oral evidence, consisting of the
testimonies of Eliezar Lopez, and Regina and Francisco Maravilla.
On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of appeal, appeal
bond and record on appeal, from the decision denying probate of the will. Some
devisees under the will, likewise, appealed from said decision.
On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a
petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator, as he failed to file an
inventory within 3 months from his appointment and qualification as special
administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court. To this
petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that said provision of the
Rules of Court does not apply to a special administrator, and an inventory had
already been submitted by him, before said petition for his removal was
filed.1äwphï1.ñët
On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas filed with the
court a petition for appointment of Conchita as special co-administratrix. Devisee
Adelina Sajo, likewise, filed a similar petition February 29.

On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint hearing the (1) petition to appoint Eliezar
Lopez as special administrator, (2) approval of respondent's record appeal and appeal
bond, (3) petition to remove respondent as special administrator, (4) petition to
appoint Conchita Kohlhaas as special co-administratrix, and (5) petition to appoint
Adelina Sajo as special co-administrator. At said hearing, respondent objected to the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez was special co-administratrix, on grounds that (a) the
law allows only one special co-administrator (b) the order of March 16, 1959 estops
the court from appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator (c) such
appointment is unfair to respondent, because owns at least 3/4 of the whole
property, conjugal nature, which would be subjected to the administrate of a
stranger, and (d) a deadlock between two special administrators would ruin the
management of the property, including those of respondent. On cross-examination of
Eliezar Lopez, respondent's counsel elicited the facts that (1) Lopez was employed full
time in the PCAPE, with office in Manila. and could not discharge the functions of a
co-administrator, and (2) there was merely intention on Lopez part to resign from
office.
After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator
in an order dictated open court, to protect the interests of Pedro, Asuncion and
Regina Maravilla.
From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for preliminary injunction) to annul
the order appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator, and to prohibit the
probate court from further proceeding with the petition for the removal of respondent
as special administrator. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction
on March 9, 1960 which was amended on March 11, 1960 to make it more specific.
On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition to certify the case to the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the
principal amount in controversy in this case exceeds P200,000.00, and the writs
(of certiorari and prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals, since the probate case is not on appeal before it. To this petition,
respondent filed an opposition. on the grounds that the amount in controversy is less
than P200,000.00 and the decision of the probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now
on appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed
for is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and the present case does not involve title to
or possession of real estate exceeding in value P200,000.00. 1
On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs
(certiorari  and prohibition) prayed for by respondent, and declaring null and void the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator.
Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision,
but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal.
S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 17
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the writs
of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent, the same not being in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from,
assumed jurisdiction over the present case on the theory that "the amount in
controversy relative to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator to
protect the interests of respondents (herein petitioners) is only P90,000.00 more or
less, i.e., one fourth of the conjugal property" (of respondent and the deceased Digna
Maravilla) which, is per inventory submitted by respondent as special administrator is
valued at P362,424.90. This theory is untenable. Note that the proceedings had on
the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator are merely incidental to
the probate or testate proceedings of the deceased Digna Maravilla presently on
appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where petitioners' motion
to elevate the same to the Supreme Court, on the ground that the amount herein
involved is within the latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is still pending, resolution. That
the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over said testate proceedings
cannot be doubted, considering that the properties therein involved are valued at
P362,424,90, as per inventory of the special administrator.
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and
liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that
part of the conjugal estate pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal
estate. This Court has already held that even if the deceased had left no debts, upon
the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse (Vda. de Roxas v. Pecson, et al., L-2211,
December 20, 1948; 82 Phil. 407; see also Vda. de Chantengco v. Chantengco, et al.,
L-10663, October 31, 1958). In a number of cases where appeal was taken from an
order of a probate court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized that the
amount or value involved or in controversy therein is that of the entire estate (Suntay
v. Suntay, L-3087, July 31, 1954, 50 O.G. 5321; Vano v. Vda. de Garces, et al., L-
6303, June 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3045). Not having appellate jurisdiction over the
proceedings in probate (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R), considering that the amount involved
therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original
jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari  and prohibition prayed for by respondent in
the instant case, which are merely incidental thereto.
In the United States, the rule is that "proceedings in probate are appealable where
the amount or value involved is reducible to a pecuniary standard, the amount
involved being either the appellant's interest or the value of the entire estate
according as the issues on appeal involve only the appellant's rights or the entire
administration of the estate. ... In a contest for administration of an estate the
amount or value of the assets of the estate is the amount in controversy for purposes

of appeal." (4 C.J.S. 204). In line with this ruling, it is to be observed that
respondent's interest as appellant in the probate proceedings (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R)
is, according to his theory, the whole estate amounting to P362,424.90, or, at least
more than 3/4 thereof, or approximately P270,000.00. Such interest, reduced to a
pecuniary standard on the basis of the inventory, is the amount or value of the
matter in controversy, and such amount being more than P200,000.00, it follows that
the appeal taken in said proceedings falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and should, therefore, be certified to it pursuant to Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment of the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator and to restrain the probate
court from removing respondent as special administrator. It is therefore, a contest for
the administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or value of the assets
of the whole estate is the value in controversy (4 C.J.S. 204). It appearing that the
value of the estate in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals
clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.
The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, arrived at the amount of
"P90,000.00 more or less", as the amount involved in the case, upon authority of the
case of Vistan v. Archbishop (73 Phil. 20). But this case is inapplicable, as it does not
refer to the question of administration of the estate, nor to an order denying probate
of a will, but only to the recovery of a particular legacy consisting of the rentals of a
fishpond belonging to the estate. In an analogous case involving the administration of
a trust fund, the United States Supreme Court held:
Where the trust fund administered and ordered to be distributed by the circuit court,
in a suit to compel the stockholders of a corporation to pay their subscriptions to
stock to realize the fund, amounts to more than $5,000.00, this court has jurisdiction
of the appeal, which is not affected by the fact that the amounts decreed to some of
the creditors are less than that sum (Handly et al. vs. Stutz, et al., 34 Law Ed. 706).
Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as distinguished from
ordinary civil cases, are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, since they are not enumerated in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as
amended. Granting, arguendo, that a special proceeding is not a civil action, it has
never been decided that a special proceeding is not a "civil case" (Carpenter v. Jones,
121 Cal. 362; 58 p. 842). On the other hand, it has been held that the term "civil
case" includes special proceedings (Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680, N.W. 178).
Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on
ordinary civil actions are applicable in special proceedings where they are not
inconsistent with, or when they may serve to supplement the provisions relating to
special proceedings. Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same in civil
actions as in special proceedings. (See Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.)
S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 18
The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate total claim of
the parties and not the combined claims against each other determine the appellate
jurisdictional amount, are not applicable to, the instant case, because Section 2, Rule
75 of the Rules of Court is explicit that the amount or value involved or in controversy
in probate proceedings is that of the entire estate. Assuming, arguendo, that the rule
in the cases cited by respondent is here applicable, it should be noted that
respondent claims the whole estate of at least more than 3/4 thereof. Said claim,
reduced to a pecuniary standard, on the basis of the inventory, would amount to
more than P200,000.00 and, consequently, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115, May 10, 1954) cited by respondent in his
brief, is also inapplicable, because unlike the instant case, it did not involve a contest
in the administration of the estate.
While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate proceedings
(Spec. Proc. No. 4977, CFI of Negros Occidental) which was appealed by respondent
to the Court of Appeals, it becomes immaterial, in view of Sections 17 and 31 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, providing that the Supreme Court shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the value in controversy
exceeds two hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs", and that "all
cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court, or to the Court of
Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same as if it had
originally been brought before it".
On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special
administrator, we agree with respondent that there was no need for it. Note that the
Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-administrator, the reason being,
that the appointment of such special administrator is merely temporary and subsists
only until a regular executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus, it would not
only be unnecessary but also impractical, if for the temporary duration of the need
for a special administrator, another one is appointed aside from the husband, in this
case, upon whom the duty to liquidate the community property devolves merely to
protect the interests of petitioners who, in the event that the disputed will is allowed
to probate, would even have no right to participate in the proceedings at all. (Roxas
v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407.)
In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the amount involved in
the controversy, it is suggested that appropriate steps be taken on the appeal
pending in the Court of Appeals involving the probate of the will (CA-G.R. No. 27478-
R) to comply with the provisions of the Judiciary Act on the matter.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is set aside and
another one entered also setting aside the order of the trial court of March 5, 1960,
appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator. Without costs. So ordered.
 S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g s fi r s t s e t | 19

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes,
Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.