023A

IN THE

LEARNED ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL

AT ODIN THRONE

IN THE MATTERS OF

COMPLAINT NO. XXXX/2022

UNION OF RUNESIA (REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENT, UNION OF RUNESIA)

………………………………………………………….………………………........CLAIMANT

V.

UNION OF ARNHURSTE (REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF ARNHURSTE)

………………………………………………………………………………….....RESPONDENT

[UNDER MASABA TREATY, 1959]

Clubbed with

COMPLAINT NO. YYYY/2022

ALICE ANALYTIC SOLUTIONS (REPRESENTED BY THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, ALICE

ANALYTIC SOLUTIONS) ………………………………………………………….…

CLAIMANT

V.

BANSAL HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION INC. (REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

OFFICER, BANSAL HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION INC.) ….…………………......RESPONDENT

[UNDER CLAUSE 12 OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN ALICE ANALYTIC SOLUTIONS AND BANSAL

HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION INC.]

[THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTERS HAVE BEEN CLUBBED UNDER MASABA TREATY, 1959]

ON BEHALF OF THE CLAIMANTS

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES......................................................................................................v

STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................................................xi

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION......................................................................................xiii

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION.........................................................................................xiv

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.............................................................................................xv

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED...................................................................................................1

I. ARNHURSTE IS RESPONSIBLE AND LIABLE FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL

DAMAGE CAUSED TO RUNESIA UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

LAW.......................................................................................................................................1

A. There was a threat to the territorial integrity of State of Runesia by the actions of

Arnhurste............................................................................................................................1

B. Arnhurste misused its right to self-defence for attacking Runesia..........................2

C. The actions of Arnhurste are in violation of International Humanitarian Law.......5

II. ARNHURSTE IS RESPONSIBLE AND LIABLE FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL

DAMAGE CAUSED TO RUNESIA UNDER INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW. 8

A. Arnhurste failed to treat “nature” as a civilian object..............................................8

B. Arnhurste violated the Convention on Biological Diversity...................................8

III. THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY SHOULD DECIDE THE CHALLENGE

AGAINST THE APPOINTMENT OF MR. ROGERS.......................................................10

iii
 A. Article 13(4) of the UNCITRAL Rules requires a challenge to an arbitrator to be

heard by an appointing authority......................................................................................10

B. Appointing authority can be constituted under article 6 of the uncitral rules at any

stage of the dispute...........................................................................................................11

IV. IN CASE THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL HAS AUTHORITY TO DECIDE ON

THE CHALLENGE, MR. ROGERS SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED FROM THE

ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL AS MR. ROGERS IS IMPARTIAL AND INDEPENDENT....12

A. Mr. Roger’s Declaration removes doubts regarding his impartiality and

independence....................................................................................................................12

B. The IBAGC referred to by the respondent are not binding...................................13

V. AAS WAS EXCUSED FROM ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONTRACT

DUE TO THANOS-20 VIRUS............................................................................................14

A. Thanos-20 virus qualifies as a force majeure event and caused the breach of

obligations........................................................................................................................15

B. Risk of non-performance was unforeseeable and could not be mitigated.............17

PRAYER FOR RELIEF...........................................................................................................18

iv
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Advisory Opinion by the International Court of justice

Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of nuclear weapons 1996,__________7

Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996, ICJ report

1996_____________________________________________________________________4

Legality of the Threat or Use of nuclear weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996I.C.J___________5

Regulations

ICRC, Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict (2020)___4

International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflict of Interest_______________________14

UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as revised in 2010)___________________________10, 11, 12

Proposition

Annexure A_________________________________________________________________5

Annexure B________________________________________________________________13

Para 10_________________________________________________________________1, 5, 9

Para 11_____________________________________________________________________9

Para 12_____________________________________________________________________7

Para 13_____________________________________________________________________7

Para 14_____________________________________________________________________7

v
Para 17___________________________________________________________________7, 9

Para 23 -32________________________________________________________________13

Para 26_________________________________________________________________10, 14

Para 27____________________________________________________________________16

Para 6______________________________________________________________________9

Para 8__________________________________________________________________2, 4, 5

Para 9______________________________________________________________________9

Journals, Books and Reports

Pilloud, C., Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C. and Zimmermann, B. eds., 1987. Commentary on the

additional protocols: of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949______7

56 ILA, Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force (2018)_______________________3

Alexander, A., 2015. A short history of international humanitarian law. European Journal of

International Law__________________________________________________________5

Bryan A. Garner, Black’s law dictionary, 8th edition_____________________________15, 17

Fareya Azfar, The Force Majeure 'Excuse',Arab Law Quarterly_______________________15

Force Majeure & Covid-19 The interplay that contracting world needs to know__________15

Franklin, M., 2007. Sovereignty and functional airspace blocks. Air & Space L___________1

vi
Gary B. Born , International Arbitration and Forum Selection Agreements, Drafting and

Enforcing, Sixth edition____________________________________________________14

ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Cambridge University Press_________________________9

Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law

Volume I: Rules, Cambridge University Press____________________________________7

Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian

Law, Volume I: Rules, International Committee of Red Cross, Cambridge University

Press,____________________________________________________________________7

Karel Daele , Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators in International Arbitration,

International Arbitration Law Library, Volume 24 (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer

Law International 2012)____________________________________________________13

Muñoz-Rojas, D. and Frésard, J.J., 2004. The roots of behaviour in war: Understanding and

preventing IHL violations, International Review of the Red Cross, 86(853)_____________5

Niculescu, L., 2018. The Fundamental Right to a Healthy and Ecologically Harmonious

Environment. EIRP Proceedings_______________________________________________6

Nwedu, C. N. (2021). THE RISE OF FORCE MAJEURE AMID THE CORONAVIRUS

PANDEMIC: LEGITIMACY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ENERGY LAWS AND

CONTRACTS. Natural Resources Journal, 61(1),________________________________16

P.H. Winfield, A Textbook of the Law of Tort_____________________________________17

Raustiala, K. and Victor, D.G., 1996; Gehring, T. and Jachtenfuchs, M., 1993. Liability for

Transboundary Environmental Damage towards a General Liability Regime.___________9

vii
Redfern And Hunter On International Arbitration, 6th edition_________________________10

Rosendal, G.K., 2000. The convention on biological diversity and developing countries (Vol.

25). Springer Science & Business Media________________________________________9

Schrijver, N., 2015. The Ban on the Use of Force in the UN Charter , Oxford Handbook of

The Use Of Force In International Law._________________________________________1

Sharp Sr, W.G., 1992. The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage During Armed

Conflict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War________________________________5

UNEP, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of

International Law__________________________________________________________9

Notifications and resolutions

G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Oct. 24, 1970, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV)___________________2

Govt. memorandum no. F.18/4/2020-PPD, Ministry of Finance_______________________15

UNGA Res. 2131(XX) Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic

Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty____________1

Statutes, Treaties and Conventions

1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land___________7

Article 25, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001__3

Charter of the United Nations,________________________________________________1, 2

Convention on Biological Diversity______________________________________________9

viii
ILC, Draft Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict,

General Assembly Official Records, Sixty-sixth Session____________________________7

Protocol Additions to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949___________________6, 7

Statute of the International Court of Justice,1945____________________________________6

Cases

Atlantic Paper Stock Ltd v. St. Anne-Nackawic____________________________________16

Aviation Holdings Ltd. v. Aero Toy Store LLC____________________________________16

Belgium v. Spain_____________________________________________________________9

Coombs v. Nolan____________________________________________________________16

Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda_________________________________________4

Energy Watchdog v. CERC___________________________________________________15

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia.)_________________________________3

Hungary. v. Slovakia__________________________________________________________3

ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Judgement, 20 February 1969___________________6

Lakeman v. Pollard__________________________________________________________16

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta________________________________________________6

National Grid v. Argentina____________________________________________________13

Saba Fakes v. Turkey________________________________________________________14

ix
Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co____________________________________15

The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić__________________________________________________6

The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu_____________________________________________6

The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America___________________________1

Vito Gallo v. Canada_________________________________________________________12

x
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Runesia v. Arnhurste

Following independence, a conflict broke out between the Runesia and Arnhurste because of

an unfair boundary separation that favoured Arnhurste. The war was put an end by the UN

Masaba Peace Treaty, which established an arbitration tribunal.

The nations later became economically and internationally engaged, joining the ICJ, VCLT,

and Convention on Biological Diversity (entailing jurisdiction of ICJ).

Runesia and the Democratic States of Collesia engaged in military drills in due order, which

alarmed Arnhurste. This unfounded anxiety was made worse by Runesia's occasional military

actions and the country's poor financial state.

Arnhurste responded to this inexplicably by launching Operation Braveheart. On December

11, 2021, Arnhurste attacked Runesiai civilians because he believed they were Runesiai

soldiers based on false intelligence, severely harming the environment around the Sargasso

Sea.

The Runesiai government rightfully denounced this conduct, but Arnhurste refused to accept

responsibility, arguing that their actions were proportionate, that they were not parties to the

treaties addressing environmental harm from armed conflict, and that International

Humanitarian Law would not be applicable.

In order to resolve the issue, an arbitral tribunal was later established in accordance with the

Masaba Treaty.

xi
Alice Analytic Solutions V. Bansal Healthcare Association Inc

Alice Analytic Solutions [ Hereinafter “AAS”] is a reputable Runesiai law-incorporated

healthcare data integration company. AAS was contacted by the Bansal Healthcare

Association [hereinafter “BHAI”], a group of medical organisations, to provide a third-party

analyser for their health data.

This developed into a five-year contract with a dispute settlement, force majeure, and data

protection provision.

AAS was compelled to temporarily keep its user data on local Runesiai servers due to the

unanticipated appearance of an infinite virus that caused a surge in number of patients, to

which the BHAI management responded and suspended payment.

This prompted AAS to file a notice of arbitration, and they duly named Mr. Steve Rogers

[Hereinafter “Mr. Rogers”] as the arbiter from their side in accordance with clause 12 (a) of

the contract. As a response, BHAI demanded Mr. Rogers' resignation and asserted that, in

accordance with UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules [Hereinafter referred as “UNCITRAL

Rules”] the arbitral tribunal, not the appointing body, should decide the case. As a result, an

arbitration tribunal has been established to assess if Mr. Rogers’s appointment is valid and

whether Force Majeure will apply to breach of obligations.

xii
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The claimants most humbly submit that this Hon’ble Arbitral Tribunal at Odin throne

Runesia has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate upon the matters of:

 COMPLAINT NO. XXXX/2022 filed under the Masaba Treaty of 1959.

 COMPLAINT NO. YYYY/2022 filed under Clause 12 of the contract of service

entered between Alice Analytical Solutions and Bansal Healthcare Association Inc.

The above-mentioned matters have been clubbed by the Learned Arbitral Tribunal under its

power granted under Clause 12 of the contract of service entered between Alice Analytical

Solutions and Bansal Healthcare Association Inc. and under United Nations Commission on

International Trade Law, Arbitration Rules.

All of which is urged in detail in the written submission and submitted most respectfully.

The parties most humbly submit to the jurisdiction of this Learned Tribunal

xiii
 ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

I. IS ARNHURSTE RESPONSIBLE AND LIABLE FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL

DAMAGE CAUSED TO RUNESIA UNDER INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAW?

II. IS ARNHURSTE RESPONSIBLE AND LIABLE FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL

DAMAGE CAUSED TO RUNESIA UNDER INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW?

III. SHOULD THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL DECIDE ON THE CHALLENGE OF MR.

ROGERS AND IF SO WITH OR WITHOUT HIS PARTICIPATION?

IV. IN CASE THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL HAS AUTHORITY TO DECIDE ON THE

CHALLENGE, SHOULD MR. ROGERS BE REMOVED FROM THE ARBITRAL

TRIBUNAL?

V. WHETHER ON ACCOUNT OF THANOS-20, AAS WAS EXCUSED FROM ITS

OBLIGATIONS TO COMPLY WITH CLAUSE 7 OF THE CONTRACT?

xiv
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. ARNHURSTE IS RESPONSIBLE AND LIABLE FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL

DAMAGE CAUSED TO RUNESIA UNDER INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAW.

II. ARNHURSTE IS RESPONSIBLE AND LIABLE FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL

DAMAGE CAUSED TO RUNESIA UNDER INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW.

III. THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY SHOULD DECIDE THE CHALLENGE

AGAINST THE APPOINTMENT OF MR. ROGERS.

IV. IN CASE THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL HAS AUTHORITY TO DECIDE ON THE

CHALLENGE, MR. ROGERS SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED FROM THE

ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL.

V. AAS WAS EXCUSED FROM ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONTRACT

DUE TO THANOS-20 VIRUS.

xv
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. ARNHURSTE IS RESPONSIBLE AND LIABLE FOR THE

ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE CAUSED TO RUNESIA UNDER

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.

It is most humbly submitted that the Government of Arnhurste is liable and responsible for

the environmental damage caused to Runesia under International Humanitarian Law

(hereinafter, “IHL”).

Firstly, there was a threat to the territorial integrity of the State of Runesia. [A] Secondly,

Arnhurste misused its right to self-defence for attacking Runesia. [B] and lastly, the actions

of Arnhurste are in violation of International Humanitarian Law. [C]

A. THERE WAS A THREAT TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATE OF RUNESIA BY THE

ACTIONS OF ARNHURSTE.

The right to territorial integrity is an internationally recognised principle under Article 2(4) of

the United Nations Charter (hereinafter, “UN Charter”).1 Unauthorised entry into the air

space of a State also constitutes to a breach to territorial sovereignty under Article 2(4).2

Arnhurste used bombs GBU-38 bombs on Runesiai soil which were deployed with the help

of drones.3 This use of force and a breach of Runesiai airspace poses a threat to the territorial

integrity of Runesia.

Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the actions of Arnhuste constitute a threat to the

Runesiai right of territorial integrity preserved under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

1
Charter of the United Nations, art 2(4), Oct. 24, 1945 1 U.N.T.S. 16 [Hereinafter U.N. Charter]; UNGA Res.
2131(XX) Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection
of Their Independence and Sovereignty (Dec. 21, 1965); Schrijver, N., 2015. The Ban on the Use of Force in the
UN Charter , Oxford Handbook of The Use Of Force In International Law.
2
The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America, , I. C. J. Reports 2003, p. 161; Franklin, M.,
2007. Sovereignty and functional airspace blocks. Air & Space L., 32, p.425.
3
Para 10, Proposition.

1
 B. ARNHURSTE MISUSED ITS RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE FOR ATTACKING RUNESIA.

The right to territorial sovereignty is provided under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. 4

However, this power is limited to circumstances of self-defence as provided under Article 51

of the U.N. Charter.5 The three cumulative elements to be present in a situation to justify self-

defence are firstly, that there was an existence of armed conflict [1.]; secondly, that the

response to the attack was imminent and necessary; lastly the attack was proportionate to the

harm caused [3]. 6

The said criteria, however, was not fulfilled in the present circumstance

which gives a conclusion that Arnhurste misused its right to self-defence for attacking

Runesia.

1. Armed attack had not taken place.

Article 51 of the U.N. Charter recognizes that members of the charter have a right to self-

defence in case of armed attack. 7 Armed attacks refer to grave forms of use of force rather

than mere skirmishes.8

In the given instance, there was no grave use of force by Runesia. The prior infiltration

attempts9 and killing of civilians10 cannot be termed to have met the high threshold required

under International Humanitarian Laws and it must also be noted that it is not even proved

that the army contingent or drones belonged to Runesia.

Hence, it is humbly submitted that as the threshold required for armed attack was not fulfilled

and no situation requiring self-defence had arisen.

4
U.N. Charter; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Oct. 24, 1970, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV).
5
U.N. Charter; Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. the U.S.) 1986 ICJ 14 (June 27) ["Nicaragua"] ¶
209.
6
The Islamic Republic of Iran v. the United States of America, Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 2003, p. 161.
7
U.N. Charter; Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. the U.S.) 1986 ICJ 14 (June 27) ["Nicaragua"] ¶
209.
8
The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America, I. C. J. Reports 2003, ¶ 91, 195.
9
Para 8, Proposition
10
Para 8, Proposition

2
 2. The response to the attack on Arnhurste was not imminent and necessary.

The state can plead the necessity to engage in a belligerent act if it is meant to protect its vital

interests from imminent danger.11 Necessity of military attack arises if firstly, there is

immediate threat and peril to the necessary interest of the Arnhurste [i]; secondly, armed

action is the only method to protect the essential interest of the belligerent state[ii]. Thirdly,

the target being attacked must be a military object[iii]. 12 The absence of satisfaction of these

criteria lead to the conclusion that the retaliatory attack was not imminent and necessary.

i. There is no immediate threat and peril to the necessary interest of

Arnhurste.

Self-defence becomes unnecessary when carried out after the threat has been diminished.13

In the given instance, the drones attack in Arnhurste killed three civilians. 14 Neither these

drones nor the alleged Runesiai contingent of armymen remain engaged in the Arnhurste

territory perpetually.

Hence, it is humbly submitted that there were no visible signs of imminent threat or the peril

to essential interest of Arnhurste.

ii. Armed action was not the only method to protect the essential interest

of Arnhurste.

To justify an armed action, the armed attack in military necessity shall be the only available

lawful recourse to safeguard the essential interest of the belligerent state.15 The situation must

be of such gravity that exploring alternate recourses shall be unreasonable.16

11
Hungary. v. Slovakia., 1997 ICJ, 52, p. 40–41, ¶51–52.
12
Article 25, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001
13
The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America, I. C. J. Reports 2003,¶ 91, 237.
14
Para 8, Proposition
15
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 57.
16
56 ILA, Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force (2018) 12 https://www.ila-hq.org/images/ILA/Dra

3
In the given instance, the drones nor the army contingent perpetually engage in the

Arnhursten territory.17 Diplomatic channels were also open as is evident from the dialogue

between the countries.

Hence, it is humbly submitted that armed action was not the only method to protect the

essential interest of the Arnhurste.

iii. The target attacked by Arnhurste was not a military object.

In an international armed conflict, an attack cannot be directed against the natural

environment unless it becomes a military objective.18 A military objective needs to make an

effective contribution to military action and its destruction, capture or neutralisation must

offer a definite military advantage.19

In the given instance, the tankers were mandated to supply oil to coastline villages. 20 They

were not carrying out or contributing to any military objective.

3. The attack was not proportionate to the harm caused.

The attack on Runesia was not proportionate which leads to the attack being not considerable

as an act of self-defence.

The proportionality principle requires that before destroying any natural resource site by

military activities, a balance of environmental harm and anticipated military benefits shall be

measured.21 The destruction or capturing of airports and towns, many hundreds of kilometres

away, in a neighbouring country by a country would not be a proportionate nor necessary

response to a series of transborder attacks by the neighbouring country.22

17
Para 8, Proposition
18
ICRC, Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict (2020), ¶98
19
ICRC, Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict (2020), ¶100
20
MOOT 12
21
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996, ICJ report 1996, ¶ 30
22
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), Merits,
Judgment, 2005 ICJ Rep., ¶147

4
In the given instance, the alleged Runesiai drones had killed only three civilians and there

was one incidence of infiltration by the alleged contingent of Runesiai army.23

On the other hand, the retaliation from Arnhurste killed everyone within hundred metres of

the epicentre. The proportionality test was not conducted in a fair manner as the Joint

Commander ordered the attack, even when no clear images regarding the target was

available.24

Hence, it is humbly submitted that the attack initiated by Arnhurste was not proportionate to

the harm caused and the proportionality test was not conducted as per military standards.

Thereby, the response to the attack on Arnhurste was not imminent and necessary.

C. THE ACTIONS OF ARNHURSTE ARE IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.

It is most humbly submitted that the actions of Arnhurste are in violation of IHL.

The scope of international humanitarian law (hereinafter, "IHL") includes laws governing the

use of force (jus ad bellum) and laws governing hostilities (jus in bello), and it is applicable

even during armed conflicts.25 Even in the middle of the warfare, environmental protection

must be enforced. 26

Actions of Arnhurste are in violation of IHL as firstly, the 1977 First and Second Additional

Protocols to the Geneva Convention[ [Hereinafter referred to as “Additional Protocols”] are

customary international law making Arnhurste responsible for environmental protection [1],

secondly, there was no legitimate military objective on the part of Arnhurste [2] and thirdly,

the actions of Arnhurste caused widespread, long-term and severe damage [3].

23
Para 8, Proposition
24
Annexure A, Proposition; Para 10, Proposition
25
Muñoz-Rojas, D. and Frésard, J.J., 2004. The roots of behaviour in war: Understanding and preventing IHL
violations, International Review of the Red Cross, 86(853), pp.189-206; Alexander, A., 2015. A short history of
international humanitarian law. European Journal of International Law, 26(1), pp.109-138.
26
Legality of the Threat or Use of nuclear weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996I.C.J. 241, ¶29 (July 8); Sharp Sr,
W.G., 1992. The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage During Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis of
the Persian Gulf War. Mil. L. Rev., 137, p.1.

5
 1. The 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention are customary

international law making Arnhurste responsible for environmental protection.

The Additional protocols are customary international law and the adjudication upon

Arnhurste’s actions must contain an application of the additional protocols.

Customary international law is "a general practise recognised as law”. 27 A rule of customary

international law is widely accepted to require the presence of two elements: State practise

(usus) and a belief that such behaviour is necessary, unlawful, or permitted, depending on the

type of rule, as a matter of law (opinio juris sive necessitatis).28

It has been held that part of the Additional protocols qualify as customary international law

and parts of it have recognised as a peremptory norm under the principle of jus cogens.29

Article 35(3) and Article 55 of the Additional protocols provide for the prohibition on

belligerents from using such means of military resources.30

Given the jus cogens nature of Article 35(3) and Article 55, the same can be applied to the

State of Arnhurste to determine its responsibilities and affix liabilities under IHL. Therefore,

it is submitted that the Additional protocols are customary international law.

27
Article 38(1)(b), Statute of the International Court of Justice,1945; Kunz, J.L., 1953. The nature of customary
international law. American Journal of International Law, 47(4), pp.662-669.
28
11 ICJ, Continental Shelf case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgement, 3 June 1985, ICJ Reports 1985,
pp. 29–30, ¶ 27; ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Judgement, 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, ¶ 3.
29
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber 1, 2 September 1998, ¶608, ¶616;
CTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision, 2 October 1995, ¶ 117;.
30
Protocol Additions to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Protocol Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 35(3) June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3; Protocol Additions to the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, art. 55, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3; Niculescu, L., 2018. The Fundamental Right to a Healthy and
Ecologically Harmonious Environment. EIRP Proceedings, 13.

6
 2. There was no legitimate military objective on the part of Arnhurste.

Armed conflicts must be directed only toward military objects and not civilian objects 31 and

protects items such as trucks, which are primarily of a civilian nature and yet cam be used for

military purposes.32 Parties are prohibited from using weapons, techniques, or means of

warfare that are intended to cause another Party to suffer unnecessarily. 33

In this matter the said “military” trucks which were attacked by Arnhurste’s drones using the

GBU-38 bombs were civilian in nature given that they were carrying oil for the civilian

residents of Cundur village.34 Further, the causalities out of the bomb explosion weren’t

military combatants but residents of Cundur.35

Moreover, the explosion led to all beings in the 100-m radius of the mushroom cloud being

killed and also led to extensive destruction of marine ecology which is vital for the

ecosystem.36 Thus, in the absence of a military target, there has been excessive environmental

damage which has led to a violation of principle of humanity and unnecessary suffering under

IHL.

Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the actions of Arnhurste posed a threat to Runesiai

territory integrity while being in violation of international law and not being an act of self-

defence, making it liable and responsible for the damage caused to Runesia.
31
Protocol Additions to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3; Pilloud, C., Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C.
and Zimmermann, B. eds., 1987. Commentary on the additional protocols: of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
32
Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume I:
Rules, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009; ILC, Draft Principles on the Protection of the
Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict, General Assembly Official Records, Sixty-sixth Session,
Supplement No. 10 (A/66/10), p. 347-364, Principle 13.
33
Protocol Additions to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, art. 35(1)-(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3; 1907 Hague Convention IV
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land Arts. 22 and 23 (e ); Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules, International Committee of Red
Cross, Cambridge University Press, Rule 70, Cambridge 2007; Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat
or Use of nuclear weapons 1996, ICJ report 1996, ¶ 78.
34
Para 12, Proposition.
35
Para 12, Proposition.
36
Para 12, Proposition; Para 13, Proposition; Para 14, Proposition; Para 17, Proposition.

7
II. ARNHURSTE IS RESPONSIBLE AND LIABLE FOR THE

ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE CAUSED TO RUNESIA UNDER

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW.

It is most humbly submitted that the Government of Arnhurste is liable and responsible for

the environmental damage caused to Runesia under International Environmental Law

(hereinafter, “IEL”) as firstly, Arnhurste has failed to treat nature as a civilian object [A]

secondly, Arnhurste violated the Convention on Biological Diversity (hereinafter, “CBD”),

[B].

A. ARNHURSTE FAILED TO TREAT “NATURE” AS A CIVILIAN OBJECT

Arnhurste failed to treat Nature as a civil object and still attacked it with bombs.

The environment is recognised as a civilian object under international law. 37

It should be

noted that the destruction of the environment must be kept in mind by States while engaging

in the use of force.38

The coastline of Runesia merely not only housed the residents of Cundur but also was an

ecologically sensitive zone as accepted by Arnhuste which housed both indigenous and non-

native flora and fauna which were impacted on the explosion.39

Therefore, the drone attack caused by Arnhurste in gross violation of this recognized

principle of IEL of treating nature as a civilian object.

B. ARNHURSTE VIOLATED THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY.

Arnhurste’s actions of dropping bombs and destroying the ecologically sensitive forests and

coastlines of Runesia are in violation of the CBD.

37
UNEP, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law,
(2009) 13-21; ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Cambridge University Press (2005) Rule 43, 44, 45; Baker, B.,
1992. Legal protections for the environment in times of armed conflict. Va. J. Int'l L., 33, p.351.
38
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of nuclear weapons 1996, ICJ report 1996, ¶ 226; Sand,
P.H., 2005. Compensation for environmental damage from the 1991 Gulf War. Envtl. Pol'y & L., 35, p.244.
39
Proposition, ¶ 9; Proposition, ¶ 10; Proposition, ¶ 12.

8
Protection of biological diversity is one of the important objectives of the CBD. 40 CBD also

provide for prevention of transboundary environmental damage caused by Contracting

Parties.41 Provisions relating to procedures and activities may be applicable outside the scope

of national jurisdiction, according to Article 4 of the CBD. 42 Moreover, duty to protect the

environment is not suspended during times of armed conflict. 43 The obligations of a State

toward the entire international community have been defined as the obligation erga omnes

principle.44

Under the present case, the Government of Arnhurste is a party to the CBD. 45The act that

caused environmental damage took place outside Arnhurste violating Articles 3 and 4. 46 The

explosion not only caused a detrimental impact on coastal vegetation and further endangered

the seal population.47It also led to destruction of the ecologically sensitive coastline of

Runesia which housed many non-native fauna species which clearly violates Article 8(d).48

This action by Arnhurste, destroying the environment of Runesia clearly violates the CBD

and therefore, it is humbly submitted that Arnhurste failed to treat nature as a civilian object

and is liable for contravention of IEL.

40
Convention on Biological Diversity, art 1, Jun. 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S 79; Rosendal, G.K., 2000. The
convention on biological diversity and developing countries (Vol. 25). Springer Science & Business Media.
41
Convention on Biological Diversity, art 5, Jun. 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S 79; Raustiala, K. and Victor, D.G.,
1996; Gehring, T. and Jachtenfuchs, M., 1993. Liability for Transboundary Environmental Damage towards a
General Liability Regime. Eur. J. Int'l L., 4, p.92.
42
Convention on Biological Diversity, art 4, Jun. 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S 79; Mackenzie, R. and Jenkins, M.,
2001. Handbook of the convention on biological diversity. Earthscan.
43
UNEP, Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law,
(2009) 13-21; ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Cambridge University Press (2005) Rule 43, 44, 45.
44
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain);
45
Para 6, Proposition.
46
Para 9, Proposition; Para 10, Proposition.
47
Para 11, Proposition.
48
Para 17, Proposition.

9
III. THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY SHOULD DECIDE THE CHALLENGE

AGAINST THE APPOINTMENT OF MR. ROGERS.

AAS and BHAI under their contract have agreed in their contract that any dispute arising

from their contract would be arbitrated in accordance with United Nations Commission on

International Trade Law Arbitration Rules [“UNCITRAL Rules”].49

The petitioner seeks to submit that any challenge to the appointment of an arbitrator, in this

case Mr. Rogers, must be adjudicated upon by an appointing authority as firstly, Article 13(4)

of the UNCITRAL Rules mandates it [A.]; secondly, an appointing authority can be formed

anytime under Article 6. [B]

A. ARTICLE 13(4) OF THE UNCITRAL RULES REQUIRES A CHALLENGE TO AN ARBITRATOR

TO BE HEARD BY AN APPOINTING AUTHORITY.

The challenge to the appointment of Mr Rogers as an arbitrator should be adjudicated upon

by the appointing authority under as provided under article 13 (4) of the UNCITRAL rules.

It is generally recognised that parties to an international commercial agreement are free to

choose for themselves the law (or the legal rules) applicable to that agreement. 50 Under

UNCITRAL Rules, if parties do not agree to a challenge to an arbitrator, then the challenging

party shall seek a decision on the challenge from the appointing authority.51

In this case, clause 12 of the contract between AAS and BHAI provides that:

“Any dispute…. arising out of or relating to this contract…. shall

be settled by arbitration in accordance with UNCITRAL Rules”52

49
Clause 7, Para 26, Proposition.
50
Redfern And Hunter On International Arbitration, 6th edition, Para 3.97, pg 187.
51
Article 13 (4), UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as revised in 2010) [Hereinafter referred as “UNCITRAL
Rules].
52
Para 26, Proposition

10
As evident from clause 7, the parties in this case had on their own accord selected

UNCITRAL as the procedural law governing their arbitration. Therefore, the proceedings

regarding the challenge of the appointment of the arbitrator should also be in accordance with

the UNCITRAL Rules.

As the UNCITRAL rules clearly under article 13(4) require an appointing authority to

adjudicate on challenges to the appointment of arbitrator, it is humbly submitted that the

same procedure should be followed in this case and the challenge to Mr. Roger’s appointment

should be decided upon by an appointing authority.

B. APPOINTING AUTHORITY CAN BE CONSTITUTED UNDER ARTICLE 6 OF THE UNCITRAL

RULES AT ANY STAGE OF THE DISPUTE

The parties can, even at this stage, designate an appointing authority to adjudicate upon the

challenge to the appointment of Mr. Rogers as an arbitrator under the provisions of the

UNCITRAL Rules.

“A party may at any time propose the name or names of one or more institutions or persons

….one of whom would serve as appointing authority”53

The challenging party, if it wishes, can ask for the designation of an appointing authority

even after the challenging the arbitrator’s appointment as article 6(3) explicitly provides for

the method of suspension of counting of limitation period in such a case. 54 If both the parties,

do not agree on an appointing authority then any party may request the Secretary-General of

the Permanent court of Arbitration to designate the appointing authority.55

Therefore, the parties will need to get an appointing authority designated which will be

responsible for adjudicating upon the challenge to the appointment of Mr. Rogers as an

arbitrator, due to the mandate placed by Article 13 (4) of the UNCITRAL Rules.
53
Article 6 (1), UNCITRAL Rules
54
Article 6(3), UNCITRAL Rules
55
Article 6 (2), UNCITRAL Rules

11
IV. IN CASE THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL HAS AUTHORITY TO DECIDE ON

THE CHALLENGE, MR. ROGERS SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED FROM

THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL AS MR. ROGERS IS IMPARTIAL AND

INDEPENDENT

Mr. Rogers had been appointed as an arbitrator by AAS and it is submitted that Mr. Rogers is

a person with utmost independence and impartiality which is evident from his declaration.

Any arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable

doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence. 56 The impartiality of Mr. Rogers is

not questionable because (A) Mr Roger’s declaration removes any doubts related to his

independence or impartiality and (B) International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflict of

Interest are not binding and should not be used [ Hereinafter referred to as “IBAGC”].

A. MR. ROGER’S DECLARATION REMOVES DOUBTS REGARDING HIS IMPARTIALITY AND

INDEPENDENCE

Mr Rogers has given a declaration as to his independence and impartiality and the declaration

in itself does not provide any cause for the arising of justifiable doubts regarding Mr. Roger’s

impartiality and independence.

Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, doubts are justifiable if they give rise to an

apprehension of bias that is, to the objective observer. 57 The test for ‘whether circumstances

exist that give rise to justifiable doubts’ is an objective one, pursuant to which it has to be

determined whether a reasonable person has justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's

impartiality.58 If the doubt had merely to arise in the mind of a party contesting the

impartiality of an arbitrator, ‘justifiable’ would have been almost redundant.59

56
Article 12 (1), UNCITRAL Rules
57
Vito Gallo v. Canada, Challenge Decision of 14 October 2009, para. 19. See also Grand River v. US,
Challenge Decision of 28 November 2007.
58
National Grid v. Argentina, Challenge Decision of 3 December 2007, paras 80 and 86-87.
59
'Chapter 5: Standard for Disqualification', in Karel Daele , Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators in
International Arbitration, International Arbitration Law Library, Volume 24 (© Kluwer Law International;

12
Mr. Rogers has declared the involvement of his colleagues in disputes related to AAS but the

subject matter of those disputes was very different from the one in the present case. The

present dispute relates to breach of contractual obligations in healthcare services, 60 while Mr.

Roger’s firm had earlier engaged with AAS in matters of loan financing and corporate

restructuring.61

Mr. Rogers himself has not appeared in any dispute or arbitrated any dispute for AAS and the

matters in which his colleagues had been involved have also been completed and disposed.

He further declared that he will not take up any other matters in relation to AAS till the

current proceedings in this case get terminated.

From an objective observer’s view, one cannot establish any relation between Mr Rogers and

AAS which may affect his independence and impartiality in the arbitral proceedings meaning

that there is no justifiable doubt on his impartiality or independence.

B. THE IBAGC REFERRED TO BY THE RESPONDENT ARE NOT BINDING

The Respondent has referred to IBA guidelines to prove the presence of justifiable doubts

regarding the impartiality of Mr. Rogers, however, these guidelines should not be applied to

judge independence or impartiality.

“The IBA Guidelines …. have been the subject of some criticism, on the grounds that they are

needlessly detailed and susceptible of encouraging challenges to …. arbitrators.”62 Further,

the IBAGC themselves provide that they “are not legal provisions and do not override any

applicable law or arbitral rules chosen by the parties.”63 It must be known that the Red and

Orange Lists are not conclusive and that each individual case's factual circumstances must be

Kluwer Law International 2012) pp. 217 - 268

60
Para 23 -32 proposition
61
Annexure B, Proposition
62
Gary B. Born , International Arbitration and Forum Selection Agreements, Drafting and Enforcing, Sixth
edition, Pg 88.
63
Para 6, pg 3 , International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflict of Interest [ Hereinafter IBAGC].

13
carefully examined in order to form an opinion regarding the allegation of lack of

independence or impartiality of an arbitrator.64

The IBAGC sets a very low standard for declaring arbitrators impartial and the factual

circumstances also are unique. Therefore, it is not the correct guidelines to be followed to

determine Mr. Roger’s impartiality. Only the UNCITRAL Rules should be used to determine

Mr. Roger’s impartiality as has been agreed upon under Clause 10 of the contract.

It is humbly submitted that there are no justifiable doubts to the impartiality or independence

of Mr. Roger as an arbitrator and the application of IBAGC is not justified. Hence, in case the

arbitral tribunal has authority with itself to adjudicate upon Mr. Roger’s appointment as an

arbitrator, Mr. Rogers must not be removed from the tribunal.

V. AAS WAS EXCUSED FROM ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONTRACT

DUE TO THANOS-20 VIRUS.

AAS and BHAI had under their contract, kept a force majeure clause which would absolve

them from certain obligations in the contract on the happening of certain events which may

inhibit performance of these obligation, if these events are out of the control of the parties.65

Force majeure is “an event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor controlled.”66 Covid-

19 was an unprecedented event that took place and justified the application of a force majeure

doctrine.67

“In several landmark cases including in Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co.1 68

and Energy Watchdog v. CERC69, the Supreme Court has applied the following tests to

determine validity of Force Majeure events:

64
Saba Fakes v. Turkey, Challenge Decision of 26 April 2008, para. 18.
65
Clause 10, Para 26, Proposition
66
Bryan A. Garner, Black’s law dictionary, 8th edition, Pg 1914.
67
Govt. memorandum no. F.18/4/2020-PPD, Ministry of Finance, Department of Expenditure, Procurement
policy division
68
Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., 1954 SCR 310
69
Energy Watchdog v. CERC, (2017) 14 SCC 80

14
  Whether the event qualifies as force majeure under the contract?

 Whether the risk of non-performance was foreseeable and able to be mitigated?”70

For an event to come under force majeure, it must be unpredictable, uncontrollable and

external.71

Thanos-20 like covid-19 and therefore would allow a similar logic to apply when it comes to

invoking of force majeure clause. It is therefore humbly submitted that AAS must be excused

from its obligations under the contract as firstly, Thanos-20 virus qualifies as a force-majeure

event and caused the breach of obligations [A] and secondly, risk of non-performance was

unforeseeable and could not be mitigated. [B]

A. THANOS-20 VIRUS QUALIFIES AS A FORCE MAJEURE EVENT AND CAUSED THE BREACH OF

OBLIGATIONS.

Thanos-20 virus was an unpredictable, uncontrollable and external event and it had caused

AAS to breach its obligations under the contract. Thanos-20 led to an uncontrollable and

unpredictable increase in patient data and that forced AAS to save data in servers located in

Runesia instead of Arnhurste in order to meet its performance obligations.72

The Canada Supreme Court in Atlantic Paper Stock Ltd v. St. Anne-Nackawic73 gave an

ideal meaning of force majeure as an Act of God, which generally operates to discharge a

contracting party when a supervening or supernatural event beyond the control of either party

makes performance of the contract impossible.74

70
, Force Majeure & Covid-19: The interplay that contracting world needs to know, HSA advocates, Pg 2,
https://www.legal500.com/developments/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2020/04/HSA-Corporate-Spring-
Cleaning-part-3.pdf
71
Fareya Azfar, The Force Majeure 'Excuse',Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2012), pp. 249
72
Para 27, Proposition
73
Atlantic Paper Stock Ltd v. St. Anne-Nackawic, [1976] 1 SCR 580.
74
Nwedu, C. N. (2021). THE RISE OF FORCE MAJEURE AMID THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC:
LEGITIMACY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ENERGY LAWS AND CONTRACTS. Natural Resources
Journal, 61(1), pg 4, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26988893

15
Pandemics and epidemics have long been accepted as ‘Act of God’. This is evident from the

ruling of the Supreme Court of Maine, USA in the case of Lakeman v. Pollard 75
where a

cholera outbreak was held as an act of God, or the case of Coombs v. Nolan76, where the

District Court for the Southern District of New York declared horse flu to be an Act of God.

Under English law, it has been held that the inability of a party to deliver an aircraft on time

due to a pandemic, causing a dearth of pilots fell within the force majeure clause.77

“In January 2021, there was the rise of Thanos-20….that quickly

spread all over the globe infecting half of the world’s population. This

caused a sudden influx of patients in Arnhurste, and consequently there

was an unexpected increase in the amount of data that AAS had to

process under the terms of the contract.”78

This sudden influx of patients had forced AAS to store data in Runesiai servers. This sudden

influx of patients was directly caused by Thanos-20 virus itself and this establishes a direct

causal link between the breach and the virus. Furthermore, as Thanos-20 was a pandemic, by

virtue of it infecting half of the world’s population, it comes under the category of ‘Act of

God’ which qualifies it as a force majeure event.

As the Thanos-20 virus is an Act of God and has resulted in the overloading of servers which

caused the breach, it is humbly submitted that Thanos-20 virus qualifies as a force majeure

event and has a direct causal link with the breach of obligations by AAS.

75
Lakeman v. Pollard, 43 Me. 463, 466 (1857)
76
Coombs v. Nolan, 6 F. Cas. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1874),
77
Aviation Holdings Ltd. v. Aero Toy Store LLC, [2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 668
78
Para 27, proposition

16
 B. RISK OF NON-PERFORMANCE WAS UNFORESEEABLE AND COULD NOT BE MITIGATED

Act of God is “An overwhelming, unpreventable event caused exclusively by forces of

nature.”79 “Act of God [is] an operation of natural forces so unexpected that no human

foresight or skill could reasonably be expected to anticipate it.”80

As submitted earlier, Thanos-20 was an act of God and as mentioned in the preceding

paragraph, acts of God are unpreventable and unforeseeable Thanos-20 being an act of God

was unforeseeable and unpreventable.

This unpreventable and unforeseeable nature of the virus meant that AAS could not prepare

in advance for the influx of patient data and if it would not have stored the data in servers

located in Runesia, then it would have compromised the privacy of patients making it liable

under Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of Arnhurste.

Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the risk of non-performance was unforeseeable and

could not be mitigated and this coupled with the fact, that the Thanos-20 virus qualifies as a

force majeure event and has a direct causal link with the breach of obligations by AAS,

absolves AAS from liability for breach of obligations due to applicability of the force

majeure clause in the contract.

79
Bryan A. Garner, Black’s law dictionary, 8th edition, pg 101.
80
P.H. Winfield, A Textbook of the Law of Tort § 16, at 45–46 (5th ed. 1950).

17
 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore in the light of facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments advanced,

it is most humbly and respectfully prayed that this Learned Arbitral Tribunal may be pleased

to:

 Hold Arnhurste liable for any damages or compensation under

International Humanitarian Law and International Environmental

law and order Arnhurste to pay compensation for the damage

caused to Runesia.

 Order the designation of an appointing authority to adjudicate upon

the challenge Mr. Steve Roger’s appointment as an arbitrator.

 Relieve Alice Analytic Solutions of all liability for the breach of

contractual obligations and order Bansal Healthcare Association

Inc. to disburse the pending payment for its use of the services the

claimant.

And further pass any other order in favour of the Claimants, as this Court may so deem fit in

the ends of equity, justice and good conscience.

Date: 13 August, 2022. Counsel no. 023A

Place: Odin Throne, Runesia (Counsel for the Claimants)

18