023R

IN THE

LEARNED ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL

AT ODIN THRONE

IN THE MATTERS OF

COMPLAINT NO. XXXX/2022

UNION OF RUNESIA (REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENT, UNION OF RUNESIA)

………………………………………………………….………………………........CLAIMANT

V.

UNION OF ARNHURSTE (REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF ARNHURSTE)

….............................................................................................................................RESPONDENT

[UNDER MASABA TREATY, 1959]

Clubbed with

COMPLAINT NO. YYYY/2022

ALICE ANALYTIC SOLUTIONS (REPRESENTED BY THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, ALICE

ANALYTIC SOLUTIONS) ………………………………………………………….…

CLAIMANT

V.

BANSAL HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION INC. (REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

OFFICER, BANSAL HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION INC.) ….…………………......RESPONDENT

[UNDER CLAUSE 12 OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN ALICE ANALYTIC SOLUTIONS AND BANSAL

HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION INC.]

[THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTERS HAVE BEEN CLUBBED UNDER MASABA TREATY, 1959]

ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES......................................................................................................v

STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................................................xi

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION......................................................................................xiii

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION.........................................................................................xiv

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.............................................................................................xv

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED...................................................................................................1

I. ARNHURSTE IS NOT RESPONSIBLE OR LIABLE FOR THE

ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE CAUSED TO RUNESIA UNDER INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAW......................................................................................................1

A. There was a threat to the territorial integrity of the State of Arnhurste by the

actions of Runesia..............................................................................................................1

B. The actions of Arnhurste constitute an act of self-defence......................................2

C. The actions of Arnhurste are not in violation of International Humanitarian Law. 7

II. THE GOVERNMENT OF ARNHURSTE IS NOT LIABLE AND RESPONSIBLE

FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE CAUSED TO RUNESIA UNDER

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW..................................................................8

A. The protection of the environment cannot be absolute during an armed conflict.. .8

B. The damage to the village of Cundur was neither widespread, long-term, nor

severe..................................................................................................................................9

iii
 III. THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL, WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF MR.

ROGERS, SHOULD DECIDE THE CHALLENGE AGAINST THE APPOINTMENT OF

MR. ROGERS......................................................................................................................10

A. The Arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to decide on challenges to appointment of

arbitrators.........................................................................................................................10

B. Mr Rogers deciding on a challenge on his own appointment would be unfair.....13

IV. MR. ROGERS SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED FROM TAKING PART AS AN

ARBITRATOR UNDER ARTICLE 12 (1) OF UNCITRAL RULES................................14

A. There are justifiable doubts as to Mr. Roger’s independence and partiality under

IBAGC.............................................................................................................................14

B. Relevant lex loci arbitri also points towards presence of justifiable doubts

regarding independence and impartiality of Mr. Rogers.................................................16

V. AAS WAS NOT EXCUSED FROM ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE

CONTRACT DUE TO THANOS-20 VIRUS.....................................................................17

PRAYER FOR RELIEF...........................................................................................................19

iv
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

ADVISORY OPINION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996, ICJ report

1996........................................................................................................................................6

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

Advisory Opinion of July 9, 2004, ICJ Rep (2004),..............................................................4

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996I.C.J. 241...........7

REGULATIONS

ICRC, Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict, 2020,

para.....................................................................................................................................5, 6

International Bar association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration,

2014................................................................................................................................14, 15

UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as revised in 2010)................................................................14

PROPOSITION

Annexure A..............................................................................................................3, 5, 6, 9, 10

Annexure B..............................................................................................................................17

Para 10............................................................................................................................3, 5, 6, 9

Para 11..................................................................................................................................3, 10

Para 16......................................................................................................................................10

Para 26......................................................................................................................................13

Para 30......................................................................................................................................11

Para 6....................................................................................................................................7, 11

Para 7..........................................................................................................................................7

v
Para 8..............................................................................................................................2, 3, 4, 5

Para 9......................................................................................................................................3, 9

JOURNALS, BOOKS AND REPORTS

56 ILA, Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force (2018) 12.......................................5

Born, International Commercial Arbitration............................................................................12

Bothe, M., Bruch, C., Diamond, J. and Jensen, D., 2010. International law protecting the

environment during armed conflict: gaps and opportunities. International Review of the

Red Cross, 92(879).................................................................................................................9

Bryan A. Garner, Black’s law dictionary, 8th edition..............................................................17

Buss D., Prosecuting Mass Rape: Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and

Zoran Vukovic. Feminist Legal Studies, 2002,......................................................................3

Corten, O., & Klein, P. (Eds.). (2011). The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: a

commentary (Vol. 1). Oxford Commentaries on International Law......................................7

De Schutter, O., 2011. Human Rights and the Rise of International Organisations: The Logic

of Sliding Scales in the Law International Responsabilité.....................................................9

Dinstein, Encyclopedia Of Public International Law, 1982......................................................4

Feris and Greenberg, ‘References to the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in

International Arbitration when deciding on arbitrator independence in ICC cases’............15

Fisher, E.C., Jones, J.S. and von Schomberg, R. eds., 2006. Implementing the precautionary

principle: perspectives and prospects.....................................................................................8

Five Lessons from the Pandemic for Health Care Systems, BCG Publications......................18

Gary B. Born, International Arbitration and Forum Selection Agreements Drafting and

Enforcing, , Sixth Edition.....................................................................................................15

Hulme Karen, War-Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold, Leiden: Martinus

Nijhoff Publishers..................................................................................................................9

vi
J.F. Flauss, Les Nouvelles Fronti`eres du Droit International Humanitaire, Brussels...............7

James Crawford, International Law Commission’s Articles On State Responsibility:

introduction, text, and commentaries, Cambridge University press......................................4

Jarvin, ‘Le lieu de l’arbitrage’ (1993)......................................................................................12

Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Identifying and applying the law governing the arbitral procedure: The

role of the law of the place of arbitration’............................................................................12

Klaus Peter Berger, Private Dispute Resolution in International Business: Negotiation,

Mediation, Arbitration (Third Edition), 3rd edition (© Kluwer Law International; Kluwer

Law International 2015).......................................................................................................14

Luan Low & David Hodgkinson, Compensation for Wartime Environmental Damage:

Challenges to International Law after the Gulf War, 35 VA. J. INT'l L. 405 (1995)............8

Meyrowitz, Henri. "The principle of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering: From the

Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 to Additional Protocol 1 of 1977." International

Review of the Red Cross (1961-1997) 34, no. 299 (1994)....................................................9

Niculescu, L., 2018. The Fundamental Right to a Healthy and Ecologically Harmonious

Environment. EIRP Proceedings............................................................................................7

Nurbani, E.S., 2018. Environmental protection in international humanitarian law. Unram Law

Review....................................................................................................................................7

Nurbani, Erlies Septiana. "Environmental protection in international humanitarian law."

Unram Law Review 2, no. 1................................................................................................10

O'Brien, The Meaning of 'Military Necessity in International Law, WORLD POLITY 109,

1957........................................................................................................................................4

Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th edition,1992....................................................................1

Park, ‘The lex loci arbitri and international commercial arbitration’......................................12

Redfurn and hunter on international arbitration, 6 th edition.............................................12, 15

vii
Roberts, G.B., 1985. The New Rules of Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of

Additional Protocol I. Va. J. Int'l L., 26.................................................................................9

Rosenstock R., The Declaration Of Principles Of International Law Concerning Friendly

Relations: A Survey., American Journal of International Law..............................................1

Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: An Appraisal of the First International War Crimes

Trial Since Nuremberg. Alb. L. Rev., 1996,..........................................................................2

Tomohiro Mikanagi, Establishing a Military Presence in a Disputed Territory: Interpretation

of Article 2(3) and (4) of the UN Charter, Cambridge University press...............................1

Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict,

Cambridge..............................................................................................................................7

NOTIFICATIONS AND RESOLUTIONS

General Assembly, Resolution no. 2625, Oct. 24, 1970, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625................1, 2

STATUTES, TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

Arbitration and Conciliation act,1996, India......................................................................12, 16

Article 2, Geneva Convention, 1949..........................................................................................2

Article 25, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001. .3

Charter of the United Nations, art 2(4), Oct. 24, 1945 1 U.N.T.S. 16...................................1, 2

Protocol Additions to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949.................................7, 8, 9

The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental

Modification Techniques of 18 May 1977...........................................................................10

UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration........................................13

United Nations Convention on the Rio Declaration of Environment and Development, June

15, 1992..................................................................................................................................8

United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.....................................................7

viii
CASES

Amec Civil Eng’g Ltd v. Secretary of State for Transp...........................................................14

BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC................................................................................................12

Day v. Savadge.........................................................................................................................13

Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda ICJ Reports, 2005............................................1

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J.......................................................5

Halliburton Offshore Services Inc v.Vedanta Limited and Another........................................17

Hungary. v. Slovakia., 1997 ICJ, 52..........................................................................................3

Kammergericht Berlin, Germany, 28 Sch 24/99, 22 March 2000,..........................................15

Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A.....................................................2

Shashoua & Ors v Sharma.......................................................................................................12

SulaméRica CIA and ors. v. Enesa Engenharia S.A and ors...................................................12

The Islamic Republic of Iran v. the United States of America..................................................2

The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America....................................................2

Thomas Bonham v College of Physicians...............................................................................13

ix
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Runesia v. Arnhurste

Following independence, a conflict broke out between the Runesia and Arnhurste because of

a boundary separation that favoured Arnhurste. The war was put to an end by the UN Masaba

Peace Treaty, which established an arbitration tribunal.

The nations later became economically and internationally engaged, joining the ICJ, VCLT,

and Convention on Biological Diversity (entailing jurisdiction of ICJ).

Runesia had attacked citizens of Arnhurste and had tried to infiltrate the country as well.

Arnhurste responded to this threat and as an act of self-defence launched Operation

Braveheart. On December 11, 2021, Arnhurste attacked Runesiai military truck on the basis

of received intel, however the intel proved to be false and the truck turned out to be a civilian

target

The Runesiai government wrongfully denounced this conduct, but Arnhurste refused to

accept responsibility for this saying that their actions were proportionate, that they were not

parties to the treaties addressing environmental harm from armed conflict, and that

International Humanitarian Law would not be applicable.

In order to resolve the issue, an arbitral tribunal was later established in accordance with the

Masaba Treaty.

Alice Analytic Solutions V. Bansal Healthcare Association Inc

Alice Analytic Solutions [ Hereinafter “AAS”] is a reputable Runesiai law-incorporated

healthcare data integration company. AAS was contacted by the Bansal Healthcare

Association [hereinafter “BHAI”], a group of medical organisations, to provide a third-party

analyser for their health data.

x
This developed into a five-year contract with a dispute settlement, force majeure, and data

protection provision.

When Thanos-20 hit, AAS found an excuse to save costs and breach contractual obligations

and kept the user data on local Runesiai servers due, to which the BHAI management

responded and suspended payment.

This prompted AAS to file a notice of arbitration, and they duly named Mr. Steve Rogers

[Hereinafter “Mr. Rogers”] as the arbitrator from their side in accordance with clause 12 (a)

of the contract in order to influence the proceedings as Mr Rogers and AAS had previous

relation.

As a response, BHAI demanded Mr. Rogers' resignation and asserted that, in accordance

with UNCITRAL regulations, the arbitral tribunal and not the appointing body, should decide

the case that too without Mr. Roger’s presence. As a result, an arbitration tribunal has been

established to assess if Mr. Rogers’s appointment is valid and whether Force Majeure will

apply to breach of obligations.

xi
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The respondents most humbly submit that this Hon’ble Arbitral Tribunal at Odin throne

Runesia has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate upon the matters of:

 COMPLAINT NO. XXXX/2022 filed under the Masaba Treaty of 1959.

 COMPLAINT NO. YYYY/2022 filed under Clause 12 of the contract of service

entered between Alice Analytical Solutions and Bansal Healthcare Association Inc.

The above-mentioned matters have been clubbed by the Learned Arbitral Tribunal under its

power granted under Clause 12 of the contract of service entered between Alice Analytical

Solutions and Bansal Healthcare Association Inc. and under United Nations Commission on

International Trade Law, Arbitration Rules.

All of which is urged in detail in the written submission and submitted most respectfully.

The parties most humbly submit to the jurisdiction of this Learned Tribunal

xii
 ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

I. IS ARNHURSTE RESPONSIBLE AND LIABLE FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL

DAMAGE CAUSED TO RUNESIA UNDER INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN LAW?

II. IS ARNHURSTE RESPONSIBLE AND LIABLE FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL

DAMAGE CAUSED TO RUNESIA UNDER INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW?

III. SHOULD THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL DECIDE ON THE CHALLENGE OF MR.

ROGERS AND IF SO WITH OR WITHOUT HIS PARTICIPATION?

IV. IN CASE THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL HAS AUTHORITY TO DECIDE ON THE

CHALLENGE, SHOULD MR. ROGERS BE REMOVED FROM THE ARBITRAL

TRIBUNAL?

V. WHETHER ON ACCOUNT OF THANOS-20, AAS WAS EXCUSED FROM ITS

OBLIGATIONS TO COMPLY WITH CLAUSE 7 OF THE CONTRACT?

xiii
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. ARNHURSTE IS NOT RESPONSIBLE OR LIABLE FOR THE

ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE CAUSED TO RUNESIA UNDER

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.

II. THE GOVERNMENT OF ARNHURSTE IS NOT LIABLE AND RESPONSIBLE

FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE CAUSED TO RUNESIA UNDER

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW.

III. THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL, WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF MR.

ROGERS, SHOULD DECIDE THE CHALLENGE AGAINST THE

APPOINTMENT OF MR. ROGERS.

IV. MR. ROGERS SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED FROM TAKING PART AS AN

ARBITRATOR UNDER ARTICLE 12 (1) OF UNCITRAL RULES.

V. AAS WAS NOT EXCUSED FROM ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE

CONTRACT DUE TO THANOS-20 VIRUS.

xiv
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. ARNHURSTE IS NOT RESPONSIBLE OR LIABLE FOR THE

ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE CAUSED TO RUNESIA UNDER

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.

It is most humbly submitted that the Government of Arnhurste is not liable and responsible

for the environmental damage caused to Runesia under International Humanitarian Law

(hereinafter, “IHL”).

Firstly, there was a threat to the territorial integrity of the State of Arnhurste. [A] Secondly,

the actions of Arnhurste constitute an act of self-defence. [B] Thirdly, there is no violation of

any provisions of treaties of IHL. [C]

A. THERE WAS A THREAT TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE STATE OF ARNHURSTE BY THE

ACTIONS OF RUNESIA.

The drone attacks on Arnhurste along with attempted infiltration by the Runesiai army poses

a significant threat to the territorial integrity of the Arnhurste.

The right to territorial integrity is an internationally recognised principle under Article 2(4) of

the United Nations Charter (hereinafter, “UN Charter”).1 Further, armed interventions or

attempted threats against the personality of the state are in violation of International Law. 2 It

was held that the use of force "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any

state" is prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.3

1
Charter of the United Nations, art 2(4), Oct. 24, 1945 1 U.N.T.S. 16 [Hereinafter U.N. Charter]; General
Assembly, Resolution no. 2625, Oct. 24, 1970, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625; Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th
edition,1992, pg. 653.
2
General Assembly, Resolution no. 2625, Oct. 24, 1970, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625; Rosenstock R., The
Declaration Of Principles Of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey., American Journal of
International Law, 1971, pp.713-735.
3
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda ICJ Reports, 2005, pp. 168, 223; Tomohiro Mikanagi,
Establishing a Military Presence in a Disputed Territory: Interpretation of Article 2(3) and (4) of the UN
Charter, Cambridge University press, 2018

1
The use of force through the medium of the open firing of the Runesiai drones constitutes a

breach of Arnhurste’s territorial integrity according to International Law principles.4

Therefore, the actions of Runesia constitute a threat to Arnhurste’s right under Article 2(4) of

the UN Charter

B. THE ACTIONS OF ARNHURSTE CONSTITUTE AN ACT OF SELF-DEFENCE.

The actions of Arnhurste under operation Braveheart were only an act of self defence in

response to the territorial threat imposed by Runesia.

The right to territorial sovereignty is provided under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. 5

However, this power is limited to circumstances of self-defence as provided under Article 51

of the U.N. Charter.6 The three cumulative elements to be present in a situation to justify self-

defence are firstly, that there was an existence of armed conflict [1.]; secondly, that the

response to the attack was imminent and necessary; lastly the attack was proportionate to the

harm caused [3]. 7

1. There was an existence of armed conflict.

The differences arising between states and leading to the intervention of members of the

armed forces is an armed conflict.8

Armed conflict can be qualified as an international one, if the military intervention of two or

more States are required along with use of armed violence. 9 The laws of armed conflict will

4
Para 8, Proposition.
5
U.N. Charter; General Assembly, Resolution no. 2625, Oct. 24, 1970, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625
6
U.N. Charter; The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America, 1986 I.C.J. 14, para 209.
7
The Islamic Republic of Iran v. the United States of America, Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 2003, p. 161.
8
Article 2, Geneva Convention, 1949
9
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, para 70; Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic:
An Appraisal of the First International War Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg. Alb. L. Rev., 1996, p.861.

2
apply through the territory of the warring states till a state of general peace is achieved,

regardless of whether there is actual combat taking place or if there is a sporadic incident.10

In the given instance, legal armed forces of the Arnhurste11 and Runesia12 were involved in an

armed conflict. The actions of the Arnhurste’s troops were part of Operation Braveheart, 13

with target being the contingent of troops of Runesia.14 Even tough, sporadic and scattered

incidents of Runesiai infiltration 15, killing of three civilians by Runesiai drones 16 and

Arnhursten retaliation17 was seen, laws of armed conflicts shall still apply.

Therefore, it is evident that owing to engagement of armed forces, along with armed

violence, there was an existence of armed conflict.

2. The response to the attack was imminent and necessary.

The state can plead the necessity to engage in a belligerent act if it is meant to protect its vital

interests from imminent danger.18 The three elements to invoke necessity are firstly, the act

must have been invoked by the need to protect an essential interest of the acting state[i.];

secondly, the essential interest must be threatened by grave and imminent peril [ii]; lastly, the

actions must have been the only means available to safeguard that interest[iii]. 19 Also, the

target must be a military object.

10
Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, para 57; Buss
D., Prosecuting Mass Rape: Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic. Feminist
Legal Studies, 2002, pp.91-99.
11
Para 8, Proposition
12
Para 9, Proposition
13
Para 9, Proposition
14
Para 10, Proposition; Para 11, proposition
15
Para 8, Proposition
16
Para 8, Proposition
17
Para 9, Proposition: Para 10, Proposition; Para 11, Proposition; Annexure A, Proposition;
18
Hungary. v. Slovakia., 1997 ICJ, 52, para 51–52.
19
Article 25, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001

3
 i. The attack on Runesia was to protect the lives of Arnhursten citizens and strategic

property of Arnhurste.

The security of the states is among state’s vital interests. A state shall not be prevented from

using self-defence in circumstances where the lives of its citizens or properties are at stake. 20

The essential interest being safeguarded must be of greater relevance than the interest of

foreign country being sacrificed.21 Necessarily, there needs to be a balance of interest rather

than absolute interest.22

In the given instance, ten Runesiai soldiers in plain clothes were caught infiltrating the

territory of Arnhurste.23 The drones flying over the border villages on the Arnhurste side

opened the fire on 9th December, 2022 and had killed three Arnhursten citizens.24

Hence, it is humbly submitted that the attack on Runesia was to protect the lives of

Arnhursten citizens and strategic property of Arnhurste as protection of lives of Arnhursten

citizens and property of Arnhurste outweighs its obligations to protect the environment.

ii. The essential interest must be threatened by grave and imminent peril.

The essential interest must be threatened by grave and imminent peril to invoke necessity.25

The imminent peril shall be objectively established and must not be merely apprehensible.26

In the given instance, ten Runesiai soldiers in plain clothes were caught infiltrating the

territory of Arnhurste.27

20
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of
July 9, 2004, ICJ Rep (2004), at ¶136.
21
James Crawford, International Law Commission’s Articles On State Responsibility: introduction, text, and
commentaries, Cambridge University press, 2002.
22
James Crawford, International Law Commission’s Articles On State Responsibility: introduction, text, and
commentaries, Cambridge University press, 2002.
23
Para 8, Proposition
24
Para 8, Proposition
25
Dinstein, Encyclopedia Of Public International Law, 1982, Military necessity.
26
O'Brien, The Meaning of 'Military Necessity in International Law, WORLD POLITY 109, 1957, pg 142-144.
27
Para 8, Proposition

4
The drones flying over the border villages on the Arnhurste side opened the fire on 9 th

December, 2021 and had killed three Arnhursten citizens. 28 Arnhurste immediately launched

Operation Braveheart on 10th December, 2021.29

Hence, it is humbly submitted that infiltration attempt by the Runesiai soldiers and killing of

the citizens, prove that there was existence grave danger. The immediate launch of Operation

Braveheart proves imminent nature of the peril. Thereby, essential interest of Arnhurste was

threatened by a grave and imminent peril.

iii. The actions must have been the only means available to safeguard that interest.

The armed attack in military necessity shall be the only available lawful recourse to safeguard

the essential interest of the belligerent state.30 The situation must be of such gravity that

exploring alternate recourses shall be unreasonable.31

In the given instance, the target was time sensitive. 32 Given the short time frame, mobilizing

ground forces was difficult and aerial operation was the only available means. Hence, it is

humbly submitted that aerial and drone attacks was the only available recourse to safeguard

essential Arnhursten interests.

iv. The target was a legitimate military target.

Attacks during an armed conflict must be directed against military objects and not civilian

objects.33 A "military objective" includes objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or

use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,

capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military

advantage.34
28
Para 8, Proposition
29
Para 10, Proposition
30
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, para 51.
31
56 ILA, Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force (2018) 12 https://www.ilahq.org/images/IL
32
Annexure A, Proposition
33
ICRC, Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict, 2020, para 98 [Hereinafter
ICRC Guidelines].
34
ICRC Guidelines, para 100.

5
In the given instance, the intelligence input received35 and the leaked transcript36 indicate

presence of hostile elements around the tankers.

Hence, it is humbly submitted that owing to the presence of hostile elements around the

tanker, the object had gained a military objective and shall be termed as a legitimate military

target and the presence of an imminent and necessary response is justified.

3. The attack was proportionate to the harm caused.

The proportionality principle requires that before destroying any natural resource site by

military activities, a balance of environmental harm and anticipated military benefits shall be

measured.37

In the given instance, the Joint Commander of the Operation Braveheart had conducted

proportionality test before the military attack, as evident from the leaked transcript. 38 The

exchange regarding distance of Cundur village, presence of hostile elements, collateral

damage estimate, conformity to rules of engagement indicate conduct of proportionality test

before the attack.39 Hence, it is respectfully submitted that the attack by Arnhurste was

proportionate to the harm caused.

Therefore, it is submitted that Arnhurste was justified in attacking Runesia as it was

exercising its right of self-defence to preserve territorial integrity and sovereignty while

following due process.

35
Para 10, Proposition
36
Annexure A, Proposition
37
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996, ICJ report 1996, ¶ 30.
[Hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Case].
38
Annexure A, Proposition
39
Annexure A, Proposition

6
C. THE ACTIONS OF ARNHURSTE ARE NOT IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

LAW

It is humbly submitted that the actions of Arnhurte are not in violation of IHL because the

Governments of Arnhurste and Runesia aren’t parties to the 1977 First and Second

Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (hereinafter “A.P. 1 and A.P. 2”)

Laws governing the resort to force (jus ad bellum) and laws regulating the conduct of

hostilities (jus in bello) are covered the ambit of International Humanitarian Law (hereinafter,

“IHL”).40 Even in the middle of the warfare, environmental protection must be enforced. 41

A.P. 1 provides for a prohibition on belligerents from using such means of military resources

that can cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment. 42

Further, a treaty cannot impose responsibilities on a State without that State's consent

according to Article 11 read with Article 17(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of

Treaties (hereinafter, “VCLT).43

In the present case, it should be noted that neither the State of Arnhurste nor the State of

Runesia is a party to the A.P. 1 and A.P. 2.44 However, it should be noted that both parties are

signatories to the VCLT. 45

40
Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge, 2004; J.F.
Flauss, Les Nouvelles Fronti`eres du Droit International Humanitaire, Brussels, 2003;
41
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996I.C.J. 241, ¶29 (July 8);Nurbani,
E.S., 2018. Environmental protection in international humanitarian law. Unram Law Review, 2(1).
42
Protocol Additions to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, art. 35(3) June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3; Niculescu, L., 2018. The Fundamental
Right to a Healthy and Ecologically Harmonious Environment. EIRP Proceedings, 13.
43
United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 11, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty
Series; United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 17(1), 23 May 1969, United Nations,
Treaty Series; Corten, O., & Klein, P. (Eds.). (2011). The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: a
commentary (Vol. 1). Oxford Commentaries on International Law.
44
Para 6, Proposition.
45
Para 7, Proposition

7
Thus, by the virtue of non-consent and lack of ratification of the Additional Protocols by both

the states, the Government of Arnhurste is not liable or responsible for its retaliatory actions

under IHL.

II. THE GOVERNMENT OF ARNHURSTE IS NOT LIABLE AND

RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE CAUSED TO

RUNESIA UNDER INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW.

It is most humbly submitted that the Government of Arnhurste is not liable and responsible

for the environmental damage caused to Runesia under International Environmental Law

(hereinafter, “IEL”).

The above is most humbly submitted as firstly, the protection of the environment cannot be

absolute during an armed conflict and [A] secondly, the damage to the village of Cundur was

neither widespread nor long-term and nor severe [B]

A. THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT CANNOT BE ABSOLUTE DURING AN ARMED

CONFLICT.

During an armed conflict, if it is proved for there is an incidental destruction of civilian

objects, including the environment, is not indiscriminate and such destruction is considered as

collateral damage rather than intentional. 46 If feasible precautions have been taken through a

proportionality analysis test, then this equally permissible under the precautionary principle. 47

46
Protocol Additions to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, art. 51(1)(b), June 8, 1977; Luan Low & David Hodgkinson, Compensation
for Wartime Environmental Damage: Challenges to International Law after the Gulf War, 35 VA. J. INT'l L.
405 (1995).
47
United Nations Convention on the Rio Declaration of Environment and Development, June 15, 1992, princ. 15
I.L.M. 876; Protocol Additions to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 57, June 8, 1977; Fisher, E.C., Jones, J.S. and von Schomberg, R.
eds., 2006. Implementing the precautionary principle: perspectives and prospects.

8
Moreover, under the sliding-scale theory, there is an inverse relationship in the application of

IEL in determining environmental depending on the intensity of the armed conflict.48

The intended target under Operation Braveheart were the military trucks on the basis of

intelligence received and the damages caused by the GBU-38 bombs were merely collateral. 49

Further, a thorough feasibility study was conducted by the Joint Commander to determine the

Collateral Damage Estimate which was expected to minimal given the non-proximate nature

of Cundur’s civilian and environmental structures50. Furthermore, given that the drone attacks

indicted higher levels of military engagement, the application of environmental law according

to the sliding-scale diminishes allowing way for military necessities as exceptions. 51Thus,

Arnhurste cannot be held liable for damages caused to Runesia.

B. THE DAMAGE TO THE VILLAGE OF CUNDUR WAS NEITHER WIDESPREAD, LONG-TERM, NOR

SEVERE.

States are required to make sure that care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural

environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage. 52

However, there is no fixed

threshold for these three-standard provided for under International Environmental Law and it

is determined on a case-to-case basis.53 The Understandings Section of the ENMOD has

qualified these terms as purely as an explanatory standard wherein: widespread involves,

encompassing an area of several hundred square kilometres, long-lasting means lasting for a

48
Bothe, M., Bruch, C., Diamond, J. and Jensen, D., 2010. International law protecting the environment during
armed conflict: gaps and opportunities. International Review of the Red Cross, 92(879), pp.569-592; De
Schutter, O., 2011. Human Rights and the Rise of International Organisations: The Logic of Sliding Scales in
the Law International Responsabilité.  pp.55-12.
49
Para 9, Proposition; Para 10, Proposition.
50
Annexure-A, Proposition.
51
Para 10, Proposition.
52
Protocol Additions to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, art. 35(3), June 8, 1977; Roberts, G.B., 1985. The New Rules of Waging War:
The Case Against Ratification of Additional Protocol I. Va. J. Int'l L., 26, p.109.
53
Hulme Karen, War-Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
p. 93, (2004); Meyrowitz, Henri. "The principle of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering: From the
Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 to Additional Protocol 1 of 1977." International Review of the Red Cross
(1961-1997) 34, no. 299 (1994): 98-122.

9
period of months and severe involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life,

natural and economic resources or other assets.54

The first prong of widespread doesn’t apply to the present case as the damage caused was

limited to the 100-m radius of the bomb. 55

The second prong of long-lasting cannot be

satisfied as according to the Estimates of the Government of Arnhurste, fire being part of the

natural landscape of the area, these affected parts are expected to soon.56 The third prong of

severe cannot be satisfied as the intended damage was restricted to the three trucks and was

brought about after the feasibility analysis test57. Thus, there is no liability on part of

Arnhurte.

III. THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL, WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF MR.

ROGERS, SHOULD DECIDE THE CHALLENGE AGAINST THE

APPOINTMENT OF MR. ROGERS

The arbitral tribunal and not an appointing authority should decide on the challenge to the

appointment of Mr. Rogers as an arbitrator, that too without his participation as the arbitral

tribunal has jurisdiction to decide on the challenge to appointment of arbitrator (A) and Mr

Rogers deciding on a challenge on his own appointment would be unfair. (B)

A. THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL HAS JURISDICTION TO DECIDE ON CHALLENGES TO

APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS

The Arbitral tribunal only and not an appointing authority has the jurisdiction to hear on

matters pertaining to a challenge on the appointment of an arbitrator as the parties in this case

54
The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques of 18 May 1977: 1108 U.N.T.S. 151, The Understandings Section; Nurbani, Erlies Septiana.
"Environmental protection in international humanitarian law." Unram Law Review 2, no. 1 (2018).
55
Para 11, Proposition.
56
Para 16, Proposition.
57
Annexure A, Proposition.

10
have excluded the role of any appointing authority (1) and the applicable Lex arbitri puts the

challenge under the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. (2)

1. The parties under their contract have excluded the role of any appointing

authority

The parties have excluded the role of any appointing authority.

The parties under the arbitration clause in the contract have excluded the involvement of any

appointing authority as clause 12 of the agreement spells out clearly that the proceedings

would be carried out “without any involvement of an arbitral institution.” 58 Further, it was

also stated by BHAI, that an appointing authority had been excluded from the contract.59

The exclusion of the involvement of arbitral institutions shows an intention towards exclusion

of appointing authorities as under article 6 of UNCITRAL, arbitral institutions can be

selected as appointing authorities. BHAI’s statements also prove that appointing authority

was excluded from the contract.

Therefore, it is concluded that the parties under their contract have excluded the role of any

authority which is visible from their intention and BHAI’s statements.

2. The applicable ‘Lex arbitri’ puts the challenge under the jurisdiction of the

arbitral tribunal.

The parties have excluded themselves from the application of certain sections of the

UNCITRAL Rules by excluding appointing authorities from their arbitration proceedings as

submitted above. Therefore, to fill these gaps, the lex arbitri will be influenced bu the lex loci

arbitri which in this case puts the challenge to the appointment of arbitrator under the

jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.

58
Clause 12, Para 6, Proposition
59
Para 30, Proposition

11
 “(A)n arbitration does not exist in a legal vacuum. It is regulated, first, by the rules of

procedure that have been agreed or adopted by the parties and the arbitral tribunal;

secondly, it is regulated by the law of the place of arbitration. It is important to

recognise at the outset…. that this dualism exists”60

An agreement to arbitrate will typically have a closer and more real connection with the place

where the parties have chosen to arbitrate than with the place of the law of the underlying

contract.61 The concept that an arbitration between parties would be governed by the law of

the place in which it is held, which is the ‘seat’ (or ‘forum’, or locus arbitri) of the

arbitration, has been established since a long time.62 This principle is evident in the wording

of the 1923 Geneva Protocol to the New York Convention whose article 2 states: ‘the arbitral

procedure, including the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, shall be governed by the will of

the parties and by the law of the country in whose territory the arbitration takes place.63

It must be noted that in the absence of an express mention of the seat of arbitration, the venue

of the arbitration would be deemed to be the juridical seat since the venue of arbitration is

most closely connected with the arbitral proceedings.64

According to Runesiai laws the challenge to the appointment of an arbitrator must be

adjudicated upon by the arbitral tribunal itself.65 This law is further in consonance with

UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as this model law also

places such jurisdiction in the hands of the arbitral tribunal.66

60
Redfurn and hunter on international arbitration, 6 th edition, para 3.04, pg 156.
61
SulaméRica CIA and ors. v. Enesa Engenharia S.A and ors, [2012] EWHC 42 (Comm), para 12 while
referring to C v. D, [2007] EWCA Civ 1282.
62
Park, ‘The lex loci arbitri and international commercial arbitration’ (1983) 32 ICLQ 21; Jarvin, ‘Le lieu de
l’arbitrage’ (1993) 4 ICC Bulletin 7; Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer Law
International, 2014), pp 1530–1531. See also Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Identifying and applying the law governing
the arbitral procedure: The role of the law of the place of arbitration’ (1999) 9 ICCA Congress Series 336.
63
Redfurn and hunter on international arbitration, 6th edition, para 3.53, pg 172.
64
BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC, (2020) 4 SCC 234, Para 63 while referring to Shashoua & Ors v Sharma,
[2009] EWHC 957 (Comm).
65
Section 13 (3), Arbitration and Conciliation act,1996, India.
66
Article 13 (2), UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.

12
The parties in the case have failed to lay down a procedure under the UNCITRAL Rules to

challenge an arbitrator’s appointment. However, the parties have declared the place of

arbitration as Odin Throne, Runesia.67 This means that the Lex arbitri in this case would be

influenced by the Lex loci arbitri. Therefore, in such a situation of absence of delineated

proceedings, the procedural laws of Runesia, related to arbitration and challenge of

appointment of arbitrator should apply.

Hence, it is humbly submitted that the arbitral tribunal must adjudicate upon the challenge of

the appointment of Mr Rogers as it is empowered to do so by the Lex loci arbitri stemming

from Section 13 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation act, 1996.

Therefore, the arbitral tribunal should decide the challenge against the appointment of Mr.

Rogers as the lex arbitri has to be influenced by the lex loci arbitri due to exclusion of

jurisdiction of the appointing authority by the parties.

B. MR ROGERS DECIDING ON A CHALLENGE ON HIS OWN APPOINTMENT WOULD BE UNFAIR

The appointment of Mr Rogers has been challenged by BHAI. Mr. Rogers should not be

allowed to adjudicate upon his own challenge as it is against the principles of natural justice

and is unfair.

A man cannot be the judge of his own cause. 68 Making a man a judge in his own cause is

against natural equity.69 This principle of natural justice has been widely accepted in

international arbitration and has found place in the IBAGC as an “overriding principle”.70

“Allowing…. arbitrator to participate in the decision on

the challenge has been heavily criticized because

67
Clause 12 (c), Para 26, Proposition.
68
Thomas Bonham v College of Physicians, 77 Eng. Rep. 638
69
Day v. Savadge, 80 E.R. 235
70
International Bar association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 2014, Pg 17, para
2, part II [ Hereinafter referred to as “ IBAGC”]

13
 arbitrators should not be their own judge in matters of

challenge”71

Mr. Roger’s own appointment has been challenged by BHAI and him being a part of the

tribunal deciding on the challenge would be a gross violation of the principle of Nemo judex

in causa sua as he would be judging his own case.

Therefore, it is submitted that Mr. Roger’s presence in the tribunal deciding upon the

challenge to his appointment would be unfair and against the principles of natural justice.

IV. MR. ROGERS SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED FROM TAKING PART AS AN

ARBITRATOR UNDER ARTICLE 12 (1) OF UNCITRAL RULES

Mr. Roger should be disqualified from taking part in the arbitral proceedings as there exist

justifiable doubts as to the independence and partiality of Mr. Roger. This can be proved on

the basis of a perusal of the IBAGC guidelines (A) and a perusal of the lex loci arbitri (B)

A. THERE ARE JUSTIFIABLE DOUBTS AS TO MR. ROGER’S INDEPENDENCE AND

PARTIALITY UNDER IBAGC

Mr Roger’s independence and impartiality is questionable because of his firm’s prior

relations with AAS.

“[i]mpartiality is the watchword of all tribunals, including arbitrators.” 72 Any arbitrator may

be challenged if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s

impartiality or independence.73 A German court had held in March, 2000 that an arbitrator

could be challenged where the circumstances invoked gave rise to reasonable grounds for

71
'Part III, 23rd Scenario: Challenge of Arbitrator', in Klaus Peter Berger, Private Dispute Resolution in
International Business: Negotiation, Mediation, Arbitration (Third Edition), 3rd edition (© Kluwer Law
International; Kluwer Law International 2015) pp. 503
72
Amec Civil Eng’g Ltd v. Secretary of State for Transp. [2005] 101 ConLR 26, ¶73
73
Article 12 (1), UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as revised in 2010) [Hereinafter referred to as “ UNCITRAL
Rules”]

14
objectively suspecting its impartiality, and that proof that the arbitrator actually lacked

impartiality was not required.74

The IBAGC categorizes circumstances into three lists. Those matters that necessarily give

rise to justifiable doubts concerning independence find place in the “red list” while matters

that require disclosure and that may give rise to justifiable doubts as to an arbitrator’s

independence find their place in the “orange list”, additionally, matters that do not ordinarily

give rise to doubts regarding independence are placed in the “green list”.75

These Guidelines have gained general acceptance as a non-binding set of principles with

which most international arbitrators seek to comply. The Guidelines are relied upon heavily

by parties challenging arbitrators and those defending such challenges. 76 According to

research conducted by the ICC, of 187 challenges and contested confirmations handled by the

ICC Court between July 2004 and 1 August 2009, 106 referred to at least one example

contained in one of the non-exhaustive lists in the Guidelines.77

One of the entries in the non-waivable red list is:

“The arbitrator or his or her firm regularly advises the party, or an affiliate of the party,

and the arbitrator or his or her firm derives significant financial income therefrom.”78

Further entry 2.3.5 of the waivable red list takes into its purview a circumstance where:

“The arbitrator’s law firm had a previous but terminated involvement in

the case without the arbitrator being involved himself or herself.”79

74
UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,2012, pg
65 while referring to Kammergericht Berlin, Germany, 28 Sch 24/99, 22 March 2000,
75
Gary B. Born, International Arbitration and Forum Selection Agreements Drafting and Enforcing, , Sixth
Edition, pg. 87-88
76
Redfern And Hunter On International Arbitration 6th edition, Para 4.88, pg 258.
77
Feris and Greenberg, ‘References to the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration
when deciding on arbitrator independence in ICC cases’
78
Entry 1.4, pg 20, IBAGC
79
Entry 2.3.5, pg 21, IBAGC

15
Mr. Roger’s firm, Avengers and Partners has advised AAS on multiple matters and are still

open to accept new matters with relation to AAS. This position of the firm put the

circumstances well within the purview of the non-waivable red list of the IBAGC.

Furthermore, it must be noted that Avengers and Partners previous engagement with AAS

can also give rise to a justifiable doubt as to impartiality and independence under entry no.

2.3.5 of the IBAGC.

Therefore, it is humbly submitted that IBAGC are well accepted guidelines to judge doubts

regarding independence and impartiality of arbitrators and if Mr Rogers were to be judged on

the parameters of IBAGC, then most certainly the outcome would be the presence of

justifiable doubts as required under article 12 (2) of the UNCITRAL Rules.

B. RELEVANT LEX LOCI ARBITRI ALSO POINTS TOWARDS PRESENCE OF JUSTIFIABLE

DOUBTS REGARDING INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY OF MR. ROGERS

The Laws of Runesia or the Lex loci arbitri are relevant and point towards the presence of

justifiable doubts as regards to Mr. Roger’s independence and impartiality.

As submitted before, the lex loci arbitri has a deep connection with the lex arbitri even if the

parties have agreed upon a foreign law. The lex loci arbitri in this case would be the Laws of

Runesia as Odin throne, Runesia is the place of arbitration.

The 5th schedule of the arbitration and conciliation act, 1996 80 lists out situations which may

give rise justifiable doubts as to the independence or impartiality of arbitrators. The 6th entry

includes a situation wherein:

“The arbitrator’s law firm had a previous but terminated involvement

in the case without the arbitrator being involved himself or herself.”81

80
Arbitration concillation act, 1996, India
81
Schedule V, Arbitration and Concillation act, 1996, India

16
Avengers and Partners had assisted AAS on two matters pertaining to loan financing and

corporate restructuring,82 which is sufficient to bring the matter at hand within the purview of

entry 6.

As the situation at hand falls within entry 6, it can be concluded that even the lex loci arbitri

points towards a presence of justifiable doubts pertaining to the independence and

impartiality of Mr. Rogers as an arbitrator.

Therefore, it is humbly submitted that, since the well accepted IBAGC and even the lex loci

arbitri point towards justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of Mr. Rogers

as an arbitrator, Mr. Rogers must be excused from the arbitral tribunal as provided under

article 12 (2) of the UNCITRAL Rules.

V. AAS WAS NOT EXCUSED FROM ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE

CONTRACT DUE TO THANOS-20 VIRUS.

AAS was not excused from its obligation under force majeure as Thanos-20 virus cannot

qualify as a force majeure event.

Every breach or non-performance cannot be justified or excused merely on the invocation of

a pandemic as a Force Majeure condition.83 Force majeure is “an event or effect that can be

neither anticipated nor controlled.”84

Thanos-20 virus is not unforeseeable or not controllable as it came in January 2021- almost a

year after Covid-19. Covid-19 hit the world in 2020 and at first the world was shocked but it

82
Annexure B, Proposition
83
Halliburton Offshore Services Inc v.Vedanta Limited and Another 2020 SCC OnLine Del 542
84
Bryan A. Garner, Black’s law dictionary, 8th edition, Pg 1914.

17
managed to escape. Covid-19 gave lessons to the healthcare system and acted as a catalyst for

improvement.85

Pandemics like Thanos-20 virus were foreseeable after the Covid experience and the fact that

it was brought under control proves that patient influxes caused by the Thanos-20 Virus could

have been foreseen and controlled.

As Thanos-20 Virus was not unforeseeable or uncontrollable, it is humbly submitted that

Thanos-20 virus cannot be qualified as a force majeure event, thereby, making AAS liable for

breach of obligations under the contract.

85
Priya Chandran, Marcus Torelm, Cassandra Yong, and Jennifer Clawson, Five Lessons from the Pandemic for
Health Care Systems, BCG Publications, December,2020, https://www.bcg.com/publications/2020/five-lessons-
for-health-care-systems-covid-19.

18
 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore in the light of facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments advanced,

it is most humbly and respectfully prayed that this Learned Arbitral Tribunal may be pleased

to:

 Hold that Arnhurste is not liable for any damages or compensation

under International Humanitarian Law and International

Environmental law for the damage caused in Runesia.

 Adjudicate on the appointment of Mr Steve Rogers without his

presence as an arbitrator and to declare his appointment invalid.

 Hold Alice Analytic Solutions liable for the breach of contractual

obligations.

And further pass any other order in favour of the Appellants, as this Court may so deem fit in

the ends of equity, justice and good conscience.

Date: 13 August, 2022. Counsel no. 023R

Place: Odin Throne, Runesia (Counsel for the Respondents)

19