United States District Court: Northern District of California

Case 5:05-cv-00334-RMW Document 2180 Filed 09/11/2008 Page 1 of 17
1 (Parties Listed On Signature Page)
7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9 SAN JOSE DIVISION
10
11
RAMBUS INC., Case No. C 05-00334 RMW
12
Plaintiff, MANUACTURRS' OPPOSITION TO
13 RAMBUS INC.'S MOTION FOR
v. RECONSIDERA TION OF CLAIM
14 CONSTRUCTION ORDER FOR THE
HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNI FARMWALDIHOROWITZ PATENTS
15 SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC., HYNI
SEMICONDUCTOR MANUACTURING
16 AMERICA INC.,
17
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
18 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,
SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,
19 SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,
L.P.,
20
NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,
21 NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION
U.S.A.,
22
Defendants.
23
24
25
26
27
28
MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR

CASE No. C 05 00334 RMW
RECONSIDERATION OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
CASE No. C 05 02298 RM CASE No. C 06 00244 RMW
1 RAMBUS INC., Case No. C 05-02298 RMW

2 Plaintiff,
3 v.
4 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,
5 SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,
SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,
6 L.P.,
7 Defendants.
8
9 RAMBUS INC., Case No. C 06-00244 RMW
10 Plaintiff,
11 v.
12 MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC. and MICRON
SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS, INC.,
13
Defendants.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RMW

RECONSIDERATION OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION CASE No. C 05 02298 RM CASE No. C 06 00244 RMW
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
2
3 i. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
II. DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................... ........... 2
4
A. Rambus' s Motion Must Meet The Requirements Of Local Rule 7-9............ ......... 2
5
B. There Is No "Manifest Failure" Of The Court In Its Construction Of
6 "Memory Device" ........................................ ..... .... ....... ......................... .................. 3

1. Rambus Improperly Reargues The Specification And
7 Impermissibly Relies On Self-Serving Inventor Testimony That It
8
Could Have Previously Addressed.............................................................. 3
2. Rambus's Prosecution History Arguments Are Improper And
9 Irelevant................................................. ............................. ..... .................. 6
10 3. The Extrinsic Evidence Cited By Rambus Is Not Relevant To The
Meaning Of "Memory Device" .................... ............. ...... ..... .... ................... 8
11
III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 10
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
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22
23
24
25
26
27
28
MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RM

RECONSIDERATION OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION CASE No. C 05 02298 RM CASE No. C 06 00244 RMW
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 CASES
Page
3
4 Duarte v. Freeland
2008 WL. 496490 (N.D. CaL. Feb. 21, 2008).................................................................. 2, 3
5
Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd.
6
78 F.3d 1575 (Fed. cir. 1996)............................................................................................. 5
7
Howmedica Osteonics v. Wright Medical Technology
8 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18747 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 2, 2008)..................................................... 5
9 Mannick v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.

2006 WL. 2168877 (N.D. CaL. July 31, 2006)............................................................ 3, 4, 7
10
11 Napa Committee Redevelopment Agency v. Continental Insurance Co.

1995 WL. 714363 (N.D. CaL. Nov. 17, 1995)..................................................................... 3
12
Nazomi Communs., Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC
13 403 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................. 1
14
Philips v. A WH Corp.
15 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)................................................................................... 1,5,9
16 Space Systems/Loral v. Lockheed Martin Co.

2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26457 (N.D. CaL. Oct. 6, 2003)....................................................3
17
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co.
18
560 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. CaL. 2008) ............................................................................ 3,5
19
Wagner v. Flippo
20 2005 WL. 3260789 (N.D. CaL. Dec. 1, 2005) .....................................................................2
21
STATUTES
22
23 Civ. L.R. 7-9 .........................................................................................................................passim
24
25
26
27
28

RECONSIDERATION OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 11 CASE No. C 05 02298 RM CASE No. C 06 00244 RMW
1 i. INTRODUCTION
2 Pursuant to the Court's Order dated August 27, 2008 (D.E.I 2083), the
3 Manufacturers jointly submit this brief in opposition to Rambus's Motion for Reconsideration of
4 the Claim Construction Order for the FarmwaldIorowitz Patents ("Rambus Mot."). The Court
5 asked for this response to "ensure that the court has not committed a 'manifest failure'" in its
6 construction of the term "memory device" in the FarmwaldIorowitz patents. D.E. 2083 (Order
7 (08/27/08)) at 2:10-11. In its July 10, 2008 Claim Construction Order, the Court properly
8 construed the term "memory device" as "a device in which information can be stored and
9 retrieved electronically (that) need not be on a single chip." D.E. 1960 (Claim Construction
10 Order (07/10/08)) at 34:20-21. The Court properly concluded after thoroughly reviewing all of
11 Rambus's arguments and the pertinent portions of the specification that "the specification does
12 not clearly limit the scope of the invention to a single chip," and that Rambus's argument to
13 import a "single chip" limitation into the claims should be rejected. Id. at 34:18-19.
14 Now Rambus asks the Court to reconsider and reverse that ruling. The premise of
15 Rambus's motion is that the Court "misunderstood or overlooked key evidence that cannot be
16 squared with the Court's construction" of "memory device." Rambus Mot. at 1:6-7. That is
17 wrong. The Court carefully and properly considered the evidence before it and the arguments of
18 . the parties and concluded that there was no basis for importing a "single chip" limitation into the
19 claims. Rambus admits that the tactical reason it seeks a reversal is because the current
20 construction raises prior ar problems for Rambus based on the existence of "multi-chip" prior ar
21 references. Rambus Mot. at 1:20-22. Rambus's concern that the Court's claim construction
22 ruling is harful to its invalidity position is not a proper basis for obtaining reconsideration.
23 Nazomi Communs., Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("(Clourts
24 should not rewrite claims to preserve validity."); see also Philips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
25 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Nazomi).
26
27
i Docket Entry ("D.E.") in Rambus Inc. v. Hynix Semiconductor Inc., et aI, Case No. C 05-00334
28
RMW.
1 The Court's construction of "memory device" embodies no "manifest failure" by

2 the Court. It instead comprises a thorough analysis of the specification and the paries'
3 arguments. Rambus's motion for reconsideration does no more than rehash the same arguments
4 that it made in both its claim construction briefing and at the claim construction hearng. As
5 discussed below, the Court's local rules expressly prohibit such reargument. In addition, Rambus
6 ignores the numerous aspects of the specification that fully support the Court's claim
7 construction, as well the testimony of its own expert that the ordinary meaning of "memory
8 device" is not limited to a single chip. The Manufacturers thus respectfully submit that Rambus's
9 motion for reconsideration of the Court's construction of "memory device" should be denied.
10 II. DISCUSSION
11 A. Rambus's Motion Must Meet The Requirements Of Local Rule 7-9
12 "A motion for reconsideration may be made on one of three grounds: (1) a
13 material difference in fact or law exists from that which was presented to the Court, which, in the
14 exercise of reasonable diligence, the pary applying for reconsideration did not know at the time
15 of the order; (2) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law; or (3) a manifest failure
16 by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments presented before entry of
17 the order." Wagner v. Flippo, 2005 WL 3260789, at *1 (N.D. CaL. Dec. 1, 2005) (citing Civil
18 Local Rule ("Civ. L.R.") 7-9(b)(1)-(3)). Furthermore, "the moving pary may not reargue any
19 written or oral argument previously asserted to the Court." !d. (citing Civ. L.R. 7-9(c)
20 (prohibiting repetition of "any oral or written argument made by the applying pary in support of
21 or in opposition to the interlocutory order which the party now seeks to have reconsidered")).
22 Although Civ. L.R. 7-9 on its face applies to motions for leave to file a motion for
23 reconsideration, this Court routinely applies its prohibitions when considering the motion for
24 reconsideration itself, after leave has been granted for its filing, and thus there is no question Civ.
25 L.R. 7-9 applies here. See, e.g., Duarte v. Freeland, 2008 WL 496490, at *4 (N.D. CaL. Feb. 21,
26 2008) (holding that "the substantive standards laid out in Civ. L.R. 7-9(b) and (c) stil apply" to a
27 motion for reconsideration itself). For example, this Court recently denied a motion seeking
28 reconsideration of a claim construction term where the moving party failed to show under Civ.
MANUFACTUERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RM

1 L.R. 7-9(b)(1) that "it could not have provided the (relied-upon) evidence at the time of the claim
2 construction hearing." Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 560 F. Supp. 2d 835, 845
3 (N.D. CaL. 2008); see also Space Systems/Loral v. Lockheed Martin Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4 26457, at *4-6 (N.D. CaL. Oct. 6, 2003) (denying motion for reconsideration for failure to show
5 "manifest failure" under Civ. L.R. 7-9(b)(3)).
6 This Court routinely denies motions for reconsideration based on the Local Rule 7-
7 9(c) prohibition against repeating arguments previously made to the Court. See, e.g., Mannick v.
8 Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 2006 WL 2168877, at *18 (N.D. CaL. July 31, 2006); Duarte,
9 2008 WL 496490, at *5 (applying Civ. L.R. 7-9(c) in denying a motion for reconsideration);
10 Napa Comm. Redevelopment Agency v. Continental Ins. Co., 1995 WL 714363, at *6 (N.D. CaL.
11 Nov. 17, 1995) (denying motion for reconsideration because "(p )resenting the same argument that
12 has previously been considered and rejected is inappropriate in a motion for reconsideration.").
13 For example, the Court in Mannick, after granting leave to file a motion for reconsideration,
14 denied the motion itself in par because:
15
(I)t appears that plaintiff is attempting to use this motion for
reconsideration to re-argue his opposition to defendants' motion for
16
summary judgment. Civil Local Rule 7-9 provides that "(n)o
17 motion for reconsideration may repeat any oral or written argument
made b5' the applying party in support of or in opposition to the
18 interlocutory order which the pary now seeks to have
reconsidered." Civ. L.R. 7-9(c). The fact that plaintiff now cites to
19 different evidence in support of that argument does not make it a
20 new argument.
21 Mannick, 2006 WL 2168877, at *18. Rambus's entire motion for reconsideration is based on
22 arguments that violate Civ. L.R. 7-9.
23 B. There Is No "Manifest Failure" Of The Court In Its Construction Of
24
"Memory Device"
25 1. Rambus Improperly Reargues The Specification And Impermissibly

Relies On Self-Serving Inventor Testimony That It Could Have
26 Previously Addressed
27 In its claim construction ruling the Court specifically quoted and considered the
28 following passage in the specification: "one object of the present invention is to use a new bus
MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N:rO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RMW

1 interface built into semiconductor devices to support high-speed access to large blocks of data
2 from a single memory device by an external user of the data, such as a microprocessor, in an
3 efficient and cost-effective manner." D.E. 1960 (Claim Construction Order (07/10/08)) at 33:8-
4 11 (citing U.S. Patent No. 6,182,184 ('" 184 patent") 3:23-27) (emphasis added). The Court
5 concluded that this passage did not support the "single-chip" limitation that Rambus was seeking
6 to read into the claim. Rambus now seeks to reargue its prior argument based on this passage,
7 focusing on the Court's statement that "it is unclear why this sentence would compel a person of
8 ordinary skill in the art to interpret a 'memory device' as residing on a single chip" as a basis for
9 doing so. Id. Rambus seeks to use the self-serving and irrelevant testimony of the inventors
10 Farwald and Horowitz to argue that those skilled in the ar would understand that passage to
11 require that a memory device be limited to a single chip. Rambus Mot. at 2: 11-4:9.
12 Rambus's argument should be rejected for multiple reasons. As an initial matter,

13 Rambus is merely rearguing the same argument that it argued and lost below. See D.E. 312
14 (Rambus CC Brief (08/24/07)) at 10:3-12 (citing to specification); D.E. 469 (Rambus CC Reply
15 Brief (09/28/07)) at 9:23-10:3 (same); D.E. 1987 (CC Hearng Trans. (06/04/07)) at 129:8-130:7
16 (same). During the claim construction proceedings, the Court considered that specific portion of
17 the specification, along with numerous other passages, and concluded that it did not require
18 importation of a "single-chip" limitation into "memory device." D.E. 1960 (Claim Construction
19 Order (07/10/08)) at 32:19-35:9. As discussed above, Rambus is prohibited from rearguing this
20 point, even under the guise of raising "new" evidence (inventor testimony) to support that
21 argument. See Civil L.R. 7-9(b)(3); Mannick, 2006 WL 2168877, at *18 ("The fact that plaintiff
22 now cites to different evidence in support of that argument does not make it a new argument.").
23 Rambus's argument must thus be rejected.
24 Second, Rambus further violates the rules by relying on testimony that was
25 available to it at the time of the claim construction briefing and oral argument and that it failed to
26 cite. Rule 7-9(b)(1) precludes the reliance on evidence that was available to the movant at the
27 time of the original proceedings. The cited Farmwald and Horowitz testimony is from the
28 Conduct Trial, well before the claim construction proceedings here. Rambus has made no

1 showing, nor could it, that it could not have provided this testimony at the time of the claim
2 construction hearng. Denial of Rambus's motion for reconsideration can be premised on this
3 violation as well. Therasense, 560 F.Supp.2d at 845 (denying motion for reconsideration under
4 Civ. L.R. 7-9(b)(I); "The Court is not inclined to revisit its claim construction based on extrinsic
5 evidence that Abbott, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have brought to the attention
6 of the Court at the time of the claim construction hearing.").
7 Third, the inventor testimony on which Rambus relies is irrelevant to claim
8 construction, as the Federal Circuit recently held "that inventor testimony as to the inventor's
9 subjective intent is irrelevant to the issue of claim construction." Howmedica Osteonics v. Wright
10 Medical Technology, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18747, at *23 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 2, 2008); see also
11 Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Markman
12 requires us to give no deference to the testimony of the inventor about the meaning of the
13 claims."). Thus even if this Court were to entertain Rambus's citation to this testimony in
14 contravention of Civ. L.R. 7-9(b)(I), it would be irrelevant to the issue of claim construction,
15 which is precisely the reason why Rambus offers it.2
16 Fourth, even if this Court were to consider the merits of Rambus's argument, the
17 cited portion of the specification does not "compel" an interpretation of the specification to
18 require a single chip limitation. First, the passage from the specification that Rambus reargues
19 points to only "one object" of the invention. The specification identifies seven different objects.
20 See D.E. 409 (Declaration of L.Kalay (09/14/07)) at Exh. A (U.S. Patent 6,182,184) at 3:22-45.
21 Rambus has itself recognized that a claim need not meet all objects. D.E. 1987 (CC Hearng
22 Trans. (06/04/07)) at 17:21-18:1; 109:18-21 ("And this, again, is directly out of the Philips case
23 which said that an invention can be many objects and not each of the claims needs to be restricted
24 to each of the objects."); see also D.E. 469 (Rambus CC Reply Brief (09/28/07)) at 4:3-7.
25 Moreover, a device having multiple memory chips could stil constitute a "single memory device"
26
2 Further, the Farmwald and Horowitz testimony cited by Rambus does not even mention the
27 portion of the specification cited by Rambus or how these inventors would interpret it. The cited
testimony is thus irrelevant to Rambus's argument as to how these individuals would have
28
understood the paricular passage in the specification on which Rambus relies.
1 as recited by the specification. There is nothing in the specification that prevents such a
2 construction?
3 Rambus moreover ignores the numerous passages in the specification that support
4 the Court's construction of "memory device" (see D.E. 1960 (Claim Construction Order
5 (07/10/08)) at 32-15), as well as the testimony of Rambus's own expert, Robert Murphy, who
6 explained that the dictionary definitions relevant to the construction of "memory device" were not
7 limited to single chips. In support of Rambus's initial claim construction brief, Mr. Murphy cited
8 contemporaneous definitions of "storage device" in support of Rambus's proposed construction
9 of "memory device." D.E. 312 (Rambus Opening CC Brief (09/28/07)) at 10:13-16; D.E. 313
10 (Declaration of R. Murphy (8/24/07)) CJ73. The definitions Mr. Murphy relied on broadly defined
11 "storage device" as "any device or storage medium into which data can be stored and held until
12 some later time, and from which the entire original data can be obtained" and "any device in
13 which memory can be stored, sometimes called a memory device." Id. (emphasis added).
14 Contrary to Rambus's present position, none of Mr. Murphy's dictionary definitions is limited to
15 a "single chip." Indeed, Mr. Murphy admitted during his deposition that the definition of
16 "storage device" included devices that were not single chips. See D.E. 1759 (Declaration of L.
17 Kalay (05/21/08)) at Exh. A (Murphy Depo.) at 67:9-69:2. For these reasons, the Court should
18 reject Rambus' s request to reconsider its claim construction based on the specification and
19 inventor testimony.
20 2. Rambus's Prosecution History Arguments Are Improper And
21
Irrelevant
22 Rambus faults the Court for "not discuss(ing)" a portion of the prosecution history
23 on which Rambus relied in its claim construction briefing and at oral argument on claim
24 construction. Rambus Mot. at 4: 11-12. Rambus again merely repeats its prior argument (see
25 3 Rambus relies on other portions of the specification to argue that the statement in the
26 specification, "high-speed access to large blocks of data from a single memory device," refers to a
single memory chip. Rambus Mot. at 4 n.2. Rambus asserts that "a person of skill in the art"
27 would so understand the specification but Rambus provides no support for its assertion as to what
one skilled in the ar would understand. Moreover, Rambus could have, but failed to, raise this
28
additional argument during its argument below.
RECONSIDERATION OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 6 CASE No. C 05 02298 RMW CASE No. C 06 00244 RMW
1 D.E. 469 (Rambus's Claim Construction Reply Brief (09/28/07)) at 10:5-22 (citing rejection
2 based on the Jackson Patent); D.E. 1756 (Rambus's Suppl. Brief (05/21/08)) at 8:7-25 (same);
3 D.E. 1987 (CC Hearng Trans (06/04/08)) at 131:6-9 (same)), and thereby again violates Local
4 Rule 7-9(c). See Mannick, 2006 WL 2168877, at *18. Further, Rambus's criticism of the Court
5 for not "discussing" the prosecution history is flawed. There is no requirement that the Court
6 address in writing every single piece of infòrmation discussed by a party. Allowing
7 reconsideration on this ground would place an impossible burden on courts.
8 Even if the Court were to again consider this same argument, the portions of the
9 prosecution history relied on by Rambus do not constitute "clear evidence" that a memory device
10 is limited to a single chip, as Rambus urges. Rambus Mot. at 4:10-11. Rambus's argument is
11 based on pure unsupported conjecture as to why the examiner rejected the claims over the
12 Jackson patent and the reasons for the examiner's ultimate allowance of the claims. Rambus cites
13 no record of the examiner's reasons for allowing the claims of U.S. Patent 6,034,918 ("the '918
14 Patent) and provides no support for its arguments as to what the examiner understood or intended.
15 Indeed, Rambus's prosecution counsel made many representations to the Patent Office regarding
16 the Jackson Patent and further amended the claims after the rejection, only underscoring that there
17 could be any number of bases for the examner's rejections and allowance. See D.E. 471
18 (Declaration of P. Hubert (9/28/07)) at Exh. 6. Rambus's prosecution counsel in fact admits that
19 he was speculating regarding the memory structure in the Jackson Patent, and may very well have
20 misunderstood its function. Id., Exh. 6 at 12 ("Although Jackson does not describe the memory
21 or memory modules in any detail, it is most likely that. . ."). From the record, it is thus
22 impossible to determne the reasons why the examiner allowed the claims. Rambus's surmse
23 cannot constitute a basis for finding a manifest failure by the Court to read a "single chip"
24 limitation into the claim.
25 Moreover, Rambus points to nothing in the '918 Patent prosecution history that
26 contradicts the Court's construction of "memory device" and the Court's conclusion that the
27 claim term is not limited to a "single chip." Contrary to Rambus's argument, the phrase "memory
28 devices, and modules containing those devices," does not require memory devices to be

1 exclusively single chips. Rambus Mot. at 5 n.3. A single chip and a module with multiple chips
2 could both be memory devices, similar to a light bulb and a chandelier both being "lighting
3 devices." The fact that a single light bulb can be removed from a chandelier and called a lighting
4 device does not change the fact that a chandelier, which would have many light bulbs, is also a
5 "lighting device." Thus the '918 Patent prosecution history by no means provides any basis for
6 finding a "manifest failure" in the Court's claim construction.
7 Indeed, Rambus ignores key evidence supporting the Court's claim construction
8 that does not limit a memory device to a single chip. As the Manufacturers explained during
9 claim construction briefing, u.s. Patent No. 5,657,481 ('''481 patent"), which claims pIiority to
10 the 1990 FarmwaldIorowitz application, underscores that "memory device" is not so limited.
11 See D.E. 408 (Manfr.'s CC Opp's (09/14/07)) at 17:15-26. Specifically, multiple claims of the
12 '481 Patent require that the elements of the "memory device" reside on "a single semiconductor
13 substrate." D.E. 409 (Declaration of L. Kalay (9/15/07)) at Exh. F at 25:1-21 (claim 1); see also
14 id. at 28:36-39 (claim 18). If a "memory device" necessarly had to be a single chip, as Rambus
15 reargues here, there would have been no need for Rambus to limit "memory device" in the '481
16 Patent to a single chip. Rambus's construction of "memory device" would thus render claim
17 language in the' 481 Patent superfuous.

18 3. The Extrinsic Evidence Cited By Rambus Is Not Relevant To The
19
Meaning Of "Memory Device"
20 Rambus again faults the Court because its claim construction order "does not
21 address key extrinsic evidence that Rambus had brought to the Court's attention." Rambus Mot.
22 at 6:19-20. The extrinsic evidence that Rambus seeks to reargue is the testimony of Mr. Desi
23 Rhoden in what Rambus concedes to be "an unrelated interference action." !d. at 6:23-24. This
24 time Rambus admits that it "brought (this extrinsic evidence) to the Court's attention" during
25 claim construction briefing. Indeed Rambus made this identical argument in its claim
26 construction briefing and during oral argument. See D.E. 429 (Rambus's Reply CC Brief
27 (09/28/07)) at 11:3-5, n.17 (quoting Mr. Rhoden); D.E. 1987 (CC Hearng Trans. (06/04/08)) at
28

1 134:17-135:1 (same). This is yet another violation of the prohibition against reargument, and this
2 argument should thus be rejected on that basis alone. See supra Sec. A.
3 Even if the Court were to revisit this evidence, Mr. Rhoden's testimony should not
4 be given any weight because it was limited to the context of a different set of issues. First, Mr.
5 Rhoden provided this testimony for an interference before the Patent Office that did not involve
6 the FarwaldIorowitz patents. Mr. Rhoden made clear in his testimony that he was offering an
7 opinion specific to the facts of that case, not a general opinion on whether there are differences
8 between memory devices and memory chips. See D.E. 471 (Declaration of P. Hubert (09/28/07))
9 at Exh. 8 ("Q. Is there a difference between memory device and a memory chip? A. I think in
10 the context here, probably be very little difference." (emphasis added)). Second, both of the
11 filing dates at issue in that interference were long after the filing of the Farmwald application.
12 See Beynon Decl.4 Exh. A (U.S. Patent 6,502,161) (fied January 5, 2000); Beynon Decl. Exh. B
13 (Public PAIR entry for U.S. Application 11/203,652 (filed November 12, 1999)). Thus this
14 testimony has no relevance to how a person of skill in the ar in 1990 would understand the term
15 "memory device" in the FarwaldIorowitz patents, and should be rejected. In any event,
16 nothing requires the Court to use extrinsic evidence that is cited during claim construction and
17 thus there would be no error even if the Court in its discretion declined to consider this extrinsic
18 evidence here. Philips, 415 F.3d at 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("(I)t is permssible for the district
19 court in its sound discretion to admit and use such (extrinsic) evidence.").
20
21
22
23
24
25 / / /
26 / / /
27
4 Declaration of John Beynon in Support of Manufacturers' Opposition to Rambus 'inc.'s Motion
28
for Reconsideration of Claim Construction Order for FarmwaldIorowitz patents.
MANUFACTUERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RMW
1 III. CONCLUSION
2 The Manufacturers respectfully request that the Court deny Rambus's motion for
3 reconsideration of the construction of "memory device" and reaffirm the Court's prior
4 construction of that term.
5
Dated: September 11, 2008
6 WElL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, LLP
7 By: lsi
John D. Beynon (Bar No. 233581)
8 Email: john.beynon&!weil.com
9 JARED BOBROW (Bar No. 133712)

Email: jared.bobrow&!weil.com
10 JOHN D. BEYNON (Bar No. 233581)
Email: john.beynon&!weil.com
11 WElL GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
201 Redwood Shores Parkway
12 Redwood Shores, CA 94065
Telephone: (650) 802-3034
13 Facsimile: (650) 802-3100
14 ELIZABETH STOTLAND WEISWASSER

Email: elizabeth.weiswasser&!weil.com
15 DAVID LENDER
Email: david.lender&!weil.com
16 WElL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
New York Office
17 767 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10153
18 Telephone: (212) 310-8000
19 WILLIAM C. PRICE (Bar No. 108542)
Email: wiliam.price&!quinnemanuel.com
20 HAROLD A. BARZA (Bar No. 80888)
Email: halbarza&!quinnemanuel.com
21 JON R. STEIGER (Bar No. 229814)
Email: jonsteiger&!quinnemanuel.com
22 ROBERT J. BECHER (Bar No. 193431)
Email: robertbecher&!quinnemanuel.com
23
24 QUI EMANUL URQUHRT OLIVER &

HEDGES,LLP
25 865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017
26 Telephone: (213) 443-3000
Facsimile: (213) 443-3100
27
28

1 Attorneys for Defendants MICRON

TECHNOLOGY, INC. and MICRON
2 SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS, INC.
3
By: lsi
4 Theodore G. Brown III
5 DANIEL J. FUNISS (Bar No. 73531)

Email: djfurniss&!townsend.com
6 THEODORE G. BROWN III (Bar No. 114672)
Email: tgbrown&!townsend.com
7 JORDAN TRENT JONES (Bar No. 166600)
Email: jtjones&!townsend.com
8 TOWNSEND and TOWNSEND and CREW LLP
379 Lytton Avenue
9 Palo Alto, California 94301
Telephone: (650) 326-2400
10 Facsimile: (650) 326-2422
11 KENNTH L. NISSL Y (Bar No. 77589)

Email: kennissly&!thelen.com
12 SUSAN van KEULEN (Bar No. 136060)
Email: svankeulen&!thelen.com
13 GEOFFY H. YOST (Bar No. 159687)
Email: gyost&!thelen.com
14 THELEN REID BROWN RA YSMAN &
STEINRLLP
15 225 West Santa Clara Street, Suite 1200
San Jose, California 95113
16 Telephone: (408) 292-5800
Facsimile: (408) 287-8040
17
KENNTH R. O'ROURKE (Bar No. 120144)
18 Email: korourke&!omm.com
WALLACE A. ALLAN (Bar No. 102054)
19 Email: tallan&!omm.com
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
20 400 South Hope Street, Suite 1060
Los Angeles, California 90071-2899
21 Telephone: (213) 430-6000
Facsimile: (213) 430-6407
22 Attorneys for Defendants
HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNI
23
SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC., and
HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR
24 MANUACTURING AMERICA INC.
25
26
27
28

1 By: lsi
Vickie L. Feeman
2
ROBERT E. FRITAS (Bar No. 80948)
3 Email: rfeitas&!orrick.com
CRAIG R. KAUFAN (Bar No. 159458)
4 Email: ckaufman&!orrick.com
VICKIE L. FEEMAN (Bar No. 177487)
5 Email: vfeeman&!orrick.com
ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIF LLP
6 1000 Marsh Road
Menlo Park, CA 94025
7 Telephone: (650) 614-7400
Facsimile: (650) 614-7401
8
Attorneys for Defendants
NANY A TECHNOLOGY
9 CORPORATION, andNANYA
TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION U.S.A.
10
11
By: lsi
Anne Cappella
12
MATTHEW D. POWERS
13
Email: matthew.powers&!weil.com
STEVEN S. CHERENSKY
14
Email: steven.cherènsky&!weil.com
WElL GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
15
201 Redwood Shores Parkway
Redwood Shores, CA 94065
16
Telephone: (650) 802-3034
Facsimile: (650) 802-3100
17
ROBERT S. BEREZIN
18
Email: robert.berezin&!weil.com
WElL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
19
New York Office
767 Fifth Avenue
20 New York, NY 10153
Telephone: (212) 310-8000
21
Attorneys for Defendants
22 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,
23 SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC., and
SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR, L.P.
24
25
26
27
28

1 ATTESTATION CLAUSE REGARDING SIGNATURS

2
I hereby attest that I have on fie permission to sign for co-counsel indicated by a
3
"conformed" signature (lSI) within this efied document.
4
5 lsI John D. Beynon

6 John Beynon (Bar No. 233581)
Email: john.beynon&!weil.com
7
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

RECONSIDERATION OFCLAIM CONSTRUCTION 13 CASE No. C 05 02298 RMW CASE No. C 06 00244 RMW

United States District Court: Northern District of California

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Case 5:05-cv-00334-RMW Document 2180 Filed 09/11/2008 Page 1 of 17

1 (Parties Listed On Signature Page)

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR

1 RAMBUS INC., Case No. C 05-02298 RMW

9 RAMBUS INC., Case No. C 06-00244 RMW

MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RMW

6 "Memory Device" ........................................ ..... .... ....... ......................... .................. 3

MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RM

9 Mannick v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.

11 Napa Committee Redevelopment Agency v. Continental Insurance Co.

16 Space Systems/Loral v. Lockheed Martin Co.

23 Civ. L.R. 7-9 .........................................................................................................................passim

MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RMW

25 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Nazomi).

1 The Court's construction of "memory device" embodies no "manifest failure" by

MANUFACTUERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RM

25 1. Rambus Improperly Reargues The Specification And Impermissibly

MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N:rO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RMW

12 Rambus's argument should be rejected for multiple reasons. As an initial matter,

MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RM

6 of the Court at the time of the claim construction hearing.").

7 Third, the inventor testimony on which Rambus relies is irrelevant to claim

8 contemporaneous definitions of "storage device" in support of Rambus's proposed construction

6 address in writing every single piece of infòrmation discussed by a party. Allowing

7 reconsideration on this ground would place an impossible burden on courts.

MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RM

6 finding a "manifest failure" in the Court's claim construction.

17 language in the' 481 Patent superfuous.

MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RM

4 construction of that term.

9 JARED BOBROW (Bar No. 133712)

14 ELIZABETH STOTLAND WEISWASSER

24 QUI EMANUL URQUHRT OLIVER &

MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RM

1 Attorneys for Defendants MICRON

5 DANIEL J. FUNISS (Bar No. 73531)

11 KENNTH L. NISSL Y (Bar No. 77589)

MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RMW

MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RM

1 ATTESTATION CLAUSE REGARDING SIGNATURS

5 lsI John D. Beynon

MANUFACTURERS' QpP'N TO MOTION FOR CASE No. C 05 00334 RM

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