RULE 37 Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals
1. NEYPES VS. CA [2005]
Factual milieu:
 Case: Petitioner filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of
land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction
before the RTC against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of
Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo.
 February 12, 1998 – Promulgation of RTC judgment
 March 3, 1998 – Petitioners received a copy of the order
 March 18, 1998 (last day of the 15-day reglementary period)– Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration
 July 1, 1998 – RTC rendered judgment dismissing the MR
 July 22, 1998 – Petitioners received a copy of the order of dismissal of the
MR
 July 27, 1998 (after 5 days) – Petitioners filed a notice of appeal
Legal issue: When is the period within which petitioners should have filed their
notice of appeal?
 An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or
final order appealed from.
 A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication
on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are;
or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
 Having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period
to appeal, did petitioners have only 1 day left to file the notice of appeal
upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR? NO.
 To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice
of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
 Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to
Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional
Page 1 of 8
by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.
 This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the
Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the
disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one
thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order,"
which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying
the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
 To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within
15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within
15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day
period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the
decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
2. DINGLASAN VS. CA [2006]
Factual milieu:
 Case: Antrom, Inc. filed a criminal case before the RTC against Dinglasan
(petitioner) for violation of BP 122 (The Bouncing Checks Law).
 December 16, 1991 – RTC found Dinglasan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
 September 4, 1992 – RTC denied the MR filed by Dinglasan.
 September 25, 1992 – Dinglasan filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
 October 26, 1998 – CA dismissed the appeal.
 Dinglasan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC.
 June 28, 1999 – SC denied the petition.
 August 26, 1999 – Dinglasan filed a motion for reconsideration of the SC
dismissal.
Civil Procedure Case Doctrines (Rules 37-39) RG Alfaro 
  September 13, 1999 – SC denied the MR.
 Dinglasan filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration.
 The Supreme Court merely noted without action in view of the En Banc
Resolution dated April 7, 1987 that no motion for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration of a judgment or a final resolution by the
same party shall be entertained.
 September 21, 2000 – Upon motion, RTC issued a warrant for the arrest
of Dinglasan and a writ of execution for enforcement of his civil liability
and, at the same time, enjoining him from leaving the country.
 October 30, 2000 – Dinglasan filed the instant Petition for New Trial and,
in the alternative, for the Reopening of the Case based on newly
discovered evidence (letter dated 8 October 1985).
Legal issue: When is the finality of judgment or order in case of the denial of a
second motion for reconsideration?
 From the receipt of the order of the resolution or order denying the first
motion for reconsideration.
 To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the
resolution or order denying the second motion for reconsideration would
result to an absurd situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue
orders or resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the first
place, in order that the period for the finality of judgments shall run,
thereby, prolonging the disposition of cases. Moreover, such a ruling
would allow a party to forestall the running of the period of finality of
judgments by virtue of filing a prohibited pleading; such a situation is not
only illogical but also unjust to the winning party.
Another legal issue: What are the requisites for the admission of newly
discovered evidence?
 The requisites for newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: (a) the evidence was
discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c)
that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching,
and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the
judgment.
 These standards, also known as the "Berry Rule," trace their origin to the
1851 case of Berry v. State of Georgia.
Page 2 of 8
 The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a
"newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by
due diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has
two aspects:
a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and
a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered.
 The records are very clear. The newly discovered evidence (which is a
transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985) was already offered as evidence
in the case before the Court of Appeals and was even annexed to the
Petition for Review filed before the Court of Appeals as Annex "B."
Irrefragably, the letter dated 8 October 1985 is not newly discovered. It is
an attempt to raise again a defense which was already weighed by the
appellate court. A contrary ruling may open the floodgates to an endless
review of decisions, where losing litigants, in delaying the disposition of
cases, invoke evidence already presented, whether through a motion for
reconsideration or for a new trial, in guise of newly discovered evidence.
3. SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS VS. BAYANG [2015]
Factual milieu:
 Case: Bayang filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) against
petitioners.
 February 16, 2004 – HLURB Arbiter ruled in favor of Bayang.
 Petitioners appealed the Arbiter’s decision to the HLURB Board of
Commissioners.
 July 27, 2005 - The Board dismissed the appeal.
 August 10, 2005 (after 14 days) – petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration.
 The Board dismissed the MR.
 April 17, 2006 – petitioners received the resolution denying the MR.
 April 27, 2006 (after 10 days) - The petitioners filed an appeal to the
Office of the President.
 November 17, 2006 – The OP dismissed the appeal for having been filed
out of time.
Civil Procedure Case Doctrines (Rules 37-39) RG Alfaro 
Legal issue: When is the period within which petitioners should have filed their
notice of appeal?
 Within the remaining period within which to appeal, meaning, within 1
day after receipt of the resolution denying the MR.
 It is settled that the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial
appeals and not to administrative appeals.
 As provided in the Neypes case: the "fresh period rule" shall apply to
Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts);
Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals
or Supreme Court);
Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals);
Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals);
and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court).
Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
 In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners to the OP, is not judicial but administrative in
nature; thus, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes does not apply.
 The rules and regulations governing appeals from decisions of the
HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP are Section 2, Rule XXI of
HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, in relation to Paragraph 2,
Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, which provides
that:
“…in case the aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from an
adverse decision of any agency/office, the said party has the only
remaining balance of the prescriptive period within which to appeal,
reckoned from receipt of notice of the decision denying his/her motion
for reconsideration.”
Page 3 of 8
RULE 39
1. DE LEON VS. PEA VS. JUDGE ALARAS [2010]
Factual milieu:
 Case: De Leon filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction before the RTC against Public Estates Authority (PEA), alleging
unlawful destruction of De Leon’s fence and houses constructed on a
disputed land, which De Leon claimed has been in the possession of his
family for more than 50 years.
 The case reached the Supreme Court, which held in its decision dated
November 20, 2000 that the disputed land was a public land so that De
Leon’s occupation thereof, no matter how long ago, could not confer
ownership or possessory rights. Prescinding therefrom, no writ of
injunction may lie to protect De Leon’s nebulous right of possession.
 The dispositive portion of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 30630, and DISMISSES the complaint in Civil Case No. 93-
143 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati.
 The aforesaid Decision became final and executory. PEA moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution with the RTC. Granted.
 De Leon moved for reconsideration of the writ. Denied. Another MR.
Denied.
 De Leon then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing
the orders of the RTC.
 De Leon filed an Urgent-Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the CA.
Denied.
 De Leon filed a second special civil action for certiorari with the CA
seeking to annul and set aside the same RTC Orders.
 PEA filed a Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Demolition with
the RTC.
 The RTC issued an Order holding in abeyance the Resolution of PEA’s
Motion. PEA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the
RTC.
 The special civil actions filed by De Leon were dismissed by the CA.
 Thereafter, PEA filed with the RTC an Urgent Motion to Resolve the Very
Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Demolition it earlier filed with the
RTC.
Civil Procedure Case Doctrines (Rules 37-39) RG Alfaro 
  The RTC issued an order holding in abeyance the resolution of PEA’s
Motion pending receipt by the trial court of the entry of judgment by the
CA. PEA filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Denied.
 De Leon’s contention: De Leon insists that what the SC did in PEA v. CA
was to simply dismiss his complaint for damages and nothing more, and
that the RTC erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a
writ of execution placing PEA in possession of the disputed property. He
insists that he can only be removed from the disputed property through
an ejectment proceeding.
Legal issue: Is an ejectment proceeding necessary if the original case was only a
complaint for damages by the plaintiff and the disputed property was thereafter
adjudicated to the defendant? – NO.
 As a general rule, a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive
portion of the decision to be executed; an execution is void if it is in
excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. However, it is
equally settled that possession is an essential attribute of ownership.
Where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment,
the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included
in the decision, it appearing that the defeated party’s claim to the
possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership. Furthermore,
adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the
defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land
independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected.
 If the defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to the
prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer should oust him. No
express order to this effect needs to be stated in the decision; nor is a
categorical statement needed in the decision that in such event the
sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the
improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a
reasonable period of time. The removal of the improvements on the land
under these circumstances is deemed read into the decision, subject only
to the issuance of a special order by the court for the removal of the
improvements. It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what
appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
Page 4 of 8
 To further require prevailing party to file an ejectment suit to oust the
defeated party from the disputed property would, in effect, amount to
encouraging multiplicity of suits.
Another legal issue: whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding in abeyance the resolution of PEA’s Motion for the Issuance
of a Writ of Demolition. – YES.
 Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides the general rule that the
mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in
relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of origin does
not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order. It is true that there are
instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper
for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the
precept of judicial courtesy. The principle of judicial courtesy, however,
remains to be the exception rather than the rule. The precept of judicial
courtesy should not be applied indiscriminately and haphazardly if we
are to maintain the relevance of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
 Therefore, the writ of execution, as well as the writ of demolition, should
be issued as a matter of course, in the absence of any order restraining
their issuance. In fact, the writ of demolition is merely an ancillary process
to carry out the Order previously made by the RTC for the execution of
this Court’s decision in PEA v. CA. It is a logical consequence of the writ
of execution earlier issued.
 Finally, the Court reminds the De Leon that it does not allow the
piecemeal interpretation of its Decisions as a means to advance his case.
To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion
thereof should be isolated and read in this context, but the same must be
considered in its entirety. Read in this manner, PEA’s right to posses sion
of the subject property, as well as the removal of the improvements or
structures existing thereon, fully follows after considering the entirety of
the Court’s decision in PEA v. CA. This is consistent with the provisions of
Section 10, paragraphs (c) and (d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
provide for the procedure for execution of judgments for specific acts .
Civil Procedure Case Doctrines (Rules 37-39) RG Alfaro 
2. NOCEDA VS. DIRECTO [2010]
Factual milieu:
 Directo donated a portion of land to her nephew Noceda, but the latter
occupied a bigger area, claiming ownership thereof.
 Directo filed a complaint against Sps. Noceda for Recovery of Possession
and Ownership and Rescission/Annulment of Donation with the RTC.
 The RTC rendered judgment in her favor. Sps. Noceda appealed to CA*.
CA affirmed the RTC judgment. Sps. Noceda filed a petition for review
with the SC. Denied. The decision became final and executory, and a writ
of execution was duly issued by the RTC.
 *During appeal to the CA, Sps. Noceda surreptitiously negotiated with
one Dahipon for the sale of the land.
 Sps. Noceda instituted an action for quieting of title against respondent.
In the complaint, the spouses admitted that Civil Case No. RTC-354-I was
decided in favor of respondent and a writ of execution had been issued,
ordering them to vacate the property. However, petitioners claimed that
the land, which was the subject matter of Civil Case No. RTC-354-I, was
the same parcel of land owned by spouses Dahipon from whom they
purchased a portion; and that a title was, in fact, issued in their name.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the implementation of the Writ of Execution.
Legal issue: W/N the principle of res judicata is applicable under the facts
obtaining in the present case. – YES.
 Petitioners assert that res judicata does not apply, considering that the
essential requisites as to the identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action are not present.
 The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.
 The principle of res judicata lays down two main rules, namely: (1) the
judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
concludes the litigation between the parties and their privies and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of
action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right,
fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which a
judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties
Page 5 of 8
and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or
subject matters of the two suits are the same. These two main rules mark
the distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in
which a judgment may operate as evidence.
 The first general rule above stated, and which corresponds with
paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to
as "bar by former judgment"; while the second general rule, which is
embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known as
"conclusiveness of judgment."
 The second concept — conclusiveness of judgment — states that a fact
or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially
passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that
action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be
again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies,
in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either
the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains
unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a
judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential
that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in
the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination
of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the
same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if
that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit.
Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.
 Bar by former judgment bars the prosecution of a second action upon
the same claim, demand, or cause of action. On the other hand,
conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or
issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim
or cause of action.
 The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions
which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly
applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the
litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final
judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference
thereto and although such matters were directly referred to in the
pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if
Civil Procedure Case Doctrines (Rules 37-39) RG Alfaro 
 the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have
been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be
considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between
the parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises,
they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.
3. INFANTE VS. ARAN BUILDERS [2007]
Factual milieu:
 Case: Aran Builders (private respondent) filed an action for specific
performance and damages against Infante (petitioner) with the RTC of
Makati, involving a land situated in Muntinlupa. The case was filed with
Makati RTC because at that time, there was still no RTC in Muntinlupa.
Cases from this City were tried and heard at Makati City.
 1994 - The RTC Makati rendered a judgment in favor of Aran which
includes, among others, an order to deliver to Aran the interest,
possession, title and ownership of the parcel of land in litigation. The
judgment became final and executory.
 2001 – Aran filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa an action for revival of
the 1994 judgment.
 Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the action (for revival of judgment)
on the grounds that the Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties and that venue was improperly laid.
 Petitioner asserts that the complaint for specific performance and
damages before the Makati RTC is a personal action and, therefore, the
suit to revive the judgment therein is also personal in nature; and that,
consequently, the venue of the action for revival of judgment is either
Makati City or Parañaque City where private respondent and petitioner
respectively reside, at the election of private respondent.
Legal issue: Where should an action for revival of judgment be filed?
 An action upon a judgment must be brought either in the same court
where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or
defendant resides, or in any other place designated by the statutes which
treat of the venue of actions in general.
 The proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present
action for revival of judgment is a real action or a personal action. If the
action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with
Page 6 of 8
the court of the place where the real property is located. If such action
does not fall under the category of real actions, it is then a personal
action that may be filed with the court of the place where the plaintiff or
defendant resides.
 The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment determine
whether it is a real action or a personal action.
 The previous judgment has conclusively declared private respondent's
right to have the title over the disputed property conveyed to it. It is,
therefore, undeniable that private respondent has an established interest
over the lot in question; and to protect such right or interest, private
respondent brought suit to revive the previous judgment. The sole
reason for the present action to revive is the enforcement of private
respondent's adjudged rights over a piece of realty. Verily, the action falls
under the category of a real action, for it affects private respondent's
interest over real property.
4. FLORES VS. LINDO [2011]
Factual milieu:
 October 31, 1995 - Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Flores. She
mortgaged a conjugal property as security for the loan without the
consent of her husband.
 November 5, 1995 – Husband executed a SPA to authorize wife to
mortgage the property.
 Upon default of Lindo, Flores filed a Complaint for Foreclosure of
Mortgage with Damages against the spouses-respondents with the RTC
Manila (Branch 33).
 RTC Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled to the foreclosure
because the Deed was executed without the consent of the husband. It
ruled further that petitioner was not precluded from recovering the loan
from Edna as he could file a personal action against her. However, the
Branch 33 ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the personal action which
should be filed in the place where the plaintiff or the defendant resides .
 Petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against
respondents with RTC Manila (Branch 42).
 Respondents moved to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, res
judicata and forum-shopping. Denied. MR also denied.
Civil Procedure Case Doctrines (Rules 37-39) RG Alfaro 
  Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
before the Court of Appeals.
 Edna also filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC of San
Pedro Laguna (Branch 93). Branch 93 declared the deed of real mortgage
as void in the absence of the consent of the spouse.
 The CA granted the petition. It held that under Section 3, Rule 2 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may not institute more than one
suit for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the
basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on a judgment upon
the merits in any one is available ground for the dismissal of the others.
The Court of Appeals ruled that on a nonpayment of a note secured by a
mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor,
that is recovery of the credit with execution of the suit. Thus, the creditor
may institute two alternative remedies: either a personal action for the
collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not
both.
 The Court of Appeals noted that the petitioner allowed the decisions of
the Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 to become final and executory
without asking the courts for an alternative relief.
Legal issue: Is there a multiplicity of suits? – No.
 What is lost is merely the right to foreclose the mortgage as a special
remedy for satisfying or settling the indebtedness which is the principal
obligation. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed remains as evidence or
proof of a personal obligation of the debtor and the amount due to the
creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action. (Take note: hindi talaga
null and void yung mortgage kasi na-perfect yung contract nung in-
authorize ni husband si wife. Remember yung continuing offer sa Art.
124, Family Code? Yon.)
 The Supreme Court set aside the CA decision. It decided the case based
on the principle of unjust enrichment. The principle against unjust
enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the procedural
rule on multiplicity of suits.
 It also held that petitioner could not be expected to ask the Branch 33 for
an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should
have done, because the Branch 33 already stated that it had no
jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might have against
Edna.
Page 7 of 8
5. FGU INSURANCE VS. RTC OF MAKATI [2011]
Factual milieu:
 GP Sarmiento (GPS) agreed to transport 30 units of refrigerators to
Concepcion Industries. The refrigerators were secured by FGU
(petitioner).
 The appliances were damaged, FGU paid Concepcion, and then FGU
sought reimbursement from GPS.
 GPS filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage
against GPS and its driver.
 The case reached the Supreme Court, which held that GPS is liable to
FGU for the value of the lost cargoes. Entry of judgment was made.
 FGU filed a motion for execution.
 GPS filed its Opposition to Motion for Execution on the ground that the
latter’s claim was unlawful, illegal, against public policy and good morals,
and constituted unjust enrichment. GPS alleged that it discovered, upon
verification from the insured, that after the insured’s claim was
compensated in full, the insured transferred the ownership of the subject
appliances to FGU. In turn, FGU sold the same to third parties thereby
receiving and appropriating the consideration and proceeds of the sale.
GPS believed that FGU should not be allowed to "doubly recover" the
losses it suffered.
 GPS moved to set case for hearing. Granted.
 FGU filed a petition for mandamus with SC.
Legal issue: Is the rule on the issuance of a writ of execution as a matter of right
absolute? – No.
 Fundamental is the rule that where the judgment of a higher court has
become final and executory and has been returned to the lower court,
the only function of the latter is the ministerial act of carrying out the
decision and issuing the writ of execution. In addition, a final and
executory judgment can no longer be amended by adding thereto a
relief not originally included. In short, once a judgment becomes final,
the winning party is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance
thereof becomes a court's ministerial duty. The lower court cannot vary
the mandate of the superior court or reexamine it for any other purpose
other than execution; much less may it review the same upon any matter
decided on appeal or error apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than
to settle so much as has been demanded.
Civil Procedure Case Doctrines (Rules 37-39) RG Alfaro 
  Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable,
and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it
be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the
land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck
down.
 But like any other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of
clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable. The exception to the doctrine of
immutability of judgment has been applied in several cases in order to
serve substantial justice.
 After a judgment has become final, if there is evidence of an event or
circumstance which would affect or change the rights of the parties
thereto, the court should be allowed to admit evidence of such new facts
and circumstances, and thereafter suspend execution thereof and grant
relief as the new facts and circumstances warrant.
 In the case at bench, the Court agrees with the RTC that there is indeed a
need to find out the whereabouts of the subject refrigerators. For this
purpose, a hearing is necessary to determine the issue of whether or not
there was an actual turnover of the subject refrigerators to FGU by the
assured. If there was an actual turnover, it is very important to find out
whether FGU sold the subject refrigerators to third parties and profited
from such sale.
 If, indeed, there was an actual delivery of the refrigerators and FGU
profited from the sale after the delivery, there would be an unjust
enrichment if the realized profit would not be deducted from the
judgment amount.
 The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and
stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments
would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.

Page 8 of 8 Civil Procedure Case Doctrines (Rules 37-39) RG Alfaro 