Republic v. N. dela Merced & Sons, Inc., G.R. No.

201501, January 22, 2018

THE FACTS
The Guadalupe Commercial Complex is a commercial building owned and operated by Dela Merced &
Sons.3 Situated alongside the Pasig River, the complex operates a wet market and houses eateries or
kitchenettes in the same building.4
On 13 July 2006, the Environmental Management Bureau-National Capital Region (EMB-NCR) of the DENR
inspected the Guadalupe Commercial Complex. The inspection team found that Dela Merced & Sons had
violated the following: 1) Section 1 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2004-26 for operating air pollution
source installations (generator set) without a permit to operate; and 2) Section 27(i) of R.A. 9275 for operating
a facility that discharged regulated water pollutants without a discharge permit.
Thus, the EMB-NCR served a notice of violation (NOV)5 dated 28 August 2006 upon Dela Merced & Sons,
stating the charges and ordering the latter to comply with the requirements.6 Dela Merced & Sons requested
and was granted an extension of time to comply with the NOV requirements.7
On 11 October 2006, however, the EMB-NCR conducted another inspection of the Guadalupe Commercial
Complex to monitor Dela Merced & Sons' compliance with R.A. 8749 (The Clean Air Act of 1999) and R.A.
9275, as well as their respective Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs ). The inspection team collected
effluent8 sample from the facility, and the results of the laboratory tests showed that the sample collected failed
to conform to the DENR Effluent Standards.9
Consequently, on 6 February 2007, the DENR Secretary, upon the recommendation of the EMB-NCR, issued
a cease and desist order (CDO) to Dela Merced & Sons for violation of R.A. 9275 and the IRR thereof.10 In the
same Order, the company was informed that no temporary lifting order (TLO)11 shall be issued in its favor,
unless it would submit the documents required under the law.12
On 30 March 2007, the EMB-NCR went ahead to partially execute the CDO by sealing the kitchen sinks of the
locators identified as sources of wastewater at the Guadalupe Commercial Complex. On the other hand, the
wet market and the kitchenettes or turo-turo on the ground floor of the building were only given warnings.13
On 3 April 2007, Dela Merced & Sons filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the imposition of the COO
and submitted the required documents for the issuance of a TLO.14 The DENR-PAB issued the TLO on 3 July
2007.15
Meanwhile, on 9 August 2007, the EMB-DENR issued a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) to Dela Merced &
Sons pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.O.) No. 1586 (Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System). 16
By 14 November 2007, another efficient sampling was conducted. Subsequently, the results were submitted to
the EMB laboratory for analysis and verification. The findings showed that the effluent conformed to the DENR
Effluent Standards.17 Thus, the DENR-PAB issued a Notice of Technical Conference to Dela Merced & Sons
for a discussion of the imposition of fines during the period of violation of R.A. 9275.18
Attached to the notice was an initial computation of the fine in the total amount of ₱3.98 million. The notice also
directed Dela Merced & Sons to submit its position paper regarding the fine.
The fine covered the alleged 398 days that Dela Merced & Sons had violated R.A. 9275. The rate was ₱10,000
per day of violation in accordance with Sec. 28 of the law. The period covered was from 12 October 2006-
when the collected effluent from the facility failed the DENR Effluent Standards-to 13 November 2007, which
marked the end of the period when, by the next day, the sampling gathered by the EMB-NCR had already
passed the DENR Standards.19
In its Position Paper,20 Dela Merced & Sons prayed that the fine be discarded for being imposed without due
process of law. It argued that the fine was violative of Sections 1 and 19(1), Article III of the Constitution. It also
contended that the period from the issuance of the TLO (3 July 2007) up to the date it had complied with the
requirements (13 November 2007) should not be included in the computation.21
Following the recommendation of the PAB Committee on Fines, the DENR-PAB issued an Order22 dated 13
November 2008 imposing a fine of ₱3.98 million on Dela Merced & Sons. The latter moved for reconsideration,
but its motion was denied in an Order dated 30 January 2009.23
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Aggrieved, Dela Merced & Sons filed with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writs of Preliminary and
Mandatory Injunction24 .
In its Resolution25 dated 1 March 2010, the CA denied the prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Injunction
when it found that Dela Merced & Sons had not been deprived of its constitutional right to due process. The CA
also found that the company had failed to show any grave and irreparable damage or injury that would have
been caused, had the DENR-PAB's Orders been executed.26
As to the main petition, Dela Merced & Sons assailed the DENR-PAB Orders imposing the fine amounting to
P3.98 million and denying the former's MR. Dela Merced & Sons claimed that it was exempt from the
requirements of R.A. 9275 by virtue of the CNC.27 It also argued that the imposition of the fine was
unconstitutional for being excessive.28
On 30 June 2011, the CA rendered a Decision29 affirming the assailed Orders of the DENR-PAB, except as to
the imposable fine which was reduced to ₱2.63 million. According to the appellate court, the fine should be
reduced in view of the EMB-NCR's unreasonable delay in complying with the order to conduct an effluent
sampling of Dela Merced & Sons' Wastewater Treatment Facility.30
Both parties filed their respective MRs which were both denied in a Resolution31 dated 18 April 2012. Hence,
they both came to this Court with their respective petitions.
PETITION BEFORE THIS COURT
The DENR-PAB filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court on 5 June 2012, docketed as G.R. No.
201501. The petition is contesting the downgraded fine imposed by the CA on Dela Merced & Sons.32 In turn,
the latter party filed its own Petition for Review on Certiorari on 8 June 2012, docketed as G.R. No. 201658.
The petition is questioning the fine imposed upon it and is contesting the constitutionality of the provision on
the imposition of the fine.33 The two petitions have been consolidated.34
ISSUES
The issues raised by both parties are summarized as follows:
1. Whether Dela Merced & Sons was denied due process.
2. Whether the issuance of a CNC means exemption from compliance with R.A. 9275.
3. Whether Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 on the imposition of fines is unconstitutional under Section 19(1), Article III of
the Constitution for being excessive.
4. Whether the amount of the fine imposed was correct, assuming that its imposition was proper.
We deny Dela Merced & Sons' petition, but grant that of the DENR-PAB.
Dela Merced & Sons was Not Denied Due Process
Dela Merced & Sons argues that the fine was imposed without due process of law because the company was
"never given an opportunity to present its evidence to dispute the alleged violation of the law."35 It also claims
that the DENR-PAB simply entered the former's premises and unilaterally conducted an inspection and
thereafter assessed excessive fines without first conducting conferences or a trial.36
We are not persuaded.
As for the inspection, the EMB-NCR was only performing its mandated duty under R.A. 927537 and the
IRR38 thereof when it inspected the premises of the Guadalupe Commercial Complex.39Clearly, the EMB had
legal authority when it conducted the inspection.
The specific claims of denial of due process are belied by the records of the case. We quote with approval the
findings of the CA on this matter:
[The opportunity to be heard] was made completely available to petitioner [Dela Merced & Sons] who
participated in all stages of the administrative proceeding before the DENR-PAB. x x x, [T]he respondent [PAB]
after issuing the notice of violation and possible imposition of fines to the petitioner, gave it time to comply with
the requirements of the environmental laws. The petitioner even requested for extension of time to comply with
the requirements which the respondent granted. But a subsequent inspection of the facility showed that the
petitioner still failed to comply with the DENR effluent standards despite the extension given by respondent.
Thus, the respondent was compelled to issue a cease and desist order.
xxxx
Upon full compliance of the petitioner with all the requirements, the respondent issued a TLO in its favor. x x x
EMB-NCR conducted another inspection of the facility and found that the effluents x x x conformed to the
DENR Effluent Standards. Thereafter, the respondent invited the petitioner to a technical conference wherein
the latter was instructed to submit a position paper on the amount of fines to be imposed and gave it a copy of
the respondent's initial computation of fines. The petitioner, in its Position Paper, pleaded that the computation
be discarded x x x. After due deliberation of petitioner's arguments, the respondent DENR-PAB imposed x x x
fines x x x. The petitioner moved for its reconsideration which was denied.40 (Emphases supplied)
The above findings overwhelmingly show that Dela Merced & Sons was not denied due process. In a real
sense, it was able to take advantage of the available opportunities to explain its side and to question the acts
and orders of the DENR-PAB. In administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's
side suffices to meet the requirements of due process.41
It is wrong for Dela Merced & Sons to insist that a trial-type proceeding is necessary. Administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In the former, a formal or trial-type
hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.42 It is not legally
objectionable for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or
documentary evidence submitted by the parties as is the case here.43
In any event, whatever procedural defect there may have been in the subject proceedings was cured when
Dela Merced & Sons moved for reconsideration.44
No Exemption from Compliance with Environmental Laws, Even if Issued a CNC
Dela Merced & Sons contends that it was exempt from complying with the environmental requirements of R.A.
9275 because it was issued a CNC.45
This argument deserves scant consideration.
As explained in Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, 46 the CNC is a certification issued by the EMB
certifying that a project is not covered by the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) System and that the
project proponent is not required to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate. The EIS System was
established pursuant to P.O. No. 1151, which required all entities to submit an EIS for projects that would have
a significant effect on the environment.47
In 1981, Proclamation No. 2146 was issued, enumerating the areas and types of projects that are
environmentally critical and within the scope of the EIS System. The areas and projects not included in the
enumeration were considered non-critical to the environment and thus, were entitled to a CNC.48
This Court notes that the Guadalupe Commercial Complex is not included in the list of environmentally critical
projects or areas under Proclamation No. 2146. As an environmentally non-critical project, it is not covered by
the EIS System and, consequently, a CNC was rightly issued in its favor.
Nevertheless, the CNC only exempts Dela Merced & Sons from securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate. It does not exempt it from complying with other environmental laws. Section 5 of P.O. 1586 is clear
on this matter:
Section 5. Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. - All other projects, undertakings and areas not declared by
the President as environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical and shall not be required to submit
an environmental impact statement. The National Environmental Protection Council, thru the Ministry of
Human Settlements may however require noncritical projects and undertakings to provide additional
environmental safeguards as it may deem necessary. (Emphases supplied)
Based on the law, environmentally non-critical projects such as the Guadalupe Commercial Complex are still
expected to provide additional environmental safeguards as deemed necessary. Hence, Dela Merced & Sons
is still bound to abide by environmental laws such as the Clean Water Act, even if it possesses a CNC. As held
in Leynes v. People,49 an entity is not exempted from compliance with applicable environmental laws, rules,
and regulations despite the issuance of a CNC in its name.
The Constitutionality of Section 28 of R.A. 9275 Was Not Properly Questioned
Another main contention of Dela Merced & Sons is that Section 2850 of R.A. 9275 violates Section 19 (1),
Article III of the Constitution, because the former section provides for the imposition of excessive fines.
We note at the outset that Dela Merced & Sons' attempt to assail the constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275
constitutes a collateral attack. This is contrary to the rule that issues of constitutionality must be pleaded
directly.51 Unless a law is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of the law's validity remains.52
Nevertheless, even if the issue of constitutionality was properly presented, Dela Merced & Sons still failed to
satisfy the fourth requisite for this Court to undertake a judicial review.53 Specifically, the issue of
constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 is not the lis mota of this case.
The lis mota requirement means that the petitioner who questions the constitutionality of a law must show that
the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question is
unavoidable.54 Consequently, if there is some other ground (i.e. a statute or law) upon which the court may rest
its judgment, that course should be adopted and the question of constitutionality avoided.55
In this case, Dela Merced & Sons failed to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the
constitutional issue it has raised is resolved. Hence, the presumption of constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A.
9275 stands.
The Fine Imposed Is Not Excessive Under the Constitution
Even if We were to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 despite the procedural lapses, Dela
Merced & Sons' petition would still be denied.
At the outset, Dela Merced & Sons' invocation of Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution is erroneous. The
constitutional prohibition on the imposition of excessive fines applies only to criminal prosecutions.56 In
contrast, this case involves an administrative proceeding and, contrary to the supposition of Dela Merced &
Sons,57 the fine imposed is not a criminal penalty. Hence, the proscription under Article III, Section 19 is
inapplicable to this case.
Besides, even if the Bill of Rights were applicable, the fines under R.A. 9275 still cannot be classified as
excessive.
For a penalty to be considered obnoxious to the Constitution, it needs to be more than merely being harsh,
excessive, out of proportion, or severe.58 To come under the prohibition, the penalty must be flagrantly and
plainly oppressive59 or so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all
reasonable persons as to what is right and proper under the circumstances.60 Dela Merced & Sons failed to
satisfy these jurisprudential standards.
In questioning the constitutionality of the fine, Dela Merced & Sons merely alleges that the amount is
"exorbitant,"61 "arbitrary, unconscionable,"62 and "too excessive as to cause grave impact on the business
operations, nay [the] very survival of petitioner as a business entity [and] its employees as a whole."63 These
unsubstantiated allegations are not enough to strike down the fine as unconstitutional for being excessive.
Moreover, Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 cannot be declared unconstitutional simply because the fine imposed may
cause grave impact on Dela Merced & Sons' business operations. Indeed, the possibility that a law may work
hardship does not render it unconstitutional.64
Also, it should be noted that the basis for the amount of fine imposed by the PAB and the CA (i.e. ₱10,000 per
day of violation) is the minimum imposable amount under the law. Since penalties are prescribed by statute,
their formulation is essentially and exclusively legislative. Having no authority to modify the penalties already
prescribed, the courts can only interpret and apply them.65 As held in US. v. Borromeo, "[t]he fixing of penalties
for the violation of statutes is primarily a legislative function, and the courts hesitate to interfere, unless the fine
provided for is so far excessive as to shock the sense of mankind."66
During the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2115 (which was the origin of R.A. 9275), one of the senators made
the following statement:
The lack of usable, clean water resources is a problem that confronts us today. This is the reason, Mr.
President, this committee thought of submitting this measure as our humble contribution in finding alternative
solutions. x x x
xxxx
This bill is not lacking in incentives and rewards and it has muscle to penalize acts that further pollute all our
water sources as well. We increased the fines so that with strict implementation, we can curb the damage we
continue to inflict, ironically, to our life source. x x x
xxxx
[T]he quality of the nation's water resources is of great interest because it is so integrally linked to a long-term
availability of water that is clean and safe for drinking, recreation and that is suitable for industry, irrigation and
habitat for fish and wildlife.67 Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the legislature saw the need to protect and conserve our water resources. To this end, it formulated
rules with concomitant penalties to ensure compliance with the law. We will not interfere with its wisdom in
drafting the law, especially since the presumption of its constitutionality has not been overturned.
The Fine imposed by the DENR-PAB was Erroneously Reduced by the CA
The DENR-PAB contests the reduction by the CA of the amount of fine the former could impose on Dela
Merced & Sons, an issue that involves a question of fact. Since there is a conflict between the finding of the CA
and that of PAB,68 we are constrained to delve into this factual issue.
At the rate of ₱l0,000 per day of violation,69 the fine was computed by the PAB in the amount of ₱3.98 million,
which covered the period of 12 October 2006 (when the collected effluent from the facility failed the DENR
standards) to 13 November 2007 (the day before the effluent sampling was gathered, which eventually passed
the DENR standards)-a total of 398 days.
On the other hand, the CA reduced the fine to ₱2.63 million, because the period of violation it considered
covered only 263 days-from 12 October 2006 to 3 July 2007 (the date of issuance of the TLO). The CA
reduced the fine in view of EMB-NCR's "unreasonable delay" in complying with the order in the TLO to conduct
the effluent sampling of the company's Wastewater Treatment Faci1ity.70
The PAB pointed out that the effluent samples were collected on 14 November 2007, which was still within the
150-day time frame71 prescribed in the TLO.72 It claimed that the period of effectivity of the TLO was based on
the Construction Timetable of the Water Treatment Facility attached to Dela Merced & Sons' MR filed with the
PAB. The timetable provided a period of 150 to 180 days before completion.73
Furthermore, it was only through a letter dated 26 November 2007 that PAB was informed by Dela Merced &
Sons that the latter's Permanent Wastewater Treatment Facility had been completed on 9 November 2007 and
a trial run conducted on 12 November 2007.74
Based on the foregoing, it was improper for the CA to indicate the date of issuance of the TLO as the end of
the period of violation. As pointed out by the PAB, Dela Merced & Sons merely submitted documentary
evidence to convince the former of the company's sincere intention to comply with the DENR standards.
Hence, the grant of the request for the issuance of a TLO cannot be equated with compliance or proof that the
company's effluent has already passed the standards.75
Any delay in conducting the influent and effluent sampling of the Water Treatment Facility cannot be
characterized as unreasonable, especially since the period of sampling was well within the 150-day period
provided in the TLO. Consequently, the amount of fine imposed by DENR-PAB must be upheld.
A Final Note
The importance of water resources for our existence cannot be overstated. These resources are vital not only
for our individual well-being, but also for the survival of society as a whole. Yet, we have continued to abuse
them, as if they were inexhaustible.
Pollution has been a perennial problem affecting our water resources. In his sponsorship speech for the Clean
Water Bill, one senator cited the Pasig River to illustrate this point. He said, "[i]f we were to present a body of
water that typifies the chronic water pollution problem in the country, nothing leads us closer than the
notoriously polluted Pasig River. x x x Pasig River is considered biologically dead x x x. [It] is just one of the
bodies of water that has been severely prostituted."76 This is the same river to which the Guadalupe
Commercial Complex has discharged its wastewater.77
Our legislators saw the need for a concerted effort of the government and society to abate, control, and
prevent the pollution of our country's water resources.78 Hence, the Clean Water Act was enacted in the hope
that "this vital measure will offer the future generation an abundant supply of potable water, clean rivers to
swim [in], and a better access to safe water for their daily use."79
All of us benefit from clean water, and we are all responsible for its preservation. Dela Merced & Sons is no
exception. Thus, we should all do our part in the protection and conservation of our water resources. As the
authors of the Clean Water Act have reminded us, we must use our water wisely, for it is the selfsame
prosperity we ought to hand down to our children.80
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition in G.R. No. 201501 is GRANTED, while that in G.R. No.
201658 is DENIED. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 107626 dated 30 June 2011 and
its Resolution on 18 April 2012, are hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the amount of fine
imposed.
Following the DENR-PAB's Order dated 13 November 2008 in DENR-PAB Case No. NCR-00760-06, N. Dela
Merced and Sons, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of ₱3,980,000 (three million nine
hundred eighty thousand pesos).
SO ORDERED.

Fuertes v. The Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208162, January 7, 2020
Facts:
            Devie Ann Isaga Fuertes (Fuertes) is among the 46 accused charged with violating the Anti-Hazing
Law, or Republic Act No. 8049, for the death of Chester Paolo Abracia due to injuries he allegedly sustained
during the initiation rites of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity.
            Fuertes, a member of Tau Gamma Sigma Sorority, admitted that she was at the premises during the
initiation rites. She was then 17 years old and was a student at that time.
Petitioner claims that Sections 3 and 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law are unconstitutional, as they would allow for the
conviction of persons for a crime committed by others, in violation of the res inter alios acta rule. She also
argues that these provisions violate Article III, Sections 1 and 19 of the Constitution for constituting a cruel and
unusual punishment, as she was charged as a principal, and penalized with reclusion perpetua, for a non-
bailable offense.
Issue:
            Whether or not Sections 3 and 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law are unconstitutional.
Held:
            No. Section 14, paragraph 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law, which provides that an accused's presence during
a hazing is prima facie evidence of his or her participation, does not violate the constitutional presumption of
innocence. This disputable presumption is also not a bill of attainder.
                The constitutional presumption of innocence is not violated when there is a logical connection
between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. When such prima facie evidence is unexplained or
not contradicted by the accused, the conviction founded on such evidence will be valid. However, the
prosecution must still prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The existence of a disputable
presumption does not preclude the presentation of contrary evidence.

Soliva v. Tanggol, G.R. No. 223429, January 29, 2020

DECISION
CARANDANG, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision2 dated
October 2, 2015 and Resolution3 dated February 9, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
137277. The CA affirmed the Decision4 dated February 13, 2014 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
finding petitioner Delilah L. Soliva (petitioner) guilty of Serious Dishonesty and imposed upon her the penalty of
dismissal from service with all accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits
(except terminal leave benefits and personal contribution to the GSIS), perpetual disqualification from holding
public office, and bar from taking civil service examinations.
Facts of the Case
Petitioner, a faculty member of the School of Computer Studies of the Mindanao State University - Iligan
Institute of Technology (MSU-IIT), together with the other members of the Board of Canvassers (BOC), was
charged with Gross Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Services for rigging the
result of the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs (VCAA) straw poll.
It was alleged that on October 6, 2010, when the votes were canvassed, petitioner was added as member of
the BOC.5 She was tasked to read the ballots. There were eight members of the BOC present at the
canvassing. On petitioner's left side was Meles Castillano (Castillano), who wrote the count on the tally sheet;
on her right were Sittie Sultan (Sultan) and Mosmera Ampa (Ampa), watchers; standing behind her were Irene
Estrada (Estrada) and Soraida Zaman (Zaman); in charge of the tally board was Michael Almazan (Almazan);
and sitting beside Almazan was Ombos Ariong (Ariong), whose function was to repeat the name being read
out by petitioner. The canvassing of ballots was done by sector. First to be canvassed was the students' ballot
box, followed by the administrative staff ballot box, and last was the faculty ballot box.6
At that time, Dr. Olga Nuñeza (Dr. Nuñeza), the Chairperson of the Search Committee, was on official travel to
Manila. Professor Jeoffrey Salgado (Prof. Salgado), the Chairman of the BOC, was also not present during the
canvassing as he allegedly had a class.7
During the canvassing, the white board and tally sheet tabulations were consistent. The October 6 canvassing
showed the following results:8

Candidate Faculty Staff Students Total

Dr. Feliciano Alagao 63 31 17 111

Dr. Jerson Orejudos 227 4 11 242

Dr. Rhodora Englis 31 10 23 64

After the canvassing, the ballots were placed inside their respective boxes sealed with plastic tape. Petitioner
and Sultan affixed their signatures over the plastic tape. Estrada kept the ballot boxes.9 However, on October
7, 2010, Prof. Salgado asked that the ballot boxes be brought to him. Then he affixed his signature over the
tape sealing the boxes.10
The result of the October 6, 2010 canvassing was not officially published or divulged to the public.11
On October 14, 2010, Dr. Nuñeza sent a communication to Dr. Marcelo P. Salazar, then Chancellor of MSU-
IIT, about the alleged irregularities in the canvassing of votes for VCAA held on October 6, 2010.12 Dr. Nuñeza
stated that Dr. Rhodora Englis (Dr. Englis), one of the candidates, texted Prof. Salgado questioning the
integrity of the straw polls. Dr. Englis wanted a recount because she refused to believe she only received 31
votes from the faculty. In the letter, Dr. Nuñeza stated that a recount was done on October 13, 2010 at 10 a.m.
and another at 12 p.m., with the presence of watchers and the representatives of nominees. Petitioner was
neither notified nor present because she was on official leave to India.13 The October 13, 2010 re-canvassing
showed disparity from the results of the October 6 canvassing. The October 13, 2010 recount showed the
following results,14 both in the 10 a.m. and 12 p.m. canvassing, viz.:

Candidate Faculty Staff Students Total

Dr. Feliciano Alagao 129 29 17 175

Dr. Jerson Orejudos 111 5 11 127

Dr. Rhodora Englis 81 11 23 115

After a formal investigation conducted by the Institute Formal Investigation Committee (IFIC),15 petitioner
alone was found administratively guilty of Gross Dishonesty (with aggravating circumstance of habituality, it
being her second offense) and was recommended to be dismissed from the service.16 Castillano, Estrada,
Ariong, Sultan, Ampa, and Almazan were declared innocent for lack of evidence to prove direct participation or
conspiracy with petitioner.17 The IFIC found that when the reading of the staff ballots was about to be
completed, petitioner instructed Ampa and Sultan to bundle and staple the counted ballots in groups of 10.
Since Ampa and Sultan were preoccupied with the task, they failed to counter-check petitioner's reading of the
remaining staff ballots and the whole of the faculty ballots. Estrada, who stood behind petitioner, was also
directed by petitioner to check the food for dinner. When she returned, the canvassing was already done.
Almazan, Castillano, and Sultan testified that subsequent to the reassignment of the two watchers, petitioner's
reading of the ballots was unusually quick and the name "Orejudos" was almost always successively called out
by petitioner.18 The recount, in the presence of the nominees' respective watchers, showed an enormous
difference in the faculty votes. Only 116 votes were credited to Dr. Jerson Orejudos (Dr. Orejudos).19
The resolution of the IFIC was adopted in toto20 by respondent Dr. Sukarno D. Tanggol (Chancellor Tanggol),
Chancellor of the MSU-IIT, who endorsed the same for approval to Dr. Macapano A. Muslim (Dr. Muslim),
MSU-Marawi City President. Dr. Muslim, with the assistance of the Director of the Legal Services Division,
recommended instead a penalty of six months suspension without pay.21
On September 19, 2012, the MSU-Board of Regents (MSU-BOR) found petitioner not guilty in its Resolution
No. 171, Series of 2012. The MSU-BOR voted as follows: 5 - GUILT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED; 6 - GUILT
HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED; and 3 - ABSTAINED.22
The MSU-IIT, represented by Chancellor Tanggol, moved for reconsideration but the MSU-BOR denied the
same in its Resolution No. 2, S. 2013.23
Chancellor Tanggol appealed24 the MSU-BOR Resolution to the CSC arguing that: (1) there were no serious
procedural lapses committed during the investigation;25 (2) there was sufficient evidence to hold petitioner
liable for gross dishonesty;26 and (3) there was no violation of petitioner's constitutional right to speedy trial.27
Ruling of the Civil Service Commission
On February 13, 2014, the CSC granted Chancellor Tanggol's appeal, reversing Resolution No. 171, s. 2012
issued by the MSU-BOR.28 It found petitioner guilty of Serious Dishonesty, the dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Dr. Sukarno D. Tanggol, Chancellor of the Mindanao State University Iligan
Institute of Technology (MSU-IIT), is GRANTED. Accordingly, Resolution No. 171, s. 2012 dated September
19, 2012 of the MSU-Board of Regents (BOR), exonerating Prof. Delilah L. Soliva for Gross Dishonesty is
REVERSED. Soliva is hereby found GUILTY of Serious Dishonesty and meted the penalty of dismissal from
the service with all accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, (except
terminal leave benefits and personal contribution to the GSIS), perpetual disqualification from holding public
office and bar from taking civil service examinations are deemed imposed.
Copies of this Decision shall be furnished the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Commission on
Audit (COA-MSU-IIT) Office of the Ombudsman, and the Integrated Records Management Office (IRMO), this
Commission for their appropriate action.29
The CSC gave greater evidentiary weight to the positive and corroborative declarations executed by Ampa,
Almazan, Castillano, Ariong, and Sultan, rather than the bare denials of petitioner. It ruled that the scheme
perpetuated by petitioner in assigning the watchers, Ampa and Sultan, to do another task, and directing
Estrada to check the food for dinner, primarily facilitated the discrepancy in the results of the canvassing. The
CSC further declared that petitioner failed to live up to the high degree of professionalism required of public
officers. She intentionally strayed from performing her duties truthfully and honestly causing serious damages
and prejudice to the government.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration30 but it was denied in the Resolution dated August 18, 2014.31
Via Rule 43, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On October 2, 2015, the CA denied the petition and affirmed the CSC Decision.32 The CA ruled that from the
series of facts, it can be logically concluded that it was petitioner who deliberately manipulated the results of
the October 6 canvassing to favor one candidate over the others. The circumstantial evidence showed that it
was petitioner alone who was responsible for misreading the results during the October 6 canvassing.33
The CA found the following circumstantial evidence: a) the witnesses were one in saying that petitioner
ordered Ampa and Sultan to group together and staple the ballots even, while petitioner was still reading the
votes; b) the witnesses were also unanimous in identifying petitioner as the only person reading all the ballots;
c) it was petitioner alone who had full control of the reading of the ballots; d) it was petitioner who announced
the name of Dr. Orejudos 242 times, albeit the votes for him only numbered 127; e) she announced the name
of Dr. Feliciano Alagao (Dr. Alagao) 111 times and Dr. Englis 64 times only, when in fact each one got 175 and
115, respectively; f) she read the ballots quickly, while the designated watchers were preoccupied; g) she
misread the names indicated in the ballots 100 times, strongly indicating that the erroneous results of the
October 6 canvassing was not accidental, but intentional; and h) the October 6 canvassing results, which she
participated in were substantially different from the two separate canvassing results on October 13, wherein
she was not a participant.34 The CA gave credence to the factual findings of the CSC. Anent petitioner's claim
of denial of due process, the CA declared that petitioner was given the opportunity to present her own
evidence, submit her motions, memoranda, and other papers, and actively participate in the cross
examinations of the witnesses before the Investigating Committee, which means that the basic tenets of due
process were complied with.35 Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him or her is
decided.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied in the Resolution36 dated February 9, 2016 of
the CA.
Hence, petitioner filed this Petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 on the following grounds:
-A-
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONER
DELIBERATELY MANIPULATED THE RESULTS OF THE OCTOBER 6, 2010 CANVASSING TO FAVOR
ONE CANDIDATE OVER THE OTHERS.
-B-
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE
SANCTITY OF BALLOTS AFTER THE OCTOBER 6 CANVASSING WERE PRESERVED CONSIDERING
THAT THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE WITNESSES WHO TESTIFIED HAD ILL MOTIVE TO PUT
PETITIONER DOWN.
-C-
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONER
SOLIVA WAS AFFORDED DUE PROCESS.
-D-
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF
DISMISSAL FROM OFFICE ON PETITIONER SOLIVA.37
Petitioner argues that it is impossible for her to have manipulated the October 6 canvassing considering that
there were other members of the straw poll present and watching during the entire canvassing; she was
included only as a member of the BOC on the same day of canvassing; and she had no intention to gamble
her retirement benefits. Petitioner asserts that it is highly impossible for her to singlehandedly manipulate 236
votes without getting caught by any of the members of the straw poll present and watching the October 6, 2010
canvassing. It is unbelievable for Ampa and Sultan not to have seen the names being read by petitioner
considering that there were only three names written in bold, large font letters.38 Petitioner, likewise, points out
the inconsistencies in the affidavits of Ampa and Sultan with the established factual circumstances of the case.
Ampa and Sultan alleged in their affidavits that it was near the end of the counting of the administrative staff
ballots that they were instructed by petitioner to arrange the ballots into groups of 10 and staple them together.
During the formal hearing, however, Ampa testified that it was during the canvassing of the faculty votes when
petitioner instructed her and Sultan to arrange the canvassed ballots by 10 and staple it. Petitioner claims that
it is important to know when she allegedly gave the instructions to arrange and group the read ballots in order
to determine how many ballots are to be arranged, grouped, and stapled.39 She also contends that the
sanctity of the ballots after the October 6, 2010 canvassing was not preserved; hence, the authenticity and
integrity of the ballots canvassed during the October 13, 2010 re-canvassing are questionable.40 Petitioner
claims that she was not afforded due process because: (1) she was not notified that a re-canvassing was to be
conducted;41 (2) she was not furnished a copy of the IFIC Resolution which was submitted to the MSU-
President;42 (3) she did not receive any paper, document, or any communication from the CSC when
respondent appealed this case;43 and (4) the CSC Decision was intentionally kept secret and was never
released to petitioner by the Office of the Chancellor of MSU-IIT, until June 3, 2014.44 Lastly, petitioner posits
that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh for her "who is a widow, sickly, has served the MSU-IIT for more than
40 years and has followed the order of the Chair of BOC to canvass the ballots."45
In his Comment,46 Chancellor Tanggol avers that petitioner manipulated 116 votes. The disparity between the
October 6, 2010 canvassing and the October 13, 2010 recount stretched to 116 votes. This will prove that in
the October 6, 2010 canvassing, the votes for Dr. Alagao and Dr. Englis were shaved off by 66 and 50 votes,
respectively, which were credited by petitioner to the votes of Dr. Orejudos. The disparity of 116 votes could
not be dismissed simply as the product of honest mistake. Chancellor Tanggol also claims that it is an
established fact that when the faculty votes were about to be canvassed, petitioner instructed Ampa and Sultan
to staple the counted ballots in groups of 10. Preoccupied with a different assignment, Ampa and Sultan failed
to counter-check petitioner's fast-pace reading of the faculty ballots. If petitioner were true to her task in
honestly counting the votes, she should have insisted the presence of watchers since they play an important
role in upholding the integrity of the canvassing process. As to petitioner's assertion that the sanctity of the
ballots was not preserved, Chancellor Tanggol declares that the ballots canvassed on October 6, 2010 were
the same ballots counted on October 13, 2010; there were no signs of tampering; and the ballots were still
stapled and bundled in groups of 10. Moreover, petitioner was not denied due process. She was represented
by a competent lawyer; had the opportunity to present her evidence; submitted her motions, memoranda and
other papers; and actively participated in the cross examination of witnesses. Thus, it was not an error to
impose upon her the penalty of dismissal from service.
Issue
Stripped of non-essentials, the pivotal issue to be resolved herein is whether there is substantial evidence to
sustain the guilt of petitioner for serious dishonesty warranting her dismissal from the service.
The Court's Ruling.
The petition is partially granted.
A petition for review under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law. Factual questions are not the proper
subject of an appeal by certiorari. Nonetheless, the Court has recognized several exceptions to the rule,
including: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f)
when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of
the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.47
Petitioner asserts that her petition falls under the established exceptions because the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on a misappreciation of facts; the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; and the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible.
Aside from this general statement, however, petitioner did not fully explain how the CA's findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; or how its inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; or how its judgment is based on misappreciation of facts. Not only must the parties allege that their
case falls under the exception, but also parties praying for a review of the factual findings of the CA should
prove and substantiate that their case clearly falls under the exception to the rule.48
Without substantiating her allegation that her petition falls within the exceptions, the present petition does not
merit a review of the factual findings of the CSC, as affirmed by the CA.
Factual Findings of the CSC and
the CA are Binding Upon this Court
Petitioner argues in this petition that the CA committed grave reversible error in ruling that: (1) she deliberately
manipulated the results of the October 6, 2010 canvassing to favor one candidate over the others; (2) the
sanctity of the ballots was preserved; (3) she was afforded due process of law; and (4) the penalty of dismissal
should be imposed on her. The first two (2) issues raised by petitioner involve questions of fact as it
necessitates a review of the appreciation of evidence by the CSC and the CA.
Settled is the rule that factual findings by quasi-judicial bodies and administrative agencies, when supported by
substantial evidence and sustained by the Court of Appeals, are accorded great respect and binding upon this
Court.49 We recognize that administrative agencies possess specialized knowledge and expertise in their
respective fields,50 so long as the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings which is
substantial evidence has been met.
In this case, both the CSC and the CA were one in saying that there is substantial evidence to hold petitioner
guilty of the administrative offense of serious dishonesty by misreading 116 ballots to favor one candidate.51
The CSC gave greater evidentiary weight to the positive and corroborative declarations executed by Ampa,
Almazan, Castillano, Ariong and Sultan, rather than the bare denials of petitioner. It ruled that the scheme
perpetuated by petitioner in assigning the watchers, Ampa and Sultan, to do another task, and directing
Estrada to check the food for dinner, primarily facilitated the discrepancy in the results of the canvassing. As
attested to by Almazan, Castillano, Ariong and Sultan, petitioner's reading of the ballots became remarkably
fast after she sent the two watchers to do another task and they heard the name of Orejudos continuously
announced by petitioner. Also, petitioner admitted that she sealed and signed all the ballot boxes after the
canvassing and securely kept by Estrada and was publicly shown only during the recount on October 13, 2010.
The CSC further declared that petitioner failed to live up to the high degree of professionalism required of
public officers. She intentionally strayed from performing her duties truthfully and honestly caused serious
damages and prejudice to the government.
The CA found the following circumstantial evidence pointing to petitioner as the one responsible for misreading
the results of the October 6, 2010 canvassing:
a) the witnesses were one in saying that petitioner ordered Ampa and Sultan to group together and staple the
ballots even while petitioner was still reading the votes;
b) the witnesses were also unanimous in identifying petitioner as the only person reading all the ballots;
c) it was petitioner alone who had full control of the reading of the ballots;
d) it was petitioner who announced the name of Dr. Oejudos 242 times, albeit the votes for him only numbered
127;
e) she announced the name of Dr. Alagao 111 times and Dr. Englis, 64 times only, when in fact each one got
175 and 115 respectively;
f) she read the ballots quickly while the designated watchers were preoccupied;
g) she misread the names indicated in the ballots 100 times, strongly indicating that the erroneous results of
the October 6 canvassing was not accidental, but intentional; and
h) the October 6 canvassing results which she participated in were substantially different from the 2 separate
canvassing results on October 13 wherein she was not a participant.52
That it was impossible for petitioner to cheat because there were many watchers during the canvassing and
that she was included as member of the Board of Canvassers at the last minute are speculative and untenable
contentions. The incontrovertible fact is she gave instructions to the watchers, which divided their attention
from watching her read the ballots. If she had no intention to commit a dishonest act, they why would she
instruct them to do other things in the first place? That there was a short period of time from her inclusion in the
BOC to the canvassing itself is not determinative of her lack of intention to commit a dishonest act. While
intention involves a state of mind, subsequent and contemporaneous acts, and evidentiary facts as proved and
admitted, can be reflective of one's intention.53
As discussed by the CA, petitioner's attempt to cast suspicion or possibly pass the blame to others, to destroy
the credibility of the witnesses as to their inconsistent testimonies, and to claim that the sanctity of the ballot
was not preserved are conjectures which does not bear any probative value. Petitioner's bare assertions are
purely speculative and without any evidence to support it. Furthermore, considering that no improper motive
has been proved against the witnesses that might prompt them to testify falsely against petitioner, there was
no reason to doubt their credibility. 54
Indeed, the factual findings of the CSC, as given credence by the CA, substantially proved that petitioner
committed the act of dishonesty in misreading 116 ballots during the canvassing for the Vice Chancellor for
Academic Affairs Straw Poll.
Petitioner was Afforded Due Process of Law
Petitioner claims that she was not afforded due process because: (1) she was not notified that a recanvassing
was to be conducted; (2) she was not furnished a copy of the IFIC Resolution which was submitted to the
MSU President; (3) she did not receive any paper, document, or any communication from the CSC when
respondent appealed this case; and (4) the CSC Decision was intentionally kept secret and was never
released to petitioner by the Office of the Chancellor of MSU-IIT, until June 3, 2014.
In administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend oneself. In such proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process.55
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former
a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly
applied.56 The essence of due process, therefore, as applied to administrative proceedings, is an opportunity
to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Thus, a
violation of that right occurs when a court or tribunal rules against a party without giving the person the
opportunity to be heard.57
We agree that petitioner was given the opportunity to present her own evidence, submit her motions,
memoranda, and other papers, and actively participate in the cross-examination of the witnesses before the
IFIC. While she was not directed to file a comment by the CSC of Chancellor Tanggol's appeal, she was able
to file a motion for reconsideration of the CSC Decision dated February 13, 2014. Petitioner further elevated
the case to the CA and moved for reconsideration after the CA dismissed her petition in the Decision dated
October 2, 2015.
Petitioner need not be notified of the recanvassing because she was only one of the BOC during the initial
canvassing, and there were no charges against her yet to merit her presence or representation. The
recanvassing was done to clear the doubt of one candidate and was not done to cast suspicion or accuse
anyone at that time. After the recanvassing, petitioner was notified that she was one of those administratively
charged. Petitioner was represented by a lawyer, and she was given every opportunity to answer the charge
from the investigation of the Institute Formal Investigation Committee until her appeal to Us.
That petitioner actively participated in every stage of the proceedings removes any badge of deficiency and
satisfied the due process requirement in administrative proceedings.
Petitioner Should Only Be Held
Liable For Simple Dishonesty
The above discussions notwithstanding, We find the petition partially meritorious because the penalty of
dismissal from service is not proportionate to the dishonesty committed by petitioner. We find the penalty of
dismissal from government service with forfeiture of benefits too severe under the circumstances of petitioner's
case.
Petitioner posits that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh for her who is a widow, sickly, has served the MSU-
IIT for more than 40 years and has followed the order of the Chair of BOC to canvass the ballots.
As an administrative offense, dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact
relevant to one's office or connected with the performance of his duties. It is disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.58
Although dishonesty covers a broad spectrum of conduct, CSC Resolution No. 06-053859 set the criteria for
determining the severity of dishonest acts. CSC Resolution No. 06-0538 recognizes that dishonesty is a grave
offense generally punishable by dismissal from service. Nonetheless, some acts of dishonesty are not
constitutive of offenses so grave that they warrant the ultimate penalty of dismissal. Thus, the CSC issued
parameters "in order to guide the disciplining authority in charging the proper offense" and in imposing the
correct penalty.60
Under Sections 3, 4, and 5 of Resolution No. 06-0538, serious, less serious and simple dishonesty comprise
the following acts:
Sec. 3. The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the dishonest
act would constitute the offense of Serious Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act causes serious damage and grave prejudice to the government.
b. The respondent gravely abused his authority in order to commit the dishonest act.
c. Where the respondent is an accountable officer, the dishonest act directly involves property, accountable
forms or money for which he is directly accountable and the respondent shows an intent to commit material
gain, graft and corruption.
d. The dishonest act exhibits moral depravity on the part of the respondent.
e. The respondent employed fraud and/or falsification of official documents in the commission of the dishonest
act related to his/her employment.
f. The dishonest act was committed several times or in various occasions.
g. The dishonest act involves a Civil Service examination, irregularity or fake Civil Service eligibility such as,
but not limited to, impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets.
h. Other analogous circumstances.
Sec. 4. The presence of any one of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the dishonest
act would constitute the offense of Less Serious Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the government which is not so serious as to qualify
under the immediately preceding classification.
b. The respondent did not take advantage of his/her position in committing the dishonest act.
c. Other analogous circumstances.
Sec. 5. The presence of any of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the dishonest act
constitutes the offense of Simple Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act did not cause damage or prejudice to the government.
b. The dishonest act had no direct relation to or does not involve the duties and responsibilities of the
respondent.
c. In falsification of any official document, where the information falsified is not related to his/her employment.
d. That the dishonest act did not result in any gain or benefit to the offender.
e. Other analogous circumstances.
On February 13, 2014, the CSC found petitioner guilty of Serious Dishonesty but it did not specify her act
which classifies it to serious dishonesty under CSC Resolution No. 06-0538. The 2017 Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, Rule 10, Section 53 provides for mitigating or aggravating circumstances which may
be appreciated in the determination of penalties to be imposed, such as length of service in the government,
first offense and other analogous circumstances.
Considering that petitioner's dishonest act was not shown to fall under serious or less serious dishonesty, it did
not cause damage or prejudice to the government or result in any gain or benefit to her, and petitioner has
been in the service for more than 40 years, petitioner should only be liable of simple dishonesty, which may be
punished by suspension of six months.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner Delilah L. Soliva
is hereby found administratively GUILTY of Simple Dishonesty and is meted the penalty of SUSPENSION for
SIX (6) MONTHS.
SO ORDERED.

People v. Bacaltos, G.R. No. 248701, July 28, 2020

The Case
Appellant Lionel Echavez Bacaltos seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated May 17, 2019 of the
Sandiganbayan in SB-18-CRM-0010 finding him guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
Antecedents
The charge and plea
By Information dated January 12, 2018, appellant was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, viz.:
That in February 2015, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Sibonga, Province of
Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, LIONEL ECHAVEZ BACALTOS, a high-
ranking public officer, being the Mayor of the Municipality of Sibonga, Cebu, in such capacity, committing the
crime in relation to office, acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or gross inexcusable negligence,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government by receiving an
honorarium from the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) in the amount of Php17,512.50,
despite the fact that he was not entitled to receive it since the said honorarium was exclusively given and
intended for the municipal health personnel, and accused was not a member of the municipal health personnel,
thereby causing undue injury to the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.3 During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated, thus:4
JOINT STIPULATIONS
The PEOPLE, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor and accused LIONEL ECHAVEZ
BACALTOS, represented by ATTY. JULIUS CEASAR S. ENTISE, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully
stipulate on the following:
1 At the time material to the allegation in the Information, the accused is a public officer holding the position of
the Municipal Mayor of Sibonga, Province of Cebu;
2 That whenever referred to orally or in writing by the Honorable Court and the Prosecution and/or its
witnesses the accused admits that he is the same person being referred to in this case;
3 Under its program, Philhealth Regional Office VII released the fund for Per Family Payment Rate (PFPR) for
the provision of primary care benefit services to the Municipal Health Office of Sibonga, Cebu for the years
2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015;
4 Under the prescribed disposition and allocation of the PFPR, twenty percent (20%) of the fund shall be
exclusively utilized as honoraria of the staff of the health facility and in the improvement of their capability to be
able to provide better health services:
(a) Ten percent (10%) for the physician;
(b) Five percent (5%) for the other health professional staff of the facility;
(c) Five percent (5%) for non-health professional/staff including volunteers;
5 In February 2015, accused Bacaltos certified the Obligation Request No. 0499-02-15-300 (Exhibit "E") for the
payment of the twenty percent (20%) PhilHealth honoraria to health personnel in the amount of
Php280,197.00;
6 From the 20% Philhealth Capitation Fund for Personnel Honorarium, accused Bacaltos received the amount
of Phpl7,512.50 as honorarium in 2015 and signed payrolls (EXHIBIT "F") for this purpose;
7 Accused Bacaltos is not a physician, or a health or non-health professional staff, nor a volunteer of Municipal
Health Office of Sibonga, Cebu from 2014-2015.
II
ISSUES
1. Whether accused Bacaltos acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence
in receiving an honorarium from the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) in the amount
P17,512.50, despite the fact that he was not entitled thereto since the said honorarium was exclusively given
and intended for the municipal health personnel, and accused was not a member thereof or not;
2. Whether accused Bacaltos caused undue injury to the government by receiving the honorarium;
3. Whether accused Bacaltos violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in receiving an
honorarium from the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) in the amount of P17, 512.50,
despite the fact that he was not entitled to receive it since the said honorarium was exclusively given and
intended for the municipal health personnel, and accused was not a member thereof, causing undue injury to
the government in the aforesaid amount;
4. Whether accused is entitled to the honorarium being the Municipal Mayor of Sibonga, Cebu.5  xxx   xxx   xxx
On the basis thereof, the prosecution and the defense manifested that they would dispense with the
presentation of evidence.6 The Sandiganbayan then ordered the prosecution and the defense to formally offer
their exhibits and file their respective comments thereon. Both parties complied and filed their respective
memoranda.7
The Prosecution's Version
In line with the government's Kalusugang Pangkalahatan Program, the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (PhilHealth), by Board Resolution No. 1587, s. 2012, approved the Primary Care Benefit (PCB)
Package, designed to provide Filipinos access to quality health services. The PCB Package was offered
through government health facilities registered with PhilHealth. In exchange for their services, these PCB
Providers were paid incentives on a Per Family Payment Rate (PFPR).8
On May 28, 2012, PhilHealth Regional Vice President William O. Chavez sent a letter to appellant informing
him of Section V (G) of PhilHealth Circular No. 010 s. 2012 which prescribed the allocation of the PFPR,
thus:"9
G. The disposition and allocation of the PFPR shall be, as follows:
1. Eighty percent (80%) of PFPR is for operational cost and shall be divided, as follows:
a. Minimum of forty percent (40%) for drugs and medicines (PNDF) (to be dispensed at the facility) including
drugs and medicines for Asthma, AGE and pneumonia; and
b. Maximum of forty percent (40%) for reagents, medical supplies, equipments (i.e., ambulance, ambubag,
stretcher, etc.), information technology (IT equipment specific for facility use needed to facilitate reporting and
database build-up), capacity building for staff, infrastructure or any other use related, necessary for the delivery
of required service including referral fees for diagnostic services if not able in the facility.
2. The remaining twenty percent (20%) shall be exclusively utilized as honoraria of the staff of the PCB
facility and for the improvement of their capabilities as would enable them to provide better health services:
a. Ten percent (10%) for the physician;
b. Five percent (5%) for other health professional staff of the facility; and
c. Five percent (5%) for non-health  professionals/staff, including volunteers and community members of health
teams (e.g., Women's Health Team, Community Health Team). (Emphases supplied)
The Municipal Health Office of Sibonga, Cebu was registered as a PCB provider and had been allocated
PFPRs from 2012 to 2015.10
In February 2015, appellant, then Municipal Mayor of Sibonga, Cebu, certified Obligation Request No. 0499-
02-15-30011 for the release of the twenty percent (20%) honoraria for health personnel in the amount of
P280,197.00. Based on Item 16 of the 2015 payroll summary, appellant received P17,512.50 of the amount
as honorarium.12 The same payroll summary bore the Municipal Accountant's annotation, expressing
reservation for Item 16 to the effect that payment thereof was still subject to the PhilHealth's existing rules and
regulations. Appellant admitted during the pre-trial that he was not a physician, health or non-health staff, nor
volunteer of the Municipal Health Office in the years 2014 and 2015. Neither did his name appear on its list of
personnel.13
Hence, appellant was not entitled to the honorarium. He clearly acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith,
or gross inexcusable negligence when he requested and accepted the honorarium over the Municipal
Accountant's reservation. Appellant's unwarranted receipt of the honorarium caused undue injury to the
government in the amount of P17,512.50.14
The prosecution offered in evidence appellant's Service Record (Exhibit B), Municipal Health Office's List of
Personnel (Exhibit C), Letter dated August 24, 2015 to Mary Jojie P. Chan (Exhibit D), Obligation Request No.
0499-02-15-300 (Exhibit E), payroll summary with attached list (Exhibit F), disbursement voucher dated March
2, 2015 (Exhibit G), PhilHealth Regional Vice President William O. Chavez' letter dated May 28, 2012 (Exhibit
HH), performance commitment dated December 16, 2014 (Exhibit H), PFP's summary released to LGU
Sibonga (Exhibit I), Disbursement Vouchers and Official Receipts issued by the Office of the Treasurer,
Sibonga, Cebu.15
The Version of the Defense
Appellant admitted having received P 17,512.50 as honorarium from the PhilHealth Capitation Fund but denied
having acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in his receipt thereof.
Owing to his exercise of control and supervision over the Municipal Health Office and its personnel, he
honestly believed he was entitled to the five percent (5%) honorarium for non-health personnel. In fact, the
Commission on Audit (COA) did not even issue a Notice of Disallowance on the release of the
subject honorarium.16 Lastly, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that the PhilHealth suffered injury as a
result thereof.17
The defense formally offered the following exhibits: the Committee Report Re: Administrative Complaint dated
April 5, 2017 of Mary Jojie P. Chan docketed as Administrative Case No. SP CBU 2015-30 by the Complaints
and Investigation Committee of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu Province (Exhibit 1), Resolution No.
1225-2017 Adopting and Approving the Committee Report dated April 5, 2017 of the Committee on Complaints
and Investigation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu Province (Exhibit 2), and Certification dated
September 3, 2018 issued by the Municipal Accountant of the Municipality of Sibonga, Cebu (Exhibit 3).18
The Sandiganbayan's Ruling:
As borne by its Decision19 dated May 17, 2019, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division rendered a verdict of
conviction, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Lionel Echavez
Bacaltos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
eight (8) years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Accused Lionel Echavez
Bacaltos is also ORDERED to indemnify the Municipality of Sibonga, Cebu, the amount of Seventeen
Thousand Five Hundred Twelve Pesos and Fifty Centavos (PhP17,512.50).
SO ORDERED.20
According to the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution had sufficiently established appellant's guilt for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Appellant was then Municipal Mayor of Sibonga, Cebu when he approved and
received PI7,512.50 as honorarium despite the fact that he was ineligible to receive it. The Sandiganbayan
rejected appellant's defense of good faith and held that his receipt of the honorarium deprived other personnel
of the Municipal Health Office of the benefit and caused undue injury to the government.
Appellant's Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated July 12, 2019.21
The Present Appeal
Appellant now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and prays anew for his acquittal. In his Supplemental
Brief,22 appellant essentially argues:
First, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case. He allegedly caused undue injury to the
government in the amount of P17,512.50 which is within jurisdictional threshold of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) under RA 10660.23 Too, the summary payroll is unclear as to the date of actual payment which is
crucial in determining whether RA 10660 would apply to the present case. At any rate, the assailed decision
was based on pure speculation and conjectures.
Second, the Office of the Special Prosecutor failed to prove that he received P17,512.50 because it failed to
indicate from which PFPR fund (2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015) appellant's honorarium was sourced. The
Obligation Request merely stated that he approved the release of P280,l 87.00 while the summary payroll
enumerated its recipients. Approval of the release of payment is not the same as receiving the amount of
P17,512.50 in 2015. The Office of the Special Prosecutor likewise failed to prove that he received P17,512.50
in February 2015 since the corresponding disbursement voucher was dated March 2, 2015.
Third, he never admitted having received P17,512.50 from the PFPR as honorarium. In the Pre-Trial Order
dated November 26, 2018, what he admitted on February 2015 he certified the Obligation Request for payment
of the PhilHealth honoraria.
Fourth, he was deprived of his right to due process of law when the Sandiganbayan directed him to submit his
memorandum after the termination of the pre-trial. This was clearly an involuntary waiver of his right to present
evidence. The Sandiganbayan brushed aside his defense of good faith and decided in such a way that mere
presentation of the pertinent documents was sufficient to declare him to have acted with manifest partiality and
evident bad faith.
Lastly, he immediately refunded subject amount upon his receipt of the COA's notice of disallowance.
On the other hand, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Ombudsman-Office of the Special
Prosecutor defends the Sandiganbayan's verdict of conviction. In its Supplemental Brief,24 the People
counters:
First. The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction since the crime charged was committed before the effectivity of RA
10660. Contrary to appellant's claim that the prosecution failed to prove the exact time he received
the honorarium, appellant himself admitted in his memorandum that he received P17,512.50 in February 2015.
Second. All the elements of the crime of violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019 were sufficiently established.
Appellant was then Municipal Mayor of Sibonga, Cebu when he, with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence, accepted honoraria from the PhilHealth's Capitation Fund despite the fact that
he was not qualified to receive it. His unwarranted receipt thereof caused undue injury to the government.
Third. Appellant was not deprived of his right to present evidence. The Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the
Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases when it narrowed down the issues based on the
parties' stipulations during the pre-trial. Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan deemed it proper to simply require the
parties to submit their respective memoranda, to which the parties did not object.
Lastly. Restitution or refund of the honorarium does not exonerate appellant from criminal liability.
Threshold Issues
1. Did the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Was appellant's right to due process violated?
3. Is appellant guilty of violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019?
Ruling
The Sandiganbayan correctly assumed
jurisdiction over the case
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is outlined in Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended by Section 2 of RA
10660,25 viz.:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019. as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads;
x x x           x x x          x x x
Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information: (a)
does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or
bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One million
pesos (P1,000,000.00). (Emphases supplied)
Prior to its amendment, Section 4 of PD 1606 did not set a threshold amount of damage or damages allegedly
suffered by the government which would vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over the offense. The
amendment was introduced in RA 10660 which took effect on May 5, 2015.
Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined at the time it was filed.26 By way of
exception, however, Section 5 of RA 10660 ordains:
SECTION 5. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in the Sandiganbayan over which
trial has not begun: Provided, That: (a) Section 2, amending Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended, on "Jurisdiction"; and (b) Section 3, amending Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended, on "Proceedings, How Conducted; Decision by Majority Vote" shall apply to cases arising from
offenses committed after the effectivity of this Act. (Emphases added)
Verily, the amended jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only covers offenses committed only after RA 10660
took effect on May 5, 2015. This has already been settled in Ampongan v. Sandiganbayan,27 viz.:
It is clear from the transitory provision of R.A. No. 10660 that the amendment introduced regarding the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall apply to cases arising from offenses committed after the effectivity of
the law. Consequently, the new paragraph added by R.A. No. 10660 to Section 4 of Presidential Decree (P.P.)
No. 1606, as amended, transferring the exclusive original jurisdiction to the RTC of cases where the
information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the
government or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding
One million pesos, applies to cases which arose from offenses committed after the effectivity of R.A. No.
10660.
Here, the Information charged appellant with violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 around February 2015.
Appellant himself categorically admitted in his memorandum28 that he received honoraria of P17,512.50 in
February 2015. Thus, when the alleged crime was committed, RA 10660 had yet to take effect, hence, the
same is inapplicable here.
Appellant was afforded his
right to due process of law.
Too, appellant was afforded his right to due process of law. The following circumstances negate appellant's
claim of due process violation:
First, appellant waived his right to question the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. He did not raise this
issue before the court below. In fact, by his own deliberate act, appellant voluntarily waived his right to present
evidence. Per the minutes29 of the session held by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division dated August 31, 2018,
the parties manifested they were no longer presenting their respective evidence, thus:
The parties upon conferring on their joint stipulation of facts manifested that they are ready to submit their joint
stipulation/narration of facts, thus the pre-trial was declared terminated without prejudice to the issuance of a
Pre-Trial Order by the Court. Upon manifestation of the parties that they are no longer presenting their
respective evidence, the parties were given 15 days, 1) from date for the prosecution to file its offer of exhibits;
2) the defense, from receipt of its copy of the prosecution's offer., to file its comment/opposition thereto, and
upon resolution of the prosecution's offer by the Court; 3) for the defense to file its offer of exhibits, and lastly,
4) from receipt of copy, for the prosecution to file its comment or opposition thereto. The parties upon receipt of
the Court's resolution on the accused's offer of exhibits were given 30 days within which to file their respective
Memorandum. Thereafter, the case will be submitted for decision. By agreement of the parties, the
promulgation of judgment was set on FEBRUARY 22, 2019  at 1:30 P.M. (Emphases added).
At any rate, appellant still was able to formally offer his documentary exhibits.30
Second, appellant actively participated in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan as in fact he entered a
plea of not guilty, entered into joint stipulation of facts, filed his memorandum, and formally offered his
documentary exhibits. SSK Parts Corporation v. Camas31 held that active participation32 in the proceedings a
quo are all part and parcel of right to due process. As appellant had all the opportunities to be heard, he may
not complain that he was denied due process.
Finally, Section 4, Rule 118 decrees that trial shall be limited to matters not disposed of during the pre-trial:
SECTION 4. Pre-trial Order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions
taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not
disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent
manifest injustice.33 (Emphasis supplied)
The Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases34 ordains that proposals for stipulations shall
be done with the active participation of the court itself and shall not be left alone to the counsel. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan here endeavored to facilitate a joint stipulation of facts between the prosecution and the
defense. As a result, the only remaining question left to be resolved was one of law - whether appellant was
entitled to honorarium from the PhilHealth's Capitation Fund.
Appellant did not act with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, and or
inexcusable negligence when
he received the honorarium
Appellant was charged with violation of Sec.  3(e) of RA 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, viz.:
SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
x x x           x x x          x x x
To sustain a conviction for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, the prosecution must sufficiently establish the
following elements: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the act was done in the discharge of the public
officer's official, administrative, or judicial functions; (3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party,
including the government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.35
Here, the first and second elements are undisputed. Appellant was then Municipal Mayor of Sibonga, Cebu. He
was performing his official functions when he certified Obligation Request No. 0499-02-15-300 for the payment
of the twenty percent (20%) PhilHealth honoraria in 2015.
We focus on the third element.
A violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed in three (3) ways, i.e., through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three (3) in connection with the
prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) is enough to convict.36 Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan37 expounded on
the different modes of committing the offense penalized under Section 3(e), viz.:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished
for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through
some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as
negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a
duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so
far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless
men never fail to take on their own property." These definitions prove all too well that the three modes are
distinct and different from each other. Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the
prohibited acts under Section 3(e) should suffice to warrant conviction. (Emphases supplied).
Here, appellant allegedly violated Section 3(e) when he, with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and/or gross
inexcusable negligence, received P17,512.50 from the PhilHealth Capitation Fund as honorarium despite his
alleged non-entitlement thereto.
Section V (G) of PhilHealth Circular No. 010 s. 2012 provides the disposition and allocation of the
PhilHealth honoraria as follows:
2. The remaining twenty percent (20%) shall be exclusively utilized as honoraria of the staff of the PCB facility
and for the improvement of their capabilities as would enable them to provide better health services:
a. Ten percent (10%) for the physician;
b. Five percent (5%) for other health professional staff of the facility; and
c. Five percent  (5%) for  non-health professionals/staff, including volunteers and community members of
health teams (e.g., Women's Health Team, Community Health Team). (Emphases added)
Hence, five percent (5%) of the total PhilHealth honoraria was allocated to the non - health professionals OR
staff of the PCB Provider. As to who these non-health or professionals mentioned, they were not specifically
identified. The rule does not expressly indicate whether they need be part of the official roll of employees of the
Municipal Health Office.
Non-health professionals include the rank and file employees or administrative staff of the Municipal Health
Office who are not among the front liners providing access to health care. It also covers volunteers and
community members of health teams. This led appellant to honestly believed, albeit mistakenly, that the office
of the municipal mayor which exercises control and supervision over the Municipal Health Office and its
personnel, may likewise be covered by the term "non-health professional." Consequently, he acted in good
faith when he received the P17,512.50 honorarium, anchored as it was on the honest belief that he was legally
entitled to the benefit.38 Otherwise stated, appellant did not act in bad faith when he mistakenly interpreted
Section V (G) of PhilHealth Circular No. 010 s. 2012.
At any rate, bad faith per se is not enough for one to be held criminally liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019; bad faith must be evident. It must partake the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive or ill will for ulterior purposes.39 In short, it is a
manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or to cause damage40 unlike here.
In Ysidoro v. Leonardo-De Castro,41 the Court decreed that an erroneous interpretation of a provision of law,
absent any showing of some dishonest or wrongful purpose, does not constitute and does not necessarily
amount to bad faith.
Neither could appellant's receipt of the honorarium amount to manifest partiality. There is manifest partiality
when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than
another.42 Appellant could not have been predisposed to favor himself when his basis for his receipt of
the honorarium was his honest belief of his entitlement thereto.
Lastly, appellant did not act with gross inexcusable negligence. Gross inexcusable negligence refers to
negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.43 Here, gross inexcusable negligence cannot be
imputed on appellant for his erroneous interpretation of the provision of the law. He did not carve out from
empty space his supposed entitlement thereto because he had legal basis, albeit, it was a mistaken
interpretation of Section V (G) of PhilHealth Circular No. 010 s. 2012.
In Ysidoro,44 the Court upheld Mayor Ysidoro's acquittal of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for the
prosecution's failure to discharge its burden of proving that Ysidoro acted in bad faith and the presence of the
exculpatory proof of good faith. There, Mayor Ysidoro ordered the deletion of private complainant's name in the
payroll for RATA and productivity pay. In acquitting him, the Court held that the presence of badges45 of good
faith on the part of Mayor Ysidoro negated his alleged bad faith.
Lastly, appellant's subsequent restitution of the honorarium upon receipt of the COA notice of disallowance all
the more bolsters his claim of good faith. In Zamboanga City Water District v. Commission on Audit,46 the
Court held that lack of knowledge of a similar ruling by this Court prohibiting a particular disbursement is a
badge of good faith.
All told, appellant is acquitted for two (2) reasons, one, absence of the third element on the modes of
committing the offense under Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, and two, the exculpatory proof of good faith.
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is GRANTED and the Decision47 dated May 17, 2019 of the Sandiganbayan in
SB-18-CRM-0010, REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant Lionel Echavez Bacaltos is ACQUITTED of violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019. Let the corresponding
entry of final judgment be immediately issued.
SO ORDERED.

Sombero v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 237888 & 237904, July 28, 2020
DECISION
REYES, J. JR., J.:
Certiorari is an extraordinary prerogative writ that is not demandable as a matter of right. For the Court to even
consider a petition for certiorari, it must clearly and convincingly show the presence of grave abuse of
discretion.1 Unfortunately, such is not the case here.
Before this Court, on March 26, 2018, petitioner Wenceslao "Wally" A. Sombero, Jr. (Sombero) filed the instant
Petition2 for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Urgent Application for the Issuance of a
Restraining Order or Status Quo Ante Order seeking to annul and set aside the Consolidated
Resolution3 dated October 23, 2017 and Consolidated Order4 dated November 23, 2017 of the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) in OMB-C-C-16-0525, OMB-C-C-17-0001, and OMB-C-C-17-0089 finding probable cause
to indict him, along with several others, for: (i) Plunder defined and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act
(R.A.)No. 70805; (ii) Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 30196; (iii) Direct Bribery under Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (iv) Presidential Decree No. (PD) 46.7
Factual Antecedents
On December 16, 2016, Sombero filed before the OMB a Complaint-Affidavit8 for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 against Bureau of Immigration (BI) Deputy Commissioners Al C. Argosino (Argosino) and
Michael B. Robles (Robles). This was docketed as OMB-C-C-16-0525.
On December 22, 2016, a Second Complaint9 was filed by the then BI Acting Intelligence Chief Charles T.
Calima, Jr. (Calima) before the OMB also charging Argosino and Robles with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 and R.A. No. 7080, docketed as OMB-C-C-17-0001.
Lastly, on January 26, 2017, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Dante A. Gierran filed the Third
Complaint,10 this time charging Argosino, Robles, Calima, Sombero, and Jack Lam (Lam) with direct bribery,
receiving/soliciting gifts, violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, and PD 46. This was docketed as OMB-C-
C-17-0089.
All three complaints are predicated upon the same set of facts summarized below:
On November 24, 2016, pursuant to BI Mission Order (MO) No. JHM-2016-06511 issued by Commissioner
Jaime H. Morente (Commissioner Morente), the Fugitive Search Unit of the BI conducted a law enforcement
operation at the Fontana Leisure Park and Casino (Fontana) in Clark Freeport Zone, Angeles, Pampanga,
resulting in the apprehension of 1,316 undocumented Chinese nationals who were running an illegal online
casino.12 Fontana was reportedly owned by Lam and managed by Ng Khoen Hon also lcnown as Norman Ng
(Ng).13
Amidst the crisis in Fontana, Sombero allegedly reached out to Ng, introduced himself as the President of the
Asian Gaming Service Providers Association, Inc. (AGSPA), and arranged for the latter to meet with
Depailment of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Vitaliano N. Aguirre II (Secretary Aguirre) and Argosino.14
On November 26, 2016, at the VIP room of High Street Cafe situated inside Shangri-La Hotel in Bonifacio
Global City, Sombero introduced Lam, Ng, and a certain Alex Yu (Yu) to Secretary Aguirre and
Argosino.15 Sombero then told Secretary Aguirre about the plight of the businessmen and even uttered the
words: "Secretary, matagalna walang nag-aalaga Icay Jack Lam. Sopwede ho ba ang Secretary of Justice ang
mang (sic) ninong sa kanya?"16 However, Secretary Aguirre ignored this and left the room within
minutes.17 Thus, it was Sombero and Argosino who allegedly agreed on the amount of PI 00 Million and P50
Million of which must be given immediately.18 That same day, before midnight, Argosino and Robles showed
up in the City of Dreams (COD) in Pasay City and waited at a restaurant.19 At around 2:00 a.m. on November
27, 2016, Sombero, carrying two paper bags each containing P10 Million, met with Argosino and Robles at the
restaurant.20 After a few conversations, Sombero left the restaurant, leaving the two bags with Argosino and
Robles.21 By 5:45 a.m., Sombero was back with three more paper bags filled with P10 Million each.22 They
then proceeded to the parking lot and loaded three paper bags in Argosino's car and the other two paper bags
in Robles' car.23Sombero also took P2 Million from the P50 Million.24
On November 30, 2016, Argosino, Robles, Sombero, Ng, and Yu met at a suite at the Crown Hotel and
discussed bail matters.25 After that, Argosino kept on demanding the other P50 Million even though none of
the Chinese workers had been released.26 Thus, Sombero went to Calima and divulged the
transaction.27 Consequently, Calima visited Argosino and Robles on separate occasions and informed them
that he knew about the P50 Million exchange on November 27, 2016 at COD.
On December 8, 2016, Argosino and Robles approached Commissioner Morente and claimed that Calima was
harassing them. Calima was thus summoned to the Commissioner's office.28 There, Calima showed
Commissioner Morente the evidence pertaining to Argosino and Robles' transaction with Sombero.29 It was
then that the two Deputy Commissioners admitted that they were in possession of the P50
Million.30 Thereafter, Calima and Argosino met after office hours to discuss damage control during which,
Calima's share was fixed at P18 Million.31 On December 9, 2016, at around 2:00 p.m., Argosino delivered two
paper bags containing a total of P18 Million to Calima.32 Thereafter, Calima was fired by Secretary Aguirre
while Robles and Argosino resigned.
Pursuant to the Order33 dated March 10, 2017 of the OMB directing the respondents in OMB-C-C-17-0089 to
submit their counter-affidavits, Sombero, in particular, submitted his Counter-Affidavit34 on April 10, 2017,
claiming that he only assisted the detained Chinese nationals in his capacity as President of AGSPA.
Moreover, he asserted that it was Argosino who asked for P100Million and insisted that half of the said amount
be given at once as a show of goodwill. He also contended that he received P2 Million from Argosino for the
puipose of forming a legal team to assist in the processing of the release of the Chinese individuals.
OMB Consolidated Resolution
and Order
On October 23, 2017, the OMB issued the assailed Consolidated Resolution finding probable cause to charge
Sombero, Argosino, Robles, Calima, and Lam. The dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, finding probable cause to indict respondents, let the appropriate Informations be FILED before
the proper court/s for the following criminal charges:
One (1) count of Violation of Section 3 (e) of [RA. No.] 3019 against [ARGOSINO, ROBLES, and petitioner];
One (1) count of Violation of Section 3 (e) of [R.A. No.] 3019 against [CALIMA];
One (1) count of Violation [of R.A.. No.] 7080 against [ARGOSINO, ROBLES, and petitioner];
One (1) count of Direct Bribery (Article 210, Revised Penal Code) against [ARGOSINO,
ROBLES, and petitioner];
One (1) count of Direct Bribery (Article 210, Revised Penal Code) against [CALIMA];
One (1) count of Violation of [PD 46 against [ARGOSINO, ROBLES, petitioner, and LAM]; and
One (1) count of Violation of [PD 46 against [ARGOSINO, ROBLES, and CALIMA].
SO ORDERED.35
However, upon separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by Sombero, Calima, Lam, Argosino, and Robles,
the OMB issued a Consolidated Order dated November 23, 2017, modifying its earlier Resolution, viz.:
WHEREFORE, finding probable cause to indict respondents except [Calima], let the appropriate Informations
be FILED before the proper court/s for the following criminal charges:
One (1) count of Violation of Section 3 (e) of [R.A. No.] 3019 against [ARGOSINO, ROBLES, and petitioner];
One (1) count of Violation [of R.A. No] 7080 against [ARGOSINO, ROBLES, and petitioner];
One (1) count of Article 210, Revised Penal Code against [ARGOSINO, ROBLES, and petitioner];
One (1) count of Violation of [PD 46 against [ARGOSINO, ROBLES, petitioner, and LAM].
SO ORDERED.36
After due consideration of the testimonial and documentary evidence, the OMB concluded that Argosino and
Robles, taking advantage of their official positions as BI Deputy Commissioners, conspired with Sombero in
acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P50 Million intended as a bribe to release the 1,316
undocumented Chinese nationals found illegally working inside Fontana.
As regards Calima, the OMB found that Commissioner Morente's testimony before the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations on February 16, 2017 validated Calima's contention that his
actions were pursuant to a duly authorized counter-intelligence operation that he was conducting and that his
receipt of the PI 8 Million was solely for the purpose of gathering more evidence against Argosino and Robles.
Thus, the charges against Calima were dropped.
Accordingly, on March 23, 2018, the OMB filed before the Sandiganbayan (SB) an Information37 charging
Argosino, Robles, and Sombero with violation of R.A. No. 7080 docketed as SB-18-CRM-0241.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari filed by Sombero raising the following issues:
THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT FOUND PROBABLE CAUSE TO CHARGE [HIM] WITH PLUNDER.
THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT VIOLATED [HIS] RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.38
Our Ruling
Plainly stated, the issue in this case is whether or not the OMB committed any grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the assailed Consolidated Resolution and Consolidated Order finding probable cause against
Sombero, et al. for the charges against them.
The Court rules in the negative.
Article XI, Section 12 of the Constitution39 and R.A. No. 667040 empower the OMB to act on criminal
complaints against public officials and government employees with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory prerogatives.41 Respect for the OMB's constitutional mandate and practicality leads this Court to
exercise restraint in interfering with the former's performance of its functions.42 Besides, its power to
investigate43 puts OMB in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand
needed to make a finding of probable cause. And, being a non-trier of facts, this Court generally defers to the
sound judgment of the OMB except if it has been made with grave abuse of discretion.44
Certainly, the burden of demonstrating all the facts essential to establish the right to a writ of certiorari lies with
Sombero.45 He must sufficiently prove that the OMB's Consolidated Resolution and Consolidated Order
finding probable cause to indict him may be reviewed or even set aside by this Court based on the narrow
ground of grave abuse of discretion amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Here, Sombero posits that there is no probable cause to charge him with plunder, in conspiracy or otherwise,
since: (a) the amassing, accumulation, and acquisition of the ill-gotten wealth must be accomplished through a
series or combination of overt or criminal acts; and (b) the element of a "main plunderer" is missing. Clearly,
Sombero's arguments are centered on the OMB's appreciation of facts. And, if only to determine the presence
or absence of grave abuse of discretion, the Court now looks into the OMB's justifications in concluding that
probable cause exists in this case.
There is probable cause to indict
Sombero, et al.
Let it first be emphasized that Sombero's Petition involves the preliminary stage in a criminal case. During a
preliminary investigation, the OMB merely determines whether probable cause exists to warrant the filing of a
criminal case against an accused. Such investigation is not a part of the trial and is executive in nature.46 The
executive finding of probable cause requires only substantial evidence and not absolute certainty of
guilt.47 The finding of probable cause need only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime
has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused.48 Thus, the
OMB is not bound by the technical rules on evidence.49 Therefore, in order to arrive at its finding of probable
cause, the OMB only has to find enough relevant evidence to support its belief that the accused most likely
committed the crime charged. Otherwise, grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to its ruling.50
After a judicious review, the Court holds that, in the present case, the OMB's finding of probable cause for
violation of R.A. No. 7080 against Sombero, et al. is supported by substantial evidence. The crime of Plunder,
as culled from the law itself (i.e., R.A. No. 7080), has the following elements: (a) that the offender is a public
officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons; (b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1 (d)51; and (c) that the
aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated, or acquired is at least P50
Million Pesos. Here, as the correctly found by the OMB, the presence of the first element is undisputed for
Argosino and Robles were serving as BI Deputy Commissioners at the time relevant to the case.52 Next,
based on the documentary evidence adduced, Argosino and Robles, in connivance with Sombero, came into
possession of ill-gotten wealth through a series of overt acts committed on a single day - in the wee hours of
November 27, 2016, they received or collected a sum of money on two instances in consideration for their
supposed intercession or assistance in the release of the detained Chinese nationals.53 Lastly, on the strength
of Ng and Yu's affidavits and of Robles' own admission in his Counter-Affidavit, the total aggregate amount
involved is P50 Million.
Anent the requirement of a main plunderer, the Office of the Solicitor General in its Consolidated
Comment54 properly pointed out that what is at issue here are the Consolidated Resolution and Consolidated
Order issued by the OMB after finding probable cause to indict Sombero et al. for Plunder. The disquisition
then regarding the lack of a main plunderer — who was supposed to be identified in the Information - is at this
stage, premature. In Macapagal-Arroyo v. People55 we held that because Plunder is a crime that only a public
official can commit by amassing, accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total value of at least P50
Million, the identification in the Information of such public official as the main plunderer among the several
individuals thus charged, is logically necessary under the law itself. It is, thus, clear that the main plunderer
must be identified in the Information and not necessarily in the questioned OMB Consolidated Resolution and
Consolidated Order.
Sombero's constitutional right to
due process was not violated.
Sombero maintains that his right to due process was violated. According to him, the initial complaint against
him and his co-respondents a quo was for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Yet, the OMB, after
preliminaiy investigation, filed an Information against him and several others for violation of R.A. No. 7080
instead.
Surely, Sombero's argument is untenable. Enrile v. Salazar56 tells us that there is nothing inherently irregular
or contrary to law in filing against an accused an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the
initiatoiy complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation. Corollarily, the
OMB is given ample room and a wide-ranging margin of discretion in determining not only what will constitute
sufficient evidence that will establish "probable cause" for the filing of an information against a supposed
offender, but the proper offense to be charged as well against said offender depending again on the evidence
submitted by the parties during the preliminaiy investigation. "In fact, the Ombudsman may investigate and
prosecute on its own, without need for a complaint-affidavit, for as long as the case falls within its
jurisdiction."57
In fine, the Court finds the foregoing facts sufficient to engender a reasonable belief that the overt acts of
Sombero satisfy all of the elements of the law allegedly violated. In turn, these facts rule out any arbitrariness
in the OMB's determination of probable cause. Stated otherwise, Sombero failed to show that the OMB
capriciously and whimsically exercised its judgment in determining the existence of probable cause to warrant
the issuance of a writ of certiorari and nullify its findings on the ground that these were made in excess of
jurisdiction.
All told, the presence or absence of the elements of the crime charged and the validity of a party's defense or
accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and other documentary proof, are matters best passed
upon during a full-blown trial on the merits.58 Hence, Sombero's assertions anchored on the absence of some
elements of the crime charged are better ventilated during trial and not during preliminaiy investigation.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Consolidated Resolution dated
October 23, 2017 and Consolidated Order dated November 23, 2017 of the Office of the Ombudsman are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Acting on the Urgent Motion for Provisional Release from Detention due to COVID-19 dated April 15, 2020 of
petitioner Wenceslao A. Sombero, Jr., the Court RESOLVES to REFER the same to the Sandiganbayan where
petitioner's case docketed as SB-18-CRM-0241 is pending, for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

Delilah J. Ablong, et al. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 233308, August 18, 2020
DECISION
REYES, J. JR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari assailing Decision No. 2016-1601 dated July 28 2016 of the
Commission on Audit (COA) dismissing the petition for review, seeking the reversal of the letter-reply of the
COA Regional Office, for having been belatedly filed, and for being an improper remedy. Also assailed is
COA's En Banc Resolution2 dated April 26, 2017, which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The Undisputed Facts
In calendar year 2008, the Board of Regents of the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU), Dumaguete
City, passed Board Resolution No. 28, Series of 2008, granting Economic Relief Allowance (ERA) in the
amount of P25,000.00 each to all regular, casual, temporary, or part-time, personnel and officials of NORSU.
ERA in the amount of P30,000.00 each was also given in the two succeeding years: 2009 and 2010.
Petitioners, all teachers of NORSU, received ERA in calendar years 2008 to 2010.
On January 27, 2011, the COA Audit Team issued Notice of Disallowance (ND) Nos. 2011-001-164(2008) to
2011-013-164(2010)3 on the payments of ERA on the grounds that the expenditure did not carry the approval
of the President of the Philippines and that the same was illegally debited from tuition fees and other school
charges. The NDs and the letter-transmittal therefor were delivered to and received by NORSU Acting Chief
Accountant Liwayway G. Alba (Alba) on February 16, 2011.4
No appeal was made on the NDs. Thus, on August 31, 2011, a Notice of Finality of Decision (NFD) on ND No.
2011-002-164(2008) was issued.5 On November 23, 2011, COA Order of Execution (COE) was issued to
enforce the said ND.6
On January 18, 2012, petitioner Delilah J. Ablong (Ablong), as a member of the Faculty and Academic Staff
Association/All NORSU Faculty Union, wrote a letter7 to COA Regional Director Delfin P. Aguilar (COA
Regional Director Aguilar) requesting that the COE be reconsidered. She maintained that she and her
colleagues were not informed that the grant of ERA by the NORSU Board of Regents was disallowed and
learned of the disallowance and the NFD subsequently issued only in November or December 2011 when they
were given copies of the NFD by the Office of the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences of NORSU. She,
thus, prayed that she and her colleagues be provided with avenues to remedy the situation instead of being
required to refund the amounts received by them.
In a Letter,8 dated February 7, 2012, COA Regional Director Aguilar denied Ablong's request stating in
essence, that the enforcement of the COE can no longer be deferred because NFDs had already been issued
and any appeal from the NDs can no longer be entertained since doing so will violate COA Circular No. 2009-
006 on the Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts.
Unyielding, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review9 before the COA Proper appealing the denial by COA
Regional Director Aguilar of their letter-request. They contended that COA rules of procedure on reglementary
period should not have been strictly applied since they were not notified of the NDs and that they should not be
required to refund the amounts disallowed as their receipt of ERA was in good faith.
The COA Proper Disposition
On July 28, 2016, the COA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for review upon a finding
that the six-month period to appeal an ND under Section 48, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 144510 and
Section 33, Chapter 5(B)(1) of Administrative Code of 1987 has already expired. The petitioners having failed
to appeal the NDs, necessarily, NFDs were issued which, in turn, led to the ministerial duty of the Regional
Director of issuing COE. Further, it ruled that the petitioners' filing of a petition for review is improper
ratiocinating that the proper subject of an appeal before the same is a decision rendered by the Director on the
ND itself before it becomes final and executory, and not a letter-reply from a Regional Director enforcing
COEs. The decretal portion of the disposition reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review of the letter of the Regional Director, COA
Regional Office No. VII, filed by Ms. Delilah J. Ablong, et al., all of the Negros Oriental State University
(NORSU), Dumaguete City, is hereby DISMISSED for not being a proper remedy under the COA rules,(sic)
and in view of the final and executory nature of the decision being appealed from. Accordingly, Commission on
Audit Order of Execution dated November 23, 2011 for Notice of Disallowance Nos. 2011-001-164(2008) to
2011-017-164(2010), on the grant of economic relief allowance to NORSU employees for calendar years 2008
to 2010, in the total amount of P20,237,850.00, shall be enforced.11
The petitioners moved for, but failed to obtain, a reconsideration.12 Undaunted, they filed the instant Petition
for Certiorari.
The Issue
THE COMMISSION PROPER COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT UPHELD THE NOTICES OF FINALITY OF DECISION (NFDS) AND
THE COA ORDERS OF EXECUTION (COES) DESPITE: (1) LACK OF ACTUAL SERVICE OF THE NOTICE
OF DISALLOWANCES TO PETITIONERS; AND (2) GOOD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONERS IN
RECEIVING THE ECONOMIC RELIEF ALLOWANCE.13
In support of their claim of grave abuse, the petitioners assert two arguments: denial of due process and good
faith. They argue that they were denied due process in that they were not informed by NORSU's Acting Chief
Accountant that NDs were issued on the ERA. According to them, the request of then NORSU President Dr.
Henry A. Sojor that copies of the NDs be furnished to the individuals determined to be liable was even denied
by the Supervising Auditor. They, thus, insist that they should not be faulted for failing to timely appeal the NDs
as they were, in the first place, unaware of the same. As for the claim of good faith, they contend that, even if
the NDs were sustained, they should not be held accountable for the disallowed amounts because they were
not part of the decision-making process to grant the ERA and they received it on the assumption that NORSU
Board of Regents' grant of the same was in accord with law and they have, in the first place, no authority to
review and pass upon the resolutions of the said Board.
For its part, COA counters that the Audit Team is not required to furnish copies of the NDs to the petitioners
considering that, in instances where there are several payees, service to the accountant constitutes service to
all payees listed in the payroll under Section 12.1 of COA Circular No. 2009-006. Thus, service of the NDs and
the letter-transmittal (which even contained a reminder to the Accountant that the service of the NDs to her
constitutes service to all payees listed in the payroll), to NORSU Acting Chief Accountant Alba was sufficient.
Thus, it insists that the petitioners were not denied of due process. As for the petitioners' claim of good faith,
COA asseverates that, even if the petitioners were not involved in the passage of the Board Resolution
allowing the grant of ERA, the latter are still bound to return the amounts illegally expended because every
person who received the same are jointly and severally liable for the full amount received under Section 49,
P.D. No. 1177.14 Further, it points out that the petitioners should be deemed aware of the illegality of the grant
of ERA because NORSU's management was already informed of the illegality as early as 2007 by the COA
Auditors, through an Audit Observation Memoranda (AOM) and the petitioners have access to the Annual
Audit Reports of NORSU where the AOMs are included.15 Asserting that it did not act with grave abuse of
discretion, the COA prays for the dismissal of the petition.
In their Reply,16 the petitioners aver that their constitutional right to due process must prevail over Section
12.1 of COA Circular No. 2009-006. Moreover, they argue that the AOMs are addressed only to NORSU's
administration and they are not given copies of the same or of the Annual Audit Reports; hence, expecting
them to sift through the same is a responsibility that is way beyond their mandate as teachers.
The Court's Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
The Court generally observes the policy of sustaining the decisions of the COA on the basis both of the
doctrine of separation of powers and of the COA's presumed expertise in the laws entrusted to it to enforce.
The Court will not review any errors allegedly committed by the COA in its decisions, unless tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The Constitution itself, as well as the Rules of Court, provide the remedy of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 in order to restrict the scope of inquiry to errors of jurisdiction
or to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the COA. Indeed, it is
the Court that determines whether or not there was an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law, on the part of the COA, as when the judgment
rendered is not based on law and evidence, but on caprice, whim and despotism.17
Here, there is no dispute that petitioners were not informed that NDs had been issued on the ERA they
received from 2008 to 2010. Petitioners learned of the disallowance of the ERA only in November to December
2011 when they were given copies of the NFD by the Office of the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences of
NORSU. Petitioner Ablong, as a member of the Faculty Union, on January 18, 2012, then wrote a letter to
COA Regional Director Aguilar requesting that the COE be reconsidered, maintaining that they were not
informed of the disallowance of the subject benefits. COA Regional Director Aguilar, however, denied Ablong's
request stating that the enforcement of the COE can no longer be deferred because NFDs had already been
issued and any appeal from the NDs can no longer be entertained, invoking COA Circular No. 2009-006 on the
Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts.
Petitioners thereafter filed a petition for review with the COA Proper appealing the denial of their letter-request.
This was dismissed by the COA on July 28, 2016, finding that the six-month period to appeal an ND under
Section 38, P.D. No. 1445 and Section 33, Chapter 5(B)(1) of Administrative Code of 1987 has already
expired. The COA further ruled that petitioners' petition for review was improper as the proper subject of an
appeal is a decision on the ND, before it becomes final and executory, and not a letter-reply from a Regional
Director enforcing COEs.
Clearly, COA failed to heed Section 10.2 of COA Circular No. 2009-006 which categorically requires service of
the ND to all the persons liable, viz.:
10.2 The ND shall be addressed to the agency head and the accountant; served on the persons liable; and
shall indicate the transactions and amount disallowed, reasons for the disallowance, the laws/rules/regulations
violated, and persons liable. It shall be signed by both the Audit Team Leader and the Supervising Auditor. xxx
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
COA's argument that, because there were several payees, it was duty-bound to serve notice only to the
accountant since service to the latter constitutes service to all payees under Section 12.118 of COA Circular
No. 2009-006, fails to sway. It is true that said provision holds that in case there are several payees, service to
the accountant who shall be responsible for informing all payees concerned, shall constitute constructive notice
to all payees in the payroll. It bears emphasizing however that while the accountant had the corresponding
duty to inform the payees, this did not materialize in this case for. to reiterate, the petitioners were not informed
by the Acting Chief Accountant of NORSU of the NDs of their ERAs.
Given the petitioners' allegation that the Supervising Auditor even refused the request of NORSU's former
president that copies of the NDs be furnished to the individuals determined to be liable, it is easy to conclude
that COA not only did not observe Section 10.2 of COA Circular No. 2009-006, but also the mandate of the due
process clause. Such lack of notice to the petitioners amounted to a violation of their fundamental right to due
process as the same is considered satisfied only if a party is properly notified of the allegations against him or
her and is given an opportunity to defend himself or herself.19
Due process of law, as guaranteed in Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, is a safeguard against any
arbitrariness on the part of the Government, and serves as a protection essential to every inhabitant of the
country. Any government act that militates against the ordinary norms of justice or fair play is considered an
infraction of the great guaranty of due process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation merely of
the procedure prescribed by the law or affects the very validity of the law itself.20
We have held that due process is satisfied if the party who is properly notified of allegations against him or her
is given an opportunity to defend himself or herself against those allegations, and such defense was
considered by the tribunal in arriving at its own independent conclusions. What is offensive to due process is
the denial of the opportunity to be heard.21
Here, petitioners were not given any opportunity to be heard and their defenses were not considered in the
denial of their petition.
It is true that a Notice of Finality of Decision and an Order of Execution had already been rendered in this case.
However, considering the non-observance of petitioners' right to due process, the same should be set aside. It
is settled that "[v]iolation of due process rights is a jurisdictional defect" and that "a. decision or judgment is
fatally defective if rendered in violation of a party-litigant's right to due process."22 Accordingly, the case
should be remanded to the COA in order to resolve petitioners' appeal from the NDs on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision No. 2016-160 dated July 28, 2016 and the Resolution
dated April 26, 2017 of the Commission on Audit are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the COA in order to resolve petitioners' appeal from the subject notices of disallowance
on the merits.
SO ORDERED.

Joint Ship Manning Group, Inc. v. Social Security System, G.R. No. 247471, July 7, 2020,
Facts:
R.A. No. 1161, or the Social Security Act of 1954, established the Social Security System (SSS). Its declared
policy was to develop a social security service to protect Filipino workers. At that time, Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs) were not covered by the said law. Subsequently, in 1987, the 74th Geneva Maritime Session
of the International Labour Organization (ILO) ruled that seafarers have the right to social security protection,
an internationally accepted principle. Eighteen (18) countries, including the Philippines, signed the Session's
act.
On July 14, 1988, the SSS and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (1988 MOA), stating that one of the conditions of the Standard Employment
Contract (SEC) of seafarers would be that sea based OFWs shall be covered by the SSS.
In 1995, the Court promulgated Sta. Rita v. Court of Appeals (Sta. Rita),[4] which stated that R.A. No. 1161
does not exempt seafarers from coverage of the SSS law. It was underscored therein that the SEC entered
into by the seafarer and the manning agencies, which imposes SSS coverage, is valid and binding.
In 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8282 or the 1997 SSS Law. However, the said law still did not consider
the mandatory coverage of OFWs under the SSS. In 2006, the ILO adopted the Maritime Labour Convention
(2006 MLC) to establish the minimum working living standards for all seafarers. It provides for the labor rights
of a seafarer, including social protection, and the implementation and enforcement of these rights.
In 2010, the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) amended the SEC, declaring that the
seafarer's SSS coverage is a duty of the principal, the employer, the master, or the company.
On February 7, 2019, Congress enacted R.A. No. 11199, which mandated compulsory SSS coverage for
OFWs. The purpose of the law is to provide OFWs with SSS benefits, especially upon retirement. It also
increased the rates of SSS contributions to provide relief for the dwindling resources of the SSS. Sec. 9-B of
R.A. No. 11199 covers the compulsory coverage of OFWs
Hence, this petition assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 9-B of R.A. No. 11199 was filed before the Court
against the Social Security System (SSS) and the Social Security Commission
Issues:
WHETHER SEC. 9-B OF R.A. NO. 11199 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF RIGHTS.
Ruling:
When a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. To justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative one.[22] Moreover, the reason courts will, as much as possible, avoid the decision of a
constitutional question can be traced to the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins on each department
a proper respect for the acts of the other departments. In line with this policy, courts indulge the presumption of
constitutionality and go by the maxim that "to doubt is to sustain." The theory is that, as the joint act of the
legislative and executive authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be
constitutional before it was finally enacted.
R.A. No. 11199 was enacted, among others, to extend social security protection to Filipino workers, local or
overseas, and their beneficiaries.[25] Sec. 9-B(a) states that OFWs shall have compulsory coverage by the
SSS. Sec. 9-B(b) states that manning agencies are agents of their principals and are considered as employers
of sea-based OFWs which make them jointly and severally or solidarily liable with their principals with respect
to the civil liabilities therein. On the other hand, the recruitment agencies of land-based OFWs are not
considered as agents of their principals, and thus, are not jointly and solidarily liable for the SSS contributions.
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is
embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the
concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of
undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of
the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the
sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.[26]It, however, does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The Court finds that Sec. 9-B of R.A. No. 11199 does not violate the equal protection of laws because there is
a substantial distinction between sea-based OFWs and land-based OFWs.
As properly argued by respondents, seafarers constitute a unique classification of OFWs. Their essential
difference against land-based OFWs is that all seafarers have only one (1) standard contract, which provides
the rights and obligations of the foreign ship owner, the seafarer and the manning agencies
As petitioners failed to prove that Sec. 9-B of R.A. No. 11199, to the extent that sea-based OFWs are
concerned, violates the Constitution, then this statutory provision must be upheld in favor of the obligatory SSS
coverage of the seafarers.

Flores-Concepcion v. Judge Castañeda, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2438, September 15, 2020

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Death, be not proud, though some have called thee
Mighty and dreadful, for thou art not so;
For those whom thou think 'st thou dost overthrow
Die not, poor Death, nor yet canst thou kill me.
From rest and sleep, which but thy pictures be,
Much pleasure; then from thee much more must flow,
And soonest our best men with thee do go,
Rest of their  bones, and soul's delivery.
Thou art slave to fate, chance, kings, and desperate men,
And dost with poison, war, and sickness dwell,
And poppy or charms can make us sleep as well
And better than thy stroke; why swell 'st thou then?
One short sleep past, we wake eternally
And death shall be no more; Death, thou shaft die.

Holy Sonnets: Death, Be Not Proud

By John Donne

Death is a far graver and more powerful judgment than anything that this Court has jurisdiction to render.

Hence, when the respondent in a pending administrative case dies, the case must be rendered moot.
Proceeding any further would be to violate the respondent's fundamental right to due process. Should it be a
guilty verdict, any monetary penalty imposed on the dead respondent's estate only works to the detriment of
their heirs. To continue with such cases would not punish the perpetrator, but only subject the grieving family to
further suffering by passing on the punishment to them.

This Court resolves the Administrative Complaint[1] against Judge Liberty O. Castaneda (Judge Castaneda),
then the judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67. She was sued by Sharon Flores-
Concepcion (Concepcion), whose marriage the judge had nullified without her even knowing about it.

In particular, Concepcion claimed that in November 2010, she received a July 30, 2010 Decision[2] in Civil Case
No. 459-09, declaring her marriage to Vergel Concepcion as void ab initio. The Decision surprised her as she
did not know that her husband had filed any petition.[3] She added that neither she nor her husband was a
resident of Paniqui.[4] Seeking answers, Concepcion went to Branch 67 on December 8, 2010, and there
discovered that, based on the records, no hearing was conducted on the case at all.
[5]
                                             

Thus, Concepcion filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment[6] on January 19, 2011 before the same court.[7] Due
to this incident, she also filed an Complaint-Affidavit[8] against Judge Castaneda.

On June 29, 2011, the Office of the Court Administrator directed the judge to comment, but she failed to
comply despite notice.[9]

In 2012, as this case was pending, Judge Castaneda was dismissed from the service in another case, Office of
the Court Administrator v. Judge Liberty O. Castañeda.[10] There, she was found guilty of dishonesty, gross
ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, and incompetency for, among others, disposing of nullity and
annulment marriages with "reprehensible"[11] haste. This Court forfeited her retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, and barred her from reemployment in any government branch or instrumentality, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.[12]

Given her dismissal, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Concepcion's Complaint be
dismissed.[13] However, this Court later resolved to return this administrative matter to the Office of the Court
Administrator to reevaluate the case on its merits.[14]

In its July 7, 2015 Memorandum,[15] the Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Castaneda willfully
and contumaciously disregarded the "laws and rules intended to preserve marriage as an inviolable social
institution and safeguard the rights of the parties."[16] It found that the judge hastily resolved the nullity case
despite several glaring procedural defects. Moreover, it noted her "act of defiance"[17] in refusing to submit a
comment despite a directive. It stated that while the judge had since been dismissed from service, penalties
could still be imposed since this Complaint had been filed before the 2012 ruling.[18] It noted that a judge's lack
of moral fitness may likewise be basis for disbarment.[19]

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the following:

1.   the instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter against
respondent Judge Liberty O. Castaneda, former Presiding Judge, Branch 67, RTC, Paniqui, Tarlac;

2.  respondent Judge Castaneda be found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law for which she would have
been DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave   credits,   if
any,   and   disqualified   from  reinstatement  or appointment to any public office, branch or instrumentality of
the government,     including     government-owned     or     controlled corporations had she not been previously
dismissed from the service in a Decision dated 9 October 2012 in A.M. No. RTJ-12-2316; and

3. respondent  Judge  Casta[n]eda be  likewise  DISBARRED  for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01
and 10.01 of the Code of Professional  Responsibility  and  her  name  be  ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys.[20]    (Emphasis in the original)
While the Memorandum was pending with this Court, Judge Castaneda died on April 10, 2018 from acute
respiratory failure.[21]

The sole issue here is whether or not the death of respondent Judge Liberty O. Castaneda warrants the
dismissal of the Administrative Complaint lodged against her.

In the 2019 case of Re: Investigation Report on the Alleged Extortion Activities of Presiding Judge Godofredo
B. Abul, Jr.,[22] this Court initially held that the respondent's death will not extinguish a pending administrative
case, since this Court is not ousted from its jurisdiction by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased to
hold public office. Thus, the respondent in Re: Judge Abul was found guilty of gross misconduct, and all his
benefits, excluding accrued leaves, were forfeited.

On reconsideration, however, this Court reversed its earlier ruling and held that the respondent's death while
the case was pending effectively renders the case moot. Thus, the complaint was dismissed.[23] We now apply
the same ruling to this case.

The imposition of a penalty on a public officer after death does not punish the public officer. Public trust is not
magically restored by punishing the public officer's heirs—persons who most likely have nothing to do with that
public officer's infractions.

Prudence dictates that this case should be rendered moot as respondent Judge Castaneda died. She could no
longer be in a position to defend herself from these charges in a motion for reconsideration. She could no
longer admit to the charges, express remorse, or beg for clemency. Proceeding any further would be a gross
violation of her constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
I

Every person is guaranteed the right to due process before any judgment against them is issued. Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution declares:
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
In this jurisdiction, due process has "no controlling and precise definition"24 but is "a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid."[25] It is, in its broadest sense, "a law which hears before it condemns."[26] In Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila[27]
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any government action for that matter, from the
imputation of legal infirmity; sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy
the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reasons
and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of
whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions
of legal and political thought." It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically
in slavery to form or phrases.[28]
Due process encompasses two concepts: substantial due process and procedural due process. Substantive
due process is generally premised on the "freedom from arbitrariness"[29] or "the embodiment of the sporting
idea of fair play."[30] It "inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life,
liberty, or property."[31]

Procedural due process, on the other hand, "concerns itself with government action adhering to the
established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere."[32] It is "[a]t its most basic ... about
fairness in the mode of procedure to be followed."[33] Medenilla v. Civil Service Commission[34] summarizes
procedural due process as:
. . . the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the tribunal which pronounces judgment upon
the question of life, liberty, and property in its most comprehensive sense; to be heard, by testimony or
otherwise, and to have the right of controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of
the right in the matter involved.[35]
The requirements of procedural due process depend on the nature of the action involved. For judicial
proceedings:
[First,] [t]here must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
[second,] jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is
the subject of the proceeding; [third,] the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and [fourth,]
judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.[36] (Citation omitted)
In administrative cases, however, the essence of procedural due process is merely one's right to be given the
opportunity to be heard.[37] In Casimiro v. Tandog:[38]
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity
to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means
the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process.[39]
The sufficiency of pleadings in lieu of actual hearings does not imply that administrative proceedings require a
"lesser" standard of procedural due process. On the contrary, Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations[40] requires that in administrative trials and investigations,[41] seven cardinal primary rights be present
for the requirements of due process to be satisfied:
(1)   The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected
to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.   In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan
v. U.S., "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play."

(2)   Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.  In the language of
this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of
the board to consider it, is vain.   Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the
evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."

(3)   "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."   This principle emanates from the
more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited
power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4)   Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
"substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.    It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

. . . The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in
judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.

(5)        The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.   Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It
should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to
use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. . . .

(6)   [The tribunal or officer], therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.. . .

(7)   [The tribunal or officer] should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.[42] (Citations omitted)
Nonetheless, this Court clarified in Gas Corporation of the Philippines v. Inciong[43] that the failure to strictly
apply the regulations required by Ang Tibay will not necessarily result in the denial of due process, as long as
the elements of fairness are not ignored:
1. The vigor with which counsel for petitioner pressed the claim that there was a denial of procedural due
process is inversely proportional to the merit of this certiorari and prohibition suit as is quite evident from the
Comment of the office of the Solicitor General. It is undoubted that the due process mandate must be satisfied
by an administrative tribunal or agency. So it was announced by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. That is still good law. It follows, therefore, that if procedural due process
were in fact denied, then this petition must prosper. It is equally well-settled, however, that the standard of due
process that must be met in proceedings before administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the
element of fairness is not ignored. So the following recent cases have uniformly held: Maglasang v. Ople,
Nation Multi Service Labor Union v. Agcaoili, Jacqueline Industries v. National Labor Relations Commission,
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, Philippine Labor Alliance Council v.
Bureau of Labor Relations, and Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation. From the Comment of the
office of the Solicitor General, it is quite clear that no imputation of arbitrariness can be justified. The
opportunity to present its side of the case was given both parties to the controversy. If, for reasons best known
to itself, petitioner did not avail of its right to do so, then it has only itself to blame. No constitutional infirmity
could then be imputed to the proceeding before the labor arbiter.[44]  (Citations omitted)
Thus, while Ang Tibay requires the application of no less than seven cardinal rights, it is generally accepted
that due process in administrative proceedings merely requires that the respondent is given the opportunity to
be heard.[45] This opportunity to be heard, however, must be present at every single stage of the proceedings. It
cannot be lost even after judgment. In Lumiqued v. Exevea:[46]
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. One
may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more
practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of
due process. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be
said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[47] (Emphasis supplied)
The opportunity to be heard is an intrinsic part of the constitutional right to due process. Thus, in criminal
cases, cases against the accused are immediately dismissed upon death[48] since the accused can no longer
participate in all aspects of the proceedings.

Administrative proceedings require that the respondent be informed of the charges and be given an opportunity
to refute them. Even after judgment is rendered, due process requires that the respondent not only be informed
of the judgment but also be given the opportunity to seek reconsideration of that judgment. This is the true
definition of the opportunity to be heard.
II
This Court's disciplinary powers must always be read alongside the guarantee of any respondent's
fundamental rights. Any attempt to exercise our disciplinary powers must always take into account the
provisions of the Constitution, from which these disciplinary powers are derived.

It is a settled doctrine that a disciplinary case against a court official or employee may continue, even if the
officer has ceased to hold office during the pendency of the case.[49]

Cessation from office may either be voluntary or involuntary. Thus, the doctrinal safeguard against the
dismissal of disciplinary cases prevents erring officers and employees from escaping liability by voluntarily
ceasing to hold office, either through resignation or optional retirement.

Compulsory retirement is likewise covered by this doctrinal safeguard, even though this is an involuntary
cessation from office. After all, retirees know when they will retire. Prospective retirees could attempt to escape
liability for infractions by committing them near retirement.

However, death, unless self-inflicted, is an involuntary cessation from office. It is not like resignation or optional
retirement. Unlike compulsory retirement, no one knows when they will die. In death, there is no certainty as to
when one ceases holding office.

The opportunity to be heard can only be exercised by those who have resigned or retired. The reason is
obvious: They are still alive. Even if they cease to hold public office, they can still be made aware of the
proceedings and actively submit pleadings.

Dead respondents have no other recourse. They will never know how the proceedings will continue, let alone
submit responsive pleadings. They cannot plead innocence or beg clemency.

Death forecloses any opportunity to be heard. To continue with the proceedings is a violation of the right to due
process.
III

Unfortunately, Gonzales v. Escalona[50] has often been misquoted as basis to state that a respondent's death
will not preclude a finding of administrative liability. In that case, where one of the two respondents had died,
this Court stated:
While [Sheriff IV Edgar V. Superada's] death intervened after the completion of the investigation, it has been
settled that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative matter by the mere fact that the
respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of the respondent's case; jurisdiction once
acquired, continues to exist until the final resolution of the case.

In Layao, Jr. v. Caube, we held that the death of the respondent in an administrative case does not preclude a
finding of administrative liability:
This jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complainant was not lost by the
mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court
retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declared him
guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications ... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves
the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding
censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.[51] (Citations omitted)
The continuation of the quoted portion in Gonzales, however, explicitly provides the several exceptions to this
rationale, foremost of which is the denial of due process:
The above rule is not without exceptions, as we explained in the case of Limliman v. Judge Ulat-
Marrero, where we said that death of the respondent necessitates the dismissal of the administrative case
upon a consideration of any of the following factors: first, the observance of respondent's right to due process;
second, the presence of exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian
reasons; and third, it may also depend on the kind of penalty imposed. None of these exceptional
considerations are present in the case.

The dismissal of an administrative case against a deceased respondent on the ground of lack of due process
is proper under the circumstances of a given case when, because of his death, the respondent can no longer
defend himself. Conversely, the resolution of the case may continue to its due resolution notwithstanding the
death of the respondent if the latter has been given the opportunity to be heard, as in this case, or in instances
where the continuance thereof will be more advantageous and beneficial to the respondent's heirs.
[52]
 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Gonzales not only lays the basis for the dismissal of the administrative case due to respondent's death,
but also states the basis for continuing the administrative case despite death: (1) when the respondent was
given the opportunity to be heard; or (2) when the continuation of the proceedings is more advantageous and
beneficial to respondent's heirs.

In fact, in Loyao, Jr. v. Caube[53] on which Gonzales hinges to justify the rule that death does not cancel out
administrative liability, this Court was actually constrained to dismiss the case and consider it closed and
terminated because the penalty could not be carried out. In Loyao, Jr.:
To be sure, respondent Caube's death has permanently foreclosed the prosecution of any other actions, be it
criminal or civil, against him for his malfeasance in office. We are, however, not precluded from imposing the
appropriate administrative sanctions against him. Respondent's misconduct is so grave as to merit his
dismissal from the service, were it not for his untimely demise during the pendency of these
proceedings. However, since the penalty can no longer be carried out, this case is now declared closed and
terminated.[54](Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
There have been several other administrative cases where the impracticability of imposing the punishment was
reason for this Court to just dismiss the case.

In Camsa v. Judge Rendon[55]this Court found it inappropriate to proceed with investigating a judge "who could
no longer be in any position to defend himself; otherwise, it "would be a denial of his right to be heard, our
most basic understanding of due process."[56]

In Apiag v. Cantero,[57] this Court dismissed an administrative case against an erring judge and allowed the
release of his retirement benefits to his heirs due to his death. It explained:
. . . [This Court] cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss in attending to the needs of his children of
his first marriage — children whose filiation he did not deny. He neglected them and refused to support them
until they came up with this administrative charge. For such conduct, this Court would have imposed a penalty.
But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this Decision, dismissal of the case is now in order.[58]
In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court of Tambulig and the 11th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Mahayag-Dumingag-Josefina, Zamboanga del Sur,[59] this Court was constrained to
dismiss the case against the deceased judge and release his retirement benefits to his heirs. This was despite
finding him guilty of gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law.

It is the impracticability of the punishment that must guide this Court in assessing whether disciplinary
proceedings can continue. To determine this, we must first examine our underlying assumptions on the
imposition of penalties for offenses against the State or its private citizens.
IV
In criminal law, "penalty" has been defined as "the suffering that is inflicted by the state for the transgression of
the law."[60] Crime and punishment are inseparable concepts, embodied by the Latin precept, nullum crimen
nulla poena sine lege.[61]

Several theories justify the imposition of a penalty. One theory is that of prevention, where the State punishes
an offender to prevent or suppress danger to society arising from that person's criminal act. Similarly, under
another theory, that of self-defense, the State punishes the offender to protect society from the threat inflicted
by the criminal.[62] These two theories underlie the imposition of penalties for attempted or frustrated crimes, as
a measure of protection to society against the potential harm that could have been inflicted by the offender.

Another set of theories is punitive in nature. The first of these is exemplarity, where the imposition of the
penalty acts as a deterrent to discourage others from committing the crime. Another theory is retribution or
retributive justice, where the State punishes the offender as an act of vindication or revenge for the harm done.
[63]
 Finally, there is the theory of reformation[64] or what is now referred to as restorative justice. The State's
objective in restorative justice "is not to penalize," but to "engage in a sincere dialogue toward the formulation
of a reparation plan. A reparation plan typically includes both monetary reparation and a rehabilitative program"
and even community work.[65]

At first glance, the aim of criminal law in this jurisdiction appears to be retributive, in line with the sovereign's
role "to regulate behavior, and in doing so, to determine guilt and punishment."[66] The severity of the penalty is
often measured against the severity of the crime. This Court once remarked:
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to
the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and
unusual." Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be
"flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral
sense of the community."[67] (Citations omitted)
In People v. Godoy,[68] the purpose of penalty imposition was used to differentiate whether an act of indirect
contempt is considered a criminal offense or a civil one. The prevailing doctrine is that indirect contempt is a
criminal offense if the purpose of punishment is punitive, aiming to seek retribution for an offense committed
against the State or its officers. It is a civil offense if the purpose of punishment is merely remedial, aiming to
restore the rights of the private offended party.[69]

While this discussion only applied to indirect contempt, looking into the purpose of the penalty can be a useful
tool to determine whether a proceeding is criminal or civil: If the purpose is punishment, it is criminal in nature;
if the purpose is remedial, it is civil in nature.

This may create the false impression that our criminal justice system has always been solely punitive in nature.
On the contrary, as early as 1933, this Court has recognized that the imposition of criminal penalties in this
jurisdiction is aimed toward restorative justice:
[I]t is necessary to consider the criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member of society. This
opens up an almost limitless field of investigation and study which it is the duty of the court to explore in each
case as far as is humanly possible, with the end in view that penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far
as is possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting the social order.

....

In considering the criminal as a member of society, his relationship, first, toward his dependents, family and
associates and their relationship with him, and second, his relationship towards society at large and the State
are important factors. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social
organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for
economic usefulness and other social ends.[70]
On the other hand, the imposition of penalties in administrative cases takes on a slightly different character
than that of criminal penalties. For instance, disciplinary cases filed against lawyers have always been
considered restorative, not punitive, as "the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the
individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the
misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court."[71] It is this protection of a higher ideal that animates the
purpose behind the imposition of administrative penalties.
The objective of the imposition of penalties on erring public officers and employees is not punishment,
but accountability. The Constitution declares:
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.[72]
To remain in public service requires the continuous maintenance of the public trust. In Office of the
Ombudsman v. Regalado:[73]
The fundamental notion that one's tenure in government springs exclusively from the trust reposed by the
public means that continuance in office is contingent upon the extent to which one is able to maintain that trust.
As Chief Justice Enrique Fernando eloquently wrote in his concurrence in Pineda v. Claudio:
[W]e must keep in mind that the Article on the Civil Service, like other provisions of the Constitution, was
inserted primarily to assure a government, both efficient and adequate to fulfill the ends for which it has been
established. That is a truism. It is not subject to dispute. It is in that sense that a public office is considered a
public trust.

Everyone in the public service cannot and must not lose sight of that fact. While his right as an individual
although employed by the government is not to be arbitrarily disregarded, he cannot and should not remain
unaware that the only justification for his continuance in such service is his ability to contribute to the public
welfare.[74]
For this reason, the worst possible punishment for erring public officials and employees is not imprisonment or
monetary recompense. It is removal from the public service. Thus, Section 46(A) of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides:
SECTION   46.     Classification  of Offenses.  — Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are
classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government
service.

A. The following grave offenses shall be punishable by dismissal from the service:
1.  Serious Dishonesty;
2. Gross Neglect of Duty;
3. Grave Misconduct;
4. Being Notoriously Undesirable;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Falsification of official document;
7. Physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits;
8. Receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties or in
connection therewith when such fee, gift or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or
expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than  that  accorded  to  other  persons, or  committing  acts
punishable under the anti-graft laws;
9. Contracting loans of money or other property from persons with whom the office of the employee has
business relations;
10. Soliciting or accepting directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of
monetary value which in the course of his/her official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated
by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of his/her office.   The propriety or impropriety of
the foregoing shall be determined by its value, kinship, or relationship between giver and receiver and the
motivation. A thing of monetary value is one which is evidently or manifestly excessive by its very nature;
11. Nepotism; and
12. Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Filipino people.
The purpose of administrative penalties is to restore and preserve the public trust in our institutions. Thus, it is
in the public interest to remove from service all individuals who diminish the public trust. This is the extent of
the punishment in administrative disciplinary cases.

The justification for the imposition of dismissal from service is neither prevention, nor self-defense, nor
exemplarity, nor retribution, nor reformation. It is part of public accountability, which arises from the State's
duty to preserve the public trust. The penalty attaches to the erring public officer or employee and to no other.
Only that erring public officer or employee is dismissed from service.

When that public officer or employee dies, there is no one left for the State to dismiss from service.

Thus, in Government Service  Insurance  System  v. Civil Service Commission,[75] this Court pronounced that
a respondent's death during the pendency of an administrative proceeding was cause to dismiss the case, due
to the futility of the imposition of any penalty. It said:
The Court agrees that the challenged orders of the Civil Service Commission should be upheld, and not
merely upon compassionate grounds, but simply because there is no fair and feasible alternative in the
circumstances. To be sure, if the deceased employees were still alive, it would at least be arguable, positing
the primacy of this Court's final dispositions, that the issue of payment of their back salaries should properly
await the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings referred to in the Second Division's Resolution of July 4,
1988.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of disciplinary administrative
proceedings, or the continuation of any then pending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said
of the binding force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and purposes, it makes
exoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot
exact an impossible performance or decree a useless exercise. Even in the case of crimes, the death of the
offender extinguishes criminal liability, not only as to the personal, but also as to the pecuniary, penalties if it
occurs before final judgment. In this context, the subsequent disciplinary proceedings, even if not assailable on
grounds of due process, would be an inutile, empty procedure in so far as the deceased employees are
concerned; they could not possibly be bound by any substantiation in said proceedings of the original charges:
irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. The questioned orders of the Civil Service Commission
merely recognized the impossibility of complying with the Resolution of July 4, 1988 and the legal futility of
attempting a post-mortem investigation of the character contemplated.[76] (Emphasis supplied)
The same rationale should apply to members of the Judiciary, as they are held to an even higher standard than
other public officers and employees. As early as 1903, this Court has imposed upon court officers their duty to
uphold public order:
The maintenance of public order and the existence of the commonwealth itself, depend upon the enforcement
of the mandates of the courts and require prompt obedience to them, not only by private citizens, but in a
special manner by the Government officers who are particularly charged with a knowledge of the law and with
the duty of obeying it.[77]
About a century later, this judicial fiat has not wavered. In Astillazo v. Jamlid:[78]

The Court has said time and time again that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the administration and  disposition of justice — from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk —
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that
may taint the well-guarded image of the judiciary. It has always been emphasized that the conduct of judges
and court personnel must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum at all times, but must also be
above suspicion. Verily, the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel, hence, it becomes
the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true
temple of justice. Thus, every employee of the court should be an exemplar of integrity, uprightness, and
honesty.[79] (Citations omitted)

In line with this, A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC80 provides that justices and judges found guilty of serious charges are
punishable by the following penalties:
SECTION 11.   Sanctions. — A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions
may be imposed:

1.  Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as   the   Court   may   determine, and  
disqualification   from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government- owned   or  
controlled   corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months; or

3.   A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.[81]

There is no hard and fast rule as to what penalty may apply. Often, the imposable penalty is purely within this
Court's discretion, in view Article VIII, Section II[82] of the Constitution, with due consideration to the offense's
gravity and the prior penalties imposed in similar cases.

The first two penalties, dismissal and suspension, are forms of negative reinforcement. They are meant to
make the respondent suffer. They are this Court's vindication for the tarnishing of its reputation. The loss of the
judicial robe, whether permanently or temporarily, carries with it the humiliation and degradation to one's
dignity within the legal profession. No judge or justice carries a dismissal or suspension from service with pride.

Dismissal from service also carries with it the accessory penalties of perpetual disqualification from public
office and forfeiture of retirement benefits.[83] The punishment is so grave that it not only requires removal from
public service but also prevents the respondent from returning, along with the future enjoyment of their labor.

This presupposes, of course, that the erring judge or justice is still a member of the Bench when the penalty is
imposed. There is, thus, a third penalty, that of a fine, which may be imposed when the erring judge or justice
is no longer in service.

It is the availability of the penalty of a fine that is often the justification for this Court to continue with cases
despite the respondent no longer being connected with the Judiciary. In Baquerfo v. Sanchez:[84]
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative
case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court's at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the
pendency of his case. Respondent's resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to
which he shall still be answerable.[85]

Summarizing the doctrine, Perez v. Abiera[86] states:

In short, the cessation from office of a respondent Judge either because of resignation, retirement or some
other similar cause does not per se warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint which was filed
against him while still in the service. Each case is to be resolved in the context of the circumstances present
thereat.[87]
The imposition of a fine regardless of the respondent's separation from service leads us to inquire why a fine
must still be imposed. It would be inaccurate to state that the fine is meant to be compensatory, as assaults on
the Judiciary's dignity are unquantifiable. Rather, as with dismissal and suspension, the purpose of the fine is
to make the respondent suffer, at least monetarily, for the harm done. The fine is a punishment, not a
repayment. It is meant to replace the penalties, which can no longer be imposed.

The punishment for administrative infractions, therefore, is personal to the respondent. As all punishments are
tempered with mercy, this Court metes them with the fervent hope that the erring judge or justice learns their
lesson and repents on all of their mistakes.

Remorse is impossible when the erring judge or justice dies before this Court can hand down its judgment. It
is, thus, irrational and illogical for this Court to continue with disciplinary proceedings despite the respondent's
death. There is no one left to punish.
V
In the initial resolution of Re: Judge Abul, the majority insisted that punishment was still a viable option for this
Court, since a fine could still be deducted from the respondent judge's accrued leave benefits. This begs the
question, however, of whom exactly this Court is trying to punish.

Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent." Here, all of respondent Judge Castaneda's properties were no longer hers at the
time of her death. They belonged to her estate, of which her heirs had an inchoate right.[88]

Charges against the estate include "claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or
implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expense for the
last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent."[89] Penalties, such as
administrative fines, are not included in this enumeration. They are not, strictly speaking, claims for money
arising from contracts or judgments for money. To categorize them as such would make this Court a creditor of
the decedent.

Upon her death, all of respondent's prospective assets, like her accrued leave benefits, have already passed
on to her estate. To impose the fine on her would be to make a claim against the estate.

In any case, from a moral standpoint, it would be cruel for this Court to make respondent's heirs bear the brunt
of her punishment. They are not under investigation. They are not the ones who committed respondent's
infractions. They are, from the findings of the investigation, innocent of the charges. And yet, should this Court
proceed with the case and impose a penalty upon a guilty verdict, it is respondent's heirs who would bear that
punishment.

Admittedly, respondent's infraction in this case is severe. The Office of the Court Administrator conclusively
found that complainant's nullity case was resolved with undue haste, having been resolved less than a year
after the petition had been filed. None among complainant, the Office of the Solicitor General, or the Office of
the Public Prosecutor was ever furnished with copies of the petition. The psychologist was never made to
testify in court to confirm the findings of the psychological report.[90] Respondent would have been dismissed
for her blatant and gross ignorance of the law.

In 2012, however, this Court has already dismissed respondent from service for her infractions. Her retirement
benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, were forfeited. She has already borne the humiliation and
degradation from that penalty. There are no more retirement, death, or survivorship benefits from which we
could bleed out any prospective fine. This Court has already extracted its pound of flesh.

Here, respondent is no longer in a position to refute the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator. She
could no longer know of the proceedings against her. She would not know of the conclusions of this Court and
of the punishment that she would have so rightly deserved. She could no longer move for reconsideration,
admit to the charges, plead her innocence, not even beg for clemency.

There is no more reason for this Court to proceed with this case.

Respondent is dead. She could no longer evade liability. She could no longer pollute the courts with her
incompetence and corrupt ways. She could no longer betray the public trust.

Death, perhaps, was a more profound judgment than any this Court could impose.

Despite all the constitutional powers we are endowed with as the Supreme Court of this country, we should
have the humility to accept that we do not have the ability to punish a dead person.   It is irrational to do so.
Perhaps, only the universe can.
WHEREFORE, the Complaint against respondent Judge Liberty O. Castaneda of Branch 67, Regional Trial
Court, Paniqui, Tarlac, is DISMISSED in view of her death during the pendency of this case.

SO ORDERED.

Frabelle Properties Corp. v. AC Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 245438, November 3, 2020
DECISION
PERALTA, C.J.:
This petition for review on certiorari challenges the June 19, 2018 Decision1 and the February 18, 2019
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 105817, which reversed and set aside the
November 28, 2014 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City, Branch 74, in favor of AC
Enterprises, Inc. (respondent).
Factual Antecedents
Frabelle Properties Corporation (petitioner), a domestic corporation, is the developer and manager of Frabella I
Condominium, a 29-storey building composed of residential and commercial units and located at 109 Rada
Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. Petitioner owns some of the units in Frabella I Condominium, and leases
them out to tenants.4
Respondent, a domestic corporation, is the owner of Feliza Building, a 10-storey building composed of
commercial and office units, and located along V.A. Rufino (formerly Herrera) Street, Legaspi Village, Makati
City.5
Frabella I Condominium was constructed around 1995, about five years later than Feliza Building. Both
buildings are located in Legaspi Village, which at that time was already a bustling business and commercial
area with numerous establishments and busy streets. Rada and V.A. Rufino streets lie parallel to each other,
with Rodriguez Street, a two-lane road approximately 12 meters wide situated in between. Feliza Building is
located at the back of Frabella I Condominium, such that the exhaust of the blowers from the air-conditioning
units at Feliza Building faces the direction of the rear of Frabella I Condominium.6
From the first to ninth floor of Feliza Building, there are air-conditioning units served by 36 blowers, with four
blowers for each floor located outside the building's windows facing Frabella I Condominium.7 Only a portion of
the rear side of Feliza Building faces Frabella I Condominium, while the remaining portion of Feliza Building
faces the Thailand Embassy, a building adjacent to Frabella I Condominium.8
Petitioner contends that respondent's blowers generate excessive noise and irritating hot air blown towards the
direction of Frabella I Condominium. The noise and hot air are claimed to be a nuisance to petitioner and the
tenants of Frabella I Condominium.9
According to petitioner, it had complained to respondent about the blowers in at least three letters dated April
11, 1995, June 6, 1995 and August 14, 2000, all of which were ignored.10 It had also attempted to settle its
complaint with respondent through other actions filed prior to the civil case. On March 10, 2001, petitioner filed
a complaint with the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) for the abatement of noise and/or pollution and
damages, with a plea of injunctive relief.11 In a letter dated March 7, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint with
then Makati City Mayor Jejomar C. Binay with prayer to cancel the Mayor's License and Business Permits of
the Feliza Building.12
In response to petitioner's complaints, respondent introduced some improvements in 2000 and 2006, including
the installation of soundproofing materials on all air-conditioning units and replacement of blowers and air-
condensers.13 However, petitioner continued to insist that respondent cease operation of its blowers.
On July 1, 2003, petitioner filed a Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance with Damages, with prayer for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 3745-
MN,14 originally raffled to RTC, Branch 170 of Malabon City, then re-raffled to Branch 74 upon the granting of
respondent's motion to inhibit the presiding judge.15
The parties presented their respective evidence, which the RTC and CA summarized in their respective
decisions.
Evidence presented by petitioner
Consuelo Albutra16 (Albutra), petitioner's Vice President, testified that even while Frabella I Condominium was
under construction, it had already informed respondent that the noise from the blowers will affect their
prospective tenants, but respondent failed to take any remedial measures. Thus, petitioner sought the
assistance of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and Makati Commercial Estate
Association (MACEA). The MMDA and MACEA conducted an ocular inspection and found that the noise is on
the intolerable level and exceeds the allowable standard level of 65 decibels per Section 78 (b) of Presidential
Decree No. 984.17
A series of noise pollution tests conducted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
in late 1995 up to early 1996 and in 2000 likewise bore the same result. As recommended by the DENR,
petitioner referred the matter to the City Health Officer of Makati City, who conducted another test that resulted
in findings similar to that made previously by MMDA, MACEA, and DENR.18
With the continuance of the noise, petitioner's rental rate was allegedly reduced from 25% to 30% because
tenants were allegedly vacating due to the noise and hot air.19 Petitioner presented letters of complaint from
tenants, but failed to authenticate the same.
Of the tenants residing in Frabella I Condominium, only one testified. Tenant-witness Ma. Cristina A. Lee (Lee)
who was occupying Unit 9-D facing Rodriguez Street testified that when she moved in Frabella I Condominium
on June 2003, she noticed the loud noise and hot air going toward the direction of her unit, and upon checking,
she noted it was coming from the blowers of the air-conditioning units of Feliza Building. Eventually, she never
opened her balcony door and kept her air-conditioning units operating most of the time. She complained to the
administration of the noise and hot air, but continued to occupy her unit.20
Jaime Matias (Matias), General Manager of MACEA, testified that MACEA is an association of property owners
within the Makati Central District. Sometime in 1995, MACEA received a letter-complaint from petitioner in
connection with the noise coming from the blowers of the air-conditioning units of Feliza Building. In response,
MACEA wrote a letter to respondent advising it to adopt remedial measures, which it failed to do. MACEA then
sought the assistance of the DENR and Makati City Engineering Office. This resulted in the conduct of noise
level measurements and the issuance of a Cease and Desist Order by the Makati City Government.21
Sometime in 2001, MACEA conducted its own monitoring of the noise and MACEA imposed a daily fine on
respondent, which the latter protested. The testing in 2001 was done using MACEA's own equipment (rayon
noise level meter) with the supervision of MACEA's Assistant Manager who was assisted by security guards.22
Sometime in 2005, MACEA hired the services of the Technical Experts on Environmental Management which
also conducted noise level tests and found that the noise level exceeded the allowable level of 65 decibels.23
Francisco Cabeltis, Jr., Sanitary Inspector of Makati City Health Department testified that acting on a letter-
request of petitioner, he and Romualdo Panopio conducted an ocular inspection on March 2, 2002 and found
that there is still an intolerable noise emitted by the air-conditioning units of Feliza Building. In conducting the
test, no special equipment was used other than the physical senses of their eyes and ears.24
Lemelie Pascua (Pascua) testified that she was then an Environmental Management Specialist of the DENR
and that she conducted an investigation on August 29, 2000 and September 27, 2000. On cross-examination,
Pascua stated that the sound readings identified different sources of noise coming from the Thailand Embassy
Building and some passing cars. She further noted that even when the blowers of Feliza Building were not in
operation, the noise level already exceeded the permissible limits.25
Evidence presented by respondent
Raulito Dumangon, who was authorized to represent respondent, testified that when Feliza Building was
constructed in 1989, the vicinity was already a commercial area. At the time of Feliza Building's operation in
1990 up to 1995 when Frabella I Condominium was constructed, its air-conditioning units were not changed or
altered, yet respondent never received complaints regarding the operation of its blowers.26
He also testified that respondent voluntarily made modifications and rectifications to improve the condition of
the air-conditioning units of Feliza Building. In 2000, respondent engaged the services of MBA Urethane
Products Contractor to install soundproofing materials (i.e., two inches of thick layer of polyurethane) on all the
air-conditioning units in all the floors of the Feliza Building. In February 2006, respondent hired Polar Wind
Airconditioning and Refrigeration, Inc., which replaced the blowers and air-condensers of the air-conditioning
units at the sixth to tenth floors of the Feliza Building, and installed on its roof deck five units of condenser fans.
Respondent also installed re-routing ducts to divert and re-route the air away from Frabella I Condominium and
towards V.A. Rufino Street.27 Respondent commenced the operation of the newly-installed air-condensers at
the roof deck of the Feliza Building on June 28, 2006. The Office of the Building Official of Makati issued a
Certificate of Operation that allowed respondent to operate its air-conditioning units.28
Engineer Albert Lusterio (Engr. Lusterio), a Sanitary Engineer of the Makati City Health Department, testified
that the Makati Health Office conducted a sound reading measurement and based on the results of the test,
issued a closure order, to which respondent objected based on some technicality on the measurement. The
City Health Officer then decided to avail the services of an independent sound expert, IAA Technologies, to
conduct the measurement and reading of the noise.29
The testing was done on November 22, 2008 at 1:00 a.m. After the said test, it was determined that the sound
produced by the blowers is within the standard during the daytime. The Makati City Government then lifted the
Closure Order.30
Dar Quintos (Quintos), owner of IAA Technologies and expert in audio and acoustics, was deputized by the
Makati City Health Department to conduct the noise pollution tests on the air-conditioning system.31 Quintos
testified that he was the one who conducted the noise pollution test on that early morning of November 22,
2008, and rendered a report on his findings that the noise measured 63.4 decibels. Prior to that, on November
13, 2010, he also conducted a noise pollution test with a result that the noise measured 61.3 decibels, which
he stated to be even below the noise levels specified in Makati Municipal Ordinance No. 93-181.32 He
furnished his report to the Makati City Health Department, which then issued to respondent a permit to operate
the air-conditioning units of Feliza Building.33
The record also shows that the RTC issued an Order dated January 14, 2008, directing the Makati City Health
Officer or her duly authorized representative to conduct a noise pollution test in the portion of Rodriguez Street
located between Feliza Building and Frabella I Condominium on January 18, 2008. Hence, the Environment
Health and Sanitation Division of the Makati Health Department carried out the noise pollution test in
Rodriguez Street and inside Frabella I Condominium, and thereafter prepared and submitted the inspection
report.34
The RTC summoned Sanitation Inspector Felipe Albayda, Jr. (Albayda) from the Makati Health Department,
who conducted the test. Albayda explained that the noise emanating from the Feliza Building exceeded the
allowable noise limit.35
Ruling of the RTC
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered the Decision dated November 28, 201436 in favor of petitioner,
ruling that the noise generated by Feliza Building's blowers constitutes a private nuisance in favor of petitioner.
It held:
In the instant case, there is preponderant evidence consisting of the testimonies of its witness, to convince the
Court that the thirty six (36) blowers in defendant's Feliza Building generate noise and blow hot air in the
direction of plaintiff's Frabella I Condominium which annoys and offends the plaintiff and its tenants, the noise
being monophonic and intense, and the hot air constantly blown towards its building, thus being of such
character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to any person of ordinary sensibilities,
rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable.37
The RTC permanently enjoined respondent from turning on and/or operating all the 36 blowers of the air-
cooled condensers, and awarded petitioner temperate damages based on the loss of earnings by 25% to 30%
on its revenue from rental of its units, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.38
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the RTC's Decision and for the inhibition of the presiding judge. Both
motions having been denied by the RTC,39 respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, respondent averred that the RTC erred in relying on the testimony of a single tenant of Frabella I
Condominium, tenant-witness Lee, and on the obsolete sound tests conducted sometime in 1995 and 2005.
Respondent also argued that the RTC disregarded its recent evidence showing that the noise levels of the
blowers are already within reasonable levels based on the readings and sound tests conducted thereon, and
that the Makati City government has been continuously allowing respondent to conduct its business and
operate its air-conditioning system in Feliza Building, as shown by various permits and certificates of authority
to operate air-conditioning units. Further, respondent questioned the RTC's award of temperate and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.40
Petitioner, on the other hand, argued that the evidence it presented was not obsolete, and it was able to prove
the merit of its case by a preponderance of evidence as shown by the results of the testing done on January
18, 2008, which it asserts to have greater probative value than the testing conducted on November 22, 2008.
Moreover, the RTC did not base its decision on the testimony of a single tenant considering the numerous
letter-complaints of other tenants that were offered in evidence, and that witness Lee testified on behalf of all
tenants similarly situated. On the award of damages and attorney's fees, petitioner averred that such was
proper in light of respondent's continuous failure to act upon its complaints.41
In its Decision dated June 19, 2018, the CA granted respondent's appeal, and reversed and set aside the
RTC's Decision dated November 28, 2014.42
The CA held that the standard used by the RTC, which is "whether it annoys or offends the senses of the
plaintiff and its tenants in Frabella I Condominium" is not the accurate standard in determining the sufficiency
of evidence of the existence of actionable nuisance entitling petitioner to relief and damages.43 In reaching
such conclusion, the CA relied on the case of AC Enterprises, Inc. v. Frabelle Properties Corporation,44 which
notably involved the same parties and factual antecedents, but had stemmed from a denial of respondent's
motion to dismiss before the RTC:45
Based on the foregoing, the mere existence of noise and hot air complained of by the plaintiff as offensive to
sensibilities and causes discomfort and annoyance are not enough to prove that the noise and/or hot air is an
actionable nuisance.
The Supreme Court laid down the correct tests or standards of actionable nuisance, to wit:
1) Whether rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the
sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of
living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise
although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another
owner who, though creating a noise, is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it;
2) In every case the question is one of reasonableness. What is a reasonable use of one's property and
whether a particular use is an unreasonable invasion of another use and enjoyment of his property so as to
constitute a nuisance cannot be determined by exact rules, but must necessarily depend upon the
circumstances of each case, such as locality and the character of the surroundings, the nature, utility and
social value of the use, the extent and nature of the harm involved, the nature, utility and social value of the
use or enjoyment invaded, and the like; and
3) Annoyances and discomforts must not be more than those ordinarily to be expected in the community or
district, and which are incident to the lawful conduct of such trades and businesses. If they exceed what might
be reasonably expected and cause unnecessary harm, then the court will grant relief.46
In applying the above standard, the CA found that petitioner failed to discharge its burden of proving nuisance.
It emphasized that the testimony of only one tenant-witness Lee, was not sufficient evidence on the extent and
nature of the discomfort caused to the tenants of Frabella I Condominium. It was not shown by petitioner that
the perception, sensibility and lifestyle of Lee represented the normal and ordinary level of sensitivity and
habits of living of the other tenants who had supposedly been offended also by the noise and hot air from
Feliza Building. The CA also took cognizance of the fact that notwithstanding the discomforts raised, Lee
continued to occupy her unit and did not vacate.47
The CA also considered that the sound test reports from 1995 to 2008. It observed that based on the latest
findings and reports of the Environmental Management Bureau and the Makati City government, the noise
level in the area surrounding the Feliza Building and Frabella I Condominium is already within normal
allowance limits for a commercial area. Consequently, the Makati City government issued to respondent the
licenses and permits for the operation of new air-conditioning and machinery units, as well as operation of its
business.48
Finding an absence of preponderance of evidence of the existence of actionable nuisance and for lack of
sufficient evidence of the petitioner's claim of loss of business rental income, the CA found that the RTC
committed reversible error in ordering the closure of respondent's 36 blowers and in awarding temperate and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.49
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,50 which was denied in the CA Resolution dated February 18,
2019.51
Thus, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari, raising the following arguments:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAULTING PETITIONER FOR PRESENTING ONLY ONE (1) OF
THE TENANTS COMPLAINING OF THE NUISANCE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE AND TO
ESTABLISH THE REQUIRED DEGREE OF EVIDENCE.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE PERMITS AND LICENSES ISSUED BY
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI CITY TO FELIZA BUILDING.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN REVERSING THE AWARD GRANTED BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT TO PETITIONER FOR TEMPERATE, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.52
In its Comment, respondent argues that the CA correctly ruled that the petitioner failed to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that the noise emanating from the air-conditioning units of Feliza Building
constitutes a nuisance, and that petitioner is not entitled to the payment of temperate and exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees.53
The Issues
I. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS AN ACTIONABLE NUISANCE
II. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE PAYMENT OF TEMPERATE AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
Our Ruling
The petition must be denied for lack of merit.
It is a settled rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The function of the Court in Petitions for Review
on Certiorari Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been
committed by the lower courts.54 Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor disturbed on
appeal to this Court.55
In Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co. Inc. v. People of the Philippines,56 the Court held:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of
law, its resolution must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants, but must rely solely on what the law provides on the given set of facts. If the facts are disputed or if
the issues require an examination of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact. The test, therefore, is not
the appellation given to a question by the party raising it, but whether the appellate court can resolve the issue
without examining or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question
of fact.57 (Citations omitted)
A question of fact requires this court to review the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations of the parties. This
review includes assessment of the probative value of the evidence presented.58
In this case, petitioner in seeking a determination if the CA erred in its appreciation of the evidence presented,
asks this Court to assess the probative value of the evidence presented and therefore raises a question of fact.
However, these rules admit of exceptions, which were listed in Osmundo Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.:59
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.60 (Citations omitted)
In this case, an exception applies – the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the RTC. The Court will
proceed to resolve the present petition.
Burden of proof in nuisance claims
In this case, petitioner, as plaintiff, has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that the noise
from the blowers of Feliza Building is an actionable nuisance. After due consideration of the factual findings of
the trial court, we rule that petitioner failed to discharge its burden.
Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,61 the burden of proof is on the party
establishing his or her claim, which in this civil case is the plaintiff, petitioner herein:
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his or her
claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Burden of proof never shifts.
Burden of evidence is the duty of a party to present evidence sufficient to establish or rebut a fact in issue to
establish a prima facie case. Burden of evidence may shift from one party to the other in the course of the
proceedings, depending on the exigencies of the case.62
This revised version of the rule is similar to the previous recital of the rule under Section 1, Rule 131 of the
recently amended 1989 Rules on Evidence: "Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the
facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law."63
Interpreting the amended provision under the 1989 Rules, we have held that in civil cases, the burden of proof
rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.64 While such
interpretation is of the amended rule, we find it applicable to the revised version as the first paragraph of the
revised version carries over the whole of or at least the substance of the amended rule.
Jurisprudence defines preponderance of evidence as the greater weight of evidence or evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief that that which is offered in opposition thereto.65
In the case at bar, as will be discussed below, petitioner's evidence was not of greater weight than that
presented by respondent such as to establish its claim of actionable nuisance. We affirm the CA's finding that
petitioner failed to discharge its burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that the noise and hot air
coming from respondent's blowers is an actionable nuisance.
I. First Issue: Actionable Nuisance
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance:
A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1)
Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies
or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.66
The Civil Code classifies nuisances as public or private. A private nuisance has been defined as one which
violates only private rights and produces damages to but one or a few persons. A nuisance is public when it
interferes with the exercise of public right by directly encroaching on public property or by causing a common
injury.67
Noise nuisance
The noise complained of by petitioner has already been recognized by this Court in AC Enterprises not to be a
nuisance per se. Noise can be considered a nuisance only if it affects injuriously the health or comfort of
ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent.68
In AC Enterprises, the Court held:
The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question
that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the
condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the
emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of
property of another owner who, though creating a noise, is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those
affected by it.
xxxx
The determining factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the
noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary
sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be
said to be substantial and unreasonable in degree, and reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon
all the circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise constitutes a
nuisance.69 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied
The reasonable use of one's property is dependent on the circumstances of each case, taking into
consideration factors such as locality and character of surroundings, the nature, utility and social value of the
use, the extent and nature of the harm involved, the nature, utility and social value of the use of enjoyment
invaded, and the like.70
We assess the circumstances of this case to determine if respondent's use of its blowers and consequent
emission of noise was within reasonable bounds or if such is an actionable nuisance.
Results of noise pollution tests
Throughout the course of the dispute, several noise pollution tests were conducted over the years.
The tests conducted in 1995 and 2000 by the DENR yielded the same result that the noise being emitted by
the blowers of Feliza Building exceeded the allowable noise level.71 However, witness Pascua of the DENR
noted that the sounds of passing cars and other externalities were also recorded, and that the noise level
already exceeded permissible limits when the blowers of Feliza Building were not in operation.72 A similar
finding was reached by MACEA in 2005.73
From 2000 to 2006, respondent introduced improvements including the installation of soundproofing materials
on all air-conditioning units and the replacement of blowers and air condensers.74 On January 2008, a test
was conducted by the Makati City government, which showed that the noise emitted exceeded the allowable
noise level.75 More recently, however, on November 2018, IAA Technologies, whose services were availed of
by the City Health Officer, conducted a noise pollution test late in the evening to minimize the interference of
external sounds. The results of the test show that the noise produced by the blowers of Feliza Building was
within the allowable noise level during daytime.76
There is no law or jurisprudence that provides an absolute quantifiable standard as to the noise level that
would qualify a sound as an actionable nuisance. Setting an absolute quantifiable standard is almost
impossible considering that noise seems inseparable from the conduct of many other necessary occupations.
In AC Enterprises, the Court held:
Its [Noise] presence is a nuisance in the popular sense in which that word is used, but in the absence of
statute, noise becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of
the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener. What those limits are cannot be fixed by
any definite measure of quantity or quality; they depend upon the circumstances of the particular
case.77 (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)
Thus, the results of the noise pollution tests are not controlling, but are among the factors to be considered in
our determination of nuisance.
In Velasco v. Manila Electric Co., et al.,78 we were constrained to rely on quantitative tests on the record due
to the vague and imprecise testimony of witnesses. We found that the noise emitted continuously day and
night from the electric transformers was a nuisance considering that the noise level was much higher
compared to the ambient sound of the residential locality.79
The noise level limits applicable to respondent are found in National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC)
Memorandum Circular No. 002, Series of 1980. For areas within any center of urban living with a section used
as a heavy industrial area, the maximum allowable noise level is 65 decibels during daytime.80 Similarly,
Makati City Ordinance No. 93-181 provides that in areas considered primarily commercial, the maximum
allowable noise level is 65 decibels during daytime.81 The limits provided by these government bodies
presumably reflect what is allowable in achieving the prevention and control of environmental pollution
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 984, which expressly vested the NPCC with the power to set up ambient
standards and recognized that local governments may set up higher standards.82 Thus, the noise level limits
may reflect what is acceptable to a person of ordinary sensibilities.83
However, while these provisions set noise level limits and provide for the abatement of the noise pollution or
possible liability for exceeding noise level limits,84 there is no law that states that violation of the noise level
limits would result in the automatic finding of nuisance. Indeed, whether or not the noise level of the blowers of
Feliza Building comply with or exceed the noise level limits imposed by the NPCC or Makati City government is
not controlling in a determination of nuisance. In Velasco, wherein we found the existence of nuisance, apart
from the results of the noise pollution tests, it was also proven that the complainant's ailments were caused by
his inability to sleep due to the incessant noise with consequent irritation coming from the transformers that
were continuously operational day and night.85
In the case at bar, several noise pollution tests were conducted and presented to the lower court as evidence.
Of the noise pollution tests conducted, most indicated that the noise level of the blowers exceeded 65 decibels,
while the recent one conducted on November 22, 2008 yielded a result of 61.3 decibels. The noise pollution
tests have conflicting findings, but we consider the November 22, 2008 test to be most reliable.
Petitioner presented evidence on multiple noise pollution tests conducted, with results indicating that the noise
level of the blowers exceeded 65 decibels, while respondent presented evidence of the noise pollution tests
conducted on November 13, 2008 and November 22, 2008.
Petitioner presented evidence on multiple tests conducted over a long period of time from 1995 to January
2008. Notably these tests did not follow a standardized methodology, but instead varied as to equipment,
administrating body, testing personnel, and schedule. In fact, one of the tests conducted in 2002 involved no
special equipment other than the physical senses of eyes and ears.86 Aside from the methodology employed,
the tests cannot accurately reflect the noise level of Feliza Building due to the presence of externalities such as
the passing vehicles, commuters, construction, and sounds from other nearby building such as the Thailand
Embassy. Even petitioner's own witness Pascua admitted that the noise of other externalities were also
recorded in the noise pollution tests, and that the noise level already exceeded permissible limits when the
blowers of Feliza Building were not in operation.87 Thus indicating that the blowers of Feliza Building may in
fact be within allowable limits in the absence of the noise from the externalities.
Of the noise pollution tests conducted, we find the November 13, 2008 and November 22, 2008 noise pollution
tests presented by respondent to be most reliable for several reasons. First, the tests were conducted by an
independent entity, IAA Technologies, which was deputized by the Makati City Health Department.88 Second,
IAA Technologies is a sound expert using equipment designed for noise pollution testing and not merely
relying on physical senses. Third, the tests were conducted late in the evening to minimize the recording of
external sounds that are present during the daytime, thus capturing with more accuracy the noise level of the
blowers. Fourth, these were the most recent tests conducted and submitted to the trial court, and the results
had not been subsequently negated. Fifth, aside from the submission of the reports, the personnel that
conducted the tests presented his testimony on the conduct and results thereof, and was able to justify the
reliability of the tests.89
The report on the November 13, 2008 and November 22, 2008 noise pollution test shows that the noise level
of the blowers of Feliza Building is at 61.3 and 63.4 decibels, respectively,90 which is below the 65-decibel
limit provided under Makati City Ordinance No. 93-181.91 We observe that technological advancements,
heightened commercial activity, and over crowdedness in the Makati City Business District has increased
through the years, while the 65-decibel limit has not been updated since 1980 and 1993 to reflect the evolving
nature of the locality wherein more noise is expected with increased activity. Nevertheless, respondent still
exerted reasonable efforts in maintaining an acceptable noise level that meets the limits provided under NPCC
Memorandum Circular No. 002, Series of 1980 and Makati City Ordinance No. 93-181. While compliance with
noise level limits is not tantamount to the absence of nuisance, we find that being within allowable limits
supports respondent's position that there is no actionable nuisance in this case considering it was acting within
the limitations of what the law itself views as permissible.
Issuance of permits and licenses by the Makati City government
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in giving weight to the permits and licenses issued by the Makati City
government to respondent.92 We agree with petitioner that the issuance of permits and licenses should not be
given significant weight in the determination of nuisance. However, we find that the CA did not base its ruling
on such fact alone.93
The act of granting permits and licenses is an exercise different and separate from and notably does not even
require a determination of nuisance. More importantly, the Makati City government cannot through the exercise
of granting permits and licenses determine nuisance in light of our pronouncement that local government units
do not have power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such is a nuisance per se. This matter is
to be resolved by the courts in the ordinary course of law.94 Thus in AC Enterprises, we held:
A finding by the LGU that the noise quality standards under the law have not been complied with is not a
prerequisite nor constitutes indispensable evidence to prove that the defendant is or is not liable for a nuisance
and for damages. Such finding is merely corroborative to the testimonial and/or other evidence to be presented
by the parties. The exercise of due care by the owner of a business in its operation does not constitute a
defense where, notwithstanding the same, the business as conducted, seriously affects the rights of those in
its vicinity.95 (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied)
Even if respondent's commercial activities in Feliza Building are presumed lawful considering the grant of
permits and licenses by the Makati City government, it is to be noted that commercial activities which are lawful
in themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they render the enjoyment of
life and property uncomfortable.96
In Coventry v. Lawrence, the United Kingdom (UK) Supreme Court ruled on the effect of a grant of planning
permission in the finding of nuisance, to wit:
The grant of planning permission for a particular development does not mean that that development is lawful.
All it means is that a bar to the use imposed by planning law, in the public interest, has been removed.
Logically, it might be argued, the grant of planning permission for a particular activity in 1985 or 2002 should
have no more bearing on a claim that that activity causes a nuisance than the fact that the same activity could
have occurred in the 19th century without any permission would have had on a nuisance claim in those days.
Quite apart from this, it seems wrong in principle that, through the grant of a planning permission, a planning
authority should be able to deprive a property-owner of a right to object to what would otherwise be a nuisance,
without providing her with compensation, when there is no provision in the planning legislation which suggests
such a possibility. x x x97
Guided by the foregoing, we find the grant of permits and licenses by the Makati City government, while
corroborative to the other evidence presented by the parties,98 to be of little weight in our determination of
nuisance.
Locality and character of surroundings
This Court has found that the reasonable use of one's property is dependent as well on the locality and
character of surroundings.99 Guided by foreign jurisprudence, we now consider the locality and character of
surroundings of the properties involved.
In Coventry, the character of locality factor was determinative on the the court's assessment of nuisance. The
court emphasized that the starting point in a nuisance claim is the "proposition that the defendant's activities
are to be taken into account when assessing the character of the locality."100 The injurious effect of a
defendant's activity would depend greatly on the circumstances of the locality where it actually occurs.101
Feliza Building and Frabella I Condominium are located in the bustling Legaspi Village at the heart of the
Makati Central Business District.102 In any urban and commercial area, noise is expected from the business
activities, passing vehicles, construction and development, and residents and commuters. Despite the efforts
made to minimize the recording of external noise in the noise pollution tests conducted on Feliza Building, still
some noise was recorded and contributed to the resulting reported noise levels.
The noise entering Frabella I Condominium is not only from the blowers of Feliza Building, but a combination of
noise naturally expected from a very busy area where commercial activities are prevalent. While noise is
expected given the locality and character of the surroundings, it must not be more than those ordinarily
expected. Otherwise, it shall be considered a nuisance. We held in AC Enterprises:
Persons who live or work in thickly populated business districts must necessarily endure the usual annoyances
and of those trades and businesses which are properly located and carried on in the neighborhood where they
live or work. But these annoyances and discomforts must not be more than those ordinarily to be expected in
the community or district, and which are incident to the lawful conduct of such trades and businesses. If they
exceed what might be reasonably expected and cause unnecessary harm, then the court will grant
relief.103 (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied)
Hence, as we consider the locality and character of the Makati Central Business District in which the properties
are situated, we must determine if the sounds from the blowers of Feliza Building are ordinarily to be expected
in the district and lawful to the conduct of respondent's business or if they exceed what might be reasonably
expected and cause unnecessary harm.
We find that the sounds from the blowers of Feliza Building are ordinarily to be expected in the Makati Central
Business District and are lawful to the conduct of respondent's business. The use of air-conditioning units in
commercial and office spaces, such as those in Feliza Building, is part of ordinary local business conditions
and is expected in the commercial rental industry, especially considering that the Philippines is a tropical
country with higher levels of heat intensity. Moreover, considering the limited available real estate in Makati
Central Business District, buildings are closely located to each other; in this case, only 12 meters of road
separate Frabella I Condominium and Feliza Building, thus sounds coming from buildings in the proximity are
expected to be heard.
The sounds complained of do not exceed what might be reasonably expected and do not cause unnecessary
harm. An illustration of unreasonable use of property can be found in Rattigan v. Wile wherein the United
States (US) court found that the defendant's placement of items near the plaintiffs' property was intended to
harass his neighbors, and although the said placement served a mixed purpose, defendant could have still
accomplished his goals without undue hardship upon plaintiffs.104 As compared to the defendant in Rattigan,
the respondent in this case did not intentionally cause harm or undue hardship to petitioner, but acted within
reasonable expectations and even made efforts to minimize any disturbance its blowers might have been
causing.
In Kasper v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., the US court emphasized that the character of the locality is a
circumstance of great importance in a determination of noise nuisance: "That a noise is disagreeable and
disturbing to ordinary people is not enough. It must also be unreasonable under all the circumstances. The
character of the locality is a circumstance of great importance."105 The court did not find nuisance holding that
the plaintiff's property was located in an industrial area, which is subject to conditions other than defendant's
business that tend to make the vicinity less desirable for residential purposes, and that the defendant
conducted its business without any more noise than is reasonably necessary for its business, even building a
high fence to reduce the noise.106
Applying the doctrine in Kasper,107 we similarly find the absence of nuisance considering the character and
locality of the surroundings of the properties involved. The noise level of the Makati Central Business District is
expected to be higher than other areas considering the magnitude of activity therein. It has been established
that in conducting its business leasing commercial and office spaces, respondent did not act to make the
vicinity less desirable, nor did it cause any more noise than that which was reasonably necessary to operate its
air-conditioning units.
Injurious effect in the health or comfort of ordinary people
Ultimately, the determining factor is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort
and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities.108
In Velasco, we ruled that the noise from defendant's substation transformers was a nuisance, being of a much
higher level than the ambient sound of the locality and having aggravated plaintiff's medical condition. We
reached this decision finding that actual physical discomfort and annoyance was proven through a host of
expert witnesses and voluminous medical literature, laboratory findings and statistics of income.109
In this case, petitioner only presented one tenant to testify on the annoyance she experienced with the noise
and heat emanating from the blowers of Feliza Building. Tenant-witness Lee testified that she is a tenant of
Frabella I Condominium with her unit facing the Feliza Building, and because of the noise and hot air that she
observed to be coming from the blowers of Feliza Building, she never opened her balcony door and operated
her air-conditioning units most of the time.110 Petitioner argues that tenant-witness Lee represents the other
tenants of Frabella I Condominium, but did not show any proof as to her authority. Instead, petitioner presented
complaint letters that it allegedly received from Frabella I Condominium tenants.111 However, these letters
deserve scant consideration as petitioner failed to prove the due execution and authenticity thereof. Thus, with
only the testimony of sole tenant-witness Lee, petitioner failed in establishing how there was actual physical
discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities.112
We agree with petitioner that there is no requirement for every tenant to be offended before nuisance can be
actionable.113 The number of witnesses is not controlling in a determination of nuisance. In Velasco, even if
several witnesses testified on their annoyance with the sounds from defendant's transformers, we found that
the testimonies of the witnesses on the intensity of the sound were vague and imprecise, failing to give a
definite idea of the intensity of the sound complained of.114
However, contrary to petitioner's assertion, we find that the CA did not base its ruling on the mere fact that the
former only presented one tenant-witness. We agree with the CA's finding:
"[I]t was not shown by [petitioner] that the perception, sensibility and lifestyle of tenant-witness Ma. Cristina Lee
represented the normal and ordinary level of sensitivity and habits of living of each of the other tenants of
Frabella who had supposedly been offended also by the noise and hot air from Feliza building."115
Petitioner failed to prove that tenant-witness Lee was of ordinary sensibilities, and that her sentiments were
representative of the community. We do not agree with petitioner's assertion that tenant-witness Lee is
presumed to be of ordinary sensibilities, as this is an evidentiary matter that cannot be presumed but must be
proven by petitioner in support of its claim of nuisance.
Moreover, we find that petitioner failed to prove that the noise of respondent's blowers injuriously affects the
health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent.116 Apart from the sentiments of
tenant-witness Lee, no other evidence was provided to show how the noise of respondent's blowers had
adversely affected the community. The complaint of tenant-witness Lee that she had to keep her balcony door
closed and air-conditioning units operational is not an unreasonable burden to an ordinary person though it
might be peculiarly bothersome to one.
The sentiments and experiences of tenant-witness Lee cannot be presumed to be shared by the other tenants
in the community so as to establish that ordinary persons living in that community would regard the noise to be
a nuisance. If ordinary persons living in the community would not regard the sound to be a nuisance, there can
be no actionable nuisance even if the idiosyncrasies of a particular member thereof, in this case tenant-witness
Lee, may make the sound unendurable to her.117
In determining what is reasonably acceptable and what is invasive to a community, the court
in Rattigan appreciated the evidence that being a residential community, there was implicit intolerance of the
activities of defendant. Moreover, the plaintiff presented expert testimony that showed how one who might
otherwise have rented Edgewater to decline to do so because of defendant's activities.118 In the case at bar,
no such evidence was presented to show how respondent's activities affected the rental opportunities and
value of Frabella I Condominium. It is also worth noting that petitioner's sole tenant-witness Lee continued to
reside in and did not vacate Frabella I Condominium despite the alleged discomfort caused to her by the noise
and hot air.119 Neither did petitioner present any evidence of loss of rental opportunities and value due to
respondent's operation of blowers, other than observations from its own personnel. In fact, petitioner's Vice
President, witness Albutra, testified that she observed the noise from the blowers as early as when the
Frabella I Condominium was being constructed.120 Despite such observations of noise, petitioner successfully
sold and rented out units, thus negating petitioner's assertion of the detrimental effects of respondent's blowers
on the rental opportunities and value of Frabella I Condominium.
We are further guided by Stevens v. Rockport Granite Company, wherein the US Court emphasized that the
number of people concerned by the noise should be considered in reaching a conclusion as to the standard,
which is what ordinary people, acting reasonably, have a right to demand in the way of health and comfort
under all circumstances:
It is not enough that a person of peculiar temperament, unusual sensibilities or weakened physical condition,
may be affected. Nor is a noise protected if persons of exceptional strength and robustness, or whose faculties
have become benumbed by close business or other experience with it, are not disturbed. The pertinent inquiry
is whether the noise materially interferes with the physical comfort of existence, not according to exceptionally
refined, uncommon, or luxurious habits of living, but according to the' simple tastes and unaffected notions
generally prevailing among plain people. The standard is what ordinary people, acting reasonably, have a right
to demand in the way of health and comfort under all the circumstances. The number of people concerned by
the noise and the magnitude of the industry complained of are both elements entitled to consideration in
reaching a conclusion as to the fact.121 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, while the number of tenant-witnesses is not in itself controlling on the finding of nuisance, it is relevant in
establishing the standard acceptable to ordinary people. On the basis of the testimony of tenant-witness Lee
alone, it is difficult to accept that her peculiar temperament is reflective of that of ordinary people. We find
petitioner's evidence to be lacking not because it had presented only one tenant-witness to testify on the
effects of the noise, but because its evidence as a whole failed to establish how the noise from the blowers is
harmful to the health or comfort of ordinary people.
Other harms raised
Petitioner claims that the noise and hot air from respondent's blowers had caused some tenants to vacate
Frabella I Condominium and decreased the rental value by 25% to 30%.
In Rattigan, the court ruled there was a nuisance and that damages were ascertainable because it found the
residential community intolerant of defendant's activities. Its finding was supported by expert opinion that one
who might have otherwise rented in the locality would probably decline to do so because of defendant's
activities.122
In this case, other than its bare assertions, petitioner failed to adduce any reliable evidence in support of its
claim of lost rental opportunities and decrease in income. As appreciated by the CA, "[t]here is no testimonial
or documentary evidence stating that the 21% vacancies, more or less, were the result of cancellation of
occupancy agreements as a consequence of the noise and hot air produced by Feliza Building."123
Further, even assuming the decrease in rental value had been proven, petitioner still failed to prove how such
decrease was caused by respondent's operation of its blowers.
In any case, even assuming petitioner proved there was a decrease in rental value attributable to respondent's
operation of its blowers, that fact alone would not prove the nuisance. We are guided by the US Court's
pronouncement in Tortorella v. H. Traiser & Company, wherein it held: "A failure to secure or to retain a single
tenant because of the existence of noise would, in strictness, show a loss of rental value, but this falls far short
of proving the noise to be unreasonable in extent."124
Petitioner also claims that the noise produced by respondent's blowers is harmful to the community. It relied on
the testimony of its witness Albayda, a sanitation inspector, who had testified that based on his experience and
training, the daily continuous intense noise produced by the blowers of Feliza Building may result in unhealthy
consequences to people.125 However, other than witness Albayda's observations as a sanitation inspector, no
medical evidence or expert testimony was presented to prove the existence of the harm allegedly caused by
the noise of the blowers.
Another claim we address is petitioner's allegation that the baby of a certain Mr. and Mrs. Taku Himeno (Mr.
and Mrs. Himeno), one of the tenants of Frabella I Condominium, suffered a seizure due to the sounds coming
from Feliza Building, as testified by witness Albayda.126 Albayda is a sanitation inspector with no medical
knowledge or expertise to be a reliable witness in proving the connection between the sound and the baby's
seizure. Moreover, he himself did not witness to seizure, but is presenting hearsay on what might have
happened to the baby of Mr. and Mrs. Himeno. The fact that Mr. and Mrs. Himeno did not testify or file any
complaint against respondent after this alleged incident casts doubt on whether respondent's operation of its
blowers really caused such harm.
In Velasco, this Court found that the noise caused by defendant's transformers resulted in an actual harm to
plaintiff's medical condition because of the medical evidence and expert testimony presented to prove the
connection between the incessant noise caused by defendant and the deteriorating health condition of plaintiff.
Clearly, this is not the case here as no medical evidence or expert testimony was presented. Neither was there
any evidence presented from those with direct knowledge on the alleged harms caused by the noise of the
blowers.
Further, in Tortorella, the court did not find nuisance even if it recognized that the noise was annoying and
disturbing to the tenant of plaintiff, tending to cause irritability and headaches and affecting sleep, and had
affected rental value to some extent. The court ruled that there was no nuisance because no one on the
subject premises had suffered materially from the noise in comfort or health, and the operation of the factory
did not unreasonably interfere with the comfort, health or property of the plaintiff.127 In the absence of proof of
material suffering in comfort or health, we are constrained to rule that there is no actionable nuisance.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing discussion and after a careful consideration of the facts and applicable law,
We rule in favor of respondent and affirm the findings of the CA that there was no actionable nuisance caused
by respondent's operation of its blowers.
Thus, in the absence of proof of material suffering in comfort or health, we do not find the sound of the blowers
to be a nuisance.
II. Award of Damages and Attorney's Fees
The CA correctly deleted the award of damages, there being no injury caused by respondent to petitioner in
the absence of nuisance.ℒαwρhi ৷ Respondent cannot be made to suffer for the lawful enjoyment of its
property, petitioner having failed to prove nuisance.
Petitioner failed to prove injury suffered due to respondent. As we held in Sps. Custodio v. Court of
Appeals,128 damage without wrong does not constitute a cause of action, to wit:
To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong,
does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury
caused by a breach or wrong.129
Even assuming petitioner suffered some loss, as it had failed to prove nuisance, there is no injury caused by
respondent to petitioner to entitle the latter to an award of damages. In situations of damnum absque injuria or
damage without injury, wherein the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of legal duty, there is no basis
for an award of damages. There must first be a breach of duty and imposition of liability before damages may
be awarded.130 At most, we can consider this to be a case of damnum absque injuria, for which petitioner is
not entitled to an award of damages.
In Tortorella, the court did not award damages to the petitioner that had similarly claimed loss of rental value
because there was no nuisance found in the case.131 In the case at bar, there being no actionable nuisance,
respondent was not in breach of duty but in the lawful exercise of its ownership rights, and therefore, there is
no basis to sustain an award of damages in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner is not entitled to the temperate and exemplary damages and attorney's fees it claims.
Temperate damages are only awarded by virtue of the wrongful act of a party132 when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be provided with
certainty.133 Exemplary damages are awarded when the act of the offender is attended by bad faith or done in
wanton, fraudulent, or malevolent manner.134 As discussed, petitioner failed to prove nuisance, thus there is
no wrongful act to serve as basis for an award of temperate or exemplary damages in its favor.
As regards attorney's fees, we similarly find petitioner not entitled because the instant case does not fall under
any of the grounds set forth in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
In view of the foregoing, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 19, 2018 Decision and the February 18, 2019 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 105817 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Asiga Mining Corporation v. Manila Mining Corporation and Basiana Mining Exploration
Corporation, G.R. No. 199081, January 24, 2018

DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
Under the Mineral Resources Decree of 1974, as amended, and as properly interpreted by established
jurisprudence, abandonment by non-performance of the annual work obligation could be declared only after
the observance of due process.
The Case

Challenged before the Court via this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100335, promulgated on May 12, 2011, which
affirmed in toto the Decision2 dated July 31, 2007 of the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Likewise challenged is the subsequent Resolution3 promulgated
on October 24, 2011 which upheld the earlier decision.
The Antecedent Facts

Petitioner Asiga Mining Corporation (Asiga) was the holder of mining claims over hectares of land located in
Santiago, Agusan del Norte. These claims, known as MIRADOR and CICAFE, were granted unto Asiga by
virtue of the Mining Act of 1936.4 Subsequently, when the law was amended by the Mineral Resources Decree
of 1974,5 the petitioner had to follow registration procedures so that its earlier mining claims, MIRADOR and
CICAFE, could be recognized under the new law. Following their successful application, their mining claims
over the subject area were upheld. Two decades later, the Mineral Resources Decree of 1974 was amended
and superseded by the Mining Act of 1995.6 Like before, Asiga was again required by the supervening law to
undergo registration procedures so that its mining claims could be recognized anew.

Hence, on March 31, 1997, Asiga applied with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) to convert its mining
claims into a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) as required by the Mining Act of 1995 and its
implementing rules and regulations.

As fate would have it, it was during this application process when Asiga discovered that its mining claims
overlapped with that of respondent Manila Mining Corporation (respondent MMC), by about 1,661 hectares,
and of respondent Basiana Mining Exploration Corporation (respondent BMEC) by 214 hectares.7

As it happened, each of the respondents had pending applications for MPSA over the overlapping subject
areas which were filed way earlier than the petitioner's application. Respondent MMC applied for MPSA over
Cabadbaran and Santiago, Agusan del Norte as early as November 26, 1992. Respondent BMEC, on the
other hand, made a similar application as early as October 3, 1995. After satisfying the initial mandatory
requirements, respondents MMC and BMEC published and posted their respective Notices of Application for
MPSA in a newspaper of general circulation for two (2) consecutive weeks, and posted the same in the bulletin
boards of concerned government agencies.8

Upon knowledge of the foregoing, and to protect its interest over the subject area, Asiga filed before the MGB-
CARAGA Regional Office an Adverse Claim with Petition for Preliminary Injunction against the respondents
MMC and BMEC, and prayed for the exclusion of the area applied for by the respondents from the bounds of
its mining claims. It asserted that: (1) it has vested right to the approved and existing mining claims that were
awarded to it since 1975; (2) it has preferential right to enter into any mode of mineral agreement with the
government for the period up to 14 September 1997; and (3) the respondents' MPSA applications are null and
void because the areas applied for encroached on Asiga's mining claims and thus, were closed to application.

The respondents MMC and BMEC, on the other hand, separately filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of
prescription and abandonment of mining claims. Collectively, they averred that: (1) Asiga's adverse claim is
rendered void by prescription as it was only filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of the first publication
of respondents' Notice of Application for MPSA; (2) Asiga did not substantiate the alleged encroachment since
it failed to submit documents that would prove such claim; (3) Asiga already abandoned its mining claims
because it failed to file an Affidavit of Annual Work Obligation (AAWO) showing its work performance over the
subject mining areas for more than two (2) consecutive years.

On December 24, 1998, the Panel of Arbitrators organized by the MGB-CARAGA Regional Office rendered a
Decision in favor of Asiga, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding petitioner's adverse claim unnecessary, the same is hereby dismissed. Respondents
Manila Mining Corporation and Basiana Mining Corporation's Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
Applications whose areas overlapped Asiga's existing and valid mining claims, "MIRADOR" and "CICAFE" as
shown herein and in the records of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Region XIII, Surigao City should be
amended accordingly and excluded therefrom Petitioner's said valid and existing mining claims. But
respondent's Mineral Production Sharing Agreement applications whose areas fell in areas open for mining
locations and those which fell within petitioner's abandoned claims should remain as they are.9

The respondents appealed to the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) reiterating their arguments of prescription
and abandonment, to which the MAB agreed. In the dispositive portion of its Decision dated July 31, 2007, the
MAB said:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of the Panel of Arbitrators dated December 24, 1998
in POA CASE NO. XIII-09-97 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Regional Director of the Mines and
Geosciences Regional Office No. XIII, Surigao City is hereby ordered to give due course to the valid
Application for Mineral Production Sharing Agreement No. APSA-0007-X of Manila Mining Corporation and
APSA No. 00047-X Basiana Mining Exploration Corp., subject to compliance with the existing mining law and
its implementing rules and regulations.10

Aggrieved, Asiga filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA. It assailed the
MAB decision arguing that: (1) holders of valid and existing mining claims cannot be divested of their rights by
mere failure to file adverse claim within the prescribed 30-day period from publication of new mining
applications; and (2) the decision ignored the new grace period of September 15, 1997 provided under DAO
97-07 (Series of 1997) within which to file an MPSA application and pay the required fees.

On May 12, 2011, the CA promulgated the assailed decision. It ruled that Asiga cannot be considered a holder
of valid and existing mining claims. The Court of Appeals said that:
Clearly, ASIGA was duty bound to conduct actual work on its mining claims and to file an AWWO showing
proof of its compliance before Mines Regional Officer concerned within sixty (60) days from the end of the year
in which such work obligation was required. Significantly. it is provided that failure to comply with the said
obligations for two (2) consecutive years shall result to an automatic abandonment of ASIGA's mining claims.

It is an established fact—as found by both POA and MAB—that ASIGA had, indeed, failed to file an AAWO nor
to conduct actual work on its mining claims ever since it was granted a leasehold right over the same.
Consequently, pursuant to Section 27 aforequoted, ASIGA's mining claims were deemed abandoned by
operation of law. x x x.11

Thus, the dispositive portion of the decision of the CA reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 31 July 2007 of
the Mines Adjudication Board is AFFIRMED in toto.12

After the dismissal of Asiga 's motion for reconsideration, Asiga filed this petition for review on certiorari.
The Issues
The petitioner raised the following arguments:

A — The [CA] committed grave error in law in instantly divesting petitioner of its existing rights over its mining
claims for alleged failure to submit its Annual Work Obligations report, the decision being inconsistent with
existing doctrines requiring field investigation on the actual work done and summary hearing to determine
propriety of cancellation for abandonment of claims.

B — The [CA] committed grave error in law in holding that petitioner's failure to pay occupation fees within
thirty (30) days from the filing of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) conversion amounts to
abandonment, the finding being completely incompatible with DAO Memorandum Order No. 97-07 which
allows payment of fees within 30 days from final termination or resolution of pending cases or dispute of
claims.

C — The [CA] committed grave error in law in sustaining the cancellation of petitioner's mining claim in favor of
respondents Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) and Basiana Mining Exploration Corporation (BMEC).13

In sum, petitioner Asiga comes before this Court to ask for the resolution of only one issue: whether or not
Asiga could be considered to have abandoned its mining claim over the hectares of land located in Santiago,
Agusan del Norte on the basis of (a) non-submission of the affidavit of annual work obligations, and (b) non-
payment of fees. An answer to this query will serve as the fulcrum around which the rights of the petitioner and
the respondents could be ascertained.
This Court's Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

Based on the facts as borne by the records of this case, the Court is of the considered opinion that Asiga did
not abandon its mining claims over the subject area. To rule that it did on the basis merely of the non-
submission of the affidavit and the non-payment of fees, without considering the relevant implementing rules
and regulations of the law as well as settled jurisprudence on the matter, would cause undue injury to a right
granted—and thus protected by law—unto the petitioner.

The notion of "automatic abandonment" being invoked by the respondents is provided for in Section 27 of the
Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974. And as early as 1990, the Court has already ruled on the
proper interpretation of this provision in the case of Santiago v. Deputy Executive Secretary.14 In no uncertain
terms, the Court has already established that there is no rule of automatic abandonment with respect to mining
claims for failure to file the affidavit of annual work obligations.15

As originally worded, Section 27 of the Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974 provided that the
failure of a claim owner to submit a sworn statement of its compliance with its annual work obligations for two
(2) consecutive years shall "cause the forfeiture of all rights to his claim." Particularly, it states that:
SECTION 27. Proof of Annual Work Obligations. — The claim owner shall submit proof of compliance with the
annual work obligations by filing a sworn statement with the Director within sixty (60) days from the end of the
year in which the work obligation is required, in a form to be prescribed by regulation. Failure of the claim
owner to file such proof of compliance for two (2) consecutive years shall cause the forfeiture of all rights to his
claim.

In 1978, Section 15 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1385 amended this specific provision. Instead of merely
causing the forfeiture of the mining rights upon failure to comply with the required submissions, the section
then provided for an "automatic abandonment" of the mining claims, viz:
SECTION 15. Section 27 of the same Decree is hereby amended to read as follows:

SECTION 27. Proof of Annual Work Obligations. — The claim owner/lessee shall submit proof of compliance
with the annual work obligations by filing an affidavit therefor and the statement of expenditures and technical
report in the prescribe[d] form in support thereof with the Mines Regional Officer within sixty (60) days from the
end of the year in which the work obligation is required: Provided, That failure of the claimowner to comply
therewith for two (2) consecutive years shall constitute automatic abandonment of the mining
claims: Provided, Further, That, if it is found upon field verification that no such work was actually done on the
mining claims, the claimowner/lessee shall likewise lose all his rights thereto notwithstanding submission of the
aforesaid documents.16 (Emphasis supplied)

In 1980, this provision was once again amended. Section 5 of P.D. No. 1677 retained the "automatic
abandonment" provision and further included that, should a verification be conducted and it was discovered
that no work was actually accomplished despite the submission of an affidavit to that effect, the owner/lessee
shall likewise automatically lose all the rights appurtenant to his/her mining claims. As stated by this decree:
SECTION 5. Section 27 of Presidential Decree No. 463 as amended by Section 15 of Presidential Decree No.
1385, is further amended to read, as follows:

Sec. 27. Proof of Annual Work Obligations. — The claim owner/lessee shall submit proof of compliance with
the annual work obligations by filing an affidavit therefor and the statement of expenditures and technical report
in the prescribed form in support thereof with the Mines Regional Officer concerned within sixty (60) days from
the end of the year in which the work obligations is required: Provided, That failure of the claim owner to
comply therewith for two (2) consecutive years shall constitute automatic abandonment of the mining claim:
Provided, further, That if it is found upon field verification that no such work was actually done on the
mining claim, the claim owner/lessee shall likewise automatically lose all his rights thereto
notwithstanding submission of the aforesaid documents.17 (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 27, as it now stands, was modified by Section 2 of P.D. No. 1902:
SECTION 2. Section 27 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended by Section 15 of Presidential Decree No.
1385 and Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1677, is further amended to read as follows:

SECTION. 27. Annual Work Obligations. — The claimowner/lessee shall submit proof of compliance with the
annual work obligations by filing an affidavit therefor and the statement of expenditures and technical report in
the prescribed form in support thereof with the Mines Regional Officer concerned within one hundred and
twenty (120) days from the end of the year in which the work obligation is required: Provided, That failure of
the claimowner to comply therewith for two (2) consecutive years shall constitute automatic
abandonment of the mining claim: Provided, further, That, if it is found upon field verification that no
such work was actually done on the mining claim, the claimowner/lessee shall likewise automatically
lose all his rights thereto notwithstanding submission of the aforesaid documents: Provided, finally,
That the Director, in cases of unstable peace and order conditions and/or involvement in mining conflicts may
grant further extensions. (Emphasis supplied)

What is being asked of this Court by the respondents is a re-interpretation of this most recent iteration of the
Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974. As how it was in Santiago, to arrive at an answer, the
subject matter of the provision must first be clarified. Is it the non-submission of the proof of the compliance—
the affidavit of annual work obligation—for two consecutive years, or is it the actual non-compliance of the
annual work obligation for two consecutive years that would become the basis for the declaration of
abandonment of mining claims?

The Court opines that it is the latter.

The title of Section 27 was changed in the latest amendment from "Proof of Annual Work Obligations" as
written in the Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974, P.D. No. 1385, and P.D. No. 1677 to "Annual
Work Obligations" under P.D. No. 1902. The latest version indicates that there is focus on the annual work
obligations imposed upon claim owners or lessees, and not merely on the submission of proof to this
requirement. Indeed, as ruled in Santiago, the essence of this provision is to exact compliance of the
obligations imposed upon claim owners or lessees who are granted the privilege of exploring and/or exploiting
the Philippines' natural resources.

Thus, when Section 27 included the phrase "failure of the claimowner to comply therewith," the phrase was
referring to the actual work obligations required of the claim owners, and not merely the submission of the
proof of the actual work obligations. This is the proper interpretation of this section. As explained by Justice
Paras in Santiago:
Under the Consolidated Mines Administrative Order (CMAO), implementing PD 463, as amended, the rule
that has been consistently applied is that it is the failure to perform the required assessment work, not
the failure to file the AAWO that gives rise to abandonment. Interpreted within the context of PD 1902, the
last amending decree of PD 463, it is intended, among others, to accelerate the development of our natural
resources and to accelerate mineral productions, abandonment under the aforequoted Sec. 27 refers to the
failure to perform work obligations which in turn is one of the grounds for the cancellation of the lease contract
(Sec. 43(a), Consolidated Mines Administrative Order, implementing PD 463).18 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Even the then Ministry of Natural Resources, now Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
was of the opinion that it is the failure to perform actual work obligations that would give rise to abandonment.
It further interpreted the provision as one which is more of convenience than substance, and that the claim
owners or lessees are not precluded from proving their actual compliance through other means. Again,
in Santiago:
The question of whether or not the failure to submit AAWO for more than two (2) consecutive years constitutes
abandonment as ground for cancellation of a mining lease contract has been the subject matter of many cases
in the Ministry of Natural Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural Resources). Public
respondent made the following significant findings, to quote:

In a number of cases, the MNR answered the question in the negative. x x x. As there explained, it is the
continued failure to perform the annual work obligations, NOT the failure to file AAWO, that gives rise
to abandonment as ground for cancellation of a mining lease contract; that compliance with AAWO
requirements, not being related to the essence of the acts to be performed, is a matter of convenience rather
than substance; and that non-submission of AAWO does not preclude the lessee from proving performance of
such working obligation in some other way.19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Further, in declaring claim owners or lessees to have abandoned their mining claims, due process must
primarily be observed. In fact, in the recent case of Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation v. Trans-Asia Oil and
Energy Development Corporation,20 the Court, through Justice Bersamin, had occasion to discuss that the
basic tenets of due process require that notice be given to the claim owners if their mining claims are to be
considered cancelled. Yinlu ruled:
The failure of Yinlu's predecessor-in-interest to register and perform annual work obligaitons did not
automatically mean that they had already abandoned their mining rights, and that such rights had already
lapsed. For one, the DENR itself declared that it had not issued any specific order cancelling the mining
patents. Also, the tenets of due process required that Yinlu and its predecessor-in-interest be given written
notice of their non-compliance with PO No. 463 and the ample opportunity to comply. If they still failed to
comply despite such notice and opportunity, then written notice must further be given informing them of the
cancellation of their mining patents. In the absence of any showing that the DENR had provided the
written notice and opportunity to Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest to that effect, it would really be
inequitable to consider them to have abandoned their patents, or to consider the patents as having
lapsed.21 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)

And so, by jurisprudential rulings, there is no "automatic abandonment" on the basis of the non-submission of
the AAWO alone. If the claim owners or lessees did indeed fail to perform their obligations as required in
Section 27 of the Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974, as amended, then the cancellation of their
mining claims could only be considered proper upon observance of due process, which, according
to Yinlu, takes the form of: (1) a written notice of non-compliance to the claim owners and lessees and an
ample opportunity to comply; and (2) in the event of the claim owners' and lessees' failure to comply, a written
notice effecting the cancellation of their mining claims.22

In this case, nothing on record indicates that the foregoing requirements have been complied with. There were
no notices sent to Asiga, which either notified it of its non-compliance to Section 27 or notified it of the
cancellation of its mining claims. Thus, on the basis of the foregoing, it could not be said that the petitioner has
abandoned its mining claims over the disputed parcels of land.

Further, with regard to the payment of occupational fees, a reading of DENR Department Administrative Order
(DENR DAO) No. 97-07, the "Guidelines in the Implementation of the Mandatory September  15, 1997
Deadline for the Filing of Mineral Agreement Applications by Holders of Valid and Existing Mining Claims and
Lease/Quarry Applications and for Other Purposes," would reveal that the petitioner is correct in asserting that
the payment thereof could be completed upon the resolution of the present dispute.

The CA was partially correct when it quoted Section 9 of DENR DAO No. 97-07 and found that it is the duty of
the holder of a valid and existing mining claim to "present proof of full payment of the occupation fees and/or
minimum work obligations or a Letter of Commitment undertaking to pay such amount within thirty (30) days
from the date of the filing of its Mineral Agreement Application."23 Section 9 provides:
SECTION 9. Occupational Fees and Work Obligations — In case of any deficiency in the payment of
occupation fees and/or minimum work obligations required, no Mineral Agreement applications by holders of
valid and existing mining claims and lease/quarry applications shall be accepted without proof of full payment
of such deficiency or a Letter-Commitment to pay such amount within thirty days from the date of filing of the
Mineral Agreement Application. Failure to present proof of full payment upon the filing of the Mineral
Agreement application or within thirty days from filing of said Letter-Commitment shall result in the
denial of the application, after which the area covered thereby shall be open for Mining Applications.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

However, the CA failed to consider Section 8 of the same administrative order which, in cases when the holder
of the mining claim is involved in a mining dispute/case, allowed the submission of the actual mineral
agreement application thirty (30) days from the final resolution of the dispute/case. Section 8 reads:
Section. 8. Claimants/Applicants Required to File Mineral Agreement Applications

Only holders of mining claims and lease/quarry applications filed prior to the effectivity of the Act which are
valid and existing as defined in Section 5 hereof who have not filed any Mineral Agreement Applications over
areas covered by such mining claims and lease/quarry applications are required to file Mineral Agreement
applications pursuant to Section 273 of the IRR on or before September 15, 1997; Provided, that the holder of
such a mining claim or lease/quarry application involved in a mining dispute/case shall instead file on
or before said deadline a Letter of Intent to file the necessary Mineral Agreement application; Provided,
further, That if the mining claim or lease/quarry application is not determined to be invalid in the
dispute/case, the claimant or applicant shall have thirty (30) days from the final resolution of the
dispute/case to file the necessary Mineral Agreement application; Provided, finally, that failure by the
claimant or applicant to file the necessary Mineral Agreement application within said thirty (30)-day period shall
result in the abandonment of such claim or application, after which, any area covered by the same shall be
opened for Mining Applications. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

These provisions could not be any clearer. In cases where a claim owner or lessee is involved in a mining
dispute, it shall just submit a "Letter of Intent to file the necessary Mineral Agreement application."
The actual mineral agreement application, however, should only be filed within thirty (30) days from the final
resolution of the dispute of the case. Necessarily, therefore, and contrary to the CA ruling, the 30-day period
within which to pay the occupational fees would only commence to run from the filing of the actual mineral
agreement application, and not before.

Considering that the present case is the very mining dispute referred to in Section 8 of DENR DAO No. 97-07,
then, contrary to the MAS and CA decisions, Asiga is correct in asserting that it has thirty (30) days from the
finality of this decision to pay in full the occupational fees as required by Section 9 thereof.
Resultantly, the disputed parcel of land covered by respondent MMC's MPSA application which overlapped
with Asiga's claim by about 1,661 hectares, and the parcel of land covered by respondent BMEC's MPSA
application which overlapped by 214 hectares, should be excluded in the respondents' MPSA application. This
is because the petitioner's mining claims are "valid and existing mining claims" as defined in Section 5(c) of
DENR DAO No. 97-07,24 and are therefore, as provided for in Section 19(c) of the Mining Act of 1995,25 closed
to other mining applications.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 12, 2011, and the
subsequent Resolution dated October 24, 2011 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Panel of Arbitrators, Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Region 13 dated December 24, 1998 is
hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration,
June 19, 2018

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act or
omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications
to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the
qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a
validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of
Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed
as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy
Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on Sereno’s
file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment,
only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a
manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or
“drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified
to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was
declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all previous
SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those
from the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date
documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter
to JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated as
coming from the private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an
Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that “considering that most of her government records in the
academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and
that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the
letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete
requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that
Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to hear the
case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then,
was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry
amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and
subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of the
Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original
jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule
66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to
declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno
therefrom. [yourlawyersays]
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition against
AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having testified
against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.
Issues:
Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
 Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive function of
the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a political question outside the
Court’s supervisory and review powers;
In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the
subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.

Ruling:
 Prescription does not lie against the State.
The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an
action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within
one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose”.
Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where private individuals asserting their
right of office, unlike the instant case where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice.
Instead, it is the government itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue
the qualification of the person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.
Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President
of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified
in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action.” It may be stated that
ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce
a public right. There is no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there
be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to
an action by the Government.
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo
warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the
action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold public office, much
more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s
qualification· for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has
not been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was
therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.
Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC
complies with its own rules.
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under
the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an
officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy from the Court
as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the Constitution
contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of
discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy
decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective
powers. While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not
give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC
is not accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political
questions that the Court is barred from resolving.
Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and subsequent
appointment as Chief Justice.
Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of appointment and
assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The voidance of
the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is ineligible, in the first
place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said position follows as a
matter of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the
Court can take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo
warranto proceeding, maintains the power to issue such further judgment determining the respective rights in
and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.
Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office
constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and nomination process is evident
from the composition of the JBC itself.
An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While the Court surrenders
discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-negotiable
requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of
which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.

People of the Philippines vs Ernesto Larin

GR No 128777         October 7, 1998

Facts:

Larin was accused of committing an act in violation of Section 5 (b) in relation to Section 31 (e) of Republic Act
No 7610 (An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse Exploitation
and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation and for other Purposes).

            Upon prior sworn complaint, Carla Lenore Calumpang, then 14 years of age, was inside the ladies’
shower room on April 17, 1996. Larin, a public employee of UP Los Banos, by taking advantage of his
authority, influence and moral ascendancy as trainer/swimming instructor of Calumpang, committed lascivious
conduct against the said minor.

            The trial court found the testimony of Calumpang worthy of full faith and credence. It further reasoned
that unless motivated by a genuine desire to seek justice, such minor would not fabricate the story, undergo a
medical examination, appear in court and announce to the whole world that she was sexually abused.

            On appeal, Larin assails the sufficiency of the evidence adduced against him.

Issue: WON Larin is guilty of the crime charged against him.

Held:

            The appeal is unmeritorious.

            Under the RA 7610, the elements of the offense penalized are the following: 1) the accused commits
the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; 2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; 3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

            A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct for a) money, profit or consideration, or b) under the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Persons below 18 years of age are those unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, or exploitation or discrimination because of
their age or mental disability or condition.

            As to the credibility of the witness, it is a well-entrenched rule that the trial court’s evaluation of the
credibility of the witness and his or her testimony is entitled to the highest degree of respect. The victim’s
testimony, given in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and candid manner, is worthy of faith and
belief. No proof of ill motive on her part to falsely accuse and testify against the appellant has been offered.
            The utter submissiveness of Calumpang to the lascivious conducts of Larin may be derived from
psychological coercion which happens when the accused is of a more powerful person who is in power.
Apparently, regardless of how intelligent children may be, when faced with these acts, they may react
differently. One cannot reasonably expect uniform reactions from victims of sexual assault. Said
submissiveness does not exonerate an accused from criminal liability. Moral coercion or ascendance is
sufficient.

            As to the imposable penalty, RA 7610 mandates that the penalty provided for in the Act shall be
imposed in its maximum period when the offender is a public officer. Larin’s employment at UPLB as a
swimming instructor makes him a public officer.

ZOMER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. SPECIAL TWENTIETH DIVISION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU CITY AND UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Courts have the discretion to entertain an action for declaratory relief.1  They cannot be compelled, by a writ of
mandamus, to resolve the case when they exercise this discretion.  
This is a Petition for Mandamus2 which seeks to compel the Court of Appeals to rule on the constitutionality of
Section 473 of Republic Act No. 8791, or the General Banking Law of 2002, in CA-G.R. CV No. 00288. In its
Decision,4 the Court of Appeals refused to rule on the constitutionality of the statute, deferring the resolution of
this issue to this Court.  
Zomer Development Company, Inc. (Zomer Development), a domestic corporation,5 owned three (3) parcels
of land in Cebu City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 59105, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 59123,
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 59214.6 The properties were mortgaged to International Exchange Bank
as security for its loan.7  
When Zomer Development failed to pay its indebtedness, International Exchange Bank foreclosed on the
properties. A Notice of Extra-judicial Foreclosure Sale was posted and published on October 18, 2001,
informing the public that the properties would be sold at an auction.8  
When the auction was conducted, International Exchange Bank emerged as the highest bidder. Thus, the
Sheriff issued to it Certificates of Sale on November 19, 2001.9 The Certificates of Sale provided for a period
of redemption of twelve months from registration, "or sooner and/or later, as provided for under applicable
laws."10  
On December 10, 2001, International Exchange Bank registered the Certificates of Sale in the Register of
Deeds. Consequently, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 361006, 361007, and 361008 were issued in its
name.11  
On February 18, 2002, Zomer Development filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Notice of Sale,
Certificate of Sale  &  TCTs and Declaration  as Unconstitutional Sec. 47, RA No. 8791.12  It argued that
Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791,13 or the General Banking Law of 2002, violates its right to equal
protection since the law provides a shorter period for redemption of three (3) months or earlier to juridical
entities compared to the one (1) year redemption period given to natural persons. This discrimination, it
argued, gives "undue advantage to lenders who are non-banks."14  
Copies of the Complaint were furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General upon order of the Regional Trial
Court. The Office of the Solicitor General, however, did not participate in the case.15  
On March 24, 2004, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the Complaint. The trial court refused to rule on the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8791, Section 47. According to the trial court, to rule on the issue will
deprive the Republic of its right to due process since it was not heard on the issue and was not impleaded as
party defendant in the case.16  
Zomer Development appealed this Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Republic was not
required to be impleaded when questions regarding the constitutionality of a statute are raised.17  
On October 18, 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision18 dismissing the appeal "without prejudice to
appellant's filing of the appropriate case before the Supreme Court. "19 The Court of Appeals categorized
Zomer Development's Complaint as one for declaratory relief and refused to "make a definitive ruling"20 on the
constitutionality issue, citing Rule 63, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on the discretion of courts to entertain
petitions for declaratory relief.
The Court of Appeals held that "the case is novel and can be best resolved by the Supreme Court[,]"21 since
any pronouncement may have "far reaching effects"22 on existing procedural rules like Supreme Court
Circular No. 7-2002.23  
Zomer Development now files this Petition for Mandamus24 before this Court, praying that the Court of
Appeals be compelled to resolve the issue on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8791, Section 47 in CA
G.R. CV No. 00288.
Petitioner argues that mandamus was the proper remedy since the Court of Appeals evaded its duty to decide
on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8791, Section 47.25 It adds that in declining to rule on the issue, the
Court of Appeals deprived it of its right to due process since it did not put an end to the controversy between
the parties.26
Private respondent, on the other hand, counters that the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy was a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal; thus, Petitioner cannot use a petition for mandamus as a substitute for a lost
appeal.27 It contends that Petitioner no longer has the right to be protected by a writ of mandamus, since
ownership over the disputed properties has already been consolidated.28 Private respondent likewise argues
that the Petition has become moot in light of Goldenway Merchandising Corporation v. Equitable PCI Bank,29 
which has already passed upon the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8791, Section 47.30
From the arguments of the parties, this Court was confronted with the following issues for resolution:  
First, whether or not the Petition for Mandamus was the proper remedy, or more succinctly, whether the Court
of Appeals can be compelled to rule on the constitutionality of a statute by writ of mandamus; and  
Second, whether or not the case has already become moot in light of Goldenway Merchandising Corporation v.
Equitable PCI Bank.31
However, in order to fully pass upon these issues, this Court later on directed the Office of the Solicitor General
to comment on the constitutionality of Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
and the Bankers Association of the Philippines were also directed to submit their comments on the issue, in
order to afford an opportunity to be heard by the parties that may be directly affected by the resolution of the
issue.32  
In its Comment,33 the Office of the Solicitor General insists that the constitutionality of Section 47 of Republic
Act No. 8791 has already been settled in Goldenway Merchandising Corporation.34 It points out that the
provision's constitutionality was further reiterated in White Marketing Development Corporation v. Grandwood
Furniture and Woodwork, Inc.35  Thus, it was "indubitable" that the provision did not violate Petitioner's right to
equal protection.36  
The Bankers Association of the Philippines and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, in their respective
Comments,37 echo the Office of the Solicitor General's sentiments, and reiterate that Goldenway
Merchandising Corporation has already settled this issue with finality.38
In its Consolidated Reply,39 Petitioner reiterates its earlier argument in the Petition that Section 47 was
unconstitutional as it was "a classic example of class legislation which is intended to favor banks, quasi-banks
and other trust entities to the prejudice of juridical persons. "40  
Thus, even after the submission of comments from parties that may be affected by this Court's resolution, the
issues before us remain the same: first, whether or not the Court of Appeals can be compelled by writ of
mandamus to pass upon the constitutionality of a statute, and second, whether or not the issue of
constitutionality has been rendered moot.
While not raised as an issue by the parties before this Court, we find that for a complete resolution of all
controversies in this case, we must likewise first pass upon the issue of whether or not the trial court erred in
dismissing the Complaint on the ground that the Office of the Solicitor General was not impleaded as a party.  
I
 The trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint on the ground that the Republic, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, was not impleaded in this case.
The Complaint, while denominated as a Declaration of Nullity of Notice of Sale, Certificate of Sale  &  TCTs
and Declaration as Unconstitutional Sec. 47, RA No. 8791, was, in reality, an action for declaratory relief.
Petitioner, in seeking the nullification of the foreclosure sale, questioned the validity of Republic Act No. 8791,
Section 47 insofar as the law limits the redemption period for juridical persons to only three (3) months.
Petitioner was a juridical person affected by the shorter redemption period. Under Rule 63, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, any person whose rights are affected by a statute may bring an action before the trial court to
determine its validity:
SECTION 1. Who May File Petition. - Any person interested under a deed, will , contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof[,] bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising , and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
In dismissing the action, the trial court cited Rule 63, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, in that the Solicitor
General was required to be impleaded in all actions where the validity of a statute was in question: 
SECTION 3. Notice on Solicitor General.  - In any action which involves the validity of a statute, executive
order or regulation, or any other governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party
assailing the same and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question.
The Rules, however, only require that notice be given to the Solicitor General. They do not state that if the
Solicitor General fails to participate in the action, the action would be dismissed.  
The Administrative Code provides that the Solicitor General shall appear in any action involving the validity of a
statute "when in his [or her] judgment his intervention is necessary or when requested by the Court."41
In this instance, the trial court sent a copy of the Complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General.42 The Office
of the Solicitor General, however, did not participate in the case. The failure of the Office of the Solicitor
General to participate, however, should not prejudice a litigant's cause.  
The trial court dismissed the action on the ground that the Solicitor General may be deprived of due process.
Due process, however, has already been accorded to the Solicitor General when he/she was furnished with a
copy of the Complaint. The Solicitor General's failure to comment on the Complaint should have the effect of
waiving his or her right to participate in the case. To hold otherwise would be to give the Solicitor General more
power than what the law grants. The Solicitor General does not have and should not have unbridled control
over cases that were originally filed between private parties.  
II
The grant of declaratory relief is discretionary on the courts. Courts may refuse to declare rights or to construe
instruments if it will not terminate the controversy or if it is unnecessary and improper under the circumstances.
A discretionary act cannot be the subject of a petition for mandamus.  
While Petitioner's Complaint before the trial court was captioned as one for Declaration of Nullity of Notice of
Sale, Certificate of Sale  &  TCTs and Declaration as Unconstitutional Sec. 47, RA No. 8791, it was, as the
Court of Appeals correctly found, a petition for declaratory relief. Petitioner sought the declaration of Republic
Act No. 8791 unconstitutional so that, in effect, the foreclosure proceedings of the properties now held by
private respondent would be declared void.  
Courts, however, have the discretion of whether to entertain an action for declaratory relief. In Chan v.
Galang :43
Declaratory relief is discretionary upon the court to entertain. It may refuse to exercise the power to declare
rights and to construe instruments in any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and
proper at the time under all the circumstances[.]44
The same paragraph now appears in Rule 63, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 5. Court Action  Discretionary. - Except in actions falling under the second paragraph of section 1 of
this Rule, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to
construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which
gave rise to the action, or in any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper under
the circumstances.
Although the Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for declaratory relief,45 the
Court of Appeals exercises appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of the trial court.46 Thus, the Court of
Appeals may, in appeals of actions for declaratory relief, apply Rule 63 of the Rules of Court in resolving the
appeal.
The Court of Appeals, in deferring the question of the validity of Republic Act No. 8791, Section 47 to the Court
of Appeals, cited Rule 63, Section 5of the Rules of Court, and held that to resolve the Petition "would be an
empty discourse and will not terminate the controversy. "47 This was an exercise of the Court of Appeals'
discretion.
Any person may file a verified petition for mandamus against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
who "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station[.]"48 Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals had the duty to pass upon the issue
of the statute's constitutionality. By refusing to pass upon it, it argues that the Court of Appeals unlawfully
neglected its duty and may properly be the subject of a petition for mandamus.
Mandamus, however, may issue only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty.  It cannot be issued to
compel the performance of a discretionary act. In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Concerned 
Residents of Manila Bay:49
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that
"requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." It connotes an act in which nothing is left to
the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or
proved to exist and imposed by law." Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters
involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.50 (Emphasis
in the original, citations omitted)
Petitioner cannot file a petition for mandamus to compel what is essentially a discretionary act on the Court of
Appeals. What Petitioner should have done was to file a petition for certiorari to question the exercise of the
Court of Appeals' discretion. Unfortunately, Petitioner filed the wrong remedy. As such, the Petition must be
denied.   
 III
Even assuming that the Court of Appeals may be compelled to rule on the issue of the validity of Republic Act
No. 8791, Section 47, the Petition has already become moot in view of the promulgation of Goldenway
Merchandising Corporation v. Equitable PCI Bank.51  
In Goldenway Merchandising, this Court squarely addressed the argument that Republic Act No. 8791, Section
47 violated the equal protection clause when it provided a shorter redemption period for juridical persons. This
Court, in finding the argument unmeritorious, stated: 
Petitioner' s claim that Section 47 infringes the equal protection clause as it discriminates mortgagors/property
owners who are juridical persons is equally bereft of merit.  
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is
to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal protection permits of reasonable
classification. We have ruled that one class may be treated differently from another where the groupings are
based on reasonable and real distinctions. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all
members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate
the equal protection guarantee.  
We agree with the CA that the legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of redemption for juridical
persons whose properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135.  
The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the
properties foreclosed — whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption
period is retained, or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed
necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee banks to
dispose sooner of these acquired assets. It must be underscored that the General Banking Law of 2000,
crafted in the aftermath of the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act
of 1949 by fashioning a legal framework for maintaining a safe and sound banking system. In this context, the
amendment introduced by Section 47 embodied one of such safe and sound practices aimed at ensuring the
solvency and liquidity of our banks. It cannot therefore be disputed that the said provision amending the
redemption period in Act 3135 was based on a reasonable classification and germane to the purpose of the
law.52
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and the Bankers
Association of the Philippines, the constitutionality of Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791 has likewise been
passed upon in White Marketing Development Corporation  v.  Grandwood  Furniture and Woodwork:53
Grandwood had three months from the foreclosure or before the certificate of foreclosure sale was registered
to redeem the foreclosed prope1iy. This holds true even when Metrobank ceased to be the mortgagee in view
of its assignment to ARC of its credit, because the latter acquired all the rights of the former under the
mortgage contract — including the shorter redemption period. The shorter redemption period should also
redound to the benefit of White Marketing as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale as it stepped into the
shoes of the assignee-mortgagee.  
Measured by the foregoing parameters, the Court finds that Grandwood's redemption was made out of time as
it was done after the certificate of sale was registered on September 30, 2013. Pursuant to Section 47 of R.A.
No. 8791, it only had three (3) months from foreclosure or before the registration of the certificate of
foreclosure sale, whichever came first, to redeem the property sole in the extrajudicial sale.  
Such interpretation is in harmony with the avowed purpose of R.A. No. 8791 in providing for a shorter
redemption period for juridical persons. In Goldenway Merchandising Corporation v. Equitable PCI Bank, the
Court explained that the shortened period under Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 served as additional security for
banks to maintain their solvency and liquidity, to wit:
The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the
properties foreclosed — whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption
period is retained, or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed
necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to
dispose sooner of these acquired assets. It must be underscored that the General Banking Law of 2000,
crafted in the aftermath of the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act
of 1949 by fashioning a legal framework for maintaining a safe and sound banking system. In this context, the
amendment introduced by Section 47 embodied one of such safe and sound practices aimed at ensuring the
solvency and liquidity of our banks. It cannot therefore be disputed that the said provision amending the
redemption period in Act 3135 was based on a reasonable classification and germane to the purpose of the
law.
To adopt Grandwood's position that Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 no longer applies would defeat its very
purpose to provide additional security to mortgagee-banks. The shorter redemption period is an incentive
which mortgagee-banks may use to encourage prospective assignees to accept the assignment of credit for a
consideration. If the redemption period under R.A. No. 8791 would be extended upon the assignment by the
bank of its rights under a mortgage contract, then it would be tedious for banks to find willing parties to be
subrogated in its place. Thus, it would adversely limit the bank's opportunities to quickly dispose of its hard
assets, and maintain its solvency and liquidity.54 (Citations omitted)
The same case has also been cited in Spouses Limso v. Philippine  National Bank,55 where this Court upheld
the rationale for the shorter redemption period for juridical persons: 
We rule that the period of redemption for this case should be not more than three (3) months in accordance
with Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791. The mortgaged properties are all owned by Davao Sunrise. Section
47 of Republic Act No. 8791 states: "the mortgagor or debtor whose real property has been sold" and "juridical
persons whose property is being sold[.]" Clearly, the law itself provides that the right to redeem belongs to the
owner of the property mortgaged. As the mortgaged properties all belong to Davao Sunrise, the shorter period
of three (3) months is the applicable redemption period.  
The policy behind the shorter redemption period was explained in Goldenway Merchandising Corporation v.
Equitable PCI Bank:
To grant a longer period of redemption on the ground that a co-debtor is a natural person defeats the purpose
of Republic Act No. 8791. In addition, the real properties mortgaged by Davao Sunrise appear to be used for
commercial purposes.56 (Citations omitted)
Despite being given numerous opportunities to do so, Petitioner has neither mentioned Goldenway
Merchandising in any of its pleadings nor argued against its applicability in this case.  
While this Court looks with favor on the redemption of properties by its owners, the process of redemption is
still a statutory privilege. Parties must still comply with the laws and the procedural rules on the matter. In City
of Davao v. Intestate Estate of Amado D. Dalisay:57
While it is a given that redemption by property owners is looked upon with favor, it is equally true that the right
to redeem properties remains to be a statutory privilege. Redemption is by force of law, and the purchaser at
public auction is bound to accept it. Further, the right to redeem property sold as security for the satisfaction of
an unpaid obligation does not exist preternaturally. Neither is it predicated on proprietary right, which, after the
sale of the property on execution, leaves the judgment debtor and vests in the purchaser. Instead, it is a bare
statutory privilege to be exercised only by the persons named in the statute.  
In other words, a valid redemption of property must appropriately be based on the law which is the very source
of this substantive right.  It is, therefore, necessary that compliance with the rules set forth by law and
jurisprudence should be shown in order to render validity to the exercise of this right. Hence, when the Court is
beckoned to rule on this validity, a hasty resort to elementary rules on construction proves inadequate.
Especially so, when there are deeper underpinnings involved, not only as to the right of the owner to take back
his property, but equally important, as to the right of the purchaser to acquire the property after deficient
compliance with statutory requirements, including the exercise of the right within the period prescribed by law.  
The Court cannot close its eyes and automatically rule in favor of the redemptioner at all times. The right
acquired by the purchaser at an execution sale is inchoate and does not become absolute until after the
expiration of the redemption period without the right of redemption having been exercised. " But inchoate
though it be, it is, like any other right, entitled to protection and must be respected until extinguished by
redemption." Suffice it to say, the liberal application of redemption laws in favor of the property owner is not an
austere solution to a controversy, where there are remarkable factors that lead to a more sound and
reasonable interpretation of the law[.]58
IV
 The Constitution guarantees that no person shall be denied equal protection of the laws.59 The right to equal
protection of the laws guards "against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. "60  
Equal protection, however, was not intended to prohibit the legislature from enacting statutes that either tend to
create specific classes of persons or objects, or tend to affect only these specific classes of persons or objects.
Equal protection "does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced."61 As aptly discussed in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union:62
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of
statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.  
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its
jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the
classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary
that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from
recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.63
Thus, a statute that treats one class differently from another class will not violate the equal protection clause as
long as the classification is valid. In Samahan ng Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City,64 this Court
summarized the three (3) tests to determine the reasonableness of a classification:
The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights,
including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes. The
intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights,
but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Lastly, the rational
basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.65
A "suspect class" is defined as "a class saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. "66  
Juridical entities enjoy certain advantages that natural persons do not, such as limited liability. A corporation
has a separate and distinct personality from its corporate officers or stockholders. It may incur its own liabilities
and is responsible for the payment of its debts. Thus, a corporate officer or a stockholder, as a general rule, is
not personally held liable for corporate debts.67
The properties of juridical entities are also often used for commercial purposes. Corporations will give more
attention to assets that are income generating, and will also be equipped with greater resources for the
protection of these assets.  
In contrast, the properties of natural persons are more often used for residential purposes. They are also
directly responsible for the liabilities they incur and, often, are not equipped with the same resources that
juridical entities may have.  
Juridical entities, thus, cannot be considered a "suspect class." The rational basis test may be applied to
determine the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8971, Section 47.  
"The rational basis test requires only that there be a legitimate government interest and that there is a
reasonable connection between it and the means employed to achieve it."68 A longer period of redemption is
given to natural persons whose mortgaged properties are more often used for residential purposes. A shorter
period of redemption is given to juridical persons whose properties are more often used for commercial
purposes. Goldenway Merchandising explains that the shorter period is aimed to ensure the solvency and
liquidity of banks. This helps minimize the period of uncertainty in the ownership of commercial properties and
enable mortgagee-banks to dispose of these acquired assets quickly.  
There is, thus, a legitimate government interest in the protection of the banking industry and a legitimate
government interest in the protection of foreclosed residential properties owned by natural persons. The
shortened period of redemption for juridical entities may be considered to be the reasonable means for the
protection of both these interests.  
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.