Prepared by:

ATTY. WALDEMAR R. GRAVADOR

USC-College of Law
Property, Right to Property, and Ownership:

• 1. Property is an economic concept [ mass of things or

objects useful to human activity] and necessary to life.

• 2. Right to Property is the juridical tie by virtue of which

a person has the exclusive power to receive or obtain all
the benefits from a thing, except those prohibited or
restricted by law or by the rights of others.

 Distinction between right to property [ vinculum between a

man and the thing] and ownership [ mass of rights over the
thing] is more historical than actual.
• Concept of things and property:

 1. Things are all objects that exist, and can be of some use
to man. This is more generic and extensive.

Property are all those that are already appropriated or are in the
possession of man.

 2.To be juridically considered as a thing or property, an

object must have the following requisites: 1) Utility [
capacity to satisfy human wants] 2) Individuality [ or,
substance or a separate and autonomous existence] and 3)
Susceptibility of being appropriated [ equivalent to
occupation, which is the willfull apprehension of a
corporeal object which has no owner, with intent to
acquire its ownership].
Common Things:

Things which, as a whole mass, are not

susceptible of appropriation e.g. sun, stars, the
core of the earth, the sea, and others called
common things, are not things or property in the
juridical concept.
RIGHTS AS PROPERTY:

Things, include not only material objects, but also

rights
 real rights- power belonging to a person over a specific
thing, without a passive subject individually determined
against whom such right may be personally exercised. It
gives to a person direct and immediate juridical power over
a thing, which is susceptible of being exercised, not only
against a determinate person, but against the whole world]

 personal rights- the power belonging to a person to demand

of another, as a definite passive subject, the fulfillment of a
prestation to give, to do, or not to do. Properly called right of
obligation, or simply obligation] although these are relations
and not objects.
DIFFERENCES IN REGIME BETWEEN MOVABLE
AND IMMOVABLES:

• a. Solemnity is greater in acts relative to immovables, e.g.

donations

• b. Adverse Possession is longer for immovables.

• c. Publicity and Recording are more important for

immovables re: double sale, mortgage of properties.

• d. Capacity to alienate, greater capacity is usually required

for immovables.

• e. Venue is usually determined by the location of the

immovable.
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY INTO INTO REAL
AND PERSONAL IS NOT REALLY COMPLETE.
 Reason:
there are things not strictly movables nor
immovables but partake of the nature of both

Example:

Movables ( Machines, paintings) rendered immovable by

reason of their being immobilized by destination or through
attachment to immovables

immovables treated as movables (plants, house of light

materials)

Animals in animal houses, pigeon houses

Classes of Immovables:

 Immovable by nature:
Cannot be carried from place to place, like lands, roads, and trees
(pars. 1 and 2, Art.415)
 Immovable by incorporation
Attached to an immovable in a fixed manner to be an integral part
thereof e.g. buildings, walls, fences, trees, statues, animal houses
(pars. 1,2,3,4,6)
 Immovable by destination
Placed in an immovable for the utility it gives to the activity carried
thereofn, such as machinery installed in a building to meet the needs
of an industry in the building and docks on a river (pars. 4,5,6,7,9)
 Immovable by analogy or by law
So claasified by express provision of the law because it is regarded as
united to the immovable property (par. 10)
IMMOVABLES AND MOVABLES:

a. Par. 1. [ (1) Land, buildings, roads and

constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil]

 Separate treatment by the parties of building from the

land on which it stands does not change the immovable
character of the building.
  While the building of strong materials in which the rice-
cleaning machinery was installed by the "Compañia
Agricola Filipina" was real property, and the mere fact
that the parties seem to have dealt with it separate and
apart from the land on which it stood in no wise
changed its character as real property. It follows that
neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage
registry of the instrument purporting to be a chattel
mortgage of the building and the machinery installed
therein, nor the annotation in that registry of the sale of
the mortgaged property, had any effect whatever so far
as the building was concerned. ( LEUNG YEE VS.
STRONG MACHINERY 37 PHIL. 644)
•
Rule: “ Building is always immovable”

 ANTONIO PUNZALAN et.al. vs. REMEDIOS

LACSAMANA et.al. G.R. No. L-55729 MARCH 28,
1993

FACTS:
Petitioner is owner of land situated in Tarlac which
he mortgaged to PNB in 1963. This property was
foreclosed. While the land was still in possession of the
petitioner, he was allowed by PNB to construct a
warehouse. In 1978, deed of sale was executed between
PNB and herein respondent Lacsamana.
Petitioner filed a suit impugning the validity of
the sale of the building in the CFI of Rizal.
Respondent PNB filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue because the suit
involves a real property.

HELD:
The warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner
is an immovable or real property as provided in
article 415(1) of the Civil Code. Buildings are
always immovable under the
 Code. A building treated separately from the
land on which it stood is immovable property
and the mere fact that the parties to a contract
seem to have dealt with it separate and apart
from the land on which it stood in no wise
changed its character as immovable property
2. Buildings on rented land- there are authorities
that buildings or constructions placed on land by
lessee do not become immovable, where
agreement gives the lessee the right to remove the
building and improvements.

3. Building or house sold to be demolished

immediately, French court held the sale to be
involving movable property.
Chattel Mortgage on house built on rented land:

 Where a house stands on a rented land, the same (house)

may be subject of chattel mortgage if so stipulated in the
document of mortgage. Validity of mortgage cannot be
assailed by parties to the mortgage ( NAVARRO vs.
REYES 9 SCRA 631)
 STANDARD OIL CO., VS. JARANILLO 44
PHIL. 631

RULE:

Registrar of Deeds duty is ministerial ( subject for

registration is house and sought to be registered in the
Chattel Regisry)
While placing of the same in Chattel Registry is a futile
act, parties may, by agreement, treat as personal property
that which by nature would be real property.
4. Par. 2 [(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits,
while they are attached to the land or form an
integral part of an immovable ] on ungathered
fruits. Under the Chattel Mortgage Law,
ungathered fruits have the nature of personal
property.
5. Par. 3.[ (3) Everything attached to an immovable
in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the
material or deterioration of the object] rex vinta (
Roman Law), immovable by incorporation.

NOTE: Under this kind, ownership of the thing

is attached i.e. whether it is the owner who
placed it there or not is immaterial.
Constructions adhered to the soil:

-construction must be attached permanently to the

land. Thus:

Board of Assessment Appeals vs. Manila Electric 10

SCRA 68 “… 40 steel towers [sought to be subjected to real
estate tax by Assessor of Quezon City] not liable for the tax,
because they are removable and merely attached to a square
metal frame by means of bolts.”

 They are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and

they can be separated without breaking the material or causing
deterioration upon the object to which they are attached.
6. Par. 4. [ (4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other
objects for use or ornamentation, placed in
buildings or on lands by the owner of the
immovable in such a manner that it reveals the
intention to attach them permanently to the
tenements]– immovable by incorporation and
destination

These are known as “REAL PROPERTIES BY

DESTINATION”
 4.a. objects must be placed by the owner or by
his agent. It becomes immobilized only when
placed in the tenement by the owner of the
tenement ( Davao Sawmill Co. vs. Castillo 61 Phil.
709).

 4.b. When placed by a mere holder, e.g. tenant,

usufructuary, or one with a temporary right
over the immovable, objects do not become
immovable property, unless the person acts as
agent of the owner ( Davao Sawmill case, supra).
7. Par. No. 5. [5) Machinery, receptacles,
instruments or implements intended by the owner
of the tenement for an industry or works which
may be carried on in a building or on a piece of
land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of
the said industry or works]
Rulings on “machineries, receptacles etc.”:

 Machinery which is movable in nature, only becomes

immobilized when placed on a plant by the owner of
the property or plant, but not when placed by a
tenant ( Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 61 Phil. 709)

 Machinery, though in fact bolted to the ground,

remains movable property susceptible to seizure
under a search warrant, where its owner is not the
owner of the land and/or building on which it was
placed ( Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800)
Basis in ruling validity of replevin is not Article 415, but
estoppel.

MAKATI LEASING AND FINANCE CORP. VS.

WEAREVER TEXTILE MILLS, INC. 122 SCRA 296

If a house of strong materials, like what was involved

in the above Tumalad case, may be considered as
personal property for purposes of executing a chattel
mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract
so agree and no innocent third party will be
prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason
why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and
becomes immobilized only by destination or
purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is
really because one who has so agreed is estopped
from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.
Validity of writ of Seizure:

SERG’S PRODUCTS, INC., and SERGIO T.

GOQUIOLAY, petitioners, vs. PCI LEASING AND
FINANCE, INC. G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000

In the present case, the machines that were the

subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by
petitioners in the factory built on their own
land. Indisputably, they were essential and
principal elements of their chocolate-making
industry. Hence, although each of them was
movable or personal property on its own, all of
them have become “immobilized by destination
because they are essential and principal elements
in the industry.”
 The Court has held that contracting parties may
validly stipulate that a real property be
considered as personal. After agreeing to such
stipulation, they are consequently estopped from
claiming otherwise. Under the principle of
estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily
precluded from denying the truth of any material
fact found therein.
 It should be stressed, however, that our holding --
that the machines should be deemed personal
property pursuant to the Lease Agreement – is
good only insofar as the contracting parties are
concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by
the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith
are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the
subject machinery as personal. In any event, there
is no showing that any specific third party would
be adversely affected
 5.a. immovable by destination, depends upon
their being destined for use in the industry or
work in the tenement ( BH. Berkenkotter. vs. Co
Unjieng 61 Phil. 663)

 5.b. Additional machinery installed by the

owner of a sugar central to improve milling
capacity is realty ( Berkenkotter vs. Cu Unjieng e
Hijos, 61 Phil. 663).
Classification made under Article 415 is used
as basis to determine whether or not there is
liability to realty tax:

Mindanao Bus. Company vs. City Assessor 116

Phil. 501, no realty tax is due on machineries of a
transportation company, such as welder, boring
machine, lathe machine, etc. sitting on a cement
or wooden platform, because they are not
absolutely essential to its transportation business
which is not carried on in a building or specified
land.
Cases where the Civil Code was not applied for purposes
of determining liability to real property tax:

CALTEX (Philippines) Inc. vs. CENTRAL BOARD OF

ASSESSMENT APPEALS and CITY ASSESSOR OF
PASAY G.R. No. L-50466 May 31, 1982

. We hold that the said equipment and machinery, as

appurtenances to the gas station building or shed
owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax)
and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of
the gas station, for without them the gas station would
be useless, and which have been attached or affixed
permanently to the gas station site or embedded
therein, are taxable improvements and machinery
within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real
Property Tax Code.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CENTRAL
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS 114 SCRA
273

 Sought to be taxed are two storage tanks installed by

MERALCO on a lot it leased (from Caltex).
 MERALCO contends that tanks are not real property
under Article 415 of the Civil Code.

RULING:
Used in resolving the issue is the Assessment Law and the
Real Property Code: “while two storage tanks are not
embedded in the land, they are considered improvements
that enhance utility and rendering it useful to the oil
industry.
Movables:

General Test of Movable Character:

1) Whether it can be carried from place to place, 2)

whether the change of location can be effected
without injury to an immovable to which the object
may be attached, and 3) whether the object is not
included in any of the ten paragraphs of Article 415.
 By Special Provision:

e.g. Act No. 1508 recognizes that growing

crops are personal property and may be the
object of chattel mortgage see. Section 7.

 Forces of Nature:

 e.g. electricity, gas, oxygen, light, rays.

 Consumables and Non-Consumables:

 Consumable are those which cannot be used in

a manner appropriate to their nature without
being consumed.

 Non-consumables are those not consumed by

use.
*Fungibles and Non-Fungibles:

 1. Distinction between Fungible and Non-fungible.

Fungible, quality of being fungible depends upon
their possibility ( because of their nature or the
will of the parties), of being substituted by others
of the same kind, not having a distinct
individuality ( e.g. ten heads of cattle, or 100 copies
of a newspaper of a given date)

 Non-fungibles are those which have their own

individuality and DO NOT admit of substitution
( e.g. ten bottles of wine in my room)

 Note: This is a classification based on PURPOSE

LUIS MARCOS LAUREL VS. HON. ABROGAR G.R.
No. 155076 January 13, 2009
It (PLDT) maintains that the Amended Information
charging petitioner with theft is valid and sufficient;
that it states the names of all the accused who were
specifically charged with the crime of theft of PLDT’s
international calls and business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service on or about
September 10 to 19, 1999 in Makati City by conducting
ISR or International Simple Resale; that it identifies the
international calls and business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service of PLDT as the
personal properties which were unlawfully taken by the
accused; and that it satisfies the test of sufficiency as it
enabled a person of common understanding to know
the charge against him and the court to render
judgment properly.
 PLDT further insists that the Revised Penal Code
should be interpreted in the context of the Civil
Code’s definition of real and personal
property. The enumeration of real properties in
Article 415 of the Civil Code is exclusive such that
all those not included therein are personal
properties. Since Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code used the words “personal property” without
qualification, it follows that all “personal
properties” as understood in the context of the Civil
Code, may be the subject of theft under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code. PLDT alleges that the
international calls and business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service are
personal properties capable of appropriation and
can be objects of theft.
RULING:

 Prior to the passage of the Revised Penal Code on

December 8, 1930, the definition of the term
“personal property” in the penal code provision on
theft had been established in Philippine
jurisprudence. This Court, in United States v. Genato,
United States v. Carlos, and United States v.
Tambunting, consistently ruled that any personal
property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of
theft.

 Moreover, since the passage of the Revised Penal
Code on December 8, 1930, the term “personal
property” has had a generally accepted definition in
civil law. In Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain,
“personal property” is defined as “anything susceptible
of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter
(not real property).” Thus, the term “personal
property” in the Revised Penal Code should be
interpreted in the context of the Civil Code provisions
in accordance with the rule on statutory construction
that where words have been long used in a technical
sense and have been judicially construed to have a
certain meaning, and have been adopted by the
legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a
particular statute, in which they are used, the words
used in such statute should be construed according to
the sense in which they have been previously used. In
fact, this Court used the Civil Code definition of
“personal property” in interpreting the theft provision
of the penal code in United States v. Carlos.
PROPERTY IN RELATION TO THE PERSON
TO WHOM IT BELONGS

 PUBLIC DOMINION

 PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
Dominion and Ownership:

 Public dominion does not carry the idea of

ownership; property of public dominion is not
owned by the State, but pertains to the State, which
as territorial sovereign exercises certain juridical
prerogatives over such property.

 Purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person

but the citizens; it is intended for the common and
public welfare.
Outside Commerce of Man:

Rule: Property of public dominion OUTSIDE the

commerce of man.

Principles:

 They cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the

subject matter of contracts.

 cannot be acquired by prescription against the State.

 not subject to attachment and execution

 cannot be burdened by voluntary easement.

they cannot be alienated or subject of commerce:

CASES:

Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [The

said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use,
the municipal council of Cavite could not in 1907
withdraw or exclude from public use a portion
thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of the
defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portion of said
plaza or public place to the defendant for private use
the plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in
the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over
a thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it
empowered so to do.
Land formed by the action of the sea as accretion
form part of the public domain.

Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335

On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application

for the registration of a parcel of land
(mangrove), situated in barrio Gasac, Navotas,
Rizal, with an area of 37,877 square meters. Later,
he amended his application by alleging among
others that he owned the parcel applied for by
right of accretion Art 457.
HELD:

The article cited is clearly inapplicable because

it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of
rivers, while the accretion in the present case
was caused by action of the Manila Bay.
ON “FORESHORE” LANDS:

“Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,

the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are
part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x
and other natural resources" and consequently
"owned by the State." As such, foreshore and
submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they
are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public
domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA
does not convert these inalienable natural resources
of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain” ( See: FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY G.R. No. 133250
July 9, 2002)
Rule: creek is a property of the public domain

MANECLANG VS. IAC 144 SCRA 553

Considering that as hold in the case of Mercado vs.

Municipal President of Macabebe, 59 Phil: 592
[1934], a creek, defined as a recess or arm
extending from a river and participating in the ebb
and flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the
public domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as
a public water, it cannot be registereder the
Torrens System….Compromise Agreement null
and void.
Rule: the term “ports” includes seaports and
airports (MANILA INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. COURT OF
APPEALS ET.AL. G.R. NO. 155650 JULY 20,
2006 )

 Subdivision roadlots:

WOODRIDGE SCHOOL INC. et.al. vs. ARB

CONSTRUCTION INC. G.R. No. 157285 February 16,
2007 (subdivisión roads-before its donation is accepted-
is still prívate in charácter.)
Cases illustrating principles governing properties of public
dominion:

 Cannot be alienated or lease or otherwise be the subject matter of

contracts
MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE VS. ROJAS, 30 PHIL. 20 (The said
Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the municipal
council of Cavite could not in 1907 withdraw or exclude from public
use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of the
defendant Hilaria Rojas. )
MACASIANO VS. DIOKNO G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992
(the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to local
government units to close roads and other similar public places
should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic
principles already established by law. These basic principles have
the effect of limiting such authority of the province, city or
municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. Article 424
of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of
public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the
public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be
disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private
persons.
 CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY G.R.
No. 133250 July 9, 2002

Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these

submerged areas be classified as public agricultural
lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural
resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed
and transformed into public agricultural lands, the
government may then officially classify these lands as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition.
Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no
longer needed for public service.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY et.al. G.R. No. 164527 AUGUST 15,
2007

 In PEA, there was no law or presidential proclamation

classifying the lands to be reclaimed as alienable and
disposal lands of public domain. In this RBI case, MO 415
of former President Aquino and Proclamation No. 39 of
then President Ramos, coupled with Special Patents Nos.
3591, 3592, and 3598, classified the reclaimed lands as
alienable and disposable;
 In PEA, the lands to be reclaimed or already reclaimed were
transferred to PEA, a government entity tasked to dispose
of public lands under Executive Order No. (EO) 525. In the
NHA case, the reclaimed lands were transferred to NHA, a
government entity NOT tasked to dispose of public land
and therefore said alienable lands were converted to
patrimonial lands upon their transfer to NHA.
  Cannot be acquired by prescription against the
State

DENR et.al. vs. MAYOR YAP et.al. G.R. No. 167707

OCTOBER 8, 2008 ( where the land is not alienable
and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how
long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights)
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 150824 February 4,
2008 (forest lands cannot be owned by private
persons. It is nor registrable …It is well-settled that a
certificate of title is void when it covers property of
public domain classified as forest or timber or mineral
land…eve prescription may not be used as a defense
against the Republic.

 Some rulings on “prescription”:

Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel in Estate of Yujuico vs.

Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 168661 October 26,
2007

Prescription as a mode to acquire ownership over public

agricultural lands in HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 179987 APRIL
29, 2009 (In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as
a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public
domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development
of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when
the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. )
 Not subject to attachment and execution:

 The property of a municipality, whether -real or personal,

necessary for governmental purposes cannot be attached and
sold at public auction to satisfy a judgment against the
municipality. ( Vda. De Tan Toco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo
49 Phil.52)
 The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, which its Charter
calls the “principal airport of the Philippines for both international
and domestic air traffic,” are properties of public dominion because
they are intended for public use. As properties of public
dominion, they indisputably belong to the State or the Republic of
the Philippines.
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion,
being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an
auction sale.(Manila International Airport Authority vs.
Court of Appeals et.Al. G.R. No. 155650 july 20,
2006
 Philippine Fisheries Development Authority vs.
CA G.R. No. 169836 July 31, 2007

 “Thus, the real property tax assessments issued by

the City of Iloilo should be upheld only with respect
to the portions leased to private persons. In case the
Authority fails to pay the real property taxes due
thereon, said portions cannot be sold at public
auction to satisfy the tax delinquency. In Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority it was held that reclaimed
lands are lands of the public domain and cannot,
without Congressional fiat, be subject of a sale, public
or private, thus:
 Warehouse:

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY vs. CITY

OF ILOILO G.R. No. 109791 July 14, 2003

“Concededly, "ports constructed by the

State" are properties of the public dominion,
as Article 420 of the Civil Code enumerates
these as properties "intended for public use."
It must be stressed however that what is
being taxed in the present case is petitioner’s
warehouse, which, although located within
the port, is distinct from the port itself.
Government Funds:

 COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS, ET AL.

vs. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO, ET AL. G.R. No. L-
30098 February 18, 1970 ( funds pertaining to
government instrumentalities are exempt from
attachment, garnishment, and/or execution)

 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

vs. HON. JUDGE JAVIER PABALAN G.R. No. L-
33112 June 15, 1978) (public funds of government
owned corporations, not exempt from execution)
 PROFESSIONAL VIDEO INC. vs. TESDA G.R. No.
155504 June 26, 2009

Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary

contract with PROVI and thereby gave its implied
consent to be sued, TESDA’s funds are still public in
nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of
garnishment or attachment. Under Section 33 of the
TESDA Act, the TESDA budget for the implementation of
the Act shall be included in the annual General
Appropriation Act; hence, TESDA funds, being sourced
from the Treasury, are moneys belonging to the
government, or any of its departments, in the hands of
public officials.
 Cannot be burdened by voluntary easement

 Villaricovs. Sarmiento G.R. No. 13648 November 11,

2004 (Considering that the lot on which the stairways
were constructed is a property of public dominion, it
can not be burdened by a voluntary easement of right
of way in favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its use by
the public is by mere tolerance of the government
through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it
for himself. )
Patrimonial Property:
 Owned by the state in its private or proprietary
capacity…property not intended for public use, or for
some public service, or for the development of the
national wealth.

 Itis property which the State has the same rights, and
of which it may dispose, to the same extent as private
individual
Conversion of property of public dominion to
patrimonial property:

 Property of national Government

Formal declaration by the executive or legislative

department of the Government that the property is no
longer needed for public use or public service ( Heirs of
Mario Malabanan vs. Republic G.R. No. 179987, April
29, 2009
Cases:

 LAUREL VS. GARCIA G.R. NO. 92013 JULY 25,

1990
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a
long time for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any
such conversion happens only if the property is
withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and
Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 (19751). A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership "until
there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v.
Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
 abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi
property for public service and to make it
patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil
Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be
inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-
use was attributable not to the government's own
deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of
financial support to repair and improve the property
(See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368
[1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive
act based on correct legal premises
 Property of political subdivisions
Conversion must be authorized by law

Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. vs. Bercilles G.R. No. L-
40474 August 29, 1975

Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for
registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of
an ordinary contract.

 Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. Court Of Appeals 73 SCRA 162 [ 1976 ] (
conversion of property from patrimonial needs explicit declaration…)
Other recent rulings:

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. NATIONAL HOUSING

AUTHORITY et.al. G.R. No. 164527 AUGUST 15, 2007

The issuance of certificates of titles in NHA’s name

automatically converts the reclaimed lands to patrimonial
properties of the NHA. Otherwise, the lots would not be of
use to the NHA’s housing projects or as payment to the BOT
contractor as the enabling component of the BOT
contract. The laws of the land have to be applied and
interpreted depending on the changing conditions and
times. The NHA holds the lands covered by Special Patents
Nos. 3592 and 3598 solely for the purpose of the SMDRP
undertaken by authority of the BOT Law and for disposition
in accordance with said special law. The lands become
alienable and disposable lands of public domain upon
issuance of the special patents and become patrimonial
properties of the Government from the time the titles are
issued to the NHA.
 The property of a municipality, whether -real or
personal, necessary for governmental purposes
cannot be attached and sold at public auction to
satisfy a judgment against the municipality.

 PROPERTY EXEMPT.-Auto trucks used by a

municipality in sprinkling its streets, its police patrol
automobile, police stations, and public markets,
together with the land on which they stand, are
exempt from execution. ( VDA. DE TAN TOCO vs.
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO 49 Phil. 52)
 A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and
so cannot be the subject of lease or any other
contractual undertaking. This is elementary. Indeed,
this point was settled as early as in Municipality of
Cavite v. Rojas,23 decided in 1915, where the Court
declared as null and void the lease of a public plaza
of the said municipality in favor of a private person. (
VILLANUEVA vs. CASTANEDA 154 SCRA 154)

 There is absolutely no question that the town plaza

cannot be used for the construction of market stalls,
specially of residences, and that such structures
constitute a nuisance subject to abatement
according to law. Town plazas are properties of
public dominion ( ESPIRITU vs. MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL OF POZORRUBIO 102 PHIL. 867)
Properties belonging to a former province were
transferred under a law free of charge in favor of a
city:

 The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature

of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in question. For, the
matter involved here is the extent of legislative control
over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which
a province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the
property is owned by the municipality (meaning
municipal corporation) in its public and governmental
capacity, the property is public and Congress has
absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in
its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial
and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality
cannot be deprived of it without due process and
payment of just compensation. (PROVINCE OF
ZAMBOANGA vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA G.R. No. L-
24440 March 28, 1968)
 . The controversy here is more along the domains of the
Law of Municipal Corporations — State vs. Province —
than along that of Civil Law. Moreover, this Court is not
inclined to hold that municipal property held and
devoted to public service is in the same category as
ordinary private property. The consequences are dire. As
ordinary private properties, they can be levied upon and
attached. They can even be acquired thru adverse
possession — all these to the detriment of the local
community. Lastly, the classification of properties other
than those for public use in the municipalities as
patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is "...
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws." For
purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining under the
Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as
"special laws". Hence, the classification of municipal
property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as
public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in
this particular case.
OWNERSHIP

Definition of Ownership:

 The independent and general power of a person over a

thing for purposes recognized by law and within the
limits established thereby.

A relation in private law by virtue of which a thing

pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his
will in everything not prohibited by public law or the
concurrence with the rights of another.
Rights of an Owner:

 Right to enjoy, right to dispose, and the right to

recover or vindicate

Enjoy: right to possess, right to use, and right to the

fruits

Dispose: right to consume or destroy or abuse, right to

encumber or alienate
 Right to Recover or vindicate:

 Actions to Recover:

For personal property- Replevin under Rule 60, Rules of

Court

For Real Property: Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

under Rule 70 , 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

o Accion Publiciana- the plenary right to recover

possessesion.

o Accion Reinvidicatoria- an action to recover

ownership.
 Requisites in an action to recover
 Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength
of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's
claim

 Identity of property
Conflict between area and boundaries of land- when
there is conflict between the area and the boundaries of
a land, the latter prevails ( Contrera vs. Director of
Lands 82 Phil. 85)
An area delimited by boundaries properly identifies the
land
Strength of plaintiff’s title

Presumption of sufficient title

Evidence to prove ownership

Torrens title
Patent duly registered in the Registry of Property
Titles from the Spanish Government
Payment of land tax coupled with actual possession
Roman Law:

 Jus possidendi-right to possess

 Jus utendi-right to use
 Just fruendi-right to the fruits
-natural, industrial,and civil
 Jus abutendi-right to consume
 Jus disponendi-right to dispose
 Jus vindicandi-right to recover
Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer:

 Forcible entry- deprivation of possession by force,

intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; possession is
illegal from the start

 Unlawful detainer-possession is legal from the start.

 Only issue is physical or material possession

 Ownership is not an issue, but may be decided

PROVISIONALLY to determine issued on priority of
possession
Forcible Entry/ Unlawful Detainer:
As to respondents' ownership and right of possession of the
subject properties, records show that the MCTC based its
Decision not only on the Position Paper of respondents but also
on the pieces of evidence submitted by them. Respondents
attached, as annexes to their Complaint, the Original
Certificates of Title Nos. RO-4326 and RO-4327 in the name of
Enrique, covering Lot Nos. 2816 and 2817, respectively, as
evidence of their ownership and right to possess the disputed
properties.

Moreover, being a mere lessee, petitioner steps into the shoes

of her lessor, Virginia. However, Virginia's claim of ownership
was not sustained by the MCTC, which instead found that she
was not the owner of and had no right to possess the disputed
property or to transfer possession of the same, through lease, in
favor of another person. Virginia later withdrew her appeal
filed with the RTC. By reason of such withdrawal, she is bound
by the findings of the MCTC. ( VILLA vs. HEIRS OF
ALTAVAS G.R. No. 162028 July 14, 2008)
Further, it appears from the allegations in the Complaint that
the respondent was already in possession of the disputed
portion at the time Manantan bought the subject property
from the Bayot family, and it was only after the conduct of
a relocation survey, which supposedly showed that
respondent was encroaching on the subject property, did
Manantan begin asserting her claim of ownership over the
portion occupied and used by respondent. Clearly,
respondent’s possession of the disputed portion was not
pursuant to any contract, express or implied, with
Manantan, and, resultantly, respondent’s right of
possession over the disputed portion is not subject to
expiration or termination. At no point can it be said that
respondent’s possession of the disputed portion ceased to
be legal and became an unlawful withholding of the
property from Manantan. (ESTATE OF MANANTAN VS.
SOMERA G.R. No. 145867 April 7, 2009)
 Accion Publiciana

Ordinary civil proceeding to recover the better right of

possession of realty INDEPENDENTLY of title

Issue is possession de jure

Also used to refer to an ejectment suit filed after the

expiration of one year from the occurrence of the cause
of action or year from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty
 Accion Reivindicatoria

Action to recover possession based on ownership

 Can an action reivindicatoria be filed even if the plaintiff is
in actual possession of the property?

Answer: Yes

 IGLESIA NI CRISTO et.al. vs. HON. THELMA

PONFERRADA et.al. G.R. No. 168943 OCTOBER 27, 2006
Facts:

In October 2001, Enrique Santos et.al filed a complaint

for quieting of title and/or accion reivindincatoria
against Iglesia ni Cristo. They alleged that they are
owners of a 936 sq.m. parcel of land in Tandang Sora,
Quezon City which they inherited from Enrique Sr.

Iglesia filed a motion to dismiss contending that the

action has prescribed. It appears that it was able to
obtain a TCT over the same parcel of land way back in
1984-the year when the title was issued in their favor.
In support of its contention, Iglesia contended that the
accion reinvindicatoria presupposes that the plaintiff is
not in actual possession of the property he seeks to
recover. Thus, this is true in this case because it (iglesia)
was in possession of the property in 1984 when the title
was issued to it.

HELD:

Petitioner’s claim that it had been in actual or material

possession of the property since 1984 when TCT No.
321744 was issued in its favor is belied by the allegations
in the complaint that respondents had been in actual and
material possession of the property since 1961 up to the
time they filed their complaint on October 24, 2001.
 Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative
reinvindicatory action against petitioner. An accion
reinvindicatoria does not necessarily presuppose that the
actual and material possession of the property is on
defendant and that plaintiff seeks the recovery of such
possession from defendant. It bears stressing that an
accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy seeking the recovery of
ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus
fruendi as well. It is an action whereby a party claims
ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its
full possession. Thus, the owner of real property in
actual and material possession thereof may file an accion
reinvindicatoria against another seeking ownership over a
parcel of land including jus vindicandi, or the right to
exclude defendants from the possession thereof.
In this case, respondents filed an alternative
reinvindicatory action claiming ownership over the
property and the cancellation of TCT No. 321744
under the name of petitioner. In fine, they sought
to enforce their jus utendi and jus vindicandi when
petitioner claimed ownership and prevented them
from fencing the property.
Limitations on the right of ownership:

✓ 1. Limitations imposed for the benefit of the State-

police power [ e.g. SECTION. 16. ( Republic Act No.
7160) General Welfare. - eminent domain; and
Taxation
 Limitationsimposed by the Law- legal easement of
waters [Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the
waters which naturally and without the intervention of
man descend from the higher estates, as well as the
stones or earth which they carry with them.

The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which

will impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher
estate make works which will increase the burden.] (552) ] or
legal easement of right of way [Art. 649. The owner, or any
person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables
pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a
public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through
the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity]
 Limitations imposed by the owner- e.g. lease/pledge

 Limitations imposed by the grantor- donor may

prohibit partition [ e.g.

Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division

of the estate unless the testator should have expressly
forbidden its partition, in which case the period of
indivision shall not exceed twenty years as provided in
article 494. This power of the testator to prohibit division
applies to the legitime.

Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership

terminates when any of the causes for which partnership is
dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for
compelling reasons that division should be ordered, upon
petition of one of the co-heirs. ](1051a) ]
Limitations on the Right of ownership:

 Although the donor may impose certain conditions

in the deed of donation, the same must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
and public policy. The condition imposed in the
deed of donation in the case before us constitutes a
patently unreasonable and undue restriction on the
right of the donee to dispose of the property
donated, which right is an indispensable attribute
of ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation,
in order to be valid, must not be perpetual or for an
unreasonable period of time. (ROMAN
CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA ET.AL
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 77425 June 19, 1991
CASES INVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS VS.
INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE:
 Police Power:

City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta

G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983:

“Ordinance requiring private cemeteries to set

aside 6% of their total area for charity burial
grounds of the city’s paupers invalid. …not a
mere police power measure, but an outright
confiscation without due process of law”
 CITY OF MANILA ET.AL VS. HON. LAGUIO ET.AL. G.R. NO.
118127 APRIL 12,2005

 “ordinance banning establishment of motels in the Malate area is an

invalid exercise of police power”

 OFFICE OF THE SOL.GEN. vs. AYALA LAND INC. G.R. No. 177056
September 18, 2009:

Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually

invoking police power to justify the regulation by the
State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building
officials, of privately owned parking facilities,
including the collection by the owners/operators of
such facilities of parking fees from the public for the
use thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally
prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees
from the public for the use of the mall parking
facilities, the State would be acting beyond the bounds
of police power.
Eminent Domain:
FORMER RULE:

 AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) AND

MACTAN-CEBU INT’L. AIRPORT VS. ANTONIO
GOPUCO, JR. G.R. NO. 158563. JUNE 30, 2005

 The answer to that question depends upon the character of

the title acquired by the expropriator, whether it be the State,
a province, a municipality, or a corporation which has the
right to acquire property under the power of eminent
domain. If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular
purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended
or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner,
then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or
abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so
expropriated.
CURRENT RULE:

In light of these premises, we now expressly hold

that the taking of private property, consequent to
the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent
domain, is always subject to the condition that the
property be devoted to the specific public purpose
for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular
purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the
former owners, if they so desire, may seek the
reversion of the property, subject to the return of the
amount of just compensation received. In such a
case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain
has become improper for lack of the required factual
justification.[ MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. LOZADA et.al. G.R. No.
176625 February 25, 2010)
Principle of “Self-Help” ( ARTICLE 429 of the
Civil Code)

 This authorizes the lawful possessor to USE FORCE,

not only to prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or
usurpation thereof.

 Qualification to the rule that a person should not take

the law in his own hands. It is lawful to repel force by
force.
 Actual invasion of property may consist of a mere
disturbance of possession or of a real dispossession.
Mere disturbance of possession [ force may be used
against it at any time as long as it continues, even
beyond the prescriptive period for an action of forcible
entry e.g. if a ditch is opened by Pedro in the land of Juan,
Juan may close it or cover it by force any time.]

 If, however, invasion consists of real dispossession [

force to REGAIN possession can be used only
immediately after the dispossession] In other words,
once the usurper’s possession has become firm by the
lapse of time, the lawful possessor must resort to the
competent authority to recover his property.
Who may use force:

 The right to use force to defend property is

given only to the immediate possessor. There
must be a real aggression, an imminent
violation of law. Preventive force to forestall
aggression is not authorized.

Nature of Agression:

 The aggression must be illicit or unlawful. It

cannot be exercised against the lawful exercise
of the function of a public official, such as a
sheriff attaching property.
Case:

* German Management & Services, Inc. vs. Hon. Court of

Appeals G.R. No. 76216 and 76217 September 14, 1989.

Private respondents, claiming to be mountainside farmers

of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members
of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association, alleged
that petitioner deprived private respondents of their
property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly
removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing
their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice,
corn, fruit bearing trees and other crops of private
respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation,
in violation of P. D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and
threatening to harass, remove and eject private
respondents from their respective farmholdings in
violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028.
HELD:
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the
time petitioner entered the property, private
respondents were already in possession thereof.
There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were
ever in possession of the subject property. On
the contrary, private respondents' peaceable
possession was manifested by the fact that they
even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees
twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of
destroying their crops.
Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial
Court have rationalized petitioner's drastic action of
bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents
on the basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in
Article 429 of the New Civil Code. Such justification is
unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be
exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession
which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has
already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of property. This is clear from
Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(In) no case
may possession be acquired through force or intimidation
as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who
believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of
the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent
court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the things.
Acts in a state of necessity:

 Art. 432. The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit

the interference of another with the same, if the
interference is necessary to avert an imminent danger
and the threatened damage, compared to the damage
arising to the owner from the interference, is much
greater. The owner may demand from the person
benefited indemnity for the damage to him

 Imminent danger or threatening damage, compared to

the damage arising to the owner from the interference
MUST BE MUCH GREATER.
 Indemnity for Damages:

Indemnity for damages-owner may demand from the

person benefited indemnity for the damage to him.( this
right exists only when another’s property is damaged by
an act in a state of necessity).
Power of eminent domain, police power, and
taxation:

 Police power
`*CITY OF MANILA ET.AL VS. HON. LAGUIO ET.AL.
G.R. NO. 118127 APRIL 12,2005
EXTENT OF OWNERSHIP and REGALIAN
DOCTRINE ( Article 437 of the Civil Code)

Extent of Ownership:

 Extent of ownership:

 Horizontally, ownership extends up to the boundaries;

vertically, extends below the surface and above it to the

extent required by the economic interest or utility to the
owner, in relation to the exploitation that may be made of
the property. ( e.g. land traversed by power lines)
Regalian Doctrine:

 But mineral and power resources of the subsoil

pertain to the State pursuant to the Constitution (
regalian doctrine)
CASES:

 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. LUCMAN

IBRAHIM et.al. G.R. No. 168732, June 29, 2007

“Thus, the ownership of land extends to the

surface as well as to the subsoil under it. In
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, this
principle was applied to show that rights over
lands are indivisible and, consequently, require
a definitive and categorical classification, thus:
“The Court of Appeals justified this by saying
there is “no conflict of interest” between the
owners of the surface rights and the owners of
the sub-surface rights. This is rather strange
doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that
the owner of a piece of land has rights not only
to its surface but also to everything underneath
and the airspace above it up to a reasonable
height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is
classified as mineral underneath and
agricultural on the surface, subject to separate
claims of title. This is also difficult to
understand, especially in its practical
application.
 Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface
owner will be planting on the land while the mining
locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer
cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the
mining operations below and the miner cannot blast a
tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can
the farmer, and how high can the miner go without
encroaching on each others rights? Where is the dividing
line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?

 The Court feels that the rights over the land are
indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be
categorical; the land must be either completely mineral
or completely agricultural.
Republic Of The Philippines (Director Of Forest
Development) vs. Hon. Court Of Appeals
(Third Division) and Jose Y. De La Rosa G.R.
No. L-43938 April 15, 1988

 The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible
and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half
mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land
must be either completely mineral or completely
agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the
land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to
be so and became mineral — and completely mineral —
once the mining claims were perfected.
Airspace:

 Airspace:owner cannot complain of the reasonable

requirements of aerial navigation.

Restrictions:

 1. Servitudes or easements
 2. Special Laws
 3) Ordinances
 4) reasonable requirements of aerial navigation
 5) principles of human relations ( Article 19 of the
New Civil Code).
HIDDEN TREASURE

 Concept of Hidden Treasure:

✓ Consist of money, jewels, or precious objects [

movables only – Tolentino e.g. prehistoric tomb
excluded except the movables found therein], and 2)
they are hidden and unknown, such that their finding is
a real discovery.

 Owner unknown e.g. only if the thing has been

considered lost and the owner has already abandoned it.
Who are “strangers”:

 Anyone who has absolutely no right over the immovable

or the thing in which the treasure is found but
INCLUDES also lessee, usufructuary, or a paid laborer
working for the owner of the land [ provided he has not
been engaged precisely to look for hidden treasure]
Finder entitled to share:
 A finder is entitled to one-half (1/2) , provided:

 finding is by chance ( not purposely sought) see however: opinion of

Jurado where finding by chance may also include cases “by a stroke
of good fortune”. ( a finder ordered by the landowner to search is not
entitled)

 finder is not a co-owner of the property where it is found

 finder not a trespasser

 finder not an agent of the landowner

 finder not married under the absolute community or conjugal

partnership otherwise his share belongs to the community [Article
117 (4), Family Code: The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure
which the law awards to the finder or owner of the property where the
treasure is found formed part of conjugal partnership properties]
RIGHT OF ACCESSION

Accession:

• Not a mode of acquiring ownership

 Accession is the right of a property owner to everything which

is:

 a) produced thereby ( accession discreta)

 b) incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially

 natural accession ( accession natural)

 artificial accession ( accession artificial or accession industrial)
Classification of Accession:

✓ A. Discreta: natural, industrial, and civil fruits

✓ B. Continua: may refer to immovables or movables

- immovables: alluvion ( deposits), force of river ( avulsion),

change of river bed, formation of islands, and building, planting
and sowing.

- movables: conjunction or adjunction; specification; and,

commixtion
 BASIS OF ACCESSION:

 1. Accession discreta-based on principles of justice[ it is only

“just” that the owner of a thing should also own whatever
it produces, unless there is some special reason for a
contrary resolution]

 2. Accession continua-based on necessity and utility [ it being

practical that the owner of the principal thing should own
the new things instead of a co-ownership being established
, e.g. giving riparian the right to own accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters]
 Basicprinciples governing the doctrine of
accession:

 The owner of a thing belongs the extension or increase of such thing

 This extension of the right of ownership is realized, as a general rule,

under the juridical principle that the accessory follows the principal.

 This incorporation of the accessory with the principal, saving the

exceptions provided by law, is effected only when two things are so
united that they cannot be separated without injuring or destroying the
juridical nature of one of them.

 Unjust enrichment

 Person in bad faith is given more punitive liability (Art. 449)

CONCEPT OF “FRUITS” ( Article 441)

✓ Concept of Fruits:

All products of or income from a thing, in accordance with

its economic purpose, so long as they do not bring about
any essential alteration thereof.
Kinds of Fruits:

 1.natural fruits [ spontaneous products of the soil,

young, and other products of animals]

 2.industrial fruits [ produced by lands of any kind

through cultivation or labor];
 How about “cultivated trees”? Strictly speaking,
they are not fruits for they are really immovables as
long as they are attached to the land, and they may
produce fruits in themselves.

 But they may be considered as “fruits” when they are

expressly cultivated or exploited to carry on an industry (
Paras, citing Manresa).

 3.civil fruits [ rents of buildings, price of leases of lands,

other property and the amount of perpetual or life
annuities or other similar income]
 Exceptions to Rule [ that the owner owns the
fruits]:

✓ Possession in Good Faith by another [ fruits belong to

the possessor in good faith].

✓ Usufruct [ usufructuary gets the fruits]

✓ Lease [ lessee gets the fruits from the property directly,

although the owner receives civil fruits in the form of
rents paid by the lessess];
✓ Antichresis [creditor gets the fruits] [Art. 2132. By the
contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to
receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, with the
obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if
owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit. (1881)
]
RIGHT OF ACCESSION WITH RESPECT TO
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

Rule:

Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of

another and the improvements or repairs made
thereon, belong to the owner of the land.
Rights of Owner of Materials: ( Article 447)

 1. Owner of the materials used by another does not

become a part owner of the thing constructed with his
materials. He is only entitled to recover their value.

 2. According to Tolentino, the owner cannot return the

materials instead of paying their value.
When property is Alienated:

✓ When property is alienated and the improvements

thereon, action of owner of materials shall be against
owner of the land and not against the vendee.(
presumably because consideration for the sale already
includes value of improvements)
ARTICLE 448

 Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in
case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
✓ Reason for the provision:

 The reason for this article is to prevent the creation of a forced co-
ownership.
RULE: Owner of the land on which anything has
been built, planted, or sown in good faith has
OPTION:

to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper

indemnity
[Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the
thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in

good faith with the same right of retention, the person who
has defeated him in the possession having the option of
refunding the amount of the expenses]
or of paying the increase in value which the thing may
have acquired by reason thereof. (453a) ]
[Art. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall
not be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may
remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the
principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his
successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the
amount expended. (454) ]

b) to oblige builder or planter to pay for the land and

the sower the proper rent.
Who has the “OPTION”:

✓ It is the owner of the land which has the option:

principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of
the accessory thing.

✓ Only permanent constructions are contemplated.

Application of the Article:

✓ Good faith in building. Applies to a case where one

builds, plants, or sows on land in which he believes
himself to have a claim of title. It does not apply where
the only interest of the builder, planter, or sower is that
of a holder, such as a tenant.
CASE:

 OWNER OF THE LAND MUST EXERCISE THE

OPTION

✓ Sarmiento vs. Agana 129 SCRA 122

 ( Owner of land must exercise the option, he can only ask for
demolition of improvement, if, after having chosen to compel
builder or planter to buy land, the latter fails to pay).
 ( Article 448 does not apply to a case of a Lessee)

Balucanag vs. Judge Francisco G.R. No. L-34199,

May 30, 1983

 But even in the absence of said stipulation,

respondent Stohner cannot be considered a builder
in good faith. Article 448 of the Civil Code, relied
upon by respondent judge, applies only to a case
where one builds on land in the belief that he is the
owner thereof and it does not apply where one's
only interest in the land is that of a lessee under a
rental contract.
 Floreza vs. Evangelista, 96 SCRA 130 [G.R. No. L-
25462 February 21, 1980]

( Said codal provision applies only when the builder, planter,

or sower believes he had the right so to build, plant or sow
because he thinks he owns the land or believes himself to have a
claim of title.)
 PNB vs. DE JESUS G.R. No. 149295 September
23, 2003
✓ Equally significant is the fact that the building,
constructed on the land by Ignacio, has in actuality
been part of the property transferred to
petitioner. Article 448, of the Civil Code refers to a
piece of land whose ownership is claimed by two or
more parties, one of whom has built some works (or
sown or planted something) and not to a case where
the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or
planter who then later loses ownership of the land
by sale or otherwise for, elsewise stated, “where the
true owner himself is the builder of works on his
own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is
entirely irrelevant.”
PARILLA et.al. VS. PILAR G.R. No. 167680
November 30, 2006

✓ {Jurisprudence is replete with cases[21] which

categorically declare that Article 448 covers only cases in
which the builders, sowers or planters believe
themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, have a
claim of title thereto, but not when the interest is merely
that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or
usufructuary. A tenant cannot be said to be a builder in
good faith as he has no pretension to be owner.[22]
CASES WHERE REQUIREMENT THAT
IMPROVEMENT MUST BE BUILT BY ONE WHO
BELIEVES THAT HE IS OWNER BUT HE IS NOT
IS RELAXED:

Spouses Del Campo vs. Abesia 160 SCRA 379 [G.R.

No. L-49219 April 15, 1988.*]

 (However, when, as in this case, the co-ownership is

terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of
defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of
the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants
obviously built in good faith, THEN the provisions of Article
448 of the new Civil Code should apply.)
 ISMAEL
MACASAET et.al. vs. SPOUSES
MACASAET G.R. Nos. 154391-92 September 30, 2004

 “ThisCourt has ruled that this provision covers only cases

in which the builders, sowers or planters believe
themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a
claim of title thereto. It does not apply when the interest is
merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or
usufructuary. From these pronouncements, good faith is
identified by the belief that the land is owned; or that -- by
some title -- one has the right to build, plant, or sow
thereon.
 However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article
448 by recognizing good faith beyond this limited
definition. Thus, in Del Campo v. Abesia,[68] this provision
was applied to one whose house -- despite having been built
at the time he was still co-owner -- overlapped with the land
of another.[69] This article was also applied to cases wherein a
builder had constructed improvements with the consent of the
owner. The Court ruled that the law deemed the builder to be
in good faith.[70] In Sarmiento v. Agana,[71] the builders were
found to be in good faith despite their reliance on the consent
of another, whom they had mistakenly believed to be the
owner of the land.[72]
 Based on the aforecited special cases, Article 448 applies
to the present factual milieu. The established facts of this
case show that respondents fully consented to the
improvements introduced by petitioners. In fact,
because the children occupied the lots upon their
invitation, the parents certainly knew and approved of
the construction of the improvements introduced
thereon. Thus, petitioners may be deemed to have been
in good faith when they built the structures on those lots.
GOOD FAITH BUILDER; SUBDIVISION LOT BUYER

In fine, the Court applied Article 448 by construing good faith beyond its limited
definition. We find no reason not to apply the Court’s ruling in Spouses Macasaet v.
Spouses Macasaet in this case. We thus hold that Article 448 is also applicable to the
instant case. First, good faith is presumed on the part of the respondent-spouses.
Second, petitioner failed to rebut this presumption. Third, no evidence was presented to
show that petitioner opposed or objected to the improvements introduced by the
respondent-spouses. Consequently, we can validly presume that petitioner consented to
the improvements being constructed. This presumption is bolstered by the fact that as
the subdivision developer, petitioner must have given the respondent-spouses permits to
commence and undertake the construction. Under Article 453 of the Civil Code, “[i]t is
understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was
done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.”

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 176791, November 14, 2012 ]

COMMUNITIES CAGAYAN, INC., PETITIONER,

VS.

SPOUSES ARSENIO (DECEASED) AND ANGELES NANOL AND ANYBODY

CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, RESPONDENTS.
As for Sps. Sarili, they knew – or at the very least, should have known – from the ver

[ G.R. No. 193517, January 15, 2014 ]

THE HEIRS OF VICTORINO SARILI, NAMELY: ISABEL A. SARILI,* MELENCIA** S

VS.

PEDRO F. LAGROSA, REPRESENTED IN THIS ACT BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT

 Manotok Realty vs. Tecson 164 SCRA 587- Since
the improvements have been gutted by fire, and
therefore, the basis for private respondent's right
to retain the premises has already been
extinguished without the fault of the petitioner,
there is no other recourse for the private
respondent but to vacate the premises and deliver
the same to herein petitioner.
✓ Filipinas Colleges Inc. vs. Timbang G.R. No L-12812
September 29, 1959 (Upon failure of builder to pay the value
of land, the landowner DOES NOT necessarily become
AUTOMATICALLY THE OWNER OF IMPROVEMENTS
under Article 445.)

There is nothing in the language of these two article, 448

and 546, which would justify the conclusion of appellants
that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of the
land, when such is demanded by the land-owner, the
latter becomes automatically the owner of the
improvement under Article 445.
Remedies of the parties are:

✓ 1….. and then they decide to leave things as they are and
assume the relation of lessor and lessee, and should they
disagree as to the amount of rental then they can go to the
court to fix that amount.

✓ 2. Court approved the sale of the land and the

improvement in a public auction applying the proceeds
thereof first to the payment of the value of the land and
the excess, if any, to be delivered to the owner of the
house in payment thereof.
Alternatives granted to OWNER OF LAND when
Builder etc. in Bad Faith:

✓ 1. Appropriate what has been built, planted, or sown in

bad faith, without any obligation to INDEMNIFY.

✓ 2. Ask the builder, planter, or sower to remove what he

has built, planted, or sown.

✓ 3. Compel builder or planter to pay the value of the land

or the sower the proper rent.
From these cases, it follows that the CA incorrectly pegged the reimbursable
amount at the old market value of the subject property – P40 per square meter
– as reflected in the Deed of Absolute Sale between the parties. On the other
hand, the RTC properly considered in its 2 December 2004 Order the value of
the lot at P1,800 per square meter, the current fair price as determined in the
Amended Sheriff’s Bill. Thus, we reverse the ruling of the CA and reinstate the 2
December 2004 Order of the RTC directing OLFI to reimburse petitioner at
P1,800 per square meter.

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 182378, March 06, 2013 ]

MERCY VDA. DE ROXAS, REPRESENTED BY ARLENE C. ROXAS-CRUZ, IN

HER CAPACITY AS SUBSTITUTE APPELLANT-PETITIONER, PETITIONER,

VS.

OUR LADY’S FOUNDATION, INC., RESPONDENT.

Liabilities of builder in bad faith:

 He loses what is built, planted, or sown without right

to indemnity except for necessary expenses

 He may be required to remove or demolish the work,

in order to replace things in their former condition

 He may be compelled to pay the price of the land

 He is liable for damages.

A builder, planter, or sower in bad faith is entitled to
reimbursement for the necessary expenses of
preservation of land.
 What are “necessary expenses”?

✓ Necessary expenses are those made for the preservation

of the property or thing upon which they have been
expended e.g. dike to preserve from destruction caused
by blood.

✓ Conversely, that those that merely “augment” the thing

like expenses for the leveling of the land are not
necessary expenses.
 Owner of land and builder, etc. both in bad faith

 Rights shall be determined as if both acted in good

faith
 Bad faith of one neutralizes the other

 When does builder become in bad faith?

 Ifhe knows that the land does not belong to him, and
that he has no right, permission, or authority to do so

 When does a landowner become in bad faith?

 Theact is done with his knowledge and without
opposition on his part.
RIPARIAN OWNER:

Rule:

✓ Owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers

[RIPARIAN OWNER] belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.( alluvion) [accession discreta].

✓ What is accretion?

Increment which lands abutting rivers gradually receive as

a result of the current of the waters

Gradual and imperceptible addition to the banks of rivers

 Reason:

✓ Owners adjoining banks of rivers are exposed to floods

and other damages due to the destructive force of the
waters and if by virtue of law, they are subject to
encumbrances, it is only just that such risks and dangers
should in some way be compensated.
Requisites for “Alluvion”:

• the deposit be gradual and imperceptible

• it be made through the effects of the current of the

water ( deposits by human intervention not included)
and

• the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the

banks of rivers.
 the deposit be gradual and imperceptible
 A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is not the
alluvial process contemplated under Article 457. It is the slow
and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the
law grants to the riparian owner ( Binalay vs. Manalo 195
SCRA 374)

 movement of dikes, not an accretion formed by natural

process.. [REP. OF THE PHIL VS. CA, ET AL G.R. NO. 61647
OCTOBER 12, 1984]

 The fact that the fish traps set up in the creek might have
slowed down its current, and might have been brought about
or caused accretion, will not affect his ownership, in the
absence of evidence, to show that the setting up or erection of
fish traps was expressly intended to cause or bring about
acrretion ( Zapata vs. Director of Lands, 6 SCRA 335)
 it be made through the effects of the current of
the water ( deposits by human intervention not
included)
 Alluvionmust be the exclusive work of nature and
not made artificially by the riparian owner

 Deposits consisting of boulders, soil, sawdust, and

other filling materials, caused by human intervention
are excluded from Article 457 and, as such would
still be part of public domain .

 The riparian owner does not acquire the additions to

his land caused by special works expressly intended
or designed to bring about accretion ( Republic vs.
Court of Appeals 132 SCRA 514)
 the land where accretion takes place is adjacent
to the banks of rivers.

 Ignacio vs. Director of Lands and Valeriano [L-12958

May 30, 1960 May 30, 1960]
( Riparian accretion should be distinguished
from the accretion due to sea water. In the
latter case, the accretion is a public land)

• Accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay, have

been held to belong to the owners of the lands to which
they are added (legal basis: Spanish Law of Waters)
 De
Buyser vs. Director of lands, et al. [G.R. No. L-22763
March 18, 1983] March 18, 1983

 ( Land formed by accretion from the sea is part of the public domain.
It cannot be acquired by adverse possession. It is outside the
commerce of man unless otherwise declared by the executive and
legislative branch of the government.)
 The law does not require an express act of
appropriation or possession to acquire ownership of
the alluvial accumulation. HOWEVER, it is not
automatically registered.

✓ Grande, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. [G.R. No. L-

17652 June 30, 1962] June 30, 1962

 [An accretion to land covered by Torrens title does not automatically

become registered land. It must be registered. If not registered, it is
subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.]

 Alluvial deposit acquired by a riparian owner of registered lands

by accretion may be subjected to acquisition through prescription
by a third person, by the failure of such owner to register said
accretion ( Reynante vs. Court of Appeals 207 SCRA 794)
AVULSION: ( Article 459)

 Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or

torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known
portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the
owner of the land to which the segregated portion
belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he
removes the same within two years.
✓ Known as delayed accession
✓ Distinction between Alluvion and Avulsion

Alluvion Avulsion
Deposit of soil is gradual It is sudden or abrupt

Deposit of soil belongs to the Owner of property from which a

owner of property where the part was detached retains the
same was deposited ownership thereof

The soil cannot be identified Detached portion can be identified

 Requisites of avulsion

Segregation and transfer must be caused by the current

of a river, creek, or torrent

The segregation and transfer must be sudden or abrupt

Portion of land transported must be known and

identifiable
 Segregation and transfer must be caused by the
current of a river, creek, or torrent

 Current- continuous movement of a body of water,

often horizontal, in a certain direction
 River- a natural surface stream of water of
considerable volume and permanent or seasonal flow
emptying into an ocean, lake or body of water
 Creek- is a small islet extending further into the land;
natural stream of water normally smaller than and
often tributary to a river
 Torrent- is a violent stream of water as a flooded
river or one suddenly raised by a heavy rain and
descending a steep incline; a raging flood or rushing
stream of water
 The segregation and transfer must be sudden or
abrupt

 In the absence of evidence as to whether the change in

the course of a river was caused by accretion and
erosion (alluvion) or whether it had occurred through
avulsion, the presumption is that the change was
gradual and was caused by alluvion ( Payatas Estate
Improvement Co. vs. Tuason 53 Phil. 55 [1929])
 Transfer by Other Forces:

✓ A known portion of land may be transferred from one

tenement to another by other forces of nature than the
current of a river, e.g. land from a mountain slope rolls
down to another tenement. Present article may be
applied by analogy.

✓ Present article may be applied by analogy ( Tolentino)

CHANGE OF RIVER BED:
Rule:

✓ River beds which are abandoned thru natural change in

the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners
whose lands are occupied by the new course in
proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the
lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to
acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which
value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by
the new bed.
 Provision of the Water Code of the Philippines [ PD
1067]:

 Art. 58. – When a river or stream suddenly changes its course to

traverse private lands, the owner of the affected lands may not compel
the government to restore the river to its former bed; nor can they
restrain the government from taking steps to revert the river or stream
to its former course. The owner of the lands thus affected are not
entitled to compensation for any damage sustained thereby. However,
the former owners of the new bed shall be the owners of the
abandoned bed in proportion to the area lost by each.

 The owners of the affected lands may undertake to return the river or
stream to its old bed at their own expense; Provided, that a permit
therefore is secured from the Secretary of Public Works [ Transportaion
and Communication] and works commenced within two years from the
change in the course of the river or stream.,
DIONESIA P. BAGAIPO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116290, December 8, 2000.

✓ “The decrease in petitioner’s land area and the

corresponding expansion of respondent’s property were
the combined effect of erosion and accretion
respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil Code is
inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claim ownership over the
old abandoned riverbed because the same is
inexistent. The riverbed’s former location cannot even be
pinpointed with particularity since the movement of the
Davao River took place gradually over an unspecified
period of time, up to the present.

✓ In the absence of evidence that the change in the course

of the river was sudden or that it occurred through
avulsion, the presumption is that the change was gradual
and was caused by alluvium and erosion.”
 When is riverbed deemed abandoned?

Are beds of river considered abandoned ipso facto

whenever there is a change in the course of the water?
Or, is it still necessary that there be abandonment of the
bed on the part of the government?

✓ Panlilio vs. Mercado 44 Phil. 695 [1923] : “ while the

abandonment of the bed may be the consequence of the river
changing its course, it is not necessarily the action of the river
itself which is the only and final determining factor in such
abandonment”.

✓ Dean Capistrano: “ipso facto” makes its clear that the rule applies
by the mere fact of the occurrence of a natural change in the
course of the water.
 Art. 462. Whenever a river, changing its course by natural
causes, opens a new bed through a private estate, this bed
shall become of public dominion. (372a)

 Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into

branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated,
the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also
retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate
by the current. (374)
 Does not refer to the formation of islands through accretion treated
in Arts. 464 and 465 BUT TO THE FORMATION OF AN ISLAND
CAUSED BY A RIVER RESULTING
✓ The isolation (without being physically transferred to another place) of
a piece of land or part thereof; or
✓ The separation (or physical transfer) of a portion of land from an estate
by the current.
 Art. 464. Islands which may be formed on the
seas within the jurisdiction of the Philippines,
on lakes, and on navigable or floatable rivers
belong to the State.

Belong to the sate if formed:

 On the seas within the jurisdiction of the Philippines
 On lakes
 On navigable or floatable rivers
 If formed in non-navigable and non-floatable rivers:

It belongs to the nearest riparian owner or owner of the the

margin or bank nearest to it as he is considered in the best
position to cultivate and develop the island.

The island is divided longtitudinally in halves, if it is in the

middle of the river.

 Concept of navigable river

One which forms in its ordinary condition by itself or by

uniting with other waters a continuous highway over which
commerce is or may be carried on.
THREE TYPES OF ACCESSION WITH RESPECT
TO MOVABLE PROPERTY:

✓ Adjunction

✓ Mixture ( commixtion or confusion)

✓ Specification
 ADJUNCTION

✓ Union of two movable things belonging to different

owners in such a way that they form a single object,
but each one of the component things preserves its
value.

✓ Characteristics:

Two movables belonging to different owners

United in such a way that they form a single object
They are inseparable that their separation would impair
their nature or result in substantial injury to either
component.
 Kinds of adjunction:

✓ Inclusion or engraftment e.g. diamond is set on a

gold ring
✓ Soldadura or soldering e.g. lead united or fused to an
object made of lead
✓ Escritura or writing e.g. a person writes on paper
belonging to another
✓ Pintura or painting e.g. a person paints on canvas
belonging to another;or
✓ Tejido or weaving, e.g. such as when threads
belonging to different owners are used in making
textile.
Art. 467. The principal thing, as between two things
incorporated, is deemed to be that to which the
other has been united as an ornament, or for its use
or perfection. (376)

✓ Criteria to Determine Principal:

Order of Preference in determining which is the principal

and which is the accessory:
✓ 1. That of the importance or purpose of the things as stated in this
article
✓ 2) That of their value
✓ 3) That of their volume.
 Rules:

✓ 1. Owner of accessory thing in bad faith, he shall lose the

thing incorporated.

 -he shall have obligation to indemnify owner of principal

thing.

✓ 2. Owner of the principal is the one in bad faith, owner of

accessory may choose:

 1) compelling principal to pay the value of accessory thing

 2) thing belonging to him be separated, even if it be necessary

to destroy the principal thing. Damages are available in both
cases.
ADJUNCTION MIXTURE SPECIFICATION

• Involves at least two (2) • involves at least two (2) • may involve only one things
things. things. ( MAY BE MORE) but
form is changed.
2.As a rule, accessory follows 2. As a rule, co-ownership
the principal results 2. As a rule, accessory follows
the principal
3. the things joined retain 3. the things mixed or
their nature confused may either 3. the new object retains or
retain or lose their preserves the nature of the
respective nature original object
QUIETING OF TITLE ( N)

 Quieting of Title- purpose: the quieting of title or removal

of a cloud therefrom when there is an apparently valid or
effective instrument or other claim which in reality is
void, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable.

 Originated from equity jurisprudence reasons: 1)

prevention of litigation 2) protection of the true title and
possession 3) real interest of both parties, and that of right
and justice, which require that the precise state of the title
be known.
 Difference between “an action to quiet title” from a
suit “ to remove cloud”

 To quiet title-an action for the purpose of putting an

end to vexatious litigation in respect to the
property involved.

 To remove cloud-to procure cancellation, delivery of,

release of an instrument, encumbrance, or claim
constituting a claim on plaintiff’s title
Application:

✓ 1. Applies only in the case of real property.

✓ 2. The matter complained of must have prima facie

appearance of validity, therefore, when invalid or
inefficacious on its face, an action to remove cloud on
title does not exist.

Examples: title procured by fraud, deceit, forged

instrument, taxes levied on exempt property etc.
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD TO FILE AN ACTION TO
QUIET TITLE:

✓ Prescription of the right to quiet title:

Plaintiff is in possession, the ACTION DOES NOT

prescribe.

Plaintiff is NOT in possession, the ACTION MAY

PRESCRIBE.
Gallar vs. Husain G.R.No. L-20954 May 29, 1967

 By the delivery of possession of the land on April 2, 1919 the sale

was consummated and title was transferred to the appellee.
Indeed, this action is not for specific performance; all it seeks is to
quiet title, 6 to remove the cloud cast on appellee's ownership as
a result of appellant's refusal to recognize the sale made by the
predecessor. And, as plaintiff-appellee is in possession of the
land, the action is imprescriptible. 7 Appellant's argument that
the action has prescribed would be correct if they were in
possession as the action to quiet title would then be an action for
recovery of real property which must be brought within the
statutory period of limitation governing such actions
Caragay-Layno vs. Hon. Court of Appeals G.R. No.
52064 December 26, 1984

 Prescription cannot be invoked against JULIANA for the

reason that as lawful possessor and owner of the Disputed
Portion, her cause of action for reconveyance which, in effect,
seeks to quiet title to the property, falls within settled
Jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to property in one's
possession is imprescriptible. Her undisturbed possession
over a period of fifty-two (52) years gave her a continuing
right to seek the aid of a Court of equity to determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the effect on
her own title.
THIS IS NOT A REMEDY TO SETTLE A
“BOUNDARY DISPUTE”, as held in the case of
ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET AL.,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO
AVILES, G.R. No. 95748. November 21, 1996
“We agree with respondent Court. The facts
presented unmistakably constitute a clear case of
boundary dispute, which is not cognizable in a
special civil action to quiet title.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the
removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty
with respect to title to real property.
CO-OWNERSHIP:
Concept:

 1. Right of common dominion which two or more persons have

in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided
[ Sanchez Roman]

 2. Manifestation of the private right of ownership, which instead

of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the
things subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the
undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the same [
Manresa]

 3. Co-ownership is not a real right distinct from ownership, but

is a mere form or manifestation of ownership [ De Diego].
Characteristics:

✓ 1. plurality of subjects
✓ 2. unity of object ( material indivision) and recognition of
the ideal or intellectual shares of co-owners.

✓ relationship of co-owner to his other co-owners is

fiduciary in character.
Causes that give rise to co-ownership:

1. Law- e.g. commixtion, Art. 147 of the Family

Code
2. Contract
3. Succession- e.g. property left by a decedent to
several heirs
4. Fortuitous event- commixtion
5. Occupancy- catch a wild beast or hidden treasure
Meaning of “purpose for which it is intended”:

✓ What is meant by “purpose for which it is intended”?

Agreement of the parties should govern. If there is none,
that use for which it is ordinarily adapted according to
its nature ( e.g. house only for living and not to be used as a
factory) or use to which is has been previously devoted.
 Limitation on the right of a co-owner to use thing
owned in common:

✓ Use only:
 1. purpose for which it is intended
 2. without prejudice to the interests of the co-ownership
and
 3. without preventing others from making use thereof
according to their own rights.
 Principles:

✓ 1. Mere tolerance on the part of the co-owners cannot

legalize the change in the use of a thing from that
intended by the parties.

✓ 2. No prejudice to co-ownership-co-owners agreed to

lease, co-owner cannot use without paying rent.
 De Guia vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 120864. October
8, 2003

 “ The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a

similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot
devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice
of the co-ownership. Hence, if the subject is a residential
house, all the co-owners may live there with their respective
families to the extent possible. However, if one co-owner
alone occupies the entire house without opposition from
the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the
other co-owners cannot demand the payment of
rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the
house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-
owner who dwells in the house.”
PARDELL vs. BARTOLOME 23 Phil. 450

 The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her

husband the upper floor of the said house, did not injure
the interests of her co-öwner, her sister Vicenta, nor did
she prevent the latter from living therein, but merely
exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as a coöwner
of the property.
 Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-
ownership rights which entitled the defendants to live in
the upper story of the said house, yet, in view of the fact
that the record shows it to have been proved that the
defendant Matilde's husband, Gaspar de Bartolome,
occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower floor
of the same house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for
the justice of the peace, a position which he held in the
capital of that province, strict justice requires that he pay
his sister in-law, the plaintiff, one-half of the monthly rent
which the said quarters could have produced, had they
been leased to another person.
Share in benefits and charges:

✓ Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as

well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their
respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the
contrary shall be void.

✓ The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-

ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary
is proved.
Right over the entire property:

Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in

common, provided he does so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as
not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or
prevent the other co-owners from using it according to
their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be
changed by agreement, express or implied.

The dual nature of ownership in co-ownership:

- Ownership over the ideal share

- Joint ownership over the whole
-co-owner cannot claim a definite portion

 Note, however, that if transferees of an undivided

portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property
to occupy a definite portion thereof, such undisturbed
possession had the effect of a partial partition of the co-
owned property ( Vda. De Cabrera vs. Court of
Appeals 267 SCRA 339)
Action in ejectment:

Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an

action in ejectment. (n)

 ejectment-all actions to recover (forcible entry and

unlawful detainer), including quieting of title

 action must be instituted for all

Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, “[a]ny one of the
co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.” This
article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and
unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of
possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of
ownership (accion de reivindicacion). The summary
actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer seek the
recovery of physical possession only. These actions are
brought before municipal trial courts within one year
from dispossession (De Guia vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120864. October 8, 2003)
ADLAWAN vs. ADLAWAN G.R. No. 161916 January 20, 2006

 In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit
for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the
exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of
self- adjudication over the disputed property. It is clear therefore that
petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that
he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from
his theory of succession to the property of his father, Dominador.

 In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioner’s claim that he has the
legal personality to file the present unlawful detainer suit because the
ejectment of respondents would benefit not only him but also his
alleged co-owners. However, petitioner forgets that he filed the
instant case to acquire possession of the property and to recover
damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession of the lot and
benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of
the heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully
capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners. Incidentally, it
should be pointed out that in default of the said heirs of Graciana,
whom petitioner labeled as “fictitious heirs,” the State will inherit her
share[31] and will thus be petitioner’s co-owner entitled to possession
and enjoyment of the property.
RESUENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 128338
March 28, 2005

 Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides simply that

“[a]ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment,” is a categorical and an unqualified authority in
favor of respondent to evict petitioners from the portions of
Lot. No. 2587.
 This provision is a departure from Palarca v. Baguisi,[14]
which held that an action for ejectment must be brought by
all the co-owners. Thus, a co-owner may bring an action to
exercise and protect the rights of all. When the action is
brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable
decision will benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot
prejudice their rights.[15]
 Respondent’s action for ejectment against petitioners is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the
property[16] since petitioners were not able to prove that
they are authorized to occupy the same.
ARCELONA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.
102900 October 2, 1997
 Contrariwise, it is logical that a tenant, in an action to
establish his status as such, must implead all the pro-
indiviso co-owners; in failing to do so, there can be no
final determination of the action. In other words, a
tenant who fails to implead all the co-owners cannot
establish with finality his tenancy over the entire co-
owned land.

 Co-owners in an action for the security of tenure of a

tenant are encompassed within the definition of
indispensable parties; thus, all of them must be
impleaded.
Can an ejectment case be filed by one co-owner
against another co-owner?
Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487
not only against a third person, but also against
another co-owner who takes exclusive possession
and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In
the latter case, however, the only purpose of the
action is to obtain recognition of the co-
ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of
the defendant from the property because as co-
owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff
cannot recover any material or determinate part of
the property.
RULES ON WHO DECIDES ON THE
FOLLOWING:

 Acts of Preservation

 Acts of Administration

 Acts of Alteration
Acts of Preservation or Acts of Administration Acts of Alteration,
Necessary Repairs or encumbrance, or
Management alienation

•Any co-owner may •This is to be decided •Unanimous consent of

decide on an act of by the majority of the all the co-owners is
preservation ( Article co-owners ( Article 489 needed
489) and 492) •Run to the courts for
•If practicable, first •By majority is meant appropriate relief, if
notify his co-owner of the controlling interest withholding of consent
the necessity of repairs (financial majority) not of one or some of the co-
numerical majority. owners is clearly
•Appointment of an prejudicial to the
administrator if there is common interest (
no majority. Article 491)
Indeed, the respected commentaries suggest the conclusion that, insofar as the sale of
co-owned properties is concerned, there is no common interest that may be prejudiced
should one or more of the co-owners refuse to sell the co-owned property, which is exa

Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ow
exists.

Essentially, a partition proceeding accords all parties the opportunity to be heard, the
denial of which was raised as a defense by respondents for opposing the sale of the
subject properties. ( ARAMBULO vs. NOLASCO, et.al.G.R. No. 189420. March 26, 2014)
…Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this
obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided
interest as may be equivalent to his share of the
expenses and taxes.

E.g.

A,B, and C owners of property worth 3M.

1M respective interest.
Expenses worth 500,000.

A, B, or C may renounce up to 500,000. (Note: he

cannot be required to renounce, option is upon
him.
Old rule: co-owner may renounce his whole interest, and
pertains to exemption in being required to contribute to
future expenses.

Criticism to the new rule: i.e. renunciation of a portion of

interest in co-ownership. (Tolentino)

a. This is dacion en pago etc.

b. Since this renunciation pertains to a debt already incurred, consent
of the other co-owners is required such as on the following
matters: valuation of the share
a. Effect on creditors (third party)- Can the co-owner exempt himself
to pay his share of the expenses to the creditor simply by
renouncing an equivalent portion of his share in the co-ownership?
No, because this constitutes novation by change of debtor and
requires consent of creditor.
ACTS OF ALTERATION:

- Act by virtue of which a co-owner, in opposition to

the express agreement, if there is any, or, in default
thereof, to the tacit agreement of all the co-owners,
and violating their will, changes the thing from that
state in which the others believe it should remain or
withdraws it from the use to which they wish it to be
intended.
- Affects the substance of the thing
- Consent to (alteration) may be given expressly or
tacitly
- If alteration is unauthorized, act is illegal,..erring co-
owner may be compelled to undo what has been
done.
- - Erring co-owner shall likewise be liable for losses or
damages
LEASE OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY:

 1. When lease is recorded with the Registry of Property

[Art. 1648. Every lease of real estate may be recorded in
the Registry of Property. Unless a lease is recorded, it
shall not be binding upon third persons. (1549a) ], it is
not a mere act of administration.

 2. Note also [ Article 1878 (8) To lease any real property

to another person for more than one year.] lease of
immovable property- mere majority cannot lease real
property for more than one year.
Some examples of “acts of alteration”:

✓ 1. Sale, donation, or mortgage of the entire property

✓ 2. Sale, donation or mortgage of a part of the property

but with definite boundaries

✓ 3. A voluntary easement

✓ 4. Lease of real property

✓ 5. Construction of a house on a lot owned in common

✓ 6. Contracts of long duration

 EFFECT OF AN ILLEGAL ALTERATION:

 1) Co-Owner will lose what he has spent

 2) Demolition can be compelled
 3) Liability for loss and damages
 4) Whatever benefits belong to the co-ownership
ALTERATION OF PROPERTY UNDER CO-
OWNERSHIP:

CRUZ vs. CATAPANG G.R. No. 164110 February 12,

2008

 Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the

consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in
common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners
can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly
consent to the making of an alteration by another person,
such as respondent, in the thing owned in common.
Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership
and any encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly
to be an act of alteration. The construction of a house on the
co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an
alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There
being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no
right to construct her house on the co-owned property.
Act of Administration:

 refers to the enjoyment of the thing and are of a

transitory character

 improvement or embellishment of the thing owned in

common for the purpose of better enjoyment
Extent of co-owner’s right:

Right over the ideal share:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full

ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be
alloted to him in the division upon the termination
of the co-ownership.
Effect of sale by one co-owner:

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a

co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a
sale of the entire property by one co-owner without
the consent of the other co-owners is not null and
void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-
seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a
co-owner of the property." ( Paulmitan vs. Court of
Appeals G. R. No. 61584 November 25, 1992)
Right of legal redemption:

 Art. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be

subrogated, upon the same terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who
acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or
by any other transaction whereby ownership is
transmitted by onerous title. (1521a)
 Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the
right of redemption in case the shares of all the other
co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third
person. If the price of the alienation is grossly
excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a
reasonable one.
 Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the
right of redemption, they may only do so in
proportion to the share they may respectively have in
the thing owned in common.
✓ Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption
shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the
notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the
vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be
recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has
given written notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners.

✓ The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of

adjoining owners
Termination of Co-Ownership:

 Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in

the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned.
 Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing
undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding
ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended
by a new agreement.
 A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a
period which shall not exceed twenty years.
 Neither shall there be any partition when it is
prohibited by law.
 No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or
co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Other causes (giving rise to termination of co-
ownership):

 Merger

 prescription in favor of 3rd person or to a co-owner

 destructionof the thing or loss of the right which is

owned in common

 partition
Example of Termination of co-ownership:
AGUILAR vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.
76351 October 29, 1993
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of
the property and the trial court granted the petition
and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-
ownership was deemed terminated and the right to
enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter,
the continued stay of respondent and his family
in the house prejudiced the interest of petitioner
as the property should have been sold and the
proceeds divided equally between them. To this
extent and from then on, respondent should be
held liable for monthly rentals until he and his
family vacate.
 Prescription (as a mode of terminating co-ownership)

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir

against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. ( Article 494).
 "No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the in view of their lack of a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership, duly communicated to the
petitioners (the other co-owners), private respondents cannot
acquire the shares of the petitioners by, prescription. The
record in the Office of the Assessor is not the sufficient
repudiation and communication contemplated by the
law. Neither may the Private respondents' possession of the
premises militate against Petitioners' claim. After all, co-
owners are entitled to be in possession of the premises.The
existence of the co-ownership here argues against the
theory of implied trust, for then a co-owner possesses
co-owned property not in behalf of the other co-owners
but in his own behalf. (Mariano vs. De Vega G.R. No. L-
59974 March 9, 1987 )
Cases:

 While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be
compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by
one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not
vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-
owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property
and consolidate title thereto in his name. But the provision does not
give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It
does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership ( Adille
vs. Hon. Court of Appeals et.al. G.R. No. 44546 29 January
1988)
 2. The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did
not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to
the entire land subject of the co-ownership…..
Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it
entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and
consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art.
1607). But the provision does not give to the
redeeming co-owner the right to the entire
property. It does not provide for a mode of
terminating a co-ownership."[ Paulmitan vs. Court
of Appeals G.R. No. 61584 November 25, 1992.]

Prescription…

DELIMA vs. COURT OF APPEALS September 14,

1991..

 In other words, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-
owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership (Del Blanco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 72694,
December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 55).

 However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the
absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others
any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition
but of ownership (De Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23; Bargayo v.
Camumot, supra; De los Santos v. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil. 811). In such
case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be
invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed
the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest
ownership by prescription.
Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the
legal heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo
Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit
executed by Galileo Delima and that on February 4,
1954, Galileo Delima obtained the issuance of a new
title in Ms name numbered TCT No. 3009 to the
exclusion of his co-heirs. The issuance of this new title
constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust
or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of
adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February
4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by
prescription
A case where prescription is not counted from issuance of the title:

MARITEGUI vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 57062 January 24,

1992:

 It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive

notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens
title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to
say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation,
assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule
that registration operates as a universal notice of title."

 Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in

fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed to have
commenced from the time private respondents discovered the
petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners
because private respondents commenced the instant action barely
two months after learning that petitioners had registered in their
names the lots involved.
PARTITION ( as mode to terminate a co-ownershihp)
RULE 69 ( Rules of Court, as amended by 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure)
 SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.—A
person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may
do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the
nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the
real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all other persons interested in the property. (1a)

 SEC. 2. Order for partition, and partition, by agreement thereunder.—

If after the trial the court finds that the plaintiff has the right
thereto, it shall order the partition of the real estate among all the
parties in interest. Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to
agree, make the partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the
partition so agreed upon by all the parties, and such partition,
together with the order of the court confirming the same, shall be
recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the
property is situated. (2a)
 A final order decreeing partition and accounting may be
appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. (n)
Restriction on right to ask for partition:
1. Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing
undivided for a certain period of time, not
exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may
be extended by a new agreement. ( 2nd par., Art.
494)
2. A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a
period which shall not exceed twenty years. (3rd
par., Art. 494)
3. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and
the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to
one of them who shall indemnify the others, it
shall be sold and its proceeds distributed (Art.
498.)
Parol (Oral) Partition:

[P]artition may be inferred from circumstances

sufficiently strong to support the presumption.
Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of
partition may be presumed.
xxx xxx xxx
A parol partition may also be sustained on the
ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in
and ratified the partition by taking possession in
severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect
thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of
the partition . ( QUIMPO SR. vs. ABAD G.R. No.
No. 160956 February 13, 2008)
Effects of Partition:
1. Co-ownership is terminated

2. The partition of a thing owned in common shall not

prejudice third persons, who shall retain the rights of
mortgage, servitude or any other real rights belonging
to them before the division was made. (Art. 499) (see:
Art. 618. Easements are indivisible. If the servient estate is divided
between two or more persons, the easement is not modified, and each of
them must bear it on the part which corresponds to him. )
3. Mutual Accounting (Art. 1087. In the partition the co-heirs
shall reimburse one another for the income and fruits which each
one of them may have received from any property of the estate, for
any useful and necessary expenses made upon such property, and
for any damage thereto through malice or neglect)
4. Liability for Defects of title
Condominium Law ( Republic Act No. 4726)

 Sec. 2. A condominium is an interest in real property

consisting of separate interest in a unit in a
residential, industrial or commercial building and an
undivided interest in common, directly or indirectly,
in the land on which it is located and in other
common areas of the building. A condominium may
include, in addition, a separate interest in other
portions of such real property.
 Sec. 4. The provisions of this Act shall apply to
property divided or to be divided into
condominiums only if there shall be recorded in
the Register of Deeds of the province or city in
which the property lies and duly annotated in
the corresponding certificate of title of the land,
if the latter had been patented or registered
under either the Land Registration or Cadastral
Acts, an enabling or master deed
 Sec. 5. Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an
apartment, office or store or other space therein, shall
include the transfer or conveyance of the undivided
interests in the common areas or, in a proper case, the
membership or shareholdings in the condominium
corporation
PARTITION OF CONDOMINIUM:

 Sec. 8. Where several persons own condominiums in a

condominium project, an action may be brought by
one or more such persons for partition thereof by sale
of the entire project, as if the owners of all of the
condominiums in such project were co-owners of the
entire project in the same proportion as their interests
in the common areas:
Partition shall be made upon showing that:
 That three years after damage or destruction to the project
which renders material part thereof unit for its use prior
thereto, the project has not been rebuilt or repaired

 That damage or destruction to the project has rendered one-

half or more of the units therein untenantable and that
condominium owners holding in aggregate more than
thirty percent interest in the common areas are opposed to
repair or restoration of the project

 That the project has been in existence in excess of fifty

years, that it is obsolete and uneconomic, and that
condominium owners holding in aggregate more than fifty
percent interest in the common areas are opposed to repair
or restoration or remodeling or modernizing of the project
 Thatthe project or a material part thereof has been
condemned or expropriated and that the project is no
longer viable, or that the condominium owners
holding in aggregate more than seventy percent
interest in the common areas are opposed to
continuation of the condominium regime

 That the conditions for such partition by sale set forth

in the declaration of restrictions, duly registered in
accordance with the terms of this Act, have been met.
DECLARATION OF RESTRICTIONS:

 The owner of a project shall, prior to the conveyance

of any condominium therein, register a declaration of
restrictions relating to such project, which restrictions
shall constitute a lien upon each condominium in the
project.

 TheRegister of Deeds shall enter and annotate the

declaration of restrictions upon the certificate of title
covering the land included within the project, if the
land is patented or registered under the Land
Registration or Cadastral Acts.
CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION:

 Whenever the common areas in a condominium

project are held by a condominium corporation, such
corporation shall constitute the management body of
the project. The corporate purposes of such a
corporation shall be limited to the holding of the
common areas, either in ownership or any other
interest in real property recognized by law, to the
management of the project, and to such other
purposes as may be necessary, incidental or
convenient to the accomplishment of said purposes
POSSESSION:
Concept of Possession

 To possess means to have, to actually and physically

occupy a thing, with or without a right. In general, it is the
holding of a thing or of a right, whether by material
occupation or by the fact that the thing or the right is
subjected to the action of our will.

Ways of acquiring possession:

 1) Material occupation
 2) Subjection of thing/right to one’s will
 3) proper acts and legal formalities.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN POSSESSION AND
OWNERSHIP:

Possession and ownership are two different legal

concepts. Just as possession is not a definite proof of
ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with
ownership. Even assuming that petitioners’ allegations are true, it
bears no legal consequence in the case at hand because the
execution of the deeds of conveyances is already deemed
equivalent to delivery of the property to respondent, and prior
physical delivery or possession is not legally required.[28] Under
Article 1498 of the Civil Code, “when the sale is made through a
public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary
does not appear or cannot be inferred.” Possession is also
transferred, along with ownership thereof, to respondent by
virtue of the notarized deeds of conveyances.[29] (Medina
et.al. vs. Greenfield Development Corporation [G.R. No.
140228. November 19, 2004]
POSSESSION:

 Material Occupation

 Possession always includes the idea of occupation, except

in cases under Article 537 [Art. 537. Acts merely tolerated,
and those executed clandestinely and without the
knowledge of the possessor of a thing, or by violence, do
not affect possession] possession cannot exist without it.

 Itis not, however, necessary that the person in possession

should himself be the occupant. The occupancy can be held
by another in his name.
Concept:

1. Holding of a thing or enjoyment of a right

2. Extends to both corporeal and incorporeal things

Relation of power or control over the object of

possession and its possessor, whether said object
be things or rights.
Possession vs. Ownership:
Possession and ownership are two different legal
concepts. Just as possession is not a definite proof of
ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with
ownership. Even assuming that petitioners’ allegations are
true, it bears no legal consequence in the case at hand
because the execution of the deeds of conveyances is already
deemed equivalent to delivery of the property to respondent,
and prior physical delivery or possession is not legally
required.[28] Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code, “when
the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution
thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the
contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or
cannot be inferred.” Possession is also transferred, along
with ownership thereof, to respondent by virtue of the
notarized deeds of conveyances. ( MEDINA vs.
GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORP. G.R. No. 140228
November 19, 2004)
POSSESSION vs. OCCUPATION:

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since

these words are separated by the conjunction and, the
clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere
fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property ( ONG vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175746 March 12, 2008)
ELEMENTS OF POSSESSION:

1. Occupancy, apprehension, or taking

2. Intent to possess (animus possidendi) (Note:
existence may be inferred from the attendant
circumstances…it may be disproved by
evidence which tends to prove that the person
under whose power or control the thing in
question appears to be, does not in fact exercise
the power or control and does not intend to do
so.
 Animus Possidendi

 This involves a state of mind whereby the possessor intends to

exercise and does exercise a right of possession, whether this
right be legal or otherwise and the intention and will to
possess usually are inferred from the fact that the thing in
question is under the apparent power and control of the
alleged possessor. Two requisites: 1) Occupancy,
apprehension, or taking 2) intent to possess.
 Possession can either be “actual” or “constructive”:

 What is “Constructive Possession”?

 “Possession does not mean that a man has to have his feet
on every square meter of ground before it can be said that
he is in possession.”

 The rule is: Possession and control of a PORTION of a tract

under a claim of ownership of is a CONSTRUCTIVE
possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse
possession of another.
 Viewpoints of Possession:

 a) RIGHT TO POSSESSION ( jus possidendi)- This is a

right or incident of ownership ( e.g. owner of parcel of land
is entitled to possess)

 e.g. “right of registered owner to possess a parcel of land”

 b) RIGHT OF POSSESSION ( jus possessionis)- This is an

independent right of itself, independent of ownership ( e.g.
lessee by virtue of the lease agreement is entitled to
possess)
 b) RIGHT OF POSSESSION ( jus possessionis)-
This is an independent right of itself, independent of
ownership ( e.g. lessee by virtue of the lease
agreement is entitled to possess)
ERNESTO V. YU et.al. vs. BALTAZAR PACLEB
G.R. No. 130316 January 24, 2007

 The issue in this case is: “Who has prior possession

over a parcel of land that is subject of an ejectment
suit?”

 The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners (Yu’s) who

bought the property not from the respondents (who are
the registered owners) were not able to prove “prior
possession”.

 It was established that the ones who supposedly

delivered possession of the land to them (petitioners)
were not owners.
Specific acts that the SC noted to be indicatof
respondents’ possession:

1. Tax declaration and receipts in 1994 and 1995

established the possession of respondents.
2. The title of the land remains with the respondents.
 DEGREES OF POSSESSION:

 1. Mere holding or possession WITHOUT title whatsoever and

in violation of the right of the owner e.g. possession of a thief or
a usurper of land.

 2. Possession with juridical [ a possession which gives the

transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up
even against the owner] title, BUT not THAT of OWNERSHIP.
This is possession peaceably acquired e.g. possession of tenant,
depositary, or pledgee.

 3. Possession with a just title, or a title sufficient to transfer

ownership, BUT NOT FROM THE TRUE OWNER e.g. the
possession of a vendee of a piece of land from one who pretends
to be the owner but is in fact not the owner.

 4. Possession with a just title FROM THE TRUE OWNER. This is

possession that springs from ownership.
Possession in one’s own name and Possession in the
name of another

Note: The meaning of possession in one’s own name

dependent on the meaning of possession in the
name of another.

Commentators: possession in another’s name=

situation where possessor is bound by some
obligation or legal tie to another e.g. agent,
administratior, lessee, borrower in commodatum.
This view, in effect, embraces these 2 situations:

1. Possession strictly as an agent of the one entitled

to possession there being no right whatsoever in
the one exercising it.

1. Possession with a right belonging to the person

exercising the possession in the name of another
of which right that person is in possession
(implying existence of juridical relation) e.g.
lessee or a mere usufructuary
Possession may be had in two concepts:

 Possession of Holder:

✓ One who possesses as a mere holder, or not in the

concept of owner, acknowledges in another a SUPERIOR
right which he believes to be ownership, whether his
belief be right or wrong e.g. tenant, usufructuary, or
borrower of a thing in commodatum.
 Possession in Concept [ opinion not of possessor
himself but opinion of others] of Owner:

✓ The possessor in the concept of owner may be the

OWNER himself or one WHO CLAIMS to be so.

 POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF AN

OWNER MAY RIPEN INTO OWNERSHIP
(Article 540).
BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC. vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND HEIRS OF MAGDALENO VALDEZ
SR G.R. No. 124699. July 31, 2003

 The mere expiration of the period of easement in 1959

did not convert petitioner’s possession into an adverse
one. Mere material possession of land is not adverse
possession as against the owner and is insufficient to
vest title, unless such possession is accompanied by the
intent to possess as an owner. There should be a hostile
use of such a nature and exercised under such
circumstances as to manifest and give notice that the
possession is under a claim of right.

 In the absence of an express grant by the owner, or

conduct by petitioner sugar mill from which an
adverse
 claim can be implied, its possession of the lot can
only be presumed to have continued in the same
character as when it was acquired (that is, it
possessed the land only by virtue of the original
grant of the easement of right of way), or was by
mere license or tolerance of the owners
(respondent heirs). It is a fundamental principle of
law in this jurisdiction that acts of possessory
character executed by virtue of license or tolerance
of the owner, no matter how long, do not start the
running of the period of prescription.”
EFFECTS OF POSSESSION IN CONCEPT OF OWNER:

 1. Possession in concept of owner is converted into ownership

by the lapse of time necessary for prescription.

 2. Possessor can bring all actions necessary to protect his

possession, availing himself of any action which an owner can
bring, except accion reinvidicatoria which is substituted by the
accion publiciana.

 3. He can ask for inscription of his possession in the registry of

property.

 4. Upon recovering possession, he may demand fruits and

damages.
Acquisitive prescription (AS EFFECT OF POSSESSION
IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER)

1) Possession of hereditary property is deemed

transmitted to the heir without interruption from the
moment of death of the decedent, in case inheritance is
accepted (tacking of possession).

Example:

Father died on June 1, 2003. Son accepted the

inheritance on June 25, 2003. Possession is deemed
transmitted NOT on June 25, 2003 but on June 1, 2003.
 Note Art. 1138 (Civil Code).

 In the computation of time necessary for

prescription the following rules shall be observed:
 (1) The present possessor may complete the period
necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to
that of his grantor or predecessor in interest;
 (2) It is presumed that the present possessor who was
also the possessor at a previous time, has continued to be
in possession during the intervening time, unless there is
proof to the contrary;
 (3) The first day shall be excluded and the last day
included. le 1138 (1):
The possessor who succeeds by hereditary title shall
not suffer the consequences of the wrongful
possession of the decedent, if it is not shown that
he was aware of the flaws affecting it; but the
effects of possession in good faith shall not benefit
him except from the death of the decedent (Article
534, Civil Code)

ILLUSTRATION:
a) If father or decedent was in bad faith, it does not
necessarily mean that the son was also in bad faith
(because bad faith is personal). The son is
presumed to be in good faith.
b) However, since the father was in BAD FAITH,
the consequences of the GOOD FAITH of the son
should be counted only from the date of the
decedent’s death.

What happens when predecessor held the property

in bad faith for several years, how should this
possession (in bad faith) be taken into account for
purposes of computing the required number of
years of possession for the (benefit) of the
successor?
“In the conversion of the character of possession
by the same possessor (unlike in tacking of
possession), i.e. “ from good faith to bad faith,
most civilist advance the view that the possessor
during his possession in good faith should be
granted an equivalent period of possession as the
extraordinary prescriptive period bears to the
ordinary period of prescription.

Or, in the proportion of 3:1 ( 30 years

extraordinary to 10 years ordinary)
ILLUSTRATION:

Father possessed in bad faith “A”s land for 3 years,

after which the property was presumably inherited by
M (son). M was in good faith. For how many years
more from the father’s death, should M possess the
land in order to become its owner?

A: For 9 years. How is this arrived?

3 x 10/30 = 30/30
= 1
In other words, we took and considered this 1 year
and add it to 9 ( to complete ) possession in good faith
of M to 10 years.
Possessor in Good Faith:

 1.Good faith consists in the possessor’s belief that the

person from whom he received the thing was the owner of
the same and could convey his title.

 2. The belief of the possessor that he is the legal owner of

the thing must be based upon SOME title or mode of
acquisition such as sale, a donation, inheritance, or other
means of transmitting ownership. Without this, there can
be no real well-grounded belief of one’s ownership.

 3.Ignorance of the law may be excusable and thus serve as

the basis of good faith. ( e.g. prohibition to transfer during
the 5 year period in case of lands covered by a free patent)
Possession in Bad Faith:

 1. One in possession of property knowing that his

title thereto is defective.

 2. Examples: Possessor bought from one whom

she knew was merely a tenant; where he knew that
land belong to another etc.
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CA, et al. [ G.R. No. L-39044
January 31, 1985]

Facts: ( Appeal from Decision of Court of Appeals declaring

private respondent Felipe Carillo as a builder in good faith
with a right to remain in the questioned premises free of
rent until reimbursed by petitioner, Manotok Realty, Inc.)

 1. There is no dispute that herein appellee is the registered owner

of a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 2455 and
2456 issued by the City Assessor's Office of Manila.

 2. It acquired the aforementioned property from the Testate Estate

of Clara Tambunting de Legarda, being the highest bidder in a
sale conducted by the Probate Court.
 3. After having acquired said property, the appellee
subdivided it, but could not take possession thereof
because the whole area is occupied by several houses
among which is the one belonging to the herein appellant
Felipe Carillo.

 4. Carillo claims to have acquired the lot in dispute from a

certain Delfin Dayrit on September 25, 1962, pursuant
to a deed of assignment.

 5. It was established by evidence that: a) Dayrit in turn

had acquired the property from the late Clam Tambunting
by virtue of a contract of Sale on Installment Basis; b)
that Dayrit had religiously paid the monthly installments
as they fell due, his last payment being on May 25, 1954,
in the sum of P200.00, then leaving an unpaid balance of
P1,306.00 when the said parcel was conveyed to
defendant Carillo.
 Issue: Whether or not Felipe Carillo is in good faith?

 Held:
 Court of Appeals reversed.
 A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw
which invalidates it. (Caram v. Laureta, 103 SCRA 7,
Art. 526, Civil Code) One who acquires real estate
with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his
vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title
thereto in good faith as against the true owner of
the land or of an interest therein-, and the same rule
must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts
which should put a reasonable man upon his guard,
and then claims that he acted in good faith under the belief
that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.
Applying the foregoing principle, the Supreme
Court ruled:

 When Dayrit executed the deed of assignment in

favor of the respondent, the disputed lot was
already registered and titled in the name of the
petitioner. Such an act of registration served as a
constructive notice to the whole world and the title
issued in favor of petitioner made his ownership
conclusive upon and against all persons including
Dayrit and herein respondent, although no personal
notice was served on either of the latter.
Furthermore, the respondent did not even bother to
inquire about the certificate of title covering the
lot in question to verify who was the real owner thereof,
despite the fact that his transferor, Dayrit, never
showed him any title thereto; a circumstance which
should have put him upon such inquiry or
investigation. His failure to exercise that measure
of precaution which was reasonably required of a
prudent man in order to acquaint him with the
defects in the title of his vendor precludes him
from claiming possession in good faith.
VILLAMIL vs. VILLAROSA G.R. No. 177187 April 7,
2009

Well-settled is the rule that every person dealing with

a registered land may safely rely on the correctness of
the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will
in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to
determine the condition of the property. Where there
is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any
cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any
encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to
explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its
face indicates in quest for any hidden defects or
inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right
thereto.[38]
GARDNER vs. COURT OF APPEALS 131 SCRA
585

While one who buys from the registered owner need

not have to look behind the certificate of title, he is
nevertheless bound by the liens and encumbrances
annotated thereon. One who buys without
checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and
losses consequent to such failure. 28
SPOUSES BORNALES vs. IAC G.R. No. G.R. No. L-75336,
October 18, 1988 [ ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE IS
EQUIVALENT TO REGISTRATION]

The petitioners claim that they were not aware of any

defect in the title of their vendors because the certificate of
title in the name of their predecessors-in-interest which
their lawyer examined contained nothing to put them on
guard. The fact however remains that the petitioners
knew and were parties to the fraud committed against the
private respondent. Having bought the land registered
under the Torrens system from their vendors who
procured title thereto by means of fraud, petitioners
cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title
against the private respondent to the extent of her interest
therein. The Torrens system of land registration should
not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the
rightful owner of real property. Registration, to be
effective, must be made in good faith. [Palanca v. Director
of Lands, 43 Phil. 149 (1922).]
STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 115548 March 5, 1996

Rule for financing institutions:

Nevertheless, we have to deviate from the general rule

because of the failure of the petitioner in this case to
take the necessary precautions to ascertain if there was
any flaw in the title of the mortgage. The petitioner is
an investment and financing corporation. We presume
it is experienced in its business. Ascertainment of the
status and condition of properties offerred to it as
security for the loans it extends must be a standard and
indispensable part of its operations. Surely, it cannot
simply rely on an examination of a Torrens certificate to
determine what the subject property looks like as its
condition is not apparent in the document.
ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION:

Essential Requisites:

 1.Acquisition of possession involves two (2)

elements:

 corpus [material holding] and

 animus [intent to possess].

Ways of acquiring possession:

1. Material Occupation
2. Subjecting the thing or right to the action of the
person’s will
3. Proper acts and legal formalities.
MATERIAL OCCUPATION:

-actual physical possession/material apprehension

-synonymous with occupation (under Art. 712)
(difference:
a) occupation under Art. 531 is used in grammatical
sense; occupation in Art. 712 has a juridical/technical
meaning
b)Art. 531 mode of acquiring possession; Art. 712
mode of acquiring ownership
c) Art. 531 must be couple with intent to possess;
Art. 712 intent to own/appropriate
d) Art. 531, applies whether property is with an
owner or not; Art. 712, can take place only with
respect to property without an owner.
e) Art. 531, occupation can have as its object a parcel of
land; Art. 712, it cannot have as its object a parcel of
land
Constructive Delivery (AS MODE OF DELIVERING
POSSESSION):

1. Constructive delivery may be considered as

equivalent to material occupation in those cases
where such occupation is essential to the
acquisition of possession.
2. Cases of constructive delivery which involve
material occupation are:

 tradition brevi manu [ takes place when one who

possesses the things by title OTHER than ownership
continues to possess the same but under a new title that
of OWNERSHIP]

 constitutum possessorium [ when the owner

alienates the thing, but continues to possess the same
under a different title, such as that of depositary,
pledge, or tenant].
SUBJECTION TO ACTION OF ONE’S WILL (
another mode of acquiring possession)

 does not necessarily involve material occupation, but

connotes a degree of control over the thing e.g.
tradition simbolica (e.g. delivery of keys) and
tradicion longa manu (mere pointing of things
transferred).
 PROPER ACTS AND LEGAL FORMALITIES
(Another mode of acquiring possession)

Another means of acquiring possession is through

performance of juridical acts and legal formalities
e.g. donations, succession, contracts, judicial
possession, execution of judgments, execution and
registration of public instruments etc.

(…the law in these instances gives the force of acts of

possession)
EXECUTION OF A PUBLIC DOCUMENT:

Ignacio Wong vs. Hon. Carpio and Manuel Mercado [

G.R. No. 50264 October 21, 1991].

The execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be

equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is
stipulation to the contrary. If, however, notwithstanding
the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot
have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing
and make use of it herself, because such tenancy and
enjoyment are opposed by another (adverse claimant),
then delivery has not been effected. (Paras, Civil Code of
the Philippines, Vol. II, 1989 Ed., p. 400).
CEBU WINLAND DEVELOPMENT vs. ONG SIAO HUA
G.R. No. 173215 May 21, 2009
(ISSUE: Has action prescribed based on Art. 1543?)

Article 1497 above contemplates what is known as real or

actual delivery, when the thing sold is placed in the control
and possession of the vendee. Article 1498, on the one
hand, refers to symbolic delivery by the execution of a
public instrument. It should be noted, however, that
Article 1498 does not say that the execution of the deed
provides a conclusive presumption of the delivery of
possession. It confines itself to providing that the execution
thereof is equivalent to delivery, which means that the
presumption therein can be rebutted by means of clear and
convincing evidence. Thus, the presumptive delivery by
the execution of a public instrument can be negated by the
failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land
sold.
Capacity to Acquire Possession:

Art. 535. Minors and incapacitated persons may

acquire the possession of things; but they need the
assistance of their legal representatives in order to
exercise the rights which from the possession arise
in their favor. (443)
Transfer of Possession through Succession:

✓ Art. 533. The possession of hereditary property is

deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption
and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in
case the inheritance is accepted.
One who validly renounces an inheritance is
deemed never to have possessed the same.
(440)

✓ Art. 534. On who succeeds by hereditary title shall not

suffer the consequences of the wrongful possession of
the decedent, if it is not shown that he was aware of
the flaws affecting it; but the effects of possession in
good faith shall not benefit him except from the date
of the death of the decedent. (442)
INSTANCES WHERE POSSESSION IS NOT
ACQUIRED:

Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired

through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes
that he has an action or a right to deprive another
of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of
the competent court, if the holder should refuse to
deliver the thing. (441a)

Thus, even if possessor is physically ousted from

the property through the use of force or violence,
he is still deemed the legal possessor.
TOLERATED POSSESSION:

Art. 537. Acts merely tolerated, and those executed

clandestinely and without the knowledge of the
possessor of a thing, or by violence, do not affect
possession.

Acts merely tolerated:

 1. They are those which by reason of neighborliness or

familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or
another person to do on the property. Acts of little disturbances,
in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations e.g.
permitting others to do on his property to pass his land, tie a
carabao, or getting some water from a well.
POSSESSORS BY MERE TOLERANCE CANNOT
BE CONSIDERED AS BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH
UNDER ARTICLE 448 OF THE CIVIL CODE

Case:

KILARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.

134329, January 19, 2000
“Considering that petitioners were in possession of the
subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they
knew that their occupation of the premises may be
terminated any time. Persons who occupy the land of
another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without
any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that they will vacate the same upon
demand, failing in which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them.26 Thus,
they cannot be considered possessors nor builders in
good faith. It is well-settled that both Article 44827 and
Article 54628 of the New Civil Code which allow full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of
the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to
a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land
with the belief that he is the owner thereof.
MACASAET vs. MACASAET 439 SCRA 625
(Not a case of tolerance)

The occupancy of the subject lots by petitioners

was not merely “something not wholly approved
of” by respondents. Neither did it arise from
what Tolentino refers to as “neighborliness or
familiarity.” In point of fact, their possession was
upon the invitation of and with the complete
approval of respondents, who desired that their
children would occupy the premises. It arose
from familial love and a desire for family
solidarity, which are basic Filipino traits.
Conflict over Possession de facto:

Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized

at the same time in two different personalities
except in the cases of co-possession. Should a
question arise regarding the fact of possession, the
present possessor shall be preferred; if there are
two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the
dates of the possession are the same, the one who
presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal,
the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit
pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings. (445)
EFFECTS OF POSSESSION:
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected
in his possession; and should he be disturbed
therein he shall be protected in or restored to said
possession by the means established by the laws
and the Rules of Court.

Art. 540. Only the possession acquired and enjoyed

in the concept of owner can serve as a title for
acquiring dominion
Application of Article:

1. To consolidate title by prescription, the possession

must be under claim of ownership and it must be
peaceful, public and uninterrupted.

2. Acts of possessory character done by virtue of a

license or mere tolerance on the part of the real
owner are not sufficient e.g. possession by lessees,
trustees, pledges, tenants.
3. Where a party through ignorance, inadvertence,
or mistake occupies a land up to a given line beyond
his actual boundaries because he believes it to be his
true line, BUT HAS NO SPECIFIC INTENTION of
claiming title to that extent, if it should be
ascertained that such line is on his neighbor’s land,
such possession is NOT ADVERSE. The question is
one of intent.
Meaning of “adverse possession”:

Case:

Wolfson vs. Aenlle G. R. No. 21312 November 22, 1924

Facts:

1. At or about the time the shortage in plaintiff's land was

discovered, the defendant said to the plaintiff: "Let us wait
for the cadastral survey, and if it is established by that survey
that I am holding any part of your property I will return to
you all of that portion which may be in excess of what
appears in my title.“
2. The cadastral survey was later made from which it was
found as a fact that the defendant was holding 1,635
square meters of plaintiff's land in excess of defendant's
record title.

3. The refusal of the defendant to abandon his claim to the

plaintiff for the excess of the 1,635 square meters, which
was found to exist by the cadastral survey, resulted in
the commencement of this action.
 Held:

After 1910, the defendant's possession of the land in

dispute could not be adverse to plaintiff's claim until after
the cadastral survey was made, and the defendant had
refused to abandon his claim for the excess. That
important fact, having been established by the evidence of
an impartial witness whose testimony is not disputed or
denied, is conclusive of this case. Under such a state of
facts, the defendant could not acquire title by prescription.
Art. 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has in
his favor the legal presumption that he possesses
with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show
or prove it.

Meaning of “Just Title”:

1. Title is NOT NECESSARILY the document.

2. By “just title” is meant that which is legally
sufficient to transfer ownership or the real right to
which it relates.
Co-Possession:

Art. 543. Each one of the participants of a thing

possessed in common shall be deemed to have
exclusively possessed the part which may be
allotted to him upon the division thereof, for the
entire period during which the co-possession
lasted. Interruption in the possession of the whole
or a part of a thing possessed in common shall be
to the prejudice of all the possessors. However, in
case of civil interruption, the Rules of Court shall
apply.
RIGHT OF POSSESSORS TO FRUITS:

Art. 544. A possessor in good faith is entitled to

the fruits received before the possession is legally
interrupted.
Natural and industrial fruits are considered
received from the time they are gathered or
severed.
Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily and belong
to the possessor in good faith in that proportion.
(451)
How good faith is interrupted?

- To interrupt, it’s not necessary to initiate legal

proceedings such as filing a case in court.
- E.g. Receipt of demand letters, summons, etc.
Rule on pending fruits:

Art. 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should
be any natural or industrial fruits, the possessor shall
have a right to a part of the expenses of cultivation, and
to a part of the net harvest, both in proportion to the time
of the possession.

The charges shall be divided on the same basis by the two

possessors.

The owner of the thing may, should he so desire, give the

possessor in good faith the right to finish the cultivation
and gathering of the growing fruits, as an indemnity for
his part of the expenses of cultivation and the net
proceeds; the possessor in good faith who for any reason
whatever should refuse to accept this concession, shall
lose the right to be indemnified in any other manner.
(452a)
BARTOLOME ORTIZ vs. HON. KAYANAN G.R.
No. L-32974 July 30, 1979

Possession in good faith ceases or is legally

interrupted from the moment defects in the title
are made known to the possessor, by extraneous
evidence or by the filing of an action in court by
the true owner for the recovery of the property.
Hence, all the fruits that the possessor may receive
from the time he is summoned in court, or when
he answers the complaint, must be delivered and
paid by him to the owner or lawful possessor.
RULE ON “NECESSARY EXPENSES”:

Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every

possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may
retain the thing until he has been reimbursed
therefor. ( ARTICLE 546)
WHAT ARE “NECESSARY EXPENSES”?

Necessary Expenses:

1. Expenses imposed by the existence of the thing itself,

and have no relation to the desire or purpose of the
possessor; hence, they are reimbursed, whatever may be
the juridical character [ whether one is in good faith or
bad faith] of the person who advanced.

2. Those incurred for the preservation of the thing, they

ARE NOT considered as improvements. They DO NOT
increase the value of the thing, but merely prevent it
from being useless.
RULE ON “USEFUL EXPENSES”:

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the

possessor in good faith with the same right of
retention, the person who has defeated him in the
possession having the option of refunding the
amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in
value which the thing may have acquired by reason
thereof.
WHAT ARE “USEFUL EXPENSES”?

Useful Expenses:

They are incurred to give utility or productivity of

the thing. Reimbursed ONLY to the possessor in
good faith. E.g. expenses for filling up with soil,
house constructed on the land etc.
Can there be waiver of the right of retention?

Answer: Yes

The surrender of possession of the property by the

possessor in good faith amounts to a waiver of right
of retention; but the claim for the expenses is not
thereby renounced.
Can “possessor in good faith” remove
improvements?

YES.

If the useful improvements can be removed without

damage to the principal thing, the possessor in
good faith may remove them, unless the person
who recovers the possession exercises the option
under paragraph 2 of the preceding article.
RULE ON EXPENSES FOR “PURE LUXURY”:

Art. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure

shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith;
but he may remove the ornaments with which he
has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no
injury thereby, and if his successor in the
possession does not prefer to refund the amount
expended.
What are expenses for “luxury”?

Expenses for Luxury:

These expenses do not affect the existence or the

substance of the thing itself, but ONLY the
COMFORT, CONVENIENCE, or ENJOYMENT of
the possessor. They ARE NOT subject to
reimbursement.
RIGHTS OF POSSESSORS:

 1. Useful expenses are reimbursed to the possessor in good

faith; by omission, the Code denies this right to the
possessor in bad faith.

 2. With respect to expenses for pure luxury or pleasure,

two kinds of possessors [ good faith and bad faith
possessors] HAVE THE SAME RIGHT i.e. to remove the
improvements upon which they were made if the principal thing
will suffer no injury and the owner does not prefer to retain
them upon payment of the proper indemnity. (NOTE: they differ
in amount of refund: Good faith=amount expended; Bad
faith=value they may have at the time (successor) enters into
possession.
3. Take note that with regard to USEFUL EXPENSES,
the possessor in BAD FAITH has NO RIGHT TO
REMOVE.

BUT, as regards “expenses for pure luxury”, a situation

may arise where a possessor in bad faith may receive the
value of the luxurious improvements (at the time he
enters into possession) under Article 549. ( Because
Article 549 provides that “…..but he may remove the objects
for which such expenses have been incurred, provided that the
thing suffers no injury thereby, and that the lawful
possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the
value they may have at the time he enters into
possession.”
In the case of *Carbonell vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et
al. [ G.R. No. L-29972 January 26, 1976], which
involve “useful improvements”, the Supreme Court held
that
“as a matter of equity, the possessors in bad faith
should be allowed to remove the aforesaid
improvements ( useful improvements e.g. draining
the property, filling it with 500 cubic meters of
garden soil, building a wall around it and installing
a gate and P11,929.00 for erecting a bungalow
thereon), unless the lawful possessor chooses to pay
for their value at the time the possessor in bad faith
introduced said useful improvements.
HOWEVER, in the later case of MWSS vs. COURT
OF APPEALS 143 SCRA 623, the Supreme Court
reiterated that the right given a possessor in bad faith to
remove improvements applies only to improvements
for pure luxury or mere pleasure as provided in
Article 549 of the Civil Code.
POSSESSION OF MOVABLE:

The possession of movable property acquired in

good faith is equivalent to a title.

Requisites for Title:

 1) Possession is in good faith

 2) the owner has voluntarily parted with the possession
of the thing;
 3) possessor is in the concept of an owner.
 RULE: If the owner has lost the thing, or he has been
unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it,
not only from the finder, thief or robber, but also from
third persons who may have acquired it in good faith
from such finder, thief, or robber ( Rule of
Irrevindicability).
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE GRANTING OWNER
THE RIGHT TO RECOVER:

When possessor acquired it in good faith in a

public sale.

In this case, owner may recover provided he shall

reimburse the possessor.
There are, however, instances where even if the
owner offers to reimburse, still he cannot recover as
a matter of right:

Estoppel

If title is lost through prescription

If possessor is a holder in due course of a

document of title
What is the meaning of “unlawful deprivation”?

Unlawful deprivation extends to all cases- not only

in cases where property is stolen- where there is no
valid transmission of ownership including those
where the proprietor has entrusted the thing to a
borrower

DOMINADOR DIZON, doing business under the

firm name "Pawnshop of Dominador Dizon“ vs.
LOURDES G. SUNTAY, G.R. No. L-30817 Sep 29,
1972
The case of *EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp.
vs. Santos [ G.R. No. 80298 April 26, 1990].

Issue: Whether the petitioner has been unlawfully

deprived of the books because the check issued by the
impostor in payment therefor was dishonored.
HELD:

Non-payment only creates a right to demand

payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But
absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the
thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the
buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz
acquired ownership over the books which he could then
validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that
he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter
between him and EDCA and did not impair the title
acquired by the private respondents to the books.
How possession may be lost?

 Abandonment
 Assignment
 Destruction (Loss)
 Possession of another

Abandonment ( spes recuperandi must be gone):

 United States vs. Laurente Rey [ G.R. No. 3326

September 7, 1907]
USUFRUCT:
 Definition of “Usufruct”:

 Real Right, of a temporary nature, which authorizes

its holder to ENJOY all the benefits which results
from the normal enjoyment of another’s property,
with the OBLIGATION TO RETURN, at the
designated time, either THE SAME THING or, in
special cases (QUASI-USUFRUCT), its
EQUIVALENT.

 Terms: Usufructuary- one who has the right of usufruct

 Naked Owner- Owner of the thing without the right to the fruits and
the right to use the fruits
Characteristics of Usufruct:

1) It is a REAL RIGHT
2) It is of a TEMPORARY NATURE or DURATION

3) Purpose is to ENJOY THE BENEFITS AND

DERIVE all the advantages of a thing as a
consequence of NORMAL USE or
EXPLOITATION
 Extent of Usufruct:

 1. Usufruct is a REAL RIGHT [ power belonging to

a person over a specific thing, without a passive
subject individually determined against whom
such right may be personally exercised] and
includes both the jus utendi AND the jus fruendi.

 2. There is an obligation to preserve the form and

substance of the thing in usufruct AS A RULE e.g.
if usufruct on a fishpond, it must be preserved as a
fishpond; if a sugarcane field, it must be preserved as a
sugarcane field.
 Consumable things:

 1.With regard to consumable things, strictly

speaking there can be no usufruct, because they
cannot be enjoyed without being consumed. But
since the law recognizes usufruct over ALL KINDS
OF THINGS, if thing is consumable, usufruct should
be considered as on their value if appraised, or an
equal quantity and quality if not.

 2.Even unproductive things can be an object of

usufruct.
 Usufruct granted to aliens:

 *Ramirez, et al. vs. Vda. de Ramirez, etc., et al. [

G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982]

 This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the

usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct,
albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in
the usufruactuary and it is the vesting of title to
land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the
Constitution.
 Rights of Usufructuary:

 1.The usufructuary has the right to enjoy the

property, to the same extent as the owner, BUT
ONLY WITH RESPECT TO ITS USE and the
RECEIPT OF ITS FRUITS. [ e.g. right to receive
dividends as usufructuary of shares of stock..]

 2.He cannot, however, extract products which do

not constitute fruits, because he is bound to
preserve the form and substance of the thing.

 3.Can even alienate his right of usufruct. Exception:

legal usufruct such as right of usufruct of parents
over properties of minor children .
RIGHTS OF THE USUFRUCTUARY (…when he
does not put up the required “security”:

1. Usufructuary CANNOT POSSESS the property

until he gives security
2. Usufructuary CANNOT ADMINISTER the
property, hence he cannot execute lease
3. Cannot collect credits that have matured

4. But, usufructuary CAN ALIENATE his right of

usufruct (since failure to give security does not
extinguish usufruct)
OBLIGATIONS OF THE USUFRUCTUARY:

A. At or before the beginning of the usufruct:

a. Make an inventory of all the property (appraisal of the

movables and description of the condition of immovables)

b. To give security

NOTE: ..non-compliance does not prevent usufruct from taking

place, but usufructuary cannot enter into possession.

Effect of Failure to give security:

Naked owner may demand that immovable be placed under
administration; movables be sold; public bonds, instruments of
credit etc. be converted into registered securities…..
Effect of Failure to give security:

RIGHTS OF NAKED OWNER:

1. Naked owner may deliver property to

usufructuary
2. Or, naked owner may choose RETENTION of
property as ADMINISTRATOR (i.e. usufructuary
gets net proceeds, minus administration
expenses…)
3. Or, naked owner may demand receivership
Usufructuary may (in certain instances) exempted from
putting up security:

“Caucion Juratoria”- Promise under oath ( Article 587)

Promise under oath takes place of bond and security.

This is based on NECESSITY and HUMANITY.

“….usufructuary asked delivery of the furniture necessary

for his use and that he and his family be allowed to live in a
house included in the usufruct…COURT may GRANT
this petition.

SAME RULE…for use of implements, tools, etc. for an

industry or vocation…
During the Usufruct:

The usufructuary enjoys the beneficial title to the

property, the naked title being retained by the owner.

Rights of Usufructuary:

1. Entitled to all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of

the property.
2. May personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, LEASE it
to another, or ALIENATE his right of usufruct, even
by a gratuitous title, but all the contracts he may enter
into as such shall terminate upon the expiration of the
usufruct.
c. Usufructuary may make such USEFUL
IMPROVEMENTS or EXPENSES FOR MERE
PLEASURE, but he HAS NO RIGHT TO BE
INDEMNIFIED.

He may, however, remove such improvements,

should it be possible to do so without damage to
the property or set-off the improvements against
any damage to the same.
Obligations of the Usufructuary:

1. Take care of the things (given in usufruct) as a good

father of the family.

2. Shall answer for any damage (in case he alienates or

lease his right of usufruct)

3. Obliged to make ordinary repairs (Note:

extraordinary repairs are at owner’s expense, BUT
usufructuary obliged to NOTIFY owner )

4. Usufructuary obliged to notify owner of any act of

third person, of which he may have knowledge, that
may be prejudicial to rights of ownership
OBLIGATION TO PAY ANNUAL CHARGES/TAXES:

 those considered as lien on the fruits-

usufructuary

 those considered as lien on the capital- naked

owner

REAL ESTATE TAXES:

 there is variance of opinion

 Chargeable against the usufructuary- Manresa, J.B.L. Reyes,
by CA in Quirante vs. Quirante (C.A.) O.G. 4th Suplement,
No. 8, 242
But SC in Bislig Bay Lumber vs. Provincial Govt.
of Surigao 100 Phil. 303 and Board of
Assessment Appeals of Zamboanga Zur vs.
Samar Mining Company 37 SCRA 734:
….LAND TAX BURDENS THE CAPITAL( real
value of the property) and thus, should be paid
by the owner.
Usufruct over Consumable Things:

 1. Improperly called “quasi-usufruct”.

 2. The usufruct is not upon the consumable things

THEMSELVES which are delivered to the usufructuary,
but upon THE SUM representing their value or upon a
quantity of things of the same kind and quality.

 3. Usufructuary becomes the owner of the things in

usufruct such as a sum of money or a quantity of liquids
or grain. Grantor becomes merely a CREDITOR entitled
to the return of their value or of things of the same
quantity and quality.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF USUFRUCT:

Death of usufructuary:

Lifetime of usufructuary..( Eleizegui vs. Lawn

Tennis Club, 2 Phil. 309) This is true even if there is
a resolutory condition or condition stipulated and
the usufructuary dies before the expiration of the
period or fulfillment of the condition…UNLESS A
CONTRARY INTENTION APPEARS i.e. usufruct
continues even after the death of the usufructuary
Expiration of period or fulfillment of condition:

Example:

..can stay on the house “as long as they like”…

MERCEDES MORALIDAD vs. SPS. PERNES G.R. No. 152809 August 3, 2006

“The document …. dated July 21, 1986 constitutes the title creating,….
Paragraph #3 thereof states “[T]hat anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to
stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not
inimical to the purpose thereof” (Emphasis supplied). XXXXX.” That the
maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious relations between and among kin
constitutes an indispensable condition for the continuance of the usufruct is
clearly deduced from the succeeding Paragraph #4 where petitioner stated
“[T]hat anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the
undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own.” In fine, the occurrence
of any of the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering
or the cessation of harmonious relationship between/among kin constitutes a
resolutory condition which, by express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the
usufruct.
Prescription (as a mode of terminating usufruct)

It is not the non-use by the usufructuary, but use by a

third person that extinguishes usufruct.

Other causes: non-fulfillment of condition,

rescission/annullment of act constituting usufruct
etc.

EFFECT OF BAD USE OF THE THING:

 …does not extinguish usufruct, but naked owner
(in case of considerable injury) may demand that
the thing be delivered to him- with the obligation
to pay annually the usufructuary the net proceeds
of the same after deducting expenses of
administration
CONCEPT OF EASEMENT:

It is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the

benefit of another immovable belonging to a different
owner.

• Immovable in favor or which easement is established: DOMINANT

ESTATE
• Immovable subject thereto: SERVIENT ESTATE

What is easement? Servitude?

Servitudes (term used for easement in civil law countries);

Easement under common law is only one form of
servitude; Easement under common law is always predial
or real [ benefit of another realty]; servitude may refer to
predial easement OR to a personal easement ( benefit of
community or of one or more persons to whom
encumbered estate does not belong.
 The benefit or durden should not be so great as to be inconsistent
with the general right of ownership of a person, amounting to a
taking of his property. Being a mere encumbrance, it should not
impair entirely the usefulness of the servient estate

Bear the inconvenience if you are the owner of the dominant esstate.
You are not the owner of the property.
SAMPLE IMAGES OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS
OF EASEMENTS
Easement of Drainage
Easement of Right of Way
Easement of Party Wall
Party Wall:
Easement of View
If you want to make an opening, move 3 meters
back from the borderline.

But if you want to make use of the 3 meters, you

may not be allowed to construct an opening

If muhimo kag railing, set back ka (maka-enjoy ka

sa view). If gusto ka makinabang sa meter,
pwede ka terrace pero way railing.
Easement of View
EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES:

Characteristics of Easements:

1. It is a real right; 2) Can be imposed only on the

property of another, never on one’s own property;
3) Produces limitation on ownership, but
ownership of servient estate is unimpaired; 4) It is
inseparable from the tenements to which it is
actively or passively attached; 5) Exists only
between neighboring tenements.
Characteristics of “ Intransmissibility” and
“Indivisibility”:

Intransmissibility- cannot be alienated or mortgaged separately from

the estate to which it forms part

Indivisibility-necessary consequence of inseparability of the easement

or servitude.

Thus, even if servient and dominant estates are divided between two or
more persons, easement continues to attach to the estates.

In case of division of the dominant estate into several parts, each and
every part shall continue to enjoy the easement in its entirety.

Finally, the mere fact that respondents subdivided the property does not
extinguish the easement. Article 618 of the Civil Code provides that if the
dominant estate is divided between two or more persons, each of them may use the
easement in its entirety, without changing the place of its use, or making it
more burdensome in any other way. (UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL vs.
JOSEPH CHUNG, GR. No. 173252, July 17, 2009)
Easement ( According to source or origin and
establishment of easement)

1. Voluntary-constituted by will or agreement of the parties

or by a testator
2. Mixed-created partly by agreement and partly by law
(example ani is nay tulo kabuok servient, sugot ang duha pero ang ikatulo ang problema so pwede
ang ikatulo ma compel by law, so mahug ni nga mixed ni)
3. Legal easement-constituted by law for public use or for
private interest

(a) Waters (Art. 637-648); (b) Right of Way (Arts. 649-

657); (c) Party Wall (Arts. 658-666); (d) Light and View
(Arts. 667-673); (e) Drainage of Buildings (Arts. 674-
676);( f) Intermediate Distances; (g) Against Nuisances
and (h) lateral and subjacent support
Modes of acquiring easements:

1) By law
2) Will of owners
3) By prescription
4) By legal presumption or apparent sign (Valisno v.
Adriano; Tanedo v. (septic tank case))

EASEMENTS may arise by:

1) TITLE : a) Voluntary ( Note: Absence of a document

or proof showing the origin of an easement may be
cured by a deed of recognition by the servient owner or
by a final judgment under Article 623, Civil Code); b)
Legal Easements (upon court declaration)
2. PRESCRIPTION

Easement may be acquired by prescription of ten years if it is continuous (di

mu stop, e.g. drainage; light and view) and apparent (made through external
signs).

Easement right of way cannot be acquired by prescription kay it is not continuous

(Bogo-Medellin case)

Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant,

without the intervention of man e.g. easement of drainage [ MANNER OF
EXERCISE, NOT ITS CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE]

Apparent are those made known by external signs e.g. right of way, window in
a party wall visible to both owners

Right of Way cannot be acquired by prescription being not continuous

although it is apparent.
The essence of this easement ("servidumbre de paso") lies
in the power of the dominant owner to cross or traverse the
servient tenement without being prevented or disturbed by
its owner. As a servitude, it is a limitation on the servient
owner's rights of ownership, because it restricts his right to
exclude others from his property. But such limitation exists
only when the dominant owner actually crosses or passes
over the servient estate; because when he does not, the
servient owner's right of exclusion is perfect and undisturbed.
Since the dominant owner can not be continually and
uninterruptedly crossing the servient estate, but can do so
only at intervals, the easement is necessarily of an
intermittent or discontinuous nature.

(Concurring opinion of Justice J.B. L. Reyes)

(LEOGARIO RONQUILLO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.

JOSE ROCO, as Administrator of VICENTE ROCO Y
DOMINGUEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellees., G.R. No. L-
10619, Feb 28, 1958 En Banc)
Referring to the case of
Municipality of Dumangas vs. Bishop of Jaro, 34 Phil. 541)

Bearing in mind the provisions of the article quoted in relation to the wording of the
decision in the Dumangas case, it can be seen that what the court had in mind is
that when the Spanish Crown apportioned the land Occupied by the Church of
Dumangas, it impliedly burdened the neighboring public square (which was also
Crown property at the time) with an easement of right of way to allow the public to
enter and leave the church, because without such easement the grant in favor of
ecclesiastical authorities would be irrisory: what would be the use of constructing a
church if no one could enter it? Now, if there was an implied grant of the right of way
by the Spanish Crown, it was clearly unnecessary to justify the existence of the
easement through prescriptive acquisition.

It would seem that the term "prescription" used in said case was merely a loose
expression that is apt to mislead unless the court's reasoning is carefully analyzed.

Since 1889, however, the Civil Code repealed the prior legislation; and thereafter
the right of way could only be acquired by title and not by adverse possession
(usucapio), saving those servitudes already acquired before the Code came into
effect (Decisions, Supreme Court of Spain, 27 Oct. 1900, 1st February 1912; 11
May 1927, and 7 January 1920).
(Ronquillo v. Roco, G.R. No. L-10619, [February 28, 1958], 103 PHIL 84-92)
In acquiring easement by prescription, the time of possession
shall be computed as follows:

1. Positive easement – (e.g. drainage or aqueduct), from the day

on which the owner of the dominant estate or the person
who may have made use of the easement commenced to
exercise it upon the servient estate

2. Negative easement – (e.g. light and view), from the day on

which the owner of the dominant estate forbade, by an
instrument acknowledge before a notary public (Notarial
Prohibition), the owner of the servient estate from
executing an act which would be lawful without the
easement.
3. BY APPARENT SIGN OR LEGAL PRESUMPTION

Existence of an apparent sign of easement between

two estates, established or maintained by the owner of
both, shall be considered, should either of them be
alienated as a TITLE, unless at the time the ownership
of the two estates is divided, the contrary is provided
or the sign is removed.

Example:
The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant's land for the passage
of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the
time of the sale of Honorata's land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a
title for the vendee of the land to continue using it, as provided in Article
624 of the Civil Code
(VALISNO VS. ADRIANO G.R. NO. L-37409 MAY
23, 1988)
EDUARDO C. TAÑEDO vs. HON. JUANITO A.
BERNAD et.al., G.R. No. L-66520 August 30,1988

“In the instant case, no statement abolishing or

extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned
in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Tañedo.
Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe
and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before
he sold said lot to Eduardo Tañedo. Hence, the use of
the septic tank is continued by operation of law.
Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim, the
new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501-B), cannot
impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the
servitude. 17
EFFECTS OF EASEMENTS:

 Title to an easement govern the rights of the dominant

estate and obligation of the servient estate. E.g. In
Jabonete vs. Monteverde 16 SCRA 462, right of way granted to
“family, drivers, servants, and jeeps” was held to be PERSONAL servitude and
NOT predial servitude, that inures to the benefit of the above-named persons and
not to whoever should own the dominant estate.

 Owner of dominant estate cannot use easement except

for the benefit of immovable originally contemplated,
neither can he exercise the easement in any other
manner than that previously established. [ e.g. easement
to draw water for irrigation purposes cannot be used to
supply water to factory] ( Exception: Case of Valderrama
vs. North Negros Sugar Co. 48 Phil. 493)

 Owner of servient estate retains ownership.

 RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE DOMINANT AND
SERVIENT ESTATE

 Art. 627. The owner of the dominant estate may make, at his
own expense, on the servient state any works necessary for the
use and preservation of the servitude, but without altering it or
rendering it more burdensome.
For this purpose he shall notify the owner of the servient estate,
and shall choose the most convenient time and manner so as to
cause the least inconvenience to the owner of the servient estate.
(543a)

 Art. 628. Should there be several dominant estates, the owners

of all of them shall be obliged to contribute to the expenses
referred to in the preceding article, in proportion to the
benefits which each may derive from the work. Any one who
does not wish to contribute may exempt himself by renouncing
the easement for the benefit of the others.
If the owner of the servient estate should make use of the
easement in any manner whatsoever, he shall also be obliged to
contribute to the expenses in the proportion stated, saving an
agreement to the contrary.
Art. 629. The owner of the servient estate cannot
impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the
servitude.

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 630. The owner of the servient estate retains the

ownership of the portion on which the easement is
established, and may use the same in such a
manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement.
Extinguishment of Easement:

Art. 631. Easements are extinguished:

 (1) By merger in the same person of the ownership of the
dominant and servient estates;
 (2) By nonuser for ten years; with respect to discontinuous
easements, this period shall be computed from the day on
which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous
easements, from the day on which an act contrary to the same
took place;
 (3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition
that the easement cannot be used; but it shall revive if the
subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should
again permit its use, unless when the use becomes possible,
sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in accordance with
the provisions of the preceding number;
 (4) By the expiration of the term or the fulfillment of the
condition, if the easement is temporary or conditional;
 (5) By the renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate;
 (6) By the redemption agreed upon between the owners of the
dominant and servient estates.
MERGER:

In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of

a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement
pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this
case, the public at large.

Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a

prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the
termination of that relation leaves the easement of no
use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor
of the public if that is possible no genuine merger
can take place that would terminate a personal
easement.
(SOLID MANILA CORPORATION VS. BIO HONG
TRADING G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991)
EASEMENT RELATING TO WATERS:

 Natural Drainage ( lower estates are obliged to receive

the waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from higher estates)
 Drainage of buildings (owner of building obliged to
construct roof so that rain water shall fall on his own
land )
 Easement on riparian banks for navigation, floatage,
fishing etc. ( Article 51, Water Code of the Philippines)
 Easement of a dam
 Easement for drawing water/watering animals
 Easement of Aqueduct (a person who may use water
upon his estate shall have the right to make it flow
through intervening estates
 Easement for construction of stop lock or sluice gate
Example of “legal easement”:

Art. 51. The banks or rivers and streams and the

shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire
length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban
areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and
forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins,
are subject to the easement of public use in the
interest of recreation, navigation, flotage, fishing and
salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this
zone longer than what is necessary for recreation,
navigation, flotage, fishing or salvage or to build
structures of any kind. ( WATER CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Presidential Decree 1067)
 CHIONGBIAN-OLIVA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES G.R. No. G.R. No. 163118 April 27, 2007

 WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT IS CORRECT IN TAKING

JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE FACT THAT PETITIONER’S LOT
COVERED BY TCT NO. 5455 IS SITUATED IN AN URBAN AREA
AND NOT IN A FOREST AREA, AND IN THUS CONCLUDING
THAT THE LEGAL EASEMENT APPLICABLE FOR RIVER BANK
PROTECTION IS THREE (3) METERS AND NOT FORTY (40)
METERS.

 WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 90(i) OF C.A. NO. 141 WHICH

PROVIDES FOR A UNIFORM EASEMENT OF FORTY (40) METERS
FROM THE BANK ON EACH SIDE OF ANY RIVER, AND WHICH
PRESERVES THE SAID 40-METER PORTION AS PERMANENT
TIMBERLAND REGARDLESS OF WHETHER IT IS SITUATED IN A
FOREST AREA OR AN URBAN AREA, IS STILL APPLICABLE TO
LOTS SITUATED IN AN URBAN AREA IN THE LIGHT OF THE
PROVISIONS OF SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION, SPECIFICALLY
SECTION 51 OF P.D. NO. 1067.12
 Since the property in this case was originally
alienable land of the public domain, the application
for free patent contained the condition that a forty-
meter legal easement from the banks on each side of
any river or stream found on the land shall be
demarcated and preserved as permanent
timberland. However, after the property was
administratively titled, it underwent several
surveys for purposes of subdivision, consolidation,
or consolidation-subdivision as evidenced by TCT
No. 5455. ….Thus, presently only three meters is
required to be demarcated and preserved as
permanent timberland.

 In this case, the trial court properly took judicial

notice that Talamban, Cebu City is an urban area.
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY:

Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of

a real right may cultivate or use any immovable,
which is surrounded by other immovables
pertaining to other persons and without adequate
outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a
right of way through the neighboring estates, after
payment of the proper indemnity. ……
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY:
Requisites: MEMORIZE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1.Dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway.
2. After payment of the proper indemnity
3. Isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate (isolation not because of your own acts e.g. naa unta kay right of
way pero imo nuon gi fence and imong silingan na nuon imong gi-
hasol)
4. Right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest [ e.g. hence, subject to the limitation that the usefulness of
the servient tenement to its owner is not impaired]
RULES GOVERNING EASEMENTS:

A. MUST BE ESTABLISHED AT THE POINT

LEAST PREJUDICIAL TO THE SERVIENT
ESTATE, and if possible, the shortest distance. In
case of conflict, “least prejudice”…prevails over
“short distance”.
IN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY that easement
where the way is shortest and will cause least
prejudice shall be chosen. However, if the two
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the
way where damage will be least shall be used even if
not the shortest route. This is so because least prejudice
prevails over shortest distance. This means that the
court is not bound to establish what is the shortest
distance; a longer way may be adopted to avoid injury
to the servient estate, such as when there are
constructions or walls which can be avoided by a
round about way, or to secure the interest of the
dominant owner, such as when the shortest distance
would place the way on a dangerous decline. (
QUIMEN vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 112331
MAY 29, 1996)
QUITANILLA vs. ABANGAN G.R. No. 160613
February 12, 2008 ( requirement of least prejudice
not complied)

As between a right of way that would demolish a

fence of strong materials to provide ingress and
egress to a public highway and another right of
way which although longer will only require a van
or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative
should be preferred. Mere convenience for the
dominant estate is not what is required by law as
the basis for setting up a compulsory easement.
Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied
without imposing the easement, the same should
not be imposed.
 Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right-of-way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. Under this guideline, whenever there are several tenements surrounding the
dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established on the tenement where the distance
to the public road or highway is shortest and where the least damage would be caused. If
these two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in a single tenement,
we have held in the past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the
shortest distance criterion.
In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners' lot
would cause the destruction of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners'
property. Although this right-of-way has the shortest distance to a public road, it is not the
least prejudicial considering the destruction pointed out, and that an option to traverse two
vacant lots without causing any damage, albeit longer, is available.
We have held that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required
by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement;" that "a longer way may be
adopted to avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when there are constructions or
walls which can be avoided by a round-about way.”
(Calimoso v. Roullo, G.R. No. 198594, [January 25, 2016])
Principle: naka-samok na ka sa servient, ayaw na dugangi
pa I love you
B. Width of the easement shall be that which is sufficient for the
needs of the dominant estate. May be adjusted from time to time
(sufficient for the need of the DOMINANT estate)

Case: Tomas Encarnacion v. CA, et. al. G.R. 77628, Mar. 11, 1991

1. One-half meter width of the path was taken from the servient
estate and the other one-half meter portion was taken from
another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino
2. It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery
business on his land where he also had his abode. He would use
said pathway as passage to the higheway for his family and for
his customers.

3. While the SC recognized ”that an additional one and one-half

meters in the width of the patway will reduce the servient estate
to only about 342.5 sqm.” it noted that petitioner has exepressed
willingness to exchange an equivalent portion of his land to
compensate private respondents for their loss” (THUS,
ADDRESSING THE REQUIREMENT OF LEAST PREJUDICE)
To force petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway,
exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply
because it could not pass through the improvised
pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the part of the
servient estate and can only be counter-productive for all
the people concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a
passageway wide enough to accomodate his jeepney since
that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant
nursery business.
While the Supreme Court recognized “that an
additional one and one-half (11/2) meters in the
width of the pathway will reduce the servient
estate to only about 342.5 square meters” it noted
that petitioner has expressed willingness to exchange an
equivalent portion of his land to compensate private
respondents for their loss (THUS, ADDRESSING
THE REQUIREMENT OF LEAST PREJUDICE)
When petitioner started out as a plant nursery
operator, he and his family could easily make do
with a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the national
highway. But the business grew and with it the need
for the use of modern means of conveyance or
transport. Manual hauling of plants and garden soil
and use of pushcarts have become extremely
cumbersome and physically taxing. To force
petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway,
exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft
simply because it could not pass through the
improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the
part of the servient estate and can only be counter-
productive for all the people concerned. Petitioner
should not be denied a passageway wide enough to
accomodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and
necessary aspect of the plant nursery business.
C. IF PIECE OF LAND IS ACQUIRED BY SALE,
EXCHANGE, OR PARTITION, VENDOR,
EXCHANGER, OR CO-OWNER IS BOUND TO
GRANT RIGHT OF WAY, WITHOUT INDEMNITY.

IN CASE OF SIMPLE DONATION, DONOR SHALL

BE INDEMNIFIED.

D. MERE CONVENIENCE TO THE DOMINANT

ESTATE IS NOT DETERMINATIVE FOR THE
GRANT OF A COMPULSORY EASEMENT OF
RIGHT OF WAY.
CASE:
REMIGIO O. RAMOS, SR., petitioner, vs.
GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC., EDUARDO ASPREC,
ENELDA ASPREC, ERNESTO ASPREC, and COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.[ G.R. No. 75905 October
12, 1987]

“We find no reason to disturb the appellate court's

finding of fact that the petitioner failed to prove the
non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road
except through the Gatchalian Avenue. As borne out
by the records of the case, there is a road right of way
provided by the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos
Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its
subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots. The fact that
said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience
to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public
highway does not bring him within the ambit of the
legal requisite.
Requirement of proving “that there is NO OTHER
ADEQUATE OUTLET”:

Here, there is absent any showing that the private

respondents had established the existence of the four
requisites mandated by law. For one, they failed to
prove that there is no adequate outlet from their
respective properties to a public highway. On the
contrary, as alleged by the petitioner in its answer to
the complaint, and confirmed by the appellate court,
"there is another outlet for the plaintiffs (private
respondents) to the main road."

(COSTABELLA CORPORATION vs. COURT OF

APPEALS ET.AL. G.R. No. 80511 January 25, 1991)
COSTABELLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

“To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the

legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is
already an existing adequate outlet from the
dominant estate to a public highway, even if the
said outlet, for one reason or another, be
inconvenient, the need to open up another
servitude is entirely unjustified. For to justify the
imposition of an easement or right of way, "there
must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity
for it."
A case of inadequate outlet:

ENCARNACION vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 77628

March 11, 1991

While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the
dominant tenement, that access is grossly inadequate.
Generally, the right of way may be demanded: (1) when
there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2)
when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use
or is grossly insufficient. In the present case, the river bed
route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no
ingress nor egress from the highway. For the jeep to reach
the level of the highway, it must literally jump four (4) to
five (5) meters up. Moreover, during the rainy season, the
river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be
used at certain times of the year. With the inherent
disadvantages of the river bed which make passage difficult,
if not impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all.
E. EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY CANNOT BE
ACQUIRED BY PRESCRIPTION BEING A
“DISCONTINUOUS EASEMENT” ALTHOUGH
IT IS APPARENT.

The essence of this easement ("servidumbre de paso") lies in the power

of the dominant owner to cross or traverse the servient tenement
without being prevented or disturbed by its owner. As a servitude, it is
a limitation on the servient owner's rights of ownership, because it
restricts his right to exclude others from his property. But such
limitation exists only when the dominant owner actually crosses or
passes over the servient estate; because when he does not, the servient
owner's right of exclusion is perfect and undisturbed. Since the
dominant owner can not be continually and uninterruptedly crossing
the servient estate, but can do so only at intervals, the easement is
necessarily of an intermittent or discontinuous nature. (
Concurring Opinion of Justice JBL Reyes,
Ronquillo vs. Roco G.R. No. L-10619 February 28,
1958)
Further in the case of BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO.,
INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF
MAGDALENO VALDEZ SR., [G.R. No. 124699. July 31,
2003]

“The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks

does not in any way convert the nature of an easement
of right of way to one that is continuous. It is not the
presence of apparent signs or physical indications showing
the existence of an easement, but rather the manner of
exercise thereof, that categorizes such easement into
continuous or discontinuous. The presence of physical
or visual signs only classifies an easement into apparent
or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right of
way) and a window (which evidences a right to light
and view) are apparent easements, while an easement
of not building beyond a certain height is non-
apparent.”
Compensation requirement in “compulsory easement
of right of way”

Statutory rule:

Art. 649…… Should this easement be established in

such a manner that its use may be continuous for all
the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a
permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the
value of the land occupied and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient estate.

In case the right of way is limited to the necessary

passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded
by others and for the gathering of its crops through
the servient estate without a permanent way, the
indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage
caused by such encumbrance.
Note, the effect when easement is extinguished:

Art. 655. If the right of way granted to a

surrounded estate ceases to be necessary because
its owner has joined it to another abutting on a
public road, the owner of the servient estate may
demand that the easement be extinguished,
returning what he may have received by way of
indemnity. The interest on the indemnity shall be
deemed to be in payment of rent for the use of the
easement.
Amount of compensation (aerial right of way)

Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over

respondent’s property was purely an easement of a right of way,
still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an
easement fee and not the full value of the property. The
acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the
power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds support in
similar cases in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of
just compensation for private property condemned for public
use. x x x

True, an easement of right of way transmits no rights except

the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the
property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not
gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature
and the effect of the installation of power lines, the limitations on
the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive
respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the
latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must
be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the
land.[ NPC vs. SUAREZ G.R. No. 175725 October 8, 2008)
EASEMENT OF PARTY WALL:

 Co-ownership or Easement?

 Easement [ Manresa, De Diego, Castan, and Ricci]; Co-

Ownership [ Sanchez Roman, Valverde, etc]

 This co-ownership is a special class in itself [ as shown

by the following: 1) co-ownership is indivisible 2) part
pertaining to the co-owner can be materially designated
3) rights of a co-owner greater than those of an ordinary
co-owner, such as with respect to increasing the height
of the wall] . This is a kind of COMPULSORY KIND OF
CO-OWNERSHIP.
It is a servitude because, in an ordinary co-
ownership [ none of the co-owners may do
anything on the common property for his own
exclusive benefit, but in a party wall, there is no
limitation upon the juridical action of the owners].
Party Wall:
Being a case of “forced-ownership”, adjoining
estates may be considered as dominant and
servient to each other.

Others, however, prefer to consider the estates as

the dominant immovables and THE PARTY
WALL the servient property.
 PRESUMPTION OF EXISTENCE OF PARTY
WALL:

 (1) In dividing walls of adjoining buildings up to

the point of common elevation;

 (2) In dividing walls of gardens or yards

situated in cities, towns, or in rural
communities;

 (3) In fences, walls and live hedges dividing

rural lands. ( Article 659)
Instances of existence of proof to the contrary are
enumerated under Article 600.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:

DOMINGO LAO and ALBINA DE LOS

SANTOS, applicants -appellants, vs. THE
HEIRS OF LORENZA ALBURO, G.R. No.
10372, December 24, 1915.

This involved a conflict in the inclusion of stone

wall in the application for registration of a parcel
of land.
It was contended by the oppositor that “…. a stone wall
shown in that plan to be northeast of the said parcel had
been improperly included; that this wall had belonged
to the said Lorenza Alburo, for it had existed since
March 8, 1881; that the principal timbers of the building
that had belonged to the said deceased had rested on it
for more than thirty-five years, and the latter's
successors had been and were now in the quiet,
peaceable, and uninterrupted possession of the said
wall.”
RULING OF THE COURT:

The record shows it to have been duly proven that the enclosing wall
of Lot No. 2 of the plan Exhibit A, belonging to the applicants,
much higher than the adjoining building of the objectors; that
along the top of the said wall there is a gutter which catches the rain
water from the eaves of the roof of the applicants' building and
carries it thence to Calle Juan Luna through an iron pipe fastened to
the said wall; that one-half of the top of the said wall is covered by
the roof of the applicants' building; that the supports of the said
wall project toward the side of the applicants' land and that none of
the buttresses are on the side of the objectors' lot; that the stones of
the wall in dispute are bound or inset in the rear enclosing wall of
the applicants' property in such wise that the two walls that inclose
the lot form but a single construction, the exterior signs of which
show that the wall in question is not a party wall, but that it forms a
part of the applicants' building and belongs to them.
Every part-owner of a party wall may use it in
proportion to the right he may have in the co-
ownership, without interfering with the common and
respective uses by the other co-owners. ( ARTICLE
666)

PROHIBITION TO OPEN AN OPENING OR WINDOW:

No part-owner, may, without the consent of the others,

OPEN through the party wall any window or aperture
of any kind ( ARTICLE 667)
EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW:

Easement of Light- right to make an opening to

admit light from an adjoining tenement (“jus
luminum” )

Easement of View- right to make projections which

can afford a direct or oblique view
AND disallowing owner of the servient estate from
obstructing that view.
Example:
“servidumbre prospectus” e.g. as in the case of full or regular windows
overlooking adjoining estate. “altius non tollendi”- easement not to
build higher for the purpose of obstruction.
Can this be acquired by prescription?

Answer: Yes, because this is a continuous and

apparent easement.

When does the period of prescription start to run?

It depends on whether it is a positive easement or a

negative easement
EASEMENT OF LIGHT WHEN POSITIVE AND
WHEN NEGATIVE?

When “positive”?

Positive- When opening is made on another’s

wall, or on a party wall, the servitude acquired is
POSITIVE, because the owner or owners of such
wall permits the encumbrance to burden his or
their wall.
Opening made on ones’ wall ( Positive
Easements):
When “negative”?

Negative- when the openings are made in one’s

own wall [ when a person makes openings on his
own wall to admit light below the ceiling joists [any
of the parallel beams of wood, metal, or concrete
that support a floor, roof, or ceiling ], and he
acquires a servitude to admit such light, the
servitude is a negative one ( Article 669)- because it
imposes upon the owner of the adjacent estate the
obligation NOT TO CONSTRUCT on his land in
such manner as to obstruct the light.]
In the case of CORTES vs. YU-TIBO G.R. No. 911,
MARCH 12, 1903, involving the plaintiffs asking for an
injunctive writ to restrain the building commenced by
defendant, the Supreme Court noted that “windows
were opened on a wall belonging to the wife of
plaintiff”.

The Supreme Court said that the opening made was just a
plain exercise of the right of ownership. NO
EASEMENT WAS CREATED AT THIS POINT (even
if this is tolerated by the neighboring owner), the reason
being that this may be covered “anytime by the owner
of the abutting property”.

“ The easement really consists in prohibiting or

restraining the adjacent owner from doing anything
which may tend to cut off or interrupt the light..”
While in general, negative easement cannot be acquired
by prescription since they are non-apparent, still the
very existence of Art. 621 proves that in certain cases,
and for purposes of prescription, there are negative
easement that may be indeed be considered apparent
not because…

The notarial prohibition makes apparent what is really

non-apparent.
Distinguish this case from that of GARGANTOS
vs. TAN YANON G. R. No. L-14652 June 30,
1960, (involving sale of a house a land with
improvements by one owner which he
subdivided into three and sold to 3 different
individuals) and one of those sold already had
existing windows and doors at the time of sale:

“It is obvious, however, that Article 538, O.C.C. (now Article 621,
N.C.C.) and the doctrine in the Yu-Tibo case are not applicable herein
because the two estates, that now owned by petitioner, and that
owned by respondent, were formerly owned by just one person,
Francisco Sanz. It was Sanz who introduced improvements on both
properties. On that portion presently belonging to respondent, he
constructed a house in such a way that the northeastern side thereof
extends to the wall of the
camarin on the portion now belonging to petitioner. On said northeastern
side of the house, there are windows and doors which serve as passages
for light and view. These windows and doors were in existence when
respondent purchased the house and lot from Sanz. The deed of sale
did not provide that the easement of light and view would not be
established. This then is precisely the case covered by Article 541,
O.C.C. (now Article 624, N.C.C.) which provides that the existence of
an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the
proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a
title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at
the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary is
stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to
disappear before the instrument is executed. …”
Art. 670 prohibits the opening of windows, apertures, etc.
which afford a direct view upon or towards an adjoining
land or tenement WITHOUT LEAVING A DISTANCE OF
TWO METERS between the wall in which they are made
and such contiguous property.

For side or oblique views, a minimum distance of 60

centimeters.

NON-OBSERVANCE OF THESE DISTANCES DOES NOT

GIVE RISE TO PRESCRIPTION.

EFFECT OF NON-OBSERVANCE: ILLEGAL and MAY BE

ORDERED CLOSED. ANY STIPULATION TO THE
CONTRARY IS VOID.

*see Art. 669

 Regulatory distances: - limited “opening” may be
made

Art. 669. When the distances in Article 670 are not

observed, the owner of a wall which is not party
wall, adjoining a tenement or piece of land
belonging to another, can make in it openings to
admit light at the height of the ceiling joints or
immediately under the ceiling, and of the size of
thirty centimeters square, and, in every case, with
an iron grating imbedded in the wall and with a
wire screen.

- Purpose is just to admit “light”, not for view

Art. 670. No windows, apertures, balconies, or
other similar projections which afford a direct
view upon or towards an adjoining land or
tenement can be made, without leaving a distance
of two meters between the wall in which they are
made and such contiguous property.

Neither can side or oblique views upon or towards

such conterminous property be had, unless there
be a distance of sixty centimeters.

The nonobservance of these distances does not

give rise to prescription.
EASEMENT OF DRAINAGE OF BUILDINGS:

1. Owner obliged to construct his roof or covering in

such a manner that the rain water falls on his land or
on a street or public place..

2. Making sure that water collected on one’s estate

would not cause damage to adjacent land or
tenement.

3. If surrounded by other houses, no possibility of

outlet, establishment of drainage can be demanded.
INTERMEDIATE DISTANCES AND WORKS FOR
CONSTRUCTIONS AND PLANTINGS

1. Constructions cannot be built or plantings near

fortified places or fortresses…
2. No trees shall be planted near a tenement or piece of
land belonging to another except if certain distance
requirements are observed, i.e. in accordance with
customs, or, in the absence thereof, 2 meters from
dividing line of estates (tall trees); 50 centimeters if
shrubs or small trees are planted.
3. Branches extending over another’s property - may
demand that it be cut off; if roots, owner may cut it by
himself.
EASEMENT AGAINST NUISANCE:

Every building/piece of land subject to easement

imposing against proprietor or possessor from
committing nuisance through noise, jarring, offensive
odor, smoke, heat, dust, water, glare, and other causes..

EASEMENT AGAINST LATERAL AND SUBJACENT

SUPPORT:

..prohibition on excavation upon one’s land as to deprive

any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or
subjacent support..
We sustain the CA in declaring that a permanent
injunction on the part of petitioner from making injurious
excavations is necessary in order to protect the interest
of respondent. However, an annotation of the existence
of the subjacent and lateral support is no longer
necessary. It exists whether or not it is annotated or
registered in the registry of property. A judicial recognition
of the same already binds the property and the owner of the
same, including her successors-in-interest. Otherwise, every
adjoining landowner would come to court or have the
easement of subjacent and lateral support registered in order
for it to be recognized and respected.

[ G.R. No. 183719, February 02, 2011 ]

MARGARITA F. CASTRO, PETITIONER,

VS.

NAPOLEON A. MONSOD, RESPONDENT.

2. NON-USER ( of easements already in existence or
which have lawfully arisen) for ten years…

3. When either or both estates fall into such condition

that the easement cannot be used; but shall revived if
the subsequent condition of the estates or either of
them should again permit its use..

4. Expiration of the term or the fulfillment of the

condition, if the easement is temporary or conditional.

5. Renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate

6. Redemption agreed upon between the owners of the

dominant and servient estate.
VOLUNTARY EASEMENTS:

As we have said, the opening of an adequate outlet to a

highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory
easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at
bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also
qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract
from its permanency as a property right, which survives
the termination of the necessity. A voluntary easement
of right of way, like any other contract, could be
extinguished only by mutual agreement or by
renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.

(UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL vs. JOSEPH CHUNG,

GR. No. 173252, July 17, 2009)
Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal only to
Hidalgo since the annotation merely mentioned Sandico and Hidalgo
without equally binding their heirs or assigns. That the heirs or assigns
of the parties were not mentioned in the annotation does not mean that
it is not binding on them. Again, a voluntary easement of right of way is
like any other contract. As such, it is generally effective between the
parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.(Unisource Commercial
and Development Corp. v. Chung, G.R. No. 173252, [July 17, 2009], 610
PHIL 642-652)
Easement Over a Co-owned Property

- Of the tenement or piece of land is in a state of co-

ownership, the unanimous consent of all co-owners is
required in order to constitute a voluntary easement upon
the same

- Consent by the co-owners may be given by them either

simultaneously or successively
EFFECT OF NON-REGISTRATION IN THE TITLE
OF DOMINANT ESTATE:

“We also hold that although the easement does not

appear in respondents’ title over the dominant estate, the
same subsists. It is settled that the registration of the
dominant estate under the Torrens system without the
annotation of the voluntary easement in its favor does
not extinguish the easement. On the contrary, it is the
registration of the servient estate as free, that is, without
the annotation of the voluntary easement, which
extinguishes the easement.” UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL
vs. JOSEPH CHUNG, G.R. No. 173252, July 17, 2009)
NUISANCE:

A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business,

condition of property, or anything else which:

 (1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

 (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

 (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or

 (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any

public highway or street, or any body of water; or
 (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
Nuisance is a tort because legal liability for a
nuisance is predicated on an invasion of the
plaintiff’s legal rights by an act not warranted by
law, or from a neglect of duty imposed by law.

HOWEVER, it differs from negligence. The basis

of liability (arising from nuisance) is not
negligence.

Negligence is want of proper care. But a person

who creates a nuisance is responsible for the
resulting injury REGARDLESS of the degree of
care or skill exercised to avoid such injury.
PUBLIC NUISANCE:

A public nuisance affects a community or

neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal.

PRIVATE NUISANCE:

 A private nuisance is one that is not included in the

foregoing definition.
 The essence of a private nuisance claim is the
protection of a property owner’s interest in the
private use and enjoyment of his land.
Nuisance may also be:

Per se- nuisance at all times e.g. house of prostitution, gambling

houses, houses constructed on public streets, and river beds

Per accidens- nuisance only under or because of certain

circumstances or conditions. This necessitate a previous
determination by a tribunal, e.g. rubber factory in a residential
subdivision, raising or breeding of pigs in a residential area..

If per se – abated summarily (di maka ingon nga asa ang warrant)
If per accidens – necessitate a previous determination by a tribunal
(kailangan ka ug abatement of nuisance)
- So while on going, kailangan ka ug Injunction
Who is liable for nuisance?

Owner, successive owner, or possessor of property

who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance started by
a former owner…

Aside from abatement as a remedy, he may also be

held liable for damages.
 REMEDIES AGAINST NUISANCE
Public nuisance:

1. Prosecution under the Penal Code (e.g. unjust

vexation) or local ordinance
2. Civil action ( e.g. injunction), or

3. Abatement without judicial proceedings

Basis for exercise of abatement:

a. Police Power ( e.g. Section 16, of R.A. 7160

“general welfare clause”)
b. No right to compensation
As a rule, civil action to abate a nuisance shall be
commenced by the city or municipal mayor ( Art.
701), but a private person may file it himself IF IT
IS ESPECIALLY INJURIOUS TO HIMSELF.

PRIVATE NUISANCE:

1. Civil Action
2. Abatement without judicial proceedings. It is
however desirable that the procedure for
extrajudicial abatement of a public nuisance shall
be followed (i.e. demand first, seek approval of
district health officer, and assistance from local
police)
 Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance:

 Dangerous instrumentality or appliance which is

likely to attract children at play.
 One who maintains on his estate or premises an
attractive nuisance without exercising due care to
prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years
who is injured thereby, even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises.
Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. vs. Guillermo Balandan et.al.
G.R. No. L-3422 June 13, 1952

“Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which

attract children. Lurking in their waters is always
the danger of drowning. Against this danger
children are early instructed so that they are
sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if
the owner of private property creates an artificial
pool on his own property, merely duplicating the
work of nature without adding any new danger, . .
. (he) is not liable because of having created an
`attractive nuisance.”
Estate of Gregoria Francisco Case (involving storage
of a copra in a quonset structure, can it be
summarily abated?)
`Estate of Gregoria Francisco et.al. vs. Court of
Appeals G.R. No. 95279 July 26, 1991
Respondents can not seek cover under the general
welfare clause authorizing the abatement of
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet
applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects
the immediate safety of persons and property and
may be summarily abated under the undefined
law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil.
123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the quonset
building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it
can not be said to be injurious to rights of
property, of health or of comfort of the community.
If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven
in a hearing conducted for that purpose.
OTHER CASES:

 …resolution struck down as invalid..which

authorizes the closure or transfer of location of a
gasoline station upon authority of its Official
Zoning Code. According to the Court, the business
of a gasoline station could not be considered a
nuisance per se which the municipality could
summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police
power. (Parayno vs. Jovellanos, G.R. No. 148408,
July 14, 2006)
An ordinance prohibiting the operation of all bus
and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including
those already existing and allowing the
operation of only one common terminal
…,invalid. Bus and jeepney terminals are not
nuisances per se. They cannot be abated via an
ordinance without judicial proceedings ( Lucena
Grand Central Terminal, Inc. vs. JAC Liner Inc.
G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005)
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still
find in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s
demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general
welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the
government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.

One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition
orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only
relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it has also been
endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals
and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon. Pertinent herein is
Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the closure
and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the
necessary permits, to wit:

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014 ]

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, PETITIONER,

VS.

MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, et.al.

DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING
OWNERSHIP:

Theory of Mode and Title:

“The efficacy of the various modes of acquiring

ownership and other real rights over property are
predicated on the existence of title or the juridical
justification to permit those modes to become
effective processes of ownership acquisition.”
MODE AND TITLE:

Mode is the specific cause which produces

dominion and other real rights as a result of the co-
existence of special status of things, capacity and
intention of persons and fulfillment of the requisites
of law.

Title is the juridical act, right, or condition which

gives the means to their acquisition (but which in
in itself insufficient to produce them).
 Mode Title

Occupation Seizure Property is seized

without a known
owned

Donation Formalities/ Agreement of parties

delivery

Succession Death Law or will

Tradition Delivery Agreement of

Parties
OCCUPATION:

1. Things appropriable by nature without an owner ( “res

nullius” e.g. animals object of hunting, hidden treasure
and abandoned movables) are acquired by occupation.
2. Ownership of piece of land cannot be acquired by
occupation.

LAW

e.g. hidden treasure (e.g. share of owner of land where

treasures are found); changes in the course of river;
fruits of trees falling naturally on the property of
another )
DONATION ( TITLE III, BOOK III):

Donation is an act of liberality, whereby a person

disposes of gratuitously of a thing or right in a favor of
another who accepts it.

ONLY GRATUITOUS AND REMUNERATORY

DONATIONS ARE GOVERNED BY THE
PROVISIONS OF TITLE III

DONATIONS WITH AN ONEROUS CAUSE ARE

GOVERNED BY THE RULE ON CONTRACTS

DONATIONS MORTIS CAUSA GOVERNED BY THE

FORMALITIES REQUIRED IN EXECUTION OF
NOTARIAL WILL ( Art. 805, CC)
DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS ARE
GOVERNED BY THE FAMILY CODE.
Characteristics (Elements) of Donation:

a) Essential REDUCTION of the patrimony of the

donor
b) INCREASE in the patrimony of the donee
c) INTENT to do an act of liberality
Is Donation a contract?

Yes.

Contract is a meeting of the minds between two

persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to
the other to give something or to render some
service.

Like any contract, donation also requires the

concurrence of the reciprocal consent of the parties
and it does not become perfect until it is perfected
by the donee.
INTER-VIVOS AND MORTIS CAUSA
DONATIONS:

In donation inter vivos, the act is immediately

operative and final, while mortis causa donations
may only become operative if the formalities of
wills are observed. Takes effect after the death of
the donor.
Austria-Magat vs. Hon. Court of Appeals G.R. No.
106755 February 1, 2002 [ INTER-VIVOS
DONATION]
Deed of Donation provides:

Ibinibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi

mababawi sa naulit na apat na anak ko at sa kanilang
mga tagapagmana, ang aking lupang residential o
tirahan sampu ng aking bahay nakatirik doon xxx.
(emphasis supplied)
This is a clear expression of the irrevocability of the
conveyance. The irrevocability of the donation is a
characteristic of a donation inter vivos. By the words
“hindi mababawi”, the donor expressly renounced
the right to freely dispose of the house and lot in
question. The right to dispose of a property is a right
essential to full ownership. Hence, ownership of the
house and lot was already with the donees even
during the donor’s lifetime.
CHARACTERISTICS OF A MORTIS CAUSA DONATION:

 Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals [ G.R. No. L-6600 July 30, 1954 ],
the characteristics of donation mortis causa are as follows:

 (1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee

before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the
same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership
(full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

 (2) That before his death, the transfer should be

revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed;

 (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor

should survive the transferee.
 Art. 729. When the donor intends that the
donation shall take effect during the lifetime of
the donor, though the property shall not be
delivered till after the donor's death, this shall
be a donation inter vivos. The fruits of the
property from the time of the acceptance of the
donation, shall pertain to the donee, unless the
donor provides otherwise. (n)

 Art. 730. The fixing of an event or the imposition

of a suspensive condition, which may take place
beyond the natural expectation of life of the
donor, does not destroy the nature of the act as a
donation inter vivos, unless a contrary intention
appears. (n)
 In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis
causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not
contain any clear provision that intends to pass
proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan’s
death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of
the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that
Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of
the properties to petitioners during her lifetime.
Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations
as mortis causa in the following Acceptance and
Attestation clauses, uniformly found in the subject deeds
of donation, to wit:

 "That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing

donation mortis causa under the terms and conditions set
forth therein, and avail herself of this occasion to express
her profound gratitude for the kindness and generosity of
the DONOR.“ ( MAGLASANG vs. HEIRS OF CORAZON
CABATINGAN G.R. No. 131953 June 5, 2002)
FORMALITIES REQUIRES FOR MORTIS CAUSA DONATION (Same as in
will and testament)

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at
the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by
some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will
is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it

shall be interpreted to them. (n)
 As we analyze it, Exhibit A is a donation in praesenti and conveyed the
fee simple title to the lands in question subject only to the life estate of the donor.
It must be conceded that during her lifetime the grantor had a legal right to
convey the fee simple title to her lands to any person in her discretion, reserving
to herself a life estate. In legal effect, that is what she did here. The
conveyance of the lands took effect upon the making and delivery of the
deed, reserving a life estate only in the donor. The conveyance itself was
not to become effective until the death of the donor, but, in legal effect, it
recites that an actual conveyance is made subject to the life estate of the
donor. Upon its face Exhibit A comes squarely within the provisions of article
623 of the Civil Code, which reads:

"A donation is perfected as soon as the donor has knowledge

that it has been accepted by the donee."
Here, it appears from the instrument itself that Ester Magno accepted the
donation on behalf of the son, and the acceptance is incorporated in the body of
the instrument and made a part of it, and is signed by the donor and acceptor in
the presence of witnesses and the instrument as a whole is legally
acknowledged before a notary public.
Again, when the instrument is construed as a whole it shows upon its face
a delivery and acceptance. The donor conveys the lands, and in and by the
same instrument the mother of the donee accepts the conveyance upon the
terms and conditions stated in the deed.
(Laureta v. Mata, G.R. No. 19740, [March 22, 1923], 44 PHIL 668-675)
FOR ONEROUS DONATIONS, THE RULE IN
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS APPLIES

 i.e. Rule in contracts [ which is applicable in a case

of “onerous donation”]:

 Art. 1183. Impossible conditions, those contrary to

good customs or public policy and those
prohibited by law shall annul the obligation which
depends upon them. If the obligation is divisible,
that part thereof which is not affected by the
impossible or unlawful condition shall be valid.
 EFFECT OF ILLEGAL OR IMPOSSIBLE CONDITIONS

Art. 727. Illegal or impossible conditions in simple and

remuneratory donations shall be considered as not
imposed. ( THIS ONLY APPLIES IF THE DONATION
IS PURELY GRATUITOUS)

Illustration:
“A” donates in proper form parcel of land worth
P100,000.00. He imposed (a) burden valued at
P50,000.00 and b) impossible condition.

Portion in excess of P50,000.00 (value of burden) is

governed by TITLE III, while P50,000.00 (other half
equivalent to burden) is governed by the rules on
obligations and contracts
Consequences:

1) The P50,000.00 gratuitous portion is valid EVEN IF THERE

IS AN IMPOSSIBLE CONDITION because this condition
will simply be disregarded.
2) With regard to the other half corresponding to the onerous
portion (equivalent to the burden), this would be invalid
because the rule on contracts says impossible condition
would invalidate the obligation.

LET’S ASSUME THAT DONATION IS IN A PRIVATE

WRITING AND NO IMPOSSIBLE CONDITION IS
IMPOSED:

Rule is: If it is a simple donation, donation of immovable

must be in a public document.
THEREFORE, the legal effects would be as follows:

1. Gratuitous portion (P50,000.00) is void, not being in

a public document.
2. But, onerous portion (other P50,000.00) would be
valid because a private writing would suffice for
validity under the rule on contracts.
ELEMENTS OF DONATION:

CONSENT

1. Consent - Following theory of cognition, donation is

perfected from the moment donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee.

Donee must accept the donation personally,

through an authorized person with an SPA,
OTHERWISE DONATION IS VOID.

Acceptance must be made during the lifetime (and

before incapacity of the donor and of the donee)
Persons who may give or receive a donation:

1. All persons who may contract and dispose.

Donor’s capacity is determined as of the time of the
making ( execution of formalities and acceptance)
of the donation.

2. All those not disqualified by law may accept

donations. Minors and others who cannot enter
into contract may become donees but acceptance
shall be done by their parents or legal
representatives.
Void donations:

1. Those between persons guilty of adultery and

concubinage at the time of the donation

2. Between persons found guilty of the same criminal

offense

3. Those made to a public officer or his wife,

descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.
 OBJECT

Ordinary donation may comprehend all the present

property of the donor, or part thereof, provided he
reserves in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient
means for the support of himself, and of all relatives,
who at the time of the acceptance of donation, are by
law entitled to be supported.

Without reservation, donation is not void, but it shall be

reduced on the petition of a person affected by it.

No donation of future property (anything which the

donor cannot dispose of at the time of the donation)
 CAUSE

Donation is an act of liberality, although it may be

made on account of the donee’s merits or services
NOT CONSTITUTING A DEMANDABLE DEBT
or of a BURDEN WHICH IS LESS THAN THE
VALUE OF THE THING GIVEN.

The case of LIGUEZ vs. LOPEZ (L-11240, February

13, 1958)
 FORMALITIES OF DONATION

If subject is movable:

May be made orally or in writing. Oral donation

requires simultaneous delivery, actual or
constructive, of the thing or of the document
representing the right donated

If value of movable exceeds P5,000.00, donation and

acceptance shall be made in writing, otherwise
donation shall be void.
If subject is immovable ( to be precise, immovable by
nature):

Donation must be made in a public document.

Acceptance may be made in the same deed of

donation or in a separate public document, but it
shall not take effect unless it is done during the
lifetime of the donor.
EFFECT OF DONATION:

Once perfected, donation is final. Except if there are legal

grounds, it cannot be revoked or rescinded.

Fruits of the property from the time of acceptance of the

donation pertains to donee, unless donor provides
otherwise.

When donation is made to several persons JOINTLY,

understood to be in equal shares, no right of accretion
among them (unless donor otherwise provides).
In donations made to the husband and wife jointly, there
shall be right of accretion.
Donee subrogated to all the rights and action (which
in case of eviction ) would pertain to the donor.
Donor, however, is not obliged to warrant the
things donated (except if donation is onerous, in
which case the donor shall be liable for eviction or
hidden defects in case of bad faith on his part)

Ownership of property can be donated to one person

and the usufruct to another, provided all the
donees are living at the time of the donation.
Obligation of donee to pay debts of donor:

a) When donation imposes (upon the donee) the

obligation to pay debts of donor, the donee is only
liable to pay debts previously contracted (unless there
is a declaration to the contrary)

b) Donee NOT RESPONSIBLE for debts exceeding the

value of the property donated.

c) Should there be no stipulation to the contrary

regarding payment of debts, the donee shall be
responsible only when donation has been made in
FRAUD OF CREDITORS (i.e. At the time donation was
made, the donor did not reserve sufficient property to
pay his debts)
 REVOCATION AND REDUCTION OF DONATIONS

GROUNDS:

Appearance of Children; Breach of Condition;

Ingratitude or Inofficiousness

APPEARANCE OF CHILDREN:

1. If donor, AFTER DONATION, should have legitimate

or legitimated or illegitimate children, even though
posthumous.
2. If child of donor believed to be dead, should turn out
to be living.
3. If donor should subsequently adopt a minor child.

Extent of revocation/reduction:

Donation shall be revoked or reduced insofar as it

exceeds the portion that may be freely disposed of by
will, taking into account whole (net) estate of the donor
at the time of birth, appearance, or adoption of child. (
e.g. “A” has net estate = 10Million, 5 M is reserved for
compulsory heirs; 5M may be donated gratuitously)

UPON REVOCATION OR REDUCTION, THE

PROPERTY AFFECTED SHALL BE RETURNED, OR
ITS VALUE IF THE DONEE HAS SOLD THE SAME.
Note: Donee not obliged to return the fruits except from
the filing of the complaint.
Prescriptive period (for filing action to revoke or
reduce based on this ground)

4 Years from the birth of the first child, or from his

legitimation, recognition or adoption, or from the
judicial declaration of filiation, or from the time
information was received regarding existence of the
child believed dead.

NOTE:

Action cannot be renounced, and is even transmitted,

upon the death of the donor, to his legitimate and
illegitimate children and descendants.
BREACH OF CONDITION:

May be revoked at the instance of the donor. The

ground is failure to comply with any of the conditions
which the former imposed upon the donee.

Effect: Property shall be returned to the donor,

alienations made by the donee void..but subject to
limitations under the mortgage law and the land
registration laws.

Note: If ground is breach of condition, the donee shall

return not only the property but also the fruits thereof
which he may have received after having failed to
fulfill the condition
Prescriptive period to file?

4 years from the non-compliance of conditions, may

be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may
be exercised against the donee’s heirs.

Note, however, that this 4 year period applies if it is

a simple donation.

In onerous donation, the rules on contracts applies

DE LUNA et.al. vs. HON. ABRIGO G.R. No. 57455
January 18, 1990

“It is true that Article 764 of the New Civil Code,

actions for the revocation of a donation must be
brought within for (4) years from the non-compliance
of the conditions of the donation. However, it is Our
opinion that the said article does not apply to onerous
donations in view of the specific provision of Article
733 providing that onerous donations are governed by
the rules on contracts.

In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the

general rules on prescription and not the rules on
donations are applicable in the case at bar.”
INGRATITUDE:
Grounds:

a) Commission of offense against the person, honor, or

the property of the donor, or of his wife or children
b) If donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or
any act involving moral turpitude, even though he
should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been
committed against the donee himself, his wife, or
children under his authority
c) If donee unduly refuses to give donor support when
donee is legally or morally bound to give support.

THESE GROUNDS ARE EXCLUSIVE. Prescriptive

period is 1 year from the time donor had knowledge of
the fact, and it was possible for him to bring the action.
INOFFICIOUSNESS:
Ground:

 Art. 752. The provisions of Article 750

notwithstanding, no person may give or receive, by
way of donation, more than he may give or receive by
will.

The donation shall be inofficious in all that it may

exceed this limitation.

If, bearing in mind the estimated net value of donor’s

property at the time of his death, what was received by
way of donation exceeds or impairs what a compulsory
heir (s) shall receive, donation shall be reduced with
regard to excess
Who may question (or, file an action to reduce based
on this ground)?

“Only those who at the time of the donor’s death

have a right to the legitime, and their heirs and
successors in interest, may ask for the reduction of
inofficious donations.” (Note: devisees and legatees
have no legal personality to ask for the reduction
based on this ground)

They cannot renounce their right during the lifetime

of the donor, either by express declaration, or by
consenting to the donation.
Prescriptive period for the filing of action to revoke
(or, reduce) based on “inofficiousness”?

“Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon

an obligation created by law must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period
applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious
donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil
Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of
compulsory heirs.”

( Eloy Imperial vs. CA et.al. GR.112483 Oct. 8, 1999)

ACCEPTANCE OF DONATION:

PAJARILLO et.al. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT G.R. No. 72908 August 11, 1989

FACTS:

Donation that is involved is that from a mother to a

daughter.

Donation was accepted by Salud Suterio in a separate

public instrument, but the acceptance WAS NOT
NOTED in both instruments, meaning, the extra-judicial
partition [ where the donation was made] and in the
instrument of acceptance, as required by the Civil Code.
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure
that the acceptance of the donation is duly
communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, it is
not even suggested that Juana was unaware of the
acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and
requested that the donated land be not registered
during her lifetime by Salud. 13 Given this
significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience
declare the donation ineffective because there is no
notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the
donee's acceptance. That would be placing too
much stress on mere form over substance.
NO NEED TO MENTION NAME OF DONEE IN
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF DEED OF DONATION

Quilala vs. Gliceria Alcantara et.al. G.R. No. 132681

December 3, 2001

FACTS:

The acknowledgement only contains the name of the

donor to be the only one who appeared before the
Notary Public. There was no mention of the donee. But
in the Deed of Donation itself, there appears a
stipulation that the “donee hereby receives and accepts
the gift and donation made in her favor by the donor….”
HELD:

In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by

the donee before the notary public does not also
render the donation null and void. The instrument
should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be
considered a private document in part and a public
document in another part. The fact that it was
acknowledged before a notary public converts the
deed of donation in its entirety a public
instrument. The fact that the donee was not
mentioned by the notary public in the
acknowledgment is of no moment.
VOID DONATION may be basis for title through
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION

CALICDAN vs. CENDANA G.R. NO. 155080

FEBRUARY 5, 2004

FACTS:

The donation involved a 760 sq.m. parcel of land in

Mangaldan, Pangasinan executed by Fermina Calicdan (
in 1947) in favor of Silverio Cendana. This is a suit for
recovery instituted by Soledad Calicdan, one of the
children of Fermina.

The donation was found to be the exclusive property of

Fermina’s husband, Sixto, being an inheritance from the
latter’s parents.
HELD:

Although the donation is void for having been

executed by one who is not the owner, considering
that it was established that respondent Silverio
Cendana has been in possession of the land for 45
years already he has acquired title to it by
acquisitive prescription.
 ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA et.al. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 77425 June 19, 1991
HELD:

Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an

action for the revocation of a donation must be brought
within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in the
case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly
provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in
case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial
declaration revoking the same is not necessary.

When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly

provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the
property donated, the rules on contract and the general
rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764
of the Civil Code.
EXAMPLE OF AN “IMPOSSIBLE/ILLEGAL
CONDITION”

Prohibition to alienate for 100 years from date of

execution of donation

“In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the

deed of donation against the alienation of the property
for an entire century, being an unreasonable
emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of
ownership, should be declared as an illegal or
impossible condition within the contemplation of Article
727 of the Civil Code.” [ ROMAN CATHOLIC
ARCHBISHOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS ]
De Guia vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 120864, October
8, 2003
MANNER OF USE OF CO-OWNED PROPERTY:

The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a

similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner
cannot devote common property to his exclusive use
to the prejudice of the co-ownership. Hence, if the
subject is a residential house, all the co-owners may
live there with their respective families to the extent
possible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies
the entire house without opposition from the other co-
owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-
owners cannot demand the payment of
rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease
the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the
co-owner who dwells in the house.
 De Guia vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 120864. October
8, 2003

 “ The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a

similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot
devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice
of the co-ownership. Hence, if the subject is a residential
house, all the co-owners may live there with their respective
families to the extent possible. However, if one co-owner
alone occupies the entire house without opposition from
the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the
other co-owners cannot demand the payment of
rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the
house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-
owner who dwells in the house.”