Food Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Food Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/foodpol

Food processor and retailer non-GMO standards in the US and EU and the
driving role of regulations
⁎
Elena Castellaria, Claudio Soregarolia, , Thomas J. Venusb, Justus Wesselerc
a
Dipartimento di Economia Agro-alimentare, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Via Emilia Parmense 84, 29122 Piacenza, Italy
b
Agricultural Production and Resource Economics Group, Technical University of Munich, Alte Akademie 14, 85354 Freising, Germany
c
Agricultural Economics and Rural Policy Group, Wageningen University, Hollandsweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: In the last two decades, voluntary standards have played an increasing role in reshaping the non-GMO labeling
GMO schemes in the EU and the US. This work compares the mandatory and voluntary labeling schemes for food
Private and public standards produced from or with GMO in these two markets. After reviewing the EU and US regulatory frameworks, we
Non-GMO regulation introduce the incentives for the implementation of private and public voluntary standards. We describe the
experiences of voluntary standards adoption by highlighting the development of non-GMO labeled products
markets in EU and US. We emphasize the similarities between EU and US frameworks, the convergence between
public and private standards, and identify the potential for future development of the non-GMO market. We
conclude by describing the policy and economic implications of the development of the non-GMO labeled
products markets and consequences of the regulation that will apply to crops derived by new genetic mod-
ification techniques.

1. Introduction
Retailers and food processors in the European Union (EU) and the
United States (US) introduced non-GMO standards in the early 2000s.
These standards have evolved over time in their characteristics, adop-
tion, and legislative frameworks. Standards can be defined as the
agreed criteria or rules “by which a product or a service’s performance,
its technical and physical characteristics, and/or the process and con-
ditions under which it has been produced or delivered, can be assessed”
(Nadvi and Waltring, 2004, p. 56). Henson and Humphrey (2010)
classify a standard according to its public/private and mandatory/vo-
luntary nature and define four types of standards: (1) regulations
(public/mandatory), (2) legally-mandated private standards (private/
mandatory), (3) public voluntary standards (public/voluntary), and (4)
private voluntary standards (private/voluntary).
In agri-food chains, regulations typically define minimum quality
standards, which generally arise as a response to food safety issues. In
addition, standards developed by the private sector can be legally
mandated by the regulator within a “co-regulation” framework (Garcia
Martinez et al., 2013). The public sector can also define standards that
private entities can adopt and implement on a voluntary basis
(voluntary public standards); examples are the “Label Rouge” in France
and the Geographical Indications defined within the EU legislation.
Differently, all functions in private voluntary standards related to the
establishment and operation of a system of standards occur privately.1
Voluntary private standards emerged in the last two decades in many
industrial sectors, with agri-food as the first and most involved sector
(Raynolds et al., 2014). These standards “go beyond” mandatory and
public voluntary standards because they can be more stringent in terms
of product and process requirements or they can suggest the im-
plementation of additional controls as compared to those defined by
regulations (Henson and Humphrey, 2010). A variety of voluntary
private standards can be described in agri-food chains distinguishing
between collective standards (e.g. British Retail Consortium, GLO-
BALG.A.P.2) and individual firm standards (e.g. Field-to-Fork by Marks
and Spencer, Filière Qualité by Carrefour). This distinction is particu-
larly useful in highlighting the main incentives of private standard
setting.
The case of modern agricultural biotechnologies is interesting for
discussing the role of at least three categories of the above-defined
standards: regulations, voluntary public, and private standards. In the
case of agricultural biotechnology, regulations on genetically modified

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: elena.castellari@unicatt.it (E. Castellari), claudio.soregaroli@unicatt.it (C. Soregaroli), thomas.venus@tum.de (T.J. Venus), justus.wesseler@wur.nl (J. Wesseler).
1
These functions can be distinguished in: standard setting, adoption, implementation, conformity assessment, and enforcement (Henson and Humphrey, 2010).
2
GLOBALG.A.P. is an internationally recognized standard. They offer the following certifications: Food safety and traceability; Environment ; Workers’ health, safety and welfare;
Animal welfare; Integrated Crop Management (ICM); Integrated Pest Control (IPC); Quality Management System (QMS), and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2018.02.010
Received 9 February 2018; Accepted 19 February 2018
0306-9192/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Castellari, E., Food Policy (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2018.02.010
E. Castellari et al.
organisms (GMOs) leave room for voluntary public and private stan-
dards on products that do not fall within the scope of the GMO reg-
ulation. For further enrichment of this discussion on the role of stan-
dards, we consider the evolution of voluntary non-GMO standards in
two different markets: the United States and the European Union.
The regulations on GMOs in the two markets start from the same
premise: GMOs that receive approval are safe for human consumption
and the environment. Nevertheless, the regulations differ with respect
to the approval procedures, their definition of a GMO, and the labeling
standards (Smart et al., 2017). Until recently, the United States had not
required labeling of GMO products but this changed and mandatory
labeling standards are currently under development (Bovay and Alston,
this issue). According to EU legislation, a product must be labeled as
GMO if it contains more than 0.9 percent of EU-approved GMO material
for any of its ingredients considered individually. Voluntary public and
private standards provide the possibility to exempt food products that
are produced with the help of GMOs but which are not from or do not
contain GMOs (e.g., products from animals fed with GMO feed do not
require a GMO label).3
Some companies are willing to ensure that their food products
follow some non-GMO production rules (e.g., comes from animals fed
with non-GMO feed) by complying with a respective private or public
voluntary standard. However, labeling is not always the ultimate goal;
some companies label their products as non-GMO whereas others adopt
a non-GMO supply chain strategy without explicit labeling (Wesseler,
2014). Non-GMO voluntary private standards emerged in the European
Union at the end of the ‘90s and - following the “right to know” cam-
paign by anti-GMO activists - are also currently gaining a momentum in
the United States with several retailers and manufacturers introducing
non-GMO labels (Bain and Dandachi, 2014).
At the same time, mandatory labeling initiatives are evolving. More
and more US states have discussed the enactment of their own GMO
labeling laws. Three states (Connecticut, Vermont, and Maine) passed
GMO labeling laws. However, shortly after the Governor of Vermont
signed the bill that would require GMO labeling in Vermont to go into
effect in July 2016, President Obama signed bill S. 764 that will require
disclosure of GMO food in the United States to avoid a patchwork
system in which each state has its own labeling law. In the European
Union, the mandatory labeling applies to all Member States, but a
patchwork of voluntary public and private standards on non-GMO la-
beling emerged over the last two decades. Some Member States im-
plemented national legislation or guidelines, or prohibit non-GMO la-
beling.
The introduction of a new standard, such as the non-GMO one, has
several implications for the value chain. Several studies analyze the link
between public and private standards under different perspectives: the
reasons to introduce voluntary private standards (for a review see
Giraud-Héraud et al., 2012a) and their legitimacy (e.g. Fuchs et al.,
2011); the relation of voluntary private and public standards (e.g.
Smith, 2009; Garcia Martinez et al., 2013); the effect of voluntary
private standards on supply chain governance (e.g. Ghozzi et al., 2016;
Gereffi et al., 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002); and their impact on
trade with developing countries with a particular focus on market ac-
cess by smallholders (e.g. Schuster and Maertens, 2013; Lee et al.,
2012). With respect to the labeling of GMOs, a large literature compares
the mandatory labeling scheme of the European Union and the volun-
tary labeling option of the United States with the aim of comparing the
efficiency and adequacy of the respective systems (e.g., Caswell, 1998a,
1998b; Kirchhoff and Zago, 2001; Crespi and Marette, 2003; Huffman
and McCluskey, 2014; Roe et al., 2014; Bonroy and Constantatos,
2015). However, there is a lack of literature assessing the commonal-
ities and divergences of the evolution of the non-GMO schemes in the
3
Later in the document the emergence of new technologies that may reshape the de-
finition of GMO in the future will be briefly described.
2
Food Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
two markets. Understanding these dynamics helps to define future
market scenarios for traded commodities (e.g., soybeans). Under-
standing if the two markets will converge or not towards similar stan-
dards and management practices have sizeable economic implications
for all stakeholders operating along the supply chain. For example,
having two similar markets will facilitate the sourcing of the raw ma-
terial, the trade between the two markets, the definition of common
strategies and the introduction of new plant breeding techniques.
This results in important questions: Did different regulations lead to
the emergence of a similar path of voluntary private standards devel-
opment? How do they differ in terms of characteristics and adoption?
More generally, is there a convergence between public and private
standards in the United States and the European Union?
This paper will tackle the questions stated above as a first objective.
The answers will allow assessing, as a second objective, the potential for
future development of the non-GMO market, opening the discussion to
a set of policy implications for the classification of new plant breeding
techniques, trade, coexistence, segregation, and identity preservation as
well as other topics related to the governance of the supply chain.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
regulations with a focus on the mandatory labeling standards of the
United States and the European Union and highlights the differences.
Then we assess the incentives for the emergence of voluntary standards
and relate the assessment to the non-GMO standards in the United
States and the European Union. We discuss the non-GMO standards in
their characteristics and adoption across the two markets. Finally,
policy implications will be discussed.
2. Regulations on GMO labeling in the European Union and the
United States
2.1. United States
Regarding food safety in general, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) states in its Statement of Policy that “safety concerns should be
characteristics of the food product, rather than the fact that new
methods are used” (FDA, 1992). With regard to GMO foods, the FDA
stated that it “has no basis for concluding that bioengineered foods
differ from other foods in any meaningful or uniform way, or that, as a
class, foods developed by the new techniques present any different or
greater safety concern than foods developed by traditional plant
breeding” (FDA, 1992). The statement implies that GMO products
subject to FDA regulation must comply with the same safety standards
as their non-GMO counterparts. Based on the Statement of Policy, the
FDA placed the regulation of GMO foods within the same existing
statutory system that regulates similar products developed using other
methods. The FDA, responsible for food and feed, has the role to ensure
that the crop is safe for human consumption. The Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) is responsible that the crop does not harm the
environment. In addition, the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) makes sure that the crop is safe to grow. The three government
agencies regulate the GMO products within their jurisdiction.
The FDA’s position is that GMO foods must be labeled only if they
differ significantly from their conventional counterparts in a way that
might pose a risk to the consumers. An example given by the FDA is a
GMO tomato with a peanut protein. In this case, consumers that are
allergic to peanuts may not expect tomatoes to contain peanut proteins
exposing them to the risk of consuming allergens.
Contrary to FDA’s position, GMO labeling has received strong sup-
port from the public opinion polls (Wohlers, 2013). Many states have
attempted to make policy changes in favor of GMO food labeling. Map 1
shows the states in which some initiatives in support of GMO labeling
legislation were taken, and in which the legislation passed.
The signing of bill S. 764 in 2016 to require labeling of GMO pro-
ducts should prevent a patchwork system of GMO labeling require-
ments. A preemption section in the bill prohibits individual states from
E. Castellari et al.
Map 1. Food labeling activity in the United States.
Source: Based on “2016 State Labeling Legislation Map” and “GE Food Labeling: States Take Action”, Center for Food Safety (online).
applying their own mandatory GMO labeling laws. The system under S.
764 conflicts with the FDA’s long-held policy that GMOs should not be
labeled. Despite objections by the FDA, the federal government placed
the regulation of GMO labeling in the hands of the USDA.
According to the definition of bioengineering in the US regulation,
labeling rules only apply where the genetic modification cannot
otherwise be obtained through conventional breeding or found in
nature. Unlike the EU regulation, S. 764 does not require labeling of
products such as oil from GMO soybeans or rapeseed, or starches from
GMO maize; these products do not contain (or contain very small
amounts of) DNA.4
2.2. European Union
The European Union regulates GMOs in a three-part GMO reg-
ulatory system (Begley, 2017). The system consists of the 2001 Delib-
erate Release Directive (Directive 2001/18/EC), the Genetically Modified
Food and Feed Regulation (Regulation (EC) 1829/2003), and the Trace-
ability and Labeling Regulation (Regulation (EC) 1830/2003). According
to the Deliberate Release Directive, each new GMO trait submitted for
marketing in the European Union requires a case-by-case environ-
mental risk assessment. This assessment applies to farming as well as
import of GMO products. Until 2015, the directive allowed Member
States to provisionally ban or restrict a GMO on their territory based on
new or additional scientific knowledge regarding a risk to human
health or the environment. After thirteen Member States requested the
Commission to base their decisions also on other reasons than food and
environmental safety, the European Union adopted a new Directive in
4
For a deeper discussion of the S.764 and the controversies regarding the GMO defi-
nition please refer to the paper: Bovay and Alston (this issue) “GMO Food Labels in the
United States: Economic Implications of the New Law”.
3
Food Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
March 2015. The Directive allows EU Member States to demand that
part or all of its territory be exempt from the applications without any
justification or to opt out by restricting or banning GMO cultivation
based on reasoned grounds (e.g., land use, socio-economic reasons,
public policy). The Directive only applies to cultivation but not the
import of GMOs. By October 2015, 19 EU Member States opted out of
GMO crop cultivation (Map 2).
The Genetically Modified Food and Feed Regulation concerns GMOs for
food use, food containing or consisting of GMOs, and food produced
from or containing ingredients produced from GMOs. The regulation
specifies the GMO authorization process for cultivation and import. An
applicant submits an application to the National Competent Authority,
which forwards the application to the European Food Safety Authority
(EFSA). The EFSA publishes its opinion to the public and sends it to the
Commission, which drafts and submits a proposal for granting or re-
fusing an authorization to the Standing Committee. The Commission
adopts the decision if the Standing Committee reaches a qualified ma-
jority in favor of EFSA’s opinion. If the Committee’s decision is different
from the EFSA’s opinion, it must provide a detailed description of the
differences. If the Committee does not reach a favorable opinion, then
the Council of Ministers votes. If the council does not reach a qualified
majority, the commission must adopt the decision within three months.
The market authorization is valid for 10 years (Smart et al., 2015).
The idea of the Traceability and Labeling Regulation is to facilitate the
withdrawal of products whose unforeseen adverse effects on human
health, the environment, or animal health become apparent (European
Union, 2004). It should also ensure accurate information to operators
and consumers to enable them to use their freedom of choice. The
regulation specifies a 0.9 percent “de minimis” threshold of ad-
ventitious presence of EU-approved GMOs.
To avoid demonstrations by anti-GMO activist groups and the risk of
boycotts, manufacturers, and retailers (with a few exceptions) do not
commercially offer products with a GMO label in the European Union
E. Castellari et al.
Map 2. Member States that opted out of GMO crop cultivation.
Source: Based on USDA FAS (2015).
(e.g., Gruere, 2006). The United Kingdom is one of the EU Member
States with some GMO-labeled products (GM Freeze Online, 2017).
Similar to S. 764 in the United States, the EU Genetically Modified
Food and Feed Regulation does not require GMO labeling of livestock
food products, only because animals were fed with GMO feed. The GMO
attribute in livestock products can be considered a process attribute.
Because consumers are unable to distinguish livestock products derived
from GMO and non-GMO feed, several consumer and environmental
groups actively lobbied for labeling these products to give consumers
the freedom of choice. In both the European Union and the United
States, the private sector has implemented non-GMO labeling standards
on a voluntary basis.
3. Incentives for voluntary standards
3.1. Cost minimization
From a buyer-driven perspective, food suppliers can introduce vo-
luntary private standards to reduce procurement transaction costs and
to minimize food safety risks. With the increasingly global procurement
of agri-food supply and the emergence of multinational players (espe-
cially retailers), the purchasing activity is particularly complex when
facing a multitude of heterogeneous suppliers and products. Suppliers
can reduce procurement costs if a large number of them implement the
same standard (Holleran et al., 1999), that is, if they set a collective
voluntary private standard. In doing so, standards are justified in their
collective nature as an open access to enlarge adoption (Giraud-Héraud
et al., 2012b).
Similarly, collective standards represent an ex-ante solution to re-
duce the risk of incurring several types of ex-post costs related to food
safety failures: (1) the costs of reputation loss; (2) the operational costs
4
Food Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
linked to managing food safety failures, and (3) the liability costs. Costs
not only relate to the occurrence of a food safety failure. In fact, in the
non-GMO case, some companies choose to adopt the standard to avoid
appearing in the naming and shaming lists of anti-GMO activists as this
appearance might negatively affect a company’s reputation.
Voluntary public standards can emerge out of similar objectives.
The legislator can set voluntary public standards to create a basis of
minimum requirements for private standards. Furthermore, legislators
can replace private initiative either to speed up the process or to avoid
the presence of too many private standards that can create confusion to
the final consumer and can limit the gains in standardization and
procurement costs as e.g. in Germany (Venus et al., this issue).
3.2. Benefit maximization
While collective voluntary private standards are usually business-to-
business standards and not advertised to consumers, individual volun-
tary private standards generally show a high degree of “visibility” to
consumers (Hammoudi et al., 2015). In the second case, the logic in
setting the standard is mainly a “differentiation” strategy. Effective
differentiation is linked to the process of building a brand and its
equity, which is strictly correlated to a consumer’s loyalty and firm’s
long-term profitability. Firms use food quality attributes to differentiate
their offer and build brand equity. These attributes have for large part
“credence” characteristics (Darby and Karni, 1973), that is, they are not
verifiable by consumers not even after purchase and consumption.
Fitting this domain are attributes such as sustainability, fair trade, non-
GMO, and green labels for which segments of consumers have a higher
willingness to pay.
Labels based on voluntary private standards are often firm-specific
and present unique characteristics, which allow gaining or defending a
E. Castellari et al.
competitive advantage. This uniqueness can depend on individual vo-
luntary private standards. These standards are usually a mix between
company-, product-, or process-specific certified characteristics and
company-selected public or collective voluntary standards. Because
competitive advantage is a dynamic concept, firms need to introduce
new company-specific attributes progressively to sustain differentia-
tion. In fact, public and collective standards will progressively in-
corporate successful individual voluntary private standards leading to a
“standardization of standards.” This standardization happened for non-
safety attributes, such as environmental and employment practices in-
corporated in GLOBAL G.A.P. (Hammoudi et al., 2015).
Voluntary public standards can also have a differentiation purpose,
as is, for example, the case of the already mentioned EU Geographic
Indications or French “Label Rouge.” In this case, the guarantee of the
public authority can be important to consumers to give credibility to
the label. In the United States, for example, Roe and Teisl (2007) find
that consumers viewed FDA-certified claims as most credible. Voluntary
public standards, as Geographical Indications, can also be driven by a
public authority to favor the coordination of different stakeholders in a
territory and provide benefits for its development.
4. Characteristics of the non-GMO voluntary standards
The definition of the non-GMO voluntary standards varies according
to the public legislation and the product category. Voluntary standards
can be set by the public sector (voluntary public standard) or by a
private organization (voluntary private standards). In general, a vo-
luntary public or private non-GMO standard defines rules regarding the
use of GMOs in the process and thresholds on the maximum GMO
content in the final product. These standards usually require that the
food is derived from non-GMO ingredients but can encounter GMOs
along the processing phase (e.g., enzymes produced by GMO bacteria)
or can contain adventitious GMO traces up to a defined threshold. We
can find two different types of non-GMO labeling: (1) plant-based
products obtained from non-GMO ingredients with no GMO traces or
traces below a defined threshold; and (2) livestock products (e.g., meat,
dairy products, eggs) from non-GMO-fed animals. If a livestock product
contains several ingredients, then a combination of the two non-GMO
labeling types emerges.5
Because a large part of the soy and maize that farmer worldwide
grow are genetically modified, it can be challenging to assure the
compliance to the non-GMO feed classification along the whole supply
chain. Soybean and maize supply chains are in many aspects similar in
terms of structure and actors involved (Fig. 1). Both chains include
domestic farmers and international trades at the top and proceeding
downstream, soybean crushers and maize mills, compound feed pro-
ducers, distributors, livestock producers, processors, and retailers.
Compound feed producers often vertically integrate crushers and mills.
Depending on the country, the relevance of domestic and international
production differs; for example, the European Union is largely depen-
dent on soybean and soybean meal imports used as protein feed. For
tracing purposes and transparency, international certifiers are im-
portant within this framework to certify traded non-GMO products.
The different actors need to preserve the identity of the non-GMO
product along the supply chain. Identity preservation costs arise be-
cause the common handling and processing of bulk commodities in-
creases the likelihood of accidental or technically unavoidable GMO
presence (often referred to as adventitious GMO presence). Therefore,
segregation and traceability practices need to be implemented (Smyth
and Phillips, 2002). These practices, and the related coordination me-
chanisms implemented along the supply chain, also translate into a
higher degree of dependency among actors and affect the overall
5
Depending on the specific standards differentiations are possible with respect to the
use of vaccines and feed and food additives.
5
Food Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
Fig. 1. The supply chain for soybean and maize. Arrows indicate the product flow.
governance of the supply chain (Varacca et al., 2014). In general, in-
gredients are classified based on the degree of potential risks of ad-
ventitious presence. Any ingredients that are at risk of containing GMOs
must be tested prior to their use and, after the test, must respect rig-
orous traceability and segregation practices along the supply chain.
Third-party certification bodies check through audits and inspections
the effective segregation between GMO and non-GMO raw materials as
well as the compliance with other product and process required by
retailer standards (Passuello et al., 2015).
Depending on the product, the non-GMO standards define its
characteristics and the production process, including audit and quali-
fication of the actors involved, the handling of the product, its sampling
and control procedures, and the management of non-compliances and
consequent liability. In general, both the supply chain management and
the vertical arrangements are similar across different non-GMO volun-
tary standards; what differs is the strictness of the technical require-
ments and the burden of controls. The standards provide a framework
to assist farmers, processors, and manufacturers in avoiding or reducing
the risk of GMO adventitious presence. However, each voluntary stan-
dard has its own specificities.
In the United States, given the absence of voluntary public stan-
dards, the “Non-GMO verified” project is the most widely applied non-
GMO standard; it is a third-party certifier that ensures the compliance
of some “best practices” for GMO avoidance (The Non-GMO Project,
2016). Since 2005, the multi-stakeholder nonprofit organization “Non-
GMO Project” sets voluntary private standards for labeling products as
non-GMO, following the protocol of the “Non-GMO Project verified”
certification, which defines threshold values in its non-GMO production
standard.6 The project, in alignment with the European Union, allows a
threshold of 0.9 percent of GMO sources in food ingredients to obtain
the non-GMO verification. For certification of livestock products, the
threshold for GMO traces in the feed is 5 percent. However, all parti-
cipants are required to improve continuously in order to get closer to
achieving a final goal of the complete absence of GMO sources (The
Non-GMO Project, 2016). The standards to label a product as non-GMO
are set on a consensus-based document to which many stakeholders and
industry experts have contributed.
In Europe, a harmonized legislation defining “non-GMO”, “GMO-
free” or similar labeling terms does not (yet) exist. Instead, several EU
Member States, as well as Switzerland, have defined different rules and
guidelines for labeling non-GMO products. A European Commission
6
The threshold values are maximum share of GMO content in a particular food or feed
ingredient or seeds, for which action is required. Within the “non-GMO Project verified”
requirements these thresholds are: 0.25 percent for seed and other propagation materials;
0.9 percent for inputs to human food, ingredients, supplements; 5 percent for livestock
feed and supplements, including those used for animal-derived inputs to human food
productions; and 1.5 percent for inputs to packaging, cleaning products, textiles.
E. Castellari et al.
Table 1
Different non-GMO livestock product labeling legislation in Europe.
Facilitating legislation
Countries Austria, Germany, France, Hungary, Croatia*, Greece*, Luxembourg*
Threshold for feed 0.1 or 0.9 percent adventitious presence
Threshold for food 0.1 percent or zero threshold
Feeding Allows GMO feed some period before milking, laying eggs, or slaughtering
Label Wording and/or labeling design is specified and must be used
* These countries are in the preparation process.
report discusses a potential harmonization of non-GMO standards
(European Commission, 2015). Furthermore, the non-profit organiza-
tion “Donau Soja” created a non-GMO standard, which it handed over
to agricultural ministers of 15 countries along the Danube river in
October 2016.7 The standard is based on the labeling guidelines es-
tablished by the Austrian organization for non-GMO food products and
only applies to adopters in a respective country once it gets transposed
into national law. The standard should be the first step to a harmoni-
zation of non-GMO labeling and guide countries that do not have their
own national approaches for non-GMO labeling.
The current EU Member State schemes of countries that have na-
tional voluntary public standards range from legislation that facilitates
non-GMO labeling to legislation that bans labeling altogether; and be-
tween the two extremes, there are legislations that are highly restrictive
(Table 1). Facilitating legislations in Austria, Germany, France, and
recently Hungary define threshold values for adventitious presence of
GMOs. These legislations also allow feeding of GMO feed over some
period before deriving the livestock product. The periods differ by
country and are specific for different animals. Further countries
(Croatia, Greece, and Luxembourg) are preparing similar regulatory
frameworks.
By 2015, 18 EU Member States did not become directly involved in
non-GMO labeling schemes. For example, the Italian government does
not have an official position on non-GMO labeling, leaving Italian re-
gions free to develop their own positions. In Italy, the national ac-
creditation body, Accredia, developed a technical document (RT-11)
defining the minimum requirements for the certification of products
commonly referred to as “non-GMO”8 (Boccaletti et al., 2012).
5. Adoption of non-GMO voluntary standards
5.1. Adoption in the United States
In the United States, in contrast to the principle of substantial
equivalence applied by the FDA, the anti-GMO movement has quickly
grown among several states.9 The main standpoint of the movement is
that consumers have the “right to know” what they are buying and to
voluntarily decide whether to consume GMO foods. The “right to know”
initiatives rose consumer awareness on issues related to GMOs and may
have increased firms’ opportunity costs of not using the non-GMO la-
beling option.
7
These countries are: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Germany (Bavaria, Baden Wuerttemberg), Hungary, Italy (Trentino Alto Adige,
Friuli Venezia Giulia, Veneto, Emilia-Romana, Lombardia, Piemont, Vallée d'Aoste),
Moldova, Poland (Dolnoslaskie, Opolskie, Slaskie, Swietokrzyskie, Podkarpackie,
Malopolske), Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine
(Uschgorod, Tschernowzy, Winniza, Odessa, Lwow, Ternopol, Chmelnizkij, Iwano-
Frankovsm).
8
According to this document, non-GMO food must not contain random traces of ge-
netically modified DNA above 0.1 percent for food compared to the species-specific total
DNA; these values go down to 0.01 percent for seeds and up to 0.9 percent for feed use.
9
Please ref Bain and Dandachi (2014) for a more detailed explanation of how the non-
GMO movement grew in the USA.
6
Food Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
Highly restrictive legislation Prohibitive legislation
The Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland Belgium, Sweden
Zero threshold
Zero threshold
Non-GMO feed during the whole animal lifetime
In the United States, retailers were the first to respond to the poli-
tical debate over GMO labeling. In 2001, Trader Joe’s, owned by the
German retailer Aldi Nord, first introduced a non-GMO private label
line followed, in 2009, by Whole Foods, which quickly became the
largest retailer of non-GMO products, and by Target in 2013 (Bain and
Dandachi, 2014). Some food processors followed the path that retailers
traced and converted their own brands partially or completely to non-
GMO. Greene et al. (2016) show that, since 2010, the adoption of the
“Non-GMO Project verified” label has grown rapidly from less than
1000 products with Universal Product Codes (UPC), to almost 12,500
UPC in 2014. Over half of the non-GMO verified products were also
labeled organic. Even though the USDA already prohibits the use of
GMOs in organic production, some organic producers decided to
highlight the non-GMO characteristic of their product at very low in-
cremental costs.
In 2015, more than 3000 brands and 30,000 items were listed as
compliant with the “non-GMO Project verified” requirements (Table 2).
The market of non-GMO products grew fast, registering an increase of
around $3 billion in annual sales in 2012 to around $5 billion in 2013,
$8.5 billion in 2014 (Genetic Literacy Project, 2017), and $11 billion in
2015 (Greene et al., 2016). In March 2017, almost 44,000 UPC and
3800 items received the non-GMO label under “non-GMO Project ver-
ified” standards (Table 2).
Bain and Dandachi (2014) point out that the growth in non-GMO
products has synergies with consumers increasing interest in organic
and natural products; a market that has increased by 13.5 percent in
2011–2012 and reached $81.3 billion dollars in sales. In 2015, more
than 40 percent of items and brands comply both with the “non-GMO
Project verified” standards and also with an organic certification. In
2017, the share of verified products that also have an organic re-
cognition has dropped to 36.4 percent (Table 2). In 2015, many cate-
gories (such as dairy products, as well as the plant and seeds and baby
food and infant formula categories) had over 70 percent of their pro-
ducts certified, both as non-GMO and organic. Plant and seeds products
labeled both as non-GMO and organic dropped by almost 10 percent
during the period December 2015-March 2017 (from 62.2 percent in
2015 to 52.9 percent in 2017), confirming that over time the market of
non-GMO products is gaining its own independent recognition. To re-
spond to the growing non-GMO food demand, the largest private trader
of grain and other agricultural commodities, Cargill, announced in
March of 2017 that it received Non-GMO Project verification for several
of its supplied food ingredients (Cargill Online, 2017).
Another activity promoted by the “Non-GMO Project” since 2010 is
the “Non-GMO Month”, one of largest in-store outreach campaigns to
draw consumers’ attention to the concerns surrounding GMOs. Many
stores (located in the United States and Canada as well as online stores)
have participated in this campaign during the recent past years.10 Map
3 shows 4050 of non-GMO Project registered retailers located in the
United States. Visually comparing Map 3 with Map 1, we can observe
10
The non-GMO project website list 2030 stores participating to the “Non-GMO
Month” campaign in 2015, 1816 stores in 2016 and 2358 stores already enrolled for the
year 2017 (source www.nongmoproject.org, accessed May 9th 2017).
 E. Castellari et al.

Table 2
Number of products with Universal Product Codes (UPC), and brands compliant with “non-GMO Project Verified” standards by market category at December 2015 and March 2017.
Source: Based on Non-GMO Project-verified data.

Category Number of non-GMO UPC Number of non-GMO UPC also % non-GMO UPC with organic Number of non-GMO Number of brands with at least one % of brands with at least one UPC also
labeled organic label brands UPC also labeled organic labeled organic

2015 2017 2015 2017 2015 2017 2015 2017 2015 2017 2015 2017

Alternative Dairy Products 774 822 199 232 25.7% 28.2% 50 55 19 25 38.0% 45.5%
Baby Food and Infant Formula 499 695 359 486 71.9% 69.9% 16 29 12 21 75.0% 72.4%
Beverages 2712 4274 1486 2133 54.8% 49.9% 240 335 141 178 58.8% 53.1%
Body Care Products 579 744 176 255 30.4% 34.3% 36 45 14 21 38.9% 46.7%
Bread and Baked Goods 1246 2489 314 436 25.2% 17.5% 142 202 47 62 33.1% 30.7%
Candy, Chocolate, Desserts, and 2222 3202 1032 1397 46.4% 43.6% 210 283 120 153 57.1% 54.1%
Sweeten
Cereal and Breakfast Foods 1516 1776 701 769 46.2% 43.3% 146 168 59 70 40.4% 41.7%
Condiments, Oils, Dressings, 2867 4347 1140 1513 39.8% 34.8% 345 475 163 208 47.2% 43.8%
and Spread
Dairy Products 292 470 211 314 72.3% 66.8% 18 31 14 19 77.8% 61.3%

7
Fruits and Vegetables 2811 4095 1112 1388 39.6% 33.9% 247 339 109 137 44.1% 40.4%
General 42 22 16 7 38.1% 31.8% 20 15 7 5 35.0% 33.3%
Grains, Beans, and Flour 2379 3155 1061 1193 44.6% 37.8% 234 310 110 130 47.0% 41.9%
Herbs, Spices, and Other 1987 2901 1130 1283 56.9% 44.2% 108 153 48 55 44.4% 35.9%
Ingredients
Meat, Fish, and Eggs 783 1236 312 374 39.8% 30.3% 83 117 33 33 39.8% 28.2%
Mercantile 76 94 0 13 0.0% 13.8% 7 11 0 4 0.0% 36.4%
Packaged and Frozen Meals 356 457 156 223 43.8% 48.8% 59 63 26 28 44.1% 44.4%
Pasta 851 1299 279 328 32.8% 25.3% 68 95 29 37 42.6% 38.9%
Pet Products 92 168 43 67 46.7% 39.9% 13 19 8 9 61.5% 47.4%
Planting Seed and Animal Feed 212 429 160 254 75.5% 59.2% 28 49 17 27 60.7% 55.1%
Snack Foods and Bars 4256 6312 1361 1838 32.0% 29.1% 375 531 160 204 42.7% 38.4%
Soups and Sauces 458 565 204 257 44.5% 45.5% 64 85 27 34 42.2% 40.0%
Spirits, Wine, and Beer 82 121 51 64 62.2% 52.9% 13 22 7 13 53.8% 59.1%
Tofu, Tempeh, and Alternative 330 440 120 136 36.4% 30.9% 36 41 17 22 47.2% 53.7%
Meat Prod
Vitamins and Supplements 1420 1993 379 580 26.7% 29.1% 103 134 53 61 51.5% 45.5%
Wholesale Ingredients 703 1823 179 456 25.5% 25.0% 100 189 39 68 39.0% 36.0%

Total 29,545 43,929 12,181 15,996 41.2% 36.4% 2761 3796 1279 1624 46.3% 42.8%
Food Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
E. Castellari et al.
Map 3. Stores registered in the non-GMO Project in the United States (N = 4050).
Source: Our elaboration on data collected from www.nongmoproject.org.
how the stores’ activities of the Non-GMO Project are higher in states,
where initiatives in favor of mandatory GMO labeling were promoted.
This comparison may indicate that NGO and consumers’ movements, as
well as the political debate, are driving incentives to offer non-GMO
labeled products.
In the last decade, the Non-GMO Project had a strategic role in
coordinating stakeholders’ actions to respond to a growing interest in
non-GMO certified products. During these years of action, the role of
the nonprofit organization received support from retailers and manu-
facturers that have strategically decided to invest in this growing
market. Besides certification and membership fees, donations and
grants that the Non-GMO Project receives increased from around
$78,000 in 2007 to $575,698 in 2013.11
While the non-GMO Project is the major player on product ver-
ification, other options became available in 2015. The federal admin-
istration has proposed a fee-based product verification process, handled
by the USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) with the assistance
of a qualified AMS auditor (Greene et al., 2016). Moreover, since 2015,
also the NSF International organization,12 incorporating elements from
the European Union’s and Vermont’s GMO labeling requirements,
launched the “NSF Non-GMO True North Program” to offer non-GMO
certification for intermediate and retail products (Greene et al., 2016).
5.2. Adoption in the European Union
In the European Union, the national legislation specifies minimum
requirements that a firm has to follow when labeling products as non-
GMO. Based on these minimum requirements, voluntary private stan-
dards can be defined to operationalize the national legislation by, for
11
Self-reported at www.guidestar.org according to IRS form 990 tax returns reported
income.
12
The Public Health and Safety Organization, http://www.nsf.org/.
8
Food Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
example, defining clear certification, monitoring, and control rules.
These voluntary private standards are developed, for example, by multi-
stakeholder associations (e.g., in Germany) comprising retailers, pro-
cessors, farmers, consumers, and consumer and environmental non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Also, in the EU Member States
that do not have national legislation (e.g., the UK, Slovenia, the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Spain) some retailers developed their own vo-
luntary private standards (Moses and Brookes, 2013).13
Labeling is not always the goal. Some companies label their pro-
ducts as non-GMO whereas others adopt a non-GMO strategy without
labeling. Several private organizations in Member States with or
without national legislation require from their suppliers not to use any
GMO inputs.
In Austria, the Ministry of Health implemented a Directive in 1998
for defining non-GMO production (Federal Ministry of Austria, 2010)
shortly after 1.2 million people signed a referendum against the use of
GMOs in food and feed (Seifert, 2002). Also in 1998, Germany im-
plemented its first voluntary public standards as part of its regulation
on novel food. While the Austrian standard facilitates non-GMO la-
beling, the German standard was very strict and made it difficult and
very expensive to implement. In 2008, non-GMO labeling in Germany
became part of the federal law on genetic engineering and now, similar
to the Austrian regulatory framework, facilitates non-GMO labeling. In
France, non-GMO labeling is regulated in the Decree by the Ministry of
Economics, Finance, and Industry (2012–128) and has been in force
since July 2012. Also, South Tyrol covers non-GMO labeling by law.
The latest EU Member State that implemented a facilitating non-GMO
voluntary public standard was Hungary. In 2015, 3.5 percent of new
13
After Brexit UK might decide to diversify GMO regulation from the rest of EU. In a
parliamentary answer of October 21st 2016 the minister of agriculture in charge George
Eustice has declared that the government will consider a revision of regulations sur-
rounding genetically modified crops after UK leaves EU.
E. Castellari et al. Food Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx

Table 3
Number of dairy and animal-based products, companies, and brands compliant with “non-GMO” standard in Austria, year 2017.
Source: Based on ARGE Online (2017).

Category Number of non-GMO labeled products Number of companies Number of brands Share of non-GMO labeled organic

Butter 2 2 2 50%
Cheese 426 16 55 19%
Dairy products 473 15 41 22%
Milk 112 16 36 21%
Eggs 122 18 25 40%
Fish frozen 1 1 1 100%
Meat 218 11 19 24%
Sausage products 107 8 9 32%
Others 866 51 83 79%

Total 2325 55 147 44%

product launches in Germany and 2.4 percent in Italy had a non-GMO
claim.
The non-GMO labeling standards in Austria and Germany are well
established and the organizations that are responsible for the issuing of
a non-GMO standard in those countries list all registered companies and
products. Table 3 and 4 report the data of Austria and Germany, re-
spectively. In both countries, livestock products play the major role for
non-GMO labeling.
Comparing Tables 3 and 4 with Table 2, where the expansion of
non-GMO products in the United States is presented, we can notice how
the label “organic” in the European Union is more distinct from the
“non-GMO” one. The share of non-GMO labeled products that also have
an organic label is higher in the US than in Austria and Germany.
Moreover, within Europe, in Austria we observe higher product shares
of non-GMO labeled organic products than in Germany.
For 2014, ProTerra and DanubeSoya estimate the consumption of
non-GMO soy in Europe at approximately 5 million metric tons dis-
tributed as follows: Germany with 1 million tons, Italy with 0.8 million
tons, France with 0.7 million tons, and Scandinavian countries with
0.75 million tons (Peter and Krug, 2016).
6. Discussion
While the GMO regulatory frameworks in the European Union and
United States had different starting points and followed different paths,
today, they have several important similarities, which suggest that the
two markets are experiencing an apparent convergence towards similar
solutions. The first similarity is that both regions allow a GMO in the
food system only if it has received approval to be safe for human and
animal consumption as well as for the environment if the authorization
pertains to cultivation. However, there are differences to what con-
stitutes and requires approval as a GMO as well as what those re-
quirements are (Smart et al., 2017). For both the United States and the
European Union, a zero threshold applies for GMOs that do not have an
approval. Earlier this year, for example, the European Union had to
withdraw GMO petunias, although not a food crop, from the market as
these plants have no approval for the EU or for the US market
(Malakoff, 2017).
A second similarity is that both regions introduced mandatory la-
beling. While the introduction in the European Union was in the early
2000s, it just recently was in the United States. One of the reasons for
the earlier introduction in the European Union is that the EU Member
States that asked for mandatory labeling had the legislative power to
block the approval of GMOs for import, processing, and cultivation,
while the federal US states did not have this power (Wesseler and
Kalaitzandonakes, 2011). In the United States, the driving force was the
possibility of different standards being introduced at state level with the
fear of compromising domestic trade. The federal government in-
tervened by introducing a nationwide mandatory labeling legislation.
Detailed specifications of the standards for the US legislation are still
missing. One of the missing specifications is, for example, a threshold
level for adventitious GMO presence in unlabeled food. In the European
Union, a threshold level of 0.9 percent threshold level applies for food.
An alignment of the US threshold to the EU threshold might be a rea-
sonable expectation as this would facilitate trade (Felbermayr et al.,
2013). However, as long as asynchronous approval exists, that is, as
long as the GM events that are approved in the European Union differ to
the events approved in the United States, the alignment would not fa-
cilitate trade to the full extent possible. Using a general zero threshold
level for mandatory labeling would likely result in labeling of most food
products as GMO, because US farmers widely plant GM crops and
manufacturers widely use GMOs in food production.
A third similarity is that both the EU and the US market exclude
products derived with GMOs from mandatory labeling. Examples are
products derived with GMO bacteria or GMO yeast cells. These bacteria
or cells are often part of the food production process for bread or

Table 4
Number of dairy and animal-based products, companies, and brands compliant with “non-GMO” standard in Germany, year 2017.
Source: Based on VLOG Online (2017).

Category Number of non-GMO products Number of companies Number of brands Share of non-GMO labeled organic

Beef 24 7 7 0%
Cheese 471 36 91 1%
Chevon and Lamb 2 1 1 0%
Dairy products 1007 57 155 9%
Eggs 349 99 132 0%
Poultry 1333 14 62 0%
Sausage products 121 11 10 12%
Pork 58 6 5 0%
Others 848 68 83 10%

Total 4503 266 467 8%

9
E. Castellari et al.
cheeses. Similarly, animal products derived from animals fed with GMO
feed do not fall within the scope of the EU and US mandatory labeling
schemes. In both regions, an increasing number of retailers list non-
GMO labeled animal products such as eggs, fresh milk, cheese, and
meat. At present, the non-GMO standards are heterogeneous in the
European Union. While some EU Member States prohibit non-GMO
labeling, others facilitate the implementation of public voluntary
standards, and some others did not get directly involved in non-GMO
labeling schemes. In the United States, the private sector Non-GMO
Project introduced a nationwide “Non-GMO verified” standard in 2007,
which is now one of several non-GMO labeling standards. The revenue
generated with Non-GMO Project verified products made about 0.4
percent of the total food sales revenue in 2012. However, the revenue
more than tripled from 2012 until 2014 in the United States. The initial
driving forces are in both regions NGOs prompting restaurants, retail
chains, and food producers to eschew GMOs in food products. Some
private sector entities implemented the label for reputation purposes
and because a non-GMO label allows product differentiation to generate
additional profits, in particular for those selling the final product (e.g.,
retailers). However, whether the products differentiation merely re-
distributes rents to producers or consumers are really better of knowing
the ingredients is still an open question which can be tackled by future
research.
A fourth similarity is that in both regions, private standards for non-
GMO labeling have emerged in parallel. From about the mid of the
2000s, food producers, retailers, and chain restaurants started to ad-
vertise non-GMO products. A recognizable market for those products
emerged from about 2010 onwards in both regions.
There are some notable differences with respect to the current la-
beling schemes. The US legislation offers food producers more flexibility
allowing them to disclose GMOs in barcodes. In the European Union, a
label on the package or product must clearly state the presence of GMOs.
Another difference to the EU regulation is that some products derived
from GMOs such as soybean oil derived from GMO soybeans or sugar
derived from GMO sugar beets currently do not fall within the scope of
the US labeling legislation. The US legislation also exempts restaurants.
In the European Union, most major retailers announced not to list
GMO-labeled food products, while in the United States, this has been
limited (so far) to retailers specialized in selling mainly organic food
products. An announcement to eschew GMOs would be more difficult
for non-specialized US food retailers considering the wide use of GMO
crops for maize, soybeans, and oilseed rape in the United States.
We expect that the non-GMO market will further grow in the
coming years. In particular, products will enter that already comply
with the non-GMO standards but are not labeled as such. In the
European Union products may enter this market that follow a non-GMO
supply chain strategy already, for example, products produced under
the three EU-wide quality logos: protected designation of origin (PDO),
protected geographical indication (PGI), and traditional specialty
guaranteed (TSG). The economic advantage of those products is that the
production process is already well documented and certified and hence,
additional costs for a non-GMO label are relatively low.
We also expect that the non-GMO standards within the European
Union and between the European Union and the United States will
further converge to increases the potential market size and facilitate
trade. The GLOBALG.A.P. standard developed similarly to the non-GMO
standards; it started as an initiative by medium-sized retailers in the
European Union and became an international private voluntary stan-
dard. Further, for internationally operating food companies using har-
monized standards allows to benefit from the collective private stan-
dards in different markets since consumers as well as lobby groups seem
to care more about the label to eschew GMO crops than the specific
characteristics. More generally, the labeling debate focuses more on the
political economic implications than on the science aspects, as GMOs
are similar to organic products in that they are a political construct
(Herring and Paarlberg, 2016).
10
Food Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
7. Policy implications
Aside from the impacts on the direct trade of labeled final products,
the developments of GMO production and usage have also potential
impacts for international trade in agricultural commodities. The most
widely planted GMO crops (soybeans, maize, and cotton) are mainly
used as feed for livestock production or as feedstock for industry rather
than as food. For example, 94 percent of soybeans and 92 percent of
corn in the United States were genetically modified in 2015, and ap-
proximately 98 percent of soybean meal goes to animal feed, and 88
percent of corn is used either for animal feed or as industrial feedstock
(mainly ethanol) (Zilberman et al., 2015; Herring and Paarlberg, 2016).
In the European Union, cultivation plays a less important role, because
Bt maize made up only 1.51 percent of total EU maize production in
2015 and was almost entirely cultivated in Spain. However, the Eur-
opean Union imports around 65 percent of the consumed soybean meal,
mostly from Brazil and Argentina where, respectively, 91 and 99 per-
cent of total soybean cultivation is GMO. If the market for non-GMO
labeled products increases, demand for non-GMO feed will also in-
crease. This will be particularly important for the soybean market with
its large imports to the European Union and its high share of herbicide-
resistant GMO soybeans. This development offers opportunities for
herbicide-resistant soybeans that are not categorized as GMO.
An increasing non-GMO market will also have implications on co-
existence between GMO and non-GMO products because most GMO
crops are used as feed for livestock production. A larger non-GMO
market may increase economies of scale of non-GMO supply chains and
certification systems, and hence, lower the costs of segregating non-
GMO from GMO products. However, a growing market may also lead to
further challenges of coexistence at farm-level in the United States and
also in the European Union if it authorizes further GMO crops for cul-
tivation. Coexistence costs highly depend on the defined coexistence
requirements and strict measures can significantly increase costs for
cultivating GMO crops (Venus et al., 2016). Since the non-GMO attri-
bute cannot be identified with tests based on the PCR-method (Varacca
and Soregaroli, 2016), a certification system must cover the whole
supply chain and is mainly based on documentation (Venus et al., this
issue).
The larger market implications will depend on the regulation of
crops derived by various new genetic modification techniques (e.g.,
CRISPR\Cas9). These techniques are often referred to as new plant
breeding techniques (NPBTs) (e.g., Lusser and Davies, 2013).14 The
current regulatory system is binary: GMO or not. Because a range of
NPBTs exists, one could think of several categories of regulation instead
of the binary system. However, it is likely that there will be a whole
continuum of NPBTs in the future, and many categories would make the
regulatory system complex. Furthermore, if the United States regulated
NPBTs differently than the European Union, then the trade implications
could be substantial. Some environmental organizations claim that the
industry can strategically use NPBTs to avoid GMO regulation (Pollack,
2015). These organizations have positioned themselves against the use
of NPBTs and favor regulating them as GMOs (Sprink et al., 2016).
Hence, even if NPBTs will not fall within the scope of GMO regulation,
it is possible that consumers and environmental organizations will ad-
vocate labeling of non-GMO products, including products derived from
NPBTs. Such a labeling system would require careful documentation
because the NPBT attribute (similar to the GMO attribute after GM feed
is processed into a livestock product) is a process attribute that cannot
be traced through identification tests. NPBTs will challenge the identity
preservation systems, including coexistence issues at the farm level
because some NPBTs only introduce minimal changes to the genome of
14
Main categories of NPBTs are site-specific mutagenesis, cisgenesis and intragenesis,
breeding with transgenic inducer line, grafting techniques, and agro-infiltration techni-
ques.
E. Castellari et al.
the plant, and currently available tests cannot distinguish these changes
from naturally occurring mutations. Identification would require the
use of specific markers and would require costly monitoring of firms’
application of these markers. Nevertheless, experiences with other
credence goods, such as organic food products, seem to make the supply
of non-GMO products under these growing challenges possible only if
the demand is sufficiently high to cover the potentially increasing costs
of non-GMO certification.
Finally, besides the possibility of regulating NPBTs as a GMO or not,
regulators in the European Union can change the complete regulatory
system from a process-based system to a strictly product-based system,
such as in Canada.15 Under this alternative framework, which is often
considered more scientifically-based and effective (Marchant and
Stevens, 2015), a product trait needs approval only if it differs from
what already exists on the market, that is, if it is novel. This evaluation
is independent of the technique. Hence, if the new traits were achieved
through conventional breeding, the authorization process would be the
same as if the trait were achieved through, for example, mutagenesis,
transgenesis, or cross-breeding (Marchant and Stevens, 2015). In the
presence of product-based GMO regulation, traceability measures
would not be required, and hence, it would probably not be possible for
firms to exclude materials derived by NPBTs at reasonable costs, since
these crops cannot be identified through product testing. In that case,
the use of mandatory GMO labeling and private, voluntary non-GMO
labeling to differentiate products from the GMO counterpart would
become part of the past and with them the related coexistence, segre-
gation, and identity preservation requirements.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Marcello Graziano for his great help on
producing the maps of the article and give a special thanks to Neha
Paliwal for her help on editing the manuscript. The Non-GMO Project is
acknowledged for providing the Product Code Spreadsheet. The
Authors are also thankful to the anonymous referees for their comments
which have helped to improve the manuscript. Authors are responsible
for any remaining errors. This research did not receive any specific
grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit
sectors.
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