1. SARMIENTO v. MISON (G.R. No.

79974, December 17, 1987)

FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino appointed Salvador Mison as Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs, in 1987, without the approval from the Commission On
Appointment (COA).
The Court allowed the Commission on Appointments to intervene and file
a petition in intervention. The petitioners note that under the Constitution, the
appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the confirmation from
COA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment made by the President needs
confirmation from the Commission on Appointment.

RULING:
No, it did not need confirmation from the Commission on Appointment.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution shows that the president, with
confirmation from the Commission On Appointment, can appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
In the case at bar, the supreme court has mentioned the instances
wherein no such approval is needed from the COA and appointments are solely
done by the president; 1.) All other Officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law; 2.) Those whom the President
may be authorized by law to appoint; and 3.) Officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

2. FRANCISCO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (G.R. NO. 160261,

NOVEMBER 10, 2003)

FACTS:
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes." This complaint, however was dismissed.
 On October 23, 2003, Representative Gilbert Teodoro and Felix
Fuentabella filed a new impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et.
al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred by the Constitution.

RULING:
Yes, the second impeachment complaint is barred by the Constitution.
Under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution: No impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.
In the case at bar, it is concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice,
the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

3. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (G.R. NO.

202242, JULY 17, 2012)
FACTS:
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
was substantially altered. An eighth member was added to the JBC as the two
(2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with
each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate
and the House of Representatives one full vote each from thereon.
Following the unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on
May 29, 2012 and in the process of selecting nominees of the vacant seat, it was
raised to the court's attention that Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) holding a seat within the JBC
counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Chaves questions the appointement of two members of the Congress within JBC.
That the composition of the JBC providing for three ex-officio members is
purposely designed for a balanced representation of each of the three branches
of the government, therefore they cannot conduct valid proceedings as its
composition is illegal and unconstitutional.
The respondents counter that petitioner has no "real interest" in questioning the
constitutionality of the JBC’s current composition because his name is not in the
official list of applicants for the post.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of
judicial review have been met in this case; and

2. Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with
eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to
the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

First Issue: Yes, the conditions have been met. The petitioner has personal stake
over the issue, as he seeks judicial intervention as a taxpayer, a concerned
citizen and a nominee to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. As a
taxpayer, petitioner invokes his right to demand that the taxes he and the rest of
the citizenry have been paying to the government are spent for lawful purposes.
The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an
object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who
have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
Second Issue: Yes, it is unconstitutional.
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with
one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other
members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit.

J. ABAD DISSENTING OPINION:

In his dissenting opinion, he states that it is logical to conclude that each should
also have the right to cast one full vote in its deliberations.
Indeed, to insist that only one member of Congress from either the Senate or the
House of Representatives should sit at any time in the JBC, is to ignore the fact
that they are still separate and distinct from each other although they are both
involved in law-making. Both legislators are elected differently, maintain separate
administrative organizations, and deliberate on laws independently. In fact,
neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives can by itself claim to
represent the Congress.

4. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (G.R. NO.

202242, APRIL 16, 2013)
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly opposed by
the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner).
Following the unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on
May 29, 2012 and in the process of selecting nominees of the vacant seat, it was
raised to the court's attention that Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) holding a seat within the JBC
counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
The respondents argue that allowing only one representative from Congress in
the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the current practice of having eight (8) members of the JBC, two
(2) of whom are members of Congress, is unconstitutional.

RULING:
Yes, it is unconstitutional. Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of
the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of
the private sector.
In the case at bar, it is explicit and specific that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a
representative." Thus, two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the
number of JBC members to eight (8), a number beyond what the Constitution
has contemplated.
To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount
to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the provision as
enacted.

5. ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL V

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (G.R. No. 191618, November 23,
2010)

FACTS:
This is an undesignated petition filed by Atty. Macalintal, that questions the
constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and
unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Macalintal highlights the decision in Buac v. COMELEC which peripherally
declared that "contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, in the exercise of quasi-judicial
power."

ISSUES:
Whether the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional for
being a violation of Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.

RULING:
No, it is not a violation. Section 4, Article VII states that the Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Therefore the Supreme Court's power to judge presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, as well as the rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary
and sole power ought to be without intervention by the legislative department.
Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution reads: The Members of the Supreme
Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with
latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the
exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial
power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the
whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the
PET and the Supreme Court.

6. GREGORIO AGLIPAY V. JUAN RUIZ (G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937)

FACTS:
In May, 1936, Ruiz (Director of Posts) announced that postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third
international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church
would be issued. Aglipay protested, stating that doing so would violate section
23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, where in there
should also be a separation of church and state.

ISSUE:
Whether or not issuing and selling of the stamps is unconstitutional.

RULING:
No, the stamps are constitutional. Section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of
any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the
postage stamps in question with no religious purpose in view. The only purpose
in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract
more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of
an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people"
7. ALEJANDRO ESTRADA V. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR(A.M. NO. P-02-1651,
AUGUST 4, 2003)

Escritor, who entered the judiciary in 1999, claimed to be a widow when her
husband died in 1998. She started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the
benefit of marriage and their union produced a son. She is a member of the
religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Her partner's legal spouse was
still alive but had separated. She and Quilapao executed a "Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness" thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within
the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.
This document was witnessed, signed and
recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.
Only couples who have been baptized and in good standing may execute the
Declaration, which requires the approval of the elders of the congregation.
In July 27, 2000, Estrada filed a request an investigation against Escritor as he
believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the
court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Escritor should be found guilty of the administrative charge of
"gross and immoral conduct."

RULING:
No, Escritor is not administrively liable. In line with this issue, it is important to
note right to religious freedom. There is no doubt that choosing between keeping
her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on
the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice
and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion. She
appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely using
the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality.
She did not secure the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the
moral standards are strict and defined, much less only after an administrative
case for immorality was filed against her.
The Solicitor General, however, is ordered to intervene in the case where it will
be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of
respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the
state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice;
and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the
least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA V. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR(A.M. NO. P-02-1651,

JUNE 22, 2006)

Escritor, who entered the judiciary in 1999, claimed to be a widow when her
husband died in 1998. She started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the
benefit of marriage and their union produced a son. She is a member of the
religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Her partner's legal spouse was
still alive but had separated. She and Quilapao executed a "Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness" thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within
the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.
This document was witnessed, signed and
recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.
Only couples who have been baptized and in good standing may execute the
Declaration, which requires the approval of the elders of the congregation.
In July 27, 2000, Estrada filed a request an investigation against Escritor as he
believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the
court.
A decision in August 4, 2003 remanded the case to Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), and ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
whether in resolving claims involving religious freedom, it is the compelling state
interest test, the strictest test, which must be applied.

ISSUE:
Whether the evidence adduced by the State proves its more compelling interest.

RULING:
The Solicitor General utterly failed to prove this element of compelling interest.
It also failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests since our Constitution adheres to the benevolent
neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause.
Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a
case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of
religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that
freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious
exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an
authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must
be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will
also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest
exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

JAMES M. IMBONG v. PAQUITO N. OCHOA (GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014)

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on
December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the
Court, claiming that it violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to health
and the right to protection against hazardous products, and to religious freedom,
equal protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.
It also claims to violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing
the one subject-one title rule. That the said law in concealing the true goal - to act
as a population control measure.

ISSUE:
Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.

RULING:
No, it is not unconstitutional. The law seeks to provide access to medically-safe,
non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare
services, methods, devices, and supplies. Philippine modem society leaves
enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant
and open-minded that the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be
trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve.

9. GAMBOA VS TEVES (G.R. NO. 176579 JUNE 28, 2011)

FACTS:
In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American
company. sold 26 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to
Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC).
Later on, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) became the owner of 111,415 shares of
stock of PTIC.
In 1986, the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered by
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The 111,415 PTIC
shares, which represent about 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of
PTIC, were later declared by this Court to be owned by the Republic of the
Philippines.
In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered, Hong Kong-based investment firm,
acquired the remaining 54 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC.
In 2007, First Pacific entered into a Conditional Sale and Purchase Agreement of
the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of
PTIC.
Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale resulted to First Pacific's
sharehaloding to increase to 37%, thereby increasing the common
shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent.
Gamboa contends that the constitution limits foreign ownership of the capital of a
public utility to not more than 40%.
A motion for reconsideration was filed after the court ruled in favor of Gamboa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court made an erroneous interpretation of the term "capital" in
its 2011 decision?

RULING:
No, it was not erroneous. The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the
development of an economy "effectively controlled" by Filipinos. As stated in the
Foreign Investments Act of 1991 at least 60 percent of whose capital with voting
rights belongs to Filipinos.