Are moral properties natural properties?

I will argue that is the case for moral properties. This is because, as I intend to show, moral situations
cannot happen in a vacuum, there exist no set moral law that applies universally across all moral
situations that is unchanging. Yet, certain actions are morally right, certain actions morally wrong.
This can only be observed empirically, similarly to properties of nature. Thus, moral properties are
natural properties.

In order to show evidence for this claim, I first have to show that moral properties in actuality exist.
However, since showing moral realism as true would require at the very least a second essay, I will
proceed as if it was shown.

My strategy is as follows: I will first lay down an inductive case for moral naturalism by showing
elements in which the two are similar. First, ways in which deductive process in natural science and
in moral philosophy are similar by their methods and limitations. Thirdly, I will show how knowledge
of both moral and natural properties is iterative. Each of those reasons individually is at best a weak
reason for accepting moral naturalism, but their conjunction is inductively strong – showing how will
be a subject of the final section. This positive case deals primarily with Shafer-Landau’s objection that
moral philosophy, as insufficiently scientific, cannot be assumed to generate natural truths the same
way other natural and social sciences do.

What are natural properties? Under my conception of them, a natural property is a true property
that is observable and can be extrapolated from observations of the real world, while impossible to
intuit in vacuum. An example is existence of gravity – assuming the world exists, it is true that there
exists a mechanism by which objects fall and do not float in the presence of large objects. Humans
have extrapolated from those observations a theory of what gravity is, how it proliferates across
space and what general patterns does it have. This, in my view, is remarkably similar to the process
by which ethical theories arise. Ethical considerations cannot be made vacuously – it depends on the
observation of life first, then of intelligence. In a same way that gravity wouldn’t be under
consideration vacuously, in the absence of objects large enough to cause it to reveal itself, so cannot
morality of a non-existent situation be theorised successfully. Consider, for example, a world without
poverty, a necessary hypothetical as defined by Brownley and Stemplowska. Thought experiments
with a necessary hypothetical can yield results, but those results will not be sufficient to create a
truth-approximating moral theory in the absence of reality to draw from. The full breadth of
considerations necessary for an ethical theory will not be available without observation, which will
bind us to make fundamental errors in any ethical consideration of such a necessary hypothetical.
This is analogous to errors in the theory of gravity. A lack of capacity to observe galaxies far from ours
in detail led us to err in our classification of rules for gravity in large objects. There is a similarly
robust moral property underlying a society without poverty, yet by our lack of observational capacity
we are unable to observe it, only extrapolate from our current understanding of the world. This
shows that methodologically, moral philosophy and even a science as systematic as physics face
similar limitations.

As for methodological procedures, moral philosophy is distinct from other kinds of scientific
enquiries, but sufficiently similar to keep it in the realm of scientific enquiry. A standard method of
enquiry in the natural sciences focuses entirely on empirical tools and experimentation, with analysis
used only after data has been created. This is not the case with some of the social sciences Shafer-
Landau highlighted as sufficiently scientific, such as anthropology. A standard convention in
anthropology is to evaluate a claim about reality through both analysis (for example, analysis of real
systems that created such and such features of a culture in question) and experimentation
(particularly interviews). In moral philosophy, a similar structure is often present. Interviews and
samples, as well as thought experiments, allow to verify the robustness of a moral claim at hand. An
example of this would be the exploration of morality of killing versus letting die, exemplified by
various cases of the trolley problem, initially coined by Foot. While most of the responses were
analytic and focused on testing the cases through thought experiments rather than through subject
interviews, some research focused on testing the generally held intuition on the subject. Shafer-
Landau discounts intuitions as methods of scientific enquiry, but scientific enquiry can use analysis in
the same way more robust moral philosophy does. While undoubtedly intuition does figure in
philosophical enquiries, it is deployed to simplify an otherwise intractable problem. An example of
this is the initial formulation of the Trolley problem by Philippa Foot. Yes, it relied on intuition to
show why doctrine of double effect applied in her case. But this intuition was subjected to rigorous
real world analysis in further enquiries into the problem. Intuition is a shorthand tool for establishing
moral right, whereas analysis, combined with experimentation, is the primary tool used in especially
contentious problems. It is similar to how we consider F=ma to be a law of nature, despite the fact it
is entirely false – it is a shorthand. Below it there are layers upon layers of analysis and
experimentation that show the exact mechanisms by which it appears to us that F=ma, and why it is
more useful to accept that as true without getting too bogged down by the intricacies of the analysis.
Moral philosophy follows a similar process, allowing me to reject the intuition objection.

Iterative functions of natural science is clear to all who dabbled into it in any depth. Before relativity,
classical mechanics was accepted in physics. In biology, theory of evolution follows a colourful bunch
of other theories that were accepted before it. This is because while natural properties are real, the
limitations described in my first consideration makes them unknowable. Sciences are an exercise in
distilling the truth further, with no way to know for sure what is and what isn’t right, relying on
approximations. Same goes with moral philosophy. The work of Mill couldn’t happen without the
work of Aristotle, as one laid the groundwork for utilitarianism and the other expanded it into the
theory we know today. No moral philosopher can state: “this ethical conundrum has been solved”
and be correct in saying that. There is bound to be insights in the future which will upset this case,
even if the case is shown to be true beyond reasonable doubt, in a same way that F=ma was
considered an iron law of cosmos, and was later overturned. However, it is still possible to falsify
results in moral philosophy in the same way it is done in natural sciences.

Where moral studies and natural/social sciences most differ is how systematic those systems are
about the claims they make. Enquiry into physics accepts certain ground rules with much more
systematic consensus. For example, no influential physicist denies the roundness of the earth, or
builds physical systems with the presumption that the universe is contracting at a steady rate of 10
mph. At first glance, philosophy appears to be different. Moral anti-realism, for instance, could be
considered a claim as incompatible with the rest of moral philosophy as flat earth is with physics. This
is true, but our observed reality right now isn’t sufficient to falsify the strong arguments in favour of
it beyond reasonable doubt. There are issues which have been settled, however, proving that claims
within moral philosophy can be falsified through observation of the natural environment. One such
claim would be a claim of most colonialist thinkers, that there exist races and peoples inferior and
people’s superior. This idea has been thoroughly discredited, using analysis of the real world,
showing that there is not a grain of truth in those erroneous claims. This shows that with sufficient
data, claims can be falsified the same way physical claims can.

One possible reason why there is much more common thought among physicists than there is among
philosophers is the complexity of the subjects. Physics, while a complex science, is analysing the
bottom level of existence – things that are as simple as they come. Moral philosophy, before it
reaches the stage of becoming moral philosophy, has to go through magnitudes of complexity. Basic
forces and particles combine for compounds and substances in chemistry. Chemicals create life in
biology. Complex life with brains can be analysed through experimental psychology. Most features of
morality are social, so the next loop of complexity is sociology. There is an iterative hierarchy of
complexity throughout the sciences, which means that at each successive step it is harder to
systematically falsify claims than on the previous level. Biologists are in much less agreement about
the basics than physicists, yet biological properties are obviously natural properties. No one
discounts the natural properties analyzed by sociology. I would argue that no matter how far
removed a science is from first principles and physics, if it follows an analogous scientific method, it
can be seen as science, generating claims on natural properties.

A strong objection to my case would be demonstrating that there is a point where being removed
from first principles makes knowledge exploration not a science. Schafer-Landau asserts this is the
case for moral philosophy, however he does not show the mechanism by which this becomes the
case, nor does he show it beyond reasonable doubt. I will nonetheless attempt to dispel this
objection, using a counterfactual.

Suppose there is a point at which science ceases to be science. There are two possible reasons why
this is the case: either that this is the case in actuality independent of what the people involved think,
or that it is the case through opinions. The second line of argument can be countered easily – if it is
opinion that make a discipline scientific or unscientific, then this has no bearing on whether or not
being scientific makes the properties it explores natural or not. Thus, we need only consider the first
line of argument.

If we were to construe a real condition on what makes a discipline scientific, showing it as falsifiable
and having its claims verifiable experimentally would be, in my judgement, sufficient to see that
discipline as scientific. I have shown in the earlier section how moral philosophy is falsifiable. I also
shown the methodological considerations permit for experimental verification, even if it’s not in the
same way experiments work in, for instance physics. I also shown some other side-pieces, helpful for
establishing this case, like for example the iterative nature of moral philosophy. Thus, I believe, moral
philosophy does not fall outside of this border. It can be considered a science. And thus, its claims are
natural claims, not only scientific but also developing over time the way we expand our knowledge in
other departments.

From this I conclude that moral properties can be interpreted as natural properties. The question
asks whether or not they are identical. Under the interpretation provided throughout this essay, I
feel the case is strong enough to go for the highly unintuitive answer and say: yes. Yes they are.
There are real facts of the world that correspond to moral properties, that are identical to them, and
that can be discovered through moral philosophy.

Readings referenced and used:

‘Trapped in an Experience Machine with a Famous Violinist' (with Kimberley Brownlee), Adrian Blau
(ed), Research Methods in Analytical Political Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2017
Shafer-Landau, Russ (2003). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press.