THEADOPTIONOF EXPORTAS ANINNOVATIVE

STRATEGY
WOO-YOUNG LEE*
Sugang University,Seoul, Korea
JOHNJ. BRASCH**
Universityof Nebraska,Lincoln

Abstract. This research identifies a typical formof the exporting adoption process regarding
two dimensions-the initiating force and the rationality of the export adoption process. It
was hypothesized, first, for this study that, in the export innovation adoption situation, the
adoption process would be initiated more often by internallyperceived problems or needs
ratherthan by the passively received informationabout the innovation: exporting. A second
major hypothesis took the view that the export adoption process was more rational than
nonrational. Third,using various instruments-including Hage and Aiken's index-we meas-
ured the organizational structural characteristics of 35 Nebraska exporting manufacturers.
The innovation-orientedand nonrational export adoption processes proved to be the more
common in this group.

* This article reports on a study of the innovation adoption process in industrial firms INTRODUCTION
and deals with the adoption of a marketing strategy-that is, a decision to adopt a
strategy of export. Exporting is treated here as an innovation. Thirty-fivesmall Nebraska
exporting manufacturers were approached to determine if their decision process in
adopting an export extension to their marketing program was: rational or nonrational; a
response to a problem or opportunity or a response to outside information; and if
descriptive variables-such as age, size, etc.-were at all relevant. This work is differ-
ent from prior studies both of the innovation diffusion process and of exporting because
it brings diffusion theory to bear on a centuries old marketing strategy-exporting-
which is being rediscovered by many U.S. manufacturers.

There has been one prior study which viewed the export adoption process from the RELATED
perspective of diffusion of innovation theory. That study, done by Simmonds and Smith EXPORT
in Great Britain, was essentially exploratory, and was based on an examination of nine RESEARCH
companies that had begun exporting between 1960 and the time of the research (ca.
1967).1 Although there was no statistical analysis on which to base conclusions, the
researchers suggested that the stimulus to begin exporting was likely to originate
outside of the firm-i.e., as the result of efforts by change agents. A primarypurpose of
our research was to look more closely at the initiating force for exporting.
Bilkey and Tesar have recently developed a model of the export development process.2
In that model management is either not exporting, filling unsolicited export orders, or
exploring the feasibility of exporting in stages one through three. The critical stage is
stage four when the firm begins to export (in the model, on an experimental basis)
because at this stage a company has decided implicitly or explicitly to make a commit-

* ProfessorWoo YoungLee is a professorof marketingat Sugang Universityin Seoul, Korea.He

was formerlyon the faculty of NorthernMichiganUniversity.ProfessorLee received his Ph.D.
degree inInternational Marketingat the Universityof Nebraska-Lincoln,He is active inresearchin
the area of promotionas well as internationalbusiness.
** JohnJ. Braschis a professorof business administration atthe Universityof Nebraska-Lincoln
where is is responsible forinternationalbusiness programs.Dr.Braschreceived his Doctoratein
Business Administration fromWashingtonUniversity-St. Louis.A past presidentof the Midwest
International TradeAssociation,he is currentlya memberof the DistrictExportExpansionCouncil
(of the U.S. Departmentof Commerce)and is active inactual exportmanagementas a consultant
to several Nebraska companies. Dr. Brasch has published in a numberof export related areas,
specifically in trade creditand sales forecasting. 85

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 ment to exporting.Fromthe perspective of the innovationdiffusionprocess this stage
can be regarded as "adoption."
In this articlethe focus is on the processes leading up to adoption, in particularthe
processes thatwouldoccur in stage three (e.g., exploringthe feasibility)of the Bilkey-
Tesar model, and the initiatingforce forthis thirdstage.
The research inthis articlealso relatesto a recent exportmodel publishedby Johanson
and Vahlne.3Thatmodel attemptsto explainhowand why a firmwillincrease its foreign
market commitment. The model assumes various levels of incremental corporate
commitmentto a particularmarket,and to foreign marketsin general. Consistentwith
the Johanson-Vahlnemodel is a view thatthe adoptionof export is a decision to make
an initialinternationalcommitmentfor many firms.Repeatedly in the Johanson-Vahlne
workthere is reference to an assumption that decisions to make a commitmentare
initiatedeither by knowledge of problems or awareness of opportunities.4Inthe re-
search presented in this article, one of the majorfindings is the relativelygreater
importance of awareness of opportunitiesfor innovation-ratherthan the analysis of
problems-as an initiatingforce in exportadoption.

RELATED INNO- It was not untilthe early 1960s that marketingemerged as an additionalinnovation
VATIONDIFFU- diffusionresearch discipline.5Since thenthe great preponderanceof diffusionresearch
SIONRESEARCH within marketinghas focused on individualconsumers, whereas organizations and
enterprises as potentialinnovationadopters have been largelyignored.According to
John A. Czepiel, the question of how innovationsare diffused in an organizationalor
corporatesituationis stillunanswered.6
Existing industrialinnovationdiffusionstudies, althoughthey are limitedin number,
share certain characteristics. First,these studies were done mainlyby economists,
particularlyduring the 1950s and early 1960s. They have taken the view that the
diffusionof innovationsamong industrialfirmsis the functionof the economic advan-
tage of the innovation and the economic situation of the potential adopters.7
Noneconomic factors possibly relatedto innovationdiffusion,therefore,have failedto
receive research attention.Second, economists have been concerned almost exclu-
sively withtechnological innovationswhichmightreduce costs, ifadopted.8Innovations
such as new services, new marketingstrategies, and new marketopportunitieshave
seldom been researched. Third,the majorityof innovationstudies done in industrial
settings have focused on the correlationsbetween earlyadoptionand selected organi-
zationalcharacteristics.9Finally,althoughthe typicalinnovationadoptionprocess of the
business organizationwas present in all studies, it has not been explored in its own
right.

THEPROBLEM The purpose ofthis study was to explore a typicalformof the exportinnovationadoption
process as used by business firms.The specific questions which providedthe primary
focus forthis study were:
(1) Wouldan export adoption process be initiatedtypicallyby problemperception
(problem-orientedadoption process or POAP)?Or, would it be typicallyinitiatedby
awareness of the innovation(innovation-orientedadoptionprocess or IOAP)?
(2) Is the exportadoption decision process rational(RAP)or nonrational(NRAP)?
(3) Are there any discernible differences in organizationalattributesbetween firms
86 using differentformsof adoptionprocess?
Priorresearch has implicitlyrecognized the decision-making dichotomies that have EXPORT
been stated inthe firsttwo problems listed.Thatis, a firmcan decide to begin to export RATIONALE
because it recognizes a corporateneed thatcan be met.Thereafter,managementfinds
out moreabout exportingfromoutside sources. The initiatingforce, however,is internal
to the firm.Companiesmay also be stimulatedto consider exportingby some activityor
event that originatesoutside of the firm.U.S. Departmentof Commerce programsare
such potentialstimulants,as are the programsof DistrictExportExpansionCouncils,
and localtradeclubs. Unsolicitedorders also are representativeof such outside events
that stimulateaction on the part of a company. To date those who have sought to
encourage exporting have hoped that outside stimulationwould be effective; that is,
that export decisions are likelyto be "innovation-oriented"
ratherthan "problem-orient-
ed." This research tests that assumption.
Because adopting an exportstrategy is a potentiallycostly decision, rationalityon the
part of corporationsas they begin to export has been assumed. This assumption is
particularlyapparent in the availabilityof advice frombanks, consultants, the Depart-
ment of Commerce, state departments of economic development, and others. But,
while it is implicitlyassumed, rationalityon the part of corporations as they enter
exportingis not necessarily intellectuallyaccepted by those who encourage the adop-
tion of an exportstrategy. Thereare too many instances of companies enteringexport
on almostan impulsivebasis, withouttakingadvantage of free and lowcost assistance
that could save time and money. This research looks empiricallyat the question of
rationalityvs. nonrationalityin the exportdecision-makingprocess.

Among innovationresearchers, ithas been widelyaccepted untilrecentlythatdiffusion DIFFUSION

OF
of an innovationis the resultof social interactionbetween knowersand non-knowersof INNOVATION
the innovation.10Therefore,at a micro level, a potentialadopter always receives the THEORY
initialinformationabout the innovationfrom an external source and thus the social RATIONALE
relationshipbetween two parties has a criticalimpact on the adoptionprocess. Social
contact is the basis for awareness and traditionalthought on innovationadoption
processes-i.e., that innovationis always initiatedby awareness. Inaddition,innovation
researchersalso have sharedthe notionthatthe decision-makingprocess of an innova-
tion adoption is rationalbecause it involves careful considerationof alternativesand
consequences, as evidenced by the decision stage termed "evaluation."
These views of rationalityand awareness initiationhave been challenged recentlyby
Rex Campbell.11According to the new view, the adoption process can be initiated
either by knowledge of the innovationthathas been received passively, or on the other
hand, by social contact, resultinginthe traditionalawareness sequence. An innovation
adoptiondecision-makingprocess can also be eitherrationalor nonrational.
Given Campbell's view, what then would be the more common formof the export
adoption process? Would it be predominantlyrationalor nonrational?Would it be
awareness-initiatedor problem-initiated?
There is some research evidence withinthe marketingdiscipline fromwhichthe major
is a dominantcharacteristicof an exportadop-
hypothesis (i.e., that problem-initiation
tion process) was developed. This research evidence, which suggests that problem-
initiatedadoption in industrialfirms may be very important,includes: (1) formalized
search for a performancegap or problemwiththe aid of such tools as planningand
control;12(2) the consistency of a problem-orientedadoption process;13(3) lack of
interactionamong industrymembers, thereforeminimizingchances forgetting informa-
tionfroman externalsource;14and (4) the factthatthe exportidea, whichwas employed
in this study as an innovation,is not revolutionarilynew, thus resulting in a limited
exposure by wordof mouth.15
87
 HYPOTHESESThe followinghypotheses were formulatedfor testing:

1. Amongexportadopting firms,the POAPis more common thanthe IOAP.

2. Among exportadopting firms,the RAPis more common than the NRAP.
3. Thereare differencesbetween the POAPfirmsand the IOAPfirms,and between the
RAPfirmsand the NRAPfirmsintermsof the size and the age of the firms,characteris-
tics of the decision group members, and theirperceptionof the business environment.
The followingalternativeadoption processes have been hypothesized to exist:
(1) Problem-orientedadoptionprocess (POAP). An adoptionprocess in whichthe
initiatingforce is one or a combination of interrelatedproblems such as: mature
product, increased competitionwithinthe domestic market,decreasing sales or profit,
definitedesire formarketexpansion based on a long-termcorporateexpansion plan, or
other comparable problems or needs as perceived by one or more of the decision-
makers.
(2) Innovation-oriented adoptionprocess (IOAP). An adoptionprocess inwhichthe
initiatingforce is eitherprecise knowledge of the existence of a marketopportunityin a
foreign marketforthe brandor product,or gaining technical knowledge of exporting.
The informationon the existence of the marketopportunityor exporttechnique may be
passively received from other firms, governmentalagencies, banks, middlemen, or
potentialbuyers in foreign countries.
(3) Rationaladoption process (RAP). An adoption process in which the decision-
makersuse a widervarietyof moreauthoritativesources of information; bothutilizeand
value planning and deliberation;keep more complete records; and give specific and
economically sound justificationsfor taking action.
(4) Nonrationaladoptionprocess (NRAP). An adoptionprocess forwhichthe deci-
sion-makersuse less authoritativeand less varied sources of information;keep less
complete records;neitheruse norvalue much planningor deliberation;and do notor
cannot give economically sound justificationsforactions taken.

OF The followingdefinitionswere given to the key terms:

DEFINITION
TERMS
Exporting. Exporting is the process of marketingto foreign countries other than
Canada. Exportdistributioncan be made (1) throughan exportrepresentative(such as
a combinationexport management firm)or other types of agents to which the firmin
questiondelegates foreignsales responsibility,(2) by dealingdirectlywithcustomersin
a foreigncountry,or (3) by sellingthrougha merchantmiddlemanwho buys forhis own
account and exports at least a partof his purchases. Forthis study,only alternatives(1)
and (2) were considered as export sales, since under alternative(3) clearly defined
management responsibilityfor exports is sometimes not created.
Adoptionof exporting.Adoptionof exportingis an organized decision to make use of
export sales as an integralpartof the marketingstrategy.Exportingis considered to be
adopted when a manufacturerboth attitudinallyand behaviorallycommits itself to
export sales. A mechanical response to an orderfroma foreignbuyer,therefore,may
not constitutean adoption of exporting unless the firmdemonstratesthe evidence of
attitudinaland behavioralcommitmentto it.
Adoptionprocess. The exportadoptionprocess is a discernibleand organized deci-
sion process which includes a series of subdecisions made towardthe assignment of
the responsibilityforthe exportoperation.
88
This study was based on the data collected from35 Nebraska-based manufacturing PROCEDURE
exporters.Researchersof export decision groups have oftenbeen plagued withcertain
operationaldifficulties.First,itwas difficultto locate the decision participants.Second,
even ifthe decision participantswere identified,itwas not easy to determinethe extent
to which each participantcontributedto the overalldecision outcome. Inthe present
study the president of each company was asked to identifythe actualdecision partici-
pants ratherthan arbitrarilytakingtop levelexecutives as the decision participants.The
second difficulty,however, remainedunsolved. Two criteriawere established for the
presidents to help them select respondents withinthe firm:(1) the respondent had
participatedin the exportadoption decision; and (2) the respondent was a high-level
officerwhen the exportadoptiondecision was made by the firm.The largest numberof
decision-makersin a firmwas five. In23 firms,or 66 percent, the export decision was
made by one executive member, indicatingthe overallsmall size of the sample firms.
On the average, the sample firmshad 1.4 export decision-makers.
A questionnaireto be filledout by the presidents was mailedto each of the firmsthat
had, by phone conversation, indicated their willingness to cooperate. We included
questions concerning the firm'sdemographic status; questionsdesigned to identifythe
initiatingforce in the adoptionprocess; questions developed to determinethe level of
rationality;and a question asking the identityof the decision group members. Later,a
questionnairewas mailedto each export decision participantidentifiedby the presi-
dent. Itcontainedquestionsdesigned to measurethe characteristicsof: (1) the decision
group members, (2) the organizationalstructure,and (3) the organizationalenviron-
ment.
Informationon the choice of the export adoption process by individualfirms was
obtained by asking the respondentto select, fromtwo general decision processes, the
one which most nearly represented that of his firmwhen it initiallymade the export
adoption decision. The followingdescriptions were offered:
1. We heard of the existence of a potentialforeignmarket,or we learnedof how-
to-exporttechniques orof exportopportunities.Later,furtherinformationabout
a particularmarketor marketsforour productwas collected. Along the way,
export responsibilitybecame assigned, or it was recognized that exporting
was a collective responsibility.
2. Forsome reason (such as increased competitioninthe existingmarket;maturi-
ty of product; excess productioncapacity; long-termcorporate expansion
plan;surpluscapital;or, change in management),we perceived needs forthe
development of new markets.Later,whilewe were examiningthe alternative
solutions,we determinedthat developing a foreign marketwas a viable one.
Then, someone was given the responsibilityfor developing the international
opportunity,or itwas recognized thatexportingwas a collective responsibility.
By using the fourdimensionsof rationalitysuggested by Dean, Aurback,and Marsh,16
the authors developed a rationalitymeasurement index. The index was originally
composed of nine questions, of which five were open-ended and fourwere multiple
forced-choice type. Thisquestionnairewas pretested, using five exportingmanufactur-
ers representingvariousindustries.Followingthe pretesting,response categories were
developed forthe open-ended questions. Each of the nine questions reflected one or
more of four rationalitydimensions. The rationalityweights were assigned to each
response by a panel of judges that consisted of such exportingspecialists as an
internationalbanker,a foreignfreightforwarder,a state industrialexportconsultant,and
a local universityresearch staff member.

89
 IMPLICATIONS Ingeneral, the two majorhypotheses regardingthe importanceof the POAPand NRAP
OF FINDINGS were substantiated by this study, whereas most of the organizationalcharacteristics
investigatedwere foundto be unrelatedwiththe formsof exportadoptionprocess. This
may be an indicationthatthe choice of a particularformof adoptionprocess is specific
to the factorsotherthanthe characteristicsof a firm.Forinstance, it may be specific to
the innovationsto be adopted. We have summarizedourfindingsand theirimplications
in the followingdiscussion.

Hypothesis 1 Among exportadopting firms,the POAPis more common than the IOAP.Twenty-four
firmsidentifiedtheiradoptionprocess as being innovation-oriented,and therewere 11
firmswhose adoption process was found to be problem-oriented.The value of chi-
square computed was 4.83. This was significant at the .007 level. Contraryto the
research hypothesis, IOAPwas a significantlymorecommonformof exportingadoption
process than POAPamong Nebraskamanufacturers.This may have been due to the
availabilityof various change agents (governmentagencies, banks, and other export
agencies), since formalinterfirmcommunicationwas apparentlyrareinthe sample. On
the informallevel there may have been some interfirmcommunicationabout exporting,
butsuch informationwouldlikelyhave had source credibilityproblems.Ona local basis
it wouldalmost always have had to come froman executive in a differentindustry,and
because most local exporters have not been highly successful, informaltalks about
exporting would probably not be motivational.Change agents have been active in
Nebraskaand theirworkseems to have resultedina high incidence of the innovation-
oriented adoptionprocess.

EXHIBIT 1
RelativePopularityBetween IOAPand POAP
IOAP POAP X2 df prob.
No. of firms 24 11 4.83 1 .007

The high proportionof IOAPfirmsis encouragingto those whoseek to gain new interest
in exportingthroughthe use of programsthat provide awareness about international
marketingopportunities and operating procedures to nonexportingmanufacturers.
Althoughcertainlynotall companies thatbecome awareof exportare responsive to the
new information,it does have a tangible impact on the majorityof new exporters in
being the adoptioninitiatingforce.
But whereas new informationabout exporting was the initiatingforce for an export
commitmentin24 outof 35 firmsinthe sample, a substantialminorityof exportingfirms
initiallyconsidered export for reasons that were apparentlyindependent of outside
influence.Thevariousexportpromotionagencies cannot hope to have much influence
in firmswhich make decisions in a similarfashion in the future.

Hypothesis 2 Amongexportadoptingfirms,theRAPismorecommonthanthe NRAP.Thefourjudges

were asked to rate the adoption process of each sample company on a seven-point
scale; one being extremely nonrationaland seven being extremely rational.Their
judgment was made on the basis of nine pieces of evidence shown on the rationality
index (the actions takenorthe subdecisions made towardthe exportingadoption).The
fourjudges' scores were averaged fora company rationalityscore. An exportadoption
process which was rated higher than four was considered to be rationaland an
90 adoptionprocess thatreceived a score lowerthanfourwas considered to be nonration-
al. No company received a rationalityscore of exactly four.Throughthis process, the
adoptionprocesses for24 firmswere determinedto be nonrational,whereas therewere
11 firmswhose adoptionprocesses were foundto be rational.

EXHIBIT
2
RelativePopularityBetween RAPand NRAP
RAP NRAP X2 df prob.
No. of firms 11 24 4.83 1 .007

Thevalue of chi-squarecomputed was 4.83. Thiswas significantatthe .007 level. Itwas

concluded that NRAPwas significantlymore common than RAP among Nebraska
manufacturers.
Because the proportionof innovation-orientedadoption process to problem-oriented
adoptionprocess firmswas the same as the proportionof nonrationaladoptionprocess
firmsto rationaladoptionprocess firms,a test was runto see iftherewas a high levelof
correlationbetween the two measures. To the contrary,no significantrelationshipwas
found.
Inorderfora decision process to be perfectlyrationalthere mustbe the existence of a
clearlydefined goal and the selection of one ora set of alternativesthatpromiseto meet
the goal inthe mostefficientmanneras determinedby some formof thoughtfulanalysis.
To the extent that most new exporters followed a nonrationaldecision process, in
varyingdegrees they did not consult with expert authorities;they did notcollect much
informationin either a quantitativeor qualitative sense; and they had only vague
justificationsfor getting themselves involvedin exporting.Thisis unsettlinginformation.
Ifthe export entry process is more frequentlynonrationalamong firmsthat qualifyas
exporters, one would thinkthat it is even higheramong those who have triedand later
withdrawneitherbecause of outrightfailure,or because it turnedout to be a different
type of experience than had been hoped.
Johanson and Vahlnestate that "establishmentand performanceof a certainkindof
operationor activity. .. requirebothgeneralknowledge and [withrespect to a specific
country]market-specificknowledge."17When making an export decision and having
minimallevels of knowledge of export opportunities,procedures, and alternatives,
manycompanies are apparentlynot takingadvantage of free and lowcost information
availablefromthe manyexport assistance agencies. Theremay be several reasons to
explainwhy some firmsmay move ahead withoutmuch rationalanalysis. Forinstance,
sample firmsin this study were small.Tothe extentthatthe export decision was made
primarilyby an entrepreneurialtype of president(the decision was infact made by only
the president in 23 firms),there may not have been extensive time availablebefore a
decision had to be made. There may have been a naive attractionto the romance of
foreign business thatresisted carefulanalysis. Theremay also have been naive accept-
ance of export agency assertions that, "the marketis out there."On the other hand,
research conducted by Simpson foundthat managementmaysimplyhave a beliefthat
exportingis a good thingto do, regardless of the particularcontributionthatitmay make
to the firm.18Any one of these reasons could be sufficientin itselfto explainwhy the
majorityof firmsintheirresearch adopted exportingas an activityunderwhathas been
termed a nonrationaldecision process.

Thereare differences between the POAPfirmsand the IOAPfirms,and between the Hypothesis3
RAPfirmsand the NRAPfirmsin termsof the size and the age of the firms,characteris-
tics of the decision group members, and theirperception of the business enviornment.
Results indicated that there was a significant difference in age between innovation-
oriented adoption process firms and problem-orientedadoption process firms. 91
 Companies thathad adopted exportingthroughthe innovation-orientedadoptionproc-
ess were decidedly younger. Thetwo groups were very much homogeneous intermsof
the size of the companies, the characteristicsof the decision group members, and the
perceived characteristicsof the environment.Differences between rationaladoption
process firmsand nonrationaladoptionprocess firmswere found in the perceptionof
the overallbusiness environment.The overallbusiness environmentis a constructthat
was developed from general attitudescales on two environmentalquestions: the do-
mestic business environmentand the foreign marketenvironment.

CONCLUSIONSNearlyone-third(31 percent) of the firmsunder investigationwere problem-orientedin

adopting an exportstrategy. Itwas interestingto note thatthe ratioof problem-oriented
firmswas very close to thatof an innovationdiffusionstudy by Reynolds.19Inhis study,
the problem-orientedadoption process was used by 30 percent of his sample. Italso
matches closely the 3:6 ratiofound in the Simmonds and Smith export study.20The
results of these three studies support Campbell'sparadigm(see Note 11) in thatfor
about one-thirdof respondents the traditionalassumption of awareness at the starting
point of the adoption process is an incompleteconceptualization,Notall exporting is
dependent on change agents. Onthe otherhand,thereis now convincingevidence that
change agents are criticalin about two-thirdsof exportadoption decisions.
The presentstudy resultsalso stronglysupportedCampbell'ssuggestion regardingthe
importanceof the nonrationaladoptionprocess. Nearly70 percent of the firmsrespond-
ing used the nonrationaladoption process in making an export decision. Although
nonrationalaspects of the organizationaldecision process have often been observed,
the dominance of the nonrationaladoptionprocess as found in the present study was
quite contradictoryto the belief shared by many that industrialdecision making is
essentially rational.Butthe magnitudeof these findingsis possibly affected by the small
size of an average Nebraska firm.A typical Nebraska exporter is fairlysmall and is
basically a familyoperation.Fora firmof this type, concepts likean informationsystem,
planning, and controlling,which are facilitatorsof rationaldecision making,might be
inconceivable luxuries. Further,the economic advantage of exporting is difficultto
calculate for an exportadopting firm.Perhaps this difficultyalso helps to explainwhy
this study found a predominanceof nonrationaladoption behavior.
The size and the age of the firms,characteristicsof decision groups, and environmental
attributeswere investigated to see if these variablesdifferentiatedthe IOAPfirmsfrom
the POAPfirmsand the RAPfirmsfromthe NRAPfirmsin the adoption of export.The
company age was foundto be a good indicatorof choice between the IOAPand the
POAP,whereas it was not so for the choice between the RAPand the NRAP.Itwas
foundthatthe IOAPfirmswere significantlyyoungerthanthe POAPfirms.Itseemed that
at an earlier stage of the company life cycle, business firmstend to be active in new
social interactionsand in informationseeking. The level of overallbusiness uncertainty
or risk,as perceived by the management, must be highduringthis stage, whereas the
company is often handicapped by a limitedinternalsupply of the large amount of
informationwithwhichthe management may reduce the uncertaintyor risk.
Perceived export risk, which mightotherwisebe a majornegative consideration,may
just be part of a general riskconditionwhichthe new firmhas learnedto livewith.This
may be why younger firmsare not only more innovativein general, but also why their
export adoption processes are more often initiatedby externallyreceived information
about exportingratherthan by internallyperceived problems.
The firms investigated perceived thatthe level of competitionat the time of exporting
adoption was relativelyhigh, but their perception of change agents and the overall
environmentwas relativelyfavorable. In the related literature,there has been less
agreement among studies regarding these environmentalvariables. In the present
study the RAPfirms perceived their overall environmentdifferentlyfromtheir NRAP
92 counterparts.
This study had several limitations. Primary among these is that it was limited in geo- LIMITATIONS
graphic scope to one state, Nebraska. The Nebraska manufacturers from which the
sample was drawn are nearly all under $50 million in sales with the vast majorityhaving
sales no greater than $5 million. It is not possible to generalize the export-related
findings to other geographic areas.
The ability to generalize the findings of this study is also limited to the extent that this
study considered only one innovation: exporting. But exporting is unusual as an innova-
tion in that the idea is not totally foreign to the average businessman. It is also unusual
because the idea of exporting is an intangible idea rather than an object. Unlike an
industrial product, it may be difficult to determine the exact impact of export adoption,
and a personalized and specialized informationsource such as an industrial salesman
is not available in export adoption. The firms, therefore, that are considering export
adoption often have to take the burden of collecting and personalizing the information.
While this study obtained a high rate of response, the absolute number of exporters
studied was only 35 since there were not many qualified sample firms that met the
criteria set for this study. For any specified difference between means and any signifi-
cance level, the type IIerror is a function of sample size. Inother words, the smaller the
sample, the greater the possibility of accepting a null hypothesis when it is, in fact, false.

1. KennethSimmondsand Helen Smith,"TheFirstExportOrder:A MarketingInnovation,"British FOOTNOTES

Journalof Marketing,Summer1968, pp. 93-100.
2. WarrenBilkeyand George Tesar, "TheExportBehaviorof SmallerWisconsinManufacturing
Firms,"Journalof InternationalBusiness Studies, Spring/Summer1977, pp. 93-98.
3. Jan Johansonand Jan-ErikVahlne,"TheInternationalization Process of the Firm-A Modelof
KnowledgeDevelopmentand IncreasingForeignMarketCommitments,"Journalof International
Business Studies, Spring/Summer1977, pp. 23-32.
4. Ibid.,p. 27.
5. EverettM. Rogers and FloydShoemaker, Communicationof Innovation(New York:The Free
Press, 1971), p. 68.
6. John A. Czepiel, "TheDiffusionof MajorTechnological Innovationin a Complex Industrial
Community:An Analysisof Social Processes in the AmericanSteel Industry"(Ph.D. dissertation,
NorthwesternUniversity,1972), p. 3.
7. See, forexample, EdwinMansfield,TheEconomicsof TechnologicalChange (NewYork:W.W.
Norton,1968).
8. C.F.Carterand B.R.William,"TheCharacteristicsof TechnicallyProgressiveFirms,"Journalof
IndustrialEconomics 7 (March1959), pp. 87-104; EdwinMansfield,"TechnicalChange and Rate
of Innovation,"Econometrica29 (October 1961), pp. 741-66; Jacob Schmookler,Inventionand
EconomicGrowth(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, 1966).
9. Carterand William,"TheCharacteristicsof TechnicallyProgressive Firms";Mansfield,"The
Speed of Response of Firmsto New Techniques,"QuarterlyJournalof Economy77 (May1963),
pp. 290-311.
10. EverettM. Rogers, Communicationof Innovations(New York:The Free Press, 1962), pp.
305-7.
11. Rex R. Campbell,"ASuggested Paradigmof the IndividualAdoptionProcess," RuralSociolo-
gy 31 (December 1966), pp. 458-66.
12. AnthonyDowns, Inside Bureaucracy(Boston:Little,Brownand Company,1966), p. 191.
13. James F. Engel, DavidD. Kollat,and RogerD. Blackwell,ConsumerBehavior(New York:Holt,
Rinehartand Winston,Inc., 1973), p. 216.
14. FrederickE. Webster,Jr.,"Informal Communicationin IndustrialMarkets,"Journalof Market-
ing Research 7 (May1970), pp. 186-9.
15. FrederickE. Webster,Jr., MarketingCommunications:ModernPromotionalStrategy (New
York:RonaldPress, 1971), p. 115.
16. AlfredDean, HerbertA. Aurback,and C. PaulMarsh,"SomeFactorsRelatedto Rationalityin
Decision MakingAmong FarmOperators,"RuralSociology 23 (1958), pp. 121-35.
17. Johanson and Vahlne,"TheInternationalization Process of the Firm,"p. 28.
18. C.L.Simpson, "TheExportDecision:AnInterviewStudyofthe DecisionProcess inTennessee
ManufacturingFirms"(Ph.D.dissertation,Georgia State University,Atlanta,Georgia, 1973).
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